Acquisition and sale of Property/enter into contracts

Municipality of Camiling vs. Lopez

G.R. No. L-8945 May 23, 1956
By Red
Facts:
A contract of lease was executed by the Municipality of Camiling in
favor of the Defendant, Diego Z. Lopez, leasing to the latter certain
fisheries of the Municipality of Camiling for three consecutive years,
the rental to be payable in three yearly installment. The Defendant
had paid all the lease rentals for the first two years of the lease and
part of the rental for the third year of the lease, but Defendant
failed to pay the remaining balance corresponding to the third year.
It is the last amount which the Municipality of Camiling seeks to
recover by virtue of this action.
The Defendant alleged as special defenses that the contract of lease
was null and void ab initio and that if there was any valid or legal
obligation at all, the same had been condoned and released. It
appears from a statement in the decision appealed from that the
case was submitted to the court a quo on the legal point of whether
or not the lease contract executed between the municipality of
Camiling and the Defendant is a valid contract or a void contract.
The trial judge held that the contract of lease on which the action is
based was not approved by the provincial governor in violation of
section 2196 of the Revised Administrative Code, and, therefore, the
contract was void and non-existent; that the mere fact that the
lessee took possession of the leased property and paid the
corresponding rentals for more than two years does not validate the
contract of lease.
In a similar case, the Municipality of Hagonoy sought to enforce a
penal clause contained in contracts of lease of fishponds, which
provided that in case of non-fulfillment by the lessee the latter
would pay a surcharge of 20 per cent, the contracts of lease involved
were not approved by the provincial governor as required by section
2196 of the Revised Administrative Code.
The court also said that as the principal obligation was void, its
nullity carried with it that of the penal clause.
Issue:
Whether or not the contract of lease is void ab initio
Held:
No
The acts declared void (actos nulos) in Article 4 of the old Civil Code
are those executed in violation of the provisions of law. Not all of
these are ipso facto void. They may be of two kinds, those that are
ipso facto void and those which are merely voidable. The approval
by the provincial governor of contracts entered into and executed by
a municipal council, as required in section 2196 of the Revised
Administrative Code, is part of the system of supervision that the
provincial government exercises over the municipal governments. It
is not a prohibition against municipal councils entering into
contracts regarding municipal properties subject of municipal
administration or control. It does not deny the power, right or
capacity of municipal councils to enter into such contracts; power or
capacity is recognized. Only the exercise thereof is subject to
supervision by approval or disapproval, i.e., contracts entered in
pursuance of the power would ordinarily be approved if entered
into in good faith and for the best interests of the municipality; they
would be denied approval if found illegal or unfavorable to public or
municipal interest. The absence of the approval, therefore, does not
per se make the contracts null and void.
In the case at bar, except for the lack of said approval, the contract
of lease is a perfectly legitimate one. The subject thereof are
fisheries belonging to the municipality, subject to management and
administration by itself. Neither is there anything in the contract of
lease which would taint it with illegality, like a violation of public
order or public morality, or a breach of a declared national policy.
The contract is not ipso facto absolutely null and void. It could have
been ratified after its execution in the ordinary course of
administration. It is merely voidable at the option of the party who
in law is granted the right to invoke its invalidity.
On the one hand, it should be noted that Article 1302 of the old Civil
Code provides that persons capable of entering into a contract may
not invoke the incapacity of those with whom they contract. In
accordance with the above provision, the lessee in the case at bar
could not allege that the contract could not be enforced against him
because the contract was not approved by the governor.
On the other hand, we must take into account that the Defendant,
who was the lessee, actually entered into the possession of the
fisheries subject of the lease and paid the rentals for two years,
except the last amount sought in the action, without questioning the
validity of the contract because it was not approved by the
governor. The Defendant could have raised the objection against the
enforceability of the contract before its terms were carried out. But
he did not do so and actually waived the objection thereto, entering
upon the fisheries subject of the lease and paying the rentals agreed
upon for two years. After he had taken advantage of the contract,
entering upon the possession of the fisheries and enjoying its fruits,
with knowledge of the existence of a defect in the said contracts,
which knowledge is presumed, he should not thereafter be
permitted to attack it on the ground that the contract did not bear
the approval of the provincial governor as required by law.
From the foregoing considerations, the judgment appealed from
should be reversed and the Defendant-Appellee ordered to pay the
Plaintiff municipality.
Estate of Gonzalez vs. Heirs of Marcos Perez
G.R. No. 169681 Nov 5, 2009
Facts:
The former Municipality of Marikina in the Province of Rizal (now
City of Marikina, Metro Manila) used to own a parcel of land located
in Barrio Concepcion of the said municipality covered by Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 629 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal.
The said property was subdivided into three (3) lots, namely, lots A,
B and C.
The Municipal Council of Marikina passed Resolution No. 9, series of
1966 which authorized the sale through public bidding of Municipal
Lots A and C.
A public bidding was conducted wherein Pedro Gonzales was the
highest bidder. Two days thereafter, the Municipal Council of
Marikina issued Resolution No. 75 accepting the bid of Pedro.
Thereafter, a deed of sale was executed in favor of the latter which
was later forwarded to the Provincial Governor of Rizal for his
approval. The Governor, however, did not act upon the said deed.
In the meantime, Pedro sold to Marcos Perez a portion of Lot C,
denominated as Lot C-3, which contains an area of 375 square
meters. The contract of sale was embodied in a Deed of Sale which,
however, was not notarized. To segregate the subject property from
the remaining portions of Lot C, Marcos had the same surveyed
wherein a technical description of the subject lot was prepared by a
surveyor.
Subsequently, Pedro and Marcos died.
The Municipality of Marikina, through its then Mayor Rodolfo
Valentino, executed a Deed of Absolute Transfer of Real Property
over Lots A and C in favor of the Estate of Pedro C. Gonzales. The
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) covering Lot C, was issued in the
name of the said estate.
Subsequently, herein petitioners executed an extra-judicial partition
wherein Lot C was subdivided into three lots. As a result of the
subdivision, new titles were issued wherein the 370-square-meter
portion of Lot C-3 is now denominated as Lot C-1 and the remaining
5 square meters of the subject lot (Lot C-3) now forms a portion of
another lot denominated as Lot C-2.
Respondents sent a demand letter to one of herein petitioners
asking for the reconveyance of the subject property. However,
petitioners refused to reconvey the said lot. As a consequence,
respondents filed an action for Annulment and/or Rescission of
Deed of Absolute Transfer of Real Property x x x and for
Reconveyance with Damages.
The RTC ruled that since the Deed of Sale executed between Pedro
and Marcos was not notarized, the same is considered void and of
no effect. In addition, the trial court also held that Pedro became the
owner of the subject lot only on February 7, 1992; as such, he could
not have lawfully transferred ownership thereof to Marcos in 1966.
The CA reversed the decision and held that a sale of real property,
though not consigned in a public instrument, is nevertheless valid
and binding among the parties and that the form required in Article
1358 of the Civil Code is not essential to the validity or enforceability
of the transactions but only for convenience.
Issue:
Whether or not the sale between Pedro Gonzales and Marcos was
valid despite the prior Deed of Sale between Pedro and the
Municipality of Marikina was still subject to approval by the
Provincial Governor of Rizal
Held:
Yes.
In Municipality of Camiling v. Lopez, it held that the absence of the
approval does not per se make the contracts null and void.
Pending approval or disapproval by the Provincial Governor of a
contract entered into by a municipality which falls under the
provisions of Section 2196 of the Revised Administrative Code, such
contract is considered voidable. In the instant case, there is no
showing that the contract of sale entered into between Pedro and
the Municipality of Marikina was ever acted upon by the Provincial
Governor. Hence, consistent with the rulings enunciated above, the
subject contract should be considered voidable. Voidable or
annullable contracts, before they are set aside, are existent, valid,
and binding, and are effective and obligatory between the parties.
In the present case, since the contract was never annulled or set
aside, it had the effect of transferring ownership of the subject
property to Pedro. Having lawfully acquired ownership of Lots A and
C, Pedro, in turn, had the full capacity to transfer ownership of these
parcels of land or parts thereof, including the subject property which
comprises a portion of Lot C.
In the present case, there is no dispute that Pedro took control and
possession of the said lot immediately after his bid was accepted by
the Municipal Government of Marikina. In fact, herein petitioners, in
their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim admit that both Pedro
and Marcos, together with their respective heirs, were already
occupying the subject property even before the same was sold to
Pedro and that, after buying the same, Pedro allowed Marcos and
his family to stay thereon. This only shows that upon perfection of
the contract of sale between the Municipality of Marikina and
Pedro, the latter acquired ownership of the subject property by
means of delivery of the same to him.
Under Article 1403, the sale of real property should be in writing and
subscribed by the party charged for it to be enforceable. In the case
before the Court, the Deed of Sale between Pedro and Marcos is in
writing and subscribed by Pedro and his wife Francisca; hence, it is
enforceable under the Statute of Frauds.
However, not having been subscribed and sworn to before a notary
public, the Deed of Sale is not a public document and, therefore,
does not comply with Article 1358 of the Civil Code.
