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Analytic philosophy has shown renewed interest in Husserl's phenomenology. In Husserl and intentionality, David Woodruff Smith and Ronald McIntyre give important contribution. Book is written in the analytic tradition, and represents attempt to make phenology palatable to those who look suspiciously at 'continental philosophy'
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Husserl and Intentionality- A Study of Mind, Meaning, And Language
Analytic philosophy has shown renewed interest in Husserl's phenomenology. In Husserl and intentionality, David Woodruff Smith and Ronald McIntyre give important contribution. Book is written in the analytic tradition, and represents attempt to make phenology palatable to those who look suspiciously at 'continental philosophy'
Analytic philosophy has shown renewed interest in Husserl's phenomenology. In Husserl and intentionality, David Woodruff Smith and Ronald McIntyre give important contribution. Book is written in the analytic tradition, and represents attempt to make phenology palatable to those who look suspiciously at 'continental philosophy'
and Intentionality: A Study of Mind, Meaning, and Language, Reidel, Dordrecht and Boston, 1982, 423 + xxiii pp., $49.50 (cloth), S 19.99 (paper). In the last twenty years, beginning with a seminal paper by Dagfinn Follesdal published in 1969,1 analytic philosophy has shown a renewed and increasing interest in Husserl's phenomenology. 2 In Husserl and Inten- tionality, David Woodruff Smith and Ronald Mclntyre give an important contribution to this line of research. The book is written in the analytic tradition, and represents in part an attempt at making phenomenology palatable to those who look suspiciously at 'continental philosophy'. Thus it provides a double service: it introduces phenomenology to an analytic public, and it shows to those raised in the opposite tradition what kind of reception their tradition has overseas. The book is divided into threeparts. The first part introduces various theories of intentionality, and relates them to topics discussed within the logic of intensional contexts (in particular epistemic contexts). The second analyzes in detail Husserl's theory of intentionality as it developed from his early to his latest works. The third expands Husserl's theory, via his notion of horizon, to make it more sensitive to results obtained by Carnap, Hintikka, and others in the field of possible world semantics. The last chapter of the book (written by Smith alone) deals with a specific problem that arises within Husserl's theory, concerning definite or de re intentions. Consciousness is always consciousness of something, and intentionality is the property that gives it the character of being directed to an object, of being about an object. More specifically, all mental acts (like desiring, perceiving, judging, etc.) are intentional acts because they are directed toward an object or a state of affairs. The objects of these acts are often puzzling: sometimes they do not exist (I may think of Pegasus), sometimes they are indeterminate or incomplete (I may desire something sweet, without desiring anything in particular), and in general they are dependent on the particular conceptual perspective from which one intends them (I may believe something of the man who denounced Catiline, without believing anything of the author of the De Fato). Or, to tell the story in terms of the acts themselves, it is not clear what kind of relation an intentional relation is: it does not depend on the existence of its second term (the object), but does depend on the perspective the first term (the subject) has on it. Those who are familiar with epistemic logic will see the similarity of these puzzles with problems of existential import and failure of substitutivity that arise in that context: the intentionality of mind and the intensionality of language share something more than mere assonance. There are two main ways in which these puzzles can be addressed. One can concentrate on the ontological status of the objects to which intentional acts are directed, or one can simply disregard that status and concentrate on the structures of the mind that make it directed toward objects. Correspondingly, there are object-theories and content-theories