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Land reform and Agrarian
change in India and Pakistan
since 1947: 1
P. C. Joshi
a
a
Professor of Economic Sociology, Institute of
Economic Growth , University of Delhi ,
Published online: 05 Feb 2008.
To cite this article: P. C. Joshi (1974) Land reform and Agrarian change in India
and Pakistan since 1947: 1, The Journal of Peasant Studies, 1:2, 164-185
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03066157408437882
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Land Reform and Agrarian Change
in India and Pakistan since 1947: I
by
P. C. Joshi*
Analysing the class character of land reform in India
and Pakistan the author makes a distinction between
ideology and programme. Judged by its ideology,
land reform in India is sharply anti-landlord and pro-
peasant and is thus a mobiliser of peasant support
for the ruling elite. The programme of land reform,
however, serves primarily the interests of an emerging
intermediate class of under-proprietors and big peasants.
This intermediate class makes a joint front with the
rural poor to curb the privileges of landlords. But it
makes a common cause with the landlords to thwart
any prospect of agrarian radicalism turning into a pro-
poor agrarian programme. In Pakistan the conflict
between the old landlords and the emerging inter-
mediate class is not as sharply articulated as in India
and land policy therefore had a more pronounced pro-
landlord bias than was the case in India. In Pakistan
at best it denotes the tension between the old moribund
and a new dynamic landlord class.
Land Reform, Class Structure and the Power-elite: Common
Features between India and Pakistan
The analysis of land reform should occupy an important place
in a survey of social trends in the Asian region.
The significance of land reform is obvious if one keeps in view
the predominantly agrarian character of most Asian countries. The
majority of the population in Asia live in villages,
1
where
land constitutes not only the main source of livelihood
2
but also
the basis of social stratification, power structure, family organi-
sation and belief systems. Land reform which is intended to
promote changes in land relations is bound to exercise a far-
reaching influence not only on the pattern of agricultural trans-
formation but of rural transformation as a whole.
It should be borne in mind that changes in land relations are
* Professor of Economic Sociology, Institute of Economic Growth, University of Delhi
The author is grateful to several persons for their help in preparation of this paper:
especially to Professor Ajit Biswas for his valuable comments on an earlier draft of this
paper; to Dr. Dharm Narain, Dr. C. H. Hanumantha Rao and Dr. Andre Beteille for
discussions on a number of points; and to Dr. Suren Navlakha for help in preparing the
final draft of this paper. This article first appeared In Studies in Asian Social Develop-
ment. I.
This article is divided into two parts. Part II will appear in the next issue of the Journal.
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LAND REFORM IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN 165
not only propellors of socio-economic change, but are also
reciprocally influenced by changes in the economic, technological,
social, political and idealogical spheres.
3
Analysis of the impact
of land reforms, therefore, has to be attempted with an awareness
of development in the total social situation. Further, countries in
Asia exhibit many points of similarity as well as of divergence in
respect of land reform programmes and their impact on socio-
economic change. These points of similarity and divergence can
be identified only by intensive country studies undertaken in a
comparative framework.
In this paper an attempt has been made to present a general
view of land reforms and agrarian change from a comparative
standpoint in t wo Asian countries, viz., India and Pakistan. The
study relates to the period following the emergence of India and
Pakistan as two independent countries in 1947.
At the very outset i t should be noted that agrarian change in
India and Pakistan is only partly a spontaneous and natural process
resulting from the interaction of diverse economic and non-
economic forces. More importantly, it is the result of various
socio-economic programmes, including land reform, introduced
by ruling elites which took over the reins of political power on
the termination of British rule. A study of agrarian change, there-
fore, is, to begin wi t h, a study of elite-sponsored land reform.
It is important to note that commitment to land reform is
common to the ruling elites both in India and Pakistan.
4
In fact,
it is safe to generalise that in the Asian region the commitment
to land reform is independent of the differences either in the social
character of the ruling elites or in the form of political regimes.
Diverse types of political elites and political regimes are all in
favour of land reform.
5
The compulsions or motivations underlying
this commitment are also in some fundamental respect similar.
6
In the case of the Indian elite, the commitment to land reform
dates back to a period when the leadership of the Indian National
Congress was struggling to wrest power from British hands.
Consequently, it was led by the logic of this struggle to make
promises for change in the agrarian system so as to win peasant
support for the anti-imperialist struggle [Malaviya, 1954; Joshi,
1967; All India Congress Committee, 1969]. There is not much
evidence of a similar commitment on the part of the leadership
of the All-India Muslim League in the pre-independence period,
even though pressure for such a commitment was being exercised
by dynamic elements specially at the lower levels of the Muslim
League organisation. This pressure increased wi th the transfor-
mation of the League from "a coterie of landlords, retired senior
officials and the lawyers" into a 'mass organisation'. [Tinker,
1962: 104]. As a result, the League leadership could no longer
ignore popular urges and demands. These pressures crystallised
into a commitment after the formation of Pakistan.
7
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166 JOURNAL OF PEASANT STUDIES
Thus, the promise of land reform assumed the shape of a more
definite agrarian programme wi th the appointment of the Congress
Agrarian Reforms Committee in India in 1949 and of the Agrarian
Committee by the Pakistan Muslim League in the same year.
Commitment to land reform by the elites both in India and
Pakistan, which was earlier a part of the strategy of winning
power, was now a part of the strategy for legitimising
power [Tai, 1968: 63-66]. It was necessary that, for gaining
political legitimacy, the ruling elites should appear to be earnest
about remedying the hardships and sufferings of the peasants who
constituted the largest section of the population in both countries.
Without the promise of land reform i t was not possible to expect
mass peasant support for the newly established regimes. In this
context, attention should also be focused on the growing agrarian
unrest in several parts of undivided India at the time of inde-
pendence. This was reflected in widespread tenant-landlord con-
flicts which threatened t o undermine the very stability of the
newly established regimes in both India and Pakistan. The situa-
tion provided another powerful compulsion for ruling elites to give
urgent attention to the question of agrarian reconstruction.
8
Another motivating factor for urgent attention to the agrarian
question was the critical situation created by the chronic stagna-
tion of agriculture.
9
This stagnation aggravated not only the prob-
lem of feeding an increasing population but also thwarted the
possibilities of rapid industrial development. The ruling elites were
forced to recognise the close interdependence of agricultural
regeneration and agrarian reorganisation. The replacement of the
unproductive landed gentry by a landowning class actively
interested in farming appeared to be one of the most important
pre-conditions for agricultural progress.
