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EBRALINAG VS.

DIVISION SUPERINTENDENTS OF SCHOOLS OF CEBU


(G.R. Nos. 95770, 95887; March 1, 1993)
Facts: All the petitioners in the original case were minor school children, and members of the sect, Jehovah's
Witnesses (assisted by their parents) who were expelled from their classes by various public school authorities in
Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as required by Republic
Act No. 1265 of July 11, 1955 and by Department Order No. 8, dated July 21, 1955 issued by the Department of
Education. Aimed primarily at private educational institutions which did not observe the flag ceremony exercises,
Republic Act No. 1265 penalizes all educational institutions for failure or refusal to observe the flag ceremony with
public censure on first offense and cancellation of the recognition or permit on second offense.
Issue: Does refusal to take part in the flag ceremony, on account of religious belief, so offensive as to prompt
legitimate state intervention?
Held: No. While conceding to the idea adverted to by the Solicitor General that certain methods of religious
expression may be prohibited to serve legitimate societal purposes, refusal to participate in the flag ceremony hardly
constitutes a form of religious expression so offensive and noxious as to prompt legitimate State intervention. It
bears repeating that their absence from the ceremony hardly constitutes a danger so grave and imminent as to
warrant the state's intervention. In the case of a regulation which appears to abridge a right to which the fundamental
law accords high significance it is the regulation, not the act (or refusal to act), which is the exception and which
requires the court's strictest scrutiny. In the case at bench, the government has not shown that refusal to do the acts
of conformity exacted by the assailed orders, which respondents point out attained legislative cachet in the
Administrative Code of 1987, would pose a clear and present danger of a danger so serious and imminent, that it
would prompt legitimate State intervention.
Source: Karissafaye, digests article III sections 5-8, constitutional law,
http://karissafaye.blogspot.com/2009/12/digests-article-iii-sections-5-8.html (last accessed Feb. 24, 2013)
US VS. BUSTOS
(G.R. No. L-12592 ; March 8, 1918)

Facts: In the latter part of 1915, numerous citizens of the Province of Pampanga assembled, and prepared and signed
a petition to the Executive Secretary(privileged communication) through the law office of Crossfield and O'Brien,
and five individuals signed affidavits, charging Roman Punsalan, justice of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol,
Pampanga, with malfeasance in office and asking for his removal. The specific charges against the justice of the
peace include the solicitation of money from persons who have pending cases before the judge. Now, Punsalan
alleged that accused published a writing which was false, scandalous, malicious, defamatory, and libelous against
him.
Issue: Whether or Not accused is entitled to constitutional protection by virtue of his right to free speech and free
press.
Held: Yes. The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to criticize judicial conduct. The
administration of the law is a matter of vital public concern. Whether the law is wisely or badly enforced is,
therefore, a fit subject for proper comment. If the people cannot criticize a justice of the peace or a judge the same as
any other public officer, public opinion will be effectively suppressed. It is a duty which everyone owes to society or
to the State to assist in the investigation of any alleged misconduct. It is further the duty of all who know of any
official dereliction on the part of a magistrate or the wrongful act of any public officer to bring the facts to the notice
of those whose duty it is to inquire into and punish them.
The right to assemble and petition is the necessary consequence of republican institutions and the complement of the
part of free speech. Assembly means a right on the part of citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to
public affairs. Petition means that any person or group of persons can apply, without fear of penalty, to the
appropriate branch or office of the government for a redress of grievances. The persons assembling and petitioning
must, of course, assume responsibility for the charges made. All persons have an interest in the pure and efficient
administration of justice and of public affairs.
Public policy, the welfare of society, and the orderly administration of government have demanded protection for
public opinion. The inevitable and incontestable result has been the development and adoption of the doctrine of
privilege. All persons have an interest in the pure and efficient administration of justice and of public affairs. The
duty under which a party is privileged is sufficient if it is social or moral in its nature and this person in good faith
believes he is acting in pursuance thereof although in fact he is mistaken. Although the charges are probably not true
as to the justice of the peace, they were believed to be true by the petitioners. Good faith surrounded their action.
Probable cause for them to think that malfeasance or misfeasance in office existed is apparent. The ends and the
motives of these citizens to secure the removal from office of a person thought to be venal were justifiable. In
no way did they abuse the privilege.

In the usual case malice can be presumed from defamatory words. Privilege destroys that presumption. A privileged
communication should not be subjected to microscopic examination to discover grounds of malice or falsity.

