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The evolving security environment in
the eastern Mediterranean: is NATO still
a relevant actor?
Thanos Dokos
a
a
Think Tank, Hellenic Foundation for European & Foreign Policy
(ELIAMEP) , Athens , Greece
Published online: 26 Nov 2012.
To cite this article: Thanos Dokos (2012) The evolving security environment in the eastern
Mediterranean: is NATO still a relevant actor?, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 12:4,
575-590, DOI: 10.1080/14683857.2012.744160
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2012.744160
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The evolving security environment in the eastern Mediterranean:
is NATO still a relevant actor?
Thanos Dokos*
Think Tank, Hellenic Foundation for European & Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), Athens,
Greece
(Received 31 October 2012; nal version received 2 November 2012)
The article aims to briey describe the main trends and drivers in the Mediterra-
nean and the Middle East (with an emphasis on the eastern Mediterranean) and
to assess whether NATO has a meaningful role to play, either as an autonomous
actor, or in cooperation with the EU or regional actors. More specically, the
article will assess the possible contribution of NATO in the following areas/mis-
sions: (a) peacemaking operations/PSOs, humanitarian intervention (Libya-type)
and post-conict stabilization; (b) security sector reform; (c) maritime security;
(d) combating WMD proliferation; and (e) energy security.
Keywords: eastern Mediterranean; Mediterranean dialogue; WMD proliferation;
security sector reform; maritime security
The eastern Mediterranean and its adjoining regions especially the Persian Gulf
contain a sizable number of ashpoints and the security environment remains
Hobbesian. Although the PalestinianIsraeli conict, the future of Iraq and the Ira-
nian nuclear programme, as well as the Syrian crisis and continued instability in
Yemen remain the most important regional security concerns, the wider Mediterra-
nean security environment is predominantly characterized by multiple sources of
insecurity, uidity and instability, and by continuing change and evolution.
1
The
Arab revolts have already caused an exponential increase in the regions volatility
and unpredictability. In this context, several of the key characteristics of the
regional security environment have either changed in terms of importance or are no
longer relevant and new ones have emerged, including:
(a) the emergence of new or the qualitative transformation of existing functional
challenges (substantial imbalances in the distribution of income at the
national level, demographic changes and population movements, the emer-
gence and growing inuence at least in some countries of Islamic parties
and political movements, Islamic terrorism and climate change);
(b) the appearance of new (China and India) or the return of old (Russia) extra-
regional actors in the Mediterranean, and the emergence of regional powers
with increasing inuence (Turkey and Iran);
*Email: thanosdokos@eliamep.gr
Southeast European and Black Sea Studies
Vol. 12, No. 4, December 2012, 575590
ISSN 1468-3857 print/ISSN 1743-9639 online
2012 Taylor & Francis
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2012.744160
http://www.tandfonline.com
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(c) the declining inuence and impact of the EUs soft power and the gradual
withdrawal of the USA from the Mediterranean;
(d) the increasingly although unequally felt impact of globalization to a
region that, with few exceptions, has not beneted greatly by this trend. At
the same time, however, more old regional conicts remain unresolved (the
IsraeliPalestinian/Arab conict, the Kurdish issue and the Cyprus problem),
while new ones have appeared, such as Irans nuclear programme, Iraqs
future after the gradual withdrawal of US forces and the rather unstable
domestic situation in several Arab countries.
This article aims to briey describe the main trends and drivers in the Mediter-
ranean and the Middle East (with an emphasis on the eastern Mediterranean) and to
assess whether NATO has a meaningful role to play, either as an autonomous actor,
or in cooperation with the EU or regional actors. More specically, the article will
assess the possible contribution of NATO in the following areas/missions: (a) peace-
making operations/PSOs, humanitarian intervention (Libya-type) and post-conict
stabilization; (b) security sector reform (SSR); (c) maritime security; (d) combating
WMD proliferation; and (e) energy security.
Key trends and drivers in the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East
To outline alternative security futures for 2020, the potential evolution of the
following key regional drivers
2
must be taken into consideration:
(a) The domestic developments and foreign policies of pivotal
3
regional states:
Egypt, Turkey, Israel, Saudi Arabia and Iran.
(b) The prospects for the resolution of key regional conicts: (i) IsraeliPalestin-
ian/Arab conict; (ii) the Iranian problem and security concerns in the Gulf
region; and (iii) the Kurdish issue and resulting problems of stability in Iraq
and Turkey.
(c) The evolution of hard security problems: (i) WMD proliferation; (ii) military
expenditures and the possibility of a conventional arms race; and (iii) jihadist
or other forms of terrorism.
(d) The changing role and inuence of extra-regional actors: the USA, EU, Russia,
China, and India. Consequences of an emerging multi-player environment,
new relationships and the structure of a future regional security architecture.
(e) The impact of soft security drivers: (i) demographic trends and population
movements (impact of increasing urbanization); (ii) impact of climate change
on already fragile ecosystems (food security and environmental refugees/
migrants); (iii) natural resources (water and hydrocarbons); (iv) organized
crime, cyber-warfare and maritime security; (v) failed/dysfunctional states (in
sub-Saharan Africa); and (vi) pace and impact of globalization. Drivers (3)
(6) could be dened as secondary of contributing factors.