10
Yet another factor underlying the promise of land reform was
the concern at the threat to political and social stability arising
from vast economic disparities between the haves and the have-
nots. In countries of Asia where the overwhelming proportion of
population was dependent on land for its livelihood, this disparity
assumed the form of a vast economic and social distance between
the landlords and the tenants and between the landed and the
landless classes. The land system was one of the main promoters
of economic and social injustice. Any advance towards a just
economic and social order, therefore, appeared inconceivable
without a reorganisation of the land system. The ruling elites
were aware that the idea of equality was fast becoming a part
of the consciousness of the exploited classes and, consequently,
an economic and social order which tended to perpetuate rather
than remove social injustice would not answer the needs of the
times; i t would not be tolerated by the masses. It would not only
promote social tension but also give birth to violent movements
led by extremist political forces. These were the considerations
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LAND REFORM IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN 167
which fay behind the emphasis placed by ruling elites on com-
bining economic development with social justice. Land reform
was regarded as fundamental both for economic development and
for social justice. A perusal of chapters dealing with land reform
in the Five Year Plan Reports of both India and Pakistan brings
out the identity of outlook in respect of the importance attached
to land reform.
11
Lastly, mention should also be made of the international factors
whi ch, apart from internal compulsions, motivated the political
elites in India and Pakistan as in many jother Asian countries
towards commitment to land reform. Most notable in this context
was the impact of peasant revolutions occurring in various Asian
countries in the post-war period. International pressure was also
exercised by various UN Agencies which time and again impressed
upon governments in underdeveloped countries the necessity of
land reform. In fact, in the post-war world a land reform pro-
gramme constituted one of the symbols of international respecta-
bility.
12
In short, the compulsions and motivations underlying the
promise of agrarian reform by ruling elites in India and Pakistan
are fundamentally similar. It is important also to emphasise the
resemblance in the broad scope of land reform in the two
countries. Thus, in both countries this general commitment to
land reform finds concrete expression in the programme for,
(1) the abolition of intermediary tenures, (2) tenancy reforms,
(3) fixation of ceiling on agricultural holdings, and (4) reorganisa-
tion of agriculture, including consolidation of holdings, prevention
of fragmentation, development of service co-operatives and
limited promotion of co-operative farms. [Government of Pakistan,
1957: 312; Government of India, Planning Commission, 1952:
184-207].
This programme was intended to provide the basic framework
of land reform in India and Pakistan. Before evaluating the poten-
tialities of this framework for promoting desired changes in the
agrarian structure, another common feature of the approach of
the ruling elites in both countries should be highlighted.
The crux of the land problem in both India and Pakistan as in
many other Asian countries was the existence of land concen-
tration in the hands of a minority of landlords who neither
managed nor cultivated their lands; the other side of the same
phenomenon was the dissociation from landownership of the vast
mass of peasants who were the actual tillers of land over which
they had limited or no proprietary rights [UNDEA, 1954: 19-24;
Thorner, 1956; Bredo in Froehlich, 7967]- The fundamental
question of land policy was the question of removing this dis-
crepancy between ownership of land and its actual cultivation.
The ruling elites in both countries were of the view that tenancy
was not compatible either with agricultural efficiency or with
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168 JOURNAL OF PEASANT STUDIES
social justice. It should therefore be replaced by owner-cultivation.
But owner-cultivation could be promoted in two different and
opposite ways. It could be promoted by transforming the actual
tillers into owner-cultivators by large-scale redistribution of land-
lords' lands among small peasants and labourers. Alternatively, it
could be promoted by inducing the landlords themselves to under-
take self-cultivation through hired labour instead of leasing out
their lands to the tenants, as was the current practice. The first
type of policy would have led to a kind of land reform programme
implemented in countries like mainland China after the communist
victory and in Taiwan and Japan under American occupation
during the period following the second World War. The second
choice would have led to a type of agrarian transformation broadly
resembling the English enclosures during the eighteenth century
or Prussian Junkerism during the nineteenth century.
13
It is important to note that the framework of policy adopted bv
ruling elites both in India and Pakistan favoured neither of the
two courses of wholesale expropriation of landlordism in the
interest of peasant ownership or expropriation of tenant cultivators
in the interest of large-scale cultivation by former landlords.
Instead, the power-elite in both countries favoured a middle
course of reconciling the interests of landlords with those of the
tenants.
14
In other words, it favoured a policy of curtailing (and
not eliminating) landlordism and of promoting conversion of non-
cultivating landlords into cultivating landowners. So far as the
peasants were concerned, it favoured a policy of upgrading the
upper layer of tenants and of giving some relief to the other
tenants. Here was thus a policy of promoting a class of owner-
cultivators from both the former landlord and the tenant classes.
It was expected to provide the social framework for economic
development and for social and political stability.
This was the basic orientation of land policy laid down in the
Five Year Plans of both India and Pakistan. It must be emphasised
that this policy framework was sufficiently elastic to permit both
a relatively more radical or a more conservative, a more tenant-
oriented or a more landlord-oriented, direction of agrarian reform
programme as and when dictated by exigencies.
It may and should be asked why in predominantly peasant
countries like India and Pakistan the ruling elites did not favour
a course of thorough-going agrarian transformation of the Japanese
or Taiwan type which held promise of maximum gain to the
peasantry. To raise this question is to raise the fundamental issue
of the agrarian class structure and its determining influence on
the structure of the ruling elites in India and Pakistan. In effect,
it is to raise the issue of the balance of political forces in both
these countries. A perceptive scholar of land reform in Asia,
Hung-chao Tai, has suggested that the character of the land
reform programme in developing countries is determined by
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LAND REFORM IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN 169
the character of the power-elites, more specifically by 'the
relation between the elites and the landed class' {Tai, 1965:
66-69], He has classified power-elites into two broad types, viz.
the 'separated' and the 'co-operative'. In the case of the former
the 'separation' of the power-elites from the landed class enables
them to act more vigorously against the powerful landed class and
in favour of the tenantry. In the case of the 'co-operative' elites,
however, the scope of such initiative against the landed interests
and in favour of the tenants is restricted. The check on freedom
of action by power-elites thus results in compromise of tenant
interests and concessions to the landed class in the formulation
and implementation of land policy. Co-operative elites, again, are
sub-divided into two types, the 'dominant' and the 'conciliatory',
the 'dominant' elites being less dependent on the landed class
than the 'conciliatory' elites. The latter are therefore much more
status-quo-oriented than the former who make concessions to the
landed class but are not totally identified with it.
Hung-chao Tai has characterised the power-elites of both
India and Pakistan as 'co-operative' elites of the 'dominant' type
which stand midway between the wholly 'separated' and the
wholly 'conciliatory' types of elites. The land policy sponsored
by these elites also stands midway between the wholly radical
and the wholly conservative types of land policy. In other words,
the separation of the elites from the landed class in India and
Pakistan had not proceeded to such an extent as to permit a
drastic redistribution of land in favour of the landless classes.