Source: Coffeeholic Writes, US vs. Bustos, http://cofferette.blogspot.com/2009/02/us-vs-bustos-37-phil-731-gr-l-
12592-8.html (last accessed Feb. 23, 2013)
IGLESIA NI CRISTO VS. COURT OF APPEALS
(G.R. No. 119673; JULY 26, 1996)

Facts: Petitioner has a television program entitled "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" aired on Channel 2 every Saturday and on
Channel 13 every Sunday. The program presents and propagates petitioner's religious beliefs, doctrines and practices
often times in comparative studies with other religions. Petitioner submitted to the respondent Board of Review for
Moving Pictures and Television the VTR tapes of its TV program Series Nos. 116, 119, 121 and 128. The Board
classified the series as "X" or not for public viewing on the ground that they "offend and constitute an attack against
other religions which is expressly prohibited by law." On November 28, 1992, it appealed to the Office of the
President the classification of its TV Series No. 128 which allowed it through a letter of former Executive Secretary
Edelmiro A. Amante, Sr., addressed for Henrietta S. Mendez reversing the decision of the respondent Board.
According to the letter the episode in is protected by the constitutional guarantee of free speech and expression and
no indication that the episode poses any clear and present danger. Petitioner also filed Civil Case. Petitioner alleged
that the respondent Board acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in requiring petitioner to
submit the VTR tapes of its TV program and in x-rating them. It cited its TV Program Series Nos. 115, 119, 121 and
128. In their Answer, respondent Board invoked its power under PD No. 19861 in relation to Article 201 of the
Revised Penal Code. The Iglesia ni Cristo insists on the literal translation of the bible and says that our (Catholic)
veneration of the Virgin Mary is not to be condoned because nowhere it is found in the bible. The board contended
that it outrages Catholic and Protestant's beliefs. RTC ruled in favor of petitioners. CA however reversed it hence
this petition.
Issue: Whether or Not the "ang iglesia ni cristo" program is not constitutionally protected as a form of religious
exercise and expression.
Held: Yes. Any act that restrains speech is accompanied with presumption of invalidity. It is the burden of the
respondent Board to overthrow this presumption. If it fails to discharge this burden, its act of censorship will be
struck down. This is true in this case. So-called "attacks" are mere criticisms of some of the deeply held dogmas and
tenets of other religions. RTCs ruling clearly suppresses petitioner's freedom of speech and interferes with its right
to free exercise of religion. attack is different from offend any race or religion. The respondent Board may
disagree with the criticisms of other religions by petitioner but that gives it no excuse to interdict such criticisms,
however, unclean they may be. Under our constitutional scheme, it is not the task of the State to favor any religion
by protecting it against an attack by another religion. Religious dogmas and beliefs are often at war and to preserve
peace among their followers, especially the fanatics, the establishment clause of freedom of religion prohibits the
State from leaning towards any religion. Respondent board cannot censor the speech of petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo
simply because it attacks other religions, even if said religion happens to be the most numerous church in our
country. The basis of freedom of religion is freedom of thought and it is best served by encouraging the marketplace
of dueling ideas. It is only where it is unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and grave danger to the
security and welfare of the community that infringement of religious freedom may be justified, and only to the
smallest extent necessary to avoid the danger. There is no showing whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will
bring about especially the gravity and imminence of the threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech, including
religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a substantive and imminent
evil. It is inappropriate to apply the clear and present danger test to the case at bar because the issue involves the
content of speech and not the time, place or manner of speech. Allegedly, unless the speech is first allowed, its
impact cannot be measured, and the causal connection between the speech and the evil apprehended cannot be
established. The determination of the question as to whether or not such vilification, exaggeration or fabrication falls
within or lies outside the boundaries of protected speech or expression is a judicial function which cannot be
arrogated by an administrative body such as a Board of Censors." A system of prior restraint may only be validly
administered by judges and not left to administrative agencies.
Source: Coffeeholic Writes, Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Court of Appeals, http://cofferette.blogspot.com/2009/02/iglesia-ni-
cristo-vs-court-of-appeals.html (last accessed Feb. 24, 2013)

