ToddPC PDF

Click
to edit Master /tle style
Radia%on Issues
CERN Accelerator School May 2014
benjamin.todd@cern.ch
1v2
To Take Away Today
CERN
* radia%on is everywhere, it can eect electronic systems

for dependable opera%on you cannot ignore this.
Par%cle accelerators actually create radia%on elds.
certain failure modes are unique to radia%on eects
* radia%on eects on electronics are dicult and costly to characterise

by far the best thing to do is avoid exposure to radia%on.

* radia%on eects are dicult and costly to mi%gate

Contents
CERN
1. Context CERN
2. Radia%on Basic Eects
3. Examples of Radia%on Tolerant Design Flow

An example of a radia%on tolerant system in design
CERN
The Context
CERN
CERN Accelerator Complex
CERN
Lake Geneva
Geneva
Airport
CERN LAB 2 (France)
CERN LAB 1 (Switzerland)

CERN
CERN
Lake Geneva
Large Hadron Collider

(LHC)
Geneva
Airport
CERN LAB 2 (France)
Super Proton Synchrotron
(SPS)
27km long
150m underground
Proton Synchrotron
(PS)
CERN
CERN
Lake Geneva

(LHC)
Geneva
Airport
CERN LAB 2 (France)
(SPS)
27km long
150m underground
Proton Synchrotron
(PS)
CERN
CERN
Lake Geneva

(LHC)
Geneva
Airport
CERN LAB 2 (France)
(SPS)

Proton Synchrotron
(PS)

Lake Geneva
(LHC)
Geneva
Airport
CERN LAB 2 (France)
(SPS)
Proton Synchrotron
(PS)
CERN
CERN
Lake Geneva

(LHC)
Geneva
Airport
CERN LAB 2 (France)
(SPS)
Injector complex
1e12 protons per injec%on
2808 injec%ons per beam
Proton Synchrotron
(PS)
CERN
CERN
Lake Geneva

(LHC)
Geneva
Airport
CERN LAB 2 (France)
(SPS)

Proton Synchrotron
(PS)
CERN
CERN
Beam Dumping Systems

(LHC)
~ 9 km
~ 5.5 miles
Beam-2 Transfer Line

(TI8)

(SPS)
Beam-1 Transfer Line (TI2)

100us for one turn,
CERN, the LHC and Machine Protec%on
13 of 23
CERN
CMS
LHC-b
ALICE
ATLAS
CERN
CERN
ATLAS A Toroidal LHC ApparatuS
15
CERN
ATLAS A Toroidal LHC ApparatuS
16
CERN
17
Collisions
CERN
~109 proton-proton collisions per second
Massive amounts of data generated all must be processed

new par%cles are rare only a few events per day
[3]
18
CERN
Radia/on
Example Par%cle Fluences
CERN
[par%cles (HEH) per cm2 per year]
105
104
Atmospheric
106
107
108
109
1010
1011
Accelerator
1013
1012
Experiment
Cross-Sec%on = the probability of a par%cle interac%ng
If you have a lot of parts, even at sea level, atmospheric eects can no%ceably aect reliability
Radia%on eects cannot be ignored for highly reliable systems
[1]
20
The Golden Rules
CERN
If you only take one thing from this Saturday morning talk let it be this:
To solve radia%on issues:
1)
2)
3)
4)
Remove the func%on

if not possible then
Move away from the radia%on

Block radia%on

and only then - conceive a radia%on tolerant system
CNGS 2006 PLC Crashed FLUKA Simula%on
[1]
21
The Golden Rules
CERN
If you only take one thing from this Saturday morning talk let it be these golden rules:
To solve radia%on issues:
1)
2)
3)
4)
Remove the func%on

Move away from the radia%on

Block radia%on

and only then - conceive a radia%on tolerant system
CNGS 2008 PLC Crashed FLUKA Simula%on
[1]
22
in a nutshell
CERN
1. Displacement Damage (DD)
2. Total Ionising Dose (TID)
cumula%ve
3. Single Event Eects (SEE)

prompt
23
in a nutshell
CERN
Frenkel Defect
Displaced atom
Silicon Atoms
Incident particle
Vacancy
Interstitial
defects accumulate and gradually destroy the silicon lalce
24
in a nutshell
CERN

