1:14-cv-00406 #46

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

OFFICER PAMELA LEE, et al., )
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
-vs- )
)
MIKE PENCE, in his official capacity ) Cause No: 1:14-cv-406-RLY-TAB
as Governor of the State of Indiana, et al. )
)
Defendants. )

PLAINTIFFS REPLY IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Karen Celestino-Horseman William R. Groth
Of Counsel, Austin & Jones, P.C. Fillenwarth Dennerline Groth &
One N. Pennsylvania St., Ste. 220 & Towe, LLP
Indianapolis, IN 46204 429 E. Vermont St., Ste. 200
Indianapolis, IN 46202

Mark W. Sniderman Kathleen M. Sweeney
Sniderman Nguyen, LLP Sweeney Hayes, LLC
47 S. Meridian St., Ste. 400 141 E. Washington St., Ste. 225
Indianapolis, IN 46204 Indianapolis, IN 46204

Robert A. Katz* Kelly R. Eskew
Indiana University 6459 Central Avenue
McKinney School of Law Indianapolis, IN 46220
530 W. New York St., Room 349
*Pro Hac Vice Admission Requested
Case 1:14-cv-00406-RLY-TAB Document 46 Filed 06/05/14 Page 1 of 53 PageID #: 334
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Statement Of Material Facts In Dispute ........................................................................... 2

Statement of Issues.......................................................................................................... 2

Argument ........................................................................................................................ 3

I I.C. 31-11-1-1 UNCONSTITUTIONALLY REFUSES
TO RECOGNIZE THE MARRIAGES
OF THE FIRST RESPONDERS AND THEIR SPOUSES ....................... 3

A. THE PLAINTIFFS' RIGHT
TO HAVE THEIR MARRIAGE RECOGNIZED
IS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT................................................... 6

B. THE STATE'S POST-HOC RATIONALIZATION
OFFERED FOR PURPOSES OF
THIS LITIGATION IS NEITHER
COMPELLING, IMPORTANT
NOR LEGITIMATE..................................................................... 8

1. The States Interest Is Merely
A Post-Hoc Rationalization
Offered For The Purpose Of This Litigation And
Not Its Actual Interest Of Doing What Is The Best
For All Children................................................................ 9

2. Defendants Completely Fail To Support Their
Claims That Heterosexual, Biologically Related
Parents Are Better for A Child ........................................ 10

3. The State's Post-hoc Rationalization
For I.C. 31-11-1-1 Is
Nothing More Then A
Moral Judgment
On Gays And Lesbians.................................................... 14

4. The States Interest In Protecting A Tradition
Is Neither Compelling, Important Nor Legitimate
State Interest ................................................................... 17

C. THERE IS NO NEXUS BETWEEN THE STATE'S
CLAIMED INTEREST IN
RESPONSIBLE PROCREATION
AMONG HETEROSEXUALS AND
iii
ITS REFUSAL TO RECOGNIZE
LAWFULLY SOLEMNIZED SAME SEX MARRIAGES......... 18
D. UNDER STRICT SCRUTINY, I.C. 31-11-1-1 VIOLATES THE
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE ............................................. 20

E. UNDER AN INTERMEDIATE LEVEL OF REVIEW, I.C. 31-
11-1-1 VIOLATES THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

1. The Instant Case Involves Suspect Classifications
Triggering Intermediate Scrutiny..................................... 21

a. The First Responders And Their Spouses Are In A
Suspect Classification

(1) History of Discrimination
Against Gay Men And Women ................ 22

(2) Relation To Ability Of
Gay Men And Women To Contribute....... 23

(3) Distinguishing Characteristic
Or Immutability ....................................... 23

(4) Political Power......................................... 24

b. The Children Are Also In A Suspect Class........... 24

2. I.C. 31-11-1-1 Is Unconstitutional
Under Intermediate Scrutiny............................................ 25

3. I.C. 31-11-1-1 Denies
Same Sex Marriages
Equal Protection Under
Heightened Rational Basis Review.................................. 26

F. I.C. 31-11-1-1 VIOLATES
THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE ................................................. 29

II GOVERNOR MIKE PENCE IS PROPERLY NAMED
AS A PARTY TO THIS ACTION......................................................... 29

A. BECAUSE I.C. 31-11-1-1 PERVASIVELY IMPACTS
THE INDIANA CODE, IT WOULD BE
A PRACTICAL IMPOSSIBILITY TO SUE
EVERY LOCAL, STATE
iv
AND FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL .......................... 30

B. OTHER COURTS HAVE RECOGNIZED
THAT GOVERNORS ARE
PROPER PARTIES IN SIMILAR
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE LITIGATION ................................... 30

C. GOVERNOR PENCE'S HISTORY
OF PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON
"TRADITIONAL MARRIAGE"
BIND HIM TO THIS ISSUE AND
HIS HISTORICAL USE OF
THE BULLY PULPIT AS REGARDS
THIS ISSUE BELIES HIS CLAIM
OF POWERLESSNESS ............................................................. 33

D. AS THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
IS NOT AT ISSUE,
THE CASE MOVES FORWARD.............................................. 35

III BAKER v NELSON DOES NOT CONTROL.......................................... 35

IV PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED
TO INJUNCTIVE RELIEF.................................................................... 37

A. PLAINTIFFS ARE LIKELY TO PREVAIL
ON THE MERITS...................................................................... 37

B. PLAINTIFFS HAVE BEEN, AND CONTINUE TO BE,
IRREPARABLY HARMED AS A RESULT OF THE
OPERATION AND ENFORCEMENT
OF THE NON-RECOGNTION LAW
AND HAVE NO ADQUATE REMEDY AT LAW.................... 38

C. THE GRANTING OF THE INJUNCTION
WILL CAUSE THE DEFENDANTS
TO INCUR ONLY NEGLIGIBLE HARM, IF ANY .................. 42

D. GRANTING THE INJUNCTION
WILL PROMOTE THE PUBLIC INTEREST............................ 43

CONCLUSION............................................................................................................. 43

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ...................................................................................... 45

v
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Case Law

A.C. v. N.J.,
1 N.E.3d 685 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) ..................................................................... 10

Adoption of K.S.P.,
804 N.E.2d 1253 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).................................................................. 9

Adoptive Parents of M.L.V. v. Wilkens,
598 N.E.2d 1054 (Ind. 1992).............................................................................. 18

Baker v. Nelson,
409 U.S. 810 (1972)..................................................................................... 35, 36

Baskin v. Bogan,
--F.Supp. 2d--, 2014 WL 1814064 (S.D. Ind., May 08, 2014) ........................... 4,7

Bishop v. United States of America, ex rel. Eric H. Holder,
962 F.Supp. 2d 1252 (N.D. Okla., 2014) .............................................................. 4

Bostic v. Rainey,
970 F.Supp. 2d 456 (E.D. Va., 2014) ................................................................... 5

Bourke v. Beshear,
--F.Supp. 2d--, 2014 WL 556729 (W.D. Ky., Feb. 12, 2014).................... 4, 18, 30

Chicago United Industries, Ltd. v. City of Chicago,
445 F.3d 940 (7th Cir. 2006).............................................................................. 42

City of Altus v. Carr,
255 F.Supp. 828 (D.C. Tex. 1966) ..................................................................... 32

City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr.,
473 U.S. 432 (1985)..................................................................................... 25, 29

Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of the Univ. of Michigan,
652 F.3d 607 (6th Cir. 2011).............................................................................. 31

De Boer v. Snyder,
973 F.Supp. 2d 757 (E.D. Mich., 2014).................................................... 4, 12, 30

De Leon v. Perry,
975 F.Supp. 2d 632 (W.D. Tex., 2014)........................................................... 5, 30

vi
Ex parte Young,
209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908) ......................................... 31, 32

Flast v. Cohen,
392 U.S. 83 (1968)............................................................................................. 38

Geiger v. Kitzhaber,
--F.Supp. 2d--, 2014 WL 2054264 (D.Or., May 19, 2014)............................ 17, 30

Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965)............................................................................................. 6

Hall v. Florida,
2014 WL 2178332 (U.S., May 27, 2014) ........................................................... 28

Hearne. v. Bd. Of Educ. of City of Chicago,
185 F.3d 770, 777 (7th Cir. 1999) ..................................................................... 35

Henry v. Himes,
2014 WL 1418395 (S.D. Ohio, Apr. 14, 2014)........................................... 4, 7, 26

Hicks v. Miranda,
442 U.S. 332 (1975)........................................................................................... 36

Kelo v. City of New London,
545 U.S. 469 (2005)........................................................................................... 29

Kitchen v. Herbert,
961 F.Supp. 2d 1181 (D. Utah, 2013)............................................................. 5, 30

Latta v. Otter,
--F.Supp. 2d.--, 2014 WL 1909999 (D. Idaho, May 13, 2014)...........4, 6, 7, 22, 30

Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558 (2003) ............................................................. 14, 17, 22, 27, 29, 36

Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1 (1967) ................................................................................................ 7

Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia,
427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976)................................................................................... 20

vii
Maynard v. Hill,
125 U.S. 190, 205, 8 S. Ct. 723, 31 L. Ed. 654 (1888)........................................ 16

Mendez v. Heller,
530 F.2d 457, 458 (2d Cir. 1976) ....................................................................... 32

Moore v. City of East Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) .................................................................................. 25

Obergefell v. Wymyslo,
962 F.Supp. 2d 968 (S.D. Ohio 2013) ....................................... 4, 7, 22, 23, 25, 30

Okpalobi v. Foster,
244 F. 3d 405 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc) ............................................................. 32

Romer v. Evans,
517 U.S. 620 (1996).............................................................. 18, 26, 27, 29, 31, 36

Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action,
134 S.Ct. 1623 (2014)............................................................................ 28, 30, 31

Sevcik v. Sandoval,
911 F.Supp. 2d 996 (D. Nev. 2012)...................................................................... 5

Shell Oil Co. v. Noel,
608 F.2d 208 (1st Cir. 1979) .............................................................................. 32

Sherman v. Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist. 21 of Wheeling Twp.,
980 F.2d 437, 441 (7th Cir. 1992) ...................................................................... 32

SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs.,
740 F.3d 471 (9th Cir. 2014).............................................................................. 27

Socialist Workers Party v. Rockefeller,
314 F.Supp. 984 (D.C.N.Y.) .............................................................................. 32

State ex rel. Sendak v. Marion Cty. Sup. Ct.,
268 Ind. 3, 9 373 N.E.2d 145 (1978) .................................................................. 29

Tanco v. Haslam,
--F.Supp. 2d--, 2014 WL 997525 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 14, 2014)....................... 4, 30

Tucker v. State,
218 Ind. 614, 35 N.E.2d 270 (1941) ............................................................. 30, 31

viii
Turner v. Safley,
482 U.S. 78 (1987)............................................................................................... 6

United States v. Windsor,
570 U.S., 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) .................................. 4, 5, 8, 19, 25, 26, 28, 36

U.S. Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno,
413 U.S. 528 (1973)............................................................................... 26, 27, 29

Valley Forge Christian College v.
Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc.,
454 U.S. 464 (1982)........................................................................................... 38

Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Gilmore,
64 F.Supp. 2d 537 (E.D. Va. 1999) .................................................................... 33

Waste Mgmt. Holdings v. Gilmore,
252 F. 3d 316 (4th Cir. 2001)............................................................................ 33

Whitewood v. Wolf,
2014 WL 2058105 (M.D. Pa., May 20, 2014) ..................... 4, 7, 21, 23, 24, 26 36

Windsor v. United States,
699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012)................................................................... 22, 23, 24

Wright v. State of Arkansas,
No. 60CV-13-2662 (Ark. Cir. Ct. 2nd Div. May 9, 2014) .................................... 4

Zablocki v. Redhail,
434 U.S. 374 (1978)....................................................................................... 6, 20

Constitutional Provisions

IND. CONST. art. I, 5 ................................................................................................... 29

IND. CONST. art. V, 16 ................................................................................................ 29
Indiana Statutes

I.C. 31-11-1-1...................................................................................................... passim

I.C. 31-11-4-11........................................................................................................... 15

I.C. 31-11-8-3............................................................................................................. 16

I.C. 31-11-8-6............................................................................................................. 15

ix

I.C. 36-8-8-13.8.......................................................................................................... 40

I.C. 36-8-8-14.1.......................................................................................................... 40

Secondary Authority

150 Cong. Rec. H6580, 6587 (daily ed. July 22, 2004) (statement of Rep. Pence) ... 34, 35
157 Cong. Rec. E207 (Ext. of Remarks, Feb. 11, 2011) (statements of Rep. Pence
recognizing National Marriage Week)................................................................ 34
Conservative Political Action Conference (Feb. 19, 2010) (speech of Rep. Pence)
www.youtube.com/watch?v=4YNEPAv_EFk.................................................... 33
Editorial: Indiana GOP Places Another Bet on Marriage,
Lafayette Journal & Courier (May 24, 2014), www.jconline.com....................... 34

Goodsell, W., A History of the Family as a Social and Educational Institution
(Macmillan Company 1915) .............................................................................. 13
Indiana General Assembly, www.in.gov/legislative....................................................... 34
Indiana Public Retirement System, 1977 Fund At A Glance (accessible online at
http://www.in.gov/inprs/files/77_fund_glance_membership.pdf) ....................... 40
Indiana Republic Party, 2014 Platform-Unapproved Text, www.indgop.org ................. 34
Merriam-Webster [dictionary] (accessible online at http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary)............................................................................... 14, 15
Note, The Benefits of Unequal Protection, 126 Harv.L.Rev. 1348 (Mar. 2013).............. 26
Shattuck, R.M. and Krieder, R.M., Social and Economic Characteristics of
Currently Unmarried Women with a Recent Birth: 2011
[ACS-21] (May, 2013) (accessible online at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2013pubs/acs-21.pdf) ............................................ 19

2
PLAINTIFFS REPLY IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs, Officer Pamela Lee, Candace Batten-Lee, Officer Teresa Welborn,
Elizabeth J. Piette, Batallion Chief Ruth Morrison, Martha Leverett, Sergeant Karen
Vaugh-Kajmowicz, Tammy Vaughn-Kajmowicz
1
and J.S.V., T.S.V. and T.R.V.
(Children), by their parents and next Friends, Sergeant Karen Vaughn-Kajmowicz and
Tammy Vaughn-Kajmowicz, reply in support of their Motion for Summary Judgment
and respond as follows to the Motion for Summary Judgment by the Defendants:
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS IN DISPUTE
Plaintiffs do not dispute any of the material facts as set forth by the defendants
except to the extent as noted in footnote 2 of this brief and the location of the marriage of
Battalion Chief Morrison and Martha Leverett as set forth in the plaintiffs' Motion for
Leave to File an Amended Complaint which was filed on this date.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1. Whether the plaintiffs have a fundamental right to marry.
2. Whether Indiana's post-hoc rationalization that marriage is intended to
provide protections and benefits only to the unintended children of heterosexuals is a
compelling, important or legitimate interest.
3. Whether the State's interest in providing the protections and benefits of
marriage only to the unintended children of heterosexuals has a nexus with the non-
recognition of same sex marriage and the denial of the protections and benefits of
marriage to the children of same sex couples.

1
Officer Lee, Officer Welborn, Batallion Chief Morrison and Sergeant Vaughn-
Kajmowicz will also be referred to collectively as First Responders.

3
4. Whether gays and lesbians who A) have historically endured persecution
and discrimination; B) whose homosexuality has no relation to their aptitude or ability to
contribute to society; C) who are a discernible group with non-obvious distinguishing
characteristics, especially in the subset of those who enter same-sex marriages; and D)
who, as a class, remains a politically weakened minority, constitute a suspect class for
purposes of Equal Protection Analysis.
5. Whether Indiana's Marriage Non-Recognition Law violates the Equal
Protection and Substantive Due Process Clauses of the U.S. Constitution.
6. Whether Baker v. Nelson controls this litigation in light of doctrinal
developments regarding same-sex marriage litigation.
7. Whether Plaintiffs are entitled to injunctive relief.
ARGUMENT
Marriage between a man and a woman is the most enduring human institution.
Marriage was ordained by God, confirmed by law,
and is the glue of the American family.

-- Congressman (now Governor) Mike Pence

I. I.C. 31-11-1-1 UNCONSTITUTIONALLY REFUSES TO RECOGNIZE
THE MARRIAGES OF THE FIRST RESPONDERS AND THEIR
SPOUSES

Defendants claims that the issue presented by this case is [w]hether States may
confer the special status of marriage on qualified opposite-sex couples without also
conferring it on any other relationships, including same-sex couples. [Doc #42, Pence
Memo., p. 17] This is incorrect. First, the only relationship for which plaintiffs are
seeking recognition are same-sex marriages lawfully solemnized outside the State of
4
Indiana. The real issue presented by this case is whether Indiana can constitutionally
deny recognition to lawful marriages of the First Responders and their spouses.
This Court has previously found that the challengers to Indianas prohibition
against same-sex marriage recognition are likely to prevail on the merits. Baskin v.
Bogan, --F.Supp. 2d--, 2014 WL 1814064 (S.D. Ind., May 08, 2014) (preliminary
injunction entered on behalf of plaintiffs). This Court is not alone in its interpretation of
the law. All but one of the challenges to state laws or constitutional amendments that
deny recognition to lawfully solemnized same-sex marriages following the Supreme
Courts Windsor decision have found violations of the Equal Protection Clause and/or
the Substantive Due Process of the United States Constitution, both of which are
applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. See, Wright v. State of Arkansas,
No. 60CV-13-2662 (Ark. Cir. Ct. 2nd Div. May 9, 2014) (a copy of the opinion is
provided in Exhibit E) (unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause); Latta v.
Otter, --F.Supp. 2d.--, 2014 WL 1909999 (D. Idaho, May 13, 2014) (unconstitutional
under both Substantive Due Process and Equal Protection Clause); Bourke v. Beshear, --
F.Supp. 2d--, 2014 WL 556729 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 12, 2014) (unconstitutional under the
Equal Protection Clause); De Boer v. Snyder, 973 F.Supp. 2d 757 (E.D. Mich., 2014)
(unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause); Henry v. Himes, 2014 WL
1418395 (S.D. Ohio, Apr. 14 2014) (unconstitutional under both Substantive Due Process
and Equal Protection Clause); Obergefell v. Wymyslo, 962 F.Supp. 2d 968, 979 (S.D.
Ohio 2013); Bishop v. United States of America, ex rel. Eric H. Holder, 962 F.Supp. 2d
1252 (N.D. Okla. 2014) (unconstitutional under Substantive Due Process and Equal
Protection Clause); Whitewood v. Wolf, 2014 WL 2058105 (M.D. Pa. May 20, 2014)
5
(unconstitutional under both Substantive Due Process and Equal Protection Clause);
Tanco v. Haslam, --F.Supp. 2d--, 2014 WL 997525 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 14, 2014)
(preliminary junction entered where same-sex couples seeking marriage recognition
likely to prevail on claim that law violates the Equal Protection Clause); De Leon v.
Perry, 975 F.Supp. 2d 632 (W.D. Tex., 2014) (unconstitutional under Equal Protection
Clause and Substantive Due Process); Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F.Supp. 2d 1181 (D. Utah
2013) (unconstitutional under Equal Protection Clause and Substantive Due Process);
Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F.Supp. 2d 456 (E.D. Va. 2014) (unconstitutional under Substantive
Due Process and Equal Protection). Following Windsor, only one court has upheld a
state's refusal to recognize same sex marriage. See Sevcik v. Sandoval, 911 F.Supp. 2d
996 (D. Nev. 2012) (law and constitutional amendment do not violate Equal Protection
Clause).
Regardless of whether the claim is argued under the Equal Protection Clause or
the Due Process Clause, the analytical framework for both share three common points:
1) if a fundamental right is involved, then strict scrutiny is required; 2) all levels of
review require a state interest that is at the most compelling or at the least legitimate; and
3) there must be a nexus between the states interest and the statute being challenged. In
the present case, plaintiffs contend that as their fundamental right of having their
marriage recognized is implicated, the strictest level of scrutiny is required.
Alternatively, even if a lesser standard of scrutiny is required, the States claimed interest
is neither important nor legitimate nor is there a nexus between the States claimed
interest and the Marriage Non-Recognition Law. As the Marriage Non-Recognition Law
fails to satisfy any level of review, it should be declared unconstitutional and the Pension
6
Fund and the states top executive officer enjoined from its enforcement.
2

A. THE PLAINTIFFS RIGHT TO HAVE THEIR MARRIAGE
RECOGNIZED IS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT

Defendants acknowledge that there is a traditional right of marriage but deny
that the right includes the right to marry the person of ones choosing. [Doc #42, Pence
Memo., p. 36] As a result, defendants claim they are free to void plaintiffs marriages.
3

Plaintiffs contend that the right to marry inherently means the right to marry the
individual of ones choice, and that the right to marry is without significance if one
cannot have her marriage recognized.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment mandates that no one shall
be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. The right to liberty
includes the fundamental right to marry. Latta, 2014 WL 1909999, at *11. The Supreme
Court has long recognized that the right to marry is fundamental. Zablocki v. Redhail,
434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978) (the right to marry is of fundamental importance for all
individuals); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) ([i]t is an association
that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths); Turner
v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (prisoners while incarcerated have right to marry because
[t]he decision to marry is a fundamental right).

2
In their complaint for relief, plaintiffs challenged I.C. 31-11-1-1 in its entirety to
the extent that it prohibits recognition of their marriages. In the plaintiffs initial brief,
plaintiffs referenced only I.C. 31-11-1-1(b). So as to make clear that I.C. 31-11-1-1 is
not to be used in any manner to prohibit recognition of their marriages, the plaintiffs will
refer to I.C. 31-11-1-1 in its entirety as was done in its complaint.

3
Defendants argue that plaintiffs marriages are still valid, just not in Indiana [Doc
#42, Pence Memo., p. 25] (Plaintiffs marriages mean exactly what they meant in the
States that licensed them and they mean no less here than they ever meant), but this
simply an attempt to whitewash the fact that the Non-Recognition Law, by its express
language, renders plaintiffs marriages void in Indiana. See, I.C. 31-11-1-1(b).

7
The fundamental right to marry includes the right to marry a same sex spouse.
Latta, 2014 WL 1909999, at *10-13. In Latta, the [d]efendants acknowledge[d] that the
fundamental right to marry exists but . . . it does not extend to same sex couples and that
plaintiffs instead were seeking recognition of a new fundamental right. Id. at *10.
However, as Latta explained:
Loving was no more about the right to interracial marriage than Turner
was about the prisoners right to marry or Zablocki was about the dead-
beat dads right to marry. Even in cases with such vastly different facts,
the Supreme Court has consistently upheld the right to marry, as opposed
to a sub-right tied to the facts of the case.

Id., at *12. Here, the defendants make the same arguments as did the defendants in Latta.
Their arguments fare no better.
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) is instructive. In 1958, Virginia banned
interracial marriages. Similar to Indianas Non-Recognition Law, Virginia prohibited
attempts to evade the ban on interracial marriage by marrying outside the state. Loving,
388 U.S. at 4-6. The Court held [m]arriage is one of the basic civil rights of man,
fundamental to our very existence, explaining the freedom to marry resides with the
individual. Id. at 12. The Court then invalidated Virginias law as violative of both
Equal Protection and Due Process because it racial improperly restricted the Lovings
fundamental right to marry.
Like the Lovings, each plaintiff in the present case exercised her individual right
to choose whom to marry, and each has a fundamental liberty interest in the recognition
of their marriages. Obergefell, 962 F.Supp. 2d at 979; Henry, 2014 WL 1418395, at *9;
Whitewood, 2014 WL 2058105, at *9; Baskin, 2014 WL 1814064, at *4. By voiding
plaintiffs marriages, Indianas Non-Recognition Law deprives them of this liberty
8
interest. The Marriage Non-Recognition Law intrudes into this fundamental relationship
that the Supreme Court has found is entitled to constitutional protection. See United
States v. Windsor, 570 U.S., 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693-2694 (2013).
In sum, the right to remain married and to have ones marriage recognized is a
fundamental right.
B. THE STATES POST-HOC RATIONALIZATION OFFERED
FOR PURPOSES OF THIS LITIGATION IS NEITHER
COMPELLING, IMPORTANT NOR LEGITIMATE

The State claims the Indiana Marriage Non-Recognition Law is intended to
provide for the unintended children resulting from a sexual encounter between a man and
a woman. [Doc #42, Pence Memo., p. 32] (For Indiana, marriage is about encouraging
responsible procreation so as to ameliorate the consequences of unplanned pregnancies)
and [Doc #42, Pence Memo., p. 46] (Civil marriage recognition . . . arises from the need
to protect the only procreative sexual relationship that exists and to make it more likely
that unintended children, among the weakest members of society, will be cared for).
According to the State, marriage is the institution that provides the greatest likelihood
that both biological parents will nurture and raise the children they beget and that
[s]tates have a strong interest in supporting and encouraging this norm. [Doc #42,
Pence Memo., p. 47]
The States claimed interest of responsible procreation is nothing more then a
post-hoc rationalization invented for purposes of this litigation that is neither compelling,
important nor legitimate. This is true because 1) the States overriding interest has
always been in promoting what is best for all children not just the children
unintentionally produced as a result of a sexual act between heterosexuals; 2) the State
9
makes absolutely no showing that parents who are genetically related to a child are better
parents then parents who adopt or who conceive their child through artificial means; and,
3) an examination of the State's post-hoc rationalization shows that in actuality, I.C. 31-
11-1-1 exists solely to cast a moral judgment upon homosexuality.
1. The States Interest Is Merely A Post-Hoc
Rationalization Offered For The Purpose Of This
Litigation And Not Its Actual Interest Of Doing What Is
The Best For All Children

For purposes of this litigation, the State claims that its interest in the Marriage
Non-Recognition Law is to provide stability and protection for the unintended children
produced as the result of sexual relations between heterosexuals. This is mere pretext:
Indianas policy has always been to promote what is in the best interest of all children, no
matter how those children were conceived; no matter whether those children were
adopted; and, no matter whether the parents of the children are opposite-sex or same-sex.
Indiana law recognizes that the guiding principle of statutes governing the
parent-child relationship is the best interests of the child. Adoption of K.S.P., 804
N.E.2d 1253, 1257 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (in adoption proceeding, rights of biological
parent continued so as to allow adoption by same-sex partner). For example, the States
interest in allowing two persons of the same-sex to adopt children derives from the
states interest in protecting and promoting the welfare of children by expediting their
entry into a suitable, stable family unit. Id. (citation omitted). [T]he relationship
between parent and child is a bundle of human rights of . . . fundamental importance.
Id. And in Indiana these human rights of fundamental importance are to be found in the
relations between both those biologically conceived by heterosexuals and those adopted
and/or artificially conceived by same-sex parents:
10
[O]ur paramount concern should be with the effect of our laws on the
reality of childrens lives. It is not the courts that have engendered the
diverse composition of todays families. It is the advancement of
reproductive technologies and societys recognition of alternative
lifestyles that have produced families in which a biological, and
therefore a legal, connection is no longer the sole organizing principle.

* * * *

We are not called upon to approve or disapprove of the
relationship between the appellants. Whether we do or not, the fact
remains that Deborah [the same-sex partner who is not biologically
related to the children] has acted as a parent of [the children] from
the moment they were born. To deny legal protection of their
relationship, as a matter of law, is inconsistent with the childrens best
interests and therefore with the public policy of this state, as
expressed in our statutes affecting children.

K.S.P., 804 N.E.2d at 1259-60 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). Thus contrary to
what the State is positing, Indiana courts, long before the pending constitutional
challenge to I.C. 31-11-1-1, recognized that Indianas interest is that which is in the
best interest of all children, and that legal recognition of a childs relationship with a
person who has acted as parent to the child is in the best interest of the child, whether the
child was artificially or naturally conceived or adopted by heterosexual or homosexual
parents. See also, A.C. v. N.J., 1 N.E.3d 685, 692 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (where child was
artificially conceived while same-sex couple lived in committed relationship, partner
who did not give birth to child has standing to seek visitation with the child).
2. Defendants Completely Fail To Support Their Claims
That Heterosexual, Biologically Related Parents Are
Better for A Child

The State also claims that limiting its sanction to heterosexual couples is justified
because married, opposite-sex couples who are biologically related to their children can
somehow provide a better family environment for children. The State offers no evidence
11
to support this assertion and social scientists reject the notion that opposite sex couples
make better parents then same sex couples.
The defendants claim: The male-female relationship alone enables the married
personsin the idealto beget children, implying that biologically related parents are
somehow the ideal form of parents. [Doc #42, Pence Memo., p. 17] (emphasis added);
see also, [Doc #42, Pence Memo., p. 18] (While same-sex couples may do an excellent
job of raising children, they cannot provide the family structure where those who raise a
child combine both legal responsibility for and a biological connection with that child);
[Doc #42, Pence Memo., p. 47] (marriage provides the opportunity for children born
within it to have a biological relationship to those having original legal responsibility for
their well-being, and accordingly is the institution that provides the greatest likelihood
that both biological parents will nurture and raise the children they beget); [Doc #42,
Pence Memo., p. 49] (The State may prefer childrearing by biological parents, whom
our society . . . [has] always presumed to be the preferred . . . custodians of their minor
children) (citation omitted); Id. (purpose of traditional marriage is not to encourage just
any two people who could be good parents to assume parental responsibility for children
but is instead to encourage the two biological parents to care for their children in
tandem). At no point does the State provide any evidence that heterosexuals who are
biologically related to a child are better parents.
Dr. Megan Fulcher, an associate professor in the Department of Psychology at
Washington & Lee University, opines whether a parent is biologically related to the child
has nothing to do with a childs adjustment:
b. Biological relatedness: Research indicates that adoptive parents are
able to build strong and secure attachment relationships with their
12
children. When children are adopted early in life by parents who
intend to rear that child together, childrens adjustment is not
different from children being reared by their biological parents.
This is true of heterosexual, gay, and lesbian adoptive families.
Some studies do show a link between biological relatedness to
parents and childrens adjustment. In most of these studies the
biologically unrelated parent is a parents new partner who enters
the childs life as part of new parental relationship. In these cases,
children may have already experienced several parental
relationship transitions (single-parenthood, divorce, remarriage).
These transitions are associated with poorer child adjustment, thus
explaining the link between a lack of biological relatedness and
maladjustment. Recent carefully designed studies of gay, lesbian,
and heterosexual couples who adopted small children indicate that
these children do as well as children who were either adopted or
born to heterosexual parents.

Ex. E, Aff. of Dr. Fulcher, 13(b).

Further, Dr. Fulcher refutes the States implication that children raised outside of
the norm, i.e., without two heterosexual parents, are abnormal:
9. Children of lesbian and gay parents do not differ in
psychological adjustment or well being from children of heterosexual
parents. The skills and processes involved in good parenting do not vary
as a function of parents gender or sexual orientation. The research
investigating the efficacy of gay and lesbian parents has been published in
rigorous, peer-reviewed journals and has been conducted by respected
researchers. Overwhelming evidence supports the idea that parenting
competence is not impacted by sexual orientation.

10. Childrens adjustment is impacted by parents behaviors in
several ways. Parental warmth and monitoring, the formation of
attachment relationships, and parents financial and emotional resources
are each associated with childrens behavioral outcomes and adjustment.
The same processes that predict success in heterosexual parents also
predict success in gay and lesbian parents. Neither gender nor sexual
orientation of parents is associated with differences in these parental
behaviors.

Ex. E, Aff. of Dr. Fulcher, 9-10; See also, Ex. F, Aff. of Dr. Buffie, 15-17 and De
Boer, 973 F.Supp. 2d at 770-772 (noting approximately 150 sociological and
psychological studies of children raised by same-sex couples have repeatedly confirmed
13
Rosenfelds findings that there is simply no scientific basis to conclude that children
raised in same-sex households fare worse than those raised in heterosexual households).
The State quotes A History of the Family as a Social and Educational Institution
7-8 (Macmillan Company 1915) [Doc #42, Pence Memo. p. 54] for the statement: The
source of marriage . . . must probably be looked for in the utter helplessness of the
newborn offspring . . . . It is noteworhty that the State must look to 100 year old social
treatises to support its definition of the traditional marriage. But in actuality, even this
100 year old secondary authority does not support the States arguments:
The source of marriage, then, must probably be looked for in the utter
helplessness of the newborn offspring and the need of both mother and
young for protection and food during a varying period. Natural selection
doubtless operated to kill off those stocks in which the male refused this
protection and care, and to select those for survival in which it was
rendered. Thus it appears that marriage has its source in the family,
rather than the family in the marriage.

Dr. Willystine Goodsell, A History of the Family as a Social and Educational Institution
at 7-8 (emphasis in original). The purpose of marriage has always been to provide the
best means of protecting the children who are in the care and custody of persons in
committed relationships. At the beginning of time, this meant protecting children born of
heterosexual intercourse because there was no means to artificially conceive children. If
marriage has its source in the family, and families now consist of same-sex parents with
artificially conceived children, then it is perfectly logical to continue to utilize marriage
to provide protection for the adopted children or artifically conceived offspring of a
same-sex couple.
Therefore, as the defendants have made no showing that persons biologically
related to a child make a better parent, there is no compelling, important nor legitimate
14
state interest.
3. The States Post-hoc Rationalization For I.C. 31-11-1-1 Is
Nothing More Then A Moral Judgment On Gays And
Lesbians

[T]he fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a
particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting
the practice. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (citing Bowers v. Hardwick,
478 U.S. 176, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting). I.C. 31-11-1-1 is actually an attempt
to regulate undesirable sexual behaviors that it considers immoral.
Defendants argue: Traditional marriage protects a norm where sexual activity
that can beget children should occur in a long-term, cohabitive relationship. [Doc #42,
Pence Memo., p. 47] (emphasis added). The definition of norm includes a principle of
right action binding upon the members of a group and serving to guide, control, or
regulate proper and acceptable behavior.
4
In other words, the State argues that a sexual
relationship between a man and a woman is proper and acceptable behavior - the
norm. Stating it another way, a sexual relationship between two persons of the same-
sex is not the norm, nor acceptable and proper. If it is not the norm then it is
abnormal.
5

The State claims that [t]raditional marriage reflects the ideal of family life,
recognizing the love between a mother and a father and the ability of this relationship to
bear children. [Doc #42, Pence Memo., p. 57] (emphasis added); see also, [Doc #42,

4
http://www.merriam-webster.com-/dictionary/norm?show=0&t=1401541571
(Last visited May 31, 2014).

5
See, http://www.merriam-webster.com-/dictionary/abnormal (Last visited May
31, 2014) (abnormal defined as different from what is normal or average : unusual
especially in a way that causes problems).

15
Pence Memo., p. 17] (The male-female relationship alone enables the married persons
in the idealto beget children who have a biological relationship to both legal parents)
(emphasis added); [Doc #42, Pence Memo., p. 54]. Ideal is defined as meaning
exactly right for a particular purpose, situation, or person.
6
According to the State, the
ideal family consists of a man and a woman who are biologically related to their
children. The State claims such a family is exactly right. Thus, according to the
States argument, the family consisting of Sargent Vaughn-Kajmowicz, her spouse
Tammy and their three children is not an ideal family - it is not exactly right.
The use of words such as ideal and norm to express the justification for I.C.
31-11-1-1, coupled with the statutes place within the Indiana marriage statutes, make
apparent the real purpose of I.C. 31-11-1-1: the majority in the Indiana legislature
passed a moral judgment against gay and lesbian couples. I.C. 31-11-1-1(b) provides:
A marriage between persons of the same gender is void in Indiana even if the marriage
is lawful in the place where it is solemnized. The only other marriages solemnized
outside of Indiana that are declared void upon return to the State of Indiana are:
1) those which seek to evade providing particular information
necessary to get an Indiana marriage license (none of which pertain
to the gender of the applicant);

2) one or both of the applicants has been adjudged to be mentally
incompetent; or,

3) one or both of the applicants [wa]s under the influence of an
alcohol beverage or narcotic drug.

I.C. 31-11-4-11.
7
By its definition of marriage, the State of Indiana has classified gays

6
http://www.merriam-web-ster.com/dictionary/ideal (Last visited May 31, 2014).

7
The States interpretation of I.C. 31-11-8-6 is mistaken. The State claims:
Knowing that they could not be married in Indiana, the Plaintiff couples decided to get
16
and lesbians with the mentally incompetent, alcoholics and the drugged.
8

Professor Grossmans survey of Indiana legal history indicates:
The early marriage laws in Indiana banned marriages that were: nearer of
kin than second cousins; by someone with a living spouse (bigamy); by
the insane or idiotic or those incapable from want of understanding;
by those afflicted with a transmissible disease; between a white person
and a person having one-eighth or more of negro blood (on the books
between 1818 and 1965); by a person under the influence of an
intoxicating liquor or narcotic drug; by an indigent person; and by men
under 18 years of age and women under 16 years of age. See Chester G.
Vernier, 1 American Family Laws 37-47 (Jan. 1, 1931). Indiana
permitted common-law marriages until the legislature abolished them by
statute in 1958. See Burns Ind. Code 31-11-8-5 (2013).

Ex. G, Aff. of Prof. Grossman Aff., 20. Indianas laws prohibiting miscegenation are
no longer valid, and marriages between persons more closely related then second cousins
is currently allowed. See, I.C. 31-11-8-3. The classification of same-sex marriages with
those of the mentally incompetent, the drunk and the drugged sends a clear and
unmistable message of moral disapproval.
The Marriage Non-Recognition Law is about the regulation of sex. The
defendants justification for the law is that it is intended to cover the unintended
consequences of a sexual act. Like the proverbial carrot and stick, if a person engages in
the norm, i.e., sex with a person of the opposite-sex, then she, her male spouse and her
children are rewarded with legal recognition and all the benefits and protections
incidental to marriage. But if she is intimate with a person of the same-sex and is married

married elsewhere which runs afoul of Indiana Code Section 31-11-8-6. [Doc #42,
Pence Memo., p. 30] I.C. 31-11-8-6 does not apply to same-sex marriages. It applies
to those who are drunk, drugged or who seek to avoid providing specific information
necessary to receive a marriage licenses. By statute, the information required does not
make inquiry into the sex of the applicant.

8
Marriage, [creates] the most important relation in life [and has] more to do with
the morals and civilization of a people than any other institution. Maynard v. Hill, 125
U.S. 190, 205, 211, 8 S. Ct. 723, 31 L. Ed. 654 (1888).
17
to that person, then Indiana declares that she has entered an abnormal relationship, and
neither she nor her children are entitled to those same benefits and protections. Instead,
her marriage will be treated like the marriages of the drunk and the drugged.
Therefore, because the only state interest promoted by the Marriage Non-
Recognition Law is a moral judgment passed upon gays and lesbians, it is neither
compelling, important nor legitimate.
4. The States Interest In Protecting A Tradition Is
Neither Compelling, Important Or Legitimate State
Interest

Limiting civil marriage to opposite-gender couples based only on a traditional
definition of marriage is simply not a legitimate purpose. Geiger v. Kitzhaber, --F.Supp.
2d--, 2014 WL 2054264, at *9 (D.Or. May 19, 2014) (citing Golinski v. Off. of Pers.
Mgmt., 824 F.Supp. 2d 968, 998 (N.D. Cal. 2012); see also, Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S.
235, 239 (1970). The defendants constantly refer to marriage of persons of the opposite-
sex as the tradition and in support of its position claims that this is a tradition that must be
protected.
This appeal to so-called tradition and history is not proper constitutional
analysis, but rather the road to engrained prejudice. As the Supreme Court has explained:
Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth
Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment known the components of
liberty in its manifold possibilities, they might have been more specific.
They did not presume to have this insight. They knew times can blind us
to certain truths and later generations can see that laws once thought
necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress. As the Constitution
endures, persons in every generation can invoke its principles in their own
search for greater freedom.
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578-79.
On this basis, the States articulated interest is neither compelling, important nor
18
legitimate.
C. THERE IS NO NEXUS BETWEEN THE STATES CLAIMED
INTEREST IN RESPONSIBLE PROCREATION AMONG
HETEROSEXUALS AND ITS REFUSAL TO RECOGNIZE THE
LAWFULLY SOLEMNIZED SAME SEX MARRIAGES

Even under this most deferential standard of review [of rational basis], courts
must still insist on knowing the relation between the classification adopted and the
object to be attained. Bourke, 2014 WL 556729, at *6 (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S.
620, 632 (1996). Thus, the issue here is whether the refusal by I.C. 31-11-1-1 to
recognize same-sex marriages lawfully solemnized in another state bears any relationship
to the States articulated interest in providing the benefits and protections of marriage
only to unintended children born as a result of a sex act between a man and a woman. In
other words, this Court must determine whether there is a nexus between the Marriage
Non-Recognition Law and denial of marriage to same-sex couples. Nowhere does the
State argue or demonstrate such a nexus because there is none.
In Indiana, same-sex couples may adopt children. As the Indiana Supreme Court
has recognized:
The objectives of the adoption statute include the placement of unwanted
and/or mistreated children with families who will care for them. See
Emmons, 235 Ind. 249, 133 N.E.2d 56 (object of adoption statute is to give
unfortunate children without home and parental care the benefits of home
and care). Another goal of the statute is to promote permanency and
stability. * * * Permanency and stability are very important, especially for
young children who may have already lived in many different homes.
These objectives all work toward the best interests of the child, which is
the primary concern in an adoption proceeding. B.G. v. H.S. (1987),
Ind.App., 509 N.E.2d 214, 217.

Adoptive Parents of M.L.V. v. Wilkens, 598 N.E.2d 1054, 1058 (Ind. 1992). The States
interest in adoption is protecting unwanted children - including those unwanted because
19
of an unintentional pregnancy - by providing them with stability and the benefits of a
home and family. The Marriage Non-Recognition Law is not related to providing the
protection and benefits of marriage to children who are unintentionally conceived by sex
acts between a man and a woman and subsequently adopted by same-sex couples. To the
contrary:
[The refusal to recognize same-sex marriage] humiliates tens of thousands
of children now being raised by same-sex couples. The law in question
makes it even more difficult for the children to understand the integrity
and closeness of their own family and its concord with other families in
their community and in their daily lives.