SENATE VS. ERMITA
(GR 169777; April 20, 2006)
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused power by issuing E.O. 464
Ensuring Observance of the Principles of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and
Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the
Constitution, and for Other Purposes. Petitioners pray for its declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional.
In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate Committees,
conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the attendance of officials and
employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices including those employed in Government Owned and
Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP).
The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear
as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project, others on the issues of massive election fraud in the
Philippine elections, wiretapping, and the role of military in the so-called Gloriagate Scandal.
Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the President as provided by E.O. 464, Section 3
which requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to
appearing before either house of Congress.
ISSUE: Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the
consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress, valid and constitutional?
RULING: No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by the executive privilege. The
doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that certain information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept
confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to
disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public
interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case.
Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of
legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it
and state the reason therefor and why it must be respected.
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional requests for
information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere
expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated.
Source: Karissafaye, Senate vs. Ermita, http://karissafaye.blogspot.com/2009/06/senate-vs-ermita-gr-169777-april-
20.html (last accessed Feb. 24, 2013)
DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO VS. VASQUEZ
(G.R. NOS. 99289-90; Jan. 27, 1993)
Facts: An information was filed against petitioner with the Sandiganbayan for violation of the Anti Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. The order of arrest was issued with bail for release fixed at Php. 15,000 so she filed a motion
for acceptance of cash bail bond. On the same day the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution authorizing the petitioner
to post cash bond which the later filed in the amount of Php.15, 000. Her arraignment was set, but petitioner asked
for the cancellation of her bail bond and that she be allowed provisional release on recognizance. The
Sandiganbayan deferred it. The Sandiganbayan issued a hold departure order against petitioner, by reason of the
announcement she made that she would be leaving for the U.S. to accept a fellowship a Harvard. In the instant
motion she submitted before the S.C. she argues that her right to travel is impaired.
Issue: Whether or Not the petitioners right to travel is impaired.
Held: The petitioner does not deny and as a matter of fact even made a public statement, that she he every intension
of leaving the country to pursue higher studies abroad. The court upholds the course of action of the Sandiganbayan
in taking judicial notice of such fact of petitioners pal to go abroad and in thereafter issuing a sua sponte the hold
departure order is but an exercise of respondent courts inherent power to preserve and to maintain effectiveness of
its jurisdiction over the case and the person of the accused.
Also, the petitioner assumed obligations, when she posted bail bond. She holds herself amenable at all times to the
orders and process of eth court. She may legally be prohibited from leaving the country during the pendency of the
case. (Manotoc v. C.A.)
Source: Coffeeholic Writes, Defensor-Santiago vs. Vasquez, http://cofferette.blogspot.com/2009/02/defensor-
santiago-vs-vasquez-217-scra.html (last accessed Feb. 24, 2013)
REYES VS BAGATSING
(G.R. No. L-65366; November 9, 1983)
FACTS: Petitioners request for a permit to hold a peaceful march and rally was denied by respondent mayor due to
police intelligence reports affirming plans of criminal intent to disrupt the assembly. Respondent recommended that
the permit may be issued if said rally is to be held at any other enclosed area where safety is ensured.
ISSUE: Whether or not denial of a permit to rally violates freedom of speech.
HELD: Yes. The sole justification for a limitation on the exercise of this right is the danger of a character both grave
and imminent, of a serious evil public safety, public morals, or any other legitimate public interest. Peaceful
assemblies are guaranteed in freedom of speech.
Source: P. Morados, Reyes vs. Bagatsing, http://piusmorados.wordpress.com/2011/11/08/reyes-vs-bagatsing-
digested/ (last accessed Feb. 24, 2013)

VILLAVICENCIO VS LUKBAN
(G.R. No. L-14639; March 25, 1919)
Facts: Justo Lukban as Manila Mayor together with the police officer, took custody of 170 women at the night of
October 25 beyond the latter's consent and knowledge and thereafter were shipped to Davao City where they were
signed as laborers.
A writ of habeas corpus was filed against the mayor on behalf of those women. The court granted the writ, but the
mayor was not able to bring any of the women before the court on the stipulated date.
Issue: Whether or not the act of mayor has a legal basis.
Held: The Supreme Court said that the mayor's acts were not legal. His intent of exterminating vice was
commendable, but there was no law saying that he could force Filipino women to change their domicile from manila
to another place. The women, said the court, although in a sense "lepers of society" were still Filipino citizens and
such they were entitled to the constitutional enjoyed by all other Filipino citizens. The right to freedom of domicile
was such a fundamental right that its suppression would be tantamount to slavery.
The Supreme Court upheld the right of Filipino citizens to freedom of domicile or the Liberty of abode. "Ours is a
government of laws and not of men."
Source: R. Dogale, Villavicienco vs. Lukban, http://idiotscasedigest.blogspot.com/2009/07/villavicencio-vs-lukban-
l-14639.html (last accessed Feb. 24, 2013)






