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THECASEOFTHEMISSINGMATERIALRIGHTS
INRONALDDWORKINSLEGALTHEORY
LarrySager

BACKGROUND

Formanyyears,whenpressedtofindanyspacebetweenhisviewsaboutpolitical
moralityandhisviewsaboutconstitutionallaw,RonaldDworkinhasinvoked
material(orinsomeconceptualvocabularies,social)rightsasaninstanceofan
importantelementofpoliticalmoralitythatdontmakeitswayintoconstitutional
law.IthasalwaysbeensomethingofamysterywhyDworkin,withhisgenerous
viewofconstitutionalcontent,andcommitmenttoamodeofconstitutional
interpretationthathasalwayswelcomedsignificantguidancefromtheworldof
politicaljustice,isinclinedtoorphanmaterialrights.

Notlongago,hereatNYULaw,inasmallpublicgathering,IpressedDworkinforan
explanation.Iofferedhimasmallmenuofpossibleexplanationsalongwithreasons
whyIthoughttheywereinsufficient.Attheendofthemenu,IprofferedwhatI
thoughtofasapoisonpill:Youcouldbelievethatlawonlycomesfromcourts,and
thatcourtsarepoorlysituatedtoenforcematerialrights.Tothesurpriseofmany
ofuspresent,Dworkinpromptlygraspedtheithastocomefromcourtsposition.
And,inthelastmomentsofthemanuscriptofhismostmostrecent,integratedand
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magisterialwork,JusticeforHedgehogs,Dworkinrepeatsthatstartlingclaim,aclaim
forwhichIfeelatleastpartiallyresponsible.Mysenseofresponsibilitynodoubt
seemsegocentric,butIdowanttomakethispointinmydefense:Askinghimself
whataretheconsequencesoflawbeingtheexclusiveproductofcourts,Dworkin
singlesoutaanaccountofconstitutionaljusticethatiscloselyidentifiedwithmy
workingeneral,and,inparticular,myargumentsfortheviewthatmaterialrights
areapartofourconstitutionaltradition.Thataccountcentersonatheideathata
conscientiousconstitutionalcourtwillonsomeoccasionsunderenforceprovisions
oftheconstitutioninthefaceofinstitutionalbarrierstofullenforcement.
Underenforcement,Dworkinargues,cantsurviveconceptuallyinaworldwhere
lawstartsandstopswiththeeffortsofthecourts.

IhaveneverfailedtolearnfromDworkinswork,oftenmostdeeplywhenI
disagreedwithit.ItisinthatspiritthatIsetouttorescuematerialrights,
underenforcement,andperhapsDworkinhimself.

MATERIALRIGHTS,UNDERENFORCEMENT,ANDTHEADJUDICATIONTHESIS.

Dworkinsunwillingnesstoletmaterialrightsintoconstitutionallawmightbelocal
andcontingent.Itmightbelocalinthesensethatheismerelyprofferingan
interpretationoftherunofconstitutionaldecisionsintheUnitedStatesoverthe
courseoftime,notmakingaclaimaboutotherconstitutionsandconstitutional
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traditions;anditmightbecontingentintherelatedsense,that,ifpersuadedthat
thebestinterpretationofdecisionsintheUnitedStatesinfactincludedsomerole
formaterialrights,hewouldrevisehisview.

ThelatterquestionisonethatIhavewrittenaboutatsomelength.Ihaveargued
thatthereisaratherlongstringofmodernconstitutionalcasesaboutadozenor
soatmostrecentcountthatarequiteoddinvariousconceptualways;thatthese
casesarelinkedbythecircumstancethattheyallinvolvegovernmentalwithholding
ofmaterialbenefitsofthesortthatwewouldbelikelytoincludeamong
constitutionallyguaranteedmaterialrights;andthattheoddityofeachofthese
casescanbeeffacedifwepositthatAmericansdohaveaconstitutionalrightto
thesebenefits.Further,Ihavearguedthattheconstitutionaljudiciarysuffers
certaininstitutionallimitationswhenitaddressesdenialsoftheserights.More
abouttheseinstitutionallimitationsanon.Forthemoment,letmejustcompletethe
argument:WhiletheseinstitutionallimitationspreventtheAmericanjudiciaryfrom
assumingtheroleofprimaryenforceroftheserights,itcananddoesinfactassume
theroleofsecondaryenforcer,insistingfirst,thatfairproceduresattachtothe
selectivewithholdingofthesebenefits;andsecond,thatthattherebeamorally
convincingjustificationfortheselectivewithholdingofthesebenefits.