Windsor, 133 S.Ct. at 2694. Thus, as regards children who are the product of an
unintentional pregnancy and adopted by same-sex parents, not only is there no
relationship between I.C. 31-11-1-1 and the States interest in providing for these
children, but that law actually harms these children.
According to defendants, marriage is a means to encourage and preserve
something far more compelling and precise: the relationship between a man and a woman
in their natural capacity to have children. [Doc #42, Pence Memo., p. 57] In other
words, the State wants to encourage heterosexuals to marry and provide for responsible
procreation, but it does not want to do anything to encourage gays and lesbians to
commit to each other, even if it means that the children adopted by or conceived in
dependence upon such unions are left without protection and stability. There is no
relationship between denying marriage recognition to same-sex couples and providing the
benefits and protections of marriage to the unintended children of heterosexuals.
9

9
Statistics do not support a claim that denying marriage recognition to same sex
couples provides the protection of marriage to unintended children. In 2011, there were
approximately 88,441 births in Indiana. Shattuck, R.M. and Krieder, R.M., Social and
Economic Characteristics of Currently Unmarried Women with a Recent Birth: 2011
20
On this basis, as there is no nexus between the pretextual post-hoc justification
offered by defendants and Indianas Marriage Non-Recognition Law, the law is
unconstitutional.
D. UNDER STRICT SCRUTINY, I.C. 31-11-1-1 VIOLATES THE
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

Strict scrutiny analysis applies to equal protection claims when a classification is
created by law that impairs a fundamental right or disadvantages a suspect class.
Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976). Such
classifications are presumed unconstitutional unless narrowly tailored to promote a
compelling government interests. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 388. As discussed supra, strict
scrutiny is the appropriate level of review because I.C. 31-11-1-1 implicates plaintiffs
fundamental rights.
Under strict scrutiny, the State bears the burden of proving a compelling state
interest. But the State never claims nor makes any showing that providing the benefits of
marriage only to heterosexual couples and denying those benefits to same-sex couples
lawfully married outside Indiana furthers any compelling State interest. It only harms the
children of those same-sex couples without any corresponding benefit to the State. The
State also makes no attempt to show that I.C. 31-11-1-1 is narrowly tailored, apparently
conceding that if this Court should find that the plaintiffs have a fundamental right to

[ACS-21] (May, 2013), p. 3, http://www.census.gov/prod/2013pubs/acs-21.pdf (Last
visited May 31, 2014). Of that number, approximately 34,754 or approximately 40% of
all births in Indiana were to unmarried women, Id., despite the lack of marriage
recognition for same sex couples. Indianas rate of births to unmarried women
significantly exceeded the national average. Id. at p. 6. In fact, Indianas rate exceeds
the rate of approximately 33% for Massachusetts, which has allowed same-sex marriage
for ten years. Despite Maryland having made same-sex marriage illegal for the longest
period of time, approximately 39% of its births in 2011 were to unmarried women.
http://www.census.gov/prod/2013pubs/acs-21.pdf at p. 3.
21
marriage recognition and/or a fundamental right to marry, then plaintiffs prevail under
strict scrutiny analysis.
E. UNDER AN INTERMEDIATE LEVEL OF REVIEW, I.C. 31-11-1-
1 VIOLATES THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

If this Court should find this case does not implicate a fundamental right, then
plaintiffs claim under the Equal Protection Clause should be reviewed under a
heightened standard, i.e., intermediate scrutiny, because it involves suspect classes.
1. The Instant Case Involves Suspect Classifications Triggering
Intermediate Scrutiny

The assessment of whether a suspect class is prejudicially impacted by a statute is
not limited to looking at, for example, race or gender. Criteria have been developed to
aid the courts in such determinations. A summary of Supreme Court jurisprudence on the
indicia of suspectness finds:
[A] class qualifies as suspect or quasi-suspect [if it]: (1) has been
subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment, Mass. Bd. of Ret,
427 U.S. at 313 (2) possesses a characteristic that frequently bears no
relation to ability to perform or contribute to society, Cleburne, 473 U.S.
at 44041; (3) exhibits obvious, immutable, or distinguishing
characteristics that define them as a discrete group, Bowen v. Gilliard,
483 U.S. 587, 602 (1987)(citation and internal quotation marks omitted);
and (4) is a minority or politically powerless. Id. Of the four factors,
the first two are most meaningful. See Windsor v. United States, 699
F.3d 169, 181 (2d Cir. 2012) (Immutability and lack of political power
are not strictly necessary factors to identify a suspect class.). The criteria
function as a lodestar, and as Justice Thurgood Marshall effectually
observed, [n]o single talisman can define those groups likely to be the
target of classifications offensive to the Fourteenth Amendment and
therefore warranting heightened or strict scrutiny; experience, not abstract
logic, must be the primary guide. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 472 n .24
(Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

Whitewood, 2014 WL 2058105, at *11 (emphasis added). This is significant as these very
criteria were considered and discussed by the Second Circuit in Windsor and, thus,
22
impliedly adopted by the Supreme Court in affirming that decision. The Second Circuit
held:
A) homosexuals as a group have historically endured persecution and
discrimination; B) homosexuality has no relation to aptitude or ability to
contribute to society; C) homosexual are a discernible group with non-
obvious distinguishing characteristics, especially in the subset of those
who enter same-sex marriages; and D) the class remains a politically
weakened minority.

Windsor, 699 F.3d at 181-182. The Supreme Court has accepted [this analysis] by
implication. Latta, 2014 WL 1909999, at *18.
In the present case, Plaintiffs contend that both the adults and children are in
suspect classes.
a. The First Responders And Their Spouses Are In A
Suspect Classification

(1) History of Discrimination Against Gay Men And
Women

Much has been written about the long history of discrimination and
condemnation gays and lesbians have been forced to endure. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571.
They have endured discrimination so extensive and enduring that a federal constitutional
right to their own intimate sexual lives has only been assured for a little over ten years.
Id. The Second Circuit in Windsor found discrimination based on sexual orientation is
not much in debate and that the most telling proof of animus and discrimination against
homosexuals in this country is that, for many years and in many states, homosexual
conduct was criminal. Windsor, 699 F.3d at 182 (referencing Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196);
see also Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
In Obergefell, the court recounted a number of egregious examples of
discrimination against gays and lesbians at the hands of both federal and state
23
governments, their officials, and one of the two primary political parties in our country,
and [found] based on these examples alone, it is easy to conclude that homosexuals have
suffered a history of discrimination. Obergefell, 962 F.Supp. 2d at 988, quoting,
Windsor, 699 F.3d at 182. The district court in Pennsylvania recently noted the
protracted historical record of injustices against gay and lesbians persons in our country,
rejecting the defendants shorter view that pointed to the recent social progress of the
gay community. Whitewood, 2014 WL 2058105, at *12-13 (citing Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685-86 (1973)).
There can be no more poignant proof of continuing discrimination then that
presented by the States own argument discussed supra.
(2) Relation To Ability Of Gay Men And Women To
Contribute

It is obvious that homosexuality has no relation to aptitude or ability to
contribute to society. Windsor, 699 F.3d at 181. Defendants make no argument on this
point, so further discussion is unnecessary.

(3) Distinguishing Characteristic Or Immutability

The State makes a specious argument that the distinguishing characteristic at issue
here is the plaintiffs inability to procreate (as a couple). [Doc #42, Pence Memo., p.
43] Many couples cannot procreate for any variety of reasons; this is not a characteristic
that distinguishes gay men and women from others. What differentiates plaintiffs from
other couples who lack the ability to procreate is that they are same-sex couples. And
they are same-sex couples because of their sexual orientation.
Neither the State nor I.C. 31-11-1-1 attempt to preclude marriage by others who
cannot procreate, which they admit. [Doc #42, Pence Memo., p. 54-55] It is the solely
24
the plaintiffs sexual orientation with which the classification is concerned.
(4) Political Power
Gay men and women cannot marry in Indiana. Their marriages in other states are
voided should they choose or need to live here. The Indiana Republican Party seeks to
enshrine I.C. 31-11-1-1 in the States Constitution. [Doc #42, Pence Memo., p. 43-
44] It currently controls both branches of the legislature, as well as the executive.
Contrary to the defendants assertion, HJR-3, which seeks to constitutionalize the ban
against same-sex marriage, will not be on the 2014 ballot because of decisions made by
the House leadership, not because of the political dominance of the gay and lesbian
community. [Doc 42, Pence Memo., id.] After all, the 2014 session of the General
Assembly voted overwhelmingly in support of HJR-3.
b. The Children Are Also A Suspect Class

The Children are a suspect class under the same four-part analysis described
above. See, Windsor 699 F.3d at 181-182; see also, Whitewood, 2014 WL 2058105, at
*11 (summarizing Supreme Court jurisprudence on the criteria for identifying a suspect
class). First, one does not need a history lesson to know that the children of same-sex
couples have always been denied the right to have married parents. The importance of
this right is exactly what the defendants claim legitimizes I.C. 31-11-1-1 for all other
children in Indiana. If marriage does not provide benefits to children, then the States
argument is meaningless. Second, the children of same-sex couples are no different than
other children in their ability to contribute to society. This is axiomatic. Next, these
children have the immutable and distinguishing characteristic of having two moms.
Last, these children are the minority of children and have no political power whatsoever.
25
They meet the criteria for a suspect class, and intermediate scrutiny must be applied to
their claims under the Equal Protection Clause.
However, the Children have justiciable claims under rational basis review as well.
It bears repeating that the Supreme Court in Windsor was concerned with a law that
denied same-sex parents the dignity of marriage, noting:
[it] humiliates tens of thousands of children now being raised by same-
sex couples. The law in question makes it even more difficult for the
children to understand the integrity and closeness of their own family and
its concord with other families in their community and in their daily lives.
133 S.Ct. at 2694. Laws that demean and humiliate children for no purpose, but based
solely on disapproval of their parents sexual orientation have no place in our society.
That the defendants justifications for this law revolve around concern for children
reveals the attenuated nature of the governments classification, rendering the distinction
arbitrary [and] irrational. City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432,
446-47 (1985). Thus I.C. 31-11-1-1 is unconstitutional under even rational basis
review as applied to the Children, whose rights may only be effectuated through their
parents.
2. I.C. 31-11-1-1 Is Unconstitutional Under Intermediate
Scrutiny

Existing marriages, family, and intimate relationships have been accorded highly-
protected status, and laws infringing upon such relationships have been subject to
intermediate review. [W]hen the government intrudes on choices concerning family [],
this Court must examine carefully the importance of the governmental interests advanced
and the extent to which they are served by the challenged regulation. Moore, 431 U.S.
494, 499 (1977); see also, Obergefell, 962 F.Supp. 2d at 978-979 (the balancing
approach of intermediate scrutiny is appropriate where Ohio[s non-recognition law]
26
is intruding into - and in fact erasing Plaintiffs already-established marital and family
relations); Henry, 2014 WL 1418395, *9 (applying intermediate scrutiny and finding
Ohios non-recognition law violates substantive due process).
Because I.C. 31-11-1-1 bears no logical much less substantial relationship to the
States post-hoc justification, the statute fails constitutional review under intermediate
scrutiny and a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief should be entered on behalf of
plaintiffs.
3. I.C. 31-11-1-1 Denies Same Sex Marriages Equal Protection
Under Heightened Rational Basis Review

If this Court should find there is no fundamental right or suspect class implicated,
then the appropriate analytical framework is heightened rational basis of the type the
Supreme Court used in Romer and Windsor.
Contrary to the States assertion, heightened scrutiny has been applied to
classifications based on sexual orientation by the Supreme Court as recently as the
Windsor decision. Justice Scalia in dissent complained, The [majority] opinion does not
apply strict scrutiny, and its central propositions are taken from rational-basis cases like
Moreno [but] the Court certainly does not apply anything that resembles that deferential
framework. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. at 2706 (dissenting). U.S. Dept. of Agriculture v.
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973), as discussed below, is one of a line of cases from the
Supreme Court that has applied what is known as rational basis with a bite, a form of
heightened scrutiny that looks to actual justifications and legislative purpose. Benefits of
Unequal Protection, 126 Harv.L.Rev. 1348, 1362 (Mar. 2103). Justice Scalia is quite
clear that his colleagues in the majority also engaged in heightened scrutiny on the equal
protection claim in Windsor. See also, Whitewood, 2014 WL 2058105, at *10
27
(Although Windsor did not identify the appropriate level of scrutiny, its discussion is
manifestly not representative of deferential review) (citing, Windsor, 133 S.Ct. at 2706
(Scalia, J., dissenting)).
The Ninth Circuit reached the same conclusion in SmithKline Beecham Corp. v.
Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471 (9th Cir. 2014), examining the use of a peremptory challenge
to exclude the only self-identified gay member of the venire in a case involving HIV
drugs. In determining which level of scrutiny applied, the Ninth Circuit looked at what
the Court actually did in Windsor. Id. at 480 (internal cite omitted). First, under rational
basis review it is entirely irrelevant for constitutional purposes whether the conceived
reason for the challenged distinction actually motivated the legislature. Id. at 481 (citing
Fed. Commcn Commn v. Beach Commcns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993)). However,
in Windsor, the Supreme Court explicitly examined the design, purpose, and effect
the essence of DOMA. 133 S.Ct. at 2689, 2693. Next, Windsor decried the failure of
the legislature to justify disparate treatment of the group, which is also completely
inconsistent with rational basis review. Id. at 2693 (citing Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534-35).
Finally, the Ninth Circuit noted that Windsor discussed other heightened review cases in
reaching its decision. SmithKline, 740 F.3d at 483. Notably, Windsor discussed the
rational basis with bite cases, including Moreno (about which Justice Scalia
complained in his Windsor dissent), Lawrence, and Romer. Concluding, SmithKline
held:
Windsor requires that when state action discriminates on the basis of
sexual orientation, we must examine its actual purposes and carefully
consider the resulting inequality to ensure that our most fundamental
institutions neither send nor reinforce messages of stigma or second class
status.

28
740 F.3d at 483. This is heightened review.
Defendants make much of Justice Kennedys recent opinion in Schuette v.
Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S.Ct. 1623, 1629 (2014), urging this Court to
interpret that opinion as some approval of a system that allows the controlling majority
within a state to determine certain civil rights issues. (Doc #42, Pence Memo., p. 50-51)
Yet last week, writing for the majority in Hall v. Florida and examining that states use
of an IQ test as an infallible determinant of intellectual disability, Justice Kennedy
returned to the theme of human dignity so often expressed in Windsor. 2014 WL
2178332 (U.S., May 27, 2014). Justice Kennedy held that while States are laboratories
for experimentation . . . those experiments may not deny the basic dignity the
Constitution protects. Id. at *15.
Indiana may not trifle with the dignity of its citizens by denying equal protection
to gay men and women on important rights like the right to have their marriages, valid in
other states, recognized here. It must not do so based on some convoluted pretense of
encouraging responsible procreation by those who might have unintended pregnancies. A
prohibition on marriage recognition bears no substantial relationship to the governments
claimed interest in attracting and regulating couples . . . in their natural capacity to have
children. [Doc # 42, Pence Memo., p. 57]
For all the reasons set forth herein, this Court should reject the States post-hoc
rationalizations and pretextual justifications. The principal effect [of I.C. 31-11-1-1]
is to identify a subset of state-sanctioned marriages and make them unequal. The
principal purpose is to impose inequality. See, Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694. This
differentiation is unconstitutional under the most deferential review because there is no
29
conceivable government interest in demeaning the plaintiffs. See, Windsor, 133 S.Ct. at
2694; Romer, 517 U.S. at 632; Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576-577; Kelo v. City of New
London, 545 U.S. 469, 491 (2005); Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534; Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440.
Indianas Marriage Non-Recognition Law is and should be declared unconstitutional.
F. I.C. 31-11-1-1 VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE

Under either strict scrutiny analysis or rational basis analysis, the plaintiffs have
been denied substantive due process. As discussed supra, the States interest is neither
compelling nor legitimate. Further, as previously discussed, I.C. 31-11-1-1 is not
narrowly tailored to effectuate only the States interest in providing protection to
unintended children resulting from sex between heterosexual parents nor is it rationally
related to such interest.
II. GOVERNOR MIKE PENCE IS PROPERLY NAMED AS A PARTY TO
THIS ACTION

A. BECAUSE I.C. 31-11-1-1 PERVASIVELY IMPACTS THE
INDIANA CODE, IT WOULD BE A PRACTICAL IMPOSSIBILITY
TO SUE EVERY LOCAL, STATE AND FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL

Indianas Marriage Non-Recognition Law impacts hundreds of other statutes in
Indiana that rely upon the State definition of marital status to determine obligations and
benefits under Indiana law. Ex. H.
10
Accordingly, the Governor, as chief executive
officer of Indiana, is a proper defendant .
Governor Pence is charged with enforcing not only the Non-Recognition Law but
also all other Indiana laws, including those that are affected by I.C. 31-11-1-1. See,
IND. CONST. art. I, 5 and art. V, 16; see also, State ex rel. Sendak v. Marion Cty. Sup.

10
(http://www.indianaequalityaction.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2012/11
/More-Than-Just-a-Couple.pdf (Last viewed on May 30, 2014). A hard copy of the
publication has also been digitally filed with the court as Ex. H.
30
Ct., 268 Ind. 3, 9 373 N.E.2d 145, 149 (1978) ([T]he executive power of the government
is vested not in the various departments and agencies, but in the Governor alone).
Executive power in Indiana ultimately resides but in one man, one officer, the
Governor. Tucker v. State, 218 Ind. 614, 35 N.E.2d 270, 279 (1941). As the head of the
executive branch, Governor Pence can effect policies and issue executive orders
regarding the prejudicial, unequal treatment of same-sex couples and their children.
Given the hundreds of Indiana statutes impacted by Indianas refusal to include
same-sex marriages within the definition of marriage, it would be impossible to sue
separately on every deprivation under the law that plaintiffs have suffered as a result of
daily living in the past, present or future as this would result in a multitude of lawsuits
and a throng of defendants that would be some unimaginable exponential number. This
is the very reason why Governor Pence is a proper party: he alone may stand as the
representative of all agencies and sub-agencies who effectuate one of the hundreds of
statutes that are in turn impacted by the Marriage Non-Recognition Law.
B. OTHER COURTS HAVE RECOGNIZED THAT GOVERNORS
ARE PROPER PARTIES IN SIMILAR SAME SEX MARRIAGE
LITIGATION

Across the country, same sex marriage laws have been challenged and governors
have been named as defendants in these actions. See, e.g., Geiger, 2014 WL 2054264;
Latta 2014 WL 1909999; De Boer, 973 F.Supp. 2d 757; Tanco v. Haslam, --F.Supp. 2d--
, 2014 WL 997525 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 14, 2014); De Leon, 975 F.Supp. 2d 632; Bourke,
2014 WL 556729; Obergefell, 962 F.Supp. 2d 968; Kitchen, 961 F.Supp. 2d 1181.
When a broad body of state law is potentially affected by a lawsuit, the naming of
a top executive officer as a party is a practical solution to a potentially burdensome
31
problem. See, Schuette, 134 S.Ct. at 1629 (Michigan governor named as party in
challenge a voter-initiated state constitutional amendment that prohibited the state itself
and any government instrumentality from giving preferential treatment on the basis of
race, gender, and other criteria potentially considered as part of an affirmative action
program); Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of the Univ. of Michigan,
652 F.3d 607, 612 (6th Cir., 2011) (governor dismissed by stipulation after attorney
general, another top executive official, intervened); Romer, 517 U.S. at 624 (governor
named in challenge to state constitutional amendment that prohibited all legislative,
executive or judicial action at any level of state or local government designed to protect .
. . gays and lesbians from discrimination).
To sue a governor or other single state top official, I.C. 31-11-1-1 need not
expressly require that all government instrumentalities comply in treating as void the
valid out-of-state marriages of same-sex couples. Because, like the challenged law in
Schuette and Romer, the Non-Recognition Law extends to all Indiana government
instrumentalities and to the legislature, executive, and judiciary. Like the governors
in Schuette and Romer, Governor Pence is a proper defendant.
The Governor cites to a line of authority where courts have found that a general
duty to enforce the law is not sufficient to render a government official a proper
defendant under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908). The
present case is not brought against Governor Pence based on his general duties or
position, but rather on his position as the official in whom executive power is vested.
Tucker, 218 Ind. 614, 35 N.E.2d at 279. None of the cases cited by the defendants where
state officials - governors in particular - have sought dismissal under Ex parte Young has
32
the law at hand had such an overwhelmingly pervasive impact on the rights of the
challengers and the duty of numerous state agencies and officials. See, e.g., Shell Oil Co.
v. Noel, 608 F.2d 208 (1st Cir. 1979) (in challenge to law that narrowly impacted retailers
of gasoline products, governor dismissed as improper defendant); Okpalobi v. Foster,
244 F. 3d 405 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (governor dismissed as party in narrow
constitutional challenge to law creating private tort remedy for women who undergo
abortion where patients had no cognizable connection to executive branch); Mendez v.
Heller, 530 F.2d 457, 458 (2d Cir. 1976) (narrow challenge to constitutionality of
residency requirement for divorce); Sherman v. Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist. 21 of Wheeling
Twp., 980 F.2d 437, 441 (7th Cir. 1992) (state attorney general not a proper party in
challenge to single statute that required children to say Pledge of Allegiance in school).
Moreover, in contrast, there are cases that find state officials are proper parties
based upon their general duties. In Socialist Workers Party v. Rockefeller, 314 F.Supp.
984 (D.C.N.Y.), the court explained:
As noted in Ex parte Young, the important and material fact is simply the
existence of some connection with the enforcement of the act by virtue of
the office held by the party defendant. By virtue of the office held by
defendant [Governor] Rockefeller he is specially authorized to take care
that the laws are faithfully executed. This would appear sufficient
connection with the enforcement of the act under Ex parte Young.

Id. at 988, n. 7 (internal citations omitted), summarily affd, 400 U.S. 806 (1970); see
also, City of Altus v. Carr, 255 F.Supp. 828, 83 (W.D. Tex.) ([T]he Attorney General is,
by virtue of his office, generally charged with the enforcement of the law s of the State),
summarily affd, 385 U.S. 35 (1966).
Cases analyzing the Supreme Courts intent in Ex parte Young lie along a
continuum. This court need not resolve what was meant by the Supreme Courts
33
rejection in Ex parte Young of the general duty approach, which lays alongside the
statement that a connection that arises out of the general law is important and
material. 209 U.S. at 157. Indiana has said that the power of the executive rests but in
one man, one officer, the Governor, and that overarching power is appropriately invoked
here where the Marriage Non-Recognition Law impacts the interpretation and application
of statutes in twenty-nine separate titles of the Indiana Code.
C. GOVERNOR PENCES HISTORY OF PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON
TRADITIONAL MARRIAGE BIND HIM TO THIS ISSUE

One district court has concluded that where the governor actively and publicly
defended the legislation at issue[h]e is therefore a proper party. Waste Mgmt.
Holdings, Inc. v. Gilmore, 64 F.Supp. 2d 537, 543 n. 6 (E.D. Va. 1999). Admittedly, the
Fourth Circuit did not agree with this reasoning, but the plaintiffs there had already
conceded that the governor had no enforcement authority over the narrow issues in the
case, which were confined to disposal of municipal solid waste. Waste Mgmt. Holdings
v. Gilmore, 252 F. 3d 316, 330-331(4th Cir. 2001). The point made by the district court,
however, merits some consideration where, as here, the governor actively lobbied for a
legislative enactment, a public policy choice, and the inclusion of a particular religious
viewpoint regarding same-sex marriage in the laws of the Indiana and the country.
Governor Pence has stated, Marriage must be defended in the Congress, in the
courts, and if need be in the Constitution of the United States. Conservative Political
Action Conference (Feb. 19, 2010), www.youtube.com/watch?v=4YNEPAv_EFk (Last
visited May 30, 2014). Throughout his career as an elected representative of the State of
Indiana, the Governor has repeatedly talked about what he sees as the need to defend
traditional marriage:
34
The Bible says If the foundations are destroyed, what can the righteous
do? And marriage is such a foundation in our society. Marriage was
ordained by God, established in the law. It is the glue of the American
family and the safest harbor to raise children. We must preserve and
defend this foundation in our society, and we begin by defending the right
of States like Indiana to define marriage as it has ever been defined and
will always be defined in the hearts of the overwhelming majority of the
American people.

150 Cong. Rec. H6580, 6587 (daily ed. July 22, 2004) (statement of Rep. Pence).
After passionately and publicly calling for legislation to protect traditional
marriage and advocating for laws and amendments codifying what he believes is
ordained by God as to marriage, Governor Pence now argues that that he is not a
proper party to the lawsuit. [Doc #42, Pence Memo. p.p. 5-7]
11
; see also, 157 Cong. Rec.
E207 (Ext. of Remarks, Feb. 11, 2011) (statements of Rep. Pence recognizing National
Marriage Week) (I have been a long-time advocate of traditional marriage, and have
been proud to support numerous pieces of legislation to protect this sacred institution).
In 2004, then-Congressman Pence stated:
The Marriage Protection Act is a [federal] constitutional remedy to a
looming constitutional crisis What brings us here today is that activist
judges in some States are poised to force a new definition of marriage on
States like Indiana, and the Marriage Protection Act will stop that strategy
in its tracks.

Let me say clearly not on my watch will I stand idly by while the courts in
Massachusetts redefine marriage in Indiana

11
Not only do the Indiana courts disagree, see, Tucker, supra, but this is an odd
position for a chief executive officer and the leader of the Indiana Republican Party,
which not only holds a supermajority dominating both the State Senate and House, but
also continues to press for enshrinement of the Non-Recognition Law in the States
Constitution. See, www.in.gov/legislative (Republican majorities and, thus, leadership in
House and Senate); www.indgop.org (discussing Indiana GOP positions and platforms).
The Indiana GOP is also presently debating whether its 2014 platform shall include
language affirming that marriage between a man and a woman [is] the foundation of
society. 2014 Platform-Unapproved Text, www.indgop.org (accessed May 30, 2014);
see also, Editorial: Indiana GOP Places Another Bet on Marriage, Lafayette Journal &
Courier (May 24, 2014), www.jconline.com.
35

150 Cong. Rec. H6580, 6587 (daily ed. July 22, 2004) (statement of Rep. Pence). Given
the passion and tone of Governor Pences prior rhetoric and his current ability to direct
agency policy and to issue executive orders, there appears to be an inconsistency in his
current position that he is not the proper party to defend Indianas Marriage Non-
Recognition Law.
D. THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IS NOT AT ISSUE

Finally, the Governors argument that the Eleventh Amendment also bars the
action as to him is not well-taken. [Doc #42, Pence Memo., p. 6] Governor Pence is
named in his official capacity, which the defendants admit. [Doc. #43, Pence Answer,
9] The Governors immunity and his standing as a proper party are coterminous. See,
Hearne. v. Bd. Of Educ. of City of Chicago, 185 F.3d 770, 777 (7th Cir. 1999)
(Technically . . . it is not the Eleventh Amendment that bars the plaintiffs action . . . it is
their inability to show that [the governor] bears any legal responsibility.) However,
even if this Court disagrees that Governor Pence is a proper defendant in this matter, the
case moves forward as to all other defendants. No argument to the contrary has been
offered by defendants.
On the basis of the foregoing, Governor Mike Pence is a properly named party to
this action.
III. BAKER v NELSON DOES NOT CONTROL

Defendants contend that pursuant to Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972), the
issue of same-sex marriage recognition does not constitute a federal question, and
therefore, this court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to consider Plaintiffs
lawsuit. [Doc #42, Pence Memo., p. 32] Defendants reliance is inappropriate and fails to
36
take into account more recent case law indicating a doctrinal change in the law since
Baker was first decided.
Baker appealed a state court decision that upheld denial of a state marriage license
to the plaintiffs. The U.S. Supreme Court issued a single sentence opinion: The appeal
is dismissed for want of a substantial federal question. Id. Defendants contend this
single sentence opinion continues to control whether this court can consider Plaintiffs
lawsuit.
Notwithstanding Baker, the doctrinal developments exception provides this
court with jurisdiction to consider Plaintiffs claim to their right of marriage recognition.
See, Hicks v. Miranda, 442 U.S. 332, 344 (1975). Since the 1972 Baker decision, there
have been numerous doctrinal developments in the application to gays and lesbians of the
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. See, e.g., Romer, 517 U.S. 620 (Colorado
constitutional amendment that prohibited the state and municipalities from providing
gays and lesbians legal protections against discrimination); Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558
(Texas law criminalizing private, consensual, same-sex conduct violated due process
clause); Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (section 3 of Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. 7
unconstitutionally denied federal benefits to same-sex couples). These cases establish that
there have been doctrinal developments in the areas of constitutional due process and
equal protection since Baker was decided. Whitewood, 2014 WL 2058105, *6.
Because, as discussed in plaintiffs original brief, the issue presented herein is a
different question then that presented in Baker, [Doc #28, p. 21, n. 5], and because of the
doctrinal developments exception, Baker does not control or constrain this Courts power
to consider plaintiffs lawsuit on its merits.
37
IV. PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Plaintiffs are entitled to a preliminary injunction. They have shown that they are
likely to prevail in their challenge of the Non-Recognition Law. Second, plaintiffs have
been, and continue to be, irreparably harmed as a result of its operation, while they have
no adequate remedy at law. Third, the defendants will suffer the negligible harm of the
smallest incremental increase in otherwise routine paperwork and processing if the
injunction is granted. Finally, an injunction can only serve to promote the public interest,
both because protecting constitutional rights is synonymous with promoting public
interest, and because the Defendants can identify, on the merits, no single harm that could
come to pass should the injunction grant.
Defendants claim that an injunction would be inappropriate in this matter, because
any harm caused to the plaintiffs is reparable; because it would not conserve the status
quo; and because the public interest and the balancing of equities weighs against
injunctive relief. [Doc #42, Pence Memo., pp. 8-17] None of these allegations stick:
instead, they are predicated on a cramped interpretation of the Complaint, plaintiffs
motions for summary judgment and preliminary injunction and the materials submitted in
support thereof.
A. PLAINTIFFS ARE LIKELY TO PREVAIL ON THE MERITS
Plaintiffs are likely to prevail on the merits in this action. The arguments for this
proposition apply equally to both preliminary and final relief, and are found in Sections I-
IV of this memorandum.

38
B. PLAINTIFFS HAVE BEEN, AND CONTINUE TO BE,
IRREPARABLY HARMED AS A RESULT OF THE OPERATION
AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE NON-RECOGNTION LAW AND
HAVE NO ADQUATE REMEDY AT LAW

Defendants claim that the non-economic damages claimed by plaintiffs are
insufficiently concrete, particularized or traceable to any Defendants, to even justify
Article III standing, let alone injunctive relief, and cite Valley Forge Christian College v.
Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 485-86 (1982)
for support (psychological consequences presumably produced by observation of
conduct with which one disagrees . . . is not an injury sufficient to confer standing under
Art. III, even though the disagreement is phrased in constitutional terms). The Valley
Forge plaintiffs asserted taxpayer standing to challenge an alleged violation of the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. 454 U.S. at 469. The Third Circuit
rejected this argument, relying upon Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), but allowed the
plaintiffs to proceed under the theory of citizen standing. The Supreme Court rejected
this theory of standing. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 470.
But plaintiffs here have asserted neither taxpayer standing, nor citizen standing.
More important, they do not merely claim damages from observing conduct with which
[they] disagree. Instead, beyond their economic harms (for which there may be an
adequate remedy at law), Plaintiffs have pleaded ongoing, targeted, and specific harms,
for which there is no adequate remedy at law, which confer upon them Article III
standing, and allow preliminary relief.
Indeed, the record here is replete with significant harms that have already been
recognized, indeed validated, by the Supreme Court: Plaintiffs affidavits document that
the defendants refusal to recognize their marriages, properly and dutifully solemnized in
39
another state, denies them a dignity and status of immense import. See, [Plaintiffs
Affs., Ex. A-D] As discussed supra and within the affidavits, the plaintiffs are
stigmatized and relegated to a second-class status by the Marriage Non-Recognition
Law, which suggests their relationships are unworthy of recognition. As Sergeant
Vaughn-Kajmowicz and Tammy have attested:
Both Sergeant Vaughn-Kajmowicz and Tammy are hurt and offended by
the refusal by INPRS and the State of Indiana to recognize their marriage.
Both feel their family is made to feel less worthy then other families
where the spouses are of the opposite-sex. The couples loves each other
and their children and do not think they or their children should be made
to feel like their family is less worthy then other families. They find this
stigma to be humiliating, embarrassing and painful.

[Doc. #27, Ex.C, Aff. of Vaughn-Kajmowicz, 12]. See also, [Doc. #27, Ex. D, Aff. of
Morrison & Leverett, 12] (Chief Morrison and Martha are humiliated by the States
to recognize their marriage and have been made to feel like second class citizens who
are somehow unworthy); [Doc. #27, Ex. B, Aff. of Welborn & Piette, 11] (refusal by
the Pension Fund and the State of Indiana to recognize their marriage shames and
dishonors [Officer Welborn and Beth] and the refusal to recognize their marriage is the
equivalent of a public statement that they are second-class citizens, that their love is
unworthy and that Officer Welborn, no matter how many acts of courage she may
display, will never rise above being a second-class officer).
And, as Sergeant Vaughn-Kajmowicz and Tammy attest, their children are
starting to understand the difference in treatment:
While their three year twins do not quite understand what is happening
regarding same sex marriage, their son comprehends it in six year old
terms as the parents of his friends are married. Tammy stated: He asked
if we were married and we said yes because it was important to him but at
the time we could not marry and did not want to tell him that.

40
[Doc. #27, Ex. C., Aff. of Vaughn-Kajmowicz, 10]
The stigma imposed by Indianas Marriage Non-Recognition Law is further
heightened because of the additional concerns raised by the Pension Funds refusal to
recognize their marriages. Under the Pension Fund, the spouses of police officers and
firefighters who die while on active duty or in the line of duty or while retired, receive a
monthly benefit. I.C. 36-8-8-13.8(c) and I.C. 36-8-8-14.1
12
The spouse of an
officer killed in the line of duty also receives a lump sum tax-free payment of
$150,000.00. I.C. 36-8-8-14.1. The knowledge that their families will not be provided
these benefits by the Pension Fund has caused Officers Lee and Welborn and Sargent
Vaughn-Kajmowicz additional emotional distress, concern, worry and upset about what
may happen to their surviving spouses and children should the First Responders
predecease their spouses. [Doc #27, Ex. A, Aff. of Lee, p. 4] (Officer Lee says that her
stress and worry are increased because she knows that if anything happens to Officer Lee,
the State of Indiana and will not provide Candace with financial support as it will the
spouses of officers who are married to persons of the opposite-sex); [Doc #27, Ex. B,
Aff. of Wellborn, pp. 4-5] (Officer Welborn is worried about whether Elizabeth will
have the financial security to continue living in their home); [Doc #27, Ex. C, Aff. of
Vaughn-Kajmowicz, p. 6] (Per Sergeant Vaughn-Kajmowicz: If I should die while a
police office or in the line of duty, Tammy will not receive the spousal benefit provided
by the Pension Fund and this worries me because she will be alone and left to take care of
our children without the same financial stability afforded my fellow officers in the same
situation but who are married to persons of the opposite-sex); [Doc #27, Ex. D, Aff. of

12
See also, 1977 Fund At A Glance, p. 2 (accessible online at http://www.in.gov/
inprs/files/77_fund_glance_membership.pdf), a copy of which has been digitally filed as
Ex. I.
41
Morrison, pp. 4-5] (Chief Morrison worries how Martha Leverett will fare financially
when Chief Morrison passes because Martha will be left without the same resources
provided her colleagues spouses in opposite-sex marriages).
13

Plaintiffs have endured and continue to be subject to prejudice sanctioned by the
Marriage Non-Recognition Law. This statute codifies prejudice and second-class
treatment, and as it does, it stigmatizes Plaintiffs. This in turn, endangers the health of
Plaintiffs. See Ex. F, Aff. of Dr. Buffie, 9-11 and accompanying article (minorities
who are stigmatized by discriminatory laws suffer adverse health effects caused by, and
attributable to, the discrimination).
Plaintiffs also allege that, by operation of the Non-Recognition Law, they are
excluded from the obligations and benefits provided by hundreds of provisions in the
Indiana Code that are legally and linguistically tied to civil marriage, family and spousal
relationships. Ex. H. Because of this exclusion, inter alia, the Marriage Non-
Recognition Law disadvantages, harms and stigmatizes plaintiffs.
None of these worries, harms and stigmas can be rectified or compensated by a
remedy at law. None of these damages are abstract to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs
have been stripped of their lawfully-wedded status by the Non-Recognition Law, which
has in turn conferred a second-class status upon them and will do continue to do so until a
Court says otherwise.

13
The possibility that Officers Lee and Welborn and Sergeant Vaughn-Kajmowicz
will die in the line of duty is not speculative. Each of these officers are required to wear
bullet-proof vests because the threat of death or serious personal injury is very real. The
officers confront potentially dangerous situations daily [Doc #27, Ex. B, Aff. of
Welborn 8) whether it be drug buys or serving warrants [Doc #27, Ex. C, Aff. of
Vaughn-Kajmowicz, 6-8] or the unknown dangers confronted when responding to
calls of domestic violence or traffic stops. [Doc #27, Ex. A, Aff. of Lee, 6-8]

42
Defendants argue that injunctions ought to preserve the status quo, and cite to
Chicago United Industries, Ltd. v. City of Chicago, 445 F.3d 940, 944 (7th Cir. 2006), for
support of this very proposition. [Doc #42, Pence Memo., pp. 9-10] Defendants failed,
however, to cite to the Court the entire sentence, which actually undercuts the point
Defendants attempt to make:
That temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions are
intended to preserve the status quo is indeed a common formula,
e.g., Ellis v. Sheahan, 412 F.3d 754, 757 (7th Cir.2005), but it is
much, and rightly, criticized. E.g., Praefke Auto Electric &
Battery Co., Inc. v. Tecumseh Products Co., 255 F.3d 460, 464
(7th Cir.2001); O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal
v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 973, 1001-04 (10th Cir.2004) (en banc)
(separate opinion of Seymour, J.), affirmed on other grounds, ___
U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 1211, 163 L.Ed.2d 1017 (2006); United Food
& Commercial Workers Union, Local 1099 v. Southwest Ohio
Regional Transit Authority, 163 F.3d 341, 348 (6th Cir.1998), Rum
Creek Coal Sales, Inc. v. Caperton, 926 F.2d 353, 359-60 (4th
Cir.1991); Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Amgen, Inc., 882 F.2d
806, 813-14 (3d Cir.1989); Canal Authority of State of Fla. v.
Callaway, 489 F.2d 567, 576 (5th Cir. 1974); Thomas R. Lee,
Preliminary Injunctions and the Status Quo, 58 Wash. & Lee
L.Rev. 109, 157-66 (2001).

Chicago United Industries, Ltd. v. City of Chicago, 445 F.3d at 944 (emphasis added)
Preliminary relief is properly sought only to avert irreparable harm to the moving
party. Id. (internal citations omitted). Preserving the status quo has nothing to do with
the analysis, and would only fuzz up the legal standard: Whether and in what sense
the grant of relief would change or preserve some previous state of affairs is neither here
nor there. Id. Defendants reliance upon the status quo, in an effort to avoid
preliminary relief, is simply misplaced.
C. THE GRANTING OF THE INJUNCTION WILL CAUSE THE
DEFENDANTS TO INCUR ONLY NEGLIGIBLE HARM, IF ANY

Defendants failed to articulate any specific harm they will suffer should this Court
43
issue a preliminary injunction and only assert some generalized interest in protecting state
laws. This is because defendants will suffer no, or only negligible, harm. Recognizing
the marriages of the First Responders is a task the defendants can easily do, for they
routinely recognize out-of-state opposite-sex marriages. Adding four marriages to their
records is no harm at all. Not being able to protect state laws that are unconstitutional,
such as the Marriage Non-Recognition Law, is not a harm that balances the equities.
D. GRANTING THE INJUNCTION WILL PROMOTE THE PUBLIC
INTEREST

For the reasons identified in the Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for
Preliminary Injunction [Doc #30, Plaintiffs Memo., p. 6], an injunction will serve the
public interest by vindicating constitutional rights, respecting human dignity, promoting
civic equality, validating the commitments that spouses in same-sex marriages make to
one another, and reducing confusion over entitlements to state pension benefits. And as
discussed above, the public interest is served by vindicating constitutional rights, not by
allowing states to protect statutes that do not pass constitutional muster.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, and as there are no genuine issues of material fact, then
as a matter of law, the Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 56
and the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment should be denied.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs, by counsel, respectfully request that a judgment and
permanent injunction be entered that:
1) Declares the Marriage Non-Recognition Law as set forth in I.C. 31-11-
1-1 unconstitutional under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution;
44
2) Permanently enjoins INPRS and the Pension Fund from refusing to
recognize the same-sex marriages of the Plaintiffs and all other same-sex marriages of
police officers and firefighters who are active members of the Pension Fund and who
have validly entered into marriage in other states;
3) Permanently enjoins the State of Indiana from:
(a) enforcing the Marriage Non-Recognition Law as set forth in I.C.
31-11-1-1;
(b) denying same-sex couples validly married in other jurisdictions the
rights, protections and benefits of marriage provided under Indiana law; and,
4) Grant all other relief just and proper in the premises.

Respectfully submitted,
/s/Karen Celestino-Horseman /s/ William R. Groth
Karen Celestino-Horseman William R. Groth
Of Counsel, Austin & Jones, P.C. Fillenwarth Dennerline Groth &
One N. Pennsylvania St., Ste. 220 & Towe, LLP
Indianapolis, IN 46204 429 E. Vermont St., Ste. 200
Tel: (317) 632-5633 Indianapolis, IN 46202
Fax: (317) 630-1040 Tel: (317) 353-9363
E-mail: Karen@kchorseman.com Fax: (317) 351-7232
E-mail: wgroth@fdgtlaborlaw.com

/s/Mark W. Sniderman /s/Kathleen M. Sweeney
Mark W. Sniderman Kathleen M. Sweeney
Sniderman Nguyen, LLP Sweeney Hayes LLC
47 S. Meridian St., Ste. 400 141 E. Washington St., Ste. 225
Indianapolis, IN 46204 Indianapolis, IN 46204
Tel: (317) 361-4700 Tel: (317) 491-1050
Fax: (317) 464-5111 Fax: (317) 491-1043
E-mail: mark@snlawyers.com E-mail: ksween@gmail.com

45
/s/Robert A. Katz* /s/Kelly R. Eskew
Robert A. Katz Kelly R. Eskew
Indiana University 6459 Central Avenue
McKinney School of Law Indianapolis, IN 46220
530 W. New York St., Room 349
*Pro Hac Vice Admission Requested

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that a copy of the foregoing Uncontested Motion
for Additional Pages was filed electronically on June 4, 2014. Notice of this filing will be
sent to the following counsel by operation of the Courts electronic filing system. Parties
and counsel may access this filing through the Courts System.

Thomas M. Fisher
Solicitor General
Office of the Attorney General
302 W. Washington St., IGCS 5th Floor
Indianapolis, IN 46204-2770
Email: Tom.Fisher@atg.in.gov

/s/Karen Celestino-Horseman
Karen Celestino-Horseman
Of Counsel, Austin & Jones, P.C.
One N. Pennsylvania St., Ste. 220
Tel: (317) 632-5633
Fax: (317) 630-1040
E-mail: Karen@kchorseman.com

1

PAMELA LEE, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.
MIKE PENCE, in his official capacity

as

Governor of the State of Indiana, et al.,
Defendants.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 1:14-cv-00406-RLY-TAB

I, Megan Fulcher, Ph.D., hereby depose and say as follows:
Preliminary Statement
1. I am an Associate Professor in the Department of Psychology at Washington and Lee
University. I have been retained as an expert by the counsel for the plaintiff in connection
with the above-referenced litigation. I have actual knowledge of the matters stated in this
declaration and could and would so testify if called as a witness.
2. My background, experience and list of publications from the last 10 years are
summarized in my curriculum vitae, which is attached as Exhibit 1 to this report.
3. I received a Bachelors degree in psychology from Virginia Commonwealth University
(1997) and a Ph.D. in psychology from the University of Virginia (2004). While at the
University of Virginia, I was mentored by Dr. Charlotte J. Patterson, a preeminent
scholar in research on lesbian and gay parents.
Case 1:14-cv-00406-RLY-TAB Document 46-1 Filed 06/05/14 Page 1 of 33 PageID #: 387

2
4. I have authored publications in the field of child development that appear either in peer-
reviewed journals or in books published by academic presses. I publish primarily on
childrens development in traditional and nontraditional families.
5. I have served as a peer-reviewer for professional journals over the course of my career. I
have also served as a reviewer for academic conference presentations as well as for
competitive grant applications.
6. I teach extensively on the topics of child development, sexuality, gender-role
development and parent-child relationships. I also teach courses on scientific
methodology and data analysis.
7. My research interests span a number of topics in the social and emotional development of
children. I have studied the social development of children in traditional and
nontraditional families. I have conducted research with gay, lesbian and heterosexual
parents. Specifically, I am interested in gender development, and focus especially on
individual differences in gender development during childhood and adolescence. Most
children have detailed knowledge of gender-role stereotypes and report sex-typed
behaviors and preferences. However, children adhere to gender roles with varying
intensities, and it is these within-sex individual differences that particularly interest me. I
am especially interested in family influences on childrens adherence to gender roles.
8. In preparing this declaration, I reviewed the States Response and the materials listed in the
Attached Bibliography (Exhibit 2). I may rely on those documents, in addition to the
documents specifically cited as supportive examples in particular sections of this declaration,
as additional support for my opinions. I also rely on my years of experience in this field, as

3
demonstrated in my curriculum vitae (Exhibit 1) and the materials listed there. I have never
met the Plaintiffs and so I do not offer an opinion about their individual capacities to parent.
I. Summary of Ultimate Conclusion
9. Children of lesbian and gay parents do not differ in psychological adjustment or well
being from children of heterosexual parents. The skills and processes involved in good
parenting do not vary as a function of parents gender or sexual orientation. The research
investigating the efficacy of gay and lesbian parents has been published in rigorous, peer-
reviewed journals and has been conducted by respected researchers. Overwhelming
evidence supports the idea that parenting competence is not impacted by sexual
orientation.
10. Childrens adjustment is impacted by parents behaviors in several ways. Parental
warmth and monitoring, the formation of attachment relationships, and parents financial
and emotional resources are each associated with childrens behavioral outcomes and
adjustment. The same processes that predict success in heterosexual parents also predict
success in gay and lesbian parents. Neither gender nor sexual orientation of parents is
associated with differences in these parental behaviors.
II. Psychological Adjustment in Children and Adolescents
11. When children and adolescents are functioning well and are able to cope with the
demands of everyday life, they are said to have psychological adjustment. Psychological
adjustment also includes an absence of problem behaviors and mental health difficulties.
When children are well adjusted they have the skills to build and maintain social
relationships and can successfully complete tasks necessary for school and home life.

