Dissension in the Court: March 2013

Posted on April 3, 2013 by Rafael L. Encarnacion Posted in Constitutional Law, Philippines -

Cases, Philippines - Law
In a majority decision penned by J. Perlas-Bernabe and promulgated last March 19, 2013, the
Supreme Court reversed the decision of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET)
which declared the validity of private respondent Lucy Torres-Gomezs substitution of Richard
Gomez as the Liberal Partys replacement candidate for the position of Leyte Representative.
The records clearly show that (i) Richard filed his certificate of candidacy (CoC) misrepresenting
in his CoC that he resided in Ormoc City (in light of the Constitutional requirement that
members of the House of Representatives be residents of their respective districts at least one
year immediately preceding the day of the election) when he in fact resided in Greenhills,
Mandaluyong City, (ii) an opposing candidate, Juntilla, filed a petition asking the COMELEC to
disqualify Richard and to deny due course to or cancel his CoC for material misrepresentation
regarding his residence, (iii) the COMELEC First Division granted Juntillas petition without
any qualification although its resolution only spoke of disqualifying Richard without denying
due course to or canceling his CoC, (iv) only Richard moved for reconsideration of the above
resolution; Juntilla did not, (v) the COMELEC En Banc issued a resolution denying Richards
motion for reconsideration and after the latter filed a Manifestation accepting the decision to
enable a substitute to take his place, the COMELEC En Banc issued an Order declaring its
resolution final and executory, (vi) Lucy promptly filed her CoC together with the Liberal Party
endorsement as the partys official substitute candidate vice Richard, (vii) over Juntillas
opposing claim that there should be no substitution because there is no candidate to substitute
for, the COMELEC En Banc issued a resolution allowing the substitution on the basis that the
COMELEC First Division resolution only spoke of disqualifying Richard without denying due
course to or canceling his CoC, (viii) Juntilla filed a motion for reconsideration of this En Banc
order but, pending resolution of his motion, local elections were conducted and Lucy was
proclaimed winner, (ix) 12 days after Lucys proclamation, one of her losing opponents,
petitioner Tagolina, filed a petition for quo warranto before the HRET to oust Lucy from her
congressional seat claiming, among others, that she did not validly substitute Richard since the
latters CoC was void ab initio, (x) the HRET dismissed the quo warranto petition and held that
the substitution was valid noting that the COMELEC First Division resolution only spoke of
disqualifying Richard without denying due course to or canceling his CoC.
In reversing the HRET ruling, the Supreme Court distinguished between a disqualification case
under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), and a petition to deny due course to
and/or cancel a CoC under Section 78. A disqualification case is hinged on either (i) a
candidates possession of a permanent resident status in a foreign country or (ii) his commission
of an election offense under the OEC, and results in the candidate still technically considered to
have been a candidate but is ordered to discontinue such candidacy (or is disallowed from
holding public office if he has already been elected) as a sanction for committing the election
offense.
On the other hand, a denial of due course to and/or cancellation of a CoC proceeding is premised
on a persons misrepresentation of any of the material qualifications required for the elective
office aspired for. Citing Miranda v Abaya (370 Phil 642), the majority noted that the
deliberateness of the misrepresentation or ones intent to defraud is of little consequence in the
determination of whether ones CoC should be deemed cancelled or not, as it is enough that the
persons declaration of a material qualification in the CoC be false. Pertinently, while a
disqualified candidate under Section 68 is still considered to have been a candidate for all intents
and purposes, a person whose CoC had been denied due course to and/or cancelled under Section
78 is deemed not to have been a candidate at all, as his cancelled CoC is considered void ab
initio. And considering that Section 77 of the OEC requires that there be a candidate in order for
substitution to take place, as well as the precept that a person without a valid CoC is not
considered as a candidate at all, it necessarily follows that a person whose CoC has been denied
due course to and/or cancelled cannot be validly substituted. It is equally revelatory that Section
77 enumerates the instances where substitution is permissible and noticeably, while death,
withdrawal or disqualification for any cause of an official candidate of a registered political party
are included as valid basis for substitution, material misrepresentation cases are not included.
In this case, it is undisputed that Richard was disqualified to run due to his failure to comply with
the residency requirement. The confusion, however, stemmed from the use of the word
disqualified in the Resolution of the COMELEC First Division, which was adopted by the
COMELEC En Banc in granting the substitution of Lucy, and even further perpetuated by the
HRET in denying the quo warranto petition. Yet, the fact that the COMELEC First Divisions
Resolution did not explicitly decree denial of due course to and/or cancellation of Richards CoC
should not have prevented the COMELEC En Banc from declaring the invalidity of Lucys
substitution since the clear basis for Richards disqualification is his failure to comply with the
residency requirement under the Constitution which is a ground for the denial of due course to
and/or cancellation of a CoC under Section 78 of the OEC, not for disqualification. There is
therefore no legal basis to support a finding of disqualification under the OEC, and it cannot be
mistaken that the COMELEC First Divisions unqualified grant of Juntillas petition necessarily
carried with it the denial of due course to and/or cancellation of Richards CoC pursuant to
Section 78, notwithstanding the use of the term disqualified in its Resolution. Hence, the
COMELEC En Banc misconstrued the COMELEC First Divisions Resolution when it noted
that Richard was only disqualified and that his CoC was not denied due course to and/or
cancelled, paving the way for the approval of Lucys substitution. And the HRET, in
perpetuating the COMELEC En Bancs error although not bound by previous COMELEC
pronouncements being the sole judge of all contests relating the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives committed a grave abuse of
discretion.