AsfarasIknow,beforeJusticeforHedgehogs,Dworkinneverconsideredthe
possibilitythattherearejudiciallyunderenforcedmaterialrightsintheAmerican
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constitutionaltradition.Ononeortwooccasions,hemadefleetingreferencetothe
ideaofjudicialunderenforcement;hispositionwassomewherebetweenagnostic
andfavorable,butmaterialrightswereneverbroached.Inanyevent,itispretty
clearthatnow,inJusticeforHedgehogs,thedisagreementbetweenDworkinandthe
underenforcement/materialrightsviewisneitherlocalnorcontingent.Itisfar
deeperthanthat.

Dworkinnowarguesthatlawisabranchof,orembeddedwithin,politicaljustice,
andthattherearebothsubstantiveandaproceduraldimensionsthatdistinguish
lawfromtheremainingbodyofpoliticaljustice.Thesubstantivedimensionoflaw
insiststhatinlawsdomainitisappropriatetoclaimthatbothrulersandcitizens
haveobligationsthatfollowdistinctlyfromtheexerciseofpoliticalpowerinthe
past,andthatthesefreshobligationscanexpandon,contradictandsupersedethe
obligationsthattheywouldhavehadwerethathistorydifferent.Inturn,the
proceduraldimensionoflawinsiststhatlawmustissuefromanappropriately
designatedadjudicativebody,fromabodychargedwithrespondingtoindividuals
demandsforthattowhichthelawentitlesthemgiveortake,fromacourt.Over
theyears,afamiliarcomplaintaboutDworkinslegaltheoryhasbeenwhatDworkin
stylesasatheoryoflawisreallymerelyatheoryofadjudication.Dworkinhasnow
dispatchedthatcomplaintwithabreathtakingstroke:iflawisadjudication,thenit
ishardlysurprisingthatlegaltheoryinhishandshasbeensopreoccupiedwith
adjudication.

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Theunderenforcementtheoryseemstobeanimmediatevictimofthecourtsonly
viewoflaw.Thecrucialideaofjudicialunderenforcementisthatscopeofa
judiciallyenforcedconstitutionshouldnotbeconfusedwiththescopeofthe
constitutionitself:courtshavegoodreasonsfortruncatingtheenforcementofthe
constitution,reasonsthatspeaktotheirinstitutionalcircumstance,nottotheirbest
viewofthemeaningoftheconstitution.Butthis,initsmostfamiliarformulation,at
least,dependsonthedistinctionbetweenadjudicationandlaw;oncetheyare
broughttogether,theideaofunderenforcementhasnoextrajudiciallegalterrainto
claimforitself.

TheimpactonmaterialrightsofDworkinsstartlingidealetscallitthe
adjudicationthesisonmaterialconstitutionalrightsismorecomplicated,and
variationsofthatimpactwillemergeinourdiscussion.Butwecanpaintageneral
picture:Wecanassumewithgoodreasonthatcourtsfacesignificantchallenges
whendealingwithmaterialconstitutionalrights,andthattheywilloftenrespondto
thosechallengesbybackingoffofafullbore,primaryenforcementrolewithregard
totheserights.Butsomethingmayremain.Forexample,constitutionalcourtsmay
proceedasIvesuggestedthattheUnitedStatesSupremeCourthasproceeded:they
mayconfinethemselvestothesecondaryroleofinsistingonadequateprocedures
andsubstantivejustificationsforexclusionsfrombenefits,whileleavingallthe
decisionsconcerningthegovernmentalprovisionofthematerialbenefitinquestion
tootherbranchesofgovernment.Orperhapstheycouldgoastepfurtherandinsist
thatgovernmenttreatthefailuretoprovidematerialrightsasagravematter,a
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mattertobeattendedtoasanimportantpriorityamongthegovernmentsconcerns.
Underthesecircumstances,presumably,evenonewhoheldtotheadjudication
thesiswouldconcedethatconstitutionallawincludesmaterialconstitutionalrights;
butthoserightswouldbelimitedtotheportionofthematerialrightsicebergthat
protrudedintoadjudication.Theywouldbeconfined,thatis,toprocedural
protection,tosubstantivescrutinyofexclusionsfromthematerialbenefitsin
questionagainsttheworryofinjustice,andpossibly,tojudicialinsistencethat
governmentingoodfaithtreattheprovisionofthebenefitsinquestionasamatter
ofurgentconcern.Thesewouldallbematerialrightsofasort,andfurther,allbe
dependent,conceptually,onthelargerrightsthataresubmergedbytheinstitutional
limitationsthecourtsinquestiontakethemselvestohave.

Soitturnsoutthateventheadjudicationthesiscantbanishmaterialrightsfrom
constitutionallaw,andcantevenbanishthemfrominterpretiveplausibilitywith
regardtotheAmericanconstitutionaltradition.Evenasradicalaclaimasthe
adjudicationthesiscannotwithoutmoreexplainwhyDworkinhasexcluded
materialrightsfromconstitutionalunderstanding.So,inretrospect,Igaveupmuch
toeasilyinmyearlierexchangeonthetopicofmaterialrights.