4
Well-adjusted children are building the skills needed to be happy and productive adults.
Children with adjustment problems may show behavior problems at home and at school
and may have trouble building friendships and relationships with peers. These children
may have difficulty coping with growing demands as they move through development.
III. Parents Behaviors Impact Childrens and Adolescents Psychological
Adjustment
12. There are several parenting processes that have been shown to be associated broadly with
childrens positive adjustment. These processes include authoritative parenting style,
secure attachment with child and between parents, and the availability of both financial
and emotional resources.
a. Parenting Style: Research consistently finds that when parents are warm, consistent,
and monitor childrens behavior, their children do well. Parents differ in warmth
toward children, the discipline they use, how and how much they communicate with
children, and the developmental appropriateness of the behavior they expect of their
children. Parents who are warm and communicative, who make developmentally
appropriate demands, and enforce rules with expressed consequences are known as
authoritative parents. In these circumstances children learn important
communication and relationship skills as well as self-discipline. Research has
consistently indicated that authoritative parenting is associated with more positive
adjustment in children.
b. Attachment with child and one another: Attachment is an enduring connection
between people that produces a desire for contact as well as feelings of distress
during separation. Children form attachment relationships to parents and other
important adults. Adults form attachment relationships with their children and with

5
romantic partners. In parenting, attachment relationships are secure when a parent
shows sensitivity and synchronicity with an infant, and their play is both
emotionally and cognitively stimulating. It is within the context of the early
attachment relationships that children create a model of social relationships. This
model forms an infants generalized expectations about the social world. They use
the skills they develop in these first relationships to create and maintain other
relationships.
i. Children can form attachments with several caregivers. The earliest
attachment research focused on attachment relationships between children
and mothers. More recent research indicates that in addition to with their
mothers, children form secure attachment relationships fathers, teachers, and
other caregivers. Indeed, having multiple attachment relationships is
associated with positive development and may protect children against the
effects of less secure relationships.
ii. Parents attachment with one another also has an impact on childrens
adjustment. As children watch parents communicate, resolve conflicts and
support one another, they learn important relationship skills to take to their
future relationships.
c. Resources: When parents have more financial and emotional resources to draw on,
children are better adjusted. A vast number of studies over 50 years have indicated
that financial security buffers children against many risks for negative adjustment.
More financial resources can have a direct impact on children (safer neighborhoods,
better schools, stimulating toys and activities) or an indirect impact (less stressed

6
parents, more time with parents). Indeed, parents who are less stressed are able to
parent positively and have more well-adjusted children. When parents have more
emotional support and less parenting or other stress their children do well.
IV. The Structure of Families Does Not Directly Affect Childrens and
Adolescents Psychological Adjustment.
13. Over and over again, research has indicated that it is not family structure (who is in the
family) that is associated with childrens adjustment. Instead, it is family processes (how
the family interacts) that influence childrens behavior and adjustment (See Golombok, et
al, 2014 for most recent evidence). Researchers have examined many structural variables
such as number of parents in the home, gender of the parents in the home, biological
relatedness of parents, and the sexual orientation of parents.
a. Single Parents: At first glance, it seems that being reared by divorced or never-
married parents may have a negative impact on psychological adjustment. Group
difference data does show that children in single parent homes are at higher risk
for poor adjustment. However, a closer look reveals that a number of important
process variables are associated with single parenthood. Two parent families are
remarkably better off financially than are single parent families. Single parents
report more financial and work stress, which impacts parenting quality. This
stress can increase as a result of transitions into and out of marriage. Children
show behavior problems both before and after their parents divorce and also after
a parent remarries. This indicates it is not the number of parents that is impacting
childrens well being but the stress from parental marital transitions. Children in
two parent families have more sources of emotional support than do children in
single parent homes. Additionally, single parents are always parenting without the

7
relief a parenting partner may contribute. Finally, people who successfully
manage a romantic relationship may be better at successfully parenting. Many of
the same skills associated with maintaining an adult relationship are necessary in
parent-child relationships.
i. When single parents can continue to use authoritative parenting, maintain
and model secure attachment, and offer children financial and emotional
resources under the increased stress of single parenthood, childrens
adjustment is not impacted.
b. Biological relatedness: Research indicates that adoptive parents are able to build
strong and secure attachment relationships with their children. When children are
adopted early in life by parents who intend to rear that child together, childrens
adjustment is not different from children being reared by their biological parents.
This is true of heterosexual, gay, and lesbian adoptive families. Some studies do
show a link between biological relatedness to parents and childrens adjustment.
In most of these studies the biologically unrelated parent is a parents new partner
who enters the childs life as part of new parental relationship. In these cases,
children may have already experienced several parental relationship transitions
(single-parenthood, divorce, remarriage). These transitions are associated with
poorer child adjustment, thus explaining the link between a lack of biological
relatedness and maladjustment. Recent carefully designed studies of gay, lesbian,
and heterosexual couples who adopted small children indicate that these children
do as well as children who were either adopted or born to heterosexual parents.

8
c. Gender of Parents: It has been hypothesized that children of single parents may be
at risk because they are not interacting with a particular parent (a mother or a
father). It was proposed that children needed to be reared by a parent of each
gender in order to develop social competencies. However, research testing this
hypothesis with single parents, gay and lesbian parents, and nontraditional
heterosexual parents indicate this is not the case. Men and women are equally
capable of all the parenting skills needed to rear well-adjusted children.
Heterosexual couples still tend to specialize their family labor with mothers doing
more nurturing and caretaking work while fathers are more responsible for
earning money. These differences in family responsibilities can lead to different
parenting behaviors and engagement. Fathers have reported being less involved
with the day-to-day care and development of their children. However, when
parents divide labor nontraditionally, fathers report having emotional connections
and close relationships with their children. Although heterosexual fathers report
feeling less competence for childcare tasks, when they are responsible for such
tasks, they build skills and competence. Childcare involves learned skills, not
intuition, which can be accomplished by anyone involved with children,
regardless of their gender or sexual orientation.
d. Sexual orientation of parents: It has been a scientific question as well as a legal
question for sometime whether children reared by lesbian or gay parents are
differently adjusted than those raised by heterosexual parents. Numerous peer-
reviewed journal articles over the past 25 years have reported on studies that
indicate no differences in childrens adjustment as a function of parental sexual

9
orientation. These studies have investigated lesbian and gay parented families in
many forms, including: custody after heterosexual marriage and divorce, birth to a
gay or lesbian couple using reproductive technology, adoption into gay or lesbian
parented families, and gay and lesbian adults serving as foster parents. In each of
these family types, the same family processes that predict positive adjustment in
the children of heterosexual parents also predict parenting success for gay and
lesbian parents. Further, the parenting processes employed by heterosexual, gay,
and lesbian parents differ very little from one another.
i. Parenting style: Interview, survey, and observational research indicate that
lesbian and gay parents show similar levels of warmth and communication
with children across development. The most recent research (Golombok
et. al. 2013) indicates that gay and lesbian parents may employ harsh
punishment less often than do heterosexual parents. Harsh punishments
have consistently been associated with childrens poor adjustment.
ii. Attachment: Most research assessing parent and child attachment
relationship as a function of parental sexual orientation has looked
specifically at adoptive parents. In these families, there is no difference
between gay, lesbian, and heterosexual parents and their ability to form
secure relationships with children. In other family forms, gay and lesbian
parents report having close relationships with their children similar to
those of heterosexual parents. Adolescent and young adult children of gay
and lesbian parents report secure, close and loving relationships with their
parents, similar to those reported by their peers reared by heterosexual

10
parents. In their relationships with one another, parents serve as models of
social and attachment behaviors for their children. Lesbian and gay
parents report rates similar to heterosexual parents of secure attachment to
their partner. Lesbian, gay, and heterosexual parents report similar levels
of satisfaction in their relationships with their partners. Studies suggest
that gay and lesbian parents may display a less hierarchical relationship
model than do heterosexual parents.
iii. Resources: Income levels of parents vary similarly in gay, lesbian, and
heterosexual parented households. Parents in each type of household
report similar support from their partners. Early fears about gay and
lesbian households included that the family would be isolated from
extended families or other sources of social support for parents and
children. Evidence indicates that this fear was unfounded; children of
lesbian and gay families are as likely to be in contact with grandparents as
other children. Parents in each family type are successful at providing
other adult role models for their children.
V. The Development of Children with Gay or Lesbian Parents
14. Domains of development: Outside of psychological adjustment, there are several other
specific areas of childrens development of interest to scientists and legal scholars
including cognitive development, peer relationships, and gender role development.
a. Cognitive development: Cognitive development in children measured by
standardized intelligence tests, school achievement tests, and grade retention is
similar in children of gay, lesbian, and heterosexual parents. Gay and lesbian

11
parents are also reported to be as involved in childrens school as are heterosexual
parents. Gay and lesbian parents are in as close contact with childrens teachers as
are heterosexual parents. Parents involvement with school and contact with
teachers are powerful predictors of school success.
b. Peer relationships: Several studies of adolescent and adult children of gay and
lesbian parents indicate that these children are as likely to report or remember
forming close friendships and enduring typical levels of teasing as do children of
heterosexual parents. Parents, teachers, peers, and children report no peer
stigmatization as a result of parental sexual orientation. These children are
reported to have similar friendships, activities with friends, and popularity as
those reared by heterosexual parents.
c. Gender role development. Early concerns about children of lesbian and gay
parents included that they would not be able to display typical gender roles
without a parent of each gender. In childhood, the toy and activity preferences of
sons and daughters of gay and lesbian parents do not differ from those of the sons
and daughters of heterosexual parents. Children of lesbian parents are more likely
to be tolerant of others nontraditional behaviors but do not show any gendered
behavior differences compared to children of heterosexual parents. Even this
difference in tolerance disappears when parents gendered attitudes are
considered. Parents with less traditional gender role attitudes and behaviors have
children less restrained by gender stereotypes, regardless of parental sexual
orientation.

12
15. Development across childhood and adolescence. At different ages, well-adjusted children
accomplish different developmental tasks. In infancy, a primary accomplishment for
children is to form attachment relationships with caregivers. Research indicates that
lesbian, gay and heterosexual parents have similar attachment patterns with children. An
important accomplishment of preschoolers is to learn to regulate their emotions and to
cope with frustrating situations. Again, there is no difference in emotional regulation
based on parental sexual orientation. In adolescence, a key accomplishment is to create
close and rewarding relationships with peers. We see that adolescents reared by gay and
lesbian parents are as capable of creating these important friendships, as are children of
heterosexual parents. Across developmental stages, different skills are demanded of
parents. None of these skills are different for gay, lesbian, and heterosexual parents.
VI. The Mental Health of Gay and Lesbian Parents
16. Sexual orientation is no longer used in any way to diagnose mental health.
Homosexuality was removed as a mental health disorder from the DSM, the standard to
tool to diagnose mental disorders, over 25 years ago. Mainstream psychological and
medical associations agree that gay and lesbian orientations are well within the normal
and healthy variations of sexual attraction. The American Psychological Association, the
American Academy of Pediatrics, the American Medical Association, the American
Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, and the American Academy of Family
Physicians (among others) each have released statements in support of gay and lesbian
parents and their ability and rights to rear children. Over 25 years of research consistently
revealed that gay and lesbian parents are able to cope with the demands of parenting and
report the same psychological adjustment themselves as do heterosexual parents.

13
VII. The Scientific Merit of Research on Gay and Lesbian Parents
17. The research relied on here has all been published in respected journals with peer-review
processes that maintain methodological, analytical, and interpretive soundness. The
earliest studies of gay and lesbian parenting often included small samples and participants
recruited through convenience sampling. Recently, however, nationally representative,
large, and longitudinal studies have replicated the findings of those early studies: there is
no substantial difference in the psychological adjustment or development of children as a
function of parental sexual orientation. Studies relied on in this opinion included outcome
measurements from several sources (children, parents, teachers, peers, standardized
assessments), children in different stages of development (early childhood, middle
childhood, adolescence, and young adulthood), and from many family forms (biological,
adoptive, foster, blended). In these widely variable studies, the same findings continue to
emerge: children reared by lesbian and gay parents are doing as well as children raised by
heterosexual parents.
VIII. The Recognition of Legal Same-Sex Marriage Would Benefit Children.
18. Parents with legal marriages are more financially secure. If gay and lesbian couples
achieve the right to marry or to have their legal marriages recognized by the state in
which they reside, their children could benefit from the financial protections afforded to
other married couples. Spouses would gain social security, survivor benefits and
inheritance rights. It is clear that the death of a parent would have a direct impact on
children. Additionally, childrens development can be impacted indirectly by the death of
their parent if the surviving parents stress and resources begin to affect their parenting. If

14
these financial protections are afforded to surviving parents it will lessen the financial
stress that is associated with poor childhood adjustment. Marriage also would allow
spouses to share employment benefits with their family, which reduces stress related to
finances.
19. The legal recognition of marriages also protects children during marital transitions. If
legal marriage of gay and lesbian parents was recognized, each parents relationship with
children of that marriage would also be recognized. Noncustodial parents would be better
able to retain a connection and maintain attachment relationships with their children.
20. The 2010 Census Report indicates that there are many gay and lesbian couples rearing
children together in the United States today. More than 115,000 same-sex couples
reported having children in their households. There are estimated to be many more gay
and lesbian single adults rearing children in the United States.
Signed under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States this second day of June,
2014.

Megan Fulcher, Ph.D.


15

EXHIBIT 1

16

Megan Fulcher, Ph.D.

Department of Psychology Office: 540 458-8107
Washington and Lee University Home: 540 463-3534
Lexington, VA 24450 e-mail: fulcherm@wlu.edu

Education

Ph.D., Department of Psychology, University of Virginia, 2004
Developmental Psychology
Advisor: Dr. Charlotte J. Patterson
Dissertation Title: Gendered differences in childrens aspirations as a function of parental
traditionality in attitudes and practices.

B.S., Virginia Commonwealth University, 1997
Magna Cum Laude
University Honors
Psychology Major
Womens Studies Minor

Employment

Associate Professor, Washington and Lee University, 2012-present
Assistant Professor, Washington and Lee University, 2006 - 2012
Visiting Assistant Professor, Washington & Lee University, 2004-2006
Adjunct Professor, Virginia Commonwealth University, Summers 2001-2003
Instructor, University of Virginia, Spring 2002
Graduate Teaching Assistant, University of Virginia 1997-2004

Awards & Grants

Lenfest Grant, Washington and Lee University, 2009, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014
Hess Scholar, 2010
NICHD Summer Institute on Applied Research with Adolescents & Children, Summer
Fellow, 2007
Glenn Grant, Washington and Lee University, 2006, 2007, 2008
Distinguished Teaching Fellowship, University of Virginia, 2002
Becky Boone Award for Excellence in Teaching, University of Virginia, 2001
Hamilton Fellowship, University of Virginia, 2001
Academic Enhancement Program Fellowship, University of Virginia, 2000
Center for Children, Families, and the Law, Summer Fellow, 2000
National Institute of Health Developmental Training Grant, Graduate Fellow,

17
1998-2000
Governors Fellowship, University of Virginia, 1998
DuPont Fellowship, University of Virginia, 1997
Outstanding Womens Studies Student, Virginia Commonwealth University, 1997

Teaching Interests

Child development; gender-role development; development in non-traditional families; children
and the law; psychology of sexual orientation; introductory psychology; research and methods.

Teaching Experience
Washington and Lee University, Department of Psychology
Principles of Development, Gender-Role Development, Social-Emotional Development,
Development of Human Sexuality, Childrens Development and Public Policy,
Quantitative Literacy, Research in Developmental Psychology, Child Psychology,
Directed Students Individual Research.
Washington and Lee University, Womens and Gender Studies Program
Introduction to Womens and Gender Studies and Feminist Theory
Virginia Commonwealth University, Department of Education
Child and Adolescent Development
University of Virginia, Department of Psychology
Gender Role Development

Research Interests

Social and emotional development of children; childrens gender-role acquisition and
understanding; individual differences in childrens gender-role flexibility; development in the
context of traditional and non-traditional families.

Publications

Fulcher, M. (in press). Teaching the Rainbow: A guide to including Gender and Sexual Diversity
in School Curriculum and Culture, Psychology of Sexual Orientation and Gender
Diversity.

Weisgram, E.S., Fulcher, M., & Dinella, L.M. (in press). Pink Gives Girls Permission: Exploring
the Roles of Explicit and Implicit Gender Labels on Preschool Childrens Toy
Preferences. Journal of Applied Developmental Psychology.

Dinella, L. M., Fulcher, M. & Weisgram, E.S. (2014). The role of gender ideology and gender
identity in predicting young adults career interests. Archives of Sexual Behavior, 43,
493-504.

Weisgram, E. S., Dinella, L.M. & Fulcher, M. (2011). Role of masculinity/femininity, values,
and occupational value affordances in shaping young mens and womens occupational
choices, Sex Roles, 65, 243-258.

18

Fulcher, M., & Coyle, E. F.* (2011). Breadwinner and caregiver: A cross-sectional analysis of
children's and emerging adults' visions of their future family roles. British Journal of
Developmental Psychology, 29, 330-346.

Fulcher, M. (2011). Individual differences in childrens occupational aspirations as a function of
parental traditionality. Sex Roles, 64, 117-131.

Fulcher, M., Sutfin, E. L., & Patterson, C. J. (2008). Individual differences in gender
development: Associations with parental sexual orientation, attitudes, and division of
labor. Sex Roles, 58, 330341.

Sutfin, E. L., Fulcher, M., Bowles, R. P., & Patterson, C. J. (2008). How lesbian and
heterosexual parents convey attitudes about gender to their children: The role of gendered
environments. Sex Roles, 58, 501-513.

Fulcher, M., Sutfin, E. L., Chan, R. W., Scheib, J. E., & Patterson, C. J. (2005). Lesbian mothers
and their children: Findings from the Contemporary Families Study. In A. Omoto & H.
Kurtzman (Eds.), Sexual Orientation and Mental Health: Examining Identity and
Development in Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual People. Washington: American
Psychological Association.

Patterson, C. J., Sutfin. E. L., & Fulcher, M. (2004). Division of labor among lesbian and
heterosexual parenting couples: Correlates of specialized versus shared patterns. Journal
of Adult Development, 11(3), 179-189.

Fulcher, M., Chan, R. W., Raboy, B., & Patterson, C. J, (2002). Contact with grandparents
among children conceived via donor insemination by lesbian and heterosexual mothers.
Parenting: Science and Practice, 2, 61-76.

Patterson, C. J., Fulcher, M., & Wainright, J. (2002). Children of lesbian and gay parents:
Research, law and policy. In B. L. Bottoms, M. B. Kovera, & B. D. McAuliff (Eds.),
Children, Social Science, and the Law, New York: Cambridge University Press.

* indicates undergraduate student collaborator

Manuscripts Under Review

Fulcher, M., Dinella, L.M., & Weisgram, E. (under review). Constructing a Feminist
Reorganization of the Heterosexual Breadwinner/Caregiver Family Model: College
Students Plans for their Own Future Families.

Coyle, E. F. *, Fulcher, M. & Trbutschek, D.* (under review). Adults Attitudes about Boys
and Girls Gender Nonconformity: The Contradiction in Positive Nonmasculinity.


19
Coyle, E. F. *, Van Leer, E.*, Fulcher, M., & Schroeder, K.* (under review). Assessing
Emerging Adults Anticipated Work-Family Conflict and Coping Strategies,



20

Conference Presentations

Fulcher, M. (2014). Gender and Sexual Orientation in the Family: Implications for the Child
Welfare System. Panel Presentation, Emerging Issues in Child Welfare symposium,
Washington and Lee School of Law. Lexington, VA.

Fulcher, M. & Schroeder, K. (2014). Girls Dont Belong in Lab Coats: Changing Childrens
Understanding of What it Means to be a Scientist. Poster presented at the Science of a
Smarter Mind Conference in NY, NY.

Fulcher, M., Schroeder, K.*, & Warner, E.* (2014). Masculinity and Femininity and
Adolescents Vision of their Future Selves: A Longitudinal Look at the First Year of
College. Poster presentation at the Society for Research on Adolescence Conference,
Austin, TX.

Fulcher, M., Weisgram, E. & Dinella, L.M. (2013). The Effects of Implicit and Explicit Gender
Labels on Childrens interest in Novel Toys. Poster presented at the 2013 Society for
Research on Child Development Biannual Meeting in Seattle, Washington.

Fulcher, M, Dinella, L.M., & Weisgram, E. (2012). College Mens Vision of their Future Work
and Family Roles: Associations with Parental Behaviors. Poster presented at 24
th
Annual
for the Association for Psychological Science in Chicago, IL.

Coyle, E. F.* & Fulcher, M. (2011). Toys as models: How Barbie may impact girls' possible self
content. Poster presented at the 2011 Society for Research on Child Development
Biannual Meeting in Montreal, Quebec.

Coyle, E. F.*, Truebutschek, D.*, & Fulcher, M. (2011). Male gender-nonconformity and
derogatory labels: Young adults' attitudes about and labels for preschoolers. Poster
presented at the 2011 Society for Research on Child Development Biannual Meeting in
Montreal, Quebec.

Fulcher, M. & Coyle, E. F. *(2011). Who will watch the children? The future family role plans
of school-age, high school and college aged students. Poster to be presented at the 2011
Society for Research on Child Development Biannual Meeting in Montreal, Quebec.

Weisgram, E., Dinella, L. M., Fulcher, M., Grunwald, A., & Kaniewski, L. E. (2011). Pink
monster trucks and camo baby dolls: The impact of implicit color labels on preschool
children's interest in toys. Poster presented at the 2011 Society for Research on Child
Development Biannual Meeting in Montreal, Quebec.

Fulcher, M., VanLeer, E.*, & Coyle, E. F.* (2010). Examining gender differences in
occupational prestige measures. Poster presented at the Gender Development Conference
in San Francisco, CA.

21

Fulcher, M., Weisgram, E. S., & Dinella, L. M. (2010). College students vision of their future
work and family roles: Associations with parental behaviors. Poster presented at the
Gender Development Conference in San Francisco, CA.

Dinella, L. M., Fulcher, M., Weisgram, E. S., & Connell, S. (2009). Gender differences and the
role of parental occupational characteristics in understanding young adults' career
aspirations. Poster presentation at the Society for Research on Child Development
Biannual Meeting, Denver, CO.

Dinella, L. M., Connell, S., Fulcher, M. & Weisgram, E. S. (2008). Gender differences in the
role of gender identity in young adults career aspirations. Poster presentation at the
Gender Development Conference in San Francisco, CA.

Weisgram, E. S., Dinella, L. M. & Fulcher, M. (2008). Predicting occupational interests in
young adulthood: gender, masculinity/femininity, and values. Poster presentation at the
American Psychological Association Annual Meeting, Boston, MA.

Fulcher, M. (2007). Visions of future family roles in elementary school, high school, and college
students. Poster presentation at the Society for Research on Child Development Biannual
Meeting, Boston, MA.

Fulcher, M. (2006). Parental sexual orientation and childrens gender role development. Paper
presentation at Symposium on Contemporary Research about LGBT-Headed Families,
Philadelphia, PA.

Fulcher, M. (2006). College students plans for combining work and family. Poster presentation
at the Gender Development Conference in San Francisco, CA.

parental traditionality. Poster presentation at the Society for Research on Child
Development Biannual Meeting in Atlanta, GA.

parental traditionality. Poster presentation at the Gender Development Conference in San
Francisco, CA.

Fulcher, M. & Sutfin, E. L. (2003). Parental division of labor and childrens sex-typed
occupational aspirations in families headed by lesbian or heterosexual couples. In E. Vo
(chair), Examining the Promise and Limitations of Coparenting Constructs in Diverse
Family Systems. Presented at the Society for Research on Child Development Biannual
Meeting in Tampa, FL.

Sutfin, E. L., Fulcher, M., & Patterson, C. J. (2001). Parents sexual orientation, gender-role
attitudes, and childrens environments. Symposium presentation at American
Psychological Association Conference in San Francisco, CA.

22

Fulcher, M., Sutfin, E. L., & Patterson, C. J. (2001). Parental sexual orientation, division of
labor, and sex-role stereotyping in childrens occupational choices. Poster presentation
at the Society for Research on Child Development Biannual Meeting in Minneapolis,
MN.

Sutfin, E. L., Fulcher, M., & Patterson, C. J. (2001). Parents sexual orientation, attitudes, and
childrens environments: Do lesbian moms provide less stereotyped environments?
Poster presentation at the Society for Research on Child Development 2001 Biannual
Meeting in Minneapolis, Minnesota.

Fulcher, M., Chan, R. W., Raboy, B., & Patterson, C. J. (2000). Contact with grandparents
In E. Rothblum (chair), Lesbian Mothers and their Families: New Directions in
Research. Presented at American Psychological Association Conference in Washington,
D.C.

Fulcher, M., Chan, R. W., Raboy, B., & Patterson, C. J. (1999). Contact with grandparents
Poster presentation at the Society for Research on Child Development Biannual Meeting
in Albuquerque, NM.


Academic Service

Expert Witness, 2013: James Obergefell v. Theodore E. Wymyslo (Civil Action No: 1:13-cv-
501). Retained as witness by plaintiff to present research findings on gay and lesbian
parents
Interim Chair, Washington and Lee University, Womens and Gender Studies Program, 2012-
2013
Legal Consultant, 2012: Christopher John Walsh, Jr. v. Chelsea Renee Hughs (DR-2011-
500192.01). Retained as a witness by the Southern Poverty Law Center to present
research findings on families headed by lesbian parents.
Reviewer, conference submissions for Panel 28: "Gender & Development" for the SRCD 2013
Biennial Meeting to be held in Seattle, WA, April 18-20, 2013.
Reviewer, Blakemore, J.E., Berenbaum, S. A. & Liben, L. S. (2009). Gender Development.
Psychology Press: New York.
Reviewer, American Association of University Women, AAUW International Fellowships
Program Panel, 2011
Reviewer, NICHD/Oxford Handbook on Child Development and Poverty, 2011
Reviewer, Second Biennial NICHD Summer Research Institute, 2009.
Reviewer, 2006 Wayne F. Placek Award
Journals Reviews
Reviewer, Developmental Psychology

23
Reviewer, Journal for Research on Adolescence
Reviewer, Journal of Homosexuality
Reviewer, Journal of Family Issues
Reviewer, Journal of Marriage and Family
Reviewer, Journal of Social and Personal Relationships
Reviewer, Parenting: Science and Practice
Reviewer, Sex Roles
Reviewer-in-Training, Journal of Marriage and Family, 2002-2004
Coordinator, Developmental Psychology Area Lunch Meeting, 1998-1999

Committee Work

GBLT Faculty Student Advisory Board, Washington and Lee University
University Athletic Committee, Washington and Lee University, 2011-2017
University Committee on Inclusiveness and Campus Climate, Washington and Lee
University, 2008-2012
Teachers Education Advisory Committee, Washington and Lee University, 2008-2011
Faculty Committee on Inclusiveness, Washington and Lee University, 2007-2010
Program in Women's Studies Advisory Committee, Washington and Lee University, 2007-
2012

Community Service

Faculty Mentor, Womens Soccer Team, Washington and Lee University
Faculty Advisor, GLBT Equality Initiative, Washington and Lee University
Faculty Advisor, Literacy Campaign, Washington and Lee University
Co-coordinator, Women in Math and Science, Washington and Lee University
Central Elementary PTA, Board Member
Rockbridge Area Prevention Council, Member

Community Presentations

You know what they say about assuming(2013). Seminar, Alumni College Family Adventures
in Science, Washington and Lee University.

Healthy GLBT Development through the College Years (2012). Presented at Washington and
Lee Universitys first Annual GLBTQ Symposium.

What do we have here? Understanding how the mind works (2009 , 2011, & 2012). Seminar,
Alumni College Family Adventures in Science, Washington and Lee University.

Attachment relationships (2011 & 2012). Advocate Institute presentation for Court Appointed
Special Advocate for Children (CASA).


24
Work and family: How children & young adults envision their future (2011). Presented at
Developmental Psychologys Area Lunch, University of Virginia.

Growing girls: Magazines, movies, and more (2010). Presentation at the Womens Health
Virginias Annual Conference.

Parent traditionality and childrens occupational aspirations (2010). Presentation at NOW-
Lexington Virginia chapter.

Gender in the school (2009). In-service workshop for teachers in the Buena Vista School
System.

The changing family form (2007). Insight, BRPT television program.

The evolution of attitudes toward work, family and gender (2006). Insight, WMRA radio
program.

Occupational aspirations and the family (2006). Presented at Developmental Psychologys Area
Lunch, University of Virginia.

I want to be the first girl president (2005). Presented at the Womens Studies Colloquia,
Washington and Lee University.

25
Exhibit 2

26

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Table of Contents

1. Psychological Adjustment of Children and Adolescents

. 25
2. Parents Behaviors Impact Childrens and Adolescents
Psychological Adjustment
. 26
Parenting Style . 26
Attachment . 26
Resources

. 27
3. Family Structure does not Impact Childrens and
Adolescents Psychological Adjustment
. 28
Number of Parents . 28
Biological Relatedness . 28
Gender of Parents . 28
Parents Sexual Orientation

. 29
4.The Development of Children of Gay and Lesbian Parents . 30

5. The Mental Health of Gay and Lesbian Parents

. 31
6. The Scientific Merit of Research on Gay and Lesbian Parents . 31

7. Recognition of Legal Same Sex Marriage Would Benefit
Children
. 32

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OFFICER PAMELA LEE, et al., )
)
Plaintiffs, ) Cause No: 1:14-cv-406-RLY-TAB
)
-vs- )
)
MIKE PENCE, in his official capacity )
as Governor of the State of Indiana, et al. )
)
Defendants. )

EXPERT DECLARATION OF DR. WILLIAM C. BUFFIE

I, William C. Buffie, M.D., hereby depose and state as follows:
BACKGROUND AND QUALIFICATIONS
1. I am over the age of eighteen (18) and competent to testify as
to the matters contained herein. I am a physician specializing in internal
medicine in Indiana. I have been retained as an expert by counsel for
plaintiffs in connection with the instant litigation. I have actual
knowledge of the matters stated herein and will testify if called as a
witness.
2. My background and experience are summarized in my
curriculum vitae, attached as Exhibit A to this declaration.
3. I graduated from Northwestern University, Phi Beta Kappa in
1977 with a B.A. in biology. In 1981 I graduated from the Indiana
University School of Medicine, Indianapolis, Indiana with an M.D., Alpha

2
Omega Alpha (highest distinction and completed my internship and
residency in internal medicine at Indiana University Medical Center.
3. Since 1984, I have been an internal medicine
specialist/hospitalist at Indiana Internal Medicine Consultants where I
am also the chief executive officer. I also currently serve on the board of
directors of St. Francis Health Network. I am a member of the American
College of Physicians, the Indiana State Medical Association and the
Society of Hospital Medicine. I am currently certified by the American
Board of Internal Medicine and hold hospital appointments at St. Francis
Hospital and Kindred Hospital South, Greenwood, Indiana.
4. In my last thirty (30) years as a practicing internist, I have
met extensively with academic, business and religious leaders; families
and friends of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) youth;
politicians and thought leaders in our medical community at Indiana
University School of Medicine (IUSOM) and through my work with the
Indiana State Medical Association (ISMA). Additionally, my daughter is
a lesbian, which further enhanced my interest in the gay and lesbian
community in Indiana. I also maintain a website that is intended, among
other things, to educate the public and our state leaders regarding
public health issues unique to the LGBT community. See,
http://www.onevoiceindiana.org/mission-statement/.
5. Seeing LGBT individuals subject to the societal prejudice
and institutionalized discrimination that puts them at risk for adverse

3
physical and mental health outcomes, I have witnessed first-hand the
Minority Stress Phenomenon. This is the well-recognized scientific
model for understanding, as was succinctly stated by the American
Medical Association (AMA) in 2011, how and why the denial of civil
marriage based upon sexual orientation is discriminatory and imparts
harmful stigma on gay and lesbian individuals and couples and their
families, as well as negatively impacting their physical and mental
health.
6. Through my efforts to educate the Indiana medical
community and public at-large about Minority Stress Phenomenon, in
2010 ISMA became the first state medical association in the country to
pass a resolution acknowledging that exclusion from civil marriage
contributes to health care disparities affecting same-sex households.
ISMA (1) recognizes that exclusion from civil marriage contributes to
health care disparities affecting same-sex households; (2) will work to
reduce health care disparities among members of same-sex households
including minor children; and (3) will support measures providing same-
sex households with the same rights and privileges to health care, health
insurance, and survivor benefits, as afforded opposite-sex households.
[re-affirmed September 2012 policy 12-05A]
7. My medical literature review efforts culminated in June 2011
with the publication of my commentary article in the American Journal of
Public Health (AJPH) titled Public Health Implications of Same-Sex

4
Marriage (Article, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto
as Exhibit B). The Article summarizes the evidence-based medical
literature to that time acknowledging that marriage is protective of ones
health and family regardless of ones sexual orientation. The AJPH is a
monthly publication of peer-reviewed articles and commentaries. The
AJPH is the official journal of the American Public Health Association,
and it is committed to advanc[ing] public health research, policy,
practice and education.
8. In reaching my opinions contained herein, I relied upon all
the medical literature cited by my Article and all other materials
referenced within this declaration. Additionally, I reviewed the
Defendants Combined Memorandum in Support of their Motion for
Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motions for
Preliminary Injunction and Summary Judgment.
SUMMARY OF ULTIMATE CONCLUSIONS
9. Minority Stress Phenomenon results when a stigmatized
minority group faces chronically high levels of stress, causing stress
responses, e.g., high blood pressure, physical and/or psychological
fatigue, pathological fatigue that overworks the bodys ability to fight
disease, etc., that, over time, can result in poor mental and/or physical
health, e.g., depression and anxiety, heart disease, gastrointestinal
problems and premature death, etc.
10. From a medical and psychosocial standpoint, the alarmingly

5
high prevalence of mental health disorders, substance abuse, risky
sexual behaviors, teen homelessness, and suicides in the gay community
are caused directly by the family and societal judgment and rejection
that are products of heterosexism and homophobia. Same-sex parents
and their children internalize such prejudice, and this serves to separate
the parents from their children and their children from their classmates.
Gay youth internalize such prejudice, and some are consumed by self-
doubt, shame, and fear such that their lives spiral out of control.
Choices they make in their youth often lead to a host of physical
maladies or diseases -- in addition to the mental health disorders from
which they suffer -- all of which may take a significant toll on well-being
throughout their lifetime.
11. Medical literature clearly supports the fact that marriage
itself has protective benefits for couples -- regardless of race, ethnicity,
religious background, socioeconomic status, or sexual orientation.
Redefining marriage, and in turn family, does in fact save money and
lives by reducing the prejudice and discrimination that contributes to
Minority Stress Phenomenon.
MEDICAL LITERATURE DEMONSTRATES THAT
THE RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGES
WILL RESULT IN BETTER PHYSICAL AND MENTAL HEALTH FOR
SAME-SEX COUPLES AND THEIR FAMILIES

12. As the numerous national medical organization position
statements attest, discrimination against same-sex couples and their
families is a strong contributor to Minority Stress Phenomenon, resulting

6
in harm to the physical and mental health of same-sex couples and their
children when they are not afforded the same protections as opposite-sex
couples and their families.
13. It is through an appreciation of the harm generated by
Minority Stress Phenomenon affecting same-sex couples, including their
children, that medical experts support re-defining family so as to
embrace a broader norm, one that affords the much needed financial
and emotional support to those families challenged by the internalized
prejudice inherent in a heterosexist society that is ignorant of Minority
Stress Phenomenon, inflicting physical and mental harm on a daily
basis. One group calling for a recognition that the traditional definition
of family is no longer a functioning definition is the American Medical
Womens Association, which stands unified in a broad policy of
nondiscrimination against lesbian, bisexual and gay individuals,
including a call to redefine family to encompass the full diversity of all
family structures and to ratify marriage for same-sex couples.
14. The Institute of Medicine Committee on LGBT Health Issues
and Research Gaps and Opportunities, approved by the Governing Board
of the National Research Council, whose members are drawn from the
councils of the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of
Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine, was convened at the request
of the National Institutes of Health in 2010. In March 2011, the Institute
of Medicine issued the report that included the following key conclusion,

7
contained on page 21 of the comprehensive 347 page report:
The minority stress model attributes the higher prevalence of
anxiety, depression, and substance use found among LGB as
compared with heterosexual populations to the additive
stress resulting from nonconformity with prevailing sexual
orientation and gender norms. The committees use of this
framework is reflected in the discussion of stigma as a
common experience for LGBT populations and, in the
context of this study, one that affects health.

15. Ellen Perrin and Benjamin Siegel speak to the primary
conclusions rendered by the National Longitudinal Lesbian Family Study
(started in 1986) and the evolving medical literature as articulated by the
American Academy of Pediatrics in its 2013 policy paper, Promoting the
Well-Being of Children Whose Parents are Gay or Lesbian:
Extensive data available from thirty years of research reveal
that children raised by gay and lesbian parents have
demonstrated resilience with regard to social, psychological,
and sexual health despite economic and legal disparities and
social stigma . . . Because marriage strengthens families
and, in so doing, benefits childrens development, children
should not be deprived of the opportunity for their parents to
be married.

16. In October 2012, the American Academy of Family
Physicians announced its support of civil marriage for same-sex couples
to contribute to overall health and longevity, improved family stability,
and to benefit children of gay and lesbian couples. The American
Academy of Pediatrics supports the right of every child and family to the
financial, psychological and legal security that results from having legally
recognized marriages with the attendant benefits and obligations that
flow to the couple and their children.

8
17. Other medical, mental health and sociological organizations
that have taken positions supporting the recognition of same-sex
marriage are:
Indiana State Medical Association, September 2010 (re-
affirmed September 2012 policy 12-05A): (1) recognizes
that exclusion from civil marriage contributes to health care
disparities affecting same-sex households; (2) will work to
reduce health care disparities among members of same-sex
households including minor children; and (3) will support
measures providing same-sex households with the same
rights and privileges to health care, health insurance, and
survivor benefits, as afforded opposite-sex households;

American Medical Association, June 2011: Recognizes
that denying civil marriage based on sexual orientation is
discriminatory and imposes harmful stigma on gay and
lesbian individuals and couples and their families;

American Academy of Pediatrics: Supports the right of
every child and family to the financial, psychological, and
legal security that results from having legally recognized
married parents who are committed to each other and to the
welfare of their children;

American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists:
endorses equitable treatment for lesbians and their families,
not only for direct health care needs but also for indirect
health care issues, which includes the same legal protections
afforded married couples;

American Psychiatric Association: In the interest of
maintaining and promoting mental health, the APA supports
the legal recognition of same-sex civil marriage with all rights,
benefits, and responsibilities conferred by civil marriage, and
opposes restrictions to those same rights, benefits, and
responsibilities;

American Psychological Association: calls on the federal
government to extend full recognition to legally married same-
sex couples, and to accord them all of the rights, benefits,
and responsibilities that it provides to legally married
different-sex couples;

9

National Association of Social Workers: encourages the
adoption of laws that recognize inheritance, insurance,
same-sex marriage, child custody, property, and other
relationship rights for lesbians and gays;

18. Too often missing from the discussion regarding same-sex
marriage is a non-emotional, non-religious, non-political, evidence-
based, rational perspective. Opponents of marriage equality frequently
cite concerns for the safety of children and families and offer their
opinion that the traditional one man-one woman parenting model is the
best and only model to which we should aspire as a society. The facts
simply do not support such opinions, and we know because of Minority
Stress Phenomenon that promoting such a mentality is harmful and
divisive and only serves to alienate and fragment families and put adults
and children at great risk both physically and mentally.
19. Under the current system, men and women entering
opposite-sex marriage and their children are rewarded with the benefits
and protections of marriage. The only way that a gay person can gain
those protections and benefits is to marry an opposite sex partner and
produce children. The stress of trying to live a lie and conform to societal
expectations will likely seriously impact the physical and mental health
of the individual and his or her family even though Indiana gets what it
is attempting to incentivize. At the same time, the state chooses to
actually punish those same-sex couples who, in a thoughtful and
responsible fashion, choose to have children together, and it denies them

10
and their children the protections and benefits of marriage while
contemporaneously rewarding those who may bring unintended
children into this world through a single act of passion. The stress
imposed upon these same-sex couples and their children as a result of
discrimination and the failure of the state to treat them as it does
married opposite sex couples with children can lead to these same-sex
couples and their children to suffer poor physical and mental health as a
result of Minority Stress Phenomenon.
20. Same-sex couples, though unable to procreate in the biologic
sense that opposite-sex couples do, in fact provide stable and loving
homes for many of those unintended children who are the products of
heterosexual intercourse. The consensus opinion of medical experts in
the fields of family and child-rearing strongly support the notion that the
optimal model for successful child-rearing is that comprised of an intact
two-parent household, regardless of the gender or sexual orientation of
the parents.
OPPOSING MEDICAL LITERATURE
21. The medical literature offered in support of a position against
the recognition of same-sex marriage is not well-regarded. The most
common include:
a. National Association for Research and Therapy of
Homosexuality (NARTH): NARTH has consistently promoted the
research of Paul Cameron, who has served as the director of the Family

11
Research Institute despite being ejected from the American Psychological
Association and the American Sociological Association (ASA), both
recognized and respected professional organizations, which NARTH is
not. The ASA declared: Dr. Cameron has consistently misinterpreted
and misrepresented sociological research on sexuality, homosexuality,
and lesbianism. NARTH promotes its goal to offer hope to those who
struggle with unwanted homosexuality. It advocates therapy to cure
one of being gay. It calls for therapy that has been repeatedly shown to
be harmful to such individuals and their families -- as stated by the
American Academy of Pediatrics and the American Psychological and
Psychiatric Associations.
b. Robert Spitzer study, published in the Archives of
Sexual Behavior in 2003: This study was offered as the primary evidence
demonstrating the effectiveness of reparative therapy. The study was
offered by same-sex marriage opponents to argue that individuals who
identify as gay or lesbian are simply choosing the homosexual lifestyle
and, as such, they can choose to renounce their sexuality and be
cured. This renunciation was promoted as the best healthy choice.
In April 2011, Dr. Spitzer renounced his own study and
repudiated his own findings as a mistake that did great disservice to the
gay and lesbian community and their families. He acknowledged that
the subjects of the study were not randomized, the hallmark of credible
research and the only manner in which causation may be scientifically

12
established, but instead were fed to him by religious reparative
therapists and that successes were short-lived. He acknowledged that
most of the study subjects later became disillusioned with the process --
one that he noted was actually was harmful to them.
c. Mark Regnerus, How different are the adult children of
parents who have same-sex relationships? Findings from the New Family
Structures Study, Social Science Research, Vol. 41, Issue 4, July 2012:
This study has been cited as evidence that parenting by same-sex
couples poses a danger to children and society in general. Mark
Regnerus is a researcher at the University of Texas who published the
findings of the New Family Structures Survey (NFSS). He is a Catholic
who admits that his scientific work and his faith are inseparable. He
received a $35,000 planning grant from the Witherspoon Institute,
where Robert George is a Senior Fellow. George is with the anti-gay
National Organization for Marriage. Regnerus has admitted that had he
sought funding for a gay parenting study from the National Institutes of
Health (NIH) and that their study protocol would have worked in the
long-term best interest of science. Regnerus was denied the funding by
NIH.
The Regnerus study compared outcomes for children raised
by intact, natural husband/wife two-parent households with those for
children who were products of broken marriages -- wherein one of the
parents, at some point, experienced a same-sex relationship outside of

13
their marriage. Rarely did any of these children actually experience
parenting from same-sex parents. In fact, only 23% of those whose
mothers are lesbian and only 2% of those whose fathers are gay actually
spent even three years under the same roof with their gay parent and
her/his partner; the vast majority spent much less than three years in
any association with a same-sex, non-married couple. Poor outcomes
experienced by these children were no different than that expected from
traditional marriages torn apart by infidelity; marriages lacking trust and
commitment to the basic tenets of marriage and parenting.
Regnerus himself, in his concluding statements, acknowledged
This study cannot answer political questions about same-sex
relationships and their legal legitimacy. He goes on to state that the
the young-adult children of parents who have had same-sex
relationships [in his study] look less like the children of todays
stereotypic gay and lesbian couples and that [t]he tenor of the last ten
years of academic discourse about gay and lesbian parents suggest that
there is little to nothing about them that might be negatively associated
with child development -- and a variety of things that might be uniquely
positive.
Regnerus did not seek to study outcomes for children
actually raised by same-sex couples in a planned, committed relationship
and he was careful to state that there was no causality implied regarding
adverse outcomes and the sexual orientation of the parents.