Nonetheless, it is a settled rule that the failure to observe the proper
form prescribed by Article 1358 does not render the acts or
contracts enumerated therein invalid. It has been uniformly held
that the form required under the said Article is not essential to the
validity or enforceability of the transaction, but merely for
convenience.
Requisites, Ultra Vires Acts / Liability of LGUs
Land Bank of the Philippines vs Eduardo M. Cacayuran
GR No. 191667 April 17,2013
By Irish
Facts:
The municipality Sanguniang Bayan passed a resolution to
implement a multi phased plan to develop Agoo Public Plaza. They
passed a resolution authorizing Mayor Enriguel to obtain a loan from
Land Bank and incidental thereto, mortgage a 2,353.75 sq. meter lot
which is a portion of its plaza as a collateral, it further authorized the
assignment of a portion of its Internal Reveneu Allotment and the
monthly income from the project as additional security. Land Band
then extended a 4M loan in favor of the municipality. 10 kiosks were
completely constructed and rented out. They passed another
resolution to build a commercial center on the Plaza lot and
contracted another loan posting the same securities as that of the
first loan to Land Bank. 28M was granted in favor of the municipality
as their 2nd loan.
Respondent Cacayuran invoking his right as a taxpayer, filed a
complaint against the implicated officers and Land Bank, questioning
the validity of the subject loans on the ground that the Plaza lot
used as a collateral of the loans is a property of public dominion and
therefore, beyond the commerce of men. Land Bank claimed that
Cacayuran did not have a cause of action and that it is not privy to
the implicated Officers acts of destroying the Agoo Plaza. Pending
the proceedings, construction of the commercial center finally
completed and made known as Agoos People Center (APC).The SB
passed another ordinance declaring APC as patrimonial property.
RTC ruled in favor of Cacayuran, declaring the nullity of the subject
loan. And that the resolution passed approving the said loan was in a
highly irregular manner and thus Ultra Vires. It further added that
the Plaza lot is proscribed from collateralization since it is a property
for public use. Only Landbank appealed yet CA affirmed with
modification the RTCs ruling, excluding Vice Mayor Eslao from the
liability. It also held that Cacayuran has Locus Standi to file his
complaint and that the resolution is invalid and that the Plaza is a
property of public dominion and so it cannot be appropriated by the
state or private person. CA further added that subject loans are ultra
vires, they are transacted without proper authority and their
collateralization constituted improper disbursement of public funds.
Hence, Land Bank file this instant petition.
Issues:
1. Whether Cacayuran has standing to sue,
2. Whether the subject Resolutions were validly passed
3. Whether the subject loans are Ultra Vires
Held:
1. A tax payer is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public
funds are illegally disbursed, or that public money is being deflected
to any improper purpose, or that there is wastage of public funds
through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. 2
requisites must (a)public funds derived from taxation are disbursed
by a political subdivision or instrumentality and in doing so, a law is
violated or some irregularly is committed. (b) the petitioner is
directly affected by the alleged act. As in this case the requisites are
present Cacayuran as a resident tax payer has Lucos Standi to sue.
Although the construction of the APC would be primarily sourced
from the proceeds of the Subject Loans, which Land Bank insists are
not taxpayers money, there is no denying that public funds derived
from taxation are bound to be expended as the Municipality
assigned a portion of its IRA as a security for the foregoing loans.
Needless to state, the Municipalitys IRA, which serves as the local
government units just share in the national taxes, is in the nature of
public funds derived from taxation. The Court believes, however,
that although these funds may be posted as a security, its
collateralization should only be deemed effective during the
incumbency of the public officers who approved the same, else
those who succeed them be effectively deprived of its use. The
proceeds from the Subject Loans had already been converted into
public funds by the Municipalitys receipt thereof. Funds coming
from private sources become impressed with the characteristics of
public funds when they are under official custody.
2. In the question of the validity of resolution. It was deemed to be
tainted with irregularities such as the SBs failure to submit
Resolutions to the Sanguniang Panlalawigan and the lack of
publication and posting in contravention of Sec. 59 of the LGC. Land
Bank cannot rely on the Subject resolutions as basis to validate the
loan because the authorization to contract the loan by the Mayor
and the Redevelopement Plan itself were not approved pursuant to
any law or ordinance but through mere resolution. The distinction
between ordinances and resolutions is well-perceived. While
ordinances are laws and possess a general and permanent character,
resolutions are merely declarations of the sentiment or opinion of a
lawmaking body on a specific matter and are temporary in nature.
As opposed to ordinances, no rights can be conferred by and be
inferred from a resolution.
3. Generally, an ultra vires act is one committed outside the object
for which a corporation is created as defined by the law of its
organization and therefore beyond the powers conferred upon it by
law. There are two (2) types of ultra vires acts. As held in
Middletown Policemen's Benevolent Association v. Township of
Middletown:
There is a distinction between an act utterly beyond the jurisdiction
of a municipal corporation and the irregular exercise of a basic
power under the legislative grant in matters not in themselves
jurisdictional. The former are ultra vires in the primary sense and
void; the latter, ultra vires only in a secondary sense which does not
preclude ratification or the application of the doctrine of estoppel in
the interest of equity and essential justice.
In other words, an act which is outside of the municipalitys
jurisdiction is considered as a void ultra vires act, while an act
attended only by an irregularity but remains within the
municipalitys power is considered as an ultra vires act subject to
ratification and/or validation. To the former belongs municipal
contracts which (a) are entered into beyond the express, implied or
inherent powers of the local government unit; and (b) do not comply
with the substantive requirements of law e.g., when expenditure of
public funds is to be made, there must be an actual appropriation
and certificate of availability of funds; while to the latter belongs
those which (a)are entered into by the improper department, board,
officer of agent; and (b)do not comply with the formal requirements
of a written contract e.g., the Statute of Frauds.
Applying these principles to the case at bar, it is clear that the
Subject Loans belong to the first class of ultra vires acts deemed as
void. Records disclose that the said loans were executed by the
Municipality for the purpose of funding the conversion of the Agoo
Plazainto a commercial center pursuant to the Redevelopment Plan.
However, the conversion of the said plaza is beyond the
Municipalitys jurisdiction considering the propertys nature as one
for public use and thereby, forming part of the public dominion.
Accordingly, it cannot be the object of appropriation either by the
State or by private persons. Nor can it be the subject of lease or any
other contractual undertaking.
Settlement of Boundary Dispute
MUNICIPALITY OF KANANGA vs. Hon. FORTUNITO L. MADRONA,
G.R. No. 141375 April 30, 2003
Facts:
A boundary dispute arose between the Municipality of Kananga and
the City of Ormoc. By agreement, the parties submitted the issue to
amicable settlement by a joint session of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Ormoc City and the Sangguniang Bayan of Kananga
on October 31, 1997.
No amicable settlement was reached. Instead, the members of the
joint session issued Resolution No. 97-01, which in part reads:
"x x x IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED x x x to pass a resolution certifying
that both the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Ormoc City and the
Sangguniang Bayan of Kananga, Leyte have failed to settle amicably
their boundary dispute and have agreed to elevate the same to the
proper court for settlement by any of the interested party (sic)."4
To settle the boundary dispute, the City of Ormoc filed before the
RTC of Ormoc City (Branch 35) on September 2, 1999, a Complaint
docketed as Civil Case No. 3722-O.
On September 24, 1999, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
following grounds:
"(1) That the Honorable Court has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the claim;
"(2) That there is no cause of action; and
"(3) That a condition precedent for filing the complaint has not been
complied with[.]"5
Ruling of the Trial Court
In denying the Municipality of Kanangas Motion to Dismiss, the RTC
held that it had jurisdiction over the action under Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129. It further ruled that Section 118 of the Local Government
Code had been substantially complied with, because both parties
already had the occasion to meet and thresh out their differences. In
fact, both agreed to elevate the matter to the trial court via
Resolution No. 97-01. It also held that Section 118 governed venue;
hence, the parties could waive and agree upon it under Section 4(b)
of Rule 4 of the Rules of Court.
Not satisfied with the denial of its Motion, the Municipality of
Kananga filed this Petition.6
Issue:
In their respective Memoranda, both parties raise the lone issue of
whether respondent court may exercise original jurisdiction over the
settlement of a boundary dispute between a municipality and an
independent component city.
Held:
The Petition has no merit.
Sole Issue:
Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction is the right to act on a case or the power and the
authority to hear and determine a cause.7 It is a question of law.8 As
consistently ruled by this Court, jurisdiction over the subject matter
is vested by law.9 Because it is "a matter of substantive law, the
established rule is that the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action determines the jurisdiction of the
court."10
Both parties aver that the governing law at the time of the filing of
the Complaint is Section 118 of the 1991 Local Government Code
(LGC),11 which provides:
"Sec. 118. Jurisdictional Responsibility for Settlement of Boundary
Disputes. Boundary disputes between and among local
government units shall, as much as possible, be settled amicably. To
this end:
"(a) Boundary disputes involving two (2) or more barangays in the
same city or municipality shall be referred for settlement to the
sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan concerned.