Nor were the power-elites in these countries identical with the
landed class. Thus, enjoying limited independence from the landed
class, the elites projected themselves as the promoters of a
cautious policy benefiting all sections of society including the
tenants. The separation of the power-elites from the landed class
is expressed in their resolve to curtail the land monopoly of the
landlord class and its social and political privileges; but the
absence of total separation is expressed in numerous com-
promises and concessions to landlords and, above all, in the
rejection of the proposal for drastic redistribution of land.
Hung-chao Tai's analysis provides a partial but not an adequate
explanation for the middle-of-the-road character of land policy in
India and Pakistan. Its inadequacy lies in the failure to identify
the class basis of land policy. The fundamental question left un-
answered by Hung-chao Tai is which particlar economic class's
interests does this policy represent? Underlying his analysis
is the somewhat oversimplified view of an agrarian society
with sharp polarisation of the landed and the landless
classes. In fact in India and Pakistan neither the landlords nor
the tenants constituted such monolithic groups. Further, between
big landlords on the one hand and the poor tenants and labourers
on the other, there existed both in India and Pakistan intermediate
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170 JOURNAL OF PEASANT STUDIES
strata of resident under-proprietors and superior tenants who also
suffered under the old land system but who were relatively better
off than the small tenants, tenants-at-will and agricultural
labourers. This intermediate class was opposed to the continuance
of the feudal land system but not to the principle of large land-
ownership. It aspired to be free from the control of big landlords
and to join the privileged class of independent proprietors. Its
attitude towards the old landed class was, therefore, ambivalent.
This intermediate class made a joint front with the rural poor
to oppose the feudal burdens imposed by the landlord class. But
i t made common cause wi th the landlords to oppose any inter-
pretation of land reform in terms of redistribution of land in
favour of the rural poor. Here was the attitude of an emerging
landed class which was keen to oust the feudal landed class from
its position of unquestioned dominance. The existence of this
dynamic group provided the social or class motivation for the
unique middle-of-the-road type of policy in India and Pakistan. In
other words, the conflict between the old landed class and the
dynamic intermediate class found its reflection in the battle of
ideas relating to alternative paths of agrarian reorganisation. It
should also be emphasised that neither in the pre-independence
period nor after independence was there a clear demarcation or
articulation of the interests of the rural poor either at the level of
political elite formation or at the intellectual level of crystallisation
of an economic model based on the interests of the rural poor.
In respect of both India and Pakistan, however, a clear distinc-
tion should be drawn between the ideology of land reform on the
one hand and the programme of land reform on the other. The
ideology of land reform is generally anti-landlord and represents
an articulation of general peasant interests. The ruling elites speak
of the interests of the entire peasantry. But the programme of
land reform serves primarily the interests of the superior tenants
and under proprietors rather than the interests of the rural poor.
It should be pointed out here that at the time of independence
the Indian power-elite emerged as a representative of the dynamic
intermediate groups to a much greater extent than the power-elite
in Pakistan which reflected the dominant position of the old
landed class. The contrast between the two power-elites is ful l y
corroborated by the relatively more radical land reform proposals
of the Congress Agrarian Reforms Committee (1949) as com-
pared to the recommendations of the Agrarian Committee of the
Pakistan Muslim League (1949). In fact, to use Hung-chao Tai's
typology again, the Pakistan Muslim League appears more as an
elite of the 'conciliatory-co-operative' type rather than of the
'dominant-co-operative' type.
The change in the character of the Pakistan power-elite from
the 'conciliatory-co-operative' to the 'dominant-co-operative' type
occurred with the military take-over and the installation of the
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LAND REFORM IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN 171
Ayub Khan regime. This is a development spotlighted not only
by Pakistan scholars on land reform but also by others outside
Pakistan. In an important paper by a Pakistan scholar, Mushtaq
Ahmad [ 7959] , this difference between the old and the new
power-elites has been fully emphasised. Ahmad's characterisation
of the new elite as completely independent of the landlord class
is no doubt exaggerated but the identification of divergence
between the two elites is important [Ahmad, 1959: 32-33].
K
Hung-chao Tai has also emphastsed the limited independence
of the Ayub Khan regime from the old landed class [Tai, 1968:
67] .
16
Similarly, Myrdal has also pointed out that "the upper class
status of those who stepped into power was even more pro-
nounced in Pakistan than in India and was weighted heavily
towards the landlord class," [Myrdal, 1968: 311] and that "the
politics pursued in Pakistan during its first decade of indepen-
dence was thoroughly inimical to social change. . ." {ibid: 315].
In contrast to the earlier parliamentary regime, the new regime,
following the military take-over, "publicly endorsed the whole
gamut of modernisation ideals, including the need for planning,
greater equality in distribution of wealth, the liquidation of
feudalism. . ." [ibid: 327-28]. Further, it tried 'to work with com-
mendable speed and relative freedom from the pressure of special
vested interests.' More importantly, "the problem of land reform
in West Pakistan was also taken up promptly and its general lines
were decreed by January, 1959. As later carried out the reform
was anything but drastic or radical . . . But the parliamentary
regime had never tackled land reform at al l , and, however mi l d
the present government's programme, it may serve as a beginning
for more effective reform in the future" [ibid: 329].
The emphasis placed by Hung-chao Tai and Myrdal on the
limited independence of the Ayub Khan regime from the land-
lords is no doubt justified. But again the class basis and orienta-
tion of the Ayub regime remains unexplained. In our view, the land
policy of the Ayub regime was more oriented towards the dynamic
intermediate groups of medium landlords and superior tenants in
sharp contrast to the policy of the earlier regimes which favoured
the big landlords. In short, the change of political regime in
Pakistan represented the shifting class basis of the power struc-
ture from the big landlords to medium land-owners and superior
tenants. It was the assertion at the political level of the classes
intermediate between the big landlords on the one hand and the
rural poor on the other against the unquestioned political domin-
ance of the big feudal landed class. In short, it represented the
unfolding of the same political processes as in India, though
with a considerable time lag.
An attempt has so far been made to relate the middle-of-the-
road character of land policy in India and Pakistan to the class
character of power-elites, more specifically to the contending
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172 JOURNAL OF PEASANT STUDIES
pressures of the old landed class and the dynamic intermediate
groups that came to the fore in the wake of independence.