CAUNCA VS. SALAZAR
(G.R. No. L-2690; Jan 1, 1949)
Facts: This is an action for habeas corpus brought by Bartolome Caunca in behalf of his cousin Estelita Flores who
was employed by the Far Eastern Employment Bureau, owned by Julia Salazar, respondent herein. An advanced
payment has already been given to Estelita by the employment agency, for her to work as a maid. However, Estelita
wanted to transfer to another residence, which was disallowed by the employment agency. Further she was detained
and her liberty was restrained. The employment agency wanted that the advance payment, which was applied to her
transportation expense from the province should be paid by Estelita before she could be allowed to leave.
Issue: Whether or Not an employment agency has the right to restrain and detain a maid without returning the
advance payment it gave?
Held: An employment agency, regardless of the amount it may advance to a prospective employee or maid, has
absolutely no power to curtail her freedom of movement. The fact that no physical force has been exerted to keep
her in the house of the respondent does not make less real the deprivation of her personal freedom of movement,
freedom to transfer from one place to another, freedom to choose ones residence. Freedom may be lost due to
external moral compulsion, to founded or groundless fear, to erroneous belief in the existence of an imaginary power
of an impostor to cause harm if not blindly obeyed, to any other psychological element that may curtail the mental
faculty of choice or the unhampered exercise of the will. If the actual effect of such psychological spell is to place a
person at the mercy of another, the victim is entitled to the protection of courts of justice as much as the individual
who is illegally deprived of liberty by duress or physical coercion.
Source: Coffeeholic Writes, Caunca vs. Salazar, http://cofferette.blogspot.com/2009/02/caunca-vs-salazar-82-phil-
851-nol-2690.html (last accessed Feb. 24, 2013)

MANOTOC VS. COURT OF APPEALS
(G.R. No. L-62100; May 30, 1986)
Facts: Petitioner was charged with estafa. He posted bail. Petitioner filed before each of the trial courts a motion
entitled, "motion for permission to leave the country," stating as ground therefor his desire to go to the United
States, "relative to his business transactions and opportunities." The prosecution opposed said motion and after due
hearing, both trial judges denied the same. Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the
then Court of Appeals seeking to annul the orders dated March 9 and 26, 1982, of Judges Camilon and Pronove,
respectively, as well as the communication-request of the Securities and Exchange Commission, denying his leave
to travel abroad. He likewise prayed for the issuance of the appropriate writ commanding the Immigration
Commissioner and the Chief of the Aviation Security Command (AVSECOM) to clear him for departure. The Court
of Appeals denied the petition.
Petitioner contends that having been admitted to bail as a matter of right, neither the courts which granted him bail
nor the Securities and Exchange Commission which has no jurisdiction over his liberty could prevent him from
exercising his constitutional right to travel.
Issue: Whether or Not his constitutional right to travel has been violated.
Held: A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a necessary
consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself
available at all times whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel.
Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond the
reach of the courts. Petitioner has not shown the necessity for his travel abroad. There is no indication that the
business transactions cannot be undertaken by any other person in his behalf.
Source: Coffeeholic Writes, Manotoc vs. CA, http://cofferette.blogspot.com/2009/02/manotoc-vs-court-of-appeals-
142-scra.html (last accessed Feb. 24, 2013)
YAP VS. CA
(G.R. No. 141529; June 6, 2001)
Facts: The right against excessive bail, and the liberty of abode and travel, are being invoked to set aside two
resolutions of the Court of Appeals which fixed bail at P5,500,000.00 and imposed conditions on change of
residence and travel abroad. For misappropriating amounts equivalent to P5,500,000.00, petitioner was convicted of
estafa and was sentenced to four years and two months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight years of prision
mayor as maximum, in addition to one (1) year for each additional P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00 but in no
case shall it exceed twenty (20) years. He filed a notice of appeal, and moved to be allowed provisional liberty
under the cash bond he had filed earlier in the proceedings.
Issue: Was the condition imposed by the CA on accuseds bail bond violative the liberty of abode and right to
travel?
Held: Imposing bail in an excessive amount could render meaningless the right to bail. Under the circumstances of
this case, we find that appropriate conditions have been imposed in the bail bond to ensure against the risk of flight,
particularly, the combination of the hold-departure order and the requirement that petitioner inform the court of any
change of residence and of his whereabouts. Although an increase in the amount of bail while the case is on appeal
may be meritorious, we find that the setting of the amount at P5,500,000.00 is unreasonable, excessive, and
constitutes an effective denial of petitioners right to bail.
Source: Karissafaye, digests article III sections 5-8, constitutional law,
http://karissafaye.blogspot.com/2009/12/digests-article-iii-sections-5-8.html (last accessed Feb. 24, 2013)