Incident particle
Source
passivation
(low dielectric constant)
SIO2
+...
Gate
Drain
Gate Oxide
(high dielectric constant)
N-type
(extra electrons)
P-type
(extra holes)
Space Charge Region
Insulator (SOI)
(low dielectric constant)
SIO2
25
in a nutshell
CERN
SIO2
SIO2
26
in a nutshell
CERN
SIO2
SIO2
accumulate and gradually degrade the transistor func%on
27
in a nutshell
CERN
SIO2
SIO2
electrons collected by junc%ons crea%ng

parasi%c current
SE Transient (SET)
SE Upset (SEU)
SE Func%onal Interrupt (SEFI)
28
in a nutshell
CERN
V DD
V SS
V D D V SS
P
P
N
P
CMOS parasi%c bi-polar transistors

Switch on = short drain to source
SE Latch-up (SEL)
29
in a nutshell
CERN
cumula%ve
cumula%ve
prompt
Non-Ionising Energy Loss
Grays
Cross-sec%on
SE Upset (SEU)
SE Transient (SET)
SE Func%onal Interrrupt (SEFI)
life%me!
SE Latchup (SEL)
SE Burnout (SEB)
random in %me failure!
30
CERN
A System In Design Today
CERN
Introduc%on
32
Introduc%on
CERN
Power Converters = Power Supplies

Cri%cal for opera%on of CERNs machines
Direct impact on beam quality
Direct impact on machine availability
Year
Peak Energy
[TeV]
Peak Intensity
[p]
Peak Luminosity
[cm-2 s-1]
2010
3.5
4 x 1013
2.0 x 1032
2011
3.5
2.0 x 1014
3.6 x 1033
2012
2.2 x 1014
7.7 x 1033
LS1-2
6.5
3 x 1014
1 x 1034
[2,3,4]
33
Introduc%on
CERN

Year
Peak Energy
[TeV]
Peak Intensity
[p]
Peak Luminosity
[cm-2 s-1]
2010
3.5
4 x 1013
2.0 x 1032
2011
3.5
2.0 x 1014
3.6 x 1033
2012
2.2 x 1014
7.7 x 1033
LS1-2
6.5
3 x 1014
1 x 1034
[2,3,4]
LS1 = Long Shutdown #1 from 2013 to 2014 upgrade magnet interconnects

LS2 = Long Shutdown #2
34
Introduc%on
CERN

Year
Peak Energy
[TeV]
Peak Intensity
[p]
Peak Luminosity
[cm-2 s-1]
2010
3.5
4 x 1013
2.0 x 1032
2011
3.5
2.0 x 1014
3.6 x 1033
2012
2.2 x 1014
7.7 x 1033
LS1-2
6.5
3 x 1014
1 x 1034
Increasing energy and intensity = increasing levels of radia%on in machine environment
[2,3,4]
exis%ng converter controls would have low availability when

higher energies and intensi%es are reached in the LS1-2 era
F
Func%on
Generator Controller
F
Func%on
Generator Controller lite
a design op%mised for high availability in radia%on = the next 25 years of LHC
35
Magnet Powering Circuit
CERN
D ump
R esistor
C ryogenic
Bath
Bypass
D iode
Magnet
C oil
Mains
Supply
C ontrol
V
Power
C onverter
Energy
Extraction
Switch
Quench
D etector
Quench
H eater
36
CERN
D ump
R esistor
C ryogenic
Bath
Bypass
D iode
Magnet
C oil
Mains
Supply
C ontrol
V
Power
C onverter
Energy
Extraction
Switch
Quench
D etector
Powering
I nterlocks
Quench
H eater
37
CERN
Mains
Supply
C ontrol
Power
C onverter
Quench
D etector
Powering
I nterlocks
38
Power Converter
CERN
Mains
Supply
V ref
command
status
V oltage
Source
V meas
C ontrol
System
Function
Generator
C ontroller
Quench
D etection
System
I meas
local
diagnostics
C urrent
T ransformer
Magnet
C ircuit
Powering
I nterlock
System
Power C onverter
39
Power Converter
CERN
Mains
Supply
V ref
command
status
V oltage
Source
T ransformer
V meas
C ontrol
System
Function
Generator
C ontroller
I meas
I nterlock I N
I nterlock O UT
local
local
diagnostics diagnostics
Magnet
C ircuitRegula%on
Closed
C urrent Loop Current
Converter State Control