"(b) Boundary disputes involving two (2) or more municipalities
within the same province shall be referred for settlement to the
sangguniang panlalawigan concerned.
"(c) Boundary disputes involving municipalities or component cities
of different provinces shall be jointly referred for settlement to the
sanggunians of the provinces concerned.
"(d) Boundary disputes involving a component city or municipality
on the one hand and a highly urbanized city on the other, or two (2)
or more highly urbanized cities, shall be jointly referred for
settlement to the respective sanggunians of the parties.
"(e) In the event the sanggunian fails to effect an amicable
settlement within sixty (60) days from the date the dispute was
referred thereto, it shall issue a certification to that effect.
Thereafter, the dispute shall be formally tried by the sanggunian
concerned which shall decide the issue within sixty (60) days from
the date of the certification referred to above."
Under this provision, the settlement of a boundary dispute between
a component city or a municipality on the one hand and a highly
urbanized city on the other -- or between two or more highly
urbanized cities -- shall be jointly referred for settlement to the
respective sanggunians of the local government units involved.
There is no question that Kananga is a municipality constituted
under Republic Act No. 542.12 By virtue of Section 442(d) of the
LGC, it continued to exist and operate as such.
However, Ormoc is not a highly urbanized, but an independent
component, city created under Republic Act No. 179.13 Section 89
thereof reads:
"Sec. 89. Election of provincial governor and members of the
Provincial Board of the Province of Leyte. The qualified voters of
Ormoc City shall not be qualified and entitled to vote in the election
of the provincial governor and the members of the provincial board
of the Province of Leyte."
Under Section 451 of the LGC, a city may be either component or
highly urbanized. Ormoc is deemed an independent component city,
because its charter prohibits its voters from voting for provincial
elective officials. It is a city independent of the province. In fact, it is
considered a component, not a highly urbanized, city of Leyte in
Region VIII by both Batas Pambansa Blg. 643,14 which calls for a
plebiscite; and the Omnibus Election Code,15which apportions
representatives to the defunct Batasang Pambansa. There is neither
a declaration by the President of the Philippines nor an allegation by
the parties that it is highly urbanized. On the contrary, petitioner
asserted in its Motion to Dismiss that Ormoc was an independent
chartered city.16
Section 118 of the LGC applies to a situation in which a component
city or a municipality seeks to settle a boundary dispute with a
highly urbanized city, not with an independent component city.
While Kananga is a municipality, Ormoc is an independent
component city. Clearly then, the procedure referred to in Section
118 does not apply to them.
Nevertheless, a joint session was indeed held, but no amicable
settlement was reached. A resolution to that effect was issued, and
the sanggunians of both local government units mutually agreed to
bring the dispute to the RTC for adjudication. The question now is:
Does the regional trial court have jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the claim?
We rule in the affirmative.
As previously stated, "jurisdiction is vested by law and cannot be
conferred or waived by the parties."17 It must exist as a matter of
law and cannot be conferred by the consent of the parties or by
estoppel.18 It should not be confused with venue.
Inasmuch as Section 118 of the LGC finds no application to the
instant case, the general rules governing jurisdiction should then be
used. The applicable provision is found in Batas Pambansa Blg.
129,19 otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,
as amended by Republic Act No. 7691.20 Section 19(6) of this law
provides:
"Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
x x x x x x x x x
"(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court,
tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions[."
Since there is no law providing for the exclusive jurisdiction of any
court or agency over the settlement of boundary disputes between
a municipality and an independent component city of the same
province, respondent court committed no grave abuse of discretion
in denying the Motion to Dismiss. RTCs have general jurisdiction to
adjudicate all controversies except those expressly withheld from
their plenary powers.21 They have the power not only to take
judicial cognizance of a case instituted for judicial action for the first
time, but also to do so to the exclusion of all other courts at that
stage. Indeed, the power is not only original, but also exclusive.
In Mariano Jr. v. Commission on Elections,22 we held that boundary
disputes should be resolved with fairness and certainty. We ruled as
follows:
"The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial
boundaries of a local unit of government cannot be
overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they define the
limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can
legitimately exercise powers of government only within the limits of
its territorial jurisdiction. Beyond these limits, its acts are ultra vires.
Needless to state, any uncertainty in the boundaries of local
government units will sow costly conflicts in the exercise of
governmental powers which ultimately will prejudice the peoples
welfare. x x x."
Indeed, unresolved boundary disputes have sown costly conflicts in
the exercise of governmental powers and prejudiced the peoples
welfare. Precisely because of these disputes, the Philippine National
Oil Company has withheld the share in the proceeds from the
development and the utilization of natural wealth, as provided for in
Section 289 of the LGC.23
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the challenged Order
AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
C. Succession and Elective Officials
Borja, Jr. v. COMELEC, Jose Capco
GR 133495 September 3, 1998
By Jet
Facts:
Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected Vice Mayor of Pateros on January 18,
1988 for a term ending June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, he
became Mayor upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. On
May 11, 1992, he ran and was elected Mayor for a term of three
years which ended on June 30, 1995. On May 8, 1995, he was re-
elected Mayor for another term of three years ending July 30, 1998.
On March 27, 1998, Capco filed a certificate of candidacy for Mayor
of Pateros relative to the May 11, 1998 elections. Petitioner
Benjamin Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate for Mayor, sought
Capcos disqualification on the theory that the latter would already
have served as mayor for three consecutive terms by June 30, 1998
and would thereafter be ineligible to serve for another term after
that. The COMELEC ruled in favor of Capco saying that In both the
Constitution and the Local Government Code, the three-term
limitation refers to the term of office for which the local official was
elected. It made no reference to succession to an office to which he
was not elected. Capco won in the elections against Borja.
Issue:
1. Whether a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of mayor by
operation of law and serves the remainder of the term is considered
to have served a term in that office for the purpose of the three-
term limit.
2. WON Capco has served for three consecutive terms as Mayor?
Held:
1. The Court ruled in favor of Capco. The term served must therefore
be one for which the official concerned was elected. If he is not
serving a term for which he was elected because he is simply
continuing the service of the official he succeeds, such official
cannot be considered to have fully served the term notwithstanding
his voluntary renunciation of office prior to its expiration. There is a
difference between the case of a vice-mayor and that of a member
of the House of Representatives who succeeds another who dies,
resigns, becomes incapacitated, or is removed from office. The vice-
mayor succeeds to the mayorship by operation of law. On the other
hand, the Representative is elected to fill the vacancy. In a real
sense, therefore, such representative serves a term for which he
was elected. To consider Capco to have served the first term in full
(when he succeeded the mayorship upon demise of Cesar Borja) and
therefore ineligible to run a third time for reelection would be not
only to falsify reality but also to unduly restrict the right of the
people to choose whom they wish to govern them. Hence, the
petition was dismissed.
2. No. Article X, Sec. 8 of the Constitution provides that the term
of office of elective local officials shall be three years and no such
official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the
full term for which he was elected.
This provision is restated in par. 43(b) of the Local Government Code
(R.A. No. 71) which states that no local elective official shall serve
for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not
be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the
full term for which the elective official concerned was elected.
The term served must therefore be one for which *the official
concerned+ was elected. The purpose of this provision is to prevent
a circumvention of the limitation on the number of terms an elective
official may serve. Conversely, if he is not serving a term for which
he was elected because he is simply continuing the service of the
official he succeeds, such official cannot be considered to have fully
served the term not withstanding his voluntary renunciation of
office prior to its expiration.
The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to
the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same
elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual
has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he
must also have been elected to the same position for the same
number of times before the disqualification can apply.
Montebon vs Comelec
G.R. No. 180444 April 8, 2008
Facts:
Petitioners Montebon and Ondy and respondent Potencioso, Jr.
were candidates for municipal councilor of the Municipality of
Tuburan, Cebu for the May 14, 2007 Elections.
On April 30, 2007, petitioners and other candidates for municipal
councilor filed a petition for disqualification against respondent with
the COMELEC alleging that respondent had been elected and served
three consecutive terms as municipal lcouncilor in 1998-2001,
2001-2004, and 2004-2007. Thus, he is proscribed from running
for the same position in the 2007 elections as it would be his fourth
consecutive term.
In his answer, respondent argues that he cannot be disqualified on
the ground of the 3 term limit rule because his second term was
interrupted when he assumed the position of vice-mayor due to
the retirement of elected vice-mayor Petronilo Mendoza.
Petitioners maintain that respondent's assumption of office as vice-
mayor in January 2004 should not be considered an interruption in
the service of his second term since it was a voluntary renunciation
of his office as municipal councilor. They argued that, according to
the law (constitution and LGC), voluntary renunciation of the office
for any length of time shall not be considered an interruption in the
continuity of service for the full term for which the official
concerned was elected.
On June 2, 2007, the COMELEC First Division denied the petition for
disqualification ruling that respondent's assumption of office as vice-
mayor should be considered an interruption in the continuity of his
service. His second term having been involuntarily interrupted,
respondent should thus not be disqualified to seek reelection as
municipal councilor.