SORIANO VS. LA GUARDIA
(G.R. No. 164785; April 29, 2009)
Facts: On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as host of the program Ang Dating Daan, aired on
UNTV 37, made obscene remarks against INC. Two days after, before the MTRCB, separate but almost identical
affidavit-complaints were lodged by Jessie L. Galapon and seven other private respondents, all members of the
Iglesia ni Cristo (INC), against petitioner in connection with the above broadcast. Respondent Michael M. Sandoval,
who felt directly alluded to in petitioners remark, was then a minister of INC and a regular host of the TV program
Ang Tamang Daan.
Issue: Are Sorianos statements during the televised Ang Dating Daan part of the religious discourse and within
the protection of Section 5, Art.III?
Held: No. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, therefore, and considering the adverse effect of
petitioners utterances on the viewers fundamental rights as well as petitioners clear violation of his duty as a
public trustee, the MTRCB properly suspended him from appearing in Ang Dating Daan for three months.
Furthermore, it cannot be properly asserted that petitioners suspension was an undue curtailment of his right to free
speech either as a prior restraint or as a subsequent punishment. Aside from the reasons given above (re the
paramountcy of viewers rights, the public trusteeship character of a broadcasters role and the power of the State to
regulate broadcast media), a requirement that indecent language be avoided has its primary effect on the form, rather
than the content, of serious communication. There are few, if any, thoughts that cannot be expressed by the use of
less offensive language.
Source: Karissafaye, digests article III sections 5-8, constitutional law,
http://karissafaye.blogspot.com/2009/12/digests-article-iii-sections-5-8.html (last accessed Feb. 24, 2013)


JACINTO VS. CA
(G.R. No. 124540; November 14, 1997)
Facts: Petitioners are public school teachers from various schools in Metropolitan Manila. Between the period
September 17 to 21, 1990, they incurred unauthorized absences in connection with the mass actions then staged; and
on September 17, 1990, DECS Secretary Isidro Cario immediately issued a return-to-work order. They were
administratively charged with gross misconduct; gross neglect of duty, etc. for joining unauthorized mass actions;
ignoring report-to-work directives; unjustified abandonment of teaching posts; non-observance of Civil Service law,
rules and regulations; non-compliance with reasonable office rules and regulations; and incurring unauthorized
absences without leave, etc.
Issue: Were the public school teachers penalized for the exercise of their right to assemble peacefully and to petition
the government for redress of grievances?
Held: Improper Exercise of the Right to Peaceful Assembly and to Petition for a Redress of Grievances. There is no
question as to the petitioners rights to peaceful assembly to petition the government for a redress of grievances and,
for that matter, to organize or form associations for purposes not contrary to law, as well as to engage in peaceful
concerted activities. Although the Constitution vests in them the right to organize, to assemble peaceably and to
petition the government for a redress of grievances, there is no like express provision granting them the right to
strike. Rather, the constitutional grant of the right to strike is restrained by the proviso that its exercise shall be done
in accordance with law.
It cannot be denied that the mass action or assembly staged by the petitioners resulted in the non-holding of classes
in several public schools during the corresponding period.
Source: Karissafaye, digests article III sections 5-8, constitutional law,
http://karissafaye.blogspot.com/2009/12/digests-article-iii-sections-5-8.html (last accessed Feb. 24, 2013)







IBP VS. MAYOR JOSE LITO ATIENZA
(G.R. No. 175241; February 24, 2010)
Conrad Lacsina

Facts: IBP filed with the Office of the City Mayor of Manila an application for a permit to rally at the foot of
Mendiola Bridge. The mayor issued a permit allowing the IBP to stage a rally on given date but indicated therein
Plaza Miranda as the venue, instead of Mendiola Bridge. The rally pushed through at Mendiola Bridge. A criminal
action was thereafter instituted against Cadiz for violating the Public Assembly Act in staging a rally at a venue not
indicated in the permit.
Held: The Supreme Court held that in modifying the permit outright, respondent Mayor gravely abused his
discretion when he did not immediately inform the IBP who should have been heard first on the matter of his
perceived imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil that may warrant the changing of the venue. The
opportunity to be heard precedes the action on the permit, since the applicant may directly go to court after an
unfavorable action on the permit. Respondent mayor failed to indicate how he had arrived at modifying the terms of
the permit against the standard of a clear and present danger test which is an indispensable condition to such
modification. Nothing in the issued permit adverts to an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, which
blank denial or modification would, when granted imprimatur as the appellate court would have it, render illusory
any judicial scrutiny thereof.