(f) Game changers (e.g. a nuclear confrontation between Israel and Iran and the
detonation of one or more nuclear weapons between those states or anywhere
else in the wider region; an incident of catastrophic terrorism; a major
pandemic; the discovery of a major non-carbon-based source of energy; the
violent overthrow of a regime by a radical group, etc.)
We will take a brief look at drivers a, d and e.
576 T. Dokos
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Domestic developments and foreign policies of pivotal regional states
The revolts in several Arab states took the international community by surprise
(with the exception perhaps of Egypt, were some kind of stand-off between the
Mubarak regime and the opposition was expected, albeit at the time of the sched-
uled presidential elections in fall 2011). The fragility of many regimes and the will-
ingness of citizens of those countries to stand up and even sacrice their own lives
for democracy (although the extremely difcult economic conditions were an
equally if not most important motive for many of those people) also came as a
surprise. As argued by Eduard Soler, common elements that contributed to Arab
revolts included
growing social disparities, high levels of corruption, worrying rates of youth unem-
ployment, the increase of food prices, waiving civil and political freedoms, abuses of
power by security forces and the eroded legitimacy of the governments in place.
(Soler I Lecha 2011, 4)
As a result of the Arab revolts, todays Middle East can be compared to a seismic
faultline which will continue to produce tremors of unpredictable size in various
parts of the region, at least for the next several years. Considerable uncertainty will
be a standard feature of the region, and several regimes will face substantial chal-
lenges for their survival, including in the future Saudi Arabia and Iran. Long-
term concerns include the nature and stability of new regimes, the consequences for
relations between the West and the Arab world (including the impact on oil prices)
and implications for transatlantic policies towards the region. The Arab revolts are
likely to lead to a far more heterogeneous and fragmented region
4
and possibly to
an increasingly polarized Mediterranean. We believe that there are at least ve piv-
otal states in the Middle East, three of which are geographically located in the east-
ern Mediterranean: Egypt, Turkey and Israel. Domestic developments and the
foreign policies of two other Middle Eastern states (Saudi Arabia and Iran) will
have potentially important consequences for regional stability (on issues like Syria,
Lebanon, Palestine, energy, etc.).
Egypt has always been a key country for the Arab world.
5
There is general
agreement that how Egypt emerges from its current uncertainty will shape the
entire Middle East (Cohen and Gabel 2011, 64 & 66). Indeed, if there is a substan-
tial change of direction in Egyptian policy, whether vis--vis the West and Israel, or
in the direction of Islamic radicalism, there will be repercussions for the whole
region. But the continuation of Egypts absence from regional affairs due to intro-
spection will also be a cause for serious concern for other moderate Arab countries,
especially in the Gulf region, as Saudi Arabia will be the only Sunni counterbalance
to Iran. It is, of course, practically impossible at this stage to predict which way
Egypt will go. The only certainty is that the road to democracy however dened
will be difcult and painful, and that the apparently incomplete reform in Egypt
will bring new revolts in the future.
6
Although Israel sems to be doing fairly well, from a security and an economic
perspective, despite its relative diplomatic isolation and its disagreements with the
Obama Administration (of course, the USAIsraeli relationship may be affected by
the results of the 2012 US presidential elections), it can be argued that the current
policies of the Netanyahu government on the Palestinian issue are short-sighted and
that the continuation of the current situation will affect negatively Israels own
Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 577
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future. This is even more the case after the Arab revolts and the uncertainty regard-
ing Egypts and Syrias future orientation and policies vis--vis Israel and the West.
Future challenges for Israel will be twofold: (a) security challenges as the Palestin-
ian youth, lacking any hope for a better future may decide to take their struggle
against Israeli occupation to the next level of violence, i.e. suicide bombings with
the use of non-conventional devices; and (b) challenges to Israels democratic sys-
tem of government as a result of limitations on non-Jewish citizens rights due to
demographic trends (increase in the percentage of the Arab population living inside
Israel).
Turkeys regional and international roles have been signicantly upgraded in the
last few years as a result of the country's impressive economic performance and its
ambitious multi-directional foreign policy of zero problems with the neighbours.
Professor Ahmed Davutoglu, the guru of AKPs foreign policy and current foreign
minister, frequently refers to Turkey as a central power and has being using the
country's soft power and the Ottoman cultural heritage as means to extend/increase
Turkish inuence in the Middle East, the Balkans and beyond. Undoubtedly Ankara
has evolved into a more autonomous regional actor, a potentially important energy
player (as an energy hub), a willing mediator in various conicts and an inuential
power in the Muslim world (and possibly as a model of the coexistence of political
Islam and democracy). Some of the questions debated by foreign policy establish-
ments in various interested countries include whether the AKP government has been
gradually transforming Turkey into an Islamic-lite country and whether this may
cause a strong reaction by Kemalist and other pro-secular forces in Turkish society,
whether its regional policies are compatible with transatlantic interests and whether
it is drifting away from the West (who lost Turkey?). There is also a feeling in
some circles that Turkey may at some point fall into the trap of strategic over-
extension (i.e. failure to match means and objectives), but this remains to be seen.
The majority of policy-makers persist that it is in the best interest of all sides if
Turkey remains anchored to Western institutions, but that this may not be an option
anymore as far as EU membership is concerned as there is increasing opposition
not only in Europe but also in Turkey itself. Key questions for Turkeys future
regional role will be the outcome of the Syrian crisis, the possible reaction of Egypt
and Iran to the attempted expansion of Turkish regional inuence, the evolution of
its relationship with Israel, the resilience of the Turkish economic miracle and the
management of the domestic and regional Kurdish issue.