Butnowaratherbroaderquestionhasbeenputonthetableofcourse,namely,the
adjudicationthesis.Lurkinginthelastparagraphs,intheungainlyandunexplained
icebergmetaphor,areseriousdifficultiesfortheadjudicationthesis.Alsolurking
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therearepossibilitiesfortheresurrectionofunderenforcement,eveninthefaceof
theadjudicationthesis.

THEADJUDICATIONTHESISANDLEGISLATION

Thinkfirstaboutthejudgesonaconstitutionalcourtinacountrywitha
constitutionthatexplicitlyprovidesfortherightofallcitizenstoadequatehealth
care.Inthefirstcaseofitskindbroughtbeforethecourt,amansufferingfroma
potentiallyfatalformofskincancercannotaffordtheonlyusefulmedicine,whichis
veryexpensiveandneedstobetakenoveralongperiodoftime.Nogovernmental
provisionhasbeenmadeforpersonsinthepositionoftheconstitutional
protagonist,andhehasinitiatedanactionclaiminganentitlementtocircumstances
thatwouldmakethemedicineaffordabletohim.

Ourcourt,wellimagine,hasalreadygottenpasttheMarburyv.Madison
necessaries.Thatis,thecourthasonpreviousoccasionsdeterminedthat(1)our
constitutionisasourceofpositivelaw;itdoesntmerelygivevoicetoaspirationsor
slogans;(2)thepositivelawthatflowsfromtheconstitutionisthetoughestlawon
theblock;whenotherlawsconflictwithconstitutionbackedlawtheymustyield;
and(3)judges(ingeneral,oratleastthoseofourconstitutionalcourt)havethe
sameresponsibilityandauthoritywithregardtotheenterpriseofinterpretingthe
constitutionaswehavewithregardtoothersourcesoflaw.Thespecialchallenges
ofmaterialrightsasideforthemoment,thisseemsaprettystraightforwardpackage
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ofconceptualcommitmentsforaconstitutionalcourttohave.Theyaresobasica
startingpointformodernconstitutionalcourtsastomakeunnecessarytheir
articulation.

Butnoticethatinordertomakespacefortheadjudicationthesis,weneededto
adoptasomewhatcarefullocutionofthesecommitments:Iftheadjudicationthesis
holds,theconstitutioncannotsimplybepositivelaw;itcanatmostbeasourceof
positivelaw.Lawitselfhastocomefromanadjudicativebody.Constitutions
themselvescantbelaw,unless,improbably,theyhavebeenproducedbyan
adjudicativebodyacourtoritsequivalent.Butneitherofcourse,canordinary
statutesbelaw.Indeed,inthefaceoftheadjudicationthesis,wehavetorecognize
thatthephraselawmakerisamisnomer.Noneofthebodiesthatwecalllawmakers
actuallymakelaw;theycanatmostprovidematerialfromwhichjudgesmakelaw.

Iamasjuriscentricasthenexttheorist,indeed,farmorejuriscentricthanthe
averagebear.Buttheadjudicationthesisisoverthetop.Apartfromsomedaunting
problemswithlanguage,takingtheadjudicationthesisseriouslybringsabasketfull
ofconceptualdifficulties.Thinkaboutalegislatureandahighcourtgoingbackand
forthonamatterofstatutoryinterpretation:Thelegislatureenactsastatute;the
courtplacesaninterpretiveglossonitwhichcausessomedispleasurewithinthe
legislature;thelegislatureamendsthestatutetobarthecourtsinterpretation;the
courtrespondswithanewinterpretation,butonethatstillrankles;thelegislature
amendsthestatuteonceagain;andsoon.Thereislittledoubtwherethe
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authoritativevoiceinthisdialogismeanttolieinthelegalsystemswithwhichwe
arefamiliar.Attheendoftheday,thecourtismeanttotakethedirectionofthe
legislature,andnotthereverse.Andthepicturedoesntchangeatthelevelofthe
constitution.Iftheconstitutionisonethatcanbechangedrelativelyeasily,whena
constitutionalcourtandconstitutionmakersskirmish,itisprettyclearwhois
meanttohavethedecisivevoice.

ItistruethatintheUnitedStateswhereournationalconstitution,forvarious
reasons,isveryhardtoamendtheSupremeCourtoftenseemstohavethefinal
wordincontestsoverthemeaningoftheConstitution.Butthatmerelyconstrains
thescopeoftheobjection;itcannotoffersupportforthesweepingviewthatlaw
inallplaces,timesandcontextsneedstospeakinthevoiceofacourt.