On appeal, the COMELEC En Banc upheld the ruling of the First
Division. Petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari on the
ground that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that
respondent's assumption of office as vice-mayor in January 2004
interrupted his 2001-2004 term as municipal councilor.
Issue:
WON the private respondents assumption of the vice-mayor
office, by virtue of succession, can be considered as an effective
disruption in his full service of his second term as councilor.
Held:
YES. In Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections, the Court held that
the two conditions for the application of the disqualification must
concur: 1) that the official concerned has been elected for three
consecutive terms in the same local government post; and 2) that
he has FULLY served three consecutive terms.
In Borja, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, the Court emphasized that
the term limit for elective officials must be taken to refer to the right
to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective
position. Thus, for the disqualification to apply, it is not enough that
the official has been elected three consecutive times; he must also
have served three consecutive terms in the same position.
In Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections, the Court explained the
concept of voluntary renunciation as follows:
The second sentence of the constitutional provision under scrutiny
states, Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall
not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for
the full term for which he was elected. The clear intent of the
framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the
three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the
same time respect the peoples choice and grant their elected
official full service of a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary
renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the
computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary
severance from office for any length of time short of the full term
provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service.
While it is undisputed that respondent was elected municipal
councilor for three consecutive terms, the issue lies on whether he is
deemed to have fully served his second term in view of his
assumption of office as vice-mayor of Tuburan on January 12, 2004.
Succession in local government offices is by operation of law.
Section 44 of Republic Act No. 7160, provides that if a permanent
vacancy occurs in the office of the vice mayor, the highest ranking
sanggunian member shall become vice mayor.
In this case, a permanent vacancy occurred in the office of the vice
mayor due to the retirement of Vice Mayor Mendoza. Respondent,
being the highest ranking municipal councilor, succeeded him in
accordance with law. Thus, respondent's assumption of office as
vice-mayor in January 2004 was an involuntary severance from his
office as municipal councilor, resulting in an interruption in the
service of his 2001-2004 term. It cannot be deemed to have been
by reason of voluntary renunciation because it was by operation of
law.
We quote with approval the ruling of the COMELEC that
The legal successor is not given any option under the law on
whether to accept the vacated post or not. Section 44 of the Local
Government Code makes no exception. Only if the highest-
ranking councilor is permanently unable to succeed to the post does
the law speak of alternate succession. Under no circumstances can
simple refusal of the official concerned be considered as permanent
inability within the contemplation of law.
Thus, succession by law to a vacated government office is
characteristically not voluntary since it involves the performance of
a public duty by a government official, the non-performance of
which exposes said official to possible administrative and criminal
charges of dereliction of duty and neglect in the performance of
public functions. It is therefore more compulsory and obligatory
rather than voluntary. (Montebon vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 180444.
April 9, 2008)
The Court ruled that Montebons assumption of office as vice-mayor
in January 2004 was an interruption of his continuity of service as
councilor. The Court emphasized that succession in local
government office is by operation of law and as such, it is an
involuntary severance from office. Since the law no less allowed
Montebon to vacate his post as councilor in order to assume office
as vice mayor, his occupation of the higher office cannot, without
more, be deemed as a voluntary renunciation of his position as
councilor.
D. Discipline of Elective Officials, grounds and Jurisdiction, Power of
the Ombudsman/ Sandiganbayan Regular Courts
Ambil Jr. vs Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 175457 July 6, 2011
By Coy
Facts:
Eastern Samar Governor Ruperto Ambil and Provincial warden
Alexandrino Apelado, Sr. were charged before the Sandiganbayan
for violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 otherwise known
as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and for Delivering
Prisoners from Jail under Article 156 of the Revised Penal Code, after
Governor Ambil ordered the release of detained mayor Francisco
Adalim and had the latter transferred from the provincial jail to the
governors residence. Mayor Adalim was then facing a criminal
charge for murder.
The Sandiganbayan, First Division, found the petitioners guilty of
violating Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The court ruled that in
moving Adalim to a private residence, petitioners have conspired to
accord him unwarranted benefits in the form of more comfortable
quarters with access to television and other privileges that other
detainees do not enjoy. It stressed that under the Rules, no person
under detention by legal process shall be released or transferred
except upon order of the court or when he is admitted to bail.
Hence, the present petitions.
Issues:
The issues raised by petitioner Ambil, Jr. can be summed up into
three:
(1) Whether he is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sec
3(e), R.A. No. 3019;
(2) Whether a provincial governor has authority to take personal
custody of a detention prisoner; and
(3) Whether he is entitled to the justifying circumstance of
fulfillment of duty under
Article 11(5) of the RPC.
The Issues raised by petitioner Apelado, Sr. can be condensed into
two:
(1) Whether he is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019; and
(2) Whether he is entitled to the justifying circumstance of
obedience to an order issued
by a superior for some lawful purpose under Article 11(6) of the
RPC.
Held:
The Court finds the present petitions bereft of merit.
Petitioners were charged with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. In order to hold a
person liable under this provision, the following elements must
concur:
(1) the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative,
judicial or official functions;
(2) he must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
gross inexcusable negligence;
(3) his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the
government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.
The accused must be a public officer discharging
administrative, judicial or official functions
As to the first element, there is no question that petitioners are
public officers discharging official functions and that jurisdiction over
them lay with the Sandiganbayan. Although Apelado has a salary
grade below SG 27, his acts are still within its jurisdiction, having
been accused with the governor. Section 4 of Presidential Decree
No. 1606, as amended, read as follows:
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction.The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No.
1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal
Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the
following positions in the government, whether in a permanent,
acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the
offense: x x x
The accused have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
gross inexcusable negligence;
The Court finds that petitioners displayed manifest partiality and
evident bad faith in transferring the detention of Mayor Adalim to
petitioner Ambil, Jr.s house. The mayor-detainee was housed in
much more comfortable quarters, provided better nourishment, was
free to move about the house and watch television. Petitioners
readily extended these benefits to Adalim on the mere
representation of his lawyers that the mayors life would be put in
danger inside the provincial jail.
There is no merit to petitioner Ambil, Jr.s contention that he is
authorized to transfer the detention of prisoners by virtue of his
power as the Provincial Jailer of Eastern Samar.
Section 28 of the Local Government Code draws the extent of the
power of local chief executives over the units of the Philippine
National Police within their jurisdiction:
SEC. 28. Powers of Local Chief Executives over the Units of the
Philippine National Police.The extent of operational supervision
and control of local chief executives over the police force, fire
protection unit, and jail management personnel assigned in their
respective jurisdictions shall be governed by the provisions of
Republic Act Numbered Sixty-nine hundred seventy-five (R.A. No.
6975), otherwise known as The Department of the Interior and
Local Government Act of 1990, and the rules and regulations issued
pursuant thereto.
In particular, Section 61, Chapter 5 of R.A. No. 6975 on the Bureau of
Jail Management and Penology provides:
Sec. 61. Powers and Functions. - The Jail Bureau shall exercise
supervision and control over all city and municipal jails. The
provincial jails shall be supervised and controlled by the provincial
government within its jurisdiction, whose expenses shall be
subsidized by the National Government for not more than three (3)
years after the effectivity of this Act.
Significantly, it is the provincial government and not the governor
alone which has authority to exercise control and supervision over
provincial jails. In any case, neither of said powers authorizes the
doing of acts beyond the parameters set by law. In fact,
subordinates must be enjoined to act within the bounds of law. In
the event that the subordinate performs an act ultra vires, rules may
be laid down on how the act should be done, but always in
conformity with the law.
Petitioner Ambil, Jr. cited Section 1731, Article III of the
Administrative Code of 1917. But, the only reference to a transfer of
prisoners in said article (which survived the Adminstrative Code of
1987) is found in Section 1737 under which prisoners may be turned
over to the jail of the neighboring province in case the provincial jail
be insecure or insufficient to accommodate all provincial prisoners.
However, this provision has been superseded by Section 3, Rule 114
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended. Section 3,
Rule 114 provides:
SEC. 3. No release or transfer except on court order or bail.-No
person under detention by legal process shall be released or
transferred except upon order of the court or when he is admitted
to bail.
Indubitably, the power to order the release or transfer of a person
under detention by legal process is vested in the court, not in the
provincial government, much less the governor.
The actions of the accused caused any undue injury to any party,
including the government, or gave any private party unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his function
As to the third element, petitioner Ambil, Jr. negates the
applicability of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019 on two points.
(1) the last sentence thereof provides that the provision shall apply
to officers and employees of offices or government corporations
charged with the grant of licenses, permits or other concessions
and he is not such government officer or employee.
(2) the purported unwarranted benefit was accorded not to a
private party but to a public officer.
On his first contention, the Court cited its ruling in Mejorada v.
Sandiganbayan which held that a prosecution for violation of Section
3(e) of the Anti-Graft Law will lie regardless of whether or not the
accused public officer is charged with the grant of licenses or
permits or other concessions. ........The Court explained that it is a
strained construction of the provision to read it as applying
exclusively to public officers charged with the duty of granting
licenses or permits or other concessions.