14

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of Indiana that
the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on the 5th day of June 2014.

Dr. William C. Buffie

EXHIBIT 1

CURRICULUM VITAE

William C. Buffie M.D.

ADDRESS: 7550 Singleton St., Indianapolis, IN 46227

DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH: November 23, 1955; Hazel Crest, Illinois

RELATIONSHIP STATUS AND FAMILY:

Married Jo Ellen Buffie;
Children Sean Henderson Buffie, Sarah Henderson Buffie, Claire Henderson Buffie,
Hannah Henderson Dale

EDUCATION:

Undergraduate: Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois; Degree: B.A., Biology,
June 1977
Graduate: Indiana University School of Medicine, Indianapolis, Indiana; Degree: M.D.,
May 1981
Post-Doctoral: Indiana University Medical Center, Indianapolis, Indiana;
Internship/Residency: Internal Medicine

EMPLOYMENT:

Internal Medicine Specialist/Hospitalist at Indiana Internal Medicine Consultants,
Indianapolis IN, July 1984 to present

C.E.O of Indiana Internal Medicine Consultants, August 1997 to present

HONORS AND AWARDS:

Phi Beta Kappa 1977 Northwestern University
Co-captain baseball team -- 1977 Northwestern University
Alpha Omega Alpha (highest distinction) 1981 Indiana University School of Medicine
Board Member St. Francis Health Network -- 2011 to present
Indiana Lambda Legal honoree for LGBT public health advocacy work -- September 28,
2012

PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES:

American College of Physicians
Indiana State Medical Association
Society of Hospital Medicine


BOARD CERTIFICATION:

American Board of Internal Medicine September 12, 1984
Society of Critical Care Medicine Board Certification 1989-1999

HOSPITAL APPOINTMENTS:

St. Francis Hospital, Beech Grove, IN
Kindred Hospital South, Greenwood, IN

LGBT ADVOCACY WORK:

Presenter: Indiana State Medical Association (ISMA) annual conventions since 2007

Fall 2010: ISMA passes resolution recognizing health care disparities unique to the
LGBT community that adversely affect outcomes for LGBT individuals and their
families (making Indianas state medical association the first in the nation to do so)

Testified before the Indiana legislature 2011 opposing HJR-6 based upon its public health
implications

June 2011: Published article in the American Journal of Public Health titled Public
Health Implications of Same-Sex Marriage

2011/12 implemented Cultural Competency training, Visitation Rights, and
Employee/Patient Nondiscrimination policies for 50 provider/250 employee medical
group (Indiana Internal Medicine Consultants/Center for Respiratory and Sleep
Medicine/Indiana Primary Care Associates/Indiana Infectious Disease Consultants)

April 2012: Panelist at IU School of Medicine forum (along with four IUSOM faculty)
on LGBT Public Health issues facilitated by IUSOM medical students in their Human
Sexuality class who had studied the June 2011 AJPH article

June 2012: Addressed Indiana Progressives caucus at the Democratic State Convention
in Fort Wayne

June 2012: Testified before City/County Council of Indianapolis/Marion County in
support of the councils Domestic Partnership proposal

June 2012: Grand Rounds presentation at St. Francis Hospital (Indianapolis): LGBT
Public Health Issues

July 25 2012: Keynote speaker to gathering of 100 business, academic, and community
leaders held at Citizens Energy Group headquarters, Indianapolis


Summer/fall 2012 meetings and phone conversations with numerous political, religious,
academic, and business leaders

November/December 2012 presentations: (1) Christian Theological Seminary
(2)Bloomington community and IU staff through FairTalk (3) Out and Equal (5) Faith &
Politics forum in Fort Wayne through Universalist-Unitarian Church and Jewish
Synagogue

February 16, 2013: Keynote speaker at annual conference for League of Women Voters
of Indiana

September 30, 2013: Presenter at Indiana annual National Association of Social Workers
convention, workshop on Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Public Health Issues

February 7, 2014: Keynote speaker at IPFW Queer Heath Conference speech titled:
Queer Health 2014: At the Intersection of Politics, Religion, and Science

April 10, 2014: Discussant (with daughters Claire and Sarah), at Franklin Colleges
convocation series, on the subject of LGBT Public Health Issues and Marriage Equality

April 14, 2014: Panelist (along with three IUSOM faculty) at IU School of Medicine
forum on LGBT Public Health issues facilitated by IUSOM Gay/Straight Alliance

Current: Facilitating active conversations with IUSOM associate Dean Stephen
Bogdewic with national resources for the incorporation of LGBT public health issues and
cultural competency training into the IUSOM curriculum

Founder: OneVoiceIndiana: The Indiana Coalition for LGBT Health and
Nondiscrimination


EXHIBIT 2

PAMELA LEE, et al.,
Plaintiffs,

v.

MIKE PENCE, et. al.,

Defendants.

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
Civil Action No. 1:14-CV-406-RLY-TAB

EXPERT DECLARATION OF
JOANNA L. GROSSMAN IN SUPPORT
OF PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

I, Joanna L. Grossman, hereby depose and declare as follows:

I. BACKGROUND AND QUALIFICATIONS

1. I am the Sidney and Walter Siben Distinguished Professor of Family Law at the
Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra University. I have actual knowledge of the matters
stated in this declaration and would be prepared to testify if called as a witness.
2. My credentials and experience are summarized in my curriculum vitae, which is
attached as Exhibit A to this declaration. I received a B.A. in Economics from Amherst College
in 1990 and a J.D. from Stanford Law School in 1994. I joined the Hofstra Law School faculty
in 1999, became a tenured professor in 2005, and a distinguished professor in 2012. I have also
taught at American University School of Law, Cardozo Law School, Tulane Law School,
University of North Carolina School of Law, and Vanderbilt Law School.
3. I teach in the area of family law, with special emphasis on the history of marriage
regulation and the legal responses to modern family forms.
4. I am the co-author or co-editor of four books, including Inside the Castle: Law
and the Family in Twentieth Century America (Princeton University Press 2011) (with Lawrence
M. Friedman), a comprehensive sociolegal history of marriage, divorce and the family. I have
also published over 30 scholarly articles, including several that address the history of marriage
and divorce in the United States, trends in state regulation of marriage, the law and controversy
regarding same-sex marriage, and the rules of interstate marriage recognition. I have given
dozens of academic presentations and lectures on the subject of same-sex marriage, state
regulation of marriage, and interstate marriage recognition. In addition, I have given lectures
and conducted training sessions for lawyers and judges on same-sex marriage law and the history
of interstate marriage recognition.
5. I have been retained by Plaintiffs counsel in connection with the above-captioned
matter. I am being compensated a flat fee of $1000 for research and preparation of this
declaration. My compensation does not depend on the outcome of this litigation, the opinions I
express, or the testimony I provide.
6. I have been researching and writing about state regulation of marriage since the
beginning of the modern same-sex marriage controversy in 1993. During my years in academia,
I have written about and studied most every aspect of the same-sex marriage controversy, with
special attention to the rules of interstate marriage recognition. I explained the same-sex
marriage controversy in detailed historical context in Inside the Castle, as well as in two lengthy
journal articles entitled Resurrecting Comity: Revisiting the Problem of Non-Uniform Marriage
Laws, 84 OREGON LAW REVIEW 433 (2005) and Fear and Loathing in Massachusetts: Same-Sex
Marriage and Some Lessons From the History of Marriage and Divorce, 14 BOSTON
UNIVERSITY PUBLIC INTEREST LAW JOURNAL 87 (2004). I have also written an online column
about virtually every same-sex marriage development since the passage of the first civil union
bill in 2000. The relevant columns are listed in Exhibit B to this Affidavit and available at
writ.findlaw.com (2000 2010) or verdict.justia.com (June 2011 present). The book, articles
and columns were written after I studied and analyzed numerous historical sources, including
cases, statutes, treatises, government documents and various non-legal sources. In preparing this
declaration, I have relied on my prior research and writing, my reading of current sources on the
issues relevant to this case, and my years of experience teaching and working in the field of
family law.

II. SUMMARY OF EXPERT OPINIONS

7. I have been asked for my expert opinion concerning the regulation of marriage in
the United States, with particular emphasis on the treatment of conflicting marriage laws among
states.
a. Marriage is both a legal and social institution, with significant public and
private consequences for individuals who enter it. Marriage is entered into by
consent, but regulated from beginning to end.
b. Marriage is primarily regulated at the state, rather than federal level.
c. By statute, states regulate whether individuals can marry, whom they can
marry, and how they can create a legal marriage. States also regulate exit
from marriage, dictating whether, when and on what terms couples can
divorce or annul legal marriages.
d. States regulate the terms and incidents of ongoing marriage and assign various
benefits and burdens on the basis of marital status.
e. The federal government also assigns significant and numerous benefits and
burdens on the basis of marital status, deferring in most instances to the states
determination as to the validity of a marriage.
f. Throughout history, states have differed on impediments to marriage those
characteristics or circumstances that prevent an individual or a particular
couple from forming a legally valid union.
g. There has never been a national law of marriage, and all efforts to create
uniform state laws have failed.
h. The conflicts among state marriage laws, however, have lessened as states
have developed shared norms about autonomy, maturity, the inappropriateness
of eugenic controls, and equality.
i. Conflicts among state marriage laws arose when couples married in one state
and then sought recognition of their union in anotherwhether because they
moved to a new state, had contracted an evasive marriage in another state in
violation of their home states laws, or had some transient contact with a state
to which the validity of their marriage was relevant.
j. The problems created by non-uniform marriage laws have been resolved
through a set of principles providing that states generally ought to recognize
valid marriages from sister states regardless of whether they would have
authorized the marriage in the first instance.
k. The centerpiece of these interstate marriage recognition principles was the
place of celebration rule, or lex loci contractus, which provided that
marriages that were valid where celebrated were valid everywhere, while
those that were void where celebrated were void everywhere.
l. The general rule was potentially subject to two exceptions for violations of
natural law (sometimes understood as public policy) or positive law
(express statutory bans on extraterritorial recognition).
m. Interstate marriage recognition principles were commonly understood to
reflect the exercise of comityrespect for the laws and policies of sister
statesrather than a constitutional mandate.
n. States differed in the degree to which they recognized or made use of the
exceptions to the general rule.
o. The conflicts among state marriage laws significantly lessened over the
second half of the twentieth century as states collectively raised the age when
adolescents could marry; distanced themselves from the eugenic principles
that informed early marriage laws; developed an understanding of genetics
and hereditary conditions that made certain impediments to marriage illogical;
and, due to constitutional mandate or changing social norms, ceased banning
interracial marriage.
p. The controversy over same-sex marriage has created a non-uniformity of
marriage laws that parallels other controversies from the past.
q. Indiana, like many other states, has departed from its traditional approach to
interstate marriage recognition by adopting a blanket statutory prohibition on
recognition of validly celebrated same-sex marriages. There does not appear
to be any historical precedent for this approach.
r. The development in the last several decades of robust protection for the right
to marry under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and
strong protection against discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment has likely narrowed the circumstances under
which states can validly refuse to recognize marriages from sister states rather
than expanded them.

III. BASIS AND REASONS FOR OPINIONS

The Significance of Marriage

8. While the meaning of marriage has changed over time, it has always been
premised under American law upon a contract between consenting individuals to enter an
indefinite, intimate, monogamous relationship regulated by the state.
9. The contract necessary to form a marriage gives way to a formal status, subject to
significant regulation from the state, which defines the terms of entry, the rights and obligations
while it endures, and the terms of dissolution through death or divorce.
10. The purposes of marriage are innumerable, but historically have included:
formation of stable family relationships; encouragement and enforcement of private rather than
public dependency; legitimation of children; clarity of property ownership and creation or
preservation of lines of inheritance; and the inculcation of civic values necessary for meaningful
participation in democratic government.
11. The legal consequences of marriage are also innumerable, but include: a right of
financial support; evidentiary privileges; rights to bestow citizenship on a non-citizen spouse;
benefits and burdens under state and federal tax laws; inheritance rights; parental status rights;
and pension and Social Security rights.

State Regulation of Marriage

12. From its earliest iteration in the United States, marriage law has been primarily
the province of the states.
13. States are generally responsible for crafting their own provisions about the right to
marry, eligibility to marry, and the mode of marriage. In other words, state statutes specifically
set forth who can or cannot marry, whether prohibited marriages are void or voidable, and the
procedural requirements for creating a valid marriage.
14. Through the nineteenth and early part of the twentieth centuries, American states
imposed a variety of different restrictions on marriage based on the capacity of the individual to
understand marriage, the capacity of the individual to participate in the production of healthy
offspring, or the nature of the particular union.
15. The impediments to marriage changed over time, as particular concerns or
circumstances animated legislators to make their laws stricter or more lax. These changes were
the product of moral, religious, social, political, and economic forces.
16. When amending marriage laws, states did not always move in lock step. State
legislatures sought at some points to depart from broader trends in marriage laws, and at other
points to join them.
17. Some impediments to marriage were universal in the United States. For example,
all states prohibited bigamous (and polygamous) marriages, and all states prohibited
consanguineous (incestuous) marriages within a certain degree. Most also prohibited marriages
by the insane or imbecilic.
18. Other restrictions were common, but not universal. Because of beliefs about the
heredity of certain conditions, several states banned individuals with epilepsy from marrying.
Because of concerns about transmission to a spouse and/or effects on future offspring, many
states prohibited people with venereal disease, tuberculosis, or addiction to alcohol from
marrying. Some prohibited certain types of criminals from marrying.
19. Certain non-universal restrictions were the source of most of the controversies
among states.
a. All states imposed a minimum age to marry and a minimum age to marry without
parental consent, but states differed significantly in setting those ages. The so-
called common law age for marriage was 12 for girls and 14 for boys. Some
states used this standard, while others imposed a higher minimum age.
b. All but a dozen states banned interracial marriage at some point in history, but
many changed or lifted their bans as the twentieth century progressed, which led
to greater interstate controversy. The categories of people prohibited from
marrying whites varied by region and period in history.
c. Nearly half the states imposed restrictions on remarriage following a divorce,
either via a waiting period or, in some states, a complete ban during the lifetime
of the former spouse.
d. Beginning in the middle of the nineteenth century, some states adopted bans on
marriages between first cousins because of concerns about the genetic effects on
future offspring. Within a few decades, roughly half the states imposed such a
restriction.
e. Common-law marriage was never universally allowed. It was common in the
nineteenth century, but gradually abolished in many states as concerns about
fabricated claims, casual attitudes about marriage, and the need for state control
over sexual unions increased. As of 1931, roughly half the states still permitted it.
20. The early marriage laws in Indiana banned marriages that were: nearer of kin
than second cousins; by someone with a living spouse (bigamy); by the insane or idiotic or
those incapable from want of understanding; by those afflicted with a transmissible disease;
between a white person and a person having one-eighth or more of negro blood (on the books
between 1818 and 1965); by a person under the influence of an intoxicating liquor or narcotic
drug; by an indigent person; and by men under 18 years of age and women under 16 years of
age. See Chester G. Vernier, 1 American Family Laws 37-47 (Jan. 1, 1931). Indiana
permitted common-law marriages until the legislature abolished them by statute in 1958. See
Burns Ind. Code 31-11-8-5 (2013).

Failure of Efforts to Create Uniform Marriage Laws

21. At the height of non-uniformity in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, there was a movement to create uniform marriage laws across the country.
22. One of the primary objectives of the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) upon its founding in 1892 was to create greater uniformity of
marriage and divorce laws.
23. Although many states shared the frustration of having their strict marriage
standards undermined by their neighbors laxer ones, states were, by and large, unwilling to
agree to a more uniform approach. The Uniform Marriage and Marriage Regulation Law,
promulgated in 1911, tackled only the procedural aspects of marriage and was adopted only by
two states. A 1950 act relating to marriage was also primarily procedural and sparsely adopted.
24. Of great concern in some states, particularly in the first decades of the twentieth
century, was the rise of evasive marriage practices leaving ones home state to contract
marriage (for which residency is never required) in another state and then returning home and
seeking recognition of the union. This practice was seen as undermining the ability of states to
maintain their own standards. To minimize the practice, NCCUSL promulgated the Uniform
Marriage Evasion Act in 1912, which provided that evasive marriages would not be recognized
in the couples home state. However, only five states adopted this law.
25. There were several attempts in the late nineteenth and early to mid-twentieth
century to amend the federal Constitution to ban certain types of marriages (interracial ones, for
example) or to give Congress the authority to set national marriage policy. None became law.

Reconciling State Marriage Law Conflicts: The Traditional Approach

26. The variation in marriage laws described above gave rise to predictable conflicts
about the portability of marriage, particularly as Americans became more mobile and had greater
access to modern forms of transportation.
27. The principle of comity, or courtesy among political entities, was the historical
touchstone for analyzing marriage recognition questions. That principle informed conflict of
laws principles as applied to out-of-state marriages.
28. All jurisdictions followed some version of lex loci contractus in evaluating the
validity of a marriage. Under this general rule, often called the place of celebration rule, a
marriage that was valid where celebrated was valid everywhere, and a marriage that was void
where celebrated was void everywhere.
29. The first exception to the general rule, the so-called universal exception,
authorized courts to refuse recognition to marriages that were thought to violate natural law. In
early twentieth century treatises and case law, this exception is described as applying to closely
incestuous marriages, such as between a brother and sister or ancestor and descendant, and to
bigamous or polygamous unions. Despite the vehement opposition to interracial marriage in the
states that banned it, courts seldom applied the universal exception to preclude recognition
because such marriages were generally not deemed to violate natural law.
30. The second exception to the general rule, the so-called positive law exception
authorized courts to refuse recognition where the legislature had declared certain marriages
invalid or void as against public policy. The most common application of this exception was to
evasive marriages in those states with a specific policy, embodied in a statute, against marriage
evasion. As noted above, five states adopted the Uniform Marriage Evasion Act to express such
a policy, and fifteen other states had evasion laws of some type on the books as of 1931. Beyond
evasive marriages, there was little consensus on the meaning of the positive-law exception.
Simply prohibiting a particular marriage was not sufficient to justify application of the exception,
for that would mean that states would never give effect to marriages that they would not have
authorized in the first instance. Courts looked, instead, for statutory language that went beyond
the usual prohibition or directly addressed the question of extraterritorial recognition. As leading
treatise-writer Joseph Vernier wrote, [m]arriages are prohibited for many reasons but are void
for few. Vernier, supra, at 45.
31. As applied to a wide variety of marriage recognition cases in many states, certain
trends emerged:
a. Common law marriages were routinely recognized in states that had
abolished them by statute.
b. Interracial marriages were often recognized in states that prohibited them
by statute, especially if they were non-evasive, i.e. contracted by residents
of a state that allowed them.
c. Remarriages following divorce in violation of statutory waiting periods
were almost always recognized by states other than the one that had
imposed the restriction in the first instance.
d. Marriages by minors below the age of consent were treated inconsistently,
in part because of procedural variations such as whether the proceeding
was brought by the minor or by her parent or guardian and whether the
proceeding was to annul or confirm the marriage.
32. Indiana has traditionally followed the place of celebration rule as a matter of
comity. See Roche v. Washington, 19 Ind. 53, 57 (1862). Under this approach, courts have and
given effect to marriages from out of state that it would not have allowed to be celebrated in the
first instance. See, e.g., Mason v. Mason, 775 N.E.2d 706 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (marriage
between first cousins); cf. Gunter v. Dealers Transport Co., 91 N.E.2d 377 (Ind. Ct. App. 1950)
(giving effect to common-law marriage validly established under Colorado law). To my
knowledge, Indiana has never applied the universal/natural law to refuse recognition to a
prohibited out-of-state marriage. It has, pursuant to Burns Ind. Code 31-11-8-6 (2013), refused
to give effect to marriages contracted by Indiana residents in another state with the intent to
evade Indiana law. Until the adoption of the mini-DOMA in 1997, the Indiana legislature has
never, to my knowledge, passed a law denying extraterritorial recognition to a class of prohibited
marriages, nor denied recognition to a non-evasive marriage validly celebrated in another
American state.
33. The hallmarks of the traditional system of interstate marriage recognition were: (i)
courts decided whether to recognize individual marriages on a case-by-case basis; (ii) the
consequences of recognizing or failing to recognize the marriage were often more important to
the outcome than the nature of the particular marriage (e.g., a polygamous marriage from abroad
might be recognized for a limited purpose such as inheritance after the death of one party
because recognition would not involve condoning an ongoing polygamous union); and (iii) the
law tilted strongly in favor of recognition.
34. Courts were most likely to recognize prohibited out-of-state marriages, even ones
that clearly violated the states public policy, for purposes like inheritance or wrongful death
because the marriage would no longer be ongoing.
35. Strong policies supported the pro-recognition tilt of the system, including the
desire to: avoid de-legitimating children who had been born into a valid marriage; to protect the
parties expectations as they had likely ordered significant aspects of their lives based on marital
status; and to protect both parties against unilateral dissolution by the other. A leading conflicts
of law scholar urged a blanket rule of recognition because the minor inconveniences of
recognition were outweighed by [I]ntroducing distinctions as to the designs and objects and
motives of the parties, to shake the general confidence in such marriages, to subject the innocent
issue to constant doubts as to their own legitimacy, and to leave the parents themselves to cut
adrift from their solemn obligations when they may become discontented with their lot. Joseph
Story, Commentaries on the Conflicts of Laws 215 (9th ed. 1883).
36. These traditional principles of interstate marriage recognition are in full force
today outside of the same-sex marriage context. Although there are fewer conflicts between
marriage laws and thus fewer cases, a modern conflict of laws treatise notes the overwhelming
tendency in the United States to grant recognition to marriages valid where celebrated. William
M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Understanding Conflict of Laws 362 (2d ed. 1993).

Modern Variations in Marriage Laws

37. The differences in state marriage laws that had been so pronounced in the first
half of the twentieth century had all but disappeared by the second half. This was the result of
converging social norms and the U.S. Supreme Courts decision in Loving v. Virginia in 1967, in
which it held that state marriage laws must comply with federal constitutional guarantees and
that anti-miscegenation laws violated both the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
38. A snapshot of state marriage laws in the 1990s, before the onset of the
controversy over same-sex marriage, reveals a remarkably uniform system.
a. All states prohibit bigamous marriage.
b. All states prohibit incestuous marriage within a certain degree.
c. No state prohibits marriage based on physical, mental, or behavioral conditions
because of the fear of inherited traits.
d. No state bans interracial marriage.
e. Almost every state sets the minimum to age to marry at 18 without parental
consent and 16 or 17 with parental consent.
f. No state bans remarriage following divorce, and very few impose a waiting period
for remarriage.
39. The most significant variations in modern marriage laws, apart from same-sex
marriage, involve first-cousin marriages (permitted by roughly half the states) and
common-law marriage (permitted in roughly one-fifth of the states).
40. Indiana law has developed in step with the trends described in 38, making
marriage available to some groups previously denied. The legislature repealed the
bans on interracial marriages; marriages between first cousins older than 65
(Burns Ind. Code 31-11-8-3); and marriages by a person with a sexually
communicable disease. It also raised the age of marriage without parental consent
to eighteen for girls, as well as boys. It abolished common-law marriage. See
Burns Ind. Code 31-11-8-5.

The Laws For and Against Same-Sex Marriage

41. The non-uniformity of state laws on same-sex marriage dates to the mid-1990s.
As of 1995, no state expressly authorized same-sex marriage, but very few states expressly
prohibited it either. The passage of laws for and against same-sex marriage began in 1996 when
it appeared imminent that Hawaii might legalize same-sex marriage (although it never did).
42. In 1996, Congress enacted the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which
provided that the definition of marriage was a union between a man and a woman for all federal
law purposes and that states were not obliged by full faith and credit principles to give effect to
same-sex marriages validly celebrated elsewhere.
43. In DOMAs wake, states began passing anti-same-sex marriage laws, which
typically did two things: (1) prohibited the establishment of same-sex marriages within the
states borders; and (2) prohibited the recognition of same-sex marriages validly celebrated in
sister states or foreign jurisdictions. Some state legislatures, such as those in Kentucky and
Virginia, went further and prohibited private contracts intended to replicate the incidents of
marriage such as cohabitation agreements.
44. At the high point of the anti-same-sex marriage movement, forty-four states had
passed so-called mini-DOMAs to prevent the celebration and recognition of same-sex marriages.
Twenty-nine also enacted constitutional amendments including the same or similar prohibitions
in order to avoid invalidation of the statute by court ruling.
45. In 1997, the Indiana legislature adopted a law, which provides: (a) Only a female
may marry a male. Only a male may marry a female. (b) A marriage between persons of the
same gender is void in Indiana even if the marriage is lawful in the place where it is
solemnized. Burns Ind. Code Ann. 31-11-1-1 (2013).
46. Although states began passing anti-same-sex-marriage laws in the mid-1990s, it
was not until 2004 that the first American state to legalize same-sex marriage, Massachusetts,
began issuing licenses to same-sex couples. As of April 2014, seventeen states and the District
of Columbia have authorized same-sex marriages, by judicial ruling, voter referendum, or
legislative action. Several additional states do not allow same-sex marriage, but do authorize an
alternative status for same-sex couples such as civil union.

Non-Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage Laws: Departure from Tradition

47. The problems of non-uniformity and the potential for interstate and
intergovernmental conflicts have been resurrected by this patchwork of laws allowing and
prohibiting same-sex marriage. Resolution of these conflicts has been made difficult, if not
impossible, by the widespread adoption of non-recognition laws at the federal and state level.
48. The state/federal conflicts were contained or eliminated when the U.S. Supreme
Court invalidated the Defense of Marriage Act in United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675
(2013). After Windsor, and federal regulations and agency actions designed to implement it,
valid same-sex marriages are recognized for most federal-law purposes. The state-to-state
conflicts, however, remain due to the existence of mini-DOMA statutes and constitutional
amendments.
49. These laws have imposed significant hardship on married same-sex couples,
including:
a. The inability to divorce after moving from a state that allows same-sex
marriage to a state that does not. See, e.g., In re J.B., 326 S.W.3d 654 (Ct.
App. Tex. 2010) (refusing to recognize Massachusetts same-sex marriage for
purposes of granting a divorce). Lack of access to divorce (including
equitable distribution and spousal support) has been one of the most
significant problems arising from the lack of interstate recognition of same-
sex marriages. This problem exists in part because the states, including those
that authorize same-sex marriage, generally do not require residency as a
prerequisite to marriage, but they do require residency as a prerequisite to
divorce.
b. The inability to obtain benefits from public employers like spousal health
insurance. See, e.g., Bassett v. Snyder, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93345
(temporarily enjoining Michigan from enforcing law prohibiting public
employers from providing same-sex partner benefits).
c. The inability to live with a spouse or civil union partner because the union is
not recognized and therefore violates a child custody order barring
cohabitation by a custodial parent with a non-marital partner. See, e.g., Burns
v. Burns, 253 Ga. App. 600 (2002) (refusing to recognize civil union for
purposes of custody agreements ban on non-marital overnight guests).
d. The ability of one spouse to avoid the obligations of marriage (including the
restriction on bigamy) by moving to a state that does not recognize same-sex
marriage.
e. Uncertainty and the potential for protracted litigation about parentage status
vis--vis the biological child of a same-sex spouse. See Miller-Jenkins v.
Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d 951 (Vt. 2007).
50. Unlike with past interstate marriage conflicts, state courts in mini-DOMA states
have been categorically deprived of the power to decide, on a case-by-case basis, whether to give
effect to an out-of-state marriage. The blanket prohibition embodied in statutes like Indianas
31-11-8-6 preclude consideration of relevant facts as well as relevant state policies that might
militate in favor of recognition in a particular case.
51. Like most states, Indiana has never adopted a blanket prohibition on interstate
marriage recognition other than the one it currently applies to same-sex marriages. But for the
statutory amendments barring recognition, courts would have the opportunity to choose whether
to exercise comity and give effect to marriages by same-sex couples validly celebrated in other
states.

The Changing Role of Federal Law in Regulating Marriage

52. Despite the significant variations among state marriage laws and some significant
conflicts between states, federal law traditionally played no role determining the validity of
marriage. Noting the lack of federal marriage rules or principles, the Supreme Court wrote in
1888 that Marriage, as the most important relation in life, as having more to do with the morals
and civilization of a people than any other institution, has always been subject to the control of
the legislature. That body prescribes the age at which parties may contract to marry, the
procedure or form essential to marriage, the duties and obligations it creates, its effects upon the
property rights of both, present and prospective, and the acts which may constitute grounds for
its dissolution. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888).
53. Until 1967, when the U.S. Supreme Court struck down Virginias ban on
interracial marriage in Loving v. Virginia, federal law had never been invoked to invalidate a
state law on marriage or divorce, despite numerous interstate conflicts. Federal law contained no
substantive norms that could be brought to bear on state marriage law, and the Supreme Court
never opined as to the proper definition of marriage.
54. The U.S. Supreme Court did weigh in on state conflicts over divorce because
divorce decrees are judgments that are subject to the requirements of full faith and credit. See,
e.g., Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942). Marriage, however, was not deemed
subject to those rules.
55. There is no general federal law of marriage. Instead, most federal laws that assign
benefits or burdens on the basis of marital status (and there are over 1000) defer to state law,
either the individuals home state or the state in which the marriage was celebrated. Congresss
decision in the Defense of Marriage Act of 1996 to refuse federal-law recognition to marriages
validly celebrated under state law was unprecedented, and, at least in part for that reason, struck
down by the Supreme Court in Windsor.
56. Despite the lack of a federal definition of marriage, the Supreme Courts ruling in
1967 in Loving v. Virginia that anti-miscegenation bans are unconstitutional signaled the
beginning of a new era in which state marriage laws would have to comport with developing
constitutional principles of equal protection and due process.
57. Over the course of three opinions, the Supreme Court recognized a fundamental
right to marry that prevents states from directly and substantially interfering with ones right to
marry without triggering heightened judicial scrutiny. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967);
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
58. In addition, the Supreme Court has applied equal protection principles to
invalidate federal and state laws that single out gays and lesbians for disadvantageous treatment,
including in the context of marriage law. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013)
and Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
59. At the time the rules of interstate marriage recognition were developed, these
constitutional constraints did not exist.

CONCLUSION

60. The categorical refusal to recognize same-sex marriage is a significant deviation
from the traditional historical approach that militated strongly in favor of recognition of
prohibited out-of-state marriages.

Signed under penalty of perjury this 21st day of April, 2014

_________________________________________
Joanna L. Grossman


EXHIBIT 1

1
JOANNA L. GROSSMAN

Hofstra Law School
121 Hofstra University
Hempstead, NY 11549
Tel. (516) 463-5241
Fax. (516) 463-4800
lawjlg@hofstra.edu

CURRENT ACADEMIC POSITION

Sidney & Walter Siben Distinguished Professor of Family Law, Sept. 2012 present

Professor (with tenure), Hofstra Law School, Sept. 2004-present

John DeWitt Gregory Research Scholar, Sept. 2010 Aug. 2011

Associate Dean for Faculty Development, Hofstra Law School, March 2004 Aug. 2008

Associate Professor, Hofstra Law School, Sept. 1999 - Aug. 2004

Courses: Sex-based Discrimination; Family Law; Advanced Topics
in Family Law; Children and the Law; Wills, Trusts and Estates; Colloquium on
Gender, Law and Public Policy; Contracts

Faculty Development Activities: ran fall, spring and summer faculty workshop series;
wrote and published quarterly faculty newsletter; edited Hofstras SSRN research paper
series; wrote content for web and print materials designed to highlight faculty
scholarship and achievements; facilitated media contacts for faculty through online
media guide and other mechanisms; coordinated faculty mentoring program; ran
Junior Faculty Forum; served as reader and mentor for untenured faculty; reviewed
summer grant applications; prepared and updated new faculty guide.

Activities: Chair, Required Curriculum Working Group (2013-14); Member, Strategic
Planning Committee (2012-14); Member, Deans Advisory Committee (2011-12);
Chair, Faculty Recruitment Committee (2010-11); Chair, Lateral Appointments
Committee (2007-08); Dean Search Committee (2004-05); Universitys Diversity Task
Force (2004-12) Chair, Visiting Scholars and Speakers Committee (2003-07); Chair,
Placement and Clerkships Committee (2002-07); Member, Appointments Committee
(2001-02); Advisor, Hofstra Law Women (1999-2008); Advisor, Law Students for
Choice (2004-2008); Advisor, Public Justice Foundation (1999-2011).


2
Honors: Universitys Diversity Lecturer (2010); Universitys Distinguished Lecturer
(Spring 2004); Hofstra Law Reviews Professor of the Year (2001); Elected Graduation
Awards Presenter (2002); Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journals Professor of the
Year (2002); Public Justice Foundations Professor of the Year (2002).

OTHER ACADEMIC POSITIONS

Visiting Professor, Vanderbilt Law School, Fall 2008

Adjunct Professor, Cardozo Law School, Fall 2007

Visiting Professor, University of North Carolina School of Law, Spring 2005

Associate Professor, Tulane Law School, 1998-1999

Adjunct Lecturer, Washington College of Law, American University, Fall 1996

EDUCATION

STANFORD LAW SCHOOL, J.D. with distinction, 1994
Order of the Coif
Cumulative GPA: 3.8
Stanford Law Review, Articles Development Editor

AMHERST COLLEGE, Amherst, MA
B.A. in Economics, May 1990.

OTHER LEGAL EXPERIENCE

WILLIAMS & CONNOLLY, Washington, D.C. (Summer 1993 & 1996-98)
Litigation Associate. Trial and appellate litigation involving trusts & estates, family law,
products liability, and trademark infringement.

NATIONAL WOMEN'S LAW CENTER, Washington, D.C. (Fall 1995-Fall 1996)
Staff Attorney. Recipient of Women's Law and Public Policy Fellowship 1995-1996. Litigated
cases involving sexual harassment in the workplace, schools, and prisons; analyzed legislation
and lobbied in areas of welfare reform and child support enforcement; provided direct legal
services and education to women in prison.

THE HONORABLE WILLIAM A. NORRIS, United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit (June 1994-June 1995). Judicial Clerk.


3
STANFORD LAW SCHOOL: Research Assistant, Prof. Barbara A. Babcock, Stanford Law
School, 1992-94; Head Teaching Assistant, Introduction to American Law, Departments of
Political Science and American Studies, Stanford University, 1992 & 1993; Research Assistant,
Prof. Lawrence M. Friedman, Stanford Law School, 1993-94.

BOOKS

OUTSIDE THE CASTLE: PRIVACY AND SECRECY IN LEGAL PERSPECTIVE (in progress) (with
Lawrence M. Friedman)

MAD WOMEN: HOW GENDER, SEX AND SEXUALITY CONTINUE TO DEFINE THE AMERICAN
WORKPLACE (essay collection under submission)

GENDER AND LAW: THEORY, DOCTRINE, COMMENTARY (6
th
ed. January 2013) (with Katharine
Bartlett and Deborah Rhode)

GENDER LAW AND POLICY (2d ed. forthcoming 2014) (with Katharine Bartlett and Deborah
Rhode) (undergraduate edition)

INSIDE THE CASTLE: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN 20
TH
CENTURY AMERICA (Princeton University
Press 2011) (with Lawrence M. Friedman)

GENDER EQUALITY: DIMENSIONS OF WOMENS EQUAL CITIZENSHIP (Cambridge Univ. Press
2009; paperback edition 2012) (Linda C. McClain & Joanna L. Grossman, eds.)

ARTICLES & CHAPTERS

The Mother (and Father) of All Questions: Who is a Parent? (in progress)

Double Take: Embezzled Lives, U. CINCINNATI L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (with Lawrence M.
Friedman)

Review of Laura Briggs, Somebodys Children: The Politics of Transracial and Transnational
Adoption, 100 JOURNAL OF AMERICAN HISTORY 255 (2013)

Review of Holly J. McCammon, The U.S. Women's Jury Movements and Strategic Adoption:
A More Just Verdict, Law and History Review (forthcoming 2013)

Independent Together, 48 TULSA L. REV. 313 (2013) (book review)

Unprotected Sex: The Pregnancy Discrimination Act at 35, DUKE J. L. & GENDER (forthcoming
2014) (with Deborah L. Brake)

4

A Private Underworld: The Naked Body in Law and Society, 61 BUFFALO L. REV. 149 (2013)
(with Lawrence M. Friedman)

Defense of Marriage Act, Will You Please Go Now!, CARDOZO L. REV. DE * NOVO 155 (2012)

The New Illegitimacy: Tying Parentage to Marital Status for Lesbian Co-Parents, 20
AMERICAN U. J. GENDER & L. 671 (2012)

Pregnancy and the False Promise of Equal Citizenship, 98 Georgetown Law Journal 567
(2010)

Civil Rites: The Gay Marriage Controversy in Historical Perspective, in LAW, SOCIETY, AND
HISTORY: THEMES IN THE LEGAL SOCIOLOGY AND LEGAL HISTORY OF LAWRENCE M.
FRIEDMAN (Cambridge 2011)

Making Pregnancy Work: Overcoming the PDAs Capacity-Based Model, 21 Yale Journal of
Law & Feminism 15 (2009) (with Gillian Thomas)

Pregnancy and Social Citizenship, in GENDER EQUALITY: DIMENSIONS OF WOMENS EQUAL
CITIZENSHIP (Joanna Grossman & Linda McClain, eds., 2009)

Introduction to GENDER EQUALITY: DIMENSIONS OF WOMENS EQUAL CITIZENSHIP (Joanna
Grossman & Linda McClain, eds., 2009) (with Linda McClain)

Book Review: Wives Without Husbands: Marriage, Desertion, & Welfare in New
York, 1900-1935, Law and History Review (2008)

The Failure of Title VII as a Rights-Claiming System, 86 North Carolina Law Review 859
(2008)

The Legacy of Loving, 51 Howard Law Journal 15 (2007) (with John Gregory) (symposium)
(reprinted in Loving v. Virginia in a Post-Racial World (Kevin Noble Maillard & Rose Cuison
Villazor, eds.) (Cambridge 2012) (republished in Loving v. Virginia in a Post-Racial World:
Rethinking Race, Sex, and Marriage (Kevin Noble Maillard & Rose Cuison Villazor, eds.,
2012)

Introduction to Symposium on Family Boundaries: Third-Party Rights and Obligations with
Respect to Children, 40 Family Law Quarterly 3 (2006)

Resurrecting Comity: Revisiting the Problem of Non-Uniform Marriage Laws, 84 Oregon Law
Review 433 (2005)


5
Fear and Loathing in Massachusetts: Same-Sex Marriage and Some Lessons from
the History of Marriage and Divorce, 14 Boston University Public Interest Law
Journal 87 (2004)

Job Security Without Equality: The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 15 Washington
University Journal of Law and Policy 17 (2004)

Feminist Law Journals and the Rankings Conundrum, 12 Columbia Journal of
Gender & Law 522 (2003)

The Culture of Compliance: The Final Triumph of Form over Substance in
Sexual Harassment Law, 26 Harvard Womens Law Journal 1 (2003)

Making a Federal Case Out of It: Section 1981 and At-Will Employment, 67 Brooklyn Law
Review 329 (2001)

Separated Spouses, 53 Stanford Law Review 1613 (2001) (review essay)

The First Bite is Free: Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment, 61 University of Pittsburgh
Law Review 671 (2000)

Adoption in the Progressive Era: Preserving, Creating, and Re-Creating Families, 43
American Journal of Legal History 235 (1999) (with Chris Guthrie)

The Road Less Taken: Annulment at the Turn of the Century, 40 American Journal of Legal
History 307 (1996) (with Chris Guthrie)

Guardianship: A Research Note, 40 American Journal of Legal History 146 (1996) (with
Lawrence M. Friedman and Chris Guthrie)

Women's Jury Service: Right of Citizenship or Privilege of Difference?,
46 Stanford Law Review 1115 (1994) (Note)

COMMENTARY

I am a regular columnist for Verdict, a legal commentary site hosted by Justia.com. My
columns are available at http://verdict.justia.com/author/grossman/. From October 2000 until
December 2010, I was a columnist for FindLaws Writ. A complete archive of my columns is
available at writ.findlaw.com/Grossman.

ENCYCLOPEDIA ENTRIES AND SHORT PIECES

Succession Law, in Oxford Companion to American Legal History (2008)

6

Family and Medical Leave Act, The Encyclopedia of the Supreme Court of the United States
(2008)

Title VIIs Protection Against Pay Discrimination: The Impact of Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire
& Rubber Co., Regional Labor Review (Fall 2007) (with Deborah L. Brake)

Seeking Equality in the Legal System, Newsday, Oct. 10, 2005, at A39 (op-ed)

NYers Confront Limbo on Same-Sex Marriages, Newsday, May 19, 2004, at A48 (op-ed)

The Supreme Courts 2003 Employment Rulings: Surprising Gains for Workers and Women,
6 Regional Labor Review 22 (Fall 2003)

A Partial Legal Victory Against Continuing Discrimination: The New Supreme Court Ruling in
Amtrak v. Morgan, 5 Regional Labor Review (Fall 2002)

ERPL: Looking Beyond the Loss Ratio, Rough Notes 77 (Nov. 2002) (interview)

Womens Labor Rights Rulings in 2001: A Mixed Bag, 4 Regional Labor Review 34
(Spring/Summer 2002)

Probate and Succession Law, in Legal Systems of the World (2002)

Harassment, in the Oxford Companion to American Law (2002)

Sexual Harassment, in the Oxford Companion to American Law (2002)

CONFERENCES AND PRESENTATIONS

Keynote Speaker, Symposium, The Legacy of Title IX, Grinnell College, September 16-19,
2013, Grinnell, IA

Presenter, The Mother (and Father) of All Questions: Who is a Parent?, Law and Society
Annual Meeting, Boston, MA, May 31, 2013

Presenter, Making and Teaching Real Family Law, University of Wisconsin Law School,
April 5-8, 2013

Keynote Speaker, Colloquium, Choices and Lives: Abortion after Roe v. Wade, St. Marys
College of Maryland (March 19-21, 2013)

Roundtable Participant, Breaking the Glass Ceiling: Exploring the Continued

7
Existence of Gender Bias in the Legal Profession and Understanding How
It Can Change, New York University School of Law, March 1, 2013

Presenter, Comparative Family Law Panel, AALS Annual Meeting, New Orleans, LA,
January 5, 2013

Presenter, Social Justice Feminism Conference, University of Cincinnati School of Law,
October 25-27, 2012

Presenter, Pregnancy, Motherhood, and Reproductive Rights, Law and Society Annual
Meeting (June 7, 2012)

Participant, Author Meets Reader Panel on Grossman & Friedman, Inside the Castle, Law and
Society Annual Meeting (June 5, 2012)

Chair and Discussant, Intimate Relationships and the State: Reconsidering the Trope of
Separate Spheres, Law and Society Annual Meeting (June 5, 2012)

Presenter, Title IX and Sexual Violence, CLE, New York City Bar Association (April 17,
2012)

Presenter, Parents and Non-Parents: The Struggle to Define Parentage in the Age of the New
Family, Law and Society Association Annual Meeting, San Francisco, CA, June 4, 2011

Commentator, Works-in-Progress Session, Emerging Family Law Scholars and Teachers
Conference 2011, San Francisco, CA, June 1-2, 2011

Keynote Speaker, The State of the Same-Sex Union, Chicago Bar Association Panel on The
Illinois Religious Freedom Protection and Civil Union Act, Chicago, IL, April 20, 2011

Presenter, Disentangling Legitimacy and Parentage, Conference on The New Illegitimacy:
Revisiting Why Parentage Should not Depend on Marriage, American University,
Washington, D.C., March 24-25, 2011

Panelist, Relationship Recognition and the New York Courts, Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and
Transgender Issues in the Courts, The New York State Judicial Institute, White Plains, NY,
March 22, 2011

Presenter, E-Marriage: Emerging Trends Meet the Law, AALS Annual Meeting, San
Francisco, CA, January 7, 2011

Presenter, Are Transsexuals Paving the Way for Gender Equality, at the Northeast Law &
Society Meeting, Amherst, Massachusetts, October 2, 2010.

