Hypocrisy laid bare in

Indonesian election race

Indonesian presidential hopeful Prabowo denounces violence while
courting political and religious thugs, writes Patrick Tibke
Indonesian presidential candidate Prabowo Subianto, center, lifts a baby boy during his campaign rally in
Bandung, West Java, Indonesia, Thursday. Pic: AP.
HONG KONG Tue
Jun 10, 2014
The startling hypocrisy of Prabowo Subianto has been spectacularly laid bare in recent
days, after the presidential hopeful and his campaign team successfully managed to
woo the backing of what can only be described as a tripartite thug alliance, comprised
of violent radical Islamists and notorious political paramilitaries. The three groups in
question Pemuda Pancasila, !orum "etawi #empug and !ront Pembela
Islam $Islamic %efenders !ront& came together last week under the banner of !orum
'rmas "ersatu $!orum of (nited 'rganisations, or !'"& in order to pledge their
support for )erindra*s campaign and encourage their members to vote Prabowo when
the presidential polling booths open on +uly ,th.
The !'"*s highly-publicised declaration of support for the disgraced former general
couldn*t have come at a more problematic point in the electoral season, since it
coincided quite precisely with a sudden outpouring of religious violence in the .ast
+ava city of /ogyakarta, to which Prabowo has so far responded with little more than
routine lip service.
In two separate incidents late last week, members of Indonesia*s Islamic +ihad !ront
$!+I& brutally attacked a 0atholic prayer group using makeshift weapons such as iron
bars and plant pots, leaving one man hospitalised with severe wounds and several
broken bones. The mob struck again three days later in the same regency
attempting to smash up a Pentecostal church by throwing rocks at the building*s
windows. So far only one person has been arrested in connection with the two
incidents, which eye witnesses say police observed but were unwilling to intervene.
1s reports of these events proliferated across the archipelago, circumstances have
obliged Prabowo to condemn the attacks as a debased e2pression of religious
intolerance and a gross affront to Indonesia*s secular constitution, which theoretically
ensures religious freedom for all. "y consenting to these righteous demands, however,
Prabowo has embroiled himself at the centre of a perfect storm, in which he is required
to make an impassioned, 3presidential* call for calm and tolerance, despite having 4ust
entered into an alliance with some of the most consistently violent and intolerant
groups in Indonesia at present. 5ot surprisingly, the glaring discrepancy between
Prabowo*s words and deeds has left the old general wide open to charges of
unmitigated hypocrisy.
1fter meeting with regional heads of his red-and-white coalition in +akarta on
Tuesday, Prabowo declared that, 67e do not 4ustify violence of any sort, let alone
unlawful attacks on 8different9 ethnicities, religions or other groups.: Indonesian
media outlets have wasted no time pointing out the duplicity of Prabowo*s
sentiments, emphasising the impossibility of his coalition offering any meaningful
censure of last week*s violence whilst simultaneously courting an alliance with the
!'"; particularly the rampageous Islamic %efenders !ront, whose own attacks on Shia
<uslims, the 1hmadiyyah sect, bars and nightclubs, =)"T persons, 0hristians and
churches often follow a similar format to the violence perpetrated in /ogyakarta last
week. (nfortunately, however, the pragmatics of the situation dictate that Prabowo
must cling to the tripartite thug alliance regardless of the outcry generated by events in
/ogyakarta.
The question must therefore be asked> what makes the )erindra-!'" alliance so
sacrosanct that Prabowo perceives there to be more benefit than harm in upholding
such a controversial pact?
'n a fairly crude level, one reason is of course votes; something which Prabowo is
looking increasingly desperate to obtain as he continues to trail +okowi in the polls
with 4ust over four weeks until election day. 7inning the backing of Pemuda Pancasila
$PP& is a particular boon in this respect, given that the notorious preman $gangster&
collective currently has somewhere in the region of @ million members. Total PP
membership has fallen dramatically since the downfall of Suharto in A,,B when it
claimed C million members but the organisation remains vast and not afraid to
intimidate rivals for cash profit and political gain.The !PI and !orum "etawi #empug
$!"#& are comparatively much younger and smaller organisations, and therefore less
important in terms of garnering votes, yet they do possess a level of influence which
belies their numbers. The !PI and !"#*s characteristically vocal and often violent
brand of activism sometimes described as 3moral policing* or vigilantism has gifted
these organisations a formidable media presence, and has also allowed them to set the
agenda on so-called religious issues through their aggressive lobbying of local
authorities. The !PI has also been accused of acting as an 6attack dog: for Indonesia*s
police and intelligence services in situations where the authorities feel unable to
sufficiently intimidate domestic dissenters.
The long-standing impunity en4oyed by Indonesia*s mob collectives such as those
represented by the !'" is not only evidenced by the conspicuous lack of criminal
convictions among their members, but is also reflected in the way that high-ranking
politicians often seek their favour during times of political challenge or upheaval.
Instead of striving to disband known criminal syndicates like the PP, !"# or !PI,
Indonesia*s politicians have more typically been inclined to cultivate amicable working
ties with such groups.
It*s worth pointing out that Prabowo himself already has a long history of sponsoring
variouspreman groups, particularly during his infamous tenure as D'P1SS(S special
forces commander in occupied .ast Timor, where he employed the assistance of paid
mobsters to help terrorise the civilian population. )iven this e2tensive track record,
Prabowo*s latest courting of the !'" is hardly surprising, but it*s also important to
recognise that he is certainly not the only top-level politician with a documented
history of preman ties. .ven squeaky-clean +okowi*s presidential running mate +usuf
Dalla, for e2ample has been caught on camera at a Pemuda Pancasila rally
emphatically e2tolling the virtues of Indonesia*s largest and most enduring mob> 67e
need preman to run the economy,: he told an audience of uniformed PP cadres, 67e
need adventurous peopleE 7ithout people who are willing to take risks nothing will
happenE 7e need preman to get things done.: Such is the e2tent to which Indonesia*s
gangsters and protection rackets have been integrated into mainstream national
politics.
Prabowo*s self-described 6embrace: of these violent, criminal gangs which he
euphemistically refers to as 6social organisations: $3organisasi masyarakat*& - signifies
one of the greatest shortcomings of post-5ew 'rder Indonesia, namely the failure of
the state to stamp out vigilantism, radical Islam and political thuggery. .ven as
Indonesia strives towards greater democracy and stronger rule of law, the three
organisations represented by the !'" as well as even more sinister counterparts,
such as the Islamic +ihad !ront still manage to operate with relative impunity across
the country, and have at times allegedly received funding from Indonesia*s national
police, as revealed by 7iki=eaks in FGAA. This deeply corrupted state of affairs looks
unlikely to improve under a Prabowo presidency, given his current courting of the !'"
alliance and his previous utilisation of preman groups prior to his discharge from the
army in A,,B.
In terms of realpolitik, Prabowo is surely aware that he has entered into an
indispensible union with three of the most belligerent, untouchable and effective thug
organisations in the country, and this is a great boon to his potential presidency should
he emerge victorious on +uly ,. If such a catastrophe does indeed transpire, then
Prabowo will benefit from having pre-emptively defused any potential hostilities with
the !'", and will most likely en4oy the protection offered by a healthy stock of
loyal preman who have a long history of conspiring to crush domestic dissent. =ast
week*s statement sends out out an implicit message that Indonesia*s preman are here
to stay, and if they play cards right when it comes to the business of power brokering
then long shall they continue to operate with impunity.