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I. Introductory Notes
1. Idealism and materialism
• One of the basic distinctions made in Western philosophy is between idealism and
materialism.
o Idealism claims, in general, that the structure and order of reality are primary and
precede all else.
Plato is typically categorized as an idealist. We saw that, for him, things
in the world received their visible qualities and distinctive configurations
from the eternal Forms. Moreover, he explained the possibility of human
knowledge on the basis of these forms: what we can know about things in the
world comes from our knowledge of the Forms.
For Plato, there must be something like the Forms; otherwise, how can
we explain the human ability to recognize commonalities in the things and
situations that surround us? How else can we explain the way these
commonalities are produced in the first place, if not with reference to a
common Form?
Although he does not deny the existence of matter, it is considered less
important than the forms.
o Materialism, by contrast, takes matter as its starting point. The task of the
materialist philosopher is to account for all known phenomena—including human
knowledge—without positing any pre-existing entity or force that would contribute
structure to the universe. Obviously, the materialist will need to carefully explain
how order can arise from out of disorder, and how human consciousness—which
certainly seems immaterial—can be the product of material interactions.
In the history of Western philosophy, idealist philosophies have tended
to dominate. There is, however, an important materialist lineage, of which
Lucretius is one of the major representatives.
o We can put this question another way. A major element of philosophy has always
been to provide an inventory of the basic elements of reality. (Although to some extent this
task has been taken up by modern science, this is a very recent development.)
o So a key question for any philosopher or philosophical system is: What elements
does it allow into its inventory? Again, Plato’s basic elements are the forms. For
Lucretius, the two types of thing we find in the universe are atoms and void. He will
describe how the combination of these two types of elements gives rise to the world
as we know it.
2. Ancient atomism
o Lucretius is not the first, or the only, philosopher to propose this type of theory.
As the translator explains in the Introduction, at least two thinkers prior to Socrates proposed
atomic theories.
o Lucretius’ more direct source, however, is the Greek philosopher Epicurus, who
lived a little after Plato (341-270 BCE). In fact, all of the theories presented in On the Nature
of Things are taken from Epicurus. Since most of Epicurus’ own writings have been lost,
Lucretius’ work is the most comprehensive and detailed presentation of Epicurean
philosophy that we have.
3. Lucretius’ life and times
• As the translator admits, we don’t know much about Lucretius himself.
o He was born around 94-96 BCE, and died around 53-55. He probably lived in
Rome.
o He lived during a time of civil strife, since the Roman Republic was in the
process of becoming the Roman Empire. (Just to give you some context, Julius
Caesar came to prominence toward the end of Lucretius’ life.)
o Although he clearly knew Greek, he wrote this book in Latin, for a Roman
audience (specifically, the nobleman Memmius).
22 February 2008
Lucretius, On the Nature of Things, pp.13-30
Lecture Notes
Last class: Idealism/materialism; Lucretius presenting the atomic theory of Epicurus; very critical
of existing (Roman) religion, with its emphasis on fear of the gods; believes that when humans
understand the true “nature of things,” they will see that there is no cause for fear; two principles
(nothing comes from nothing, nothing is destroyed into nothing); components of the cosmos are
invisible particles (“first beginnings” or atoms) and void (empty space). Unlike Plato, Lucretius
downplays the gap between being and seeming, emphasizing the need to trust our senses.
25 February 2008
Lucretius, On the Nature of Things, pp.32-
Lecture Notes
Last class: We saw Lucretius conclude his basic inventory of the cosmos by introducing a
distinction between properties and accidents. Each of these is an attribute of body or void, with
no independent existence apart from these things; properties are intrinsic to bodies and cannot be
removed without the body ceasing to be the kind of thing that it is, whereas accidents have no
intrinsic connection to the things of which they are accidents. (Social phenomena, events, and
time are all accidents.) Lucretius then offered a critique of the physical theories presented by his
predecessors. In general, he argued that the basic constituents of reality cannot resemble
macroscopic bodies, because it would then be impossible to explain the variety and coherence of
existing things.
27 February 2008
Lucretius, On the Nature of Things, pp.46-62
Lecture Notes
Last class: Lucretius presented his theory of atomic movement. There are three basic movements
performed by the atoms: 1) a downward fall (the default movement); 2) the clinamen, or random
swerve, in which an atom deviates from its downward movement; and 3) the collision with other
atoms. Since nothing comes from nothing, everything that happens must be a result of some
combination of these 3 movements.
Although it’s easy to criticize Epicurean philosophy for this idea of a random atomic
swerve, it serves an important function: it establishes a minimal level of disequilibrium, without
which nothing would ever happen. (In many ways we’re no further ahead in our theories about
how everything began: although we may have some ideas about what took place shortly after the
Big Bang, there’s no way to know for certain why this cosmic event took place; which means
ultimately we cannot know for certain why there is something that exists, rather than nothing at
all.)
Lucretius then began a more detailed description of the physical constitution of the
atoms. Although there must be a variety of different atomic types in order to account for the
diversity of things in the world—especially diversity among things that would seem to have the
same form (such as individuals of a species)—this variety cannot be infinite. Lucretius suggested
that we can infer the shapes of different atoms based upon the impacts of various substances upon
our senses.