In his dissenting opinion, J. Leonardo-de Castro voted to deny the quo warranto petition of
Tagolino on the ground that it was filed beyond the prescribed period of 10 days after the
proclamation of the winner under Rule 17 of the HRET Rules, having been filed 12 days after
the proclamation of Lucy Torres-Gomez. Hence, the petition should have been dismissed
outright pursuant to Rule 21 of the said Rules.
Furthermore, the petition for quo warranto lacked factual basis since, under Rule 17 of the
HRET Rules, the grounds for such petition are ineligibility to run for a public office or disloyalty
to the Republic of the Philippines. The ponencia did not find any of the qualifications of a
member of the House of Representatives absent in the case of Lucy; rather it attributed her
ineligibility to its erroneous assumption that the CoC of Richard, whom she substituted, should
have been cancelled.
Moreover, this dissenter believes that the substantive issue extensively discussed in the ponencia,
particularly as to the divergent effects of disqualification and denial of due course to and/or
cancellation of CoC cases vis--vis candidate substitution, is inappropriate, firstly because the
CoC of Richard Gomez was not cancelled by the COMELEC, and secondly because the decision
by the COMELEC not to cancel said CoC was proper as the COMELEC did not reach any
finding that Richard deliberately committed a misrepresentation, which deliberate
misrepresentation is a requisite for the cancellation of a CoC under Section 78 of the OEC, citing
Mitra v. Commission on Elections (622 SCRA 744), contrary to the majority view that
deliberateness of the misrepresentation is of little consequence in the determination of whether
the CoC should be cancelled. Since the COMELEC did not cancel the CoC of Richard but only
disqualified him from running in the elections, the substitution by Lucy of Richard squarely falls
within Section 77 of the OEC, which uses the broad language disqualification for any cause.
In his separate dissenting opinion, J. Abad, joined by J. Mendoza and J. Del Castillo, posits that
the real issue in this case is whether or not the HRET can review and reverse a COMELEC
decision involving a member of the House of Representatives that had become final and
executory. This dissenter believes that neither the HRET nor this Court can review or set aside
final and executory resolutions of the COMELEC that it rendered pursuant to its powers under
the Constitution, even if such resolutions are erroneous.
It is clear from the facts that the COMELEC First Divisions Resolution, which merely
disqualified Richard but did not cancel or deny due course to his CoC, although it may be in
error, became final and executory for the following reasons: first, Juntilla never filed a motion
for reconsideration of that Resolution; second, only Richard moved to reconsider and when the
COMELEC En Banc resolved to dismiss his motion, Richard filed a manifestation accepting its
dismissal, whereupon the COMELEC En Banc declared its resolution final and executory and
consequently closed down the last window of opportunity to review and possible reverse the
COMELEC First Divisions Resolution; third, over Juntillas claim that the COMELEC First
Division Resolution resulted in the COMELEC denying due course to Richards CoC with the
effect that, without a valid CoC, he could not be substituted, the COMELEC En Banc issued a
resolution allowing the substitution on the basis that the COMELEC First Division resolution
merely ordered Richards disqualification and such resolution had become final and executory;
fourth, while Juntilla filed a motion for reconsideration of this En Banc order, the motion
remained unacted upon due to the supervening local elections and thereafter he never insisted
that it be resolved and never elevated the matter before the Supreme Court or the HRET and may
thus be deemed to have abandoned that motion for reconsideration.
This dissenter notes that the Supreme Court may have earlier ruled in Guerrero v. Commission
on Elections (391 Phil 344) that, since the Constitution makes the HRET the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the House of
Representatives, it has the jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of substitution involving such
members. However, this dissenter believes that Taganito cannot invoke that ruling for three
reasons:
First, the Courts thesis in that case is that the HRET can take over a pending matter before the
COMELEC since the latter may be considered ousted of its jurisdiction over the same upon the
winners assumption of office. Here, however, the key issue of whether or not the COMELEC
First Divisions Resolution, which merely disqualified Richard but did not cancel his CoC, is no
longer a pending matter but has become final and executory.
Second, the petitioner Guerrero in that case had the right to raise the issue of disqualification
before the HRET since he intervened in the earlier action before the COMELEC. Here, Tagolino
never intervened in Juntillas actions before the COMELEC; consequently, he has no right to ask
the HRET to resolve Juntillas motion for reconsideration of the COMELEC En Bancs order.
Third, Tagolino made a binding admission before the HRET that the COMELEC did not in fact
order the cancellation of Richards CoC and is thus barred from claiming that, in disqualifying
Richard, the COMELECs First Division in effect caused the cancellation of his CoC.