Another factor closely related to this interaction of the class
structure and the ruling elite structure is the overall balance of
political forces in these countries. This is a point on which great
emphasis has been laid by many perceptive analysts of land
reform in underdeveloped countries. Doreen Warriner has stated
that 'the balance of political power in each country wi l l determine
the extent of reform' [Warriner, 1969: 15]. Similarly, from a
survey of land reform in Asia, Wolf Ladejinsky has drawn the
conclusion that 'the content and implementation of agrarian
reform are a reflection of a particular political balance of forces
in a country.' [Ladejinsky, 1964: 456].
Ladejinsky shows how in Taiwan and Japan "both forces which
were indigenous and which were created as a result of the war
favoured a drastic agrarian reform and a redistribution of income
and social and political power" [ibid-: 456]. Further, the balance
of political forces in these countries was clearly in favour of
reforms which "were not designed to satisfy the claims of both
contending parties" [ibid.: 449] as in India and Pakistan. In fact,
"the tenant was to gain at the expense of the landlord" [ibid.:
449]. According to Ladejinsky, one of the crucial factors deter-
mining the absence of a political balance favourable to reforms
of the Japanese type in countries like India and Pakistan was the
weakness of the peasantry as a political force. Thus, Ladejinsky
explains that
the peasants themselves while discontented have not developed a
movement, whether in the form of tenant-unions like those of Japan
before the reforms, or peasant political parties like those of Eastern
Europe after the First World War. . . . For the most part the peasants
behaved as if any change in their condition depended upon somebody
else. By their apathy they disproved the reasonable assumption that in
an agricultural country a government must have peasant support. The
fact is that the national and state legislatures in Asia do not represent
the interests of the peasantry; if they did, reform might have taken a
different character altogether. The reality is that even when voting is
free the peasantry in Asia is not yet voting its own interests [1964:
456; [emphasis added].
This weakness of the peasantry as a political force capable of
exerting adequate pressure on political parties and governments
for reforms in their favour is reported by scholars as a charac-
teristic common to political systems of both democratic and
authoritarian types. Doreen Warriner's study of land reforms also
presents a similar view [Warriner, 1969: 14]!
Doreen Warriner has also drawn attention to the lack of
genuine support from other articulate classes in countries like
India and Pakistan for agrarian reform.
18
The analysis offered by Ladejinsky and Warriner is partially
correct in so far as it throws light on the lack of political articu-
lation or organisation of the rural poor in India and Pakistan. The
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LAND REFORM IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN 173
weight attached to this factor in explaining the absence of
Japanese-type land reforms is also justified. But, this analysts is
incomplete or perhaps even defective in so far as it is based on
an oversimplified view of the class relations and the power struc-
ture in these countries. This analysis does not take into account
the existence of intermediate classes between the two extremes
of the big landlords and the rural poor. Nor does it take account
of the resilient middle-of-the-road (as against the two extremes
of the right-wing and the left-wing) political forces; this middle
force articulated and championed the interests of the intermediate
classes in the name of the general interests of all the oppressed
classes in the rural areas. As a result, this analysis presents a
generally negative rather than an objective view of land reform
policy in India and Pakistan. Considered from the standpoint of
the rural poor, land policy in both countries has, by and large,
ended in fiasco. But considered from the standpoint of the inter-
mediate classes, it was a positive success and a promoter of
change from an economic and political system dominated by
feudal landlords to another dominated by the intermediate
classes.
Doreen Warriner is not entirely correct in her statement regard-
ing the absence of agrarian unrest or peasant movements in India
and Pakistan. As indicated earlier, the rural scene at the time of
independence was characterised by the general crisis of the old
agrarian system and widespread peasant discontent. This discon-
tent did not, however, become trie basis of a peasant movement
based clearly on the interests of the rural poor. On the contrary,
it was skilfully exploited by the political elites representing the
interests of the intermediate classes to make only such demands
on the old landlord class as would yield maximum benefits for the
intermediate classes rather than for the rural poor.
The class bias of the power-elites and the nature of power
balance in India and Pakistan discussed above can thus be said
to be important factors determining the class content of agrarian
reform programmes. The most important characteristics of these
programmes were: (1) they did not seek to attack land concen-
tration but only to modify it, and (2) they sought to extend
protection not to all classes of tenants, but to certain specified
sections belonging to the upper layers of the tenantry. This was
in marked contrast to the dominant approach to land reform in
Taiwan and Japan which attacked land monopoly and gave
primacy to the interests of the tillers of land. Another feature
distinguishing the approach in India and Pakistan from that of
Japan and Taiwan pertained to the methods and instruments of
enforcing reforms. The distinguishing features on the enforce-
ment side were two-fold. In Japan and Taiwan
the reformers recognised not only that the cultivators had to be made
aware of the essence of the main provisions, but that they and only
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174 JOURNAL OF PEASANT STUDIES
theyhad to be the true implementors of the reform if it were to
succeed. This attitude led to the creation of a practical enforcement
agency, the local land commissions so far shunned by all the other
countries engaged in reform, save Taiwan [Ladejinsky, 1964: 457J.
In India and Pakistan, on the other hand, the enforcement of land
reform was assigned to the normal administrative agencies of the
government without any time-bound programme and without any
obligation on their part to associate the peasants with the process
of reform implementation.
The second distinguishing feature of land reform enforcement
in Japan and Taiwan was the readiness of the ruling elites "to
use all instruments of government to attain their goals" [Lade-
i'msky, 1964: 459}. In fact " . . . landlords in these countries knew
that overt opposition would have met with drastic punishment"
[ibid}. But the situation in India and Pakistan was different.
Neither peasant mobilisation nor "government coercion whether
practised or clearly threatened" occupied a significant place in
the strategy of reform enforcement in either India with a parlia-
mentary democratic system or in Pakistan with a military regime.
In fact, commitment to 'peaceful' change-over, without exercise
of coercion against the landed class, was common to the approach
adopted by both regimes. Thus, notwithstanding the dissimilarity
in the character of the political regimes, the liberal approach
towards the landed classes in both countries amply justifies the
characterisation of both India and Pakistan, a la Myrdal, as 'soft
states' [Myrdal, 1968: 66 and 895-9001. In short, in the course
of reform enforcement the state governments in India and Pakis-
tan, unlike those in Taiwan and Japan, were not prepared to act
decisively for the enforcement of the rights of the weaker party
(i.e., the peasants) against the machinations and pressure of the
stronger party (i.e., the landlords). What made the situation worse
from the point of view of the peasantry was that while the govern-
ments in both countries were not prepared to use the instruments
of authority for preventing the violation of land laws by the land-
lords, they were prepared ruthlessly to use all the instruments of
coercion and force for suppressing protest movements by the
peasantry whenever it tried to stand up for its rights. The 'soft
state' for the landlords thus tended to act as a 'strong state'
vis-a-vis the poor peasantry.