Source: C, Lacsina, IBP vs. Mayor Jose Lito Atienza,
https://www.google.com.ph/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&cad=rja&ved=0CDUQFjAB&url=htt
p%3A%2F%2Fxa.yimg.com%2Fkq%2Fgroups%2F75308565%2F756800583%2Fname%2FIBP%2Bv.%2BAtienza
.doc&ei=NAUsUaneKeSXiQeIlICgAQ&usg=AFQjCNFeXJ1UBVkwbSeQ3N5jmcJd4tuLrw&bvm=bv.42965579,d
.aGc (last accessed Feb. 24, 2013)

SWS VS COMELEC
(G.R. No. 147571; May 5, 2001)
Facts: Petitioner SWS and KPC states that it wishes to conduct an election survey throughout the period of the
elections and release to the media the results of such survey as well as publish them directly. Petitioners argue that
the restriction on the publication of election survey results constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of
speech without any clear and present danger to justify such restraint.
Issue: Are the Comelec Resolutions prohibiting the holding of pre-polls and exit polls and the dissemination of their
results through mass media, valid and constitutional?
Ruling: No. The Court held that Section (5)4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of
expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even though such suppression is only
for a limited period, and (3) the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than
suppression of freedom of expression.
It has been held that "[mere] legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public convenience may well
support regulation directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient to justify such as diminishes the exercise
of rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions.
Source: Karissafaye, Case Digests, http://karissafaye.blogspot.com/2010/05/sws-vs-comelec-facts-petitioner-sws-
and.html (last accessed Feb. 24, 2013)
MALABANAN VS. RAMENTO
(G.R. No. 62270; May 21, 1984)
Facts: Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council of respondent University. They sought and were
granted by the school authorities a permit to hold a meeting from 8:00 A.M. to 12:00 P.M, on August 27, 1982.
Pursuant to such permit, along with other students, they held a general assembly at the Veterinary Medicine and
Animal Science basketball court (VMAS), the place indicated in such permit, not in the basketball court as therein
stated but at the second floor lobby. At such gathering they manifested in vehement and vigorous language their
opposition to the proposed merger of the Institute of Animal Science with the Institute of Agriculture. The same day,
they marched toward the Life Science Building and continued their rally. It was outside the area covered by their
permit. Even they rallied beyond the period allowed. They were asked to explain on the same day why they should
not be held liable for holding an illegal assembly. Then on September 9, 1982, they were informed that they were
under preventive suspension for their failure to explain the holding of an illegal assembly. The validity thereof was
challenged by petitioners both before the Court of First Instance of Rizal against private respondents and before the
Ministry of Education, Culture, and Sports. Respondent Ramento found petitioners guilty of the charge of illegal
assembly which was characterized by the violation of the permit granted resulting in the disturbance of classes and
oral defamation. The penalty was suspension for one academic year. Hence this petition.
Issue: Whether on the facts as disclosed resulting in the disciplinary action and the penalty imposed, there was an
infringement of the right to peaceable assembly and its cognate right of free speech.
Held: Yes. Student leaders are likely to be assertive and dogmatic. They would be ineffective if during a rally they
speak in the guarded and judicious language of the academe. But with the activity taking place in the school
premises and during the daytime, no clear and present danger of public disorder is discernible. This is without
prejudice to the taking of disciplinary action for conduct, "materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial
disorder or invasion of the rights of others."
The rights to peaceable assembly and free speech are guaranteed students of educational institutions. Necessarily,
their exercise to discuss matters affecting their welfare or involving public interest is not to be subjected to previous
restraint or subsequent punishment unless there be a showing of a clear and present danger to a substantive evil that
the state, has a right to present. As a corollary, the utmost leeway and scope is accorded the content of the placards
displayed or utterances made. The peaceable character of an assembly could be lost, however, by an advocacy of
disorder under the name of dissent, whatever grievances that may be aired being susceptible to correction through
the ways of the law. If the assembly is to be held in school premises, permit must be sought from its school
authorities, who are devoid of the power to deny such request arbitrarily or unreasonably. In granting such permit,
there may be conditions as to the time and place of the assembly to avoid disruption of classes or stoppage of work
of the non-academic personnel. Even if, however, there be violations of its terms, the penalty incurred should not be
disproportionate to the offense.
Source: Coffeeholic Writes, Malabanan vs. Ramento, http://cofferette.blogspot.com/2009/02/malabanan-vs-
ramento-129-scra-359-gr.html (last accessed Feb. 24, 2013)




ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
(G.R. No. 190582; April 8, 2010)

Facts: COMELEC refused to recognize Ang Ladlad LGBT Party, an organization composed of men and women
who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs),as a party list based on
moral grounds. In the elevation of the case to the Supreme Court, Comelec alleged that petitioner made
misrepresentation in their application.
Issue: Whether or not Ang Ladlad LGBT Party qualifies for registration as party-list.
Ruling: Ang Ladlad LGBT Partys application for registration should be granted.
COMELECs citation of the Bible and the Koran in denying petitioners application was a violation of the non-
establishment clause laid down in Article 3 section 5 of the Constitution. The proscription by law relative to acts
against morality must be for a secular purpose (that is, the conduct prohibited or sought to be repressed is
detrimental or dangerous to those conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human society"),
rather than out of religious conformity. The Comelec failed to substantiate their allegation that allowing registration
to Ladlad would be detrimental to society.
The LGBT community is not exempted from the exercise of its constitutionally vested rights on the basis of their
sexual orientation. Laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to
participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented sectors.
Discrimination based on sexual orientation is not tolerated ---not by our own laws or by any international laws by
which we adhere.
Source: J. Parilla, Over A Cup of Coffee and a Pint of Insanity, http://lapadiday.blogspot.com/2012/11/case-digest-
ang-ladlad-lgbt-party-vs.html (last accessed Feb. 24, 2013)

ESTRADA V. ESCRITOR
(A.M.No. P-02-1651, August 4, 2003)
Facts:
1. Respondent is the Court interpreter of RTC Branch 253 in Las Pinas City. The complainant Estrada requested for
an investigation of respondent for living with a man not her husband while she was still legally married and having
borne a child within this live-in arrangement. Estrada believed that Escritor is committing a grossly immoral act
which tarnishes the image of the judiciary, thus she should not be allowed to remain employed therein as it might
appear that the court condones her act.
2. Respondent admitted she started living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr. more than 20 years ago when her husband was
still alive but living with another woman. She likewise admitted having a son with Quilapio but denies any liability
for alleged grossly immoral conduct because, 1) She is a member of the Jehovahs Witnesses and the Watch Tower
Society, 2) That the conjugal arrangement was in conformity with their religious beliefs, and 3) That the conjugal
arrangement with Quilapio has the approval of her congregation.
3. Escritor likewise claimed that she had executed a Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness' in accordance with her
religion which allows members of the Jehovahs witnesses who have been abandoned by their spouses to enter into
marital relations. The Declaration thus makes the resulting union moral and binding within the congregation all over
the world except in countries where divorce is allowed.
Held: Escritor was therefore held not administratively liable for grossly immoral conduct. Escritors conjugal
arrangement cannot be penalized as she has made out a case for exemption from the law based on her fundamental
right to religion. The Court recognizes that state interests must be upheld in order that freedomsincluding religious
freedommay be enjoyed.
In the area of religious exercise as preferred freedom, however, man stands accountable to an authority higher than
the state, and so the state interest sought to be upheld must be so compelling that its violation will erode the very
fabric of the state that will also protect the freedom. In the absence of a showing that the state interest exists, man
must be allowed to subscribe to the Infinite.
Source: Laws and Found, Estrada v. Escritor Digest, http://lawsandfound.blogspot.com/2012/11/estrada-v-escritor-
digest.html (last accessed Feb. 24, 2013)