InahighlymoralizedaccountoflawandDworkinsissurelythatitispossibleto
explainthisabsolutelycleardominanceoflegislativeauthorityinawaythatdoes
notrenouncetheadjudicationthesis.Eachroutinecaseofjudicialacceptanceof
legislativeauthoritycanbeseenasinvolvingajudgmentofpoliticalmoralityso
clearonthemeritsdenovoandfurther,sowellsettledinthehistoryoftherelevant
judiciarysdecisionmaking,thatthejudgmentgoesunquestionedandunmentioned.
Itisanextremelyeasyjudgmentindeed,anirresistiblejudgmentforthecourtto
make,butstillitisforthecourt,onthisandeveryotheroccasiontomakethe
judgment.Onthisaccount,apieceoflegislationoraconstitutionalprovisionsisnt
law,itisanirresistiblesourceoflawforthecourt,whichturnsitintolawby
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treatingitassuchatleastforthemoment.Thesame,ofcourse,wouldbetruefora
constitution,howeverexplicitandunduckableitscommandsmightbe.

Asstrainedandstrangeasthiswayofthinkingaboutlegislationorconstitutional
provisionsis,itactuallyhasconceptualadvantagesforDworkin.Onewouldhave
thoughtthatthemuchofcorpusofwhatwevethoughtaboutaslawlendsitself
ratherpoorlytotheviewthatlawisabranchofpoliticaljustice.Alotofthatcorpus
doesntlooklikethepracticalarmofpoliticaljustice.Thinkaboutzoning
ordinances,bankregulations,environmentalregulations,ortheUniform
CommercialCode.Eachoftheseprovisionsmayhaveelementsthataimatorderive
frompoliticaljustice;andeachofthesecananswertoconcernsaboutpolitical
justicebyinvokingsomeformofdemocratictheory.Butmuchofwhattheselaws
aimandworkatconcernssocialgoodsthatdonotanswertopoliticaljustice.And
thesearenotincidental,supportiveorderivativeelements;theyareanimating
purposesofthislegislation.

Butifwetreatallthisasmaterialthatiswaitingtobeusheredintobeingaslaw
whenandifacourtfindsreasontoactaccordingtotheenactedstipulations,thereis
asenseinwhichitbecomesplausibletospeakofalllawasapartofpoliticaljustice.
Howeverthin,conventionalandinvisible,thereisalwaysafoundationaljudgment
atplaywhenacourtgivesvoicetoalegislativeenactmentajudgmentaboutthe
moralbonafidesoftheinvocationofthelegislation.

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Sotheadjudicationthesis,asstartlingasitis,canexplainDworkinsalmosttotal
neglectofnonjudiciallawmakinginhislegaltheory,anditcanmakessenseofhis
otherwiseperplexingassertionthatlawisasubcaseofpoliticaljustice.Butthe
obverseisalsotrue:Dworkinstheoryoflawisseemsheavilydependentonthe
adjudicationthesis.Andtheadjudicationthesishasmorethanitsshareof
problems.

Iftheadjudicationrequiresustothinkoflegislationaslawinwaitingratherthan
lawitself,thisseemstobetheconceptualequivalentofhanginganelephantbyits
tail.Almostallthecontent,almostalltheworkisbeingdonebythelegislation,but
allofourconceptualattentionisbeingdrawntothequitepossiblyroutineand
unexceptionalmomentinwhichthelegislationispermittedtohaveforceinthe
handsofacourt.Thereseemsatleasttogiveontothecomplaintthatwearebeing
misdirected.Thisisalittlelikesomedefensesofpositivisminthefaceofrobust,
normativeaccountsofthelaw,defenseswhichgosomethinglikethis:Well,evenif
allthisorsomethingverymuchlikethisistrue,whatyouaredescribingisasocial
institution,andeverythingyouvedescribedpendstodependsuponasocial
convention.Thisinvitesattentionawayfromalmosteverythinginterestingto
observeandreflectuponaboutthenatureoflaw.Insistingthatroutinejudicial
enforcementofclearlegislationcarrieswithitthesilentcomplexjudgmentthat
givesthelegislationtheforceoflaw,andthatthatiswhereourattentionshouldbe
directed,hasthissameunsatisfyingquality.

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Acloselyrelatedproblempossiblyanotherangleonthesameproblemconcerns
thecriticalandindissolubleconnectionbetweenalegislativeenactmentandthe
judicialdecisionthatgivestheenactmentoperativeforce.Evenifweacceptthe
constructthatwhatthejudiciarydoesislaw,andthelegislationisonlyasourceof
law,wehavetorecognizewhataspecialsortofsourcelegislationis.Ajudicial
decisionbringingintolawapartoftheNewYorkversionoftheUniform
CommercialCodeandtheNewYorkCodeitselfarepartsofthesameconceptual
structure.Theyarenotmerelytightlybound,butofapiecewitheachother.Thisis
whatIwasgesturingtowardearlier,withtheicebergmetaphor:Ifwetreatthe
judicialpart,abovethewaterline,astheonlylawinthepicture,wereatriskof
ignoringortreatingasseparatewhatsbelowthewaterline,andtodothatwould
placeusinconceptualperil.Thejudicialdecisionannouncinganddirectingan
outcomeontheonehand,andofferingreasonsforthatoutcomeontheotheris
devotedtoanddependentuponthelegislation.Ifweweretosetouttostudythe
rulesgoverningsomefacetofcommercialtransactionsinNewYork,itwouldbe
bizarreintheextremetofailtoreadtheapplicableprovisionsoftheStatesversion
oftheUCC.Wecouldexplainthisintermsofourexpectationofwhatthejudiciary
woulddowhenaskedtoenforcetheCodeinaspecificcase,ofcourse,butthat
explanation,inturn,isproblematic.