The changing role and inuence of extra-regional actors
Changes in the global balance of power will be reected in the Middle East as well.
China has adopted a policy of close relations with resource-rich states in Africa and
the Gulf region.
7
Russia has also been trying to increase its inuence in the region,
and India is expected to make its presence more felt in the future. For the time
being, China and, to a lesser extent, India have limited their regional involvement
to the economic sector, satised with the US guarantee to the safety of supply lines.
But this will probably change given their growing energy dependency. Already
interesting signs can be observed, such as the rst visits of Chinese warships in the
Gulf in 2010, the Indian Navys visit to the Mediterranean and the Atlantic in
2009, the Chinese nancial support of the construction of a deep-sea port at
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Gwadar in Pakistan, strategically located only 250 miles from the Strait of Hormuz,
and a joint TurkishChinese air force exercise in 2010.
At the same time, the USA is reducing its military presence in the region and
the EU appears to be losing its inuence (the trend is less important in the Gulf
where the EUs inuence has always been quite limited, and more worrisome for
the eastern Mediterranean).
8
One can foresee three possible scenarios for the EUs
role in the region. In the rst, the EU crumbles under the weight of its internal
problems, the integration process stops completely or advances extremely slowly,
and the EU becomes irrelevant both at the global and at the regional levels.
The second scenario can be labelled business as usual or muddling through
(Emmanouilidis 2012). The EU continues to spend a not insignicant amount of
money but still does not get enough inuence. There is no substantial strengthening
of EU institutions and the Unions role even in its backyard, along the Mediterra-
nean coast is not negligible, but it is not central either. In the third scenario, the
EU gets its act together, develops a coherent CFSP and neighbourhood policy,
especially vis--vis the Middle East. The Union for the Mediterranean or a comple-
mentary/successor initiative ourishes and there is substantial investment and coop-
eration, especially on renewable energy. Northern and Southern Mediterranean
countries agree on a quota system for workers.
The USA is shifting its strategic attention to Asia and reducing its military pres-
ence in the Mediterranean. Its image in the Muslim world remains strongly nega-
tive. Again, one can envisage three possible scenarios: (1) The USA uses its
leverage to help resolve the Palestinian problem. Its credibility, image and inuence
in the Middle East and the Muslim world in general receives a major boost; (2)
The USA continues its rather ambivalent policy on the Palestinian problem and its
support for conservative regimes in the Gulf; in combination with the growing pres-
ence of other major powers, the US inuence in the region continues its slow
decline; and (3) A US Republican Administration attempts to resolve the Iranian
problem with the use of military force; the USA becomes entangled in, yet, another
war in the Middle East.
Irrespective of which scenario will reect more accurately future developments
in the region, it would be fairly safe to predict that, overall, the wider Middle East
is gradually evolving into a multi-player security system and the West (a concept
which probably needs redenition, anyway) may have to adjust to a new reality
where its inuence in the Middle East will decline.
Demographic trends and population movements
Demographic developments and population movements are issues of serious con-
cern for Europe and migration will remain a central and highly politicized issue for
most European countries, mostly for domestic political reasons. Ironically, Europe
will be signicantly labour-short several million workers within the next 25 years
due to the general ageing of European populations. The EU member states are
already home to more than six million immigrants from the Mediterranean
non-members, especially from North Africa. Illegal movement of people is greatly
facilitated by the proximity of North Africa and the Middle East and there are also
substantial numbers of irregular immigrants travelling via Turkey and crossing to
EU territory through Greeces archipelago of islands, its long coastline and the land
border between the two countries. The population in North Africa and the Middle
Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 579
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East is projected to double from 240 million in the early 1990s to almost 500 mil-
lion by the year 2020 (Winrow 2000, 100). Demographic pressures of this magni-
tude are producing relentless urbanization, social and economic strains, and a
steady stream of migrants seeking jobs and social services (a process which starts
well to the south of the Maghreb and affects societies on both sides of the Mediter-
ranean). The number of immigrants is increasing as a result of various conicts
and, in the near future, climate change.
Climate change
In the developing world, even a relatively small climatic shift can trigger or exacer-
bate food shortages, water scarcity, destructive weather events, the spread of dis-
eases, human migration and natural resource competition.
9
These crises are all the
more dangerous because they are interwoven and self-perpetuating.
10
It is projected
that parts of the Middle East will be affected by climate change in terms of deserti-
cation and food production, availability of water resources and environmentally
induced refugees/migrants.
Fragile and failed states
The emergence of fragile, unstable, dysfunctional or failed states can have important
destabilizing consequences not only beyond their borders but also in adjacent
regions. In some cases, such states may constitute black holes for the whole inter-
national system (e.g. Afghanistan in the Taliban/Al-Qaeda era). There are a number
of states in sub-Saharan Africa which may be classied in the above categories
(Dyer 2010; Mazo 2010, 87118). In some cases, they may constitute safe heavens
for a wide variety of criminal activities, with only local or limited regional impact.