(ON/OFF/RESET)
Quench
Powering
D etection
System
I nterlock
System
Machine Protec%on Interlocks
Diagnos%cs
Power C onverter
40
CERN
Power converters are installed in one of ve areas with machine radia%on risks:
1
Surface Buildings
none
Perpendicular galleries
none - low
Parallel galleries
low
Alcoves
medium - high
LHC Tunnel
high
[7]
CERN
Power converters are installed in one of ve areas with machine radia%on risks:
Power Converter
Power Converter Types
CERN
C onverter R equirements
Quantity
T ypical U se
C urrent
V oltage
Main D ipoles
13000
190
Main Q uadrupoles
13000
18
16
Quadrupole C ircuits
4-6-8000
189
W arm C ircuits
1000
450-950
16
Sextupole C ircuits
600
40
37
Octupole C ircuits
600
10
400
Orbit C orrectors
120
10
290
Orbit C orrectors
60
752
T otal
>1700
[5,6]
43
CERN
G enerator C ontroller
Func%on
F
Quantity
T ypical U se
C urrent
V oltage
Main D ipoles
13000
190
Main Q uadrupoles
13000
18
16
4-6-8000
189
W arm C ircuits
1000
450-950
16
Sextupole C ircuits
600
40
37
Octupole C ircuits
600
10
400
Orbit C orrectors
120
10
290
Orbit C orrectors
60
752
T otal
>1700
[5,6]
44
CERN
Quantity
T ypical U se
C urrent
V oltage
Main D ipoles
13000
190
Main Q uadrupoles
13000
18
16
4-6-8000
189
W arm C ircuits
1000
450-950
16
Sextupole C ircuits
600
40
37
Octupole C ircuits
600
10
400
Orbit C orrectors
120
10
290
Orbit C orrectors
60
752
T otal
>1700
FCG2
1000 FGClite needed
[5,6]
45
CERN
FGC2
46
Func%on
CERN
Function
T able
start function
C ontrol
System
Network
C ontrol System
Gateway
C ontrol
System
Network
Function
T able
V ref*
C ircuit
Settings
I ref
R egulation
C ircuit
Settings
x30
C ontrol System G ateway
R egulation
DA C
V ref
V oltage
Source
Magnet
C ircuit
start function
I meas
A DC
Function G enerator C ontroller 2
Field-bus
start function
I ref
V ref*
V ref*
V ref*
I meas*
I meas*
Field-bus
I meas*
x30 per bus segment
DA C
A DC
Function G enerator
C ontroller l ite
V ref
V oltage
Source
Magnet
C ircuit
I meas
x30 per bus segment
47
Souware versus Programmable Logic
CERN
DSP
V ref
W atchdog
T imer
C ontrol
Signal
C ontrol
I nterlocks
C oefficient
Processing
W orldFI P &
microFI P
Gateway
Multiplexing
Signals
A ccess
I nterlocks
Board L ogic
Processing
C ontrol
C ontrol
Gateway
Magnet
C ircuit
I meas
Function G enerator C ontroller 2
W orldFI P &
nanoFI P
C ontrol
Signal
V oltage
Source
V ref
C ontrol
Field B us
V oltage
Source
Magnet
C ircuit
C ontrol
A nalogue
C ontrol
I meas
Function G enerator C ontroller l ite
48
CERN
Design Flow for Radia%on Tolerance

1. Conceptual Design
2. Component Selection
3. Radiation Risk Classification
49
CERN
Class 0 (C0)
components known to be resistant, or easily replaced, conceptual

design not influenced by these components.
Resistors, capacitors, diodes, transistors
Class 1 (C1)
components potentially susceptible to radiation, in less-critical parts

of the system. Substitution of parts or mitigation of issues is
possible with a re-design.
Regulators, memory, level translators
Class 2 (C2)
components potentially susceptible to radiation, in more-critical

parts of the system. The conceptual design is compromised if
these components do not perform well. Substitution of parts or
mitigation of issues would be difficult.
ADC, FPGA, fieldbus driver
50
CERN
C2
C1