Taking an overall view, the approach of the power elites, both
in India and Pakistan, to the problem of land reform thus suffered
from serious inconsistencies. At the level of enunciating the
general principles, the power-elites emphasised the incompatibility
of the traditional landed class with the demands of economic
development as well as those of social justice and political
stability. At the level of concretising the actual reform pro-
grammes, they adopted a policy of balancing the interests of
the peasantry with those of the landed class. In laying down
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LAND REFORM IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN 175
methods of enforcing land reforms, they showed a reluctance to
decisively intervene in favour of the weak as against the strong.
They showed a naive faith in 'peaceful' methods and 'peaceful
changeover'. This inconsistency between diagnosis of the land
problem on the one hand and the operational strategy for reform
on the other is inherent in the approach of the ruling elites in
both countries. It is not difficult to discern this inconsistency in
all major reports of official commissions and committees.
Reference may be made in this respect to the U.P. Zamindari
Abolition Committee Report [ 7948] for India and the Land Reform
Commission Report 11959} for West Pakistan. The U.P. Zamindari
Abolition Committee Report in its analytical parts builds up a
formidable case against landlordism and concludes that "no solu-
tion within the existing framework of the land system being
possible, the landlord must go" [Vol. 1, 1948: 35]. Further it
emphasises that ' . . . the system needs complete overhauling.
Any attempt on our part to tinker with the problem and suggest
changes here and there in the superstructure is bound to fail"
{ibid}. In the next part of the report dealing with recommenda-
tions, however, it proposes 'modifications' rather than complete"
overhauling' of the system. It recommends the retention of sir and
khudkasht lands by the landlords. It opposes not only redistribu-
tion of these lands but also imposition of a ceiling on lands held
by landlords. In the opinion of the Committee, "the results
achieved by redistribution of land would not be commensurate
with the discontent and hardships resulting from it. We, therefore,
recommend that no limit be placed on the maximum area held in
cultivation either by a landlord or a tenant" [ibid: 389].
Similarly, the Report of the Land Reform Commission for West
Pakistan presents a revealing analysis of the major defects of
'large estates' from the point of view of both developmental
requirements as well as social justice. It represents a case for
ceilings by emphasising the unproductive character of large hold-
ings and the productive potentialities of redistribution in favour
of small farmers [ibid: 12-15}. While making concrete recom-
mendations, however, it proposes the fixation of ceilings on land
holdings at such a high level as to reduce land redistribution, in
effect, to a symbolic gesture rather than a substantial measure.
Having emphasised, in the analytical part of its report, the hard-
ships and injustices to which the peasants have been exposed
under the domination of the landlord, the Commission recom-
mends, in the operative part, that the process of change should
be 'smooth' and "should not involve for the landlord too abrupt
a break with the past, making it difficult for him to adjust to a
new way of life which the change, in the form of a sudden
reduction of income from land, will impose on him" [ibid.: 29-
30}. This plea for caution on the part of elites both in India and
Pakistan has been interpreted by Warriner as a reflection of the
'pressures to compromise' [Warriner, 1969: 14}.
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176 JOURNAL OF PEASANT STUDIES
In short, there is a clear inconsistency between the ideology of
the power-elites which proclaims the objective of 'land to the
tiller*, and the programme which provides for land rights for only
the upper section of the peasantry. Most analysts of land reform
in India and Pakistan have either not taken note of this inconsis-
tency or have dismissed this phenomenon as a reflection of sur-
render to the landed class by the power elites. This inconsistency
assumes a definite meaning if one interprets it as a reflection of
the dual role of the intermediate classes of rural society and of
the power-elites championing the interests of these classes. As
indicated earlier, these classes try to rally the entire peasantry
behind them under the slogan of 'land to the ti l l er' in order to
oust the old landed class from its dominant position in the land
and power structures. Having broken the land and power monopoly
of the old landed class, they try to dilute the 'land to the ti l l er'
policy into an agrarian programme suited to their own limited
class aims. The anti-landlord bias soon gives way to compromise
with the landlords for common opposition to any radical pro-
gramme of 'land to the ti l l er' oriented to the interests of the
rural poor.
Land Reform, Class Structure and the Power-elite: Variations
between India and Pakistan
An attempt has been made in the foregoing section to analyse the
broad similarities in approach to the land problem and land
reform programmes in India and Pakistan. Also, some attempt has
been made to indicate the contrast in agrarian policy between
India and Pakistan on the one hand and Japan and Taiwan on the
other. In this section, we shall try to bring out the points of
divergence between India and Pakistan within the framework of
a broadly uniform agrarian policy. We shall also try to indicate
the factors which explain the divergence in the policies of the
two countries.
As mentioned earlier, the common feature of agrarian policy in
India and Pakistan in the wake of their independence was the
absence of a clear-cut programme of 'land to the ti l l er' and of
abolition of non-cultivating landed interests altogether. Within this
identical framework, however, there existed important points of
divergence in the agrarian policies ot the two countries. Speaking
in general terms, the tendency to compromise wi th feudal landed
interests was far more pronounced in Pakistan than in India. This
tendency was reflected in various provisions of the reform
measures. Firstly, land legislation in India was much more sharply
aimed at curtailing land ownership by big landlords who had
constituted the social and political allies of British rule. As
between the big landlords on the one hand and the medium and
small landlords on the other, agrarian reform in India extended
protection to the latter much more than to the former. Secondly, as
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LAND REFORM IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN 177
between purely absentee and non-cultivating landlords on the one
hand and cultivating landlords on the other, agrarian reform in
India favoured the latter much more than the former. In other
words, the Indian policy did not approve of the practice of leasing
out of land to tenants by landlords; instead, it desired landlords
to become self-cultivators on their sir and khudkasht lands. The
curbs on big land ownership were meant precisely to discourage
resort to tenancy and to promote the transformation of non-
cultivating landlords into cultivating landowners.
The emphasis in Indian agrarian policy on discouraging land-
lords from resorting to tenancy is also confirmed by the stress
laid on 'personal cultivation' and by the definition of the term
'personal cultivation' adopted by the policy-makers. According to
this definition, only such a landowner could claim to be engaged in
'personal cultivation' as bore the risk of cultivation and undertook
supervision either himself or through another member of his
family or, if necessary, even through a paid manager. According
to the official definition, 'personal cultivation' did not involve
personal manual labour, i.e., participation by the landowner in
actual agricultural operations. In other words, cultivation through
lease arrangements or without any active role in risk-taking and
supervision by the landlord was a clear violation of the principle
of 'personal cultivation' [Government of India, Planning Com-
mission, 1956: 186].