8

Chair, Author Meets Readers: Deborah Brake, Getting in the Game: Title IX and the
Womens Sports Revolution, Annual Meeting of the Law and Society Association, Chicago,
IL, May 27, 2010

Reader, Author Meets Readers: Deborah Rhode, The Beauty Bias, Annual Meeting
of the Law and Society Association, Chicago, IL, May 28, 2010

Lecturer, Beyond Open Doors: Integrating Pregnant Women into the Workplace,
Provosts Annual Diversity Lecture, Hofstra University, March 10, 2010

Keynote Speaker, The Future of Pregnancy Discrimination Law, Annual Conference of
National Employment Lawyers Association (Florida chapter), St. Petersburg, Florida,
September 5, 2009

Presenter, Legal Protections for Same-Sex Partners and Their Families, Annual Conference
of Gay Officers Action League, New York, NY, June 24, 2009
Chair and Moderator, Dimensions of Womens Equal Citizenship, Law and Society
Association Annual Meeting, Denver, Colorado, May 28, 2009

Participant, Empirical Research in Family Law, Law and Society Association Annual
Meeting, Denver, Colorado, May 29, 2009

Presenter, Pregnant Workers and Disparate Impact Law, Twelfth Annual Conference of the
Association for the Study of Law, Culture, and Humanities, Boston, MA, April 3-4, 2009

Presenter, Why Transsexuals Are Paving the Way for Sex Equality, at Symposium: Applied
Feminism, University of Baltimore School of Law, Baltimore, MD, March 6, 2009

Presenter, Faculty Workshop, Pregnancy, Work, and Citizenship, Vanderbilt Law School,
Nashville, TN, November 18, 2008

Presenter, The Future of Pregnancy Discrimination Claims, Symposium: Respecting
Expecting: The Thirtieth Anniversary of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Yale Law School,
New Haven, CT, November 7-8, 2008

Presenter, Defining Discrimination: The Problem of Pregnancy, Northeast Regional Law
and Society Conference, Amherst, MA, October 31, 2008 (planned)

Presenter, Faculty Workshop, Pregnancy, Work, and Citizenship,
Stanford Law School, Stanford, CA, July 30, 2008


9
Moderator, Opening Plenary: The New Generation of Family Law Scholars, Emerging
Family Law Scholars Workshop, Cardozo Law School, New York, NY, June 5, 2008

Presenter, Pregnancy and Womens Equal Citizenship, Law and Society Association
Annual Meeting, Toronto, Canada, May 30, 2008

Participant, Roundtable, Thirty Years of Anti-Discrimination Law, Law and Society
Association Annual Meeting, Toronto, Canada, May 30, 2008

Keynote Speaker, National Pay Equity Day, The Future of Pay Discrimination Claims,
Hofstra University, Hempstead, NY, April 25, 2008

Presenter, Faculty Workshop, Rights-Claiming and Reality under Title VII, Villanova
Law School, Villanova, PA, February 8, 2008

Presenter, Reflections on the Roberts Court, Cardozo Law School, New York, NY,
September 26, 2007

Presenter, Knowledge and Voice in a Rights-Claiming System: The Failed Promise of Title
VII, Law and Society Association Annual Meeting, Berlin, Germany, July 25, 2007.

Organizer and Moderator, Sticky Cultural Norms: The Transformative Potential of Title IX,
Hofstra Law School, April 30, 2007

Moderator, Social Citizenship and Gender, Conference on Dimensions of Womens Equal
Citizenship, held at Hofstra Law School on November 3-4, 2006 (conference co-director)

Presenter, Title VII and Reasonable Employees, Northeast Regional Law and
Society Conference, Amherst College on May 19-20, 2006

Presenter, Festschrift for Lawrence Friedman, Same-Sex Marriage: Some Lessons from the
History of Marriage and Divorce, Stanford Law School, October 1, 2005, Stanford,
California

Chair and Moderator, Author-Meets-Reader Panel on Linda McClain's The Place of Families,
International Society for Family Law World Conference, July 20, 2005, Salt Lake City, Utah

Presenter, Resurrecting Comity: Revising the Problem of Non-Uniform Marriage Laws,
Annual Meeting of the Law and Society Association, June 3, 2005, Las Vegas, Nevada

Presenter, Same-Sex Marriage, International Society for Family Law World Conference, July
20, 2005, Salt Lake City, Utah


10
Presenter, Faculty Workshop, The Portability of Marriage, University of North Carolina
School of Law, March 24, 2005, Chapel Hill, North Carolina

Participant, Roundtable, Master Trends in the Role of Law, New York Law School, on
November12, 2004, New York, New York

Presenter, Same-Sex Marriage, Judicial Training Institute, September 18, 2004, Pace Law
School, Westchester, New York

Participant, Roundtable, What Makes a Parent?, Cardozo Law School, June 17-18, 2004,
New York, New York

Same-Sex Marriage and the False Rhetoric of Uniformity, Conference on Same-Sex
Marriage in Massachusetts: The Meaning and Implications of Goodridge v. Department of
Public Health, Southern New England School of Law, June 11, 2004, Dartmouth,
Massachusetts

Understanding Organizational Efforts to Prevent Harassment and Their Impact
on Employees, Annual Meeting of the Law and Society Association, May 28, 2004,
Chicago, Illinois

Discussant, The Canon of Family Law, Seventh Annual Conference of the Association for
the Study of Law, Culture, and Humanities, March 12, 2004, Hartford, Connecticut

Understanding the Sexual Harassment Culture (with Vicki Magley and Lisa Kath),
Seventh Annual Conference of the Association for the Study of Law, Culture, and
Humanities, March 12, 2004, Hartford, Connecticut

The Limits of Law: Sexual Harassment and Institutional Culture, Distinguished
Lecture, Hofstra University, February 25, 2004, Hempstead, NY

Participant at conference on Dont Ask, Dont Tell: 10 Years Later, Hofstra University,
Sept. 18, 2003, Hempstead, New York

Escaping the Confines of Marriage: Divorce and Gender at the Turn of the
Twentieth Century, presented at the International Society of Family Law, North
American Regional Conference, June 27, 2003, Eugene, Oregon

Escaping the Confines of Marriage: Divorce and Annulment at the Turn of the Twentieth
Century, presented at the Annual Meeting of the Law and Society Association, June 6, 2003,
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania


11
Feminist Law Journals and the Rankings Conundrum, presented at conference on Why a
Feminist Law Journal?, April 4, 2003, Columbia University School of Law

Moderator, Current Policy Initiatives to Promote Marriage, at A Conference on
Marriage, Democracy, and Families, March 14, 2003, Hempstead, New York

Escaping the Confines of Marriage: Women and Divorce at the Turn of the Twentieth
Century, March 7, 2003, at the Sixth Annual Conference of the Association for the Study of
Law, Culture, and the Humanities, Sixth Annual Conference, New York, New York

Chair and Discussant, A Duty of Care: Being Responsible for the Mentally Incapable in the
Eighteenth- Century Atlantic World, American Society for Legal History Annual Meeting,
Nov. 8, 2002, San Diego, California

The Clash Between Law and Reality: Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment,
presented at the Law and Society Annual Meeting, May 31, 2002, Vancouver, Canada

When Law Confronts Reality: The Limitations on Laws Ability to Change Workplace
Culture, presented at the Fifth Annual Conference of the Association for the Study of Law,
Culture, and Humanities, March 10, 2002, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Discussant and Chair, Women and Violence, Law, Culture, and Humanities
Conference, Austin, TX (March 2001)

Panelist, Sexual Harassment and the Workplace, Nov. 10, 1999 (conference for New York
employers) Melville, NY (November 1999)

Lecturer, CLE course on sexual harassment sponsored by the Suffolk County Bar
Association, May 26, 2000, Islip, New York

Participant, RoundtableLaw, Society, and History: The Contributions of Lawrence Friedman
(III), May 28, 1999, Chicago, Illinois

SELECT MEDIA APPEARANCES

Interviewed on KMOX Radio, St. Louis, October 8, 2009 (David Letterman harassment
scandal)
Interviewed on WNYC, October 10, 2008 (same-sex marriage in Connecticut)
Interviewed on A Current Affair (Australia), May 22, 2008 (Heath Ledgers Will)
Interviewed on News12, October 15, 2007 (about controversial ethics speaker)
Interviewed on WNYC, July 6, 2006 (same-sex marriage in New York)
Interviewed on WNYC, May 17, 2004 (same-sex marriage in Massachusetts)
Interviewed on NPRs Morning Edition, March 3, 2004 (same-sex marriage in New York)

12
Interviewed on Ken and Company, KABC 770, Los Angeles, California, November
19, 2003 (same-sex marriage in Massachusetts)
Onstage commentary for Broadway production of Oleanna, a David Mamet play about sexual
harassment in the university setting, October 10, 2009

HONORS, GRANTS AND FELLOWSHIPS

Profiled as Law Star on Lawcrossing.com (2006)
Inducted into Long Islands 40 Under 40 (2005)
Hofstra Law School Summer Grant (2000-13)
Hofstra University Distinguished Lecturer (2004)
Tulane Law School Summer Grant (1999)
Womens Law and Public Policy Fellowship (1995-96)
Stanford Law and Society Program Funding (1993-94)

PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS

Elected Member, American Law Institute (since 2009)
Member, New York Bar (2002), California Bar (1995), District of Columbia Bar (1996)
Member, Law and Society Association
Member, Society for American Law Teachers
Member, Association for the Study of Law, Culture, and the Humanities

PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES

Anonymous Referee:
Aspen Law and Books
Law and History Review
Journal of American History
Hypatia
Law and Society Review
Law, Culture, and Humanities Journal
Law and Social Inquiry
Oxford University Press
Lexis/Nexis Publications

Member, Blue Ribbon Advisory Committee, Equal Rights Advocates
Member, 2002-05, Editorial Board, PERSPECTIVES (magazine of the ABAs Commission on
Women in the Profession)
Contributor, JOTWELL Press Blogs, Trusts & Estates Section
Guest Contributor, SALT Blog


13
PERSONAL

Married with three sons. Ultramarathon runner, triathlete, and youth soccer coach.


EXHIBIT 2
Exhibit 2

Family Law Commentary published on Justias Verdict from June 2011 - present

The Red State Scare: Federal Court in Texas Invalidates Ban on Marriages by Same-Sex
Couples (March 4, 2014)

Kentucky to Become a Second Paradise for Same-Sex Married Couples (February 18, 2014)

Why a Craiglist Sperm Donor Owes Child Support (January 27, 2014)

Secrets and Lies: A New Ohio Law Opens the Adoption Closet (January 21, 2014)

Kodys Big Score in the Challenge to Polygamy Law (December 24, 2013)

De Facto Parentage and the Rights of Former Stepparents (December 10, 2013)

Sperm Donors on the Large and Small Screen (November 27, 2013)

Hawaii Comes Full Circle on Same-Sex Marriage (November 15, 2013)

Same-Sex Weddings at the Jersey Shore (October 21, 2013)

California Allows Children to Have More than Two Legal Parents (October 15, 2013)

Falling Dominoes: Same-Sex Spouses Gain More Recognition Rights (September 3, 2013)

And They Shall Call Him? Post-Divorce Disputes Over Childrens Surnames (August 22,
2013)

DOMA is Dead: The Supreme Court Rules in United States v. Windsor that the Defense of
Marriage Act is Unconstitutional (June 26, 2013)

Birthright: The Iowa Supreme Court Allows a Lesbian Co-Parent to Be Listed on an Infants
Birth Certificate (May 28, 2013)

A Difference of Opinion: Are Universal Life Church Weddings Valid in New York? (May 14,
2013)

Victor/Victoria: Michigan Court Says Marriage Still Valid Despite Husbands Sexual
Reassignment Surgery (April 30, 2013)

Parenthood by Contract: The Kansas Supreme Court Enforces a Lesbian Co-Parenting
Agreement (April 16, 2013)

Going to the Show: The Supreme Court Will Consider Validity of Same-Sex Marriage Bans
(December 11, 2012)

An Historic First: Voters Support Same-Sex Marriage at the Polls (November 13, 2012)

Beware the Undissolved Civil Union: Massachusetts Highest Court Says That a Subsequent
Marriage is Polygamy (August 21, 2010)

The Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) Takes Another Bullet: How Can It Survive? (August 7,
2012)

Two More Nails in DOMAs Coffin: Courts Invalidate Federal Laws Rejection of Same-Sex
Marriage (June 12, 2012)

Is the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) Indefensible? A Federal Court Says Yes, in Golinski v.
OPM (March 6, 2012)

The Beginning of the End of the Anti-Same-Sex Marriage Movement (February 7, 2012)

Can Laypersons Ordained Online as Universal Life Church Ministers, or the Like, Officiate at
Weddings? In Some States, the Answer is No (November 21, 2011)

Can Universal Life Church Ministers Officiate at Weddings? In Some States, the Answer is No,
Part One in a Two-Part Series of Columns (November 1, 2011)

The Potential Consequences of Adult Adoption for Inheritance: A Recent Virginia Supreme
Court Ruling (October 20, 2011)

Do Lesbian Co-Parents Have Rights? A Recent Ohio Ruling Offers an Unusual Answer (August
23, 2011)

Respect or Defend Marriage? The Senate Considers a Bill to Repeal the Defense of
Marriage Act of 1996 (DOMA): Part Two in a Two-Part Series of Columns (August 9, 2011)

Respect or Defend Marriage? The Senate Considers a Bill to Repeal the Defense of
Marriage Act of 1996 (DOMA): Part One in a Two-Part Series of Columns (July 26, 2011)

The Reality Show Sister Wives: Will Its Stars Prevail in Their Civil Rights Lawsuit? (July 18,
2011)

Same-Sex Marriage is Legal in New York: The In-State and National Ramifications (June 27,
2011)

Family Law Commentary Published on FindLaws Writ (October 2000 December 2010)

Will Gays and Lesbians in Florida Finally Gain the Right to Adopt Children? (October 26, 2010)

Sister Wives: Will Reality Show Stars Face Prosecution for Polygamy in Utah? (October 4,
2010)

The Kids Are Alright: Family Life and Family Law on the Big Screen (September 14, 2010)

No Gay Divorces in Texas: An Appellate Court Refuses to Dissolve a Same-Sex marriage
(September 13, 2010)

The Enforceability of Postnuptial Agreements: Massachusetts Weighs In, Part Two in a Two-
Part Series of Columns on Postnuptial Agreements (August 3, 2010)

The Enforceability of Postnuptial Agreements: Massachusetts Weighs In, Part One in a Two-
Part Series of Columns on Postnuptial Agreements (August 2, 2010)

Is the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) Valid? A Federal Court Judge Says No: Part Two in a
Two-Part Series of Columns on the Two Companion DOMA Cases in Massachusetts (July 20,
2010)

Is DOMA The Defense of Marriage Act Valid? A Federal District Court Judge Says No (July
19, 2010)

New Yorks Legislature is on the Brink of Adopting True No-Fault Divorce: What the Change
Would Mean for Unhappy Couples (June 22, 2010)

New Yorks Highest Court Recognizes a Lesbian Co-Parents Rights, but Affirms an Unpopular
Precedent: Part Two in a Two-Part Series of Columns (May 25, 2010)

New Yorks Highest Court Recognizes a Lesbian Co-Parents Rights, but Affirms an Unpopular
Precedent: Part One in a Two-Part Series of Columns (May 11, 2010)

If Sandra Bullock Divorces Jesse James, What Rights or Privileges Will She Have with Respect
to His Young Daughter Sunny, Whom She Has Helped Raise? (April 13, 2010)

Annulments Based on Fraud: What is the Essence of Marriage? Part Two in a Two-Part
Series of Columns on Traditional and Modern Annulment (March 5, 2010)

Annulments Based on Fraud: What is the Essence of Marriage? Part One in a Two-Part
Series of Columns on Traditional and Modern Annulment (March 2, 2010)

Elizabeth Edwards v. Andrew Young: Can He Be Held Liable for Contributing to the Failure of
the Edwardses Marriage? (February 19, 2010)

Common-Law Marriage: A Nineteenth-Century Relic with Continuing Relevance (February 1,
2010)

Time to Revisit Baby M.? A New Jersey Court Refuses to Enforce a Surrogacy Agreement, Part
Two (January 20, 2010)

Time to Revisit Baby M.? A New Jersey Court Refuses to Enforce a Surrogacy Agreement, Part
One (January 19, 2010)

New Yorks Highest Court Upholds Benefits for Same-Sex Spouses in Narrow Ruling (November
24, 2009)

The State of the Same-Sex Union: Part Three in a Three-Part Series (August 4, 2009)

The State of the Same-Sex Union: Part Two in a Three-Part Series (July 21, 2009)

The State of the Same-Sex Union: Part One in a Three-Part Series (July 7, 2009)

When Same-Sex Couples Adopt: Problems of Interstate Recognition (June 9, 2009)

The Vermont Legislature, Inventor of the Civil Union, Grants Full Marriage Rights to Same-
Sex Couples: Why It Decided Civil Unions Were Not Sufficient to Ensure Equality (April 13,
2009)

The Iowa Supreme Court Appeals to Iowas Constitution and Iowan Values to Strike Down State
Ban on Same-Sex Marriage and Renders the Practice Once Again Legal in Three (Make that
Four) States (April 4, 2009)

Whos Your Daddy? A New York Court Says the Answer Doesnt Matter When the Court is
Dividing Marital Property (March 31, 2009)

Separate is Not Equal, According to the New Jersey Civil Union Review Commission: The
Implications of Its Findings That the Civil Union Alternative Invites and Encourages Unequal
Treatment (January 20, 2009)

Prenuptial Agreements: The Iowa Supreme Court Takes a Strong Pro-Enforcement Stance
(January 6, 2009)

Adoption Rights for Gays and Lesbians in Florida: A Trial Court Rules That the States
Longstanding Ban Must End (December 9, 2008)

And Connecticut Makes Three: The States Highest Court Declares Same-Sex Marriage Ban
Unconstitutional (October 14, 2008)

The California Supreme Court Rules That Fertility Doctors Must Make Their Services Available
to Lesbians, Despite Religious Objections (September 2, 2008)

The Virginia Supreme Court Enforces Vermonts Custody and Visitation Order Regarding a
Same-Sex Couples Child: Why an Anti-Same-Sex Marriage State Recognized a Same-Sex Union
for This Purpose (June 25, 2008)

The California Supreme Court Rules in Favor of Marriage for Same-Sex Couples: Why
Domestic Partnerships Are Not Enough: Part Two in a Two-Part Series of Columns (May 28,
2008)

The California Supreme Court Rules in Favor of Marriage for Same-Sex Couples: Why
Domestic Partnerships Are Not Enough: Part One in a Two-Part Series of Columns (May 27,
2008)

A New York Appellate Court Gives Effect to a Canadian Same-Sex Marriage: Using Traditional
Rules to Validate a Non-Traditional Marriage (February 6, 2008)

The Rhode Island Supreme Court Denies a Divorce to a Same-Sex Couple That Was Married in
Massachusetts: Why This Case Was Wrongly Decided (December 11, 2007)

Marylands Highest Court Rules Against a Claim to a Right to Same-Sex Marriage: Why, in This
Area, Litigation Still Matters (October 2, 2007)

An Ohio Supreme Court Case Interprets the States Anti-Same-Sex-Marriage Amendment: How
the Court Protected Unmarried, Cohabitating Couples from Domestic Violence Despite the
Amendment (August 7, 2007)

The Fortieth Anniversary of Loving v. Virginia: The Legal Legacy of the Case that Ended Legal
Prohibitions on Interracial Marriage (June 12, 2007)

The Fortieth Anniversary of Loving v. Virginia: The Personal and Cultural Legacy of the Case
that Ended Legal Prohibitions on Interracial Marriage, Part One in a Two-Part Series (May 30,
2007)

All But the Name of Marriage: New Jersey Adopts Civil Unions for Same-Sex Couples
(December 26, 2006)

Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, and Vermont versus Virginia: How One Contested Custody
Case Illustrates the Perils of Non-Uniform State Marriage and Parentage Laws (December 12,
2006)

The New Jersey Supreme Courts Same-Sex Marriage Decision: Couples Get the Benefits of
Marriage, but Will They Also Get the Name? (October 31, 2006)

Rhode Island Same-Sex Couples Now Can Marry in Massachusetts But Will Rhode Island
Recognize Their Unions? (October 3, 2006)

The Financial Penalty for Spousal Abuse: A New York Judge Ups the Ante, By Awarding All
Marital Property to the Abuse Victim (September 5, 2006)

The State of the Nation on Same-Sex Marriage: Key Court Losses Mean It May Be Restricted to
Massachusetts for Now (August 8, 2006)

Will the State of Massachusetts Ever Permit Same-Sex Out-of-Staters to Marry? A New Decision
from the States Highest Court Leaves Open the Possibility (April 10, 2006)

Desperate Feminist Wives: Does the Quest for Marital Equality Doom Marital Happiness?
(April 4, 2006)

New Developments in the Same-Sex Marriage Wars: The Fight Over the Issue in New York, and
the Growing International Acceptance and American Rejection of Genderless Marriage
(December 13, 2005)

The Difference Between Recognizing a Same-Sex Marriage and Authorizing One: Why a New
York Appellate Court Got it Wrong (October 20, 2005)

The California Supreme Court Considers Three Broken-Up Lesbian Partnerships, and Finds, in
Each, That a Child Can Have Two Mothers (September 6, 2005)

Is a Domestic Partnership the Same as a Marriage? No, but the California Supreme Court
Says a Domestic Partner is the Same as a Spouse (August 9, 2005)

A Loss, in New Jersey, for Proponents of Same-Sex Marriage: A Window into New Claims by
Opponents about the Governments Interest in Marriage (June 28, 2005)

The One-Year Anniversary of Same-Sex Marriage in the United States: Some Thoughts on
Recent Developments, and on the Future (May 17, 2005)

When Parentage Turns on Anatomical Sex: An Illinois Court Denies a Female-to-Male
Transsexuals Claim of Fatherhood (March 8, 2005)

Will Non-Resident Same-Sex Couples be Able to Marry in Massachusetts? The States Highest
Court Considers the Marriage Evasion Law (March 1, 2005)

A Manhattan Judge Validates Gay Marriage, Creating a Split among New York Courts, and
Setting the Stage for a Court of Appeals Ruling (February 8, 2005)

The Virginia Supreme Court Strikes Down the States Fornication Law, Indicating that Other
States Antiquated Laws Will Fall if Challenged (January 25, 2005)

Why the U.S. Supreme Court Should have Chosen to Review a Florida Gay Adoption Case: The
Law at Issue was Invidious, and the Case Offered a Chance to Clarify a Key Precedent (January
12, 2005)

The Canadian Supreme Courts Same-Sex Marriage Decision: An Interesting Contrast to the
United Statess Law (December 14, 2004)

Will New York Finally Adopt True No-Fault Divorce? Recent Proposals to Amend the States
Archaic Divorce Law (October 20, 2004)

Is Britney Spears Legally Married? And if So, is Her Prenup Enforceable? (September 27, 2004)

The Proposed Marriage Protection Act: Why it May be Unconstitutional (July 27, 2004)

As the Federal Marriage Amendment Fails in the Senate, Recent and Older Examples in Legal
History Provide Insight (July 15, 2004)

Same-Sex Couples Prepare to Marry in Massachusetts, but the Governor Invokes an Archaic
Marriage Evasion Act to Stop Out-of-Staters from Taking Vows (May 18, 2004)

A New York Court Authorizes a Lesbian Couples Joint Adoption of a Child: Part of a Growing
Same-Sex Adoption Trend (April 19, 2004)

San Francisco Takes Center Stage by Permitting Gay Couples to Marry: The Legal Questions
the Citys Actions Raise (February 24, 2004)

How Same-Sex Marriage Became Legal in Massachusetts: The States Supreme Court Rebukes
its Legislatures Attempt to Circumvent the Courts Decision (February 6, 2004)

The New Jersey Domestic Partnership Law: Its Formal Recognition of Same-Sex Couples, and
How It Differs from Other States Approaches (January 13, 2004)

Punishing Adultery in Virginia: A Cheating Husbands Guilty Plea is a Reminder of the
Continued Relevance of Adultery Statutes (December 16, 2003)

Are Bans on Same-Sex Marriage Constitutional? New Jersey Says Yes, but Massachusetts, in a
Landmark Decision, Says No (November 20, 2003)

The Consequences of Lawrence v. Texas: Justice Scalia is Right that Same Sex Marriage Bans
are at Risk, but Wrong that a Host of Other Laws are Vulnerable (July 8, 2003)

Vermont Civil Unions: Will Sister States Recognize Them? An Early Status Report (May 20,
2003)

Does Discrimination Against Gay Men and Lesbians Count as Sex Discrimination? The Supreme
Court May Soon Give an Answer (March 25, 2003)

Should a Surviving Spouse in a Same-Sex Couple be Permitted to Sue for Wrongful Death? A
New York Court will Have a Chance to Decide (February 25, 2003)

The Dark Side of Annulment: How a Divorce Alternative Became the Center of a Landmark
Trial Early in Our History (August 5, 2002)

Should the Law be Kinder to Kissin Cousins?: A Genetic Report Should Cause a Rethinking
of Incest Laws (April 8, 2002)

In a Decision Rejecting a Transsexuals Marital Union, Kansas Embraces Traditional Marriage
Or Does It? (March 26, 2002)

Two New, But Opposing, Developments for Gay and Lesbian Parents: A Pediatricians Group
Supports Gay Relationships, but a George Court Does Not (February 12, 2002)

Fault-Based Divorce is Alive and Well in New York, as Two Recent Decisions Show (January 15,
2002)

Who Gets the Engagement Ring When the Wedding is Off? (October 23, 2001)

The Cost of Hitting your Wife with a Barbell: Fault and the Division of Marital Property
(August 14, 2001)

Whom Can Transsexuals Marry? And From Whom Can They Inherit? (June 5, 2001)

Dissolving Unhappy Vermont Civil Unions: Its Harder than It Looks (April 24, 2001)

Adopting Adults: An Estate Planning Device for Gay Partners (January 16, 2001)

Beauty and the Billionaire: Anna Nicole Smith and the Rights of the Surviving Spouse Part I
(November 21, 2000)

Beauty and the Billionaire, Part Two: Anna Nicole Smith Goes to Trial (November 5, 2000)

Whats in a Name? Why Gay Couples Should be Allowed to Adopt Each Others Surnames
Part II (October 17, 2000)

Whats in a Name? Why Gay Couples Should be Allowed to Adopt Each Others Surnames
Part I (October 16, 2000)

Who Wants an Annulment? (July 11, 2000)

1

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2

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AMERICA (1999)

Report of the Committee on Marriage and Divorce, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEVENTEENTH
ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 122 (1907)

REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST CONFERENCE OF THE STATE BOARDS OF COMMISSIONERS
FOR PROMOTING UNIFORMITY OF LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (1892).

WILLIAM M. RICHMAN & WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT OF LAWS (2d ed.
1993).

MARY E. RICHMOND & FRED S. HALL, MARRIAGE AND THE STATE (1929)

E.H. Schopler, Conflict of Laws as to Validity of Marriage Attacked Because of Nonage, 71
A.L.R.2d 687 (1960)

Edward Stein, Past and Present Proposed Amendments to the United States Constitution
Regarding Marriage, 82 WASH. U. L. Q. 611 (2004)

Mark Strasser, Loving the Romer out for Baehr: On Acts in Defense of Marriage and the
Constitution, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 279, 280 (1997)

WALTER C. TIFFANY, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF PERSONS AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS (1896)

JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (8th ed. 1883)
3

P.H. Vartanian, Recognition of Foreign Marriage as Affected by the Conditions or Manner of
Dissolving it Under the Foreign Law, or the Toleration of Polygamous Marriages, 74 A.L.R.
1533 (1931)

CHESTER G. VERNIER, 1 AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE FAMILY LAW
OF THE FORTY-EIGHT AMERICAN STATES (to Jan. 1, 1931)

Tobias Barrington Wolff, Interest Analysis in Interjurisdictional Marriage Disputes, 153 U. PA.
L. REV. 2215 (2005).

CARROLL D. WRIGHT, A REPORT ON MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN THE UNITED STATES, 1867-86

U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, A SPECIAL REPORT ON MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, 1867-1906.

Cases

Bassett v. Snyder, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93345

Burns v. Burns, No. A01A1827 (Ga. Ct. App. Jan. 23, 2002)

Courtright v. Courtright, 11 Ohio Dec. Reprint 413 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1891)

In re J.B., 326 S.W.3d 654 (Ct. App. Tex. 2010)

Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)

Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888)

Mazzolini v. Mazzolini, 155 N.E.2d 206 (Ohio 1958)

Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d 951 (Vt. 2007)

Mut. Ben. Assn v. Knafelj, 173 N.E. 630 (Ohio Ct. App. 1930)

Peefer v. State, 182 N.E. 117 (Ohio Ct. App. 1931)

Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)

Rosengarten v. Downes, 802 A.2d 170 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002)

Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987)

Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942)

United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013)

Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978)

4

Statutes & Constitutional Provisions

Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 3101.01(c) (West 2013)

Ohio Const. art. XV sec. 11

Uniform Marriage and Marriage License Act (1911)

Uniform Marriage Evasion Act (1912)

Uniform Marriage License Application Act (1950)
A Compendium of the Rights and Responsibilities of
Civil Marriage in the Indiana Code
More Than Just a Couple
614 Reasons Why Marriage Equality Matters in Indiana
3
More Than Just a Couple
614 Reasons Why Marriage Equality Matters in Indiana
A Compendium of the Rights and Responsibilities of
Civil Marriage in the Indiana Code
Acknowledgements
This document is a publication of Indiana Equality Action.
Research for this publication was conducted by the following law students of the LGBT Project at
Indiana University Maurer School of Law:
Angela Ayala, Donald E. Bierer III, Stephen Briles, Kevin P. Casimer, Jorden Colalella, Ian Doig,
Melissa Hewitt, Katherine A. Holley, Jessica Sue Jackson-McLain, Cara M. Johnson, Dani Johnson,
Caitlin Judge, Elizabeth A. Martin, Katherine K. McTavish, Huong Nguyen, Ryan
Christopher OLaughlin, Miranda R. Patton, Jennifer O. Pernas, Mitchell Z. Rickey, Toby D.
Sedgwick, Tommy Simendinger, John K. Taggart, Matthew Van Arkel, and Maggie J. Watson
Faculty Advisor: Seth M. Lahn, Senior Lecturer in Law
Indiana Equality Action Liaisons: Don Sherfck and Richard Sutton
Design: Greg L. McHenry
Cover photo source: http://openwalls.com/image?id=15374
4
5
6
7
8
20
26
32
37
42
57
58
LGBT Project
Indiana Equality Action
Indiana Code Civil Marriage Provisions
. . . . . Family and Health
. . . . . Probate and Trusts
. . . . . Courts, Criminal and Civil Procedure, and Corrections
. . . . . Commerce, Finance, and Trade
. . . . . Employment and Education
. . . . . Government Affairs
. . . . . Agriculture and Environment
. . . . . Property and Taxation
Contents
Note: Nothing in this document is, or should be construed
as, legal advice. Persons with questions about legal aspects
of marriage, family, and spousal relationships, or any other
question about Indiana law, should consult with a licensed
attorney. The description of statutes in this document is based
on the Indiana Code provisions in efect as of July 1, 2012. The
views expressed in this document are strictly those of the law
student authors.
5
LGBT Project
The LGBT Project at the Indiana University Maurer School
of Law is proud to present this compendium of provisions
detailing the rights and responsibilities of marriage in the
Indiana Code. It is the product of nine months of research by
over twenty-fve law students in the LGBT
Project to concisely catalogue those
statutes related to married and family life
in Indiana.
This research helps illuminate the
extent to which many provisions of the
Indiana Code are legally and linguistically
tied to civil marriage, family, and spousal
relationships. Civil marriage in Indiana
confers upon Hoosier families a range of rights, as well as a
host of responsibilities owed to others. As future lawyers, we
recognize that any discussion of marriage equality for same-
sex couples, or over legislation that afects marriage equality,
must include what marriage is in the eyes of the law.
What is clear from this compendium is the extent to which
Indiana law uses civil marriage as a way to classify, grant rights
to, and impose responsibilities upon couples and families in
614 ways. We hope that it serves as a resource for examining
how legislative action around marriage can afect all Hoosier
couples and families.
Civil marriage in Indiana
confers upon Hoosier families
a range of rights, as well as a
host of responsibilities owed
to others.
Donald E. Bierer III
Katherine A. Holley
Cara M. Johnson
Jennifer O. Pernas
Mitchell Z. Rickey
Executive Board of the LGBT Project
6
Indiana Equality Action
Indiana Equality Action is pleased to acknowledge and endorse this well-researched
and documented compendium of Indiana statutes by students in the LGBT Project at the
Mauer School of Law at Indiana University in Bloomington.

Hoosiers and their lawmakers continue to participate in the debate over what has
come to be known as The Marriage Equality Issue. This compilation amply illustrates the
signifcant number of diverse sections of
the Indiana Code where the rights and
benefts, as well as the obligations and
responsibilities associated with civil
marriage are addressed.

Awareness of how pervasive these
rights and obligations are within Indianas
statutes is important to meaningful
dialogue concerning a proposed
amendment to Indianas Constitution that would invalidate and prohibit recognition of any
legal status identical or substantially similar to marriage for unmarried couples.