C0
4. Type Testing
51
Principle for Test-bench CIRX
CERN
PL A N V I EW
C NGS I nstallation
C NGS
T arget
C oncrete W all
CERN
Neutrino B eam
Proton B eam
CERN
Neutrino B eam
Particle
Shower
Proton B eam
CERN
D evice
Under
T est
CERN
200cm
D evice
Under
T est
Particle
Shower
D evice
Under
T est
CERN
200cm
D evice
Under
T est
Particle
Shower
D evice
Under
T est
20-30Gy
per w eek
C oncrete W all
Proton B eam
CERN
200cm
D evice
Under
T est
Particle
Shower
D evice
Under
T est
20-30Gy
per w eek
C oncrete W all
Proton B eam
XC95144 x 32
XC95288XL x 32
CERN
Testbench Electronic Func%onality
XC95144 x 32
XC95288XL x 32
CERN

Particle
Shower
CERN

Particle
Shower
4 x P I C -T ype B oards
C IRP E D MS # 995295
4 x B I S-T ype B oards

C IRB E D MS # 995292
CERN

Particle
Shower
CERN

Particle
Shower
3U D river B oard
C IRD E D MS # 995296
1U Supply B oard
C IRS E D MS # 995299
CERN

Particle
Shower
CERN

Particle
Shower
3U D river B oard
C IRD E D MS # 995296
CERN

Particle
Shower
CERN

L abview P X I
Particle
Shower
T est P rogram
Office M achine
T est R esults
CERN

BB4
2-3 Gy/wk
20-30 Gy/wk
Particle
Shower
4 x P I C -T ype B oards
C IRP E D MS # 995295
3U D river B oard
C IRD E D MS # 995296
4 x B I S-T ype B oards

C IRB E D MS # 995292
3U D river B oard
C IRD E D MS # 995296
1U Supply B oard
C IRS E D MS # 995299
1200m
15m
CERN
CERN
Every circuit which needs characterising needs a tester here memory, FPGA and ADCs
[9]
CERN
Every circuit which needs characterising needs a test infrastructure
[9]
CERN
Then to be taken to a facility and tested = $$$$ and %me+++

[9]
CERN
and a dedicated test team who can make meaningful results

[9]
CERN
The packaging of components can eect interac%ons here ADCs have had their plas%c removed
[9]
CERN
C2
C1

C0
4. Type Testing
[8]
75
CERN
C2
C2
C0 / C1
8. Component Batch Testing
C1

C0
4. Type Testing
Batch to batch deviation

Wafer position deviation
Work with vendors = $$$$
5. Detailed Design
6. Dependability Analysis
7. Final Design
[8]
76
CERN
C2
C1
C0
C2
C0 / C1
8. Component Batch Testing
9. Industrialisation
10. Fabrication
4. Type Testing
11. Board / Unit Testing
5. Detailed Design
12. Burn-in / Run-in
6. Dependability Analysis
13. Installation & Commissioning
7. Final Design
14. Surveillance
[8]
77
CERN
CERN
CERN
Stress screening
Run in
Burn in
Maintenance
Plan
Programmable Logic?
considered by Reliability Analysis
FGClite Reliability Requirements
CERN
acceptable failure rate < 40 per year

Mean Time Between Failures > 200000 hours
(1000 units x 8800 hours per year) / 40
cross-sec%on
cross-sec%on <1 x 10-12
SEE radia%on
> 300000 hours
electrical
[8]
81
FGClite Reliability Requirements
CERN
acceptable failure rate < 40 per year