In Pakistan, on the other hand, agrarian policy was less sharply
aimed at curtailing land ownership by big landlords and at dis-
couraging tenancy. This becomes clear from the much higher
levels of ceiling on land ownership in West Pakistan (e.g., 500
acres of irrigated land or 1,000 acres of unirrigated land in West
Pakistan in contrast to the relatively low levels recommended in
most Indian state). This is also borne out by the statements of
policy-makers. For instance, the Land Reform Commission for
West Pakistan stated in very clear terms:
In recent years agrarian reforms have been undertaken in a number of
countries with the object of breaking up the power of the old ruling
oligarchy with its roots in big estates. Such consequence may follow in
some measure if our recommendations in this report are implemented
but this is not one of the specific objectives for the achievement of
which we have been asked to propose measures. {West Pakistan Lend
Reforms Commission. 19S9: 19].
That the policy-makers in Pakistan were reconciled to the resort
to tenancy by landlords for cultivation of their lands is also indi-
cated by another statement in the Report of the Land Reform
Commission [ibid.: 1959: 58]:
Land as we have stated is held high in value by the rural society. As
a corollary, there is a great demand for the ownership of land. An
ideal situation in our conditions would have been if the entire agricul-
tural land could be operated through owner-farmers or peasant pro-
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178 JOURNAL OF PEASANT STUDIES
prietors. Ideals, however, are seldom attainable and tenancy would,
however, continue to be a dominant feature of the tenurial structure,
despite the present attempt at the redistribution of the ownership of
land and of making access to the land more free [emphasis added.]
It is evident that policy-makers in Pakistan were much more
concerned with regulating landlord-tenant relations than with
abolishing tenancy. This is not to say that the actual impact of
agrarian reforms was much more beneficial to tenants as a whole
in India than in Pakistan. In fact, in India, the pro-tenant pro-
visions of agrarian reform were not supported by an adequate
enforcement strategy. As a result, the landlords retaliated either
by evicting tenants on a large scale or by converting open into
disguised {but illegal) tenancy arrangements. (The empirical
evidence on evictions is given later.) In Pakistan, on the other
hand, a more realistic attitude of not declaring a 'legislative'
war against tenancy meant that the landlords were not provoked
into retaliatory action to as large an extent as in India. Tenancy
continued to be 'open' rather than 'underground' and evictions
also did not occur on as large scale as in India. Having said this,
it must be recognised that agrarian reform in India succeeded to
a larger extent than in Pakistan in reducing the incidence of wholly
absentee, non-cultivating, big landlords.
Attention may now be focussed on the third important point of
divergence between agrarian reforms in India and Pakistan. It is
noteworthy that, as between occupancy tenants on the one hand
and tenants-at-will, sharecroppers and agricultural labourers on
the other, land reforms in both India and Pakistan were biased
in favour of the former rather than the latter. But partly because
of its relatively sharper edge against big landlords, partly
because of the pro-big-tenant provisions of land-reforms and partly
because of political and social changes, the total social situation
in India proved much more favourable for the stabilisation of the
upper layer of the peasants as independent peasant proprietors and
their rise as the new dominant class in the emerging agrarian
structure. Land reforms were a contributory factor in bringing
about this shift of social and political power from old style landed
gentry to the new class of medium landlords and rich peasants.
These processes, though not entirely absent in Pakistan, were a
far less pronounced feature of agrarian change in that country.
Lastly, the Indian elite contributed much more towards creating
a general climate for land reform and towards arousing the hopes
and expectations of the rural poor than its counterpart in
Pakistan.
As Myrdal has emphasised, "in culture and aspiration the
country's leaders (in Pakistan) were, and still are, separated
from the masses even more than in India, and there was among
them little of that ideological identification with the interests of
the masses which in India both Gandhi and the radical intellec-
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LAND REFORM IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN 179
tuals in the Congress had nurtured' [Myrdal, 1968: 313]. It is
this factor which contributed at the ideological (though not at the
programmatic) level to imparting a radical tone to Indian land
reform policy. But this also provides part of the explanation why
the retaliatory action by landlords in anticipation of reforms was
on a much larger scale in India than in Pakistan. Indian radicalism
which remained confined to legislative enactments only served
to make the landlords more vigilant and skilful in forestalling
reforms and in nullifying them through prior manipulation.
For an understanding of differences in the agrarian policies of
India and Pakistan, one has to consider several factors like the
character and composition of power-elites, the characteristics of
the power-balance, and the compulsion and restraints of the
political system in the two countries.
India was more advanced industrially and educationally than
Pakistan at the time of independence. The existence of more
developed industrial, commercial and professional groups and of a
more broad-based middle class in India was an important factor
which helped to neutralise the influence of the big landed gentry
on political affairs, though to a much larger extent at the all-India
than in India sought an alliance with the emerging class of upper
sociated from the landed class were relatively weaker in Pakistan
than in India [Myrdal, 1968: 309-12 and 339-41]. The urban
elite in India sought an alliance with the emerging class of upper
strata peasants and medium landowners rather than with the
discredited class of feudal landlords.
During the nationalist struggle the big landlords had openly
sided with the British. It was therefore a class morally discredited
and, in fact, the abolition of this class was, as it were, 'one of
the symbols of freedom from British rule' [Ladejinsky, 1964:
453].
Much more favourable conditions existed in India, therefore, for
greater initiative against the big landed gentry than in Pakistan.
Favourable factors of a similar nature also helped the shift of
power from the big landlords to the upper layer of the peasants
in Indian villages.
119
And here the relative openness of the Indian
parliamentary system based on adult franchise and the right of
political organisation and opposition was a favourable factor of
great importance. The emerging peasant groups with their roots in
rural communities constituted 'vote banks' for the ruling urban
elites and, consequently, they possessed considerable bargaining
power. This political factor constituted a powerful compulsion for
ruling elites to impart a pro-big-peasant orientation to agrarian
and developmental policies. It also constituted a powerful constraint
on the growth of a pro-rural-poor orientation of reform pro-
grammes.
Lastly, in explaining the relatively sharper anti-landlord edge of
agrarian reforms in India, one should also not lose sight of the
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180 JOURNAL OF PEASANT STUDIES
role played by the leftist opposition and by the pockets of agrarian
revolt (e.g., in Telangana) during the early years of independence
IMalaviya in Desai, 1969; Gough, 1968-69}.
This is not to say that the change from an agrarian social struc-
ture dominated by the big landed class towards a new agrarian
system dominated by meduim landlords and rich peasants is an
exclusively Indian phenomenon. These trends are operative in
Pakistan as wel l , though much more tardily than in India. Even
in India the orientation of agrarian reform towards a new class
structure was not a uniform characteristic of all the regions. It was
more pronounced in some regions than in others. Agrarian reform
in Uttar Pradesh, for instance, represented the closest approxima-
tion to the model of reform contemplated by the Indian ruling
elite. In contrast, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan typified
another model of reform thrown up by regional elites much less
dissociated from the traditional landed class.