In other cases, such as Somalia, the impact is much wider. One state in the Middle
East that could, theoretically, become a dysfunctional state is Yemen, with its popu-
lation explosion, resource shortages, crumbling infrastructure and sectarian violence
(e.g. Phillips 2011). Another case might, if all goes wrong, be Gaza. Of course,
there are many things that neighbouring countries and the international community
can do to prevent such a development.
NATOs possible role in the Mediterranean
Looking at the emerging regional security environment in the Mediterranean, one
can identify ve categories of missions where NATO could, in principle, make a
contribution: (a) peacemaking operations/PSOs, humanitarian intervention (Libya-
type) and post-conict stabilization; (b) security sector reform (SSR); (c) maritime
security; (d) combating WMD proliferation; and (e) energy security.
NATO began to focus on the Mediterranean in the 1960s with the establishment
of the Expert Working Group on the Middle East and the Maghreb, and later at a
more political level of the ad hoc Group on the Mediterranean (Lesser et al.
2000, 45). However, until the end of the cold war there was little common NATO
policy toward the Mediterranean to speak of, beyond a basic commitment to
common defence of allied territory, maritime space and sea-lanes. The primary
concern for the Atlantic Alliance in the Mediterranean during the cold war was the
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development of a Soviet maritime capability developed for deployment in the
region (the Sovmedron or Fifth Eskadra), the deployment of Soviet military person-
nel and equipment in friendly states around the littoral and the deployment of
Soviet forces on the GreekTurkish borders.
11
The shift by the Alliance beyond a primary concern with military security to a
concern with multiple security threats was manifest in the Alliances new Strategic
Concept of 1991, which declared that:
the stability and peace of the countries on the southern periphery of Europe are impor-
tant for the security of the Alliance, as the 1991 Gulf War has shown. This is all the
more so because of the build-up of military power and the proliferation of weapons
technologies in the area, including WMD and ballistic missiles capable of reaching the
territory of some member states of the Alliance.
In December 1994, NATO Foreign Ministers stated their willingness to establish
contacts, on a case-by-case basis between the Alliance and the Mediterranean non-
member countries with a view to contributing to the strengthening of regional sta-
bility. The Alliances Mediterranean Dialogue was launched with six Mediterranean
partners, namely Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. Algeria
joined the Dialogue in February 2000.
12
In the Strategic Concept adopted at the Washington Summit of 1999, there is a
direct reference to the Mediterranean as a region of interest for the Alliance. More
specically, Article 38 mentions that:
The Mediterranean is an area of special interest to the Alliance. Security in Europe is
closely linked to security and stability in the Mediterranean. NATOs Mediterranean
Dialogue process is an integral part of NATOs co-operative approach to security. It
provides a framework for condence building, promotes transparency and cooperation
in the region, and reinforces and is reinforced by other international efforts. The Alli-
ance is committed to developing progressively the political, civil, and military aspects
of the Dialogue with the aim of achieving closer cooperation with, and more active
involvement by, countries that are partners in this Dialogue.
There are no geographic but there are several related thematic references in the
Strategic Concept adopted by the Alliance members at the Lisbon Summit in 2010
(published in the NATO website), including the following:
(11) Instability or conict beyond NATO borders can directly threaten Alliance
security, including by fostering extremism, terrorism, and trans-national ille-
gal activities such as trafcking in arms, narcotics and people.
(13) All countries are increasingly reliant on the vital communication, transport
and transit routes on which international trade, energy security and prosper-
ity depend. They require greater international efforts to ensure their resil-
ience against attack or disruption.
(19) Develop the capability to defend our populations and territories against
ballistic missile attack as a core element of our collective defence, which
contributes to the indivisible security of the Alliance. We will actively seek
cooperation on missile defence with Russia and other Euro-Atlantic partners;
further develop NATOs capacity to defend against the threat of
chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons of mass destruction;
Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 581
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(20) Crises and conicts beyond NATOs borders can pose a direct threat to the
security of Alliance territory and populations. NATO will therefore engage,
where possible and when necessary, to prevent crises, manage crises, stabi-
lize post-conict situations and support reconstruction.
(24) Even when conict comes to an end, the international community must
often provide continued support, to create the conditions for lasting stability.
NATO will be prepared and capable to contribute to stabilization and recon-
struction, in close cooperation and consultation wherever possible with
other relevant international actors.
(35) We are rmly committed to the development of friendly and cooperative
relations with all countries of the Mediterranean, and we intend to further
develop the Mediterranean Dialogue in the coming years. We attach great
importance to peace and stability in the Gulf region, and we intend to
strengthen our cooperation in the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI).
deepen the cooperation with current members of the Mediterranean Dialogue
and be open to the inclusion in the Mediterranean Dialogue of other countries
of the region;
develop a deeper security partnership with our Gulf partners and remain ready
to welcome new partners in the ICI.
Let us now examine NATOs possible role in a variety of contingencies:
Peacemaking operations and humanitarian intervention
Despite the good intentions, NATOs role in Libya and Operation Unied Protector
did not make the Alliance more popular or acceptable among Arab elites and public
opinion. Despite accelerating the fall of the Gadha regime and therefore saving an
unknown number of Libyan lives, NATOs intervention was perceived by many Mus-
lims as yet another Western military attack against a Muslim country (after Iraq and
Afghanistan). NATOs experience in south-eastern Europe and other parts of the
world (including its involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan) makes it the only security
organization with the expertise and the capabilities for peacemaking operations of the
kind that will probably be necessary at some point in the case of Syria. However,
such an involvement would probably be opposed by most Arab countries and would
be highly unpopular among NATO governments and public opinions. Furthermore,
the military difculties faced by the two most capable European military powers (the
UK and France) underline the limitations that European countries would face in case
they decide to act alone, without US involvement or support. It should also be noted
that NATOs undertaking of a post-conict stabilization mission, as the ones in Bos-
nia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, should be considered as a highly unlikely develop-
ment. The only exception might be its participation in a multinational force that
would monitor a peace settlement between the Israel and the Palestinians.