SupposeCongressenactsastatutedirectingtherelevantfederalagencytomakeits
fundingofcertaineconomicenterprisesdependentonthesatisfactionofparticular
requirementsbythoseenterprises,alongwithaprocessofclosemonitoringto
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assureongoingcomplianceasaconditionofongoingfunding.Whatsortof
obligationaretheofficialsoftheagencyunder?Surelytheirobligationisnot
conditionedonthepossibility/likelihoodthatacourtwouldinsistontheir
compliancewiththestatute,orpunishtheirnoncompliance.Theyareundera
strongobligationtodowhataproperlyenactedstatutehasdirectedthemtodo.In
theordinarycase,thatobligationwouldholdeveniftherelevantofficialswere
convincedthattheimpositionofthestipulatedconditionswoulddomoreharmthan
good.(Forexample,ifthebeneficiaryenterpriseswerebanks,andtheofficials
thoughtthatdemandingthatthebankslendmoregenerouslywouldjuststartthe
cycleofbaddebtsoveragain.)Tospeakofandtakethemeasureofthisobligation
withoutbeingabletotreatthecongressionalenactmentaslawistomisstheheart
ofthematter.Theheartofthematter,afterall,isthattheseofficialshaveviolated
validcongressionaldirectives.Toacknowledgethatthesedirectivesarevalidand
thattheycreatebindingobligationsontheofficialstowhichtheyaredirected,butto
denythattheyarelaw,wouldseemtobeanexerciseinsemanticobduracy.Itis
hardtoimaginehowavoidingthecharacterizationofthisregulatorystatuteaslaw
advancesourunderstandingofthesituationinanyrelevantdimension.

Letsreturnatlasttothecaseofaconstitutionthatprovidesexplicitlyforarightto
adequatehealthcareandaplaintiffwhoissufferingfromapotentiallyfatalskin
cancerforwhichthetreatmentinvolvesamedicinethatisveryexpensive.A
constitutionalcourtconfrontingthiscasemightwellhavereasonstothinkit
difficultandeveninappropriatetointerpretandenforcethisprovisioninastraight
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forward,primarymanner.Thereareseriousquestionsofstrategy,responsibility,
andsocialcoordinationandprioritizationthatthecourtseemsbadlyplacedto
answer.Strategy:shouldthemedicinesimplybegiventoanyonewhoneedsit?
Shouldsomescarceresourcesgotoprevention?Shouldthegovernmentsimplygive
theneedyenoughmoneyorscripttosustainaminimallydecentlifeandletthose
individualsmakedifficultchoicesaboutwheretospendtheirresources?
Responsibility:Shouldthisbefundedatanationalormorelocallevel?By
government,employers,publicorprivateinsurance?Taxpayersunderwhatregime
oftaxation?

Socialcoordinationandprioritization:Thisistheproblemofthetrafficcop.When
Iminalongandslowmovinglineoftraffic,Iworrythatthereisapoliceofficer
aheadattheintersection,directingtraffic.Iworry,becausethepoliceofficercan
onlyseeahandfulofyardsineachdirection,andheorshehasnowherenear
enoughinformationtorationalizetheflowoftraffic.Courtsinmaterialrightscases
aremuchworseoff.Theycantpossiblyunderstandthefullbudgetarypicturewith
regardstothefulfillmentofsuchrights,andmoreover,theyhavelittleornobasis
formakingpainfultradeoffs.Tradeoffs,forexample,amongvariousmedical
necessities,notallofwhichcanbesatisfiedforallmemberofthecommunity;
tradeoffsbetweentherighttoadequatemedicalcareandothermaterialrights,like
education,likeeducation,housingandnutrition;andtradeoffsbetweenmaterial
rightsandeconomicinvestmentsthatmightwellresultinmorematerialbenefitsfor
everyone.
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Inthefaceofthisdauntingsetofdifficulties,aconstitutionalcourtmightsoldieron
anddothebestthatitcanintheroleofprimarymaterialrightsenforcer.Some
have,sometimeswithworrisomeconsequences,butperhapsnotalways.Buta
constitutionalcourtmightstopshortofthisandengageinsomethinglessthanfull
andprimaryenforcementoftherighttoadequatehealthcare.Acourtmight,for
example,insistthatthegovernmentdemonstratethatitistakingtherightof
adequatehealthcareseriously,thatitistreatingtheprovisionofsuchcareasan
urgentmatteramongitsotherurgentpriorities.Oracourtmightadopt(hopefully
inanexplictandarticulatemanner)theroleofsecondaryenforcementthatIhave
attributedtothedecisionsofourownSupremeCourt.Itmight,thatis,insiston
adequateprocedurestopreventthearbitrarydenialofmaterialrightsbenefitsto
individualsoncethegovernmentisprovidingthem;anditmightpoliceprograms
thatprovidebenefitsthathelptosatisfymaterialrightsagainstthepossibilityof
unjustcategoricalexclusions.Andfinally,acourtmightsimplysayofmaterial
constitutionalrightsthattheyexistbutthattheyaresubjecttoenforcementonlyby
theotherbranchesofgovernment.ThePresidentandthelegislature,inturn,might
wellrefertotheexistenceofthesematerialrights,andinvoketheserightsas
reasonstoinsistuponlegislativeresponsibilityfortendingtothem,assourcesof
authoritytoactonthem,andasjustificationsandexplanationsforgovernmental
behaviorofvarioussorts.