MTRCB V. ABS-CBN AND LOREN LEGARDA
(GR No. 155282; January 17, 2005)
FACTS: An episode of The Inside Story entitled Prosti-tuition, produced by Loren Legarda was aired by ABS-
CBN depicting female students moonlighting as prostitutes to enable them to pay for their tuition fees. Philippine
Womens University (PWU) was named as the school of some of the students involved. MTRCB alleged that the
episode besmirched the name of the PWU and respondents did not submit The Inside Story to MTRCB for review
and exhibited the same without its permission, violating Sec. 7 of PD 1986, Sec. 3, Chapter III and Sec. 7, Chapter
IV of MTRCB Rules and Regulations.
MTRCB declared that all subsequent programs of the The Inside Story and all other programs of the ABS-CBN
Ch. 2 of the same category shall be submitted to the Board of Review and Approval before showing. On appeal,
RTC ruled that Sections 3 (c) (d), 4, 7 and 11 of P. D. No. 1986 and Sections 3, 7 and 28 (a) of the MTRCB Rules
and Regulations are unconstitutional for violating the freedom of expression and of the press guaranteed by the
Constitution
ISSUE : Whether or not there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry so as to proceed with the
issue on constitutionality.
RULING: NO. There is no need to resolve whether certain provisions of PD 1986 and MTRCB Rules and
Regulations contravene the Constitution. No question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or
governmental act may be heard and decided by the court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for
judicial inquiry: 1) proper party 2)actual case or controversy 3) question raised at the earliest possible opportunity
and 4) that the decision on the constitutional or legal question must be necessary to the determination of the case
itself. The fourth requisite is wanting. MTRCB did not disapprove or ban the showing of the program nor did it
cancel respondents permit. The latter was merely penalized for their failure to submit the program to MTRCB for
its review and approval. Therefore, the issue of constitutionality is not necessary to the determination of the case
itself.
Source: Political Law Blog For The First Year, MTRCB V. ABS-CBN AND LOREN LEGARDA,
http://rsbast.blogspot.com/2012/12/yanson.html (last accessed Feb. 24, 2013)




RANDOLF S. DAVID V. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
(G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006)
FACTS: On February 24, 2006, as the Filipino nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the EDSA People Power I,
President Arroyo issued PP 1017, implemented by G.O. No. 5, declaring a state of national emergency.
In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, respondents stated that the proximate cause
behind the executive issuances was the conspiracy among some military officers, leftist insurgents of the New
Peoples Army, and some members of the political opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate President Arroyo.
They considered the aim to oust or assassinate the President and take-over the reins of government as a clear and
present danger.
Petitioners David and Llamas were arrested without warrants on February 24, 2006 on their way to EDSA.
Meanwhile, the offices of the newspaper Daily Tribune, which was perceived to be anti-Arroyo, was searched
without warrant at about 1:00 A.M. on February 25, 2006. Seized from the premises in the absence of any official
of the Daily Tribune except the security guard of the building were several materials for publication. The law
enforcers, a composite team of PNP and AFP officers, cited as basis of the warrantless arrests and the warrantless
search and seizure was Presidential Proclamation 1017 issued by then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in the
exercise of her constitutional power to call out the Armed Forces of the Philippines to prevent or suppress lawless
violence.

ISSUE:
1. Were the warrantless arrests of petitioners David, et al., made pursuant to PP 1017, valid?
2. Was the warrantless search and seizure on the Daily Tribunes offices conducted pursuant to PP 1017 valid?

RULING:
[The Court partially GRANTED the petitions.]

1. NO, the warrantless arrests of petitioners David, et al., made pursuant to PP 1017, were NOT valid.
Searches, seizures and arrests are normally unreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued search warrant or
warrant of arrest. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides [for the following
circumstances of valid warrantless arrests]:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense.
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
Neither of the [provisions on in flagrante nor hot pursuit warrantless arrests] justifies petitioner Davids warrantless
arrest. During the inquest for the charges of inciting to sedition and violation of BP 880, all that the arresting officers
could invoke was their observation that some rallyists were wearing t-shirts with the invective Oust Gloria Now
and their erroneous assumption that petitioner David was the leader of the rally. Consequently, the Inquest
Prosecutor ordered his immediate release on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. He noted that petitioner David
was not wearing the subject t-shirt and even if he was wearing it, such fact is insufficient to charge him with inciting
to sedition.

2. NO, the warrantless search and seizure on the Daily Tribunes offices conducted pursuant to PP 1017 was NOT
valid.
The search [and seizure in the Daily Tribune premises] is illegal. Rule 126 of The Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure lays down the steps in the conduct of search and seizure. Section 4 requires that a search warrant be
issued upon probable cause in connection with one specific offence to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. Section 8 mandates
that the search of a house, room, or any other premise be made in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any
member of his family or in the absence of the latter, in the presence of two (2) witnesses of sufficient age and
discretion residing in the same locality. And Section 9 states that the warrant must direct that it be served in the
daytime, unless the property is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched, in which case a direction may be
inserted that it be served at any time of the day or night. All these rules were violated by the CIDG operatives.
Source: Philippine Constitutional Law Digests, Randolf S. David v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo,
http://philippineconstitutionallawdigests.blogspot.com/2012/02/randolf-s-david-vs-gloria-macapagal.html (last
accessed Feb. 24, 2013)