(To appreciate the advantages of this approach, it’s helpful to imagine how other theories
would attempt to explain the same phenomena. For example, Plato would need to explain
material properties based upon the forms: if something is bitter, it would be because it partakes of
the form of bitterness. The problem with trying to explain things on the basis of forms is that we
end up having to posit a huge number of different forms in order to deal with the various qualities
we encounter in everyday life: a form of slipperiness? A form of roughness? Etc. Here the
materialist account may be preferable b/c it is more economical—that is, it can explain the same
phenomena with fewer principles.)
29 February 2008
Lucretius, On the Nature of Things, pp.63-
Lecture Notes
Last class: Lucretius continued his description of atomic nature. First, he explained that there is a
finite number of possible compounds of combinations of atoms: otherwise, the world would
manifest far less order than it does. (If anything could combine with anything, there’d be nothing
to prevent all the atoms from being homogeneously mixed together.) Next, he emphasized the
lack of macroscopic properties on the atomic level. Any property that changes cannot be a
property of the individual atoms themselves (since these atoms do not change). In particular, we
saw, atoms lack sensation—that is, they are not themselves living beings. Rather, the capacity for
sensation arises out of the combination of some atoms—so-called “soul atoms”—with other
atoms to form an organism. He concluded the section with an argument for the existence of other
worlds in the cosmos, and a general theory of growth and decline: things grow only as large as
their structure intrinsically permits, and they decline as the result of continual impacts from
surrounding atoms. Not only does this befall individual things, moreover, but it also happens to
entire worlds; in fact, he sees our own world as having entered the stage of irreversible decline.
(Since other worlds are continually coming into being, however, the cosmos as a whole is
eternal.)
5 March 2008
Lucretius, On the Nature of Things, pp.78-92; pp.127-
Lecture Notes
Last class: Lucretius presented his theory of the mind and soul.
[We’ve skipped Bk. IV, which focuses upon the way in which we perceive and think. His basic
theory is that every existing thing is continually shedding images of itself, like a snake shedding
its skin: these images circulate continuously, entering our senses (which causes perception) and
our minds (which causes thought and dreams). For the ancients, the fact that we often dream of
the dead was taken to be evidence that the soul survives after death; Lucretius explains that this is
simply the result of our encounter with left-over images of the dead person (images that have
survived the person herself). He also addresses the validity of sense perception with a lengthy
discussion of optical illusions. He claims that our senses do not deceive us, even in these cases:
rather, we go astray when we make faulty inferences based upon our perceptions. (We’re do not
perceive falsely; rather, we interpret falsely.) Lucretius also argues at length against
romantic/erotic love, suggesting that it’s better just to enjoy sex without getting emotionally
involved.]
7 March 2008
Lucretius, On the Nature of Things, pp.78-92; pp.127-
Lecture Notes
o Turning back to the question of the origin and development of the cosmos as we
know it, Lucretius tackles the question of life.
o The earth is seen as the origin of all living things: not only vegetable life, but also
animal life.
• Plant life comes first; Lucretius compares the growth of plants
upon the earth’s surface to the growth of hair, fur, and feathers upon the skins of
animals (in other words, the earth as a whole is treated like a giant organism) (l.788-
789).
• Next comes animal life. Some existing theories at the time
claimed that animal life had always existed; some claimed that animals were created
by the gods; nowadays, of course, we tend to favor a theory of evolution of more
complex life forms out of less complex ones. Lucretius’ theory is somewhat unique:
the first members of each animal species originate in “wombs” upon the surface of
the earth. (Much like the “noble lie” given by Socrates, in which the citizens are said
to have been born from the earth itself). This is Lucretius’ answer to the question,
Which came first—the chicken or the egg?
• At a certain point, however, and as a result of the aging of the
world, the process of genesis changes and becomes indirect: instead of the earth
directly generating all organisms, many of these organisms acquire the capacity to
reproduce themselves, whereas the world becomes less fertile than previously
(p.149).
o Once again, note the emphasis upon the complexity and
contingency of the process of genesis: not every organism initially generated
by the earth has the capacity to survive. If it cannot both sustain and
reproduce itself, it is destined to perish; the gods are not about to intervene to
save it from its inherent design flaws.
o Some species, naturally less adept at self-preservation,
have entered into symbiotic relationships with the human species, which
protect them in exchange for the useful products and services they provide.
o Finally, Lucretius denies that various mythological
creatures ever existed—in particular, the kinds consisting of some combination of actually
existing animals (e.g., the centaurs = human + horse; satyrs = human + goat).
o What rules out the survival of these species is the
incompatibility between their parts (for example, the vastly differing rates of
development and lifespan for a human being and a horse; or the different nutritional
requirements of a human and a goat).
o The point here is that “nature”—that is, the particular
laws governing the constitution and interactions of atoms and void—cannot be
overruled: there is no realm of the supernatural that would exist in defiance of the
laws of nature (although there may well be aspects of nature that we do not yet fully
understand). If something seems to fly in the face of what is naturally possible, this is
strong grounds for assuming that it doesn’t exist.