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THEADJUDICATIONTHESISANDJUDICIALPROCESS
Considerfirstthecasesofpartialjudicialenforcement,thecaseswherethecourt
insistsongovernmentaleffortsconsistentwithtreatingadequatehealthcareasan
urgentmatterofconcern,orthecaseswherethecourtimposesproceduresor
invalidatesunjustcategoricalexclusions.Forourpurposes,thequestionishowwe
aretothinkaboutthatpartoftheconceptualstructureuponwhichthecourtrelies
butwhichisreflectedonlyindirectlyorincompletelyinthecourtsjudgments.This
istheicebergproblemagain,butinformthatseemsevenharderforDworkinto
ignore.Dworkin,afterall,wantscourtstogiveauthorityofsortstotheprinciples
thatbestexplainwhatpriorcourtshavedone.Heretheprinciplesarenotdetached
andgeneralbutconnectedandspecific.Ifwestipulatethatthebestinterpretation
ofwhattheconstitutionalcourthasdoneinanyofthesethreesortsofcasesisbest
explainedbythenormativeproposition,flowingfromtheconstitution,thatthestate
owesitscitizensadequatehealthcare,theninwhatwayisitusefultosaythat,
notwithstandingthisappropriateascriptionofmeaningtothecourtsprior
decisions,thelawdoesnotembodythisproposition?

PerhapsDworkinwouldconcedethatthelawdoesincludethisproposition,
providedwecancorrectlyinferitsstatusfromjudicialdecisions.Ifso,thenitturns
outthatmateriallegalrightscanexistinagenuinelyrobustaway,eveniftheroleof
courtsinenforcingsuchrightsistruncatedbyinstitutionalconcerns.
Underenforcement,onthisaccount,isaliveandwell,eveninthefaceofthe
adjudicationthesis,andsotooarematerialconstitutionalrights.
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ThereisonestrongconceptualincentivethatDworkinhasforthisconcession.
Dworkinhasspentmuchofhiscareerasalegaltheoristarguingthatthereitis
sensibleforlawyersandjuriststoargueaboutwhatthelawis,asopposedtowhat
inshouldbeinsituationswherenoauthoritativejudicialdecisionasspokenonthe
precisequestiontheyarediscussing.IftheadjudicationthesisinvolvesasIve
argueditdoesawithholdingofthedesignationoflawfromcompellingsourcesof
lawuntilthosesourceshavebeentakenupandappliedbyacourt,thenitwould
appearthatwehavethelawofacase,butnocontinuityoflawbeyondtheindividual
case.Thereareanabundanceofjuicysourcesoflaw,butthereisneveranylawthat
doesntattachtoaspecificcase.ThatisantitheticaltoDworkinsruleoflawinthe
faceofachangingcommonlawposition,anditisunsettlingtoalmostplausible
theoryoflaw,exceptperhaps,strongformsofrealism.Treatingtheprinciples
immanentinjudicialdecisionsaslawcreatesconsiderablylesshavocforDworkin.