NATO and security sector reform (SSR)
The overall aim of SSR is the transformation of security institutions so that they
play an effective, legitimate and democratically accountable role in providing
external and internal security for their citizens. Institutional reform focuses upon
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building up their capacities in line with the standards assumed appropriate to the
democratic political context (Hanggi and Tanner 2005, 1617). Transformation of
the security sector requires broad consultation and includes goals such as strength-
ening civilian control and oversight of the security sector (International Alert
2002, 3); professionalization of the security forces; demilitarization and peace-
building; and strengthening the rule of law. SSR is therefore about much more
than the internal structure of security forces. It promotes the strengthening of
norms in relation to the proper relationship between the security sector and soci-
ety at large (Chanaa 2002, 29).
The need for reform will be particularly acute in Arab countries under transition,
former failed states that are currently under reconstruction or countries facing seri-
ous internal challenges (such as Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, eventually Syria, etc.). With
its extensive experience in SSR in former eastern Europe and south-eastern Europe,
NATO could offer valuable assistance to those countries wishing to reform their
security agencies. NATOs negative image in many of those countries could be an
impediment. The EU would clearly be a more acceptable partner, although it does
not have the same level of expertise as NATO. Perhaps one should think along the
lines of a common endeavour.
Maritime security
Although it can be argued that piracy in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean is, at
least for the time being, more a nuisance than a real threat for maritime commerce,
there is increasing concern about maritime security, especially among NATO and
EU countries. According to a recent report, Maritime security in the Mediterranean
concerns over 500 million people, 150 million of whom live on the coast, and is a
key factor for economic development, environmental protection, sustainability of
natural resources and quality of life (Maritime security in the Mediterranean 2011,
11). Specic concerns include migration ows, terrorism and cross-border crime.
NATO has played a positive role in multinational efforts to combat piracy (with
Operation Ocean Shield). Although not the only capable actor involved, its structure
and experience would allow it to play successfully the role of guardian of maritime
seaways. However, this mission can only be of a temporary nature, as dealing with
the core causes of piracy would require the political stabilization and economic
development of Somalia. Furthermore, whereas NATO could make a valuable con-
tribution to efforts to inhibit the illegal trade of arms, and especially WMD materi-
als and technology, through the Mediterranean, it would be much less useful in
efforts to control illegal migration or organized crime as such missions are best sui-
ted for coast guards, not regular navies.
NATO and WMD proliferation
Although Syrias chemical weapons stockpile are currently an issue of concern in
the context of the Syrian crisis, the only plausible WMD-related threat in the wider
region is Irans nuclear programme. This is undoubtedly the most critical strategic
question in the proliferation eld and a very important issue on todays international
security agenda. The regional security problem is in reality not limited to the
nuclear issue, but this is perceived by Western countries, and probably by several
of Irans neighbours, as being the most pressing security concern.
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At the global level, there is little doubt that further proliferation would make the
strategic chessboard more complex whilst at the same time multiplying risks and
complicating strategic decision-making. There is also growing concern that the open
nuclearization of Iran could also, in combination with other negative developments,
deal a serious even deadly blow to the NPT regime. Although one can speculate
whether Irans nuclearization will be the hair that broke the camels back,
Christoph Bertram rightly points out that:
anyone seeing in an Iranian bomb a key factor which might prompt Saudi Arabia,
Egypt or other countries to obtain one as well needs to explain why for 40 years the
Israeli bomb has not had that effect. (Bertram 2008, 5556)
Kenneth Waltz agrees that If an atomic Israel did not trigger an arms race then,
there is no reason a nuclear Iran should now (a rather controversial statement in
view of his conviction that the real cause of the Middle Eastern crisis has been the
Israeli nuclear monopoly) (Waltz 2012, 24).
The key question remains, of course, whether it is conceivable that under certain
circumstances Irans leaders might decide to threaten or even use nuclear weapons
or will deterrence be sufcient to ensure restraint in the case of Iran? Waltz argues
that Iranian policy is made not by mad mullahs but by perfectly sane ayatollahs
who want to survive just like any other leaders and that once Iran crosses the
nuclear threshold, deterrence will apply even if the Iranian arsenal is relatively
small (Dokos 2012; Waltz 2012, 3).