20
In Pakistan also, there existed significant differences in the
orientation of agrarian reform as between East and West Pakistan.
In the East, not only was agrarian reform introduced much earlier
but the emphasis of reform policy on curbing the socio-political
privileges and landrights of big landlords was more pronounced
than in the West. As in the case of India, this anti-big-landlord
orientation was facilitated by certain socio-political circumstances.
Analysts of Pakistan land reform have drawn attention to the fact
that most of the land in East Bengal was held by Hindu land-
owners. As a result 'it was possible to obtain land reform so
quickly in East Bengal after partition, as it provided the opportu-
nity for the Muslim majority to free itself from the economic
control of the Hindu minority' [Bredo, 1961: 263]. In fact, as
Hung-chao Tai points out, 'in East Pakistan the reform law intro-
duced in the aftermath of partition . . . was by and large a
measure of the new government to legalise what had already taken
place: the seizure and occupation of land of the fleeing Hindu
zamindars by the Muslim peasants' [Tai, 1968: 65]. It must
also be borne in mind that political awareness was more
developed among the peasants in Eastern than in the Western
Pakistan [Myrdal, 1968: Vol I, 316]. These trends, however, were
sought to be reversed by upper class Muslim refugees from
northern India who occupied commanding positions in the power
structure and were acutely hostile to a break-up of large estates
[ibid.. 3101.
The analysis of Indian and Pakistan land reform programmes
presented so far may be summed up as follows:
(1) The social or class motivation for agrarian policy in India and
Pakistan was provided by the contending pressures of the erstwhile
feudal landlords on the one hand and the emerging class of medium
landowners and superior tenants on the other.
(2) Within this common frame, the variations between India and
Pakistan were determined by the relatively greater pull of the old
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LAND REFORM IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN 18 1
landed class in Pakistan and of the upper layer of the peasantry in
India.
(3) In both countries, the rural poor were neither articulate nor
organised enough at the political level to exercise influence on the land
reform programmes in their favour.
(4) The impact of land reform has been positive for the intermediate
class which has been upgraded and pushed into a position of prominence
both in the land and power structure. On the other hand it has by and
large been instrumental in disturbing the old framework within which
the rural poor had some security but it has failed to provide alternative
forms of security for them.
NOTES
1 The percentage of rural to total population was as high as 89.9 for
Pakistan and 82.8 for India in 1950. Source: [US Department of Agricul-
ture, 1965].
2 The percentage of population dependent on agriculture was 92 for
Pakistan and 70 for India in 1951. Source: [ibid.].
3 The influence of outside factors in shaping the social framework of
agriculture has been emphasised by Paul Baran as follows:
As a German writer once remarked, whether there will be meat in the
kitchen is never decided in the kitchen. Nor is the fate of agriculture
under capitalism ever decided in agriculture. Economic, social and
political processes unfolding outside of agriculture . . . become with
the onset of capitalism prime movers of historical development. In the
underdeveloped countries predominantly agrarian this may be
less obvious than in the advanced ones; it is, however, no less true.
[Baran, 1958: 189] .
4 This can be seen from the great importance attached to land reform in
the Five Year Plan reports of both India and Pakistan. The First Five Year
Plan of Pakistan stated: ['A readjustment of the rights in land] is the
most urgently needed social and economic measure of reform. It is a
prerequisite to rural and agricultural development. It will remove what
by any criteria is by far the largest source of inequalities and injustices
in our social order. This reform is the most important single measure
needed for the health and vigour of our society' [Emphasis added.]
[Government of Pakistan, 1957: Vol. 1, 4].
India's First Five Year Plan ( 1 9 5 0 / 5 1 - 1 9 5 5 / 5 6 ) had much earlier
assigned a fundamental role to land reform in the building up of a new
economic and social order. 'The future of land ownership and cultivation
constitutes perhaps the most fundamental issue in national development.
To a large extent the patterns of economic and social organisation will
depend upon the manner in which the land problem is resolved . . .
From the social aspect which is no less important than the economic, a
policy for land may be considered adequate in the measure in which,
now and in the coming years, it reduces disparities in wealth and income,
eliminates exploitation, provides security for tenants and workers and
finally promises equality of status and opportunity to different sections of
the rural population' [1952: 184].
5 This general support for land reform in Asian countries is confirmed by
a United Nations analysis of replies by governments to a UN ques-
tionnaire: 'An important contrast emerges from comparison of the state-
ments from the countries of the world's temperate zones with those from
other regions. In the former, the general and sometimes explicit assump-
tion is that no major measures of reform are needed . . . In the replies
from countries in other regions, the general view, either explicit
or implied, is that major reforms of one kind or another are needed'
[UNDEA, 1954: 48 ] .
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182 JOURNAL OF PEASANT STUDIES
6 For an analysis of motivations, see Doreen Warriner [1969: 3-231.
7 Gunnar Myrdal writes: 'Before Pakistan became independent . . . there
was no programme for social and economic reform equivalent to that of
the Indian National Congress . . . Although the Pakistani leaders did not
attempt a sophisticated description of the kind of society they were
building and had not the intellectual stature of a Gandhi or Nehru, argu-
ments that are labelled "socialist" in India were beginnnig to be heard,
though in less forceful and less finished form' [7968: Vol. 1, 806].
8 The Report of the United Provinces Zamindari Abolitions Committee, [Vol.
I, 1948: 358] made an explicit mention of agrarian discontent as a factor
which made it necessary to expedite legislative action for agrarian reform:
'The age-long simmering discontent occasionally bursting into acts of
open defiance and sometimes of violence in our province and other parts
of India has reached a critical stage. Whatever forbearance and self-
restraint we find in the countryside among the tenants is due to the hope
that those who are running the State will undo the wrong done to them.
Once that hope is gone the tenant will be driven to desperation. The
discontent may develop into open revolt and our social security may be
threatened by the outbreak of violence. Our scheme of Zamindari abolition
contemplates payment of compensation. If abolition is held over for a
few years, abolition may mean expropriation without compensation and,
quite possibly, bloodshed and violence . . . One can only hope that the
landed gentry is not blind to the writing on the wall'.
9 Recent studies have shown that, during the period extending over more
than half a century before independence, agricultural output in India was
growing at an average rate of less than a half of one per cent per annum,
even more slowly than the rate of population growth which itself averaged
at a mere 0.67 per cent per annum. In fact, foodgrains output increased
at a much slower rate of a mere 0.11 per cent per year. [Blyn, 1966].