Whether one supports or opposes such a proposal, knowing what is involved in
something as enduring as an amendment to the Bill of Rights in Indianas highest legal
document is critical to enlightened public discourse and decision.
This document helps do just that, and we heartily add our deep appreciation for the
eforts involved.
Chris Paulsen Richard Sutton
President Immediate Past President
... knowing what is involved in
something as enduring as an
amendment to the Bill of Rights in
Indianas highest legal document
is critical to enlightened public
discourse and decision.
Indiana Code Civil Marriage Provisions
8
Family and Health
1 - Community spouse
IC 12-7-2-40.2
If a spouse is in a nursing home, the other spouse is
considered a community spouse for Medicaid
purposes.
2 - Immediate family
IC 12-7-2-111
For purposes of Medicaid, immediate family includes
spouse and dependent children under twenty-one years
of age.
3 - Related
IC 12-7-2-162.5
For purposes of day care regulation, a person under
eighteen years of age is considered to be related to
someone if he or she has a relationship with that person
through marriage, blood, or adoption.
4 - Responsible party
IC 12-7-2-169
For purposes of State Institutions, a spouse is considered
a responsible party.
5 - Privileged information
IC 12-10-3-11
Spouses are exempt from testifying before a court or
grand jury about a report fled for purposes of Adult
Protective Services.
6 - Membership; appointment
IC 12-10-5-3
The Alzheimers Disease Task Force must include one
member whose family member, which may be a spouse,
is afected with Alzheimers disease or related senile
dementia.
7 - Duties
IC 12-10-11-8
When calculating the share of expenses paid by the
state and the share paid by the client who is receiving
state sponsored long-term care services, the client may
deduct the medical expenses of his or her spouse from
the calculation of his or her share.
8 - State ombudsman; eligibility; pecuniary interest
in health facility or home care service organization
IC 12-10-13-12
The state ombudsperson and his or her spouse may not
own a pecuniary interest in a long-term care facility or a
home care service organization within the three
preceding years of appointment.
9 - Registration; prohibition
IC 12-10-17.1-10
A spouse cannot apply for compensation under
Medicaid for providing services to his or her disabled
spouse.
10 - Duties of individuals in need of care; minor or
individual with brain injury or mental defciency;
authorized care plan
IC 12-10-17.1-15
Power of attorney may be given to the spouse of a
person who is in need of self-directed in-home care if
that person is under twenty-one years of age, sufers a
brain injury, or is mentally defcient.
11 - Authorizing services for individual in
community based setting
IC 12-11-2.1-5
Equal consideration shall be given to individuals with
developmental disabilities as between those individuals
who were previously being cared for by a spouse and
those individuals that were previously being cared for in
facilities.
12 - Eligibility
IC 12-14-1-1
A dependent child is eligible for assistance under
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families if the child lives
in a family home with a stepparent.
13 - Qualifcations for eligible dependent child to
receive assistance
IC 12-14-1-1.5
If a minor is married but not supported by his or her
spouse, the minor can still qualify for public assistance
under Temporary Assistance for Needy Families.
14 - Needy individual with disability defned
IC 12-14-15-1
A person who is fnancially supported by his or her
spouse will not qualify as a needy individual with a
disability for purposes of public assistance.
Title 12 - Human Services
9
Family and Health
15 - Lien foreclosure proceedings
IC 12-14-16-11
With respect to supplemental assistance to the elderly
received by a person now deceased, the division and
county ofce of family resources cannot commence a
foreclosure action to recover benefts paid to the
deceased person if the deceased persons spouse is
occupying the home.
16 - Real property occupied by surviving spouse
IC 12-14-21-4
With respect to supplemental assistance to the elderly
previously received by a person now deceased, the
division and county ofce of family resources may not
assert a lien on the home of the deceased persons
surviving spouse during his or her lifetime.
17 - Relief from liability of maintaining and
supporting child or spouse
IC 12-14-22-9
A person receiving public assistance is not relieved of
the liability of supporting a spouse as required by law.
18 - Recovery of assistance
IC 12-14-22-10
A spouse who was able to provide assistance to a needy
spouse may be liable to reimburse the state for failing to
provide that assistance.
19 - Community action programs; design and
purpose; components
IC 12-14-23-4
Community action programs assist qualifying individuals
to obtain assistance for individual and family needs.
20 - Provisions of assistance
IC 12-14-28-3
A spouse of an individual with a qualifying child may
receive Temporary Assistance for Needy Families.
21 - Individuals eligible; children in families
receiving assistance
IC 12-15-2-7
A child is eligible for Medicaid if the childs family,
including a stepparent, receives Temporary Assistance
for Needy Families.
22 - Individuals eligible; pregnant women with
limited family incomes; income limitations; covered
services; duration of assistance
IC 12-15-2-13
A pregnant woman is eligible for Medicaid if the
family income is within two hundred percent of the
federal poverty level.
23 - Women over age 65
IC 12-15-2-13.5
A woman in need of treatment for breast or cervical
cancer whose family income is within two hundred
percent of the federal poverty level and meets other
criteria is eligible for Medicaid.
24 - Minors with limited family income
IC 12-15-2-14
An individual who is under nineteen years of age and
whose family income is within 150 percent of the federal
poverty level is eligible for Medicaid.
25 - Determination of eligibility; certain equity
value in motor vehicle may not be considered
IC 12-15-2-22
When determining Medicaid eligibility, the ofce may
not consider $5,000 of equity in a vehicle belonging to
the applicant or a family member.
26 - Determination of eligibility; improper transfer
of assets
IC 12-15-2-23
When determining whether an individual improperly
gave away assets to become Medicaid eligible, the ofce
will not consider up to $1,200 per year of contributions
made by the applicant to a family member.
27 - Determination of Medicaid eligibility for
individual residing in medical institution who has
community spouse
IC 12-15-2-24
Those who reside in a nursing home and have a com-
munity spouse will not be ineligible for Medicaid on
account of support from the community spouse under
certain circumstances.
10
Family and Health
28 - Retention of income by medical institution
resident for purpose of supporting community
spouse
IC 12-15-2-25
An individual on Medicaid who lives in a nursing home
may continue to support a community spouse through
an income allowance under certain circumstances.
29 - Ineligibility for medical assistance
IC 12-15-3-1
A person is ineligible for Medicaid if that persons total
cash value of money, stock, bonds, and life insurance
owned by that person and his or her spouse exceeds
$2,250 for assistance to the elderly, blind, or disabled.
30 - Requirements for Medicaid assistance
IC 12-15-4-4
A person will only be eligible for Medicaid if his or her
spouse does not have sufcient income to provide
medical assistance.
31 - Liens not allowed
IC 12-15-8.5-3
A lien may not be placed on a Medicaid recipients house
for the cost of Medicaid expenditures if the recipients
spouse still lawfully resides in that house.
32 - Medicaid claims against an estate, property
exempt
IC 12-15-9-2
Medicaid claims may not be enforced against the real
estate or personal property of a recipient if property is
necessary for the support, maintenance, or comfort of
the recipients surviving spouse.
33 - Recoverability of claims
IC 12-15-9-5
Under Medicaid, for funeral expenses, claims may not be
made on the estate of a recipients surviving spouse.
34 - Hospice defned
IC 12-15-40-2
Hospice refers to providers that furnish planned and
continuous care for hospice patients and their families.
35 - Hospice services defned
IC 12-15-40-5
Hospice services includes care for the patients family
before and after the patients death.
36 - Countable resources defned
IC 12-15-41-2
For purposes of the Medicaid Buy-In Program for
Working Individuals with Disabilities, countable
resources include the cash, liquid assets, real property,
and personal property owned by an applicants spouse.
37 - Exemptions from eligibility requirements
IC 12-15-41-4
For determining a persons eligibility in the Medicaid
Buy-In Program for Working Individuals with Disabilities,
the income of the persons spouse may not be
considered.
38 - Sliding scale of premiums; Premiums
IC 12-15-41-7 & IC 12-15-41-8
The amount an individual pays as the premium for the
Medicaid Buy-In Program for Working Individuals with
Disabilities is calculated based on the income of the
individual and the income of the individuals spouse.
39 - Annual review of premiums
IC 12-15-41-9
The premium paid by an individual in the Medicaid
Buy-In Program for Working Individuals with
Disabilities will be modifed with a change in family size
of the recipient.
40 - Commission, division, waiver defned;
report; plan to reduce cost of waiver
IC 12-15-46-2
When the state amends the Medicaid plan in order to
reduce the cost of waivers, the state may require
individuals to contribute if their family income is above
fve hundred percent of the federal poverty level.
41 - Goals of program
IC 12-17-19-13
Within the goals of the Step Ahead Comprehensive
Early Childhood Grant Program, emphasis is placed on
strengthening the family unit, including enhancing the
capacity of families to meet the special needs of their
children.
11
Family and Health
42 - Studies and recommendations
IC 12-17.2-3.3-5
In making recommendations regarding child care
regulation, the Committee on Child Care must further
certain child care regulation purposes, including
supporting families in need of child care and allowing
for a variety of child care methods; this in turn giving
families the option to choose which method is best for
their family. The study must include consideration of
several factors, including the efect of child care and
child care regulations on families.
43 - Applying for a license
IC 12-17.2-5-3
A person must submit to the state the criminal history
of his or her spouse when applying for a license to run a
day care.
44 - Performance criteria and monitoring
IC 12-17.6-2-6
When the state monitors the public childrens health
insurance program, it will use a formula based on the
childs family income.
45 - Program to subsidize employer sponsored
coverage
IC 12-17.6-2-10
The state may create a program to subsidize employer-
sponsored health insurance for eligible individuals and
families of eligible individuals.
46 - Eligibility requirements
IC 12-17.6-3-2
Eligibility for state sponsored childrens health care
includes requirements based on the childs family
income and the familys cost sharing.
47 - Termination of eligibility
IC 12-17.6-3-3
A child enrolled in the state-sponsored childrens health
insurance program may become ineligible subject to the
families compliance with enrollment requirements.
48 - Limits on premium and cost sharing amounts
IC 12-17.6-4-3
Premiums and other cost sharing for the state-
sponsored childrens health insurance program may be
based on family income and may not exceed fve
percent of the familys income.
49 - Nepotism; persons ineligible for positions in
division
IC 12-19-2-4
For county welfare administration and fnancing, an
employee of the division of family resources may not be
the spouse of the state-level director of the division of
public welfare.
50 - Nepotism; ineligible persons
IC 12-19-2-5
For county welfare administration and fnancing, an
employee of the county ofce of the division of family
resources may not be the spouse of the county-level
director.
51 - Investigation; relatives
IC 12-20-6-9
When reviewing applications for township assistance,
the family relationships of the applicant will be
investigated.
52 - Funeral and burial or cremation expenses
IC 12-20-16-12
If certain people die without assets, a township may
authorize and pay for the funeral and burial or cremation
services; but, the township may not cremate a person if a
surviving family member objects in writing.
53 - Filing claims
IC 12-20-27-1
A township cannot fle a claim against the estate of a
deceased person for the rendering of assistance services
if that person is survived by a spouse.
54 - Members
IC 12-21-6.5-3
Two members of the commission on mental health and
addiction must be family members of consumers of
mental health or addiction services.
55- Notifcation of family or next of kin
IC 12-23-9-5
If an individual is admitted to a certain treatment facility,
the family will be notifed unless the patient objects and
meets certain qualifcations.
56 - Recovery of treatment charges
IC 12-24-15-8
Neither a claim nor a lien may be placed on the real
property of a deceased patient during the lifetime of the
patients spouse if the spouse continues to occupy the
property.
12
Family and Health
57 - Commitment of mentally ill individuals
IC 12-26-7-2
The spouse of a mentally ill individual may initiate a
proceeding to commit that individual to an appropriate
institution.
58 - Notice of transfer; persons notifed
IC 12-26-11-4
Notice of transfer to another mental health facility may
be given to an institutionalized persons spouse.
59 - Enactment and text of compact
IC 12-28-2-1
For purposes of the Interstate Compact on Mental
Health, a person may be transferred to a facility in
another state based on certain factors, including the
location of the patients family.
60 - County homes and other facilities,
management
IC 12-30-2-3
Despite the restrictions on other family members, the
spouse of a superintendent of a county home may be
employed as an assistant at the facility.
61 - Superintendent; salary; quarters and board
IC 12-30-2-6
In addition to salary, each superintendent of a county
home will receive room and board for his or her family.
62 - Charges against estates
IC 12-30-5-1
If an individual supported by public assistance is living at
a county home or died at a county home, the expenses
of that individual will be charged against his or her
estate unless that estate is needed to support his or her
surviving spouse.
63 - Health care programs; telephone information
service
IC 16-19-3-23
The state must maintain a toll-free telephone line that
provides assistance and information about programs
providing services to children with long term needs to,
among others, families with children having these types
of needs.
64 - Permissible personnel programs and policies
IC 16-22-3-11
A hospital board may pay for the reasonable expenses
related to the interview process incurred by potential
hires and their spouses. A board may also pay for
reasonable moving expenses for hired personnel and
their spouses.
65 - Powers and duties of board of managers
IC 16-24-1-12
The board of managers has the power to use hospital
funds to pay for reasonable expenses incurred by
potential hires and their spouses.
66 - Group insurance
IC 16-24-1-15
The family members and dependents of employees of
tuberculosis hospitals, in certain counties, may
participate in group health programs at no cost to the
hospital.
67 - Donations conditioned upon life annuity
IC 16-24-1-24
When a citizen ofers to donate securities or bonds to
the county for the purpose of giving equipment to a
hospital or constructing hospital buildings, in exchange
for an annuity from the county, the annuity may be paid
to spouses jointly so long as they both live but will
continue to the surviving spouse if either dies.
68 - Hospice program
IC 16-25-1.1-4
A hospice program is an interdisciplinary health care
program designed to help alleviate the discomforts
of the last phase of terminally ill individuals and their
families.
69 - Hospice services
IC 16-25-1.1-6
Hospice services include psychological, social, spiritual,
and other needs of a hospice patient and his or her
family.
70 - Vaccines
IC 16-25-2-2
An employee of a hospice program who is a licensed
pharmacist, registered nurse, or a licensed practical
nurse may administer a vaccine to family members of a
patient so long as a licensed physician orders it.
Title 16 - Health
13
Family and Health
71 - Complaints; investigations
IC 16-25-5-4
The state department has a duty to investigate any
hospice program about which a complaint is made from
hospice patients family member.
72 - Contents of disclosure document
IC 16-25-7-2
The disclosure document of a hospice program must
include to both patients and their families information
about services provided and a the toll free number
where hospice patients and their families may fle
complaints against the hospice program.
73 - Vaccines
IC 16-27-3-2
An employee of a home health agency who is a licensed
pharmacist, registered nurse, or licensed practical nurse
may purchase, store, or transport a vaccine in order to
administer the vaccine to home health patients and
their families so long as it is under the order of a licensed
physician.
74 - Personal services agencies defned
IC 16-27-4-5
A spouse is considered family for the purpose of
defning a personal services agency. A person will not
be given a license to be a personal services agency if
the services are provided only to that persons family.
75 - Complaint made by client; investigation and
resolution
IC 16-27-4-13
A personal services agency must investigate a complaint
made by a client, the clients family, or the clients
personal representative.
76 - Programs of center
IC 16-33-3-5
For purposes of the Silvercrest Childrens Development
Center, if the original assessment of a client is no longer
descriptive of the clients needs or useful to the clients
family, the center must provide the client with a
reassessment.
77 - Viable fetus; requirements; preservation of life
and health of viable unborn child; certifcates of
birth and death; ofense of failure to preserve life;
ward status of child
IC 16-34-2-3
If before having an abortion a married woman and her
spouse state in writing that she does not want to keep
the child in the event that the abortion results in a live
birth, this child immediately becomes a ward of the
state.
78 - Persons authorized to consent for incapable
parties; minors
IC 16-36-1-5
A spouse may give or refuse consent to health care even
if he or she had not previously been appointed by his or
her spouse as a health care representative.
79 - Persons authorized to give consent
IC 16-36-2-3
A surviving spouse is authorized to give a physician
consent to perform an autopsy on his or her deceased
spouse.
80 - Life-prolonging procedures will declarations;
living will declarations
IC 16-36-4-8
A spouse will not qualify as a witness to a living will.
81 - Certifcation of qualifed patient; procedure
where physician refuses to honor declaration
IC 16-36-4-13
An attending physician who does not withdraw life
support from a person may attempt to ascertain the
persons intent by consulting with, among others, the
persons spouse.
82 - Competent witness defned
IC 16-36-5-2
A spouse will not qualify as a competent witness for an
out-of-hospital do not resuscitate declaration.
83 - Transfer of patient to another physician
IC 16-36-5-13
An attending physician who does not issue a do not
resuscitate order may transfer the patient to another
physician, who may issue the do not resuscitate order.
The attending physician may also attempt to ascertain
the persons intent and the validity of the order by
consulting with, among others, the persons spouse.
14
Family and Health
91 - Notice of petition to use autopsy results
IC 16-39-7.1-5
A surviving spouse must be given notice of any
petitions to view or hear the record of his or her
deceased spouses autopsy; a surviving spouse must
also be given a copy of these petitions and a reasonable
notice of any hearings related to these petitions.
92 - Disclosure to locate or identify a missing
person
IC 16-39-10-4
Certain agencies and providers may share with a law
enforcement agency a missing persons family contact
information.
93 - Potentially disease transmitting ofenses
IC 16-41-8-5
The testimonial privileges applying to communications
between spouses will not excuse a couple from
testifying in a disease transmitting ofense hearing.
94 - Quarantine; public information and instruction;
location
IC 16-41-9-1.6
A public health authority may ask a court to require
family members of an individual infected with a
communicable disease to report that the individual has
contracted the disease.
95 -Application of chapter to husbands
IC 16-41-14-1
The male spouse of a woman who is going to be
artifcially inseminated does not have to have his semen
tested for communicable diseases.
96 - Child
IC 31-9-2-13
For purposes of child support, custody, and visitation,
child refers to the child or children of both parties to a
marriage.
97 - Dissolution decree
IC 31-9-2-41
A dissolution decree dissolves a marriage and restores
the parties to the state of unmarried persons.
84 - Registration certifcate charges; coroners
continuing education fee
IC 16-37-1-9
No fee shall be charged for providing a birth certifcate,
a death certifcate, or stillbirth registration to a person or
to a family member of a person who needs the
certifcate to establish a dependency relationship to
a member of the armed forces of the United States or
a death or disability pension of a serviceperson of the
armed forces of the United States.
85 - Persons entitled to request records
IC 16-39-1-3
A spouse may request the health records of a deceased
spouse.
86 - Inpatient requests
IC 16-39-1-6
The spouse of a patient who is incompetent and in an
inpatient facility may request these records on his or her
spouses behalf.
87 - Decedents records; consent to release
IC 16-39-2-10
A spouse of a deceased patient has the right to consent
to the release of the deceased spouses patient records.
88 - Release of records from a primary caregiver
IC 16-39-4-2
A primary care giver may provide, upon written request
from a patients spouse, the patients medical
information to the patients spouse if the patient cannot
provide for his or her own needs.
89 - Access to autopsy records
IC 16-39-7.1-3
Following an autopsy, a surviving spouse has a right to
view photographs and video recordings of the autopsy
and listen to audio recordings of the autopsy.
90 - Court orders regarding access to records
IC 16-39-7.1-4
A court may allow a person access to an autopsys
photos, audio recording, and video recording for good
cause. In determining good cause, the court may look
at a number of factors including the seriousness of the
intrusion of the familys right to privacy.
Title 31 - Environment
15
Family and Health
106 - Issuance of marriage license to minor not
obtaining required consent; procedure
IC 31-11-2-3
With court authorization, a person under the age of
eighteen may be married without obtaining parental
consent.
107 - Premarital agreement defned
IC 31-11-3-2
A premarital agreement is a contract created in
contemplation of marriage.
108 - Content; child support unafected
IC 31-11-3-5
Couples creating a premarital agreement may decide
how to divide their property in the event that they are
later divorced.
109 - Efective date
IC 31-11-3-6
A premarital agreement becomes efective upon
marriage.
110 - Amendment or revocation must be in writing;
consideration not required
IC 31-11-3-7
A premarital agreement may be changed or revoked
only through a written agreement signed by both
parties.
111 - Efect of void marriage
IC 31-11-3-9
If a marriage is void (for example, it is a same sex
marriage or a bigamous marriage), an agreement that
would otherwise have been a premarital agreement will
only be enforced as necessary to avoid injustice.
112 - Tolling of statute of limitations during
marriage; equitable defenses
IC 31-11-3-10
A lawsuit to recover property as provided for in a
premarital agreement can be fled up to a certain time
after the marriage.
113 - Marriage license required to marry
IC 31-11-4-1
A marriage license is necessary before two people can
get married.
98 - Final separation
IC 31-9-2-46
Final separation refers to the date of fling a petition
for dissolution of marriage, unless a legal separation was
already pending or in efect.
99 - Intended biological parent
IC 31-9-2-63
An intended biological parent is a party to a surrogate
agreement who is not the surrogates spouse.
100 - Property
IC 31-9-2-98
In the context of prenuptial contracts, property
includes the right to receive retirement payment and
benefts that are payable after divorce.
101 - Related
IC 31-9-2-106.5
In the context of child care regulation, related refers to
a relationship by marriage, blood, or adoption.
102 - Surrogate
IC 31-9-2-126
In a surrogacy agreement, a surrogate is the party who
agrees to bear the child: (1) for herself and an intended
biological parent, (2) for an intended biological par-
ent and a donor who is not her spouse, or (3) for two
intended biological parents.
103 - Same sex marriages prohibited
IC 31-11-1-1
Same-sex marriage is not recognized in Indiana
regardless of whether the marriage was lawful in the
place where it was solemnized.
104 - Bigamous marriages prohibited
IC 31-11-1-3
A person cannot legally marry someone who is already
married.
105 - Issuance of marriage license to underage
persons; procedure; confdentiality of records
IC 31-11-1-6
Two people may be issued a marriage license as long as
they are not prohibited from marrying each other under
Indiana law. A female who is at least ffteen years old and
is either pregnant or a mother may be married to a male
who is at least ffteen and is the expected father, as long
as they have parental consent and court authorization.
16
Family and Health
122 - Expiration of license
IC 31-11-4-10
A marriage license expires after sixty days unless the
marriage is solemnized within that time.
123 - Conditions precluding issuance of marriage
license
IC 31-11-4-11
A marriage license may not be issued if either person is
mentally incompetent or under the infuence of alcohol
or drugs.
124 - Refusal to issue marriage license; notice;
hearing; fnding; costs
IC 31-11-4-12
If a marriage license is refused, the applicants have the
right to a hearing.
125 - Duty to present marriage license to individual
authorized to solemnize marriages
IC 31-11-4-13
A couple intending to marry must present a marriage
license to the person authorized to solemnize the mar-
riage.
126 - Marriage license as authorization of solemni-
zation of marriage
IC 31-11-4-14
A marriage license is the legal authority for an
authorized person to solemnize the marriage.
127 - Marriage certifcates
IC 31-11-4-15
A marriage license must have two certifcates attached
to it that verify the date and location of the marriage as
well as the clerks ofce that approved the license.
128 - Completion, disposition, fling and recording
of marriage certifcates and marriage licenses
IC 31-11-4-16
The person who solemnizes a marriage must complete
original and duplicate marriage certifcates, give the
original to the newly married couple, and fle the
duplicate with the clerks ofce no later than thirty days
after the marriage.
114 - Prerequisites for issuance of marriage license
IC 31-11-4-2
A marriage license cannot be issued to couples that are
prohibited from marrying (such as same sex couples, frst
cousins who are under the age of sixty-fve, individuals
who are already married to someone else, and minors
who do not have court authorization).
115 - County of residence or solemnization; place to
obtain license
IC 31-11-4-3
A couple must obtain a marriage license in the county
where they live, or in the county where they will be
married if they do not live in Indiana.
116 - Application; sexually transmitted diseases
acknowledgement; religious objections
IC 31-11-4-4
Applicants for a marriage license must provide basic
personal information and sign certain acknowledg-
ments.
117 - Distribution of information concerning
dangerous communicable diseases that are
sexually transmitted
IC 31-11-4-5
Applicants for a marriage license must receive
information about sexually transmitted diseases.
118 - Proof of birth date
IC 31-11-4-6
Applicants for a marriage license must be able to verify
their date of birth.
119 - Birth date information required for issuance
of marriage license
IC 31-11-4-7
A marriage license cannot be issued unless the
application verifes both individuals birth dates.
120 - Filing of consent to marry; entry of notice of
fling
IC 31-11-4-8
If parental consent is required to marry, the clerk must
make certain records before accepting the marriage
application.
121 - Expiration of application
IC 31-11-4-9
A marriage application expires sixty days after it is fled
unless a marriage license is issued within that time.
17
Family and Health
137 -Common law marriages entered into after
January 1, 1958
IC 31-11-8-5
Common law marriages are void if they were entered
into after January 1, 1958.
138 - Foreign marriage solemnized between
Indiana residents to evade Indiana law
IC 31-11-8-6
Marriages are void if the parties went out of state to
marry in order to evade Indiana law requiring that they
are mentally competent, not under the infuence of
alcohol or drugs, and that they meet the requirements
for marriage applications.
139 - Incapacity to marry because of age or mental
incompetence
IC 31-11-9-2
Parties may seek to declare their marriage void if either
of them was incapable of consenting to the marriage
because of age or mental incompetence.
140 - Fraud
IC 31-11-9-3
An individual may seek to void his or her marriage if it
was brought about by fraud.
141 - Action by party incapable of contracting mar-
riage because of age or mental incompetence
IC 31-11-10-1
A party who was incompetent or incapable of entering
into marriage may seek to annul the marriage.
142 - Action by victim of fraud; defense
IC 31-11-10-2
A party who discovers that his or her marriage was
brought about by fraud may seek to annul the marriage;
however, the other spouse can defend against annul-
ment if the alleged victim continued to live with him or
her after fnding out about the fraud.
143 - False information in marriage license applica-
tion
IC 31-11-11-1
It is a Class D felony to knowingly furnish false informa-
tion on a marriage license.
129 - Failure to fle marriage certifcates and
marriage licenses; declaratory order upon proof of
marriage; legal efect; recording requirements
IC 31-11-4-17
If the person who solemnizes a marriage fails to properly
fle the marriage certifcate, the couple can seek a court
order declaring their marriage to be valid.
130 - Marriage records, forms, and indexes
IC 31-11-4-18
County clerks must forward records of marriage to the
Indiana State Department of Health.
131 - Public inspection of marriage records statisti-
cal data
IC 31-11-4-19
Data on marriage records is available to the public.
132 - Husbands immunity for wifes contracts or
torts
IC 31-11-7-4
A spouse is not legally responsible for the contracts his
or her spouse signs or the civil harms she causes.
133 - Legalization of certain marriages between
frst cousins solemnized before April 9, 1907
IC 31-11-8-0.3
Marriages between frst cousins that were solemnized
before April 9, 1907 are legal.
134 - Prior existing marriage
IC 31-11-8-2
A marriage is void if either party already had a spouse
who was alive at the time.
135 - Marriage to close relative; marriages between
cousins; exceptions
IC 31-11-8-3
A marriage is void if the parties are more closely related
than second cousins, with an exception for frst cousins
who are over the age of sixty-fve.
136 - Mentally incompetent persons
IC 31-11-8-4
A marriage is void if either person was mentally
incompetent at the time the marriage was solemnized.
18
Family and Health
151 - Child of common law marriage consummated
before January 2, 1958
IC 31-13-2-3
If a common law marriage was consummated before
January 2, 1958, any children of the marriage are
considered to be children of a valid marriage.
152 - Presumptions; childs biological father
IC 31-14-7-1
A man is presumed to be a childs biological father if he
is married to the childs biological mother.
153 - Grounds for decree
IC 31-15-2-3
A divorce can be granted only on the grounds that there
was an irretrievable breakdown of the marriage, a felony
conviction of either of the parties, impotence existing at
the time of marriage, or incurable insanity of either party
for a period of at least two years.
154 - Verifed petition; averments
IC 31-15-2-5
A married individual may seek a divorce by fling a
petition verifying basic facts about the marriage.
155 - Final hearing
IC 31-15-2-10
The fnal hearing in a divorce proceeding cannot be held
until sixty days after the divorce petition is initially fled.
156 - Motion to dismiss by party who fled action;
counter petition; hearing
IC 31-15-2-12
An individual who fled for divorce may seek to dismiss
the action, but the other spouse has fve days to oppose
the dismissal and continue the divorce proceedings.
157 - Final hearing; evidence; dissolution decree;
continuance; motion for dissolution
IC 31-15-2-15
At the fnal hearing in a divorce proceeding, the court
considers evidence presented by the parties. If it fnds
that the material allegations are true, the court will enter
a dissolution decree. If the court fnds there is a reason-
able possibility of reconciliation, it may order the parties
to seek counseling.
144 - Solemnization of marriage in violation of this
article
IC 31-11-11-5
It is a Class C infraction for a clergy member or other
person authorized to solemnize marriages to do so in
violation of Indiana law.
145 - Attempt to solemnize marriage by person not
authorized to solemnize marriages
IC 31-11-11-6
It is a Class B misdemeanor for a person who is not
authorized to solemnize a marriage to attempt to do so.
146 - Solemnization of marriage between persons
prohibited from marrying
IC 31-11-11-7
It is a Class B misdemeanor to solemnize the marriage
of individuals who are prohibited from marrying under
Indiana law.
147 - Failure to timely fle marriage license and
duplicate marriage certifcate
IC 31-11-11-8
It is a Class C infraction to solemnize a marriage and fail
to fle the marriage license within ninety days.
148 - Parties to marriage more closely related than
second cousins
IC 31-13-1-1
If a marriage is void because the parties are more closely
related than second cousins, any children of the
marriage will be treated as if the marriage was valid.
149 - Bigamous marriages
IC 31-13-1-2
If a marriage is void because one of the parties was
already married at the time, and the other spouse did
not know, any children of the marriage will be treated as
if the marriage was valid.
150 - Child of annulled marriage
IC 31-13-1-3
If a marriage is annulled, any children of the marriage
who were conceived before the annulment will be
treated as if the marriage was valid.
19
Family and Health
165 - Findings concerning maintenance
IC 31-15-7-2
Upon legal separation or divorce, a court may award
temporary fnancial support payments to a spouse in
limited circumstances (such as where the spouse cannot
work because he or she is caring for a disabled child,
or where the spouse is seeking appropriate training or
education in order to fnd employment).
166 - Division of property
IC 31-15-7-4
In a divorce proceeding, the court is to fairly divide all
property, whether owned or acquired by one or both
spouses.
167 - Presumption for equal division of marital
property; rebuttal
IC 31-15-7-5
In a divorce proceeding, the court assumes that an equal
division of property is fair, unless a party shows other-
wise.
168 - Money judgment award to spouse for expens-
es or postsecondary education
IC 31-15-7-6
If there is no marital property to divide at divorce, the
court may award one spouse a money judgment for use
toward his or her postsecondary education.
169 - Enforcement
IC 31-15-7-10
A court may enforce all orders and awards made in a di-
vorce or legal separation decree by holding the violating
party in contempt of court, withholding amounts from
his or her paycheck, or utilizing other permitted means.
158 - Agreements
IC 31-15-2-17
A couple seeking a divorce may agree to provide
fnancial support to one spouse, divide property in a
certain way, and determine who will have custody of
any children. The court can approve their agreement or
make its own provisions regarding these matters.
159 - Findings required for decree
IC 31-15-3-3
A legal separation will be granted if current circum-
stances make it intolerable for a married couple to live
together, but the marriage should otherwise be
maintained.
160 - Caption; verifed petition; averments
IC 31-15-3-4
A married individual may seek a legal separation by
fling a petition verifying basic facts about the marriage.
161 - Motions
IC 31-15-4-1
In a divorce proceeding, either party may request
spousal support payments, child support payments,
custody of any children, marital counseling, or a
protective order.
162 - Counseling
IC 31-15-4-9
In a divorce proceeding, the court may require
counseling, if appropriate, where there is a child
involved or where the couple so requests.
163 - Legislative fndings; enactment of Property
and Inheritance Rights of Spouses Act
IC 31-15-7-0.3
The Property and Inheritance Rights of Spouses Act is
meant to address problems related to the transfer of
property when a spouse dies, the division of property
when spouses divorce, and the legal ownership status of
a spouses property during his or her life.
164 - Order for maintenance
IC 31-15-7-1
A court may require that an individual provide fnancial
support payments to his or her spouse upon a legal
separation or divorce.
20
Probate and Trusts
170 - Defnitions
IC 29-1-1-3
For probate purposes, heirs and interested persons
include a surviving spouse that may be entitled to
property and interests of his or her deceased spouse.
171 - Disqualifcation of judges
IC 29-1-1-6
A judge in a probate matter is disqualifed from those
proceedings if the judge or his or her spouse is related
within the third degree or consanguinity to the
decedent or his or her attorney, was counsel to any of
the probate proceedings, is interested in the probate
matter, or drafted the will in question.
172 - Net estate; distribution
IC 29-1-2-1
Generally, upon the death of a spouse who does not
have a will, the surviving spouse takes either: a) the
entire estate if the decedent has no children or surviving
parents, b) one-half of the estate if the decedent has any
children (then living or not), or c) three-fourths of the
estate if the decedent has a surviving parent or parents.
173 - Wifes interest in real property by reason of
marriage, extinguishment
IC 29-1-2-3.1
When an individual sells real property without the
knowledge of his or her spouse the spouse may no
longer claim an interest in the property.
174 - Waiver; intestate share
IC 29-1-2-13
A spouse may waive by written contract an intestate
share, a gift under a will, or the right to elect to take
against the will of the other spouse and is bound by
such waiver if consideration is given; a good faith
promise of marriage is sufcient consideration.
175 - Adultery; forfeiture of rights
IC 29-1-2-14
An individual who has left his or her spouse and is living
in adultery at the time of his or her spouses death may
not receive a share of the deceased spouses intestate
estate or trust.
Title 29 - Probate
176 - Abandonment; forfeiture of rights
IC 29-1-2-15
An individual who abandons his or her spouse will take
no part in the spouses estate or trust.
177 - Limitations and conditions
IC 29-1-3-1
A surviving spouse may elect to take one-half of his or
her deceased spouses personal and real property (a
share at law) instead of any amount left to the
surviving spouse in the deceased spouses will. If the
deceased spouse has surviving children from a prior
marriage, the surviving spouses share at law is reduced
to one-third of personal property and one-fourth of real
property. If the share provided for the surviving spouse
in the deceased spouses will is less than the share at
law, the surviving spouse is still entitled to the specifc
bequests in the will.
178 - Time
IC 29-1-3-2
A surviving spouse who elects to take a share at law over
the amount provided for the surviving spouse in the
deceased spouses will must do so within three months
after the will is ordered to probate, or, if litigation
regarding the will is pending, within thirty days after the
fnal determination of such litigation.
179 - Forms; recording; service
IC 29-1-3-3
A surviving spouse who elects to take a share at law
must do so in writing.
180 - Personal right; election by attorney-in-fact or
guardian; spousal election exercised subsequent to
spouses death
IC 29-1-3-4
A spouses right to elect to take a share at law is a
non-transferable personal right, but may be exercised
by an attorney-in-fact or after death, in certain circum-
stances.
181 - Binding efect; change
IC 29-1-3-5
A surviving spouses election to take a share at law,
rather than the amount provided to the surviving
spouse in the deceased spouses will, is binding and non-
revocable, except for equitable rescission of a deed.
21
Probate and Trusts
182 - Waiver of right
IC 29-1-3-6
A spouse may waive his or her right to elect to take a
share at law of the other spouses property before or
after marriage, so long as the waiver is in writing and
there is consideration; a good faith promise to marry is
sufcient consideration.
183 - Failure to elect; intestate succession
IC 29-1-3-7
A surviving spouse who makes no election to take a
share at law receives any benefts provided for him or
her in the will, if any, and is treated as an heir of any part
of the estate of the deceased spouse not disposed of by
the will.
184 - Afterborn or adopted children; omitted heirs
IC 29-1-3-8
Any child born or adopted after a deceased parents will
was created will receive a share of the estate unless the
will specifes that the whole estate goes to the surviving
spouse or the omission of the child was intentional.
185 - Surviving spouse and family allowances
IC 29-1-4-1
A surviving spouse is entitled to an allowance of $25,000
from the deceased spouses estate. If the value of the
deceased spouses estate is less than $25,000 then the
surviving spouse may make up the diference with a lien
on the real estate in the estate.
186 - Revocation; divorce; annulment of marriage;
change in circumstances
IC 29-1-5-8
If, after making a will, an individual is divorced or has
an annulment all provisions in the will in favor of the
individuals spouse are revoked.
187 - Construction of wills; rules
IC 29-1-6-1
For gifts made under a will, the terms heirs, next of kin,
relatives, or family include the surviving spouse unless
the will indicates intent to the contrary.
188 - Restraint of marriage
IC 29-1-6-3
Where a deceased spouse makes a gift under a will to
a surviving spouse with a condition that restricts the
surviving spouses right to remarry the gift is valid but
the condition restraining marriage void.
189 - Petitions; hearing
IC 29-1-7-4
A surviving spouse may not be appointed to be the
administrator of the estate of the deceased spouse if a
petition to dissolve the marriage is pending.
190 - Petition for probate; letters testamentary;
administrator with will annexed; appointment of
administrator
IC 29-1-7-5
A petition for probate of a will must state whether a peti-
tion to dissolve the marriage of the decedent is pending
in an Indiana court.
191 - Real and personal property; devolution;
charges against
IC 29-1-7-23
A surviving spouse has the opportunity to elect to take
his or her share and prevent that share from passing to
another person.
192 - Payment of claims; accounting; closing admin-
istration
IC 29-1-8-8
A surviving spouses allowance is factored into calcula-
tion of the payment of claims from an estate.
193 - Letters testamentary; letters of general
administration; persons to whom granted; order;
qualifcations
IC 29-1-10-1
Probate orders may be issued to a surviving spouse,
among others.
194 - Perishable properties; family allowance; title
to property; approval
IC 29-1-15-9
Any perishable property or property necessary to sup-
port a surviving spouse can be sold without notice to
the court in a probate matter.
195 - Final accounts; decree of fnal distribution
IC 29-1-17-2
The court shall make the fnal determination of the
proportions or amounts of the election by the surviving
spouse.
22
Probate and Trusts
196 - Abatement of distributee shares
IC 29-1-17-3
Shares gifted under a will shall be reduced for payment
of a surviving spouses share at law, if the surviving
spouse elects for a share at law.
197 - Abatement of distributee shares; contribution
by legatees and devisees
IC 29-1-17-4
Specifc gifts under a will shall be sold to pay, among
other items, the share at law to the surviving spouse, if
the surviving spouse elects for a share at law.
198 - Support, maintenance or education of
protected person
IC 29-1-19-14
The guardian of a veteran may use income from the
estate or the Department of Veterans Afairs to support
the veteran and his or her spouse and children.
199 - Real estate acquisition by guardian
IC 29-1-19-15
The court may authorize a guardian to purchase real
estate as a home for the person under a guardianship or
the family of a person under a guardianship.
200 - Five years absence; presumption of death
IC 29-2-5-1
If a persons location is unknown for a period of fve
years and the persons family needs the missing persons
property, the missing person is presumed dead.
201 - Defnitions
IC 29-2-16.1-1
For purposes of the Revised Uniform Anatomical Gift
Act, a spouse is not a disinterested witness.
202 - Anatomical gifts made after death; persons
authorized to make gift
IC 29-2-16.1-8
A spouse has the authority to make anatomical gifts of
the deceased spouses body for permitted purposes.
203 - Execution of declaration
IC 29-2-19-8
A persons spouse may not serve as a witness to a funeral
planning declaration. In such a declaration, a person
may not direct a funeral provider or disposer of the that
persons remains to be his or her designee unless the
funeral provider or disposer of remains is his or her
spouse.
204 - Automatic revocation of delegation of spouse
IC 29-2-19-15
The delegation of authority in a funeral planning
declaration to the declarants spouse is revoked if there
is a subsequent dissolution or annulment of the
marriage or a legal separation.
205 - Right to make arrangements
IC 29-2-19-17
Unless otherwise provided in written agreement, a
surviving spouse has the right to control the disposition
of the deceased spouses remains.
206 - Considerations for appointment of guardian
IC 29-3-5-4
A spouse may make a request, which will be given due
regard, for appointment as guardian of an incapacitated
spouse.
207 - Considerations for appointment of guardian;
order of consideration; priorities
IC 29-3-5-5
The request of a spouse to be appointed guardian of his
or her incapacitated spouse will be given top priority,
second only to a person acting under durable power of
attorney.
208 - Notice of petition and hearing; persons to
whom notice must be given; waiver of notice
IC 29-3-6-1
If a petition for guardianship is fled alleging that an
individual is incapacitated, the spouse of that individual
must receive notice of the petition and of the hearing on
the petition.
209 - Property transactions involving conficts of
interest
IC 29-3-8-5
If the guardian of an incapacitated person sells that
persons property to himself or herself, or to his or her
spouse, the sale is void unless approved by the court.
210 - Consent to or refusal of health care
IC 29-3-8.5-9
A program that advocates for seniors or incapacitated
people cannot make health care decisions for an
individual whose spouse is able to make those decisions.
23
Probate and Trusts
211 - Powers of guardian
IC 29-3-9-4.5
If the spouse of an incapacitated person subject to a
guardianship dies, the incapacitated persons
guardian may exercise the incapacitated persons right
to a share at law, and related rights, in the deceased
spouses estate.
212 - Conditions for termination of guardianship;
efect of termination on guardianship powers
IC 29-3-12-1
A court my terminate guardianship of a minor upon the
minors marriage. A guardianship may also terminate
upon death of the incapacitated person; the guardian of
the deceased may pay the surviving spouse any
statutory allowance directly.
213 - Signifcant connection factors
IC 29-3.5-2-1
The location of a respondents family shall be considered
in determining whether there is a signifcant connection
with a particular state for purposes of jurisdiction.
214 - Members of the minors family defned
IC 30-2-8.5-9
A member of a minors family includes the minors
spouse.
215 -Renunciation, resignation, death, or removal
of custodian; designation of successor custodian
IC 30-2-8.5-33
In certain situations, a minor who is at least fourteen
years of age may designate a family member as
successor custodian if none is available. If a minor is
under the age of fourteen and has no guardian, a
member of the minors family may be able to petition
the court to designate a successor custodian.
216 - Accounting by and determination of liability
of custodian
IC 30-2-8.5-34
An adult member of a minors family may petition the
court for purposes of determining aspects related to
custodianship and custodial property.
Title 30 - Trusts and Fiduciaries
217 - Member of the benefciarys family defned
IC 30-2-8.6-12
A member of a benefciarys family, for purposes of
custodial trusts, includes the benefciarys spouse.
218 - Transfer to custodial trustee by fduciary or
obligor; facility of payment
IC 30-2-8.6-25
Subject to limitations, a person who holds the property
of or owes a debt to an incapacitated individual may
make a transfer to an adult member of the benefciarys
family for the beneft of the incapacitated individual.
219 - Multiple benefciaries; separate custodial
trusts; survivorship
IC 30-2-8.6-26
Unless the trust instrument provides otherwise,
custodial trust for the beneft of a husband and wife
does not create a right of survivorship in either spouse in
the trust.
220 - Declination, resignation, incapacity, death, or
removal of custodial trustee; designation of
successor trustee
IC 30-2-8.6-33
If there is no successor custodial trustee designated in a
custodial trust, a member of the benefciarys family may
petition the court to designate one.
221 - Reporting and accounting by custodial
trustee; determination of liability of trustee
IC 30-2-8.6-35
Among those able to petition a court for an accounting
by the custodial trustee are adult members of a
benefciarys family.
222 - Trustees power to adjust between principal
and income
IC 30-2-14-15
A trustee who would otherwise be able to adjust
between principal and income in a trust may not do so if
the trust requires all the income from the trust be paid to
a spouse and where an estate or gift tax marital
deduction would be allowed.
223 - Deferred compensation to trustee
IC 30-2-14-31
Certain trusts are subject to rules regarding allocations
and distributions of income to a surviving spouse.
24
Probate and Trusts
224 - Allocation of receipts during administration of
trust; property not productive of income
IC 30-2-14-35
A surviving spouse who benefts from a trust for which
a marital deduction is available may require the trustee,
under certain circumstances, to sell some of the trusts
income producing property to support the surviving
spouse.
225 - Marital deductions or generation-skipping
transfer taxes
IC 30-2-15-23
The laws governing marital deductions in relation to
trusts apply to a trust for which a marital deduction has
been taken during the lifetime of a spouse for whom the
trust was created.
226 - Other Defnitions
IC 30-4-1-2
For purposes of trusts, the term afliate can mean a
spouse, a spouse of a descendant, or spouse of a brother
or sister.
227 - Divorce or annulment of marriage; efect on
revocable trust
IC 30-4-2-15
For a revocable trust, when a settlor (creator of the trust)
is divorced (or has an annulment) the former spouse is
treated as if he or she had predeceased the settlor.
228 - Election by surviving spouse to take share
against settlors will; distribution of remainder
IC 30-4-2-16
If a surviving spouse exercises his or her right to receive
a share at law of his or her deceased spouses estate,
where that estate is at least partly held in a trust, the
surviving spouse is treated as if he or she had pre-
deceased the settlor for purposes of disposing of the
assets of the trust after the surviving spouse receives his
or her share at law.
229 - Omitted children
IC 30-4-2.1-4
The rules providing benefts for children of a settlor
(creator of the trust) born after the trust is executed do
not apply if, when the trust was executed, the settlor
gave everything to a surviving spouse.
230 - Deceased spouse
IC 30-4-2.1-9
An individual who has left his or her spouse and is living
in adultery at the time of his or her spouses death or an
individual who abandons his or her spouse will take no
part in the spouses trust.
231 - Revocation or amendment of revocable trust
IC 30-4-3-1.5
If a revocable trust consists of community property, the
trust may be revoked by either spouse or amended only
by both spouses acting together.
232 - Liability for loss due to certain events
IC 30-4-3-6.5
If a marriage afects the administration or distribution of
a trust, a trustee who exercised reasonable care to know
about the marriage beforehand is not liable for a loss
resulting from the lack of knowledge.
233 - Matrimonial trust
IC 30-4-3-35
Spouses may elect to create a matrimonial trust in
joint or separate trusts. Property transferred to the
matrimonial trust is treated as owned by the entirety,
meaning each spouse has a right to survivorship in the
entire property of the trust upon the death of the other
spouse.
234 - Cessation of service of attorney in fact;
succession attorney in fact
IC 30-5-4-4
If a person is the attorney in fact for his or her spouse,
that person ceases to be the attorney in fact for his or
her spouse if the marriage terminates.
235 - Gift transactions
IC 30-5-5-9
An attorney in fact may be authorized to make gifts
on behalf of the principal to the principals spouse and
descendants of the spouse.
236 - Family maintenance
IC 30-5-5-12
If a principal confers general authority to his or her
attorney in fact to provide for family maintenance, the
attorney in fact is authorized to make all necessary
payments and arrangements to provide the same
standard of living to the principals spouse.
25
Probate and Trusts
237 - Benefts from military service
IC 30-5-5-13
An individuals attorney in fact is given authority to make
decisions regarding military benefts available to such
individual by virtue of his or her marriage to a military
service member.
26
Courts, Criminal Law, Civil Procedure, and Corrections
238 - Payment of tuition or fees by surviving spouse
or child of hazardous duty employee who dies in
line of duty
IC 11-8-2-12
The surviving spouse of a hazardous duty employee of
the Indiana Department of Correction who dies in the
line of duty is eligible to attend any state educational
institution without paying tuition or mandatory fees.
239 - Establishment of correctional professionals
assistance fund; use of funds
IC 11-8-2-14
Money contained in the Correctional Professional Assis-
tance Fund may be used to provide monetary assistance,
including tuition assistance to a family member of a
correctional employee.
240 - Involuntary transfers to division of mental
health or to mental health facility
IC 11-10-4-3
When a mentally ill committed ofender is transferred to
a mental health facility, notice must be provided to the
ofenders spouse or another designated party.
241 - Establishment of programs; violent crime
ofenders
IC 11-10-4-3
Except in instances pertaining to people convicted of a
violent crime or sex ofense, the corrections department
must establish a minimum security release program that
allows committed ofenders to be temporarily released
to attend to family needs.
242 - Purpose and period of time
IC 11-10-10-2
Under certain circumstances, the corrections depart-
ment may temporarily release an ofender to visit im-
mediate family.
Title 11 - Corrections
243 - Interstate compact provisions
IC 11-12-8-2
For purposes of community corrections programs, the
governor of Indiana may enter into a compact with other
states if the other state agrees to certain provisions.
One key provision of such a compact must be that the
sending state will allow the ofender to participate in a
community corrections program in the receiving state
if the person has family residing in the receiving state.
242 - Compact
IC 11-13-4-1
For purposes of out of state probationers or parolees,
the governor may enter into a compact with other states
if the contracting states agree that, among other things,
the governing authorities in a state will permit convicted
persons to serve the terms of probation or parole in the
other state if he or she has family residing in the
receiving state.
243 -Close relative defned
IC 33-23-11-2
For purposes of judicial ethics, a close relative is defned
as a person related to an individuals spouse.
244 - Employer defned
IC 33-23-11-5
For purposes of judicial ethics, an employer includes
anyone who provides nonstate income to the spouse of
a judge, justice, or prosecuting attorney.
245 - Participation in cause with economic interest
prohibited
IC 33-23-11-9
A justice, judge, or prosecuting attorney may not par-
ticipate in a cause that involves a matter where a family
member of the justice, judge, or prosecuting attorney
has an economic interest.
Title 33 - Courts and Court Ofcers
27
246 - Infuence upon actions involving legislator
by legislators consideration of legislative matters
prohibited
IC 33-23-11-10
The actions of a justice, judge, or prosecuting attorney
in an action that involves a member of a legislators
family may not be infuenced by any matter considered
or previously considered by the legislator in the general
assembly.
247 - Disclosure of economic interest
IC 33-23-11-11
A justice, judge, or prosecuting attorney must disclose a
family members economic interest or personal stake in
a cause where the justice, judge, or prosecuting attorney
is a participant.
248 - Contents of statement of economic interests
IC 33-23-11-16
In order to determine whether a justice, judge, or
prosecuting attorney has an economic interest in a par-
ticular matter, his or her spouses employment, business
endeavors, and stock interests are taken into account.
249 - Compensation of judge pro tem
IC 33-31-1-13
When an individual is appointed judge pro tem, that
individual is entitled to $10 per day. Any amount greater
than $500 given to an individual for acting as a judge
pro tem shall be deducted from the regular annual
salary of the judge of the probate court who made the
appointment, unless the judges absence is due to a
family members serious illness.
250 - Afect of retirement; afect of removal
IC 33-33-71-68
Whenever a judge of a St. Joseph County court is retired
by the supreme court, the judge is considered to have
retired voluntarily. In such situations, this chapter may
not be construed to authorize any encroachment on the
rights of the judge or the judges surviving spouse under
any constitutional or statutory retirement program.
251 - Qualifcation of fund under Internal Revenue
Code
IC 33-38-6-13
The life expectancy of a judges spouse factors into that
judges retirement benefts paid under the statutory
retirement system and shall not be recalculated after the
initial determination.
252 - Retirement annuities; termination of employ-
ment; requirements; computation of amount
IC 33-38-7-11
A participant whose employment as a judge has been
terminated is entitled to a retirement annuity if certain
conditions are met. A judges surviving spouse is also en-
titled to annuity payments if certain conditions are met.
253 - Payments to participants surviving spouse,
dependents, or estate
IC 33-38-7-14
The amount owed to a surviving spouse of a judge is
payable within sixty days after the date of the with-
drawal application or in monthly installments. The
surviving spouse may elect his or her payment method.
254 - Death of participant; benefts of surviving
spouse or children
IC 33-38-8-17
The surviving spouse of a participant in the Indiana
judges retirement plan is entitled to certain benefts if
the participant has met certain enumerated criteria.
255 - Death of participant; payments when no
benefts payable to survivors
IC 33-38-8-19
If benefts of the Indiana judges retirement plan are
not payable to the participants survivors, and a with-
drawal application is fled with the board, the total of the
participants contributions shall be paid to the surviving
spouse, minus any payments made to the participant
and plus interest at a rate specifed by rule of the board.
The amount owed the spouse is payable within sixty
days from the date of the receipt of the withdrawal
application or in monthly installments. The surviving
spouse may elect his or her payment method.
256 - Exclusion
IC 33-38-13-35
For the purposes of the Commission on Judicial Qualif-
cations and the Retirement, Discipline, and Removal of
Justices and Judges, the rights of a surviving spouse of a
justice or judge under a constitutional or statutory retire-
ment program are not impaired.
28
257 - Benefts payable to surviving spouse;
eligibility; computation
IC 33-39-7-19
The surviving spouse of a participant in a prosecuting
attorneys retirement fund is entitled for life to the
greater of $7,000 or ffty percent of the amount the
participant was drawing at the time of death.
258 - Death of participating; payments when no
benefts payable to survivor
IC 33-39-7-21
If benefts of the retirement fund for prosecuting
attorneys are not payable to the participants survivors,
the total of the participants contributions may be paid
to the surviving spouse, minus any payments made to
the participant and plus interest. The amount owed the
spouse is payable within sixty days from the date of
the receipt of the withdrawal application or in monthly
installments.
259 - Satisfaction of I.R.C. 401 requirements
IC 33-39-7-22
All benefts paid from the prosecuting attorneys retire-
ment fund shall be paid out in accordance with Section
409(a)(9) of the IRS Code. The fund must not calculate
the life expectancy of the participants spouse after an
initial determination is made for the purposes of
determining any benefts.
260 - Determination of ordering payment of costs
IC 33-40-3-7
If an individual has a public defender, the court will
consider the assets available to the defendants spouse.
If the court fnds that the persons spouse is able to pay
the costs of representation, the court will enter a fnding
that the person is able to pay those additional costs.
261 - Prosecuting attorney; civil action to recover
losses
IC 34-16-1-4
Civil actions to recover gambling losses can be brought
for the beneft of the gamblers spouse.
262 - Representative
IC 34-18-2-25
When an individual is injured by medical malpractice, his
or her spouse can sue as his or her representative.
263 - Seizure of vehicles or other property
IC 34-24-1-1
Where a motor vehicle is used to commit certain crimes,
it may be seized from the owner or the owners spouse.
264 - Parties plaintif
IC 34-24-4-2
A spouse may sue for damages caused by his or her
spouses drug use.
265 - Attachment barred while debtors spouse and
family reside within county; exceptions
IC 34-25-2-2
A debtor who leaves Indiana for no more than one year
is protected from attachment if his or her spouse
continues to live in the county where the debtor usually
lives.
266- Concealment of debtors absence by spouse or
family
IC 34-25-2-3
A debtor may not be protected from attachment if his or
her spouse attempts to conceal his or her whereabouts.
267 - Grant of writs to parents, guardians, and
spouses
IC 34-25.5-7-1
A spouse may be granted a writ of habeas corpus to
protect his or her incapacitated spouse.
268 - Transportation of guests
IC 34-30-11-1
An individual may not sue his or her spouse for
injuries resulting from a motor vehicle accident unless
the spouse caused the accident by willful misconduct.
269 - Asbestos claim defned
IC 34-31-8-1
An individual may sue for his or her spouses exposure to
asbestos.
Title 34 - Civil Procedure
29
270 - Afdavit of judicial bias or prejudice
IC 34-35-4-2
A judge may not appoint his or her spouse, or any other
relative by marriage, as a special judge in a case that has
been remanded for a new trial or if either party in the
cause is entitled to a change of venue.
271 - Husband or wife
IC 34-45-2-9
If an individual is not competent to testify in a civil case,
his or her spouse also cannot testify.
272 - Persons not required to testify
IC 34-46-3-1
Spouses must not be required to testify about the
communications made to each other.
273 - List of exemptions; limitations
IC 34-55-10-2
Certain exemptions exist to protect against foreclosure
of a debtors family residence, but property for which a
spouse is jointly liable is not exempt.
274 - Absence of execution defendant; rights of
spouse
IC 34-55-10-13
When real property is to be foreclosed, the debtors
spouse may claim an exemption on his or her behalf and
make out and verify a description of the property.
275 - Application
IC 34-57-5-1
Family law arbitration rules apply only in dissolutions of
marriages to establish child support, custody, or
parenting time. These rules also apply to modify a
decree, a judgment, or an order.
276 - Agreement to arbitrate
IC 34-57-5-2
In a dissolution of marriage, the arbitration agreement
must state that both spouses allow the family law
arbitrator to dissolve the marriage and determine any
child support, custody, and parenting time for children
of the marriage.
277 - Duties of arbitrator; oath
IC 34-57-5-5
A family law arbitrator must use the Indiana
parenting time guidelines if the marriage has a child to
both spouses.
278 - Division of marital property
IC 34-57-5-8
In a dissolution of marriage case, a family arbitrator must
divide the property of the parties. This is to include
property owned before entering the marriage.
279 - Summary dissolution decree
IC 34-57-5-9
The family law arbitrator may enter a dissolution decree
without holding a hearing provided that at least sixty
days after the dissolution of marriage was fled have
elapsed and the spouses have signed a waiver of hearing
and all, if any, contested issues are settled.
280 - Fees
IC 34-57-5-12
The fees of a family arbitrator must be divided equally
between spouses unless otherwise agreed upon in
writing.
281 - Other grounds; motion; afdavit; time
limitation
IC 35-36-5-2
Both a defendant and the state may obtain a change of
judge if the judge is related by marriage to any party in
the case.
282 - Physical safety of victim or victims family in
danger; exclusion of evidence; disclosure to court
IC 35-37-4-12
A victim does not have to give personal information
while giving a sworn testimony if the physical safety of
his or her immediate family is in danger.
283 - Victim representative, defned;
sentencing; date; hearing for increased
penalty; imprisonment pending sentencing
IC 35-38-1-2
If a crime victim is killed, incapacitated, or under the age
of eighteen, the court may designate a victim represen-
tative, for example, the victims spouse.
Title 35 - Criminal Law and Procedure
30
284 - Presentence investigation; notice to victim;
victim impact statement; contents
IC 35-38-1-8.5
A probation ofcer must prepare a victim statement
reporting how the victim or the victims family has been
afected by the crime.
285 - Human immunodefciency virus (HIV)
screening test; criminal sexual acts and controlled
substances; confrmatory test; presentence
investigation; marital privilege; mental health
service providers civil and criminal immunity
IC 35-38-1-10.5
Privileged communications between spouses will not
excuse spouses from divulging information in the event
that one of the spouses is convicted of a criminal sexual
act or a drug related distribution ofense either of which
that created a case of HIV .
286 - Persons permitted to be present at execution
of death sentence
IC 35-38-6-6
Where a defendant is sentenced to death, the crime
victims spouse may be present at the execution.
287 - Victim assistance program; purposes
IC 35-40-6-4
A prosecuting attorney or a victims assistance program
shall inform the victim and his or her family of programs
available to them.
288 - Threat of harm to victim
IC 35-40-6-6
If the victim sends a statement to the prosecuting
attorney that a defendant has threatened his or her
immediate family and the prosecuting attorney has
reason to believe these are true statements, then the
prosecuting attorney must request to have the
defendants bond or the order of release on personal
recognizance revoked.
289 - Use of force to protect person or property
IC 35-41-3-2
A person is justifed in using reasonable force if the
person reasonably believes that the force is necessary to
immediately prevent or terminate another persons
trespass on or criminal interference with property
belonging to an immediate family member.
290 - Crime of domestic violence defned
IC 35-41-1-6.3
A crime of domestic violence applies to victims who are
a current or former spouse of the perpetrator, among
others.
291 - The efects of battery defned
IC 35-41-1-10.3
Under Indiana law, the crime of battery may afect the
psychological wellbeing of the battered individuals
spouse or former spouse.
292 - Family or household member defned
IC 35-41-1-10.6
The crime of battery is considered domestic battery
when the victim is a spouse or former spouse of the
perpetrator.
293 - Unauthorized control over property of beneft
provider; prima facie evidence
IC 35-43-4-6
It is a crime to use a beneft identifcation card (such as
an insurance card listing an individual, his or her spouse,
and any dependents entitled to benefts under the plan)
to obtain a beneft for someone who is not covered
under the policy.
294 - Confict of interest
IC 35-44-1-3
When considering whether a public ofcial has a confict
of interest, the interests of the ofcials spouse are also
considered.
295 - Obstruction of justice
IC 35-44.1-2-2
Communications between spouses are privileged and
exempt from disclosure in an ofcial or criminal
investigation.
296 - Assisting a criminal; defenses
IC 35-44.1-2-5
Spouses are exempt from criminal liability if they assist
their fugitive spouse from lawful detention.
297 - Sexual misconduct by service provider with
detainee
IC 35-44-1-5
The crime of sexual misconduct between a person
detained in jail and a jail employee or service provider
does not apply if the parties are spouses.
31
298 - Application
IC 35-44.1-5-1
Where an individual is an illegal alien, his or her spouse
cannot be prosecuted for certain crimes involving illegal
aliens.
299 - Intimidation
IC 35-45-2-1
If an individual with criminal charges pending against
him or her intimidates one of the witnesses in the case
or a witnesss spouse, he or she commits felony intimida-
tion.
300 - Bigamy
IC 35-46-1-2
A married individual who marries someone else commits
bigamy, a Class D felony.
301 - Incest
IC 35-46-1-3
Marriage, if valid where solemnized, is a defense to
incest.
302 - Nonsupport of a spouse
IC 35-46-1-3
Marriage, if valid where solemnized, is a defense to
incest.
303 - Restitution order
IC 35-50-5-3
For purposes of determining trial courts authority to
order restitution, victim of crime includes victims
survivors who show loss as direct and immediate result
of criminal acts of a defendant.
32
Commerce, Finance, and Trade
310 - Non-appearing stockholders
IC 23-13-5-7
If a majority of shares in a corporation are transferred to
or purchased by the directors of that corporation, the
directors may purchase remaining shares from surviving
spouses and others if they satisfy certain requirements.
311 - Authorizing agents
IC 23-14-31-26
A spouse has the right to order the cremation of his
or her deceased spouses remains, except where the
deceased person had set up other arrangements, or in
other limited circumstances.
312 - Vested rights of spouses of grantees
IC 23-14-39-3
If an individual is granted a burial plot in a cemetery, his
or her spouse has a right to be buried in that same plot,
unless certain exceptions apply.
313 - Rights held in joint tenancy by husband and
wife
IC 23-14-40-4
If spouses own burial rights as tenants by the entirety,
they each equally own and control the right to be buried
in the given plot; they cannot act to afect their owner-
ship unless they are in agreement.
314 - Holding of burial plots
IC 23-14-41-3
If an owner of rights to a burial plot dies, the plot is then
held as the family burial plot as long as specifc
conditions are met.
315 - Right to use
IC 23-14-41-4
In a family burial plot, a surviving spouse is next in line
to be buried in the plot. If the deceased person has no
child or parent, the right to be buried in the family plot
next goes to the heirs or spouses of the heirs.
316 - Waiver of rights
IC 23-14-41-5
The surviving spouse of an owner of a family burial plot
can waive his or her right in favor of another relative or
spouse of the deceased.
304 - Associate defned
IC 23-1-43-3
In the context of laws governing business combinations,
the term associate includes an individuals spouse, as
well as any relative of the spouse who lives with them.
305 - Defnitions
IC 23-2-2.5-1
In the context of laws governing gas station franchise
agreements, the term designated family member
includes the spouse of the person granted the franchise
(the franchisee).
306 - Service stations
IC 23-2-2.5-51
A designated family member (a term that includes
spouses) may take over a gas station franchise in the
event of the franchisees death.
307 - Franchise agreements; unlawful acts and
practices
IC 23-2-2.7-2
A franchisor may not deny the surviving spouse of a
franchisee the opportunity to participate in the owner-
ship of the franchise after the franchisees death.
308 - Improperly infuencing valuation of real
estate; family owned appraisal companies
IC 23-2-5-9.1
A loan broker or his or her immediate family (a term that
includes live-in spouses) may not own a real estate
appraisal company, except in certain limited circum-
stances.
309 - Nature of partners right in specifc partner-
ship property
IC 23-4-1-25
If one partner in a partnership dies, the other partner has
a right to specifc partnership property; the deceased
partners surviving spouse does not receive an
allowance with respect to such property.
Title 23 - Business and Other Associations
33
324 - Defnitions
IC 24-4.4-1-301
For purposes of frst lien mortgage lending, immediate
family member includes ones spouse.
325 - Use of multiple agreements
IC 24-4.5-3-509
The lender of a consumer loan cannot allow multiple
loans to individuals or spouses in order to gain a higher
rate of interest.
326 - Limitation on garnishment and proceedings
supplemental to execution; employers fee
IC 24-4.5-5-105
The maximum amount that can be withheld from a
persons paycheck to satisfy a court order is reduced if
that person is supporting a spouse.
328 - Designation of benefciary; change of ben-
efciary; eligible benefciaries; exemption of policy
proceeds from claims of creditors
IC 27-1-12-14
Any individual may take out a life insurance policy, for
any period of time or for the term of his or her natural
life. The benefciary of the life insurance policy can be
the individuals spouse.
329 - Competency of certain minors to contract for
insurance and receive payments
IC 27-1-12-15
An individual older than sixteen years of age but
younger than eighteen years of age may contract for an
insurance policy for life, accident, and sickness insurance
or annuities, for the beneft of the individual or his or her
spouse.
330 - Group life insurance; death of spouse or
dependent child; coverage requirements
IC 27-1-12-40
A group insurance policy may be extended to insure
against loss due to the death of a spouse subject to
certain provisions.
317 - Authority and liability of cemetery owners
upon receiving authorizations
IC 23-14-55-2
The owner of a cemetery may bury an individual upon
written authorization from the surviving spouse, unless
certain other exceptions apply.
318 - Requirements; general liabilities
IC 23-14-57-1
The remains of a deceased person cannot be removed
from a plot without the written consent of that persons
surviving spouse or that of another related party in
limited circumstances.
319 - Autopsies or reinterments
IC 23-14-57-5
The remains of a deceased person may be removed for
an autopsy or reburial in another cemetery with the
written consent of the surviving spouse.
320 - Duties upon wrongful burials
IC 23-14-59-2
If a person is wrongfully buried or disinterred, that
persons spouse must be notifed.
321 - Exempt transactions
IC 23-19-2-2
Certain transactions involving gifts of securities to family
members, or transfers of securities required by a court
order (such as in a divorce or child support proceeding),
are exempt from Indiana securities registration require-
ments.
322 - Eligibility
IC 23-20-1-11
The surviving spouse of a victim of a securities violation
is eligible for assistance in getting his or her money back.
323 - Authorized driver
IC-24-4-9-1
In a car rental agreement, the renters spouse is con-
sidered an authorized driver, as long as he or she has
a drivers license and meets the rental companys age
requirements.
Title 24 - Trade Regulation
Title 27 - Insurance
34
337 - Powers and duties of the association
IC 27-6-8-7
In the case of a claim for wrongful death, the amounts
legally payable because of the death of the policyholder,
are to be paid to the survivors spouse, among others.
338 - Requirements for issuance and delivery of
policy
IC 27-8-5-2
The policyholder of an insurance policy may apply to
have two or more eligible members of his or her family,
including the policyholders spouse, covered under his