In the more recent case of Cruz v. Sandiganbayan, the Supreme
Court also affirmed that a prosecution for violation of said provision
will lie regardless of whether the accused public officer is charged
with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
As to whether the mayor-detainee be considered a private party
accorded with unwarranted benefit, the Court says:
..In drafting the Anti-Graft Law, the lawmakers opted to use
private party rather than private person to describe the
recipient of the unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference for a
reason. The term party is a technical word having a precise
meaning in legal parlance as distinguished from person which, in
general usage, refers to a human being. Thus, a private person
simply pertains to one who is not a public officer. While a private
party is more comprehensive in scope to mean either a private
person or a public officer acting in a private capacity to protect his
personal interest.
In the present case, when petitioners transferred Mayor Adalim
from the provincial jail and detained him at petitioner Ambil, Jr.s
residence, they accorded such privilege to Adalim, not in his official
capacity as a mayor, but as a detainee charged with murder. Thus,
for purposes of applying the provisions of Section 3(e), R.A. No.
3019, Adalim was a private party.
On justifying circumstances:
Petitioner Ambil, Jr. invokes the justifying circumstance of fulfillment
of duty or lawful exercise of right or office. Under paragraph 5,
Article 11 of the RPC, any person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty
or in the lawful exercise of a right or office does not incur any
criminal liability.
As we have earlier determined, petitioner Ambil, Jr. exceeded his
authority when he ordered the transfer and detention of Adalim at
his house. Needless to state, the resulting violation of the Anti-Graft
Law did not proceed from the due performance of his duty or lawful
exercise of his office.
In the case of petitioner Apelado, While the order for Adalims
transfer emanated from petitioner Ambil, Jr., who was then
Governor, neither said order nor the means employed by petitioner
Apelado, Sr. to carry it out was lawful. The Court was able to
establish the participation of Apelado as principal by indispensable
cooperation.
The Supreme Court DENIED the consolidated petitions and
AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION the Decision of the Sandiganbayan.
Alejandro vs Office of the Ombudsman
G.R. NO. 173121 April 3, 2013
Facts:
The Manila Water Services, Inc. (MWSI) received a report that the
Mico Car Wash (MICO), owned by Alfredo Rap Alejandro, has been
illegally opening a MWSI fire hydrant and using it to operate its car-
wash business. The matter was coordinated with the PNP-CIDG
which conducted an anti-water pilferage operation against MICO.
When MICOs car wash boys were arrested and their water
containers were confiscated during police operation, the petitioner,
Franklin Alejandro, Alfredo's father and Punong Barangay of the
area, interfered by ordering several men to unload the confiscated
containers. The commotion that followed caused the escape of the
apprehended boys.
An administrative complaint was filed at Office of the Overall Deputy
Ombudsman against the PB Alejandro for his blatant refusal to
recognize a joint legitimate police activity, and for his unwarranted
intervention. The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman found the
petitioner guilty of grave misconduct and ordered his dismissal from
the service; and ruled that the petitioner cannot overextend his
authority as Barangay Chairman and induce other people to
disrespect proper authorities and that the petitioner had tolerated
the illegal acts of MICO's car-wash boys.
When his motion for reconsideration was denied, the petitioner
appealed to the CA, which dismissed the petition for premature
filing; that the petitioner failed to exhaust proper administrative
remedies because he did not appeal the Deputy Ombudsman's
decision to the Ombudsman.
The petitioners motion for the reconsideration of the CA ruling was
also denied; hence this petition for review on certiorari.ch
Issues:
1. Whether the principles of exhaustion of administrative remedies
requires a request for reconsideration from the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman to the Ombudsman for purpose of a Rule 43 review;
2. Whether the Office of the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over
Elective Officials and has the power to order their dismissal from
service;
3. Whether the petitioners act constitute grave misconduct to
warrant his dismissal
Held:
On Issue No. 1
The Court referred to Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No.
07, dated April 10, 1990, provides that:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Section 7. FINALITY OF DECISION. Where the respondent is absolved
of the charge and in case of conviction where the penalty imposed is
public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one (1)
month, or a fine equivalent to one (1) month salary, the decision
shall be final and unappealable. In all other cases, the decision shall
become final after the expiration of ten (10) days from receipt
thereof by the respondent, unless a motion for reconsideration or
petition for certiorari shall have been filed by him as prescribed in
Section 27 of RA 6770.
Administrative Order No. 07 did not provide for another appeal from
the decision of the Deputy Ombudsman to the Ombudsman. It
simply requires that a motion for reconsideration or a petition for
certiorari may be filed in all other cases where the penalty imposed
is not one involving public censure or reprimand, suspension of not
more than one (1) month, or a fine equivalent to one (1) month
salary. To our mind, the petitioner has fully exhausted all
administrative remedies when he filed his motion for
reconsideration on the decision of the Deputy Ombudsman. There is
no further need to review the case at the administrative level since
the Deputy Ombudsman has already acted on the case and he was
acting for and in behalf of the Office of the Ombudsman.
On Issue No. 2
The Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction over administrative
cases which are within the jurisdiction of the regular courts or
administrative agencies (Sangguniang Bayan).
The Office of the Ombudsman was created by no less than the
Constitution. It is tasked to exercise disciplinary authority over all
elective and appointive officials, save only for impeachable officers.
While Section 21 of The Ombudsman Act and the Local Government
Code both provide for the procedure to discipline elective officials,
the seeming conflicts between the two laws have been resolved in
many cases decided by this Court.nr
Since the complaint against the petitioner was initially filed with the
Office of the Ombudsman, the Ombudsman's exercise of jurisdiction
is to the exclusion of the sangguniang bayan whose exercise of
jurisdiction is concurrent.
Substantive Issue (Issue No. 3)
The petitioner is liable for grave misconduct
The maintenance of peace and order in the community is a general
function undertaken by the punong barangay. It is a task expressly
conferred to the punong barangay under Section 389(b)(3) of RA
7160.
On the other hand, the maintenance of peace and order carries both
general and specific functions on the part of the police. Section 24 of
RA 6975 (otherwise known as "the DILG Act of 1990"), as amended,
enumerates the powers and functions of the police. In addition to
the maintenance of peace and order, the police has the authority to
"investigate and prevent crimes, effect the arrest of criminal
offenders, bring offenders to justice and assist in their prosecution,"
and are charged with the enforcement of "laws and ordinances
relative to the protection of lives and properties."
Examined side by side, police authority is superior to the punong
barangay's authority in a situation where the maintenance of peace
and order has metamorphosed into crime prevention and the arrest
of criminal offenders.
In this case, a criminal act was actually taking place and the situation
was already beyond the general maintenance of peace and order.
The police was, at that point, under the obligation to prevent the
commission of a crime and to effect the arrest, as it actually did, of
criminal offenders.
From another perspective, the peace and order function of the
punong barangay must also be related to his function of assisting
local executive officials (i.e., the city mayor), under Section 389(b),
Chapter III of the RA 7160 Local executive officials have the power to
employ and deploy police for the maintenance of peace and order,
the prevention of crimes and the arrest of criminal offenders.
Accordingly, in the maintenance of peace and order, the petitioner is
bound, at the very least, to respect the PNP-CIDG's authority even if
he is not in the direct position to give aid. By interfering with a
legitimate police operation, he effectively interfered with this
hierarchy of authority. Thus, we are left with no other conclusion
other than to rule that Alejandro is liable for misconduct in the
performance of his duties.
Misconduct is considered grave if accompanied by corruption, a
clear intent to violate the law, or a flagrant disregard of established
rules, which must all be supported by substantial evidence.
Sufficient records exist to justify the imposition of a higher penalty
against the petitioner. x x x what we can conclusively confirm is that
the petitioner violated the law by directly interfering with a
legitimate police activity where his own son appeared to be
involved. This act qualifies the misconduct as grave. Section 52(A)(3),
Rule IV of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service provides that the penalty for grave misconduct is
dismissal from the service.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we hereby DENY the petition
for lack of merit, and AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 88544.
SO ORDERED.
Arias vs Sandiganbayan
GR. No. 81563 & GR. No. 82512 December 19, 1989
By Pure
Summary: Arias (District Engineer) and Data (Chief Auditor), officials
of the Province of Rizal were found guilty by the Sandiganbayan (SB)
together with their subordinates and a private citizen (seller of land)
for having caused injury to & damage to the Republic of the
Philippines in connection with scandalous overpricing of land
purchased by the Government as right of way for a floodway
project, by allowing & approving the illegal disbursement &
expenditure of public funds.
Facts:
Petitioners Arias and Data, were found guilty by SB for
violating sec. 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft Practices Act:
SEC. 3. Corrupt Practices of Public Officers-In addition to acts or
omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law. the
following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and
are hereby declared to be unlawful:

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the
Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his official
administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision
shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government
corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions
In 1975, when the Bureau of Public Works planned a floodway
project to ease the floods in some parts of Marikina and Pasig,
Metro Manila. This floodway project will traverse certain portions of
Ortigas, where the subject lot was located. The implementation of
this floodway project headed by Petitioner Data. Data formed a
committee headed by a Supervising Civil Engr and three others. The
team was tasked to notify lot owners affected by the project of the
impending expropriation of their properties and to receive and
process applications for payment.