Butnowletssettwosituationsonthetablesidebyside.Ontheonehand,wehave
thefederalbankfundinglegislation,which,ifweposittheunavailabilityofjudicial
intervention,failstoimposeanylegalobligationonthefederalofficialswhoarethe
addresseesoftheenactment.Ontheotherhand,wehavethepartialenforcementof
aconstitutionalrighttoadequatemedicalcare.Bothofthese,iftreatedaslaw,
wouldcreatelegalobligationsonthepartofpublicofficials.Theadjudicationthesis,
ononereading,woulddenythestatusoflawtothebankfundinglegislationyet
grantthatstatustotherighttoadequatehealthcare.Thatseemshardtojustify.
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Dworkinmightresistthisbysayingthatconceptualimmanenceinjudicialdecisions,
howeverintrinsicandtightlybonded,doesnotqualifyanormativepreceptaslaw.
Lawincludes,onthisreading,theasyetunrealizedjudicialdeterminationsthata
courtshouldreachinaccordwiththepreceptsimmanentinpriordecisions.Butit
doesntincludetheconceptualreachofthosepreceptstotheextentthatthefuture
realizationofthosepreceptsinthecourtsistruncatedbyinstitutionalconcerns.
Thatwouldharmonizeunenforcedlegislationandunenforcedimmanentjudicial
preceptscases.Itwouldalsotakethestingfromtheworrythatthecommonlawis
intrinsicallyepisodicandneverhasthecontinuitythatDworkininsistsupon:So
longasthepreceptsimmanentinjudicialdecisionscouldandshouldberealizablein
futurecases,theoutcomesofthosehypotheticalcasesarepartofthelaw.

THESEARCHFORAJUSTIFICATIONOFTHEADJUDICATIONTHESIS
Butwhatotherthantheabsenceofacuteconceptualpainjustifiestheseoutcomes?
Whyshouldwebeattractedtotheadjudicationthesisandtheungainlyconceptual
baggageitbrings?Dworkinsactualdefenseoftheadjudicationthesisisfleeting.
Havingarguedthatlawisabranchofpoliticaljustice,hesaysthatitisnecessaryto
separatelawfromtherestofmorality.Insistingthatcourtsbetheexclusiveauthors
oflawperformsthatdemarcatingrole.

Takenatfacevaluethatseemsapoordefenseoftheadjudicationthesis.Thefederal
bankfundingcaseandthepartialjudicialenforcementoftherighttoadequate
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medicalcarecaseofferanobviousanswer.AsKelsenandHartrecognized,partof
whatlegalsystemsdoisdesignateofficialswhogenerateandrecognizelaw.Courts,
legislaturesandthecomplexprocedureswherebyconstitutionscometodraftedand
ratifiedareprettystraightforwardinstancesofsuchdesignations.Lawiswhat
theseentitiesandprocessesproduce,giveortake,subjecttoobvious
difficultiesbutthesedifficultiesattachtotheworkproductofcourtsunderthe
adjudicationthesisaswell.Itishardtoseewhatadvantageissecuredbylopping
offconventionallawmakingbodies.

Dworkinmaybemakinganotherpointaltogether.AsIsummarizeDworkinsview
oflaw,above,thedistinguishingcharacteristicsoflawinthemidstofsocialjustice
moregenerallyaretwo:First,lawinadistinctandrobustwayisinflectedbythe
historyofpriorexercisesofpoliticalpowerinthecommunity;andsecond,law
emanatesfromanadjudicativebody.PerhapswhatDworkinmeanswhenhe
referencestheneedtoseparatelawfromtherestofmoralityisthatlaw,inorderto
enjoyitsdistinctbowtopoliticalhistory,needstobeprotectedbybeinglefttothe
provinceofcourts,whichhaveachainnovellikerespectforpriorexercisesof
politicalauthoritybuiltin.Onthisview,wewanttokeeplawseparatetoprotectits
distinctsubstantivecontent,andcourtsarebestsuitedtodothat.

Butthereisaseriousproblemwiththisdefenseoftheadjudicationthesis.Lets
assumethatcourts,lefttotheirowndevices,cedeauthoritytopastpolitical
decisionsofthecommunityinadifferentandbetterwaythanlegislators.
20
Nevertheless,giventheabilityoflegislationtodrivejudicialoutcomessubstantively,
theadjudicationthesiscannotprotectlawfromdisruptionsofhistoricalcontinuity.
Thisisaspecificinstanceoftheproblemwevealreadyencounteredofseparating
lawfromthesourcesoflawtowhichitistightlybound.

ACLOSECOUSIN
Inmyintroductiontothesethoughts,Iofferedtheegocentricsuggestionthatitwas
mypushingDworkinonmaterialrightsinAmericanconstitutionallawthat
provokedhisattachmenttotheadjudicationthesis.Thatmaybequitewrong,orat
leastirrelevant,giventhesympatheticfitoftheadjudicationthesiswithsome
elementsofDworkinslegaltheory,includingandespeciallyhisnearlyexclusive
preoccupationwithwhattheprotocolsofadjudicationareandoughttobe.But
supposewetrytoexplaintheadjudicationthesisasasomewhatmisshapenbut
understandablereactiontothedifficultiesofaccommodatingmaterialrightsin
constitutionallaw.Letmemakeclear,IdontmeantosaddleDworkinwith
responsibilityforanargumenthenevermade.ButtheargumentImabouttoset
outispromptedbyDworkinsreactiontomaterialrightsinconstitutionallaw,and
mayinturninspiresympathyfortheadjudicationthesis.