or her policy.
339 - Required provisions; statutory option
provisions; inapplicable or inconsistent provisions;
order of provisions; third party ownership; require-
ments of other jurisdictions; fling procedure
IC 27-8-5-3
An insurer may include a payment of claims provision
in an insurance policy that states that the insurer may
indemnify a spouse up to a certain amount.
340 - Franchise plan; accident and sickness
insurance; defnitions, limitations, requirements
and standards
IC 27-8-5-11
Family members and dependents are considered a part
of a qualifed group for franchise plans.
341 - Extension to family members or dependents;
premiums; exclusions; group accident and sickness
insurance
IC 27-8-5-18
When a group accident or sickness insurance policy is
paid for by funds contributed by an employer, union, or
association, it must cover all eligible members of that
family including spouses and dependent children.
342 - Contents; group accident and sickness
insurance
IC 27-8-5-19
Life insurance benefts are payable to the benefciary
designated by the policyholder. The benefciary may
be the family member specifed by the policy terms. If
the benefciary designated is a minor or otherwise not
competent, payments coming out of the policy may be
made to a spouse who is determined by the insurer to
be entitled to the beneft.
331 - Group life insurance; required provisions
IC 27-1-12-41
A spouse may be considered a benefciary to a group
insurance policy if there is no benefciary listed.
332 - Required provisions of policies
IC 27-1-13-7
If a motor vehicle is owned jointly by spouses, either
spouse can be excluded from coverage under an
insurance policy, with the written consent of the other
spouse. The spouses can choose to have their liability
covered under separate policies.
333 - Temporary insurance producer license
IC 27-1-15.6-11
The commissioner may issue a temporary insurance
producer license to the surviving spouse of a licensed
individual insurance producer who dies or becomes
mentally disabled to allow for an appropriate transition.
334 - Penalties
IC 27-1-15.6-12
The commissioner may not grant, renew, continue,
or permit to continue any license if the commissioner
fnds that the license is being used or will be used by
the applicant or licensee for the purpose of writing a
controlled business, which includes insurance written
on the interests of the applicant or licensees immediate
family, insurance covering members of the applicants
or licensees immediate family, or a corporation where
the applicant or licensees immediate family is an ofcer,
director, substantial stockholder, partner, member,
manager, associate, or employee.
335 - Groups eligible to purchase group insurance
policy
IC 27-1-41-6
A spouse may be considered an eligible member of a
group for group insurance policies.
336 - Spendthrift laws; exemption from judicial
process
IC 27-2-5-1 & IC 27-1-12-20
When an individual pays a premium for an individual
life insurance policy, and names his or her spouse as a
benefciary, that policy is not exempt from the claims of
the creditors of the policy owner if the premium is paid
not more than one year before the date of the fling of
a voluntary or involuntary bankruptcy petition or to
defraud the creditors of the policy owner.
35
343 - Maternity benefts, replacement of
discontinued policy; prohibition on preexisting
condition limitation or exclusion of coverage
IC 27-8-5-25
When an employer discontinues a group insurance
policy that contains maternity benefts, and replaces it
with coverage through a new insurer, the new
insurance policy must not contain a preexisting
limitation for maternity or exclude coverage due to
pregnancy for employees or spouses of employees who
were covered under the prior policy on the date when it
was discontinued.
344 - Indemnity for services provided by certifed
registered nurse anesthetist
IC 27-8-6-5
For purposes of indemnifying a nurse anesthetist,
insured includes an individual who is entitled to
coverage under an accident and sickness insurance
policy or the spouse of the policyholder.
345 - Policies; deductable and coinsurance require-
ments; limitations
IC 27-8-10-4
The maximum aggregate out-of-pocket payments for
policyholder expenses in the form of deductibles and
co-insurance may not exceed $2,500 per family per
policy year.
346 - Eligibility for association policies
IC 27-8-10-5.1
An association policy that provides coverage for a family
member of a policyholder must also provide that the
health insurance benefts applicable for children are
payable with respect to a newborn child of the policy-
holder from the moment of the childs birth.
347 - Policies; renewal provisions; election to
continue coverage upon death of policyholder
IC 27-8-10-6
In a family Medicare policy, the age of the younger
spouse becomes the durational requirement for
coverage. Spouses are entitled to share Medicare
coverage.
348 - Late enrollee defned
IC 27-8-15-10.5
The term late enrollee does not include an eligible
employee or an eligible employees spouse, where a
court has ordered that health insurance coverage be
provided for the spouse under the eligible employees
insurance plan, as long as the request for enrollment is
timely.
349 - Compliance
IC 27-8-15-27
The spouse of an individual covered under an insurance
plan provided by a small employer cannot be excluded,
limited, or denied coverage for more than nine months
after the efective date of the coverage because of pre-
existing condition.
350 - Exclusion of coverage
IC 27-8-15-29
A plan may exclude coverage for a late enrollees
covered spouse for no more than ffteen months. If a late
enrollees covered spouse has a preexisting condition, a
plan may exclude coverage for the preexisting condition
for no more than ffteen months.
351 - Conversion
IC 27-8-15-31
If an eligible employee who has been continuously
covered under a health insurance plan for at least ninety
days loses coverage because of the dissolution of his
or her marriage, is not eligible for COBRA, and requests
a conversion policy from the small employer insurer
that issued the health insurance plan, the individual is
entitled to receive a conversion policy from the small
employer insurer.
352 - Continuing coverage
IC 27-8-15-31.1
If an eligible employee who has been continuously
covered under a health insurance plan for at least ninety
days loses coverage because of the dissolution of his or
her marriage and requests a continuing insurance from
the small employer insurer that issued the health
insurance plan, the individual is entitled to receive con-
tinuing coverage from the small employer insurer.
36
358 - Associate
IC 28-6.2-1-5
For purposes of mutual savings bank holding compa-
nies, the spouse of a person or any relative of the spouse
of that person is considered an associate of that person.
359 - Defnitions
IC 28-7-1-0.5
For purposes of credit unions, the immediate family of
a person includes a spouse.
360 - Membership
IC 28-7-1-10
The spouse of a person qualifed to join a credit union is
also qualifed to join that credit union.
361 - Loans to directors and committee members
IC 28-7-1-17.1
A credit union can make a loan to its individual directors
and committee members and to the spouses of those
individuals, if the amount of loans is below the lesser of
$25,000 or fve percent of the credit unions capital and
surplus.
362 - Credit union loan to individual ofcers
IC 28-7-1-17.2
A credit union can make a loan to its ofcers, and to the
spouses of the ofcers, if the amount of either the loan
or the total amount of all loans is less than the lesser of
$25,000 or two and one-half percent of the credit unions
capital and unimpaired surplus.
363 - Check cashing fee limitations
IC 28-8-5-17
A licensed cashier of checks or a person licensed to cash
checks may not accept multiple checks from a person or
from that persons spouse if they are drawn on that per-
sons account with the intention that the person collect
multiple or increased fees for cashing the checks.
353 - Certifcation of admission, service or
procedure; enrollee request; notice and infor-
mation; assistance; denial under terms of beneft
program
IC 27-8-17-15
A utilization review agent must allow a family member
to assist an enrollee in fulflling the enrollees
responsibility to notify the utilization review agent of the
admission, service, or procedure in a timely manner ain
order to obtain certifcation of health care services.
354 - Insured defned
IC 27-8-24.7-3
For purposes of referrals to womens health care
providers, insured is defned as an individual who is
entitled to the benefts provided by a health insurance
policy. The term also includes a female who is entitled to
coverage under a health insurance policy as a spouse.
355 - Determination of eligibility for health care
services coverage by insurer; prohibitions
IC 27-8-26-5
In processing an application for health insurance
coverage, an insurer may not: require an individual
or any member of the individuals family to submit to
genetic testing or screening; consider any information
obtained from genetic testing or screen that is adverse
to an applicant of a member of the applicants family; or,
make a decision adverse to an applicant or a member of
an applicants family based on entries related to results
of genetic testing or screening in medical records.
356- Associate
IC 27-14-1-8
For purposes of mutual insurance holding company law,
associate means the spouse of an individual who is a
director or an ofcer of the applicant or any of the
applicants afliates.
357 - Outside director
IC 27-14-1-28
For purposes of mutual insurance holding company law,
outside director cannot be a spouse of an ofcer, an
employee, or a consultant of any mutual insurance
holding company, stock holding company, or a
recognized insurer.
Title 28 - Financial Institutions
37
Employment and Education
364 - Eligibility for application
IC 20-20-7-9
If a veteran eligible to receive a high school diploma is
deceased, that veterans surviving spouse may apply to
have a high school diploma issued to that veteran.
365 - Legal settlement; attendance areas; school
corporations
IC 20-26-11-2
A married student who is less than eighteen years of
age or not emancipated may attend school in the at-
tendance area where that student and his or her spouse
reside.
366 - Transportation contracts; substitute drivers;
when permitted
IC 20-27-5-20
A school bus driver may provide a substitute driver if a
member of the bus drivers family is ill or dies.
367 - Adoption of rules
IC 20-28-2-6
The state board can adopt emergency rules that allow
the spouse of a person on active duty and assigned to
a duty station in Indiana to expedite the issuance or
renewal of his or her license.
368 - Teacher payments; sick days; death in family
IC 20-28-9-9
A teacher may be absent from work with pay for death
in the teachers immediate family for a period extending
not more than fve days beyond the death.
369 - Teacher payments; school corporation adopt-
ing regulations for payment of certain absences
IC 20-28-9-12
A school corporation may adopt regulations governing
the payment of teachers, and it can make payments
according to those regulations to teachers who are
absent because of a death in their immediate family.
370 - Anti-discrimination; marital status
IC 20-28-10-12
Teachers cannot be discriminated against because of
their marital status.
Title 20 - Education
371 - Human sexuality instructional requirements
IC 20-30-5-13
Classes on human sexuality will: require teachers to
teach abstinence from sexual activity outside of
marriage; instruct students that the only way to avoid
health problems that are associated with sexual
activity is abstinence; and teach students that the best
way to avoid these problems is to enter into a relation-
ship through marriage.
372 - General language arts essay questions; scor-
ing rubric; anchor paper
IC 20-32-5-5
An essay question, scoring rubric, or anchor paper used
in the ISTEP program must not seek or compile informa-
tion about a students family relationships.
373 - Powers of certain ofcers to take children into
custody
IC 20-33-2-23
A school attendance ofcer, sherif, marshal, or police
ofcer may take into custody a child who is outside of
school during school hours in order to bring the child
to his or her school unless he or she is with a parent or,
with the consent of the parent, with an adult relative by
blood or marriage.
374 - School corporation defned; governing
body defned; determination of fnancial eligibility
IC 20-33-5-1
The maximum gross income available to a family shall
be used to determine eligibility for fnancial assistance.
To determine if a seasonal worker is eligible for fnancial
assistance, an average will be made of his or her familys
income for the last twelve calendar months.
375 - Procedures to qualify for assistance; fnancial
eligibility standard
IC 20-33-5-2
In order to determine if a recipient of assistance is a
member of a qualifying family, the Family and Social
Services Administration needs information regarding the
familial relationship of a child to the head of the house-
hold.
38
376 - Payment of fees by school corporation;
reimbursement; records; denial of government
assistance
IC-20-33-5-7
Parents receiving other forms of fnancial assistance that
considers educational needs in computing the amount
awarded may not be denied assistance if the applicants
total family income does not exceed the standards
established by Indiana law on fnancial assistance for
students.
377 - AIDS information; contents; consent to
distribution
IC 20-34-3-17
Schools shall provide information on AIDS stating that
the best way for young people to avoid AIDS is to refrain
from sexual activity until they are in a marriage.
378 - Purpose
IC-20-38-3-1
The purpose of this multi-state compact is to remove
barriers to children of military families by: facilitating
their timely enrollment; facilitating the student place-
ment process; facilitating the timely graduation of
children of military families; providing for the uniform
collection and sharing of information among member
states, schools, and military families; promoting
coordination among compacts afecting children of
military families; and, promoting fexibility and
cooperation among the educational system, students
and families to achieve educational success for the
students.
379 - Defnitions
IC 20-38-3-2
Children of military families are defned as school-aged
children enrolled in kindergarten through grade twelve
who are members of the household of an active duty
member.
380 - Eligibility
IC 20-38-3-6
A transitioning child of a military family cannot be
charged local tuition by a local education agency when
the child is placed in the care of a noncustodial parent
or guardian who lives in a jurisdiction other than that
jurisdiction of the custodial parent. A transitioning child
of a military family, when placed in the care of a noncus-
todial parent or another guardian who lives in a diferent
jurisdiction than the custodial parent, may attend the
school where the child was enrolled while living with the
custodial parent.
381 - Graduation
IC 20-38-3-7
Local education agencies shall coordinate and take
certain measures to facilitate the on time graduation of
children of military families.
382 - State coordination
IC 20-38-3-8
The states in the military family compact will establish
councils or boards to coordinate the actions of local
education agencies, government agencies, and mili-
tary installations to participate in and comply with the
compact.
383 - Interstate commission on educational oppor-
tunity for military children
IC 20-38-3-9 (I)
The interstate commission shall collect standardized
data concerning the educational transition of the chil-
dren of military families.
384 - Powers and duties of interstate commission
IC 20-38-3-10 (T)
The interstate commission has the power to provide for
the uniform collection and sharing of data among states,
schools, and military families that are under the Inter-
state Compact on Educational Opportunity for Military
Children.
385 - Accounting methods by governing body for
textbook rental program
IC 20-41-2-5
A governing body may furnish textbooks to a student
free of charge if it determines that a hardship exists due
to the inability of a students family to purchase or rent
books, taking into consideration the income of the fam-
ily and the demands on the family.
386 - Members of the family
IC 21-9-2-17.5
For purposes of the Indiana Education Savings pro-
grams, member of the family includes the spouse of a
designated benefciary, as well as the spouse of certain
relatives of a designated benefciary.
Title 21 - Higher Education
39
387 - Scholarship amount; initial enrollment after
June 30, 2011
IC 21-12-6-10.3
Amounts awarded to scholarship recipients under the
Twenty-First Century Scholars Program are reduced by
the expected family contribution.
388 - Eligible applicant defned
IC 21-14-1-4
An eligible applicant refers to someone who is eligible
for an exemption for educational costs under the
provision of this law that gives exemptions to children
and surviving spouses of public safety ofcers who are
killed in the line of duty. An eligible applicant also refers
to a person who is eligible for an exemption for
educational costs under the provision of this law that
gives exemptions to children and spouses of National
Guard members.
389 - Surviving spouse; exemption from education
costs
IC 21-14-6-3
The surviving spouse of a public safety ofcer who was
killed in the line of duty may obtain an undergraduate
degree from a state school free of charge.
340 - Public Policy
IC 22-2-2-2
The Minimum Wage Law of 1965 was enacted in part
to eliminate conditions such that persons employed in
Indiana were receiving wages insufcient to support
themselves and their families.
341 - Defnitions; exemptions
IC 22-2-2-3
For purposes of labor and safety laws, the term
employee does not include a person employed by his
or her spouse.
342 - Married persons; consent; exemptions
IC 22-2-7-4
A married person cannot, without the consent of his or
her spouse, assign wages to a wage broker.
Title 22 - Labors and Safety
343 - Requirements; time allotted
IC 22-2-13-11
The spouse of a person who is ordered to active duty is
entitled to an unpaid leave of absence.
344 - Collection of medical expense payments; civil
penalties; good faith errors
IC 22-3-3-5.1
For purposes of workers compensation, a medical
service provider may not attempt to collect payments
from the family members of an employee.
345 - Physical examination; physicians statement;
autopsy
IC 22-3-3-6
For purposes of workers compensation, the spouse of
a deceased worker must be informed of and may refuse
an autopsy ordered by the deceased spouses employer
or the workers compensation board. If the surviving
spouse refuses, he or she must be informed of the
consequences. The spouse must be given an
opportunity to witness any such autopsy.
346 - Presumptive dependents; termination of
dependency
IC 22-3-3-19
A surviving spouse shall be considered a presumptive
dependent of the deceased spouse. Upon remarriage,
the spouse is no longer presumed to be a dependent.
If the deceased spouse died after July 1, 1977, and the
surviving spouse is the only surviving dependent, the
spouse is entitled to the lump sum of up to one hundred
and four weeks of compensation upon remarriage.
347 - Total or partial dependents; eligibility; termi-
nation
IC 22-3-3-20
For purposes of workers compensation, a spouse may
be considered a total or partial dependent of a deceased
employee. The spouses right to compensation will end
upon remarriage.
348 - Dependents; total or partial dependents; rela-
tives; termination of dependency
IC 22-3-7-14
For purposes of Workers Occupational Diseases Com-
pensation, a spouse may be considered a total or partial
dependent of a deceased employee. The spouses right
to compensation will end upon remarriage.
40
349 - Collection of medical expense payments; civil
penalties; good faith errors
IC 22-3-7-17.1
pensation, a medical service provider may not attempt
to collect payments from the employees family mem-
bers.
350 - Physical examinations; board and lodging;
traveling expenses; reports; autopsy
IC 22-3-7-20
pensation, the spouse of a deceased employee must
be informed of and may refuse an autopsy ordered by
the deceaseds employer or the workers compensation
board. If the spouse refuses, he or she must be informed
of the consequences. The spouse must be given an op-
portunity to witness any such autopsy.
351 - Personal injuries or death; damages
IC 22-3-9-1
Certain frms, people, or limited liability companies
may be liable, in the case of the death of an employee
that occurred while working, to provide benefts to the
surviving spouse.
352 - Services not included
IC 22-4-8-3
For purposes of the Unemployment Compensation
System, the term employment does not include service
performed for ones of a spouse. Similarly, service
performed for an eligible school by a students spouse is
not considered employment if the spouse is informed
that the work is provided under by the schools fnancial
assistance program and that the work will not be
covered by unemployment insurance.
353 - Grounds for disqualifcation; modifcations
IC 22-4-15-1
If an individual is eligible for unemployment compensa-
tion, that individual will not lose eligibility due to mov-
ing to another labor market to join a spouse who had
previously moved to that market.
354 - National Guard members; federal and state
employment or training programs; priority
IC 22-4.1-4-3
The spouse of a member of the National Guard may re-
ceive priority placement in federal or state employment
or training programs if the spouse meets the eligibility
requirements until the member is discharged or released
from active duty.
355 - Exemptions
IC 22-5-1-4
For purposes of laws regarding the limitations on im-
porting alien laborers, a person is not prohibited from
assisting a member of his or her family to migrate from
any foreign country to the state for purposes of settle-
ment.
356 - Defnitions
IC 22-9-1-3
For purposes of the rules governing civil rights enforce-
ment, the term employee does not include an individu-
al employed by his or her spouse.
357 - Standards of professional practice; fndings
required for sanctions
IC 25-1-9-4
A board may impose disciplinary sanctions on a health
care professional for a number of reasons, including
engaging in sexual contact with a patient under the
practitioners care. This provision does not apply to
practitioners who provide health care services to the
practitioners spouse.
358 - License, certifcate, registration, or permit of
spouse of person on active duty
IC 25-1-9-20
The Indiana licensing board for health care profession-
als may establish procedures to expedite the issuance
or renewal of a license, certifcate, registration, or permit
of a person whose spouse is assigned to an active duty
station in Indiana. (IC 25-1-11-21 provides the same for
other professional licensing boards)
359 - Military spouse defned
IC 25-1-17-3
For purposes of rules governing licensure of individuals
with military training or licensure of military spouses, the
term military spouse means the husband or wife of an
individual who is a member of the armed forces of the
United States.
Title 25 - Professions and Occupations
41
367 - Membership of state board of massage
therapy
IC 25-21.8-2-2
Board members of the State Board of Massage Therapy
must not, among other things, be the spouse of an indi-
vidual who is certifed as a massage therapist or intends
to become certifed.
368 - Designated representative of wholesale drug
distributors facilities
IC 25-26-14-16.5
A designated representative of a wholesale drug dis-
tributors facilities must disclose to the board certain
information of his or her spouse (among other things,
the name, address, occupation, and date and place of
birth) in order to receive a license. This information is
kept confdential.
369 - Continuation of business after death of li-
censee
IC 25-30-1-9
When a licensed as a private investigator dies, his or her
surviving spouse may carry on the private investigator
frm with which the deceased was connected.
370 - Continuation of business after death of li-
censee
IC 25-30-1.3-11
When an individual holder of a security guard agency
license dies, the security guard agency connected to the
deceased may be carried on for a period of ninety days
by the surviving spouse.
360 - Conditions for issuance of license, certifcate,
registration or permit to military spouse applicant
IC 25-1-17-5
If a military spouse can meet certain conditions regard-
ing competency and good standing, the board may
issue a license to that spouse to practice his or her
occupation in Indiana.
361 - Credit for relevant experience in calculation of
years of practice; Guide to the evaluation of
educational experiences in the armed services
IC 25-1-17-6
For purposes of licensure for a military spouse, all of his
or her relevant experience must be credited in the
calculation of years of practice in an occupation.
362 - Temporary practice permits and provisional
licenses
IC 25-1-17-8
A board may issue a temporary practice permit or license
to a qualifying military spouse. The temporary permit or
provisional license is issued until (1) the board grants or
denies the license; (2) the temporary permit expires; or
(3) the provisional license holder fails to comply with the
terms of the license.
363 - Other licensure, certifcation, registration or
permit proceedings
IC 25-1-17-10
A military spouse may proceed under regular permit
requirements as opposed to complying with or pursuing
a temporary license under one of many military spouse
provisions available.
364 - Defnitions applicable to article
IC 25-5.2-1-2
For purposes of rules governing athlete agents, the term
athlete agent does not include a spouse.
365 - Priority of persons determining fnal disposi-
tion and interment of human remains
IC 25-15-9-18
For purposes of the rules governing funeral and cem-
etery services, a spouse is the third in line to determine
the fnal disposition of the deceaseds remains.
366 - Application for license
IC 25-18-1-3
For purposes of applying for a license for retail distress
sales, a person is deemed related to his or her spouse.
42
Government Afairs
371 - Defnitions
IC 2-2.1-3-1
For purposes of Indiana General Assembly ethics law,
close relative includes those related by marriage or
remarriage; employer includes the employer of a
member or candidates spouse; and family business is a
business eighty percent owned by a member or
candidate and his or her spouse.
372 - Statements of economic interests
IC 2-2.1-3-2
Every member or candidate of the Indiana General
Assembly must fle a written statement of economic
interests, which includes the name of his or her spouses
employer and the nature of that employers business.
373 - Surviving spouses or relatives
IC 2-3-2-1
If a member of the Indiana General Assembly dies before
the end of his or her elected term, his or her unpaid
salary for that term will be paid to the surviving spouse.
374 - Qualifcation requirements
IC 2-3.5-3-3
When determining a legislators retirement benefts, the
life expectancy of the legislator, his or her spouse, or
his or her benefciary may not be recalculated after it is
initially determined.
375 - Surviving Spouses
IC 2-3.5-4-6
The surviving spouse of a legislator meeting certain
criteria is entitled to a lifetime beneft equal to ffty per-
cent of the legislators retirement benefts.
376 - Death of participants
IC 2-3.5-5-7
If a legislator dies without having designated a
benefciary for his or her retirement accounts, those ac-
counts are to be paid to his or her surviving spouse.
377 - Close relative
IC 2-7-1-1.7
For purposes of Indiana General Assembly lobbying law,
close relative includes those related by marriage.
378 - Immediate family
IC 2-7-1-5
For purposes of Indiana General Assembly lobbying law,
immediate family includes a spouse residing in a
legislative persons household.
379 - Legislative person
IC 2-7-1-8
A legislative person includes the spouse of a member,
candidate, ofcer, or employee of the Indiana General
Assembly.
380 - Applicability of chapter and article
IC 2-7-2-6
Indiana General Assembly lobbying law does not apply
where a legislators spouse receives payment from
engaging in everyday business with a lobbyist.
381 - Purchases
IC 2-7-3-7
Indiana General Assembly lobbying law applies to
purchases involving a member or candidates family
business.
382 - Legislative persons; travel expenses
IC 2-7-5-9
A lobbyist may not reimburse a legislators travel outside
Indiana unless the lobbyist works for an organization
with which the legislator or his or her spouse is afliated.
Title 2 - General Assembly
43
Government Afairs
389 - Requirements for election ofcers
IC 3-6-6-7
A person cannot be a precinct election ofcer if their
spouse is on the ballot unless the spouse is running
unchallenged.
390 - Form of oath for precinct election ofcers
IC 3-6-6-23
An election ofcer must sign an oath afrming that he
or she cannot be an election ofcer if his or her spouse is
on the ballot unless the spouse is running unchallenged.
391 - Registration of absent uniformed services
voter upon returning to Indiana; after registration
deadline and before preparation of certifed list of
voters
IC 3-7-36-11
If a person is the spouse of an uniformed service mem-
ber and is qualifed as an absent uniformed services
voter who returns to Indiana after the registration
deadline but before the certifed list is prepared, he or
she can vote in the election if they show their spouses
discharge or movement orders.
392 - Registration of absent uniformed services
voter upon returning to Indiana during period
beginning on date of preparation of certifed list of
voters and ending at noon election day
IC 3-7-36-14
If a person is the spouse of a uniformed service member
and is qualifed as an absent uniformed services voter
who returns to Indiana after the certifed list is prepared
but before noon on election day, he or she can vote in
the election by absentee ballot if he or she show his or
her spouses discharge or movement orders.
383 - Absent uniformed services voter
IC 3-5-2-1.5
The defnition of an absent uniformed service voter
includes the spouse of a member of a uniformed service,
merchant marine, or Indiana national guard who is
absent from the place where he or she would be
qualifed to vote because the service member is on
active duty.
384 - Location of immediate family as residence
IC 3-5-5-11
The place where a persons immediate family resides is
that persons residence, unless the immediate family is
only residing in that place temporarily.
385 -Living away from family while conducting
business
IC 3-5-5-12
If a person is away from his or her immediate familys
residence on business, then the familys residence is still
his or her residence.
386 -Living away from family with intent to remain
away
IC 3-5-5-13
If a person is living in a place that is not the residence of
his or her immediate family, and they intend to remain in
that place, then that place is their residence.
387 - Establishment of voting residence separate
from spouse
IC 3-5-5-14
For the purposes of determining residency for elections,
a married person can establish a separate residence from
his or her spouse.
388 - Candidates legal name
IC 3-5-7-4
If a candidate is married, the legal name the candidate
uses on the ballot is either the name he or she was born
with, the name on his or her marriage license or any
combination of the names of both the candidate and his
or her spouse used for their marriage license.
Title 3 - Elections
44
Government Afairs
393 - Contents of statement; information for
preceding calendar year
IC 3-8-9-8
For the purposes of fling a statement, an individual
must include the business name and nature of a flers
spouse and the spouses positoin within the company he
or she works for.
394 - Communications regarding clearly identifed
candidates; soliciting contributions
IC 3-9-3-2.5
A communication by a political action committee (PAC)
that solicits contributions for itself does not need to
include a disclaimer stating who paid for and authorized
the communication if the communication is directed
towards the families of the members or employees of
the organization that formed and controls the PAC.
395 - Absentee voter boards; appointment;
eligibility
IC 3-11-10-36
A person cannot be a member of the absentee voter
board if he or she is the spouse of a candidate unless the
candidate is running unopposed.
396 - County election board appointments for
absentee vote processing; qualifcations
IC 3-11.5-4-22
The county election board cannot appoint an absentee
ballot courier or counter if the person is the spouse of a
candidate unless the candidate is running unopposed.
397 - Eligibility
IC 3-11.7-3-2
The spouse of a candidate cannot be a counter in an
election in which his or her spouse is an unopposed
candidate.
398 - Electioneering
IC 3-14-3-16
A person who knowingly does any electioneering
commits a Class A misdemeanor. A person cannot be
charged with electioneering when the voter being
addressed is the persons spouse.
399 - Defnitions
IC 4-2-6-1
For the purposes of ethics and conficts of interest, an
employer means any person who provides
compensation to a state ofcer or employee or the
state ofcer or employees spouse. A fnancial interest
means an interest involving property or services arising
from employment or prospective employment where
negotiations have begun. The term does not include the
interest of a state ofcer or employee in the common
stock of a corporation unless the ofcer or employees
combined holdings of the ofcer or employee, the
ofcer or employees spouse, and the ofcer or
employees unemancipated children are more than one
percent of the outstanding shares of common stock in
the corporation. A relative includes a spouse.
400 - Financial disclosure; fling of false statement;
penalty
IC 4-2-6-8
A state employee must disclose the name of any person
or client that provided thirty-three percent or more of
the state employee or his or her spouses income. The
state employee must also disclose the location of any
real property that the state employee, his or her spouse,
or his or her unemancipated children have an interest in,
if it is worth more than $5,000 or ten percent of the state
employees net worth.
401 - Confict of economic interests
IC 4-2-6-9
A state employee may not knowingly vote for a matter
that would have a fnancial impact on a member of his
or her family.
402 - Pension of surviving spouse; election;
limitations; payment
IC 4-3-3-2
The surviving spouse of a person who has served as
Governor of Indiana is entitled to an annual pension. The
pension will be paid in monthly installments by the state
treasurer to the surviving spouse or the person acting on
behalf of the surviving spouse.
Title 4 - State Ofcers and Administration
45
Government Afairs
403 - Establishing account; benefciaries; limits
IC 4-4-28-7
When a person establishes an individual development
account he or she must name a benefciary for that
account in the event of the death of the account holder.
If the benefciary is a member of the persons family,
then all funds remain in the account. If the benefciary
is not a family member, then the funds provided by the
state go back to the state.
404 - Automatic taxpayer refund; requirements
IC 4-10-22-4
For purposes of an excess reserve refund, an individual
and his or her spouse are considered two taxpayers. The
amount of the refund that the individual and his or her
spouse are entitled to is the amount entitled to a
qualifying taxpayer, multiplied by two.
405 -Duties of commission
IC 4-23-25-7
The Indiana Commission for Women places an emphasis
on determining the needs of Indiana women and their
families and working towards the inclusion of Indiana
women in all aspects of society.
406 - Duties
IC 4-23-26-9
For the purposes of assisting the childrens health policy
board, the Advisory Committee for Children with Special
Health Needs will seek information from families about
state or local policies that negatively impact the
provision of quality health services.
407 - Provision of Information and advice;
promotion of public and private sector
partnerships; administration of act
IC 4-23-29-11
The Governors Council for People with Disabilities shall
promote public and private partnerships to advance
legislation that protects and benefts the families of
individuals with disabilities.
408 - Persons less than eighteen years of age
IC 4-30-11-3
If a person under the age of 18 possesses a winning
ticket that was lawfully purchased by an adult and given
to the minor as a gift, then the payment will be given to
an adult member of the minors family.
409 - Member of the family, defned; ofer of
compensation or thing of value by permit holder or
employee to commission member or family;
prohibition
IC 4-31-13-5
A permit holder cannot give a gift, money, property,
entertainment, or thing of value to a spouse of a
commission member with the intent to infuence that
member.
410 - Horse in which racetrack ofcial has direct or
indirect interest in; ineligibility
IC 4-31-13-7
If an individual, who is serving in an ofcial capacity at a
racetrack or his or her spouse, has an ownership or
fnancial interest in a horse, that horse cannot be raced
at the racetrack where the individual works.
411 - Confict of interest
IC 4-33-3-8
A person cannot be appointed to or remain on the
gambling commission if he or she or his or her spouse
has a fnancial interest in a gambling operation under
their jurisdiction.
412 - Employee confict of interest
IC 4-33-3-17
An individual cannot be employed to serve the
gambling commission if the employees spouse is an
ofcial of a gambling operation, has any fnancial con-
nection to a gambling operation, or is the spouse of a
commission member.
413 - Applicants for license or operating agent
contract; disclosure of information
IC 4-33-5-1
If an individual is applying for a gambling license or
similar document, the individual is required to tell the
commission about any business his or her spouse has an
equity interest of more than one percent of all shares.
414 - Applicants for license or operating agent
contract; confdential information
IC 4-33-5-1.5
The gambling commission requires the following
information for the purpose of obtaining a riverboat
gambling license: the date and place of birth of an
applicants spouse; the address, telephone number,
drivers license number, email address and social security
number of the spouse; and, the address of a former
spouse. This information will be kept confdential.
46
Government Afairs
415 - Application for license; confdential
information
IC 4-35-10-3
The gambling commission requires the following
information for the purposes of gaining a racetrack
gambling license: the date and place of birth of an
applicants spouse; the address, telephone number,
drivers license number, email address and social security
number of the spouse; and, the address of a former
spouse. This information will be kept confdential
416 - Claimant
IC 5-2-6.1-1
For purposes of compensation for victims of violent
crimes, the term claimant includes a surviving spouse.
417 - Persons eligible for assistance
IC 5-2-6.1-12
The surviving spouse of a person who died as a result
of a violent crime or who died while trying to prevent a
violent crime is able to seek assistance from the state.
418 - Compensable Losses
IC 5-2-6.1-21
A spouse of a victim may recover: losses related to
necessary medical services; loss of income caused by
the crime; emergency shelter care expenses; child care
expenses; loss of fnancial support; funeral and burial
expenses; and, other expenses resulting from the bodily
injury or death of the victim.
419 - Domestic violence prevention center
defned
IC 5-2-6.7-2
The term domestic violence prevention center refers to
an organized entity created to prevent and treat
domestic and family violence.
420 - Required services
IC 5-2-6.7-12
In order to be eligible for funding, domestic violence
prevention and treatment centers are required to
provide certain services for victims of and people
threatened by or fearing family violence.
Title 5 - State and Local Administration
421 - Surviving mothers, fathers, spouses, or
unmarried children; eligibility for benefts
IC 5-10-5.5-15
A surviving spouse of a member of the Excise Police and
Conservation Enforcement Ofcers Retirement Plan who
had accrued at least ffteen years of creditable service
before death, may recover survivors benefts.
422 - Survivors benefts, amount
IC 5-10-5.5-16
Under the Excise Police and Conservation Enforcement
Ofcers Retirement Plan, surviving spouses may receive
an annual allowance equal to ffty percent of what the
deceased spouse would have been entitled to if he or
she had retired.
423 - Sending agencies; travel expenses; per diem
allowance
IC 5-10-7-5
If a public employee is assigned or detailed away from
his or her residence for more than eight months, travel
expenses may include transportation of his or her
immediate family.
424 -Public safety employees; surviving spouses;
dependents
IC 5-10-8-2.2
A current or retired public safety employee can add his
or her spouse to his or her insurance plan.
425 - Retired employees; ability of employer to pay
premiums
IC 5-10-8-8
The surviving spouse of a member of the general
assembly, who has served for at least ten years, may
have access to a group health insurance program for
surviving spouses and former members.
426 - Retired legislators
IC 5-10-8-8.1
A retired legislator may choose to have his or her spouse
covered under a state health insurance program. If
the retired legislator dies, the spouse has the ability to
continue paying the amount the retired legislator was
paying in order to stay enrolled in the health insurance
program.
47
Government Afairs
427 - Former legislators
IC 5-10-8-8.2
A former legislator may choose to have his or her spouse
covered under a state health insurance program. If
the former legislator dies, the spouse has the ability to
continue paying the amount the former legislator was
paying in order to stay enrolled in the health insurance
program.
428 - Account; establishment; administration by
general assembly; adoption of rules of
administration
IC 5-10-8.5-11
Spouses have access to a state retirement medical
benefts account.
429 - Balances in subaccounts of retired partici-
pants; permissible uses
IC 5-10-8.5-18
A balance left in a retired public employees subaccount
may be used by his or her spouse.
430 - Surviving spouses or dependents
IC 5-10-8.5-19
Upon the death of a public employee, a surviving spouse
may use the amounts credited to the employee to pay
health care related expenses. If the retired employee dies
without a surviving spouse, the credits will be forfeited.
431 - Special death benefts; suspension of payment
IC 5-10-10-6
If a public safety ofcer dies in the line of duty his or her
surviving spouse may receive a special death beneft
between $75,000 and $150,000.
432 - Amount of the special death beneft
IC 5-10-10-6.5
The surviving spouse of a probation ofcer who died in
the line of duty may receive $150,000.
433 - Lump sum payment
IC 5-10-11-5
The surviving spouse of a state employee who dies in
the line of duty may receive a lump sum of $50,000.
434 - Health coverage for survivors
IC 5-10-14-3
State police departments that provide health coverage
to active employees shall provide health coverage for
the spouse of a public safety ofcer who dies in the line
of duty.
435 - Transfer of accounts
IC 5-10.2-2-7
The spouse of a member of the Indiana state teachers
retirement fund or a member of the public employees
retirement fund may transfer the amount of money left
in the members account to his or her own retirement
pension or account
436 - Survivor benefts; death after March 31, 1990
and before January 1, 2007; death after December
31, 2006; forfeiture
IC 5-10.2-3-7.5
When a member of the state retirement fund dies, a
surviving spouse may, given certain conditions be
entitled to a survivor beneft in a monthly amount equal
to the beneft that would have been payable to the
spouse.
437 - Survivor benefts; death after June 30, 1996
IC 5-10.2-3-7.6
Subject to certain qualifcations, a surviving spouse of a
member of the public retirement fund may be eligible to
receive benefts.
438 - Survivor benefts; death while not in service
IC 5-10.2-3-8
If a member of the state retirement fund dies without
coverage from the retirement fund, and is eligible to
receive retirement benefts but has not yet applied for
them, he participants spouse is entitled to survivor
benefts.
439 -Retirement medical benefts account;
qualifcation of adoption of rules; conversion of
unused excess accrued leave
IC 5-10.3-8-14
A member of the state retirement fund has the ability to
convert unused excess leave to monetary contributions
to fund the medical expenses of his or her spouse.
440 -Death of member
IC 5-10.3-12-27
If a member of the state retirement fund dies while in
service but not in the line of duty, the surviving spouse
may be able to recover the value of the account.
48
Government Afairs
441 - Defnitions
IC 5-16-10-1
For purposes of employing construction managers for
public projects, the term afliate means a spouse.
442 - Conficts of interest; consultants
IC 5-16-11-5.5
Conficts of interest arise with consultants due to the
actions and activities of the consultants spouse.
443 - Legislative fndings and declaration of public
policy
IC 5-20-1-1
The Indiana legislature has declared a need for safe and
sanitary residential housing within the means of low and
moderate income families.
444 - Families of low and moderate income
defned
IC 5-20-3-1
For purposes of the public housing and mutual
housing associations, the term families of low and
moderate income takes into account the amount of the
familys total income available for housing needs.
445 - Lower income families defned
IC 5-20-4-5
For purposes of the Afordable Housing and Community
Development Fund, the term lower income families
means families whose income does not exceed eighty
percent of the median income for the area.
446 - Very low income families defned
IC 5-20-4-6
For purposes of the Afordable Housing and Community
Development Fund, the term very low income families
means families whose income does not exceed ffty
percent of the median for the area.
447 - Persons prohibited from bidding
IC 5-22-21-11
For purposes of public purchasing, the commissioner
may prohibit the spouse of a state employee from
bidding on property sold when the employee has
participated in the disposal process surrounding the
property.
448 - Surviving spouse or heir
IC 7.1-3-24-7
An individual must obtain consent in order to take
charge of a deceased spouses business requiring an
alcohol or tobacco related permit.
449 - Exception for certain public places
IC 7.1-5-7-11
A person who is at least eighteen but not yet
twenty-one is permitted to be on premises where
alcoholic drinks are served, if he or she is accompanied
by a family member or spouse who is twenty-one or
older.
450 - Political infuence or activities; free or reduced
rates or charges for products or services; violations;
ofense
IC 8-1-2-102
Surviving spouses of victims of public utility service may
get free or reduced products of service, provided that
they have not remarried.
451 - Riding, driving or walking on right-of-way or
yard as misdemeanor; defnitions; exceptions
IC 8-3-15-3
It is not a misdemeanor for an individual or an
individuals family members or employees, to use the
right-of-way when crossing from one part to another
part of his or her farm if the farm lies on both sides of the
right-of-way.
452 - Liability; guests defned
IC 8-21-5-1
An individual operating an aircraft is not responsible
for the death of his or her spouse unless the death was
caused by willful misconduct of the aircraft operator.
Title 7.1 - Alcohol and Tobacco
Title 8 - Utilities and Transportation
49
Government Afairs
453 - Compensation for expenses and losses
IC 8-23-17-13
A person may recover for reasonable expenses incurred
for moving his or her family when displaced by a state
agency.
454 - Moving expense and dislocation allowances
IC 8-23-17-14
A person eligible for dislocation payments may have that
payment adjusted according to the number of persons
in his or her family.
455 - Payment based on average annual net
earnings
IC 8-23-17-15
The owner of a farm or his or her spouse may receive a
displacement payment totaling half their net earnings
before income tax for the preceding two years.
456 - Relocation assistance advisory programs;
measures, facilities, and services
IC 8-23-17-20
Each relocation assistance advisory program shall in-
clude measures, facilities, or services that are
necessary to assure that, within a reasonable period of
time prior to displacement, there will be decent, safe,
sanitary dwellings for displaced families at rents or prices
within their means.
457 - Credit
IC 8-24-17-13
If a married couple fles a joint tax return and are subject
to diferent tax improvement rates, they must calculate
credit using the directions in subsection (a) of the provi-
sion.
458 - Designated family member
IC 9-13-2-43
For purposes of general provisions for the department
of motor vehicles, the term designated family member
may include a persons spouse.
459 - Persons eligible for personalized or special
group license plates
IC 9-18-15-1
An individual may be eligible for a group or special
license plate if he or she is a Gold Star family member,
which includes individuals whose spouses have died
while serving on active duty in the armed forces or
National Guard.
460 - Issuance
IC 9-18-16-1
The spouse of a member of the Indiana General
Assembly may receive a special Indiana license plate.
461 - Issuance
IC 9-18-17-1
The surviving spouse of a former prisoner of war may
receive a special Indiana license plate.
462 - Exemptions from chapter
IC 9-18-25-1
This chapter, which deals with special group
recognition license plates, does not apply to Gold Star
family members, which includes individuals whose
spouses have died while on active duty in the armed
forces or National Guard.
463 - Owner registration; former prisoners of war
IC 9-18-25-8
The Bureau of Motor Vehicles may register a vehicle for a
special group recognition license plate if the applicant is
a surviving spouse of a former prisoner of war.
464 - Application for plates
IC 9-18-45.8-3
The surviving spouse of a Pearl Harbor survivor may
receive a special Indiana license plate.
465 - Gold Star family member defned
IC 9-18-54-1
An individual whose spouse has died while serving on
active duty in the armed forces or National Guard may,
for purposes of this chapter, be designated as a Gold
Star family member.
Title 9 - Motor Vehicles
50
Government Afairs
466 - Design and Issue
IC 9-18-54-2
Starting in January, 2012, the Bureau of Motor Vehicles
will design and issue a special license plate for Gold Star
family members.
467 - Persons entitled to receive; required
procedure
IC 9-18-54-5
Procedural requirements for obtaining a Gold Star family
member license plate include providing the bureau with
documentation establishing the spousal relationship.
468 - Retail Lessee Defned
IC 9-23-2.5-6
For purposes of disclosure requirements, the term retail
lessee includes an individual who executes a lease for a
motor vehicle for family purposes.
469 - Transaction conditioned upon continuation of
franchise
IC 9-23-3-22
In the context of a vehicle dealer selling assets of the
dealership and maintaining a franchise relationship with
the vehicle manufacturer, a manufacturer has the frst
opportunity to buy the new dealers ownership if there is
a proposed change in over ffty percent of the
ownership and if the proposed change in ownership
does not involve the transfer of assets to one of the
dealers family members, which includes the dealers
spouse.
470 - Application of chapter
IC 9-23-5-1
There are specifc rules for the succession of a franchise
engaged in buying or selling motor vehicles to a spouse
or other family member.credit using the directions in
subsection (a) of the provision.
471 - Prerequisites for succession to franchise
IC 9-23-5-2
If an individual who owns a franchise passes away, that
individuals spouse may take over the existing franchise
if the manufacturer determines that the existing fran-
chise should be honored and the spouse complies with
other sections of this chapter.
472 - Good cause refusal to honor franchise
IC 9-23-5-3
A manufacturer may only refuse to honor the franchise
for a family member for good cause.
473 - Notice of refusal to honor franchise; contents
IC 9-23-5-6
When a manufacturer refuses to honor an existing
franchise, he or she must notify the family member who
wishes to take over the franchise of his or her decision,
explain the reason for the decision and the date when
the franchise will be discontinued.
474 - Age, experience, education, and examination
requirements
IC 9-24-3-2.5
In order to obtain a drivers license, an individual must
complete ffty hours of supervised driving practice,
which can include driving with his or her spouse who is
at least twenty-one years old.
475 - Probationary operators licenses issued after
June 30, 2009
IC 9-24-11-3.3
An individual holding a probationary drivers license
may drive with his or her spouse in the car without an
additional accompanying individual present.
476 - Change of residence or name; application for
duplicate drivers license or permit
IC 9-24-13-4
An individual should apply to amend his or her driver
license if the name of the individual is changed by
marriage.
477 - Petition; conditions
IC 9-24-15-2
If an individuals drivers license has been suspended, he
or she may apply for a restricted drivers if he or she can
show that suspension of the license would burden his or
her family.
478 - Adoption of rules; increase or decrease of
service charge; imposition of charge on other
license branch services; uniformity of charges
IC 9-29-3-19
A charge may not be imposed for a low numbered
license plate issued to the surviving spouse of a former
prisoner of war or Purple Heart recipient.
51
Government Afairs
479 - Vehicles registered under IC 9-18-25
IC 9-29-5-38
No annual registration fee may be imposed for a license
plate issued to the surviving spouse of a former prisoner
of war.
480 - Trial date; notice; application
IC 9-30-6-17
The surviving spouse of an individual killed by a driver
charged with driving under the infuence must receive
ten days notice of the defendants upcoming trial.
481 - Qualifcation of trust under Internal Revenue
Code; beneft limitations
IC 10-12-2-3
For purposes of determining state police ofcer
pensions and benefts, the life expectancy of a
participants spouse cannot be recalculated to change
beneft payouts.
482 - Dependents pension reserve account;
dependent children; colleges and universities;
tuition
IC 10-12-2-6
The surviving spouse of a state police ofcer who died in
the line of duty may receive a monthly pension.
483 - School payments by child or spouse of em-
ployee benefciary who has a disability
IC 10-12-2-11
If a state police ofcer becomes permanently disabled in
the line of duty, his or her spouse may obtain an
undergraduate degree from a state school free of
charge.
484 -Amount; benefciaries
IC 10-12-6-2
The surviving spouse of certain police employees killed
in the line of duty is entitled to a lump-sum $150,000
special death beneft.
485 - Presentation of state fag upon member of the
military or public safety ofcer dying in the line of
duty
IC 10-14-2-5
The surviving spouse of a military or public safety worker
killed in the line of duty is to receive a state fag.
486 - Pensions; funeral expenses
IC 10-16-7-19
The surviving spouse of a member of the Indiana
National Guard who died in connection with his or her
military service is entitled to the deceased spouses
pension.
487 - Establishment of department; supervision
and administration; domicile
IC 10-17-1-2
The Indiana Department of Veterans Afairs may act at
the request of a veterans spouse or surviving spouse as
necessary to obtain compensation or benefts owed.
488 - Requirements of employees of department
IC 10-17-1-11
The spouse or surviving spouse of an honorably dis-
charged veteran can be eligible for employment with
the Indiana Department of Veterans Afairs.
489 - Disclosure of a discharge record;
photographic identifcation defned
IC 10-17-2-4
The surviving spouse of a veteran who was discharged
from the military can obtain the veterans discharge
record.
490 - Copies necessary to secure benefts; duty to
provide
IC 10-17-3-2
The surviving spouse of a member of the military or
honorably discharged veteran can obtain certifed re-
cords as necessary to secure benefts.
491 - World War I benefts extended
IC 10-17-5-1
The spouse or surviving spouse of an honorably
discharged veteran who was injured while serving in
World War II, Korea, or Vietnam has certain rights and
privileges as provided by law.
492 - Civil War benefts extended
IC 10-17-5-2
The spouse or surviving spouse of a military member
who served during World War I or in other specifed mili-
tary service has certain rights and privileges as provided
by law.
Title 10 - Public Safety
52
Government Afairs
493 - Authorization to execute contracts
IC 10-17-6-1
A minor veteran and his or her minor spouse may sign
contracts to receive certain rights and benefts under
federal law, despite the fact that they are minors.
494 - Political afliation of employees; employment
preferences
IC 10-17-9-5
Among applicants seeking a position in the Indiana
Veterans Home, preference is given to honorably dis-
charged military veterans and their spouses or surviving
spouses.
495 - Admissions; rules; funds; death
IC 10-17-9-7
The disabled or impoverished spouse of an honorably
discharged veteran may be eligible for admission to
the Indiana Veterans Home, provided he or she meets
certain admission criteria.
496 - Standard method of determining
maintenance charges; adjustments
IC 10-17-9-11
A married couple living in the Indiana Veterans Home
may be eligible to pay a lesser fee for living in the Home.
If a member of the Home dies owing maintenance fees,
the Home cannot seek payment from the surviving
spouse.
497 - Claim or judgment for maintenance charges;
lien; suit against guardian; foreclosure; claim
against estate
IC 10-17-9-13
If a member of the Indiana Veterans Home dies owing
maintenance or treatment fees, the Home generally
cannot seek to take his or her real estate on which the
surviving spouse lives.
498 - Claims for burial allowance; reimbursement
IC 10-17-10-1
An allowance may be granted to reimburse the burial
costs of a deceased service member or honorably
discharged veteran and his or her spouse or surviving
spouse.
499 - Eligibility for burial
IC 10-17-11-10
A veteran or the spouse of a veteran who is eligible to be
buried in a national cemetery according to federal law is
also eligible to be buried in the Indiana State Veterans
Cemetery.
500 - Purpose of fund
IC 10-17-12-0.7 & IC 10-17-12-8
The Military Family Relief Fund provides short-term
fnancial assistance to families who have sufered a hard-
ship in connection with a qualifed service members ac-
tive service. The defnition of family includes the service
members spouse and dependents as set forth under
federal law (see IC 10-17-12-5.5 & 37 U.S.C. 401).
501 - Relative defned
IC 36-1-20.2-8
For purposes of laws on nepotism, relative includes
ones spouse.
502 - Sherifs spouse employed as a prison matron
IC 36-1-20.2-13
It is permissible for a sherifs spouse to be employed
as a prison matron and supervised by the sherif, unless
policy provides otherwise.
IC 36-1-21-3
For purposes of laws afecting contracts with a county,
municipality, or township, relative includes ones
spouse.
504 - Afdavit; recording in miscellaneous records;
record as prima facie evidence
IC 36-2-11-19
The county recorders ofce may fle a record indicating
that an individual is married to someone who owns or
has an interest in real estate in that county.
505 - Investigation of death of person; certifcate of
death; autopsy; release of body for disposition
IC 36-2-14-6
A spouse may request that an autopsy not be performed
upon his or her deceased spouse if there are no suspi-
cious circumstances (as provided by law) regarding the
cause of death.
Title 36 - Local Government
53
Government Afairs
506 - DNA analysis defned; immediate family
member defned; identifcation of deceased
IC 36-2-14-6.5
A coroner may use a spouse to identify a deceased
person as long as the remains are recognizable.
507 - Coroners verdict and report; autopsy records
IC 36-2-14-10
A surviving spouse may obtain photo, video, or audio
records of the autopsy of his or her deceased spouse. If
another person wishes to obtain such records, he or she
must have a good reason, and the surviving spouse will
be given an opportunity to object.
508 - Prompt identifcation of human remains;
disposal of unidentifed remains; requesting assis-
tance of state police; missing persons
IC 36-2-14-12.5
When a deceased person is identifed, eforts must be
made to contact the missing persons family members.
509 - Ordinance; special reduced rates for
afordable housing development
IC 36-7-4-1326
Housing development plans that provide housing to
families earning less than eighty percent of the median
income for a county may receive special fee reductions.
510 - Dissolution of commission
IC 36-7-11.2-66
The spouse of a Meridian Street property owner is con-
sidered an indirect owner for the purposes of signing a
petition to dissolve the commission to preserve Meridian
Street.
511 - Sale or grant of real property to urban
enterprise association or community development
corporation; appraisal; public meeting; notice
IC 36-7-14-22.2
A city or county may give property to a nonproft that
serves low-income families.
512 -Acquisition of real property; procedure;
purposes
IC 36-7-14-32.5
A city or county redevelopment commission may, in
certain circumstances, seize real estate for the purpose
of providing housing to low-income families.
513 -Applications; eligibility; drawings to
determine receipt of dwellings
IC 36-7-17-5
For purposes of determining eligibility to receive a home
under an Urban Homesteading program, an individual is
ineligible if his or her immediate family member already
participated in the program.
514 - Availability of housing; national defense
activities; major disasters
IC 36-7-18-22
A city or county housing authority can provide emer-
gency housing to military or defense workers and their
families.
515 - Qualifcation of 1925 fund under Internal
Revenue Code; beneft limitations
IC 36-8-6-1.5
For purposes of determining benefts under the 1925
Police Pension Fund, the life expectancy of a members
spouse cannot be recalculated to change beneft pay-
outs.
516 - Members dying other than in line of duty;
monthly beneft
IC 36-8-6-9.6
The surviving spouse of an active or retired police ofce
who died, not in the line of duty, is guaranteed a specifc
monthly payment from the 1925 Police Pension Fund.
517 - Members dying in line of duty before
9-1-1982; monthly beneft for surviving spouses,
children, or parents
IC 36-8-6-9.7
The surviving spouse of a police ofcer who died in
the line of duty is guaranteed a specifc monthly pay-
ment under the 1925 Police Pension Fund. The surviving
spouse is also guaranteed health insurance coverage
equal to that ofered to active members of the unit.
518 - Members dying in line of duty after 8-31-1982;
monthly beneft or surving spouses, children, or
parents
IC 36-8-6-10.1
The surviving spouse of a police ofcer who died in
the line of duty is guaranteed a specifc monthly pay-
ment under the 1925 Police Pension Fund. The surviving
54
Government Afairs
519 - Special lump sum death beneft in addition to
other benefts
IC 36-8-6-20
The surviving spouse of a police ofcer who died in the
line of duty will be given a special death beneft of either
$75,000 or $150,000, depending on the year in which his
or her spouse died.
IC 36-8-7-2.5
For purposes of determining benefts under the 1937
Firefghters Pension Fund, the life expectancy of a
members spouse cannot be recalculated to change
beneft payouts.
521 - Members dying other than in line of duty
IC 36-8-7-12.2
The surviving spouse of a frefghter who died, not in the
line of duty, is guaranteed a specifc monthly payment
from the 1937 Firefghters Pension Fund.
522 - Members dying in line of duty before 9-1-1982
IC 36-8-7-12.3
The surviving spouse of a frefghter who died in the
line of duty is guaranteed a specifc monthly payment
from the 1937 Firefghters Pension Fund. The surviving
523 - Members dying in line of duty after 8-31-1982
IC 36-8-7-12.4
The surviving spouse of a frefghter who died in the
from the 1937 Firefghters Pension Fund. The surviving
524 - Lump sum death beneft
IC 36-8-7-13
The surviving spouse of a frefghter will be given a
death beneft of at least $12,000 upon the frefghters
death.
525 - Exemption of fund from judicial process;
authorized expenditures
IC 36-8-7-22
Payment to be disbursed to a surviving spouse from the
1937 Firefghters Pension Fund cannot be withheld due
to a debt of the deceased frefghter or the surviving
spouse.
other benefts
IC 36-8-7-26
The surviving spouse of a frefghter who died in the line
of duty will be given a special death beneft of either
or her spouse died.
IC 36-8-7.5-1.5
For purpose of determining benefts under the 1953
Police Pension Fund (Indianapolis), the life expectancy
of a members spouse cannot be recalculated to change
beneft payouts.
528 - City ofcers; powers and duties
IC 36-8-7.5-9
The city will ensure that the 1953 Police Pension Fund
(Indianapolis) has accurate information as to the marital
status and spouse of any member of the police
department.
529 - Members dying other than in line of duty
IC 36-8-7.5-13.6
The surviving spouse of an Indianapolis police ofcer
who died, not in the line of duty, is guaranteed a specifc
monthly payment from the 1953 Police Pension Fund
(Indianapolis).
IC 36-8-7.5-13.7
who died in the line of duty is guaranteed a specifc
(Indianapolis). The surviving spouse is also guaranteed
health insurance coverage equal to that ofered to active
members of the unit.
IC 36-8-7.5-14.1
who died in the line of duty is guaranteed a specifc
(Indianapolis). The surviving spouse is also guaranteed
55
Government Afairs
532 - Necessity of application; dismissed member of
police department
IC 36-8-7.5-15
The surviving spouse of a police ofcer must submit a
specifc form in order to obtain benefts from the 1953
Police Pension Fund (Indianapolis).
533 - Payments to dependent children or mentally
incompetent persons; benefts where member dies
before payments are made; payments where
member is entitled to part salary; reentry into
active service
IC 36-8-7.5-17
Benefts payable under the 1953 Police Pension Fund
(Indianapolis) to a mentally incompetent person may be
paid to that persons spouse. Additionally, if a member
dies without having made required payments to the
Fund, his or her surviving spouse typically must make
those back-payments in order to receive benefts.
other benefts
IC 36-8-7.5-22
who died in the line of duty will be given a special death
beneft of either $75,000 or $150,000, depending on the
year in which his or her spouse died.
Revenue Code
IC 36-8-8-2.5
For purpose of determining benefts under the 1977
Police Ofcers and Firefghters Pension and Disability
Fund, the life expectancy of a members spouse cannot
be recalculated to change beneft payouts.
536 - Members dying other than in line of duty after
8-31-1982
IC 36-8-8-13.8
The surviving spouse of a fund member who died in the
from the 1977 Police Ofcers and Firefghters Pension.
IC 36-8-8-13.9
The surviving spouse is also guaranteed health
insurance coverage equal to that ofered to active
IC 36-8-8-14.1
The surviving spouse is also guaranteed health
insurance coverage equal to that ofered to active
other benefts
IC 36-8-8-20
line of duty will be given a special death beneft of either
or her spouse died.
540 - Deferred retirement option plan
IC 36-8-10-12.2
Certain referred retirement benefts are payable in a
lump sum to the surviving spouse of an eligible sherif or
county police ofcer.
541 - Dependents pension benefts; establishment
and operation; maximum monthly pension
payable; eligibility
IC 36-8-10-16
The surviving spouse of an eligible sherif or county
police ofcer may receive monthly payments as
determined by the sherifs department in that county.
542 - Validation and reinstatement of certain
monthly pensions
IC 36-8-10-16.3
Certain monthly pension payments to a sherif or county
police ofcers surviving spouse, who has remarried after
the ofcers death, are valid or reinstated.
543 - Dependents pension benefts; health
insurance coverage
IC 36-8-10-16.5
The surviving spouse of an eligible sherif or county
police ofcer who died in the line of duty is guaranteed
56
Government Afairs
544 - Restrictions on alienation of benefts;
expenses
IC 36-8-10-19
An eligible county police ofcer is permitted to put part
of his or her monthly pension toward accident, health, or
long-term care insurance for his or her spouse.
545 - Cost of living payment to employee
benefciaries who are retired or have a disability or
surviving spouses; adoption ordinance
IC 36-8-10-23
A county may elect to give a cost of living payment to
the surviving spouse of an eligible sherif or county
police ofcer, in addition to or instead of a monthly
pension.
.
57
Agriculture and Environment
546 - Family member
IC 14-8-2-87.6
For the purposes of access to cemetery land, a family
member is a person who is a descendant or a relative of
the buried person.
547 - Annual passes
IC 14-19-3-5
An annual pass gives access to state parks and
recreation areas and entitles the pass holders
immediate family to access state parks an unlimited
number of times during a calendar year without paying
an admission fee.
548 - Visitation rights to land classifed under
IC 6-1.1-6.8
IC 14-21-5-3
Family members of individuals who are buried in
privately owned cemetery land are allowed to have
access to the cemetery a minimum of three times per
year. Visiting dates must be agreed upon between the
family members and the landowner.
549 - License required to take or chase wild animals
IC 14-22-11-1
A spouse of an owner of farmland may hunt, fsh, or trap
without a license on his or her spouses land.
Additionally, a spouse of a tenant of farmland may hunt,
fsh, or trap without a license on his or her spouses
leased land. If the land owner or tenant is not a resident
of Indiana, his or her spouse may hunt without a license
so long as the spouses state of residence allows
residents of Indiana who own land in that state to hunt,
fsh, and trap on their land without a license.
IC 14-33-5.4-2
A spouse of a candidate or trustee is considered to be a
relative.
551 - Communications not breach of confdentiality
provisions
IC 15-15-6-10
Communications between a farmer and his or her
spouse regarding the terms of a seed contract are not a
breach of a confdentiality provision in said contract.
552 - Owner desiring to make claim; report of loss;
subrogation
15-20-2-6
In the event of loss of livestock by attack or exposure,
the owner of the lost livestock cannot include his or her
spouse as one of the landowners serving as a
disinterested witness in the afdavit when fling for
damages.
Title 14 - Natural and Cultural Resources Title 15 - Agriculture and Animals
58
Property and Taxation
553 - Sales disclosure form; requirements of form
IC 6-1.1-5.5-5
For purposes of Indiana state property tax, the
department of local government fnance must create a
sales disclosure form for property sales, and that form
must contain instructions on how to terminate a
deduction when the taxpayer or taxpayers spouse stops
living at that property.
554 - Real property or mobile or manufactured
home; persons over 65; surviving spouse
IC 6-1.1-12-9
The value of a persons home is tax deductible up to
a certain amount after turning sixty-fve years of age.
While current co-owners do not have to be married to
take advantage of the deduction, only spouses can take
a deduction on behalf of a deceased spouse.
555 - Real property or mobile or manufactured
home; persons over 65 or surviving spouse; fling
claim
IC 6-1.1-12-10.1
In order to deduct the value of a persons home, the
person must fle a sworn statement, that includes infor-
mation about his or her spouses income and tax return.
556 - Veteran with a partial disability; prerequisite
for deduction
IC 6-1.1-12-13
The amount a person may deduct for the value of his
or her home increases if he or she is a partially disabled
veteran. This deduction may be taken by the surviving
spouse of a disabled veteran, who is deceased.
557 - Veteran with a total disability, or older veteran
with partial disability; prerequisite for deduction
IC 6-1.1-12-14
The amount a person may deduct for the value of his or
her home increases if he or she is a totally disabled
veteran. This deduction may be taken by a surviving
spouse if the veteran is deceased.
558 - Surviving spouse of veteran; prerequisites for
deduction
IC 6-1.1-12-16
The surviving spouse may deduct a portion of the value
of his or her home if his or her deceased spouse was a
veteran.
559 - Surviving spouse of veteran; fling claim
IC 6-1.1-12-17
If a surviving spouse is claiming a deduction on the
value of a home based on the deceased spouses veteran
service, he or she must submit a sworn statement that
includes a letter from the U.S. Department of Veterans
Afairs confrming the military service.
560 - World War I veterans; prerequisites for
deduction
IC 6-1.1-12-17.4
The amount a person may deduct for the value of his
or her home increases if he or she is a veteran of World
War I. This deduction applies if either spouse was the
property owner.
561 -Subsequent applications; ineligibility; trusts;
cooperative housing corporations; homestead
credits
IC 6-1.1-12-17.8
A person who receives certain deductions for property
that he or she holds jointly with another owner is not
required to fle a statement to reapply for the deduction
if he or she is the sole owner following the death of his
or her spouse.
562 - Homestead ownership; defnitions; standard
deduction
IC 6-1.1-12-37
An individual claiming a deduction on property taxes for
his or her home must fle a statement that includes
information about his or her spouse. If the spouses
live separately in diferent states and do not own each
others homes, they may each be eligible to claim a
deduction in their respective states.
563 - Form to be provided by closing agents to
customers
IC 6-1.1-12-43
A closing agent must inform customers of their eligibility
for each deduction, provide instructions on how to
terminate a deduction that the customer or the
customers spouse will no longer be eligible for after the
closing, and indicate the tax consequences of failing to
terminate deductions that the customer or customers
spouse are no longer eligible for.
Title 6 - Taxation
59
564 -Additional credit for qualifying individual;
amount of credit; application
IC 6-1.1-20.6-8.5
A home owner may qualify for a reduction in property
taxes if, along with his or her spouse, he or she meets
certain income requirements, and the value of the home
does not exceed a certain amount.
565 - Statement of current and delinquent taxes
and special assessments; requirements; payments;
transmission of information by electronic mail
IC 6-1.1-22-8.1
The county treasurer must send out a letter notifying
property owners of their current and delinquent taxes.
This letter must include information on the deductions
or credits they may be eligible for and the process for
appeals. When taking a deduction on the property, a
property owner must list himself or herself along with
his or her spouse.
566 - Assessment of personal property;
classifcation
IC 6-1.1-31-7
When determining the value of a mobile home for tax
purposes, the purchase price may be considered if the
buyer and seller are not related by blood or marriage.
567 - Delinquent property tax installments; waiver
of penalty in case of death of taxpayers immediate
family member
IC 6-1.1-37-10.7
An individual who is late paying a property tax
installment will not be penalized if he or she experi-
ences the death of a spouse who lived in the same home
within seven days of the due date.
568 - Motor vehicles; intrafamilial title transfers
IC 6-2.5-5-15.5
A transaction to transfer the title of a car to a spouse is
exempt from state retail tax.
569 - Adjusted gross income
IC 6-3-1-3.5
When calculating adjusted gross income, an individual
may subtract additional amounts based on his or her
marital status, spouses income, and spouses
contributions to a long-term care plan.
570 - Victim of the September 11 terrorist attack
IC 6-3-1-31
For purposes of defning victim of the September 11
terrorist attack, the term victim includes the spouse of
an individual who died in the attack.
571 - Military service deduction; retirement income
or survivors benefts; age limit of 60
IC 6-3-2-4
Under certain circumstances, a surviving spouse may
deduct a portion of military income earned by either
one of the spouses.
572 - Dwelling rental deduction; limitations
IC 6-3-2-6
For purposes of claiming a tax deduction for the cost of
rent, spouses are limited to a $3,000 deduction.
573 - Unemployment compensation; deduction
IC 6-3-2-10
For state income tax purposes and under certain
circumstances, unemployment income may be
deducted. The amount of income is reduced if a married
couple that lives together fles separately.
574 - Deduction for unreimbursed education
expenditure
IC 6-3-2-22
For purposes of state income tax deductions, spouses
are limited to one $1,000 deduction for educational
expenses for the private schooling of a dependent.
575 - Unifed tax credit for the elderly
IC 6-3-3-9
An individual over the age of sixty-fve may receive a
credit on his or her state income taxes if his or her
household income, including a spouses income, is
below $10,000 for the fscal year.
576 - Returns; fduciaries; husband and wife
IC 6-3-4-2
When fling joint federal taxes, spouses must fle joint
state income taxes as well. An individual spouse is not
liable for the taxes based on the other spouses income.
When fling separate federal tax returns, spouses must
fle separate state income taxes.