Among the lot owners affected was a 19,004 sq.m.
riceland owned by Agleham, which was previously owned by
parents of Gutierrez (private citizen & convicted co-accused) from
whom Agleham acquired his property. Gutierrez was one of those
who filed an application for payment, holding with her a Special
Power of Attorney allegedly executed by Agleham. In her
application, she submitted a falsified Tax Declaration Certificate
purporting that the land was residential with fair market value of
P80/sq m
ISSUE: WON SB petitioners ARIAS and DATA are guilty as co-
conspirators in the conspiracy to cause injury to the Government
through the irregular disbursement and expenditure of public funds.
HELD:
NO.
The Sandiganbayan, without any clear factual basis for doing so has
assumed that the P5.00 per square meter value fixed by the assessor
in the tax declarations was the correct market value of the
Mangahan property and if the Government purchased the land for
P80.00 a square meter, it follows that it must have suffered undue
injury. The Court is not prepared to say that P80.00 to P500.00 a
square meter for land in Pasig in 1978 would be a fair evaluation.
The value must be determined in eminent domain proceedings by a
competent court. There can be no overpricing for purposes of a
criminal conviction where no proof adduced during orderly
proceedings has been presented and accepted.
ARIAS DOCTRINE in CRIMINAL LAW: All heads of offices have to
rely to a reasonable extent 'on their subordinates and on the good
faith of those prepare bids, purchase supplies, or enter into
negotiations. If a department secretary entertains important
visitors, the auditor is not ordinarily expected to call the restaurant
about the amount of the bill, question each guest whether he was
present at the luncheon, inquire whether the correct amount of
food was served and otherwise personally look into the
reimbursement voucher's accuracy, propriety, and sufficiency. There
has to be some added reason why he should examine each voucher
in such detail. Any executive head of even small government
agencies or commissions can attest to the volume of papers that
must be signed. There are hundreds of document , letters and
supporting paper that routinely pass through his hands. The number
in bigger offices or departments is even more appalling.
HELD: SB decision SET ASIDE insofar as the conviction of Arias &
Data. They are both acquitted on grounds of reasonable doubt.
Inadequacy of evidence is not sufficient to warrant a conviction.
DISSENTING OPINION OF GRINO-AQUINO: Conspiracy of Silence
and Inaction - The petitioner's partiality for Agleham/Gutierrez may
be inferred from their having deliberately closed their eyes to the
defects and irregularities of the transaction in his favor and their
seeming neglect, if not deliberate omission, to check, the
authenticity of the documents presented to them for approval. Since
partiality is a mental state or predilection, in the absence of direct
evidence, it may be proved by the attendant circumstance instances.

Constantino vs Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 140656 September 13, 2007
Facts:
Two (2) consolidated petitions, the determination of both rests
ultimately on whether Felipe K. Constantino (Constantino), mayor of
Malungon, Sarangani Province, was indeed guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 (The Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act). In G.R. No. 140656, Constantino filed a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, assailing the decision

finding him and his co-accused, petitioner Norberto N. Lindong
(Lindong) guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
In an Information against Constantino, in his capacity as mayor,
together with his co-accused Lindong, was charged with violation of
Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 before the Sandiganbayan:
xxxx, accused Constantino, a public officer, being then
the Mayor of Malungon, Sarangani Province, committing
the crime herein-charged in relation to, while in the
performance and taking advantage of his official functions,
with evident bad faith, manifest partiality or through gross
inexcusable negligence, and conspiring and confederating
with accused Norberto N. Lindong, President and
Chairman of the Board of the Norlovanian Corporation,
Davao City, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
criminally enter into a Lease Agreement for the rental of
various heavy equipment for a period of six (6) years for
and in consideration of P257,111.11 per month or a total
consideration of P18,511,999.92 and a guaranty deposit
of P1,780,000.00. xxxx
This is contrary to the express mandate of the Sanguniang Bayan
Resolutions that authorized the Municipal Mayor of Malungon to
enter into an agreement for the purchase of heavy equipment on a
five-year term basis for and in consideration of the amount of only
P2,200,000.00 per year or a total consideration of only
P11,000,000.00. Both accused pleaded not guilty to the charge.
SB Tomanan testified that he was directed by the COA Regional
Office XI to conduct a special and comprehensive audit of the
municipality of Malungon for the period of 1 May 1995 to 31 May
1996 in view of a complaint filed by certain officials therein. In
January 1997, Tomanan submitted his report detailing the following
adverse findings relative to the purchase of the subject fleet of
heavy equipment: (a) the lease/purchase contract was
disadvantageous to the municipal government because of the rigid
terms and conditions therein required of the municipality before the
latter could acquire ownership over the pool of heavy equipment;
xxxxxx (d) the lease/purchase procedure utilized by the municipality
was uneconomical and resulted to a wastage of P9,658,000.00 of
government funds.
The defense presented Lindong as its sole witness. According to
Lindong, after negotiations between himself and petitioner
Constantino, together with some members of the Sanggunian, the
parties agreed to a lease/purchase scheme in accordance with the
mandate of the resolution. They agreed that since the municipality
did not have sufficient funds to buy the fleet of heavy equipment
outright at P8.9 Million, the latter would purchase the subject
equipment on installment basis but with allowance for Norlovanian
Corporation to recover some incremental cost. Thus, on the very
same day, 28 February 1996, Lindong as representative of
Norlovanian Corporation and Constantino as representative of the
municipality entered into the lease/purchase agreement. They
contemporaneously executed the Lease Agreement and Undertaking
in the presence of the members of the Sanggunian who
accompanied the mayor.
Subsequently Sandiganbayan found the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt. The Sandiganbayan held that there was no
evident bad faith attended the commission of the offense but
Constantino caused undue injury to the Municipality through his
gross inexcusable negligence in executing only a lease agreement
over the fleet of heavy equipment. Lindong, was convicted as co-
conspirator of Constantino although it was found that he violated
the anti-graft law through negligence only.
According to Sandiganbayan since the law violated is a special law,
intent to commit the offense was not essential. The Sandiganbayan
ruled that it was sufficient for the prosecution to have proven that
Lindong allowed or failed to prevent Constantino from entering into
an agreement which was clearly contrary to law. Constantino and
Lindong filed separate appeals to the Supreme Court and On 25 April
2006, during the pendency of his present appeal, Constantino died.
With the death of Constantino during the pendency of his appeal,
the same should normally be regarded as moot and academic
following the norm that the death of the accused marks the
extinction of his criminal liability. However, the present two
petitions are so intertwined that the absolution of Constantino is
ultimately determinative of the absolution of Lindong. Indeed, the
exoneration of Constantino will necessarily signify the injustice of
carrying out the penalty imposed on Lindong. Thus, the Court in this
instance has to ascertain the merits of Constantinos appeal to
prevent a developing miscarriage of justice against Lindong.
The "moot and academic" principle is not a magical formula that can
automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will
decide cases, although they are moot and academic, if: 1) there is a
grave violation of the Constitution; 2), the exceptional character of
the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; 3),
when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the
public; 4), the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. In
the instant case, the exceptional character of the appeals of
Constantino and Lindong in relation to each other, as well as the
higher interest of justice, requires that the Court determine the
merits of the petition and not dismiss the same outright on the
ground of mootness.
ISSUE:
Is Constantino guilty or not?
HELD:
NO. Mayor Constantino would have been acquitted had he still been
alive.
In order to be liable for violating RA 3019, the following elements
must concur: (1) the accused is a public officer or a private person
charged in conspiracy with the former; (2) he or she causes undue
injury to any party, whether the government or a private party; (3)
the said public officer commits the prohibited acts during the
performance of his or her official duties or in relation to his or her
public positions; (4) such undue injury is caused by giving
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to such parties; and
(5) the public officer has acted with manifest partiality, evident bad
faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
There are two (2) modes of committing the offense, thus: (1) the
public officer caused any undue injury to any party, including the
government; or (2) the public officer gave any private party
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of
his functions. An accused may be charged under either mode or
under both should both modes concur.
Additionally, Section 3(e) poses the standard of manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence before liability can
be had under the provision. Manifest partiality is characterized by a
clear, notorious or plain inclination or predilection to favor one side
rather than the other. Evident bad faith connotes a manifest
deliberate intent on the part of the accused to do wrong or cause
damage. Gross inexcusable negligence is defined as negligence
characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to
act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but
willfully and intentionally with a conscious indifference to
consequences insofar as other persons may be affected. Mere bad
faith or partiality and negligence per se are not enough for one to be
held liable under the law since the act of bad faith or partiality must
in the first place be evident or manifest, respectively, while the
negligent deed should both be gross and inexcusable.