of intentionality. Object-theories hold that the objects of intentional acts (or intentional objects) are ontologically different from ordinary entities (from things we eat, for example). Franz Brentano in early works held that intentional objects were mind-dependent entities (i.e., entities existing 'in' the mind, in some sense of existence). But this attitude generates more problems than it solves: as Roderick Chisholm points out, 3 Diogenes was looking for a real honest man, not for an immanent object. Brentano himself became aware of these problems, and later on offered a different theory. The move from object-theories to content-theories (among which Husserrs is to be found, in Smith and McIntyre's reading of him) is suggestive of Kant's Copernican revolution: instead of inquiring into the objects themselves, one inquires into the conditions that make it possible for the mind to refer to objects (distinct Topoi 6 (1987), 139--142. 9 1987 by D. Reidel Publishing Company. 140 REVIEW f r om itself). Husser l finds an answer by descri bi ng t he experi ent i al ( phenomenol ogi cal ) cont ent of ment al acts. It is in vi rt ue of t hei r i nner st r uct ur e that i nt ent i onal acts have this ' poi nt i ng at' charact er. Mor e specifically, he finds a model f or t he i nt ent i onal i t y of ment al acts in linguistic reference: as expressi ons r ef er to t hei r denot at a t hr ough t he senses t hey express, ment al acts r ef er t o obj ect s t hr ough t hei r phenomenol ogi cal con- tent. In bot h cases, an ent i t y of t he nat ur e of a meani ng plays t he maj or r ol e in det er mi ni ng t he "hooki ng up" with t he object. Such an ent i t y Husser l called (in t he latest f or mul at i on of his t heor y) noe mat i c Si nn. In per f or mi ng ment al activities, we are never i mme- di at el y aware of noemat i c Sinne: we can onl y grasp t hem by reflecting on t hese activities. For exampl e, if I t hi nk of a per son I met t en years ago, and I t hi nk of hi m as having cert ai n pr oper t i es (like weari ng glasses, liking det ect i ve stories, and what have you), t he obj ect I i nt end will be my fri end, and he will be i nt ended via t he noemat i c Sinn t hat pr escr i bes t hose pr oper t i es, but t he Sinn itself will not be what I i nt end. Let us see how t he t heor y addresses t he puzzl es ment i oned above. (1) An act is i nt ent i onal onl y in vi rt ue of its cont ent , whet her it has an (existing) obj ect or not. 4 (2) The obj ect s of i nt ent i onal acts are always i nt ended t hr ough a noemat i c Sinn, a n d hence t hr ough a part i cul ar perspect i ve. (3) However , t he obj ect s i nt ended oft en t r anscend that perspect i ve, in t hat t hey ar e ri cher in det er mi na- tions t han any descri pt i on, however compl ex, we might give of t hem. (4) Act s with a di fferent phenomenol ogi cal cont ent may be di r ect ed t owar d t he same obj ect . Fur t her mor e, t he noemat i c Sinn is, accor di ng t o Husserl , t he cor e of a mor e compl ex No e ma , whi ch i ncl udes t he ki nd of exper i ence I am having: my act of imagining t hat it is snowi ng out si de, and my act of hopi ng t hat it is snowi ng out si de, will have t he same cont ent (t he same noemat i c Sinn), but will be ent er- t ai ned in di fferent ways, and hence be part s of di fferent Noemas. Smi t h and McI nt yr e summar i ze t hei r i nt er pr et at i on of Husserl ' s t heor y with t he following diagram: Act . . . . noema --- object entertains prescribes I t intends whi ch t hey expl ai n as follows: "an act i nt ends (is di r ect ed t owards or i nt ent i onal l y rel at ed t o) an obj ect , if and onl y if t he act [ . . . ] ent ert ai ns a cert ai n noemat i c Sinn and t hat Sinn prescri bes t hat obj ect ". (p. 143) 5 Thes e r emar ks ar e cl earl y suggestive of Frege' s t heor y of Sinn and Bedeut ung, and in fact, it was Fol l esdal ' s original insight, fully shared by Smith and McI nt yr e, t hat noemat i c Si nne wer e t he same ki nds of entities as Frege' s Sinne. And since t he l at t er are Si nne o f l i ngui st i c entities, t he suggestion emerges t hat we can under st and i nt ent i onal r ef er ence in anal ogy with linguis- tic reference. Smi t h and McI nt yr e find in Husser l t wo pri nci pl es support i ng this suggestion: (a) Language is t