60
577 - New employee defned
IC 6-3.1-13-6
A credit is issued toward state taxes for creating a new
job position. For purposes of the credit, the term new
employee does not include a spouse who has a direct or
indirect ownership of at least fve percent of the
taxpayers holdings.
578 - Related member defned
IC 6-3.1-13-8
For purposes of the Economic Development for a
Growing Economy Tax Credit, the term related member
may include the taxpayers spouse.
579 - Utilization of tax credit
IC 6-3.1-14-3
When utilizing a certain tax credit regarding the
operation of a registered maternity home, spouses may
split the credit equally, or one spouse may take the
whole credit.
580 - Credit; amount; married couple fling separate
returns
IC 6-3.1-16-7
restoration of a historic property, spouses fling returns
may split the credit equally, or one may take the whole
credit.
581 - Earned income defned
IC 6-3.1-20-1
For purposes of state tax liability credits, earned income
includes the spouses income if fling a joint adjusted
gross income tax return.
582 - Entitlement to credit
IC 6-3.1-22-8
preservation and rehabilitation of a historic property,
spouses that own the property jointly and fle separate
tax returns may split the credit equally, or one spouse
may take the whole credit.
583 - Credit for the elderly; computation
IC 6-3.5-1.1-7
When calculating the credit for the elderly, spouses must
combine their adjusted gross incomes and use the
average of the county tax rates applicable to each of
them.
584 - Defnitions
IC 6-3.5-2-1
For purposes of local employment taxes, the term
employee does not include individuals employed by
their spouse.
585 - Credit for the elderly or individuals with a
total disability
IC 6-3.5-6-24
For purposes of calculating the credit for the county
option income tax for the elderly or individuals with a
total disability, spouses must combine their adjusted
gross incomes and use the average of the county tax
rates applicable to each of them.
586 - Credits for the elderly or individuals with a
total disability
IC 6-3.5-7-9
For purposes of calculating the credit for the economic
development income tax for the elderly or individuals
with a total disability, spouses must combine their ad-
justed gross incomes and use the average of the county
tax rates applicable to each of them.
587 - Classes of transferees defned; adopted child
as natural child
IC 6-4.1-1-3
For the purposes of death taxes, a Class A transferee
includes the spouse of a child or stepchild. A Class B
transferee includes the spouse of a child of the trans-
feror.
588 - Transfers of interests in property; transfers in
contemplation of death; transfers for consideration
IC 6-4.1-2-4
An inheritance tax will be applied to property interests
conveyed at or after the time of death, or in the year
preceding death, if the transfer was in contemplation
of death. If a surviving spouse dies who had property
interest or income from a previously deceased spouse,
the income will be considered property of the surviving
spouse, for purposes for inheritance tax.
589 - Transfers of property by decedent to surviving
spouse; qualifying income interest for life; election
IC 6-4.1-3-7
Transfers made to a surviving spouse at death are
exempt from the inheritance tax.
61
590 - Items deductible from value of property
interests transferred by resident decedent by will,
intestate succession, or under trust
IC 6-4.1-3-13
Deductions on property transferred at death include
tax and mortgage liens, taxes from other states, debts,
funeral and memorial expenses, estate administration
expenses such as legal fees, and the value of property
received by a surviving spouse as allowed by the
probate code.
591 - Personal property; consent to transfer
IC 6-4.1-8-4
A person may not transfer the personal property of a
deceased person, other than money in a checking
account, to anyone other than a surviving spouse
without the written consent of the department of state
revenue or the county assessor.
592 - Checking account; notice of transfer of funds
to person other than surviving spouse
IC 6-4.1-8-4.6
If the money in a deceased persons checking account is
transferred to someone other than a surviving spouse,
the tax assessor shall be notifed.
593 - Dependent defned
IC 6-8-11-2
For purposes of employee medical care savings account
plans, the term dependent includes the spouse of the
employee
594 - Levy release or tax warrant surrender;
grounds
IC 6-8.1-8-9
A tax levy or warrant shall be released if, among other
reasons, the advocate orders the release after fnding
that the levy threatens the health or welfare of the
individual or his or her spouse.
595 - Designation of all or part of refund to be paid
to nongame fund
IC 6-8.1-9-4
Spouses fling a joint income tax return may donate their
state income tax refund to the nongame fund.
596 - Two or more persons; conveyances or devises
IC 32-17-2-1
Any conveyance of land made to two persons is assumed to
be a tenancy in common and not a joint tenancy (with rights
of survivorship), unless the two persons are married.
597 - Purchase or lease of real estate; rights of
survivor
IC 32-17-3-1
Where a married couple purchases real estate, or leases
real estate with an option to purchase, a surviving
spouse, upon the death of the other spouse, owns all of
the real estate (or rights under the option to purchase
contract), unless the contract appears to have intended
to create a tenancy in common.
598 - Divorce
IC 32-17-3-2
If a married couple is divorced after purchasing real
estate or leasing real estate with an option to purchase,
each owns equal shares of the interest and equity of the
purchased or leased real estate after the divorce.
599 - Title bond or contract for sale of land;
survivorship
IC 32-17-3-3
If a married couple sells real estate and one spouse dies
before the whole of the agreed purchase price has been
paid, the surviving spouse is entitled to the remainder of
the purchase price.
600 - Husband and wife; joint deed of conveyance
IC 32-17-3-4
A married couple may transfer any real estate in which
they are tenants in common, joint tenants, or tenants by
the entireties, by signing a joint deed of conveyance.
601 - Personal property owned as tenants in
common; exceptions
IC 32-17-11-29
Upon the death of a spouse, the surviving spouse
becomes the sole property owner of all household
goods, including any notes, bonds, certifcates, or titles
acquired during marriage and that were possessed by
both spouses.
Title 32 - Property
62
602 - Claims and allowances included in liability;
limitations
IC 32-17-13-2
If an individual receives the benefts of a nonprobate
transfer, that individual is liable up to the amount of the
beneft for any allowed claims against the decedents
probate estate and statutory allowances to the dece-
dents spouse and children.
603 - Enforcement proceedings; written demand;
failure to commence proceeding
IC 32-17-13-7
The surviving spouse of a deceased person may not
seek payment of an amount owed to him or her without
delivering a written demand to the personal
representative of the estate.
604 - Transfer on death deed
IC 32-17-14-11
If real property is held by two spouses as a tenancy by
the entirety, a transfer on death deed recorded by one
spouse is void unless the other spouse also agrees to the
transfer.
605 - Revocation or change of benefciary
designation
IC 32-17-14-16
When a married couple owns property by the entirety,
both individuals must make any change in benefciary
designation. If one spouse dies, the surviving spouse
may revoke or change the benefciary designation.
606 - Provisions regarding owners former spouse
IC 32-17-14-23
Any property benefciary designation to a spouse that
is made before a divorce or anullment is revoked, unless
certain exceptions apply.
607 - Surviving spouse and family allowances;
children of owner designated as benefciaries
IC 32-17-14-25
Any transfer of real estate by a deceased spouse may be
subject to laws that provide a $25,000 allowance from
the estate to the surviving spouse.
608 - Agreements or promises not covered
IC 32-21-1-1
An agreement to transfer property in consideration of a
promise to marry must be in writing and signed by both
parties to be enforceable.
609 - Application of chapter
IC 32-21-5-1
Transfers of real property between spouses are exempt
from otherwise-required specifc disclosures related to
the property, such as, for example, the condition of the
foundation, roof, structure, and water and sewer
systems.
610 - Certifcation of consent by judge
IC 32-22-1-4
A person who is less than eighteen years of age and is
married to a person who is at least eighteen years of age
may consent to a transfer, mortgage, or contract
concerning real estate with the consent of a judge.
611 - Procedure for conveyance by spouse of
mentally incompetent person
IC 32-22-1-5
A married person may sell real estate without the assent
of a mentally incompetent spouse.
612 - Petition; inspection; assessment
IC 32-26-6-1
If an owner of farmland petitions a county government
to allow a fence to be constructed around his or her
farmland, the owners spouse may not be appointed to
the committee charged with inspecting the property
and making the assessment of cost for the fence.
613 - Requirements for proceedings in state court
IC 32-30-3-14
A person who brings an action in state court
concerning real estate may name as a defendant any
person who has an interest in the real estate, or includes
the spouse, widow, or widower of the former owner of
the real estate.
614 - Nonresidents; presumption of death; passing
of title to heirs
IC 32-30-3-18
A nonresident who would be entitled to real estate in
Indiana by descent or devise is presumed dead if the
nonresident has been absent from their last place of
residence for seven years ,and a spouse, parent, child, or
sibling of the nonresident has not heard from the
nonresident for seven years.

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