The standard of culpability imposed by Section 3 of R.A. No. 3019 is
quite high which, in this case, was not hurdled by the evidence
presented against Constantino. The prosecution failed to satisfy the
requisite proof to demonstrate Constantinos guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. While Constantino should have exercised more
prudence when he transacted with Norlovanian Corporation, he
could not however be held liable for "gross inexcusable negligence"
as contemplated in R.A. No. 3019. Indeed, in the earlier case
of Constantino v. Desierto, the Court had already made an express
finding that petitioner Constantino did not violate the mandate of
Resolution No. 21 but instead merely carried out its directive. The
controversy in of Constantino v. Desierto arose from the same
transaction entered into between Constantino and Norlovanian
Corporation and involved the same subject matter as in the case at
bar.
Constantino in the latter case was also acquitted from the
administrative charges, the Court found that the evidence against
him was not enough to warrant his dismissal from service on the
grounds of grave misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service and gross neglect of duty.
Although the instant case involves a criminal charge
whereas Constantino involved an administrative charge, still the
findings in the latter case are binding herein because the same set of
facts are the subject of both cases. The dictum therein laid down
became the law of the case and what was once irrevocably
established as the controlling legal rule or decision continues to be
binding between the same parties as long as the facts on which the
decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before
the court. Hence, the binding effect and enforceability of that
dictum can no longer be resurrected anew since such issue had
already been resolved and finally laid to rest, if not by the principle
of res judicata, at least by conclusiveness of judgment.
It is likewise clear from the decision of the Court in Constantino that
the level of proof required in administrative cases which is
substantial evidence was not even met. The same evidence is again
before the Court in connection with the appeal in the criminal case.
The same evidence cannot with greater reason satisfy the higher
standard in criminal cases such as the present case which is evidence
beyond reasonable doubt.

Preventive Suspension
JOSON vs EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

GR no. 131255 May 20, 1998
By Cybill

Facts:
On Sept. 17, 1996, some SB members of Nueva Ecija filed with the
Office of the President (FV Ramos) a letter-complaint charging Gov.
Edno Joson with grave misconduct and abuse of authority. They
allege that in the morning if Sept. 12, 1996, they were at the session
hall of the provincial capitol for a scheduled session of the
sangguniang Panlalawigan when Joson Belligerently barged in to the
hall, kicked the doors and chairs and uttered threatening words at
them; and that Joson was with his private security which were men
with firearms who encircled the area during the incident. They claim
that this incident is an offshoot of their resistance to a pending
legislative measure supported by the petitioner that the province of
NE obtain a loan of P 150 M at PNB.
The President acted on the complaint (without verification
requirements required by law) by noting that the use of force,
intimidation, or armed followers were unjustificed and instructed
DILG Sec. Barbers to take preemptive and investigative actions. Sec.
Barbers directed the petitioner to sub,it an answer but Joson failed
to submit after asking for several extension which was granted by
the DILG amounting to a total of 60days (15 days is required by law
to submit an answer). On April 22, 1997, Usec Sanchez, then acting
secretary issued an order declaring Joson in default of answering
and to have waived his right to present evidence. 2 days later,
Josons counsel entered appearance causing Usec Sanchez to
reconsider his order and gave petitioner, for the last time, 15 days to
file his answer. But still Joson failed to file an answer. The order of
default was thus reinstated.
Joson then filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that the complaint was
not verified and that the DILG has no jurisdiction over the case.
On July 11, 1997, on recommendation of DILG Sec. Barbers,
Executive Secretary Torres issued an oreder, by authority of the
President, placing Joson under preventive suspension for 60 days
pending investigation of the charges against him. Vice-Governor
Tinio of NE was designated as Acting Governor. Joson filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA challenging the
order of preventive suspension and the order of default. Joson also
filed, among others, a Motion to Conduct Formal Investigation
pursuant to the provisions of the LGC and Rule 7 of Administrative
Order No. 23.
The petition for certiorari with the CA was later dismissed. The
Motion to Conduct Formal Investigation with the DILG was also
denied. The DILG Secretary found the affidavits of complainants
witnesses to be more natural, reasonable, and probable than
those of Josons. The Exec. Sec., by authority of the Pres., adopted
the findings and recommendation of the DILG and imposed on the
petitioner the penalty of suspension from the office for 6 months
without pay. The SC, however, issued a TRO enjoining the
implementation of said order. That notwithstanding such, Tinio was
installed as Acting Governor.
Issue No. 1:
Whether the DILG Secretary had jurisdiction over the case?
Held:
Yes. Jurisdiction over administrative disciplinary actions against
elective local officials is lodged in two authorities: 1) the Disciplining
Authority and 2)the Investigating Authority. Pursuant to Sec. 2 and
3 of AO No. 23, the Disciplining Authority is the President, whether
acting by himself or through the Exec. Secretary. The DILG is the
Investigating Auhtority, who may act by himself or constitute an
Investigating Committee. He is not, however, the exclusive
Investigating Authority for the DILG Sec. may designate a Special
Investigating Committee.
The power of the Pres. over administrative disciplinary cases against
local officials is derived from his power of general supervision over
local governments (Sec. 4 Art. X 1987 Constitution). And the power
of supervision means overseeing or authority of an officer to see
that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the subordinate
officers fail or neglect to fulfill their duties, the official may take
such step or action as prescribed by law to make them perform their
duties. The Presidents power to general supervision means no
more than the power to ensure that laws are faithfully executed, or
that subordinate officers act within the law. Supervision is not
incompatible with discipline. This power must be construed to
authorize the President to order an investigation of the act or
conduct of local officials when in his opinion the good of the public
service requires. A.O. No. 23 delegates the power to investigate to
the DILG or a Special Investigating Committee, as may be
constituted by the Disciplining Authority. This is not undue
delegation, contrary to petitioners claim. The President remains the
Disciplining Authority. And the power of the DILG to investigate
administrative complaints is based on the alter-ego principle or the
doctrine of qualified political agency. Under this doctrine, all
executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Exec.
Dept., the heads of which are assistants and agents of the President.
And this doctrine is corollary to the control power of the President
as provided in the Constitution.
The procedure under the LGC and A.O. No. 23, however, is that
when an administrative complaint is filed, the Disciplining Authority
shall issue an order requiring the respondent to submit his verified
answer within 15 days from notice. And upon filing of the answer,
the Disciplining Authority shall refer the case to the Investigating
Authority for investigation. In the case at bar, the Office of the
President did not comply with this requirement since it should have
first required petitioner to file his answer and this, together with the
complaint, to be referred to the Investigating Authority. Be that as it
may, this procedural lapse is not fatal. The filing of the answer is
necessary merely to enable the President to make a preliminary
assessment of the case. The President found the complaint sufficient
in form and substance to warrant its further investigation. The
judgment of the President on the matter is entitled to respect in the
absence of grave abuse of discretion.
Issue No. 2:
Whether the DILG Sec. erred in recommending to the Discipling
Authority the preventive suspension of petitioner during the
investigation.
Held:
No. Preventive suspension is authorized under Sec. 63 of the LGC. It
may be imposed by the Disciplining Authority at any time (a) after
the issues are joined; (b) when the evidence of guilt is strong; and (c)
given the gravity of the offense, there is great probability that the
respondent, who continues to hold office, could influence the
witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records
and other evidence .Exec. Sec. Torres found that all requisites for
the imposition of preventive suspension had been complied with.
Petitioners failure to file his answer despite several opportunities
given him was construed as a waiver of his right to file answer and
present evidence; and as a result of this waiver, the issues were
deemed to have been joined. It was also found that the evidence of
petitioners guilt was strong and that his continuance in office during
the pendency of the case could influence the witnesses and pose a
threat to the safety and integrity of the evidence against him.
Issue No. 3:
Whether the Resolution finding petitioner guilty and imposing the 6-
monthsuspension is valid.
Held:
Yes. Settled is the rule that in administrative proceedings, technical
rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied. The essence
of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be
heard and to submit evidence one may have in support of ones
defense. To be heard does not only mean verbal arguments in court;
one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be
heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded,
there is no denial of due process. Thus, when petitioner failed to
submit his position paper as directed and insisted for the conduct
formal investigation, he was not denied of his right of procedural
process.
Alvin Garcia vs Hon. Arturo Mojica
GR No. 139043 September 10, 1999
Facts:
On May 7, 1998, petitioner, in his capacity as Cebu City mayor,
signed a contract with F.E. Zuellig for the supply of asphalt to the
city. The contract covers the period 1998-2001, which period was to
commence on September 1998 when the first delivery should have
been made by F.E. Zuellig.
Sometime in March 1999, news reports came out regarding the
alleged anomalous purchase of asphalt by Cebu City, through the
contract signed by petitioner. This prompted the Office of the
Ombudsman (Visayas) to conduct an inquiry into the matter.
Respondent Jesus Rodrigo T. Tagaan, special prosecution officer of
the Office of the Ombudsman, was assigned to conduct the inquiry,
docketed as INQ-VIS-99-0132. After his investigation, he
recommended that the said inquiry be upgraded to criminal and
administrative cases against petitioner and the other city officials
involved. Respondent Arturo C. Mojica, Deputy Ombudsman for the
Visayas, approved this recommendation.