10 Government of Pakistan [1956: Vol. II, 19-21, 115-137]. 'We believe
that in the conditions of our country peasant proprietorship rather than
the widespread tenancy or large scale individual holdings or co-operative
farming offers maximum possibilities of success for agricultural develop-
ments' [ibid.: 20]. See also Government of Pakistan [1957: 309-10].
Also, see the First and Second Five Year Plan Reports, Government of
India, New Delhi: 'Thus programmes for abolition of intermediary tenures,
giving security to tenants and bringing tenants into direct relationship
with the State with a view to conferring ownership upon them are steps
which lead to the establishment of an agrarian economy based on peasant
ownership': [Government of India, Planning Commission, 1956: 179].
11 'The institution of landlordship, characterised by the large concentration
of wealth, property and power', says the First Five Year Plan of the
Government of Pakistan [1957: 310] 'is basically incompatible with the
aspirations which are surging in the heart of modern man. A change in
this institution is an urgent measure of reform. It constitutes the most
important problem of our country, transcending in magnitude and impli-
cations every other problem, social or economic. Economic development
would rather be uninterrupted nor meaningful until this problem is
solved'. Also see. India's First Five Year Plan [1952: 9-11 and 184-85].
12 United Nations activities in the sphere of land reform found concrete
expression in the resolution of the Economic and Social Council which
was adopted on 28 July, 1965 and which recommended to Governments
'to take measures for rapid implementation of land reform in the interest
of landless and small peasants and agricultural hired labourers' [World
Land Reform Conference, 1968].
13 On the various patterns of agrarian structural change in Western Europe
in the context of economic take-off, see Mogens Boserup [in Rostow,
1963: 201-24].
14 For an anlysis of the middle-of-the-road character of Indian agrarian
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LAND REFORM IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN 18 3
policy see Joshi [in Desai, 1969] and Thorner [ 1956] . The middle-of-
the-road character of Pakistan agrarian policy becomes evident from a
careful reading of the Report of the Land Reform Commission, West
Pakistan. The following observation which gives the rationale for a policy
of limited re-distribution of land typifies the middle-of-the-road approach:
'Even if we were to recommend a much lower ceiling than what we have
suggested, the surplus land which would have become available for
redistribution among landless tenants would have been too small to secure
for each of them a subsistance farm unit. The ends of social justice, in
the sense of securing land for the entire landless population, thus being
almost unattainable, what we thought prudent was to fix the ceiling at
a level which will on the one hand eradicate the feudalisitc elements
from the existing tenurial structure, and on the other, by causing the
minimum necessary disturbance of the social edifice, lead to a har-
monious change-over and at the same time, by providing incentives at
all levels, conduce to greater production [1959: 30].
15 Ahmad writes: 'Thus more than ten years after independence, not only
the problem [of land reform] was unsolved but there was not even the
hope of a solution. Dominated as the political parties of West Pakistan
were by the landed interests, no basic change in the structure of land
tenure could be expected from them. The Republicans were hostile to
the very idea of reform and whatever might have been the professions of
the Muslim League, in view of its performance in office, not much
credence could be attached to its promises about the future. Only a
government completely detached from class loyalties could carry through
a programme of reform . . . The reform of the land system could,
therefore, come only from a government that did not owe its authority
and influence to the agrarian aristocracy, and such a government came
into being after the disbandment of the old regime on 7th October, 1958'
[ibid.].
16 Tai writes: 'In West Pakistan, when Field Marshal Ayub Khan seized
power in 1958 he was succeeding a regime that had been under the
continuous domination of the landed class. With the strong backing of
the army, Ayub Khan enjoys a measure of political independence that was
denied to his predecessors. In line with his nation-building effort, he
expressed determination to bring about a reform programme. However,
his programme with generous allowance to the land-holders, neither
reduced the iandlords' political influence much nor precluded their loyalty
to the new regime' [ibid.].
17 Miss Warriner writes: 'Landowners, rich and therefore politically powerful,
organised in right-wing political parties, can exert strong influence on
the government and administration. Peasants and farm labourers are
generally disfranchised by the land system itself; they vote, that is to
say, as the landowner tells them. And this is as true of India, with its
constitutional and democratic form of government, as it is under dictator-
ships [of the type obtaining in Pakistan]' [ibid.: 14].
18 Miss Warriner says: 'Public opinion in these countries is strikingly in-
different to the question of reform, because it is urban opinion. Middle
class people are usually rather hostile, while industrial workers are too
few and too distinct an economic interest to make common cause with
the peasants . . . So there is no parallel to the situation in nineteenth
and early twentieth century Europe, when liberal opinions in the towns
found response in the countryside from peasant movements themselves
supporting a national cause' [ibid.: 58].
19 This shift has been noted as a significant aspect of social change since
independence by many social scientists. See Srinivas [1967], Rosen
[1966: 195-98], Hunter [1969: 227] and Beteille [1965: Chapters IV
and V].
20 A similar assessment of UP Land reforms has been offered by Warriner
and Ladejinsky. The only state where tenancy conditions have improved
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18 4 JOURNAL OF PEASANT STUDIES
as a result of the legislation is Uttar Pradesh' [Warriner, 1969: 766-67];
and Ladejinsky [1965].
For information on land registration in different states of India see
Government of India, Planning Commission, 1966].
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Blyn, George, 1966, Agricultural Trends in India, 1891-1947: Output, Avail-
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Boserup, Mogens, 1963, 'Agrarian Structure and Taff-Off' in W. W. Rostow,
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Bredo, Williams, 1961, 'Land Reform and Development in Pakistan' in W.
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Gough, Kathleen, 1968-69, 'Peasant Resistance and Revolt in South India',
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Hunter, Guy, 1969, Modernising Peasant Societies, London: Oxford University
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Joshi, P. C, 1967, 'Pre-lndependence Thinking on Agrarian Policy', Economic
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Joshi, P. C, 1969, 'Land Reform in India' in A. R. Desai, ed., Rural
Sociology in India, Bombay: Popular Prakashan.
Ladejinsky, Wolf. 1964, 'Agrarian Reform in Asia'. Foreign Affairs, XLII: 3,
April.
Ladejinsky, Wolf 1965, A Study of Tenurial Conditions in Package Districts,
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Malaviya, H. D., 1954, Land Reforms in India, New Delhi: All India Congress
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Rosen, George, 1966, Democracy and Economic Change in India, Bombay:
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Tai, Hung-chao, 1968, The Political Process of Land Reform: A Comparative
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LAND REFORM IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN 185
Tinker, Hugh, 1962, India and Pakistan, A Political Analysis, New York.
United Nations, Department of Economic Affairs (UNDEA), 1954, Progress
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