Mean Time Between Failures > 200000 hours
equipment life%me > 25 years
cross-sec%on <1 x 10-12
SEE radia%on
> 300000 hours
electrical
>200 Grays
DD / TID radia%on
design for 25 years
electrical
82
CERN
In Conclusion
To Take Away Today
CERN
* radia%on is everywhere, it can eect electronic systems

for dependable opera%on you cannot ignore this.
Par%cle accelerators actually create radia%on elds.
certain failure modes are unique to radia%on eects
As engineers building cri%cal systems, you must consider the impact on your system
* radia%on eects on electronics are dicult and costly to characterise


1) Remove the func%on

2) Move away from the source

3) Block radia%on from the source

4) Conceive a radia%on tolerant system
* radia%on eects are dicult and costly to mi%gate
Take a closer look.
CERN
Fin!
Thank You!
References and Further Reading
CERN
[1]
M. Brugger and the R2E working group
[2]
From the Chamonix Performance Workshop 2011
[3]
Extracted from http://lhc-statistics.web.cern.ch/LHC-Statistics/index.php
[4]
Extrapolated from W. Herrs talk:

Luminosity Performance Reach Auer LS1
[5]
h~p://www.cern.ch/r2e
h~p://indico.cern.ch/conferenceOtherViews.py?view=standard&confId=103957
Derived from
h~p://cdsweb.cern.ch/record/1123729/les/LHC-PROJECT-REPORT-1133.pdf?version=1
[6]
Photographs courtesy Y. Thurel et al, from:

LHC Power Converters the Proposed Approach
[7]
Diagram background is from h~p://cdsweb.cern.ch/record/842349/
[8]
Figures and ow derived from work by Y. Thurel and S. Uznanski
[9]
Pictures courtesy S. Uznanski , K. Motala, CERN

ToddPC PDF

Загружено:

Сведения о документе

Исходное описание:

Оригинальное название

Авторское право

Доступные форматы

Поделиться этим документом

Поделиться или встроить документ

Параметры публикации

Этот документ был вам полезен?

Это неприемлемый материал?

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

ToddPC PDF

Загружено:

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

Click

to edit Master /tle style

To Take Away Today

* radia%on is everywhere, it can eect electronic systems

* radia%on eects on electronics are dicult and costly to characterise

* radia%on eects are dicult and costly to mi%gate

2. Radia%on Basic Eects

3. Examples of Radia%on Tolerant Design Flow

CERN Accelerator Complex

CERN LAB 1 (Switzerland)

CERN Accelerator Complex

Large Hadron Collider

CERN LAB 1 (Switzerland)

CERN Accelerator Complex

Large Hadron Collider

CERN LAB 1 (Switzerland)

CERN Accelerator Complex

Large Hadron Collider

CERN LAB 1 (Switzerland)

CERN Accelerator Complex

CERN LAB 1 (Switzerland)

CERN Accelerator Complex

Large Hadron Collider

CERN LAB 1 (Switzerland)

CERN Accelerator Complex

Large Hadron Collider

CERN LAB 1 (Switzerland)

CERN Accelerator Complex

Beam Dumping Systems

Large Hadron Collider

Beam-2 Transfer Line

Super Proton Synchrotron

Beam-1 Transfer Line (TI2)

CERN Accelerator Complex

ATLAS A Toroidal LHC ApparatuS

ATLAS A Toroidal LHC ApparatuS

~109 proton-proton collisions per second

Massive amounts of data generated all must be processed

Example Par%cle Fluences

[par%cles (HEH) per cm2 per year]

Cross-Sec%on = the probability of a par%cle interac%ng

The Golden Rules

Remove the func%on

CNGS 2006 PLC Crashed FLUKA Simula%on

The Golden Rules

Remove the func%on

CNGS 2008 PLC Crashed FLUKA Simula%on

1. Displacement Damage (DD)

2. Total Ionising Dose (TID)

3. Single Event Eects (SEE)

1. Displacement Damage (DD)

2. Total Ionising Dose (TID)

3. Single Event Eects (SEE)

defects accumulate and gradually destroy the silicon lalce

2. Total Ionising Dose (TID)

1. Displacement Damage (DD)

3. Single Event Eects (SEE)

1. Displacement Damage (DD)

2. Total Ionising Dose (TID)

3. Single Event Eects (SEE)

1. Displacement Damage (DD)

2. Total Ionising Dose (TID)