In this authors view, although Iran is in many ways a special case and has often
caused problems to its neighbours and beyond, there should be little doubt about
Irans rationality in the foreign policy and security realm, and its understanding of
the concept of deterrence. Scenarios regarding the probability of nuclear strikes
against Europe or any of Irans neighbours do not sound especially convincing. Fur-
thermore, the lack of common borders between Iran and Israel alleviates to an
extent the possibility of military crisis escalation, a conventional conict and loss of
control during a crisis. An interesting study edited by Ephraim Kam focuses on the
day after Irans nuclearization and examines issues of potential concern including
the checks and balances on the deployment and use of nuclear weapons, the sociali-
zation of Iranian leadership and high-level bureaucracy with nuclear facts of life
and the common understanding of red lines. However, lack of regular channels of
communication between Tel-Aviv and Tehran complicate the situation (Kam 2008,
54). Furthermore, it is possible that the acquisition of a nuclear weapon capability
may increase not only Irans self-condence but also its propensity for brinkman-
ship and risk-taking. Iranian ofcial rhetoric, often bombastic in style, will not help
in this context.
Would Iran transfer nuclear weapons to terrorist organizations? There is no
record or proof so far of any NWS providing nuclear weapons to non-state actors.
If we accept that Iran is indeed a rational actor, and aware of the possible conse-
quences for its own security should the weapon be traced to Tehran (while having
no full control over its employment), it is quite unlikely that its leadership will
contemplate the transfer of nuclear weapons to a terrorist organization. Of course,
there are no absolute certainties on such matters, but the probability would be
extremely low. One caveat: the major weakness of this school of thought on both
deterrence and weapons transfer to terrorists is that it assumes that there is a central
584 T. Dokos
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decision-making authority in Iran. This may not be the case as Irans domestic
political scene is extremely complex, and actors have multiple agendas. Several
centres of power are involved in the design and execution of Iranian foreign and
military policy, whereas consensual style and the opaque nature of the decision-
making process complicate the situation even further.
Missile arsenals in the region are rather limited in both quality and quantity.
The missile threat today, to the extent that there is one, stems from one country,
namely Iran, and is limited geographically to Southern Europe (Southern Italy,
Southern Greece and a signicant part of Turkey). The threat of massive conven-
tional (or nuclear in the case of NATO) retaliation and the limited nuclear, biologi-
cal and chemical (NBC) and missile capabilities of the single proliferant country
make it highly unlikely that such weapons would be used against the populations of
NATO member states. (It is theoretically possible, however, that, under certain
circumstances, they could be used against NATO theatre or power projection
forces.) The threat of NBC use against European territories, thus, should not be
conceived of as an immediate or short-term threat, but as a mid- to long-term one.
In analyzing threat scenarios, one must remain realistic and keep in mind that in
most cases these are worst-case scenarios and that there probably are active political
and economic measures to prevent such scenarios from being realized.
Nonetheless, under certain extreme circumstances, a sufciently desperate and
ruthless leader might use nuclear or biological weapons against Western power pro-
jection forces (Blackwill and Carnesale 1993, 4243). This will be a low probability
but high consequences event and the necessary measures must be taken to deal with
such a contingency. Offensive counter-proliferation action presents signicant politi-
cal and military problems and should be seen as an option of last resort (Dokos
2008, 90110). Defensive measures, such as theatre missile defences are more feasi-
ble both politically and militarily although they may be less efcient and have a
higher economic cost. As a preventive measure, NATO has been developing an
anti-missile shield (theatre missile defence/TMD system). In this context, an early
warning radar will be built in Turkey (near Malatya) and USN ships equipped with
the Aegis system have been deployed in the eastern Mediterranean. TMD would
have two objectives: to dissuade states from developing and deploying offensive
missiles and, should proliferation of more sophisticated ballistic missiles occur, to
defend against their use in a crisis.
As mentioned, currently there is only one potential proliferant country (Iran).
Should there be a regional proliferation domino effect as a result of Irans nucleari-
zation, then NATO will have a more important role in managing and combating
nuclear proliferation in the Mediterranean and the Middle East.
Energy security
The energy dimension is increasingly important at both the global and regional
level. Oil and natural gas will continue to be a major factor in regional politics in
the Mediterranean/Middle East. The consensus view suggests that Caspian resources
will provide an important additional long-term source of energy for world markets,
although still much less signicant than Middle Eastern sources and far from the
transforming development that some early analyses implied. European oil
dependence on the Middle East will continue, thus providing a strong incentive for
securing the continuous supply of energy products.
13
In the entire region, a wide
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range of energy transportation projects are underway, linking energy and economic
security interests on a SouthSouth as well as a NorthSouth basis.
14
Indeed, one of the most critical geopolitical questions haunting the West is
whether the Middle East will continue to be a reliable supplier of oil and gas
exports at market driven prices.
15
This is not easy to predict in a region with many
interregional and internal conicts, serious economic and demographic problems.
On the other hand, the Middle East is so heavily dependent on the income from
energy exports that few if any nations will voluntarily limit their export reve-
nues. It has also been argued that, with growing levels of European dependence on
energy from the southern periphery, it would not be highly surprising if NATO (or
even the EU) in the twenty-rst century were compelled to plan for operations to
restore the ow of hydrocarbons from unstable regions. Such a mission would,
however, be of a rather interesting nature because it might require the semi-perma-
nent stationing of large military contingents to selected energy producing countries,
causing a strong domestic or regional reaction.
Some conclusions
Judging from the regions history turbulent and full of major events it is far
more likely that the evolution of the regional security environment will be non-lin-
ear. Furthermore, this is a multi-variable equation, and most variables are interde-
pendent which makes a foresight exercise even more difcult. Inevitably, any
foresight exercise leads to a number of policy-oriented questions. In this case, the
pertinent questions include the following: What are the transatlantic policy implica-
tions? What could the USA, NATO, the EU and the international community do to
prevent negative developments and increase the prospects for the realization of
more optimistic scenarios? And what should be the division of labour among those
actors? More specically, is there a role for NATO in the evolving regional security
environment in the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East?