Ifwethinkbacktothekindsofreasonsthatmaterialrightsarepoororatleast
complicatedcandidatesforjudicialenforcement,wemaybegintowondertheyare
bestthoughtofaslegalrightsatall,withoutregardtowhethertheyareattributable
toacourtinanyway.Especiallyincircumstancesofsharplylimitedresourceslike
21
thoseincountrieswhereexpressprovisionsformaterialrightarecommon,there
arepainfultradeoffstobemadeateveryturn;andasweobservedabove,thereare
anabundanceofquestionsofstrategy,responsibilityandcoordination.Little
wonderthatcourtstypicallystopfarshortoforderingaregimeofsocialbenefits
thatanyonewouldthinkofasfullysatisfyingtheunderlyingmaterialrights.But
onemightbelievethat,preciselyforthereasonsandpreciselytotheextentthat
courtshaveasomewhatlimitedroleinenforcingmaterialrights,legalmaterial
rightsthemselvesstopshortofwhatfullblownmoralrightstomaterialbenefits
mightonthebestviewofthoserightoffer.

Letmebeclear:thepointisnotthatcourtsmustauthorlaw,butrather,thatrights
sodiffuseandcomplexastoeludejudicialenforcementareunsuitedtobelegal
rightspreciselybecausetheyaresodiffuseandcomplex.Thiswouldnotbea
defenseoftheadjudicationthesis,butratheranexplanationofwhatcouldmakethe
adjudicationthesismistakenlyseemattractive.Ormorecharitably,perhaps,this
couldexplainhowitmightbethattheadjudicationthesis,inaspecialdomainoflike
materiallegalrights,couldfunctionasagoodproxyfordecidingwhatshouldqualify
aslegal,asopposedtomoral,rights.

ThismightseemastrangeargumenttoassociateinanywaywithDworkin,whose
earlyworkasatpainstomovethelawfromamodelofrulestooneofprinciples,
withthelatterbeingagooddealmoreopenendedandsubstantivelyalivethanthe
former.Butstill,attheendoftheday,thekindsofprinciplestowhichDworkinhas
22
beenattractedarerelativelydecisiveandnoncontingent.Principleslikenoone
shouldprofitfromhisownwrongdoinghaveagreatdealmorecategoricalgrip
thanapreceptlikeeverycitizenisentitledtoadequatemedicalcareinacountry
ofsharplylimitedresources.

Thereisagreatdealmoretobefilledintomakethispositionconvincing.For
examplemoreneedstobesaidaboutwhycategoricalityisimportanttothelaw.
Anditwontdotosaythatcategoricalityisrequiredbycourts;thatwouldbe
circular,oratleastbackwardshere.Nevertheless,thisseemsaroughlyplausible
position.

Butonlyroughly.Thinkaboutamateriallegalrighttoanadequateeducation.
Theconstitutionalcourtinourhypotheticalcountryneveraskswhetherthesystem
offreepubliceducationinplaceisforthesepurposesadequate.But,inthename
ofprotectingaccesstoamateriallegalright,itinsistsonsubstantialprocedural
protectionsanadversaryhearing,etc.beforeachildcanbeexpelled,orpossibly
evensuspended,fromapublicschool.And,similarly,againinthenameofaccessto
amateriallegalright,thecourtpolicescategoricalexclusionsfromaccesstothe
publicschools,strikingdown,forexamplealawexcludingthechildrenof
unregisteredaliensfromattendingthoseschools.

Insuchasituationtheabsenceofcategoricalityseemstodonoharm.Insistingthat
theonlylegalrightsinthepicturearethecourtscrispholdingswilleitherbeofno
23
consequenceoradversetothebestunderstandingofconstitutionallaw.And
supposethatonejurisdictioninourhypotheticalcountrydecidestocloseitspublic
highschools,andlettheprivatemarketdothejob,withtheresultthatlarge
numbersofthepoorarewithoutaccesstoeducationbeyondthe8
th
grade.The
courtinsiststhatitdoesntknowwhatanadequateeducation,butthatknowsthat
thisstateofaffairsisnotadequate,andinsiststhatthejurisdictioninquestion
developsomeplanetoprovidewhatitplausiblydeterminestobeanappropriate
responsetotherequirementofanadequateeducation,giventhecomplexwebof
tradeoffsinwhichthislegalrequirementisembedded.Hereagain,treatingthe
underlyingrightaslegalseemsifanythingthebettercourse.

CONCLUSION
Intheend,itishardtoembracetheadjudicationthesis,andthoughitislesshardto
seetheappealofthismorelimitedpositionadistantcousintotheadjudication
thesisitseemsunlikelytomatureintoaconvincingargument.Andeventhe
adjudicationthesisleavessomespaceformateriallegalrights,andonsome
readings,canevenaccommodatejudicialunderenforcement.Havingcomefull
circle,wecanresthere.