In a memorandum dated June 22, 1999, respondent Allan Francisco
S. Garciano, the graft investigating officer to whom the case was
raffled for investigation, recommended the preventive suspension of
petitioner and the others. Two days later, or on June 24, 1999, the
affidavit-complaint against petitioner was filed. The following day,
on June 25, 1999, the Office of the Ombudsman issued the
questioned preventive suspension order. On June 29, 1999,
petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of said order, which
motion was denied in an order dated July 5, 1999.
Issues:
1. Whether Garcia may be held administratively liable?
2. Whether the Ombudsman was stripped of its powers by virtue of
the Local Government Code?
3. Is the preventive suspension of petitioner based on strong
evidence as required by law?
Held:
1. No. As previously held, a reelected local official may not be
held administratively accountable for misconduct committed during
his prior term of office. The rationale is that when the electorate
put him back into office, it is presumed that it did so with full
knowledge of his life and character, including his past misconduct. If,
armed with such knowledge, it still reelects him, then such is
considered a condonation of his past misdeeds.
However, in the present case, respondents point out that the
contract entered into by petitioner with F.E. Zuellig was signed just 4
days before the date of the elections. It was not made an issue
during the election, and so the electorate could not be said to have
voted for petitioner with knowledge of this particular aspect of his
life and character.
Petitioner can no longer be held administratively liable for an act
done during his previous term. The agreement between petitioner
and F.E. Zuellig was perfected on the date the contract was signed,
during petitioners prior term. At that moment, petitioner already
acceded to the terms of the contract, including stipulations now
alleged to be prejudicial to the city government. Thus, any
culpability petitioner may have in signing the contract already
became extant on the day the contract was signed. It hardly matters
that the deliveries under the contract are supposed to have been
made months later.
While petitioner can no longer be held administratively liable for
signing the contract with F. E. Zuellig, this should not prejudice the
filing of any case, other than administrative, against petitioner. The
ruling does not mean the total exoneration of petitioners
wrongdoing, if any, that might have been committed in signing the
subject contract. The ruling is now limited to the question of his
administrative liability therefore, and it is our considered view that
he may not.
2. No. There is nothing in the LGC to indicate that it has repealed,
whether expressly or impliedly, the pertinent provisions of the
Ombudsman Act. The two statutes on the specific matter in question
are not so inconsistent, let alone irreconcilable, as to compel us to
only uphold one and strike down the other. The decision of the
Ombudsman (6 month suspension) will prevail over the LGC (60day
suspension) if the evidence of guilt is strong.
SEC. 24. Preventive Suspension. The Ombudsman or his Deputy
may preventively suspend any officer or employee under his
authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of
guilt is strong, and (a) the charge against such officer or employee
involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in
the performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal
from the service; or (c) the respondents continued stay in office
may prejudice the case filed against him.
The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is
terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman but not more than six
months, without pay, except when the delay in the disposition of the
case by the Office of the Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence
or petition of the respondent, in which case the period of such delay
shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein
provided.
The power to preventively suspend is available not only to the
Ombudsman but also to the Deputy Ombudsman. In this case,
petitioner was preventively suspended and ordered to cease and
desist from holding office for the entire period of six months, which
is the maximum provided by law.
Administrative complaints commenced under the Ombudsman Law
are distinct from those initiated under the Local Government Code.
Respondents point out that the shorter period of suspension under
the Local Government Code is intended to limit the period of
suspension that may be imposed by a mayor, a governor, or the
President, who may be motivated by partisan political
considerations. In contrast the Ombudsman, who can impose a
longer period of preventive suspension, is not likely to be similarly
motivated because it is a constitutional body.
But the petition is hereby GRANTED insofar as it seeks to declare
that respondents committed grave abuse of discretion concerning
the period of preventive suspension imposed on petitioner, which is
the maximum of six months, it appearing that 24 days the number
of days from the date petitioner was suspended on June 25, 1999, to
the date of our status quo order on July 19, 1999 were sufficient
for the purpose. Accordingly, petitioners preventive suspension,
embodied in the order of respondent Deputy Ombudsman, dated
June 25, 1999, should now be, as it is hereby, LIFTED immediately.
3. Yes. Garciano recommended that petitioner be preventively
suspended, based on an initial investigation purportedly showing:
(1) the contract for supply of asphalt to Cebu City was designed to
favor F.E. Zuellig, (2) the amount quoted in the contract was too
expensive compared to the amount for which asphalt may be
bought from local suppliers such as Shell and Petron, particularly
considering that the amount was fixed in dollars and was payable in
pesos, thus exposing the city government to the risks attendant to a
fluctuating exchange rate, and (3) the interest of the city under the
contract is not protected by adequate security. These findings were
based on the contract itself and on letters from Bitumex and Credit
Lyonnais. There were also letters from Shell and Petron that were
replies to the Office of the Ombudsmans (Visayas) inquiry on
whether or not they could supply Cebu City with asphalt and on
what terms.Given these findings, we cannot say now that there is no
evidence sufficiently strong to justify the imposition of preventive
suspension against petitioner. But considering its purpose and the
circumstances in the case brought before us, it does appear to us
that the imposition of the maximum period of six months is
unwarranted.
NOTE: Preventive Suspension was valid here, but the term of
6months preventive suspension is too much as claimed by the
Supreme Court for an investigation and inquiry on the case.
ALDOVINO vs COMELEC
Dec 23, 2009
Facts:
The respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) ruled that
preventive suspension is an effective interruption because it renders
the suspended public official unable to provide complete service for
the full term; thus, such term should not be counted for the purpose
of the three-term limit rule. The present petition seeks to annul and
set aside this COMELEC ruling for having been issued with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Wilfredo F. Asilo (Asilo) was elected councilor of Lucena City for
three consecutive terms: for the 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-
2007 terms, respectively. In September 2005 or during his 2004-
2007 term of office, the Sandiganbayan preventively suspended him
for 90 days in relation with a criminal case he then faced.This Court,
however, subsequently lifted the Sandiganbayans suspension order;
hence, he resumed performing the functions of his office and
finished his term.
In the 2007 election, Asilo filed his certificate of candidacy for the
same position. The petitioners Simon B. Aldovino, Jr., Danilo B.
Faller, and Ferdinand N. Talabong (the petitioners) sought to deny
due course to Asilos certificate of candidacy or to cancel it on the
ground that he had been elected and had served for three terms; his
candidacy for a fourth term therefore violated the three-term limit
rule under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section
43(b)of RA 7160.
The COMELECs Second Division ruled against the petitioners and in
Asilos favour in its Resolution of November 28,2007. It reasoned out
that the three-term limit rule did not apply, as Asilo failed to render
complete service for the2004-2007 term because of the suspension
the Sandiganbayan had ordered.
Issue:
a. Whether preventive suspension of an elected local official is an
interruption of the three-term limit
b. Whether preventive suspension is considered involuntary
renunciation as contemplated in Section 43(b) of RA 7160
Held:
NEGATIVE. Petition is meritorious. As worded, the constitutional
provision fixes the term of a local elective office and limits an
elective officials stay in office to no more than three consecutive
terms
This is the first branch of the rule embodied in Section 8, Article X.
Significantly, this provision refers to a "term" as a period of time
three years during which an official has title tooffice and can serve.
The word "term" in a legal sense means a fixed and definite period
of time which the law describes that an officer may hold an
office.,preventive suspension is not a qualified interruption
Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections
presented the question of whether the disqualification on the basis
of the three-term limit applies if the election of the public official (to
be strictly accurate, the proclamation as winner of the public official)
for his supposedly third term had been declared invalid in a final and
executory judgment. We ruled that the two requisites for the
application of the disqualification (viz., 1. that the official concerned
has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local
government post; and 2. that he has fully served three consecutive
terms The petitioner vacated his post a few months before the
next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in
compliance with the legal process of writ of execution issued by the
COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary severance from office is an
interruption of continuity of service and thus, the petitioner did not
fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term.(EXCEPTION)
"Interruption" of a term exempting an elective official from the
three-term limit rule is one that involves no less than the involuntary
loss of title to office. The elective official must have involuntarily left
his office for a length of time, however short, for an effective
interruption to occur. This has to be the case if the thrust of Section
8, Article X and its strict intent are to be faithfully serv ed, i.e., to
limit an elective officials continuous stay in office to no more than
three consecutive terms, using "voluntary renunciation" as an
example and standard of what does not constitute an interruption.
Strict adherence to the intent of the three-term limit rule demands
that preventive suspension should not be considered an interruption
that allows an elective officials stay in office beyond three terms. A
preventive suspension cannot simply be a term interruption because
the suspended official continues to stay in office although he is
barred from exercising the functions and prerogatives of the office
within the suspension period.
The best indicator of the suspended officials continuity in office is
the absence of a permanent replacement and the lack of the
authority to appoint one since no vacancy exists