Although it would be practically impossible to put forward recommendations for
such a wide range of issues and future challenges, there are some obvious conclu-
sions and suggestions:
Transatlantic actors need to urgently revise their strategies in view of the Arab
revolts and the other changes in the regions fundamental dynamics described
in this paper. Formulating effective responses to new challenges will be even
more difcult because of the nancial and political crises plaguing in differ-
ent ways and degrees Europe and the USA.
Security, demographic, political and socio-economic developments in the
Mediterranean and the Middle East will put an increasing strain on southern
European states (which are front-line states whether the Mediterranean is con-
sidered a faultline, a bridge or a barrier). The logical conclusion is that this is
by far the most important neighbouring region for the Europe and it must
become the top priority for both the EU and the NATO.
Resolution of the Palestinian problem is a necessary but not sufcient
condition for a substantive improvement of the regions security situation.
The West should overcome prejudices about engaging with Islamist political
forces, as these will play an important role in many countries in the region.
586 T. Dokos
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Open channels of communication should be maintained with all political
forces in the region.
Increased inuence for emerging powers looks almost unavoidable, at least in
the Gulf region. It would be relatively safe to predict that the wider Middle
East is gradually evolving into a multi-player security system and the West (a
concept which probably needs redenition, anyway) may have to adjust to a
new reality where its inuence in the Middle East will decline. But it should
be made clear to those new actors that this also means greater responsibilities.
In this context, the creation of a regional security forum with the participation
of all regional and extra-regional actors should be a priority.
From a NATO perspective, the Alliances Mediterranean Dialogue and ICI,
and more generally, its strategy towards the Mediterranean region should
focus on areas of comparative advantage for the Alliance: hard security issues
and defence-related cooperation. Such a strategy would have four basic ele-
ments: (1) understanding better the Souths strategic perceptions; (2) inform-
ing the partners about its concerns and plans in order to clear misperceptions
(on both sides); (3) inuencing the perceptions of elites
16
; and (4) promoting
military and intelligence cooperation whenever feasible and realistic. More-
over, its potential roles are bound to be further complicated by the continuing
anti-NATO and anti-US bias in most Arab countries (Dokos 2003, 7479).
Among possible missions, NATO has extensive experience and expertise in
peacemaking operations and humanitarian intervention missions. There would be
considerable reluctance, however, among member states to become involved into
such a mission in the Mediterranean, unless the crisis is very dire and there is suf-
cient legitimacy and international support. NATO countries might even insist that
there would be regional cooperation in any such mission.
The need for SSR will be particularly acute in Arab countries under transition,
former failed states that are currently under reconstruction or countries facing seri-
ous internal challenges (such as Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, eventually Syria, etc.). With
its extensive experience in SSR in former eastern Europe and south-eastern Europe,
NATO could offer valuable assistance to those countries wishing to reform their
security agencies.
NATO can be a useful player in the eld of maritime security. Whereas it could
certainly make a valuable contribution to efforts to combat piracy and to inhibit the
illegal trade of arms, and especially WMD materials and technology through the
Mediterranean and adjoining regions, it would be much less useful in efforts to
control illegal migration or organized crime as such missions are best suited for
coast guards, not regular navies.
The only plausible WMD-related threat in the wider region is Irans nuclear
programme. Although Iran is in many ways a special case and has often caused
problems to its neighbours and beyond, there should be little doubt about Irans
rationality in the foreign policy and security realm, and its understanding of the
concept of deterrence. Scenarios regarding the probability of nuclear strikes against
Europe or any of Irans neighbours do not sound especially convincing.
Nonetheless, under certain extreme circumstances, a sufciently desperate and
ruthless leader might use nuclear or biological weapons against Western power pro-
jection forces. This will be a low probability but high consequences event and the
necessary measures mainly in the form of missiles defences must be taken to deal
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with such a contingency. Should there be a regional proliferation domino effect as a
result of Irans nuclearization, then NATO will have a more important role in manag-
ing and combating nuclear proliferation in the Mediterranean and the Middle East.
Finally, although it has been argued that, with growing levels of European
dependence on gas from the southern periphery, it would not be highly improbable
if NATO (or even the EU) were compelled to plan for operations to restore the ow
of hydrocarbons from unstable regions. Such a mission would, however, be of a
rather interesting nature because it might require the semi-permanent stationing of
large military contingents to selected energy producing countries, causing a strong
domestic or regional reaction.
Although not a central player anymore in most scenarios, NATO will remain in
the foreseeable future a very useful tool for crisis management in the Mediterranean
region.
Notes
1. It has been observed that although the Mediterranean may be regarded as a geographic
entity, this did not make the Mediterranean a political or strategic whole. Other
analysts argue that todays Mediterranean may be seen as a vital crossroads open to
inuences and exchanges, but they also tend to stress that the Mediterranean has become
a frontier separating different worlds. According to Stephen Calleya, the Mediterranean
is a frontier separating different political, economic, military and cultural forces
(Winrow 2000, 3, 7). According to Roberto Menotti, The Mediterranean region is
not unitary, let alone cohesive. The Mediterranean basin comprises a large number of
national actors belonging to various subregional complexes, linked by a series of
interacting rivalries, animosities and highly competitive relationships. In other words, the
basin is practically a patchwork of sub-regional complexes showing little coherence
(Menotti 19971999, 25).
2. According to the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, a driver is a factor that
directly inuences or causes change (Global Strategic Trends 2010, 6). For NATO, a dri-
ver designates the course of an event that results in a specic trend into a component
(FSE 2007, 11). Jair van der Lijn denes drivers as underlying causes or incentives for
an actor or phenomenon (van der Lijn 2011, 149).
3. Dened as developing countries whose futures were poised at critical turning points
and whose fates would signicantly affect regional, and even international, stability.
(Chase, Hill, and Kennedy 1999, 4).
4. If certain conditions are fullled, some countries will move towards a sustainable future,
while others will either remain in or accelerate dynamics towards unsustainability, insta-
bility and/or conict (Tocci 2011, 3).
5. As Nathalie Tocci argues, the overall prospects for war and peace in the Middle East
will be fundamentally shaped by Egypts probable resurgence on the regional scene. It
will ll part of the void currently lled by non-Arab countries like Iran and Turkey
(Tocci 2011, 7).
6. It should also be noted that young democracies are often unstable and have weak institu-
tions.
7. It is estimated that China already gets around 50% of its imported oil from the Middle
East. Chinas oil imports from the Middle East are expected to rise ve- to sixfold until
2030, and its dependency will rise to 70 or even 80%. The projection or Indias crude
oil imports from the region is quite similar (Economy 2010, 142; Strategic Trends 2011,
51, 64).
8. The EU-ISS examines four scenarios for the EU's future: (1) barely keeping aoat, (2)
fragmentation, (3) concept of Europe redux and (4) gaming reality: conict trumps coop-
eration (EU Institute for Security Studies [EU-ISS] 2010, 1415). Van der Lijn presents
another ve scenarios for the EU: (a) EU integrates further, but militarily it remains the
junior partner to the USA. As such, this scenario is more or less a continuation of the cur-
rent situation; (b) the Union becomes an independent political and military entity that dis-
588 T. Dokos
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tances itself from the USA; (c) the Union disintegrates and nationalism becomes predomi-
nant again; (d) the Union is a strong economic trade unit; and (e) The EU expands too
far and too fast and disintegrates into a free trade organization, which is peacefully inte-
grated into the world system. (van der Lijn 2011, 152; see also Project Europe 2010).
9. The World Bank notes that poor nations will bear 7580% of the cost of oods,
increased desertication and other disasters caused by global warming, and it estimates
that by 2030, developing countries will need $75 billion annually for adaptation and
another $400 billion for low-carbon technology development. The EU estimates that
$130 billion a year by 2020 would cost-effectively address climate change. (Glenn,
Gordon, and Florescu 2010, 67).
10. Water shortages can lead to food shortages, which can lead to conict over remaining
resources, which can drive human migration, which can create new food shortages in
new regions (Podesta and Odgen 20072008, 116).
11. The Mediterranean south played a rather marginal role in the EastWest strategic compe-
tition and NATO strategy (Lesser 2005, 5; Whitman 19971999, 5).
12. According to NATO, the Dialogue is aimed at creating good relations and better mutual
understanding throughout the Mediterranean, as well as promoting regional security and
stability. It provides for political discussions with the participating countries. Its work is
organized through an annual Work Programme focusing on practical cooperation in secu-
rity and defence-related areas, information, civil-emergency planning and science http://
www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/med-dia.htm. For a history of the Mediterranean Dialogue
see, Whitman (19971999, 1112).
13. The discovery of signicant natural gas deposits in the exclusive economic zones of
Israel and Cyprus and the alleged holdings of the Levant Basin may provide an addi-
tional energy source outside the former Soviet space and the Middle East proper.
14. As Ian Lesser points out, the proliferation of new energy routes, and especially gas pipe-
lines, around the Mediterranean and its hinterlands is uniting previously distinct econo-
mies and encouraging interest to protect this complex and costly infrastructure. It is a
promising area for cooperation on a Mediterranean and sub-regional basis. It will also
raise new issues for the transatlantic debate about energy security (Lesser 2005, 14).
15. According to Anthony Cordesman, the real threats in the Middle East may well consist
of how well local powers can achieve enough stability and resources to consistently
meet the worlds growing need for oil and gas exports (Cordesman 2005, 2).
16. Even a marginal contribution to the reduction of the level of mistrust toward the West
among the elites of those states and a much more difcult task their societies, would
be a signicant achievement (Menotti 19971999, 15 and 17). In this context, NATOs
Mediterranean Dialogue and ICI constitute a useful tool of preventive diplomacy and a
potentially important condence-building measure (Winrow 2000, 2).
Notes on contributor
Thanos Dokos is a director-general of Hellenic Foundation for European & Foreign Policy
(ELIAMEP). He teaches at the University of Athens and the National Security Academy.
His research interests include international security, the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, regional security in the Middle East and Turkish foreign and security policy. His
publications include: The Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the
Mediterranean and the Middle East: EU and NATOs Options (2008); The Eastern
Mediterranean and the Gulf Region in 2020: Alternative Scenarios for the Regional Security
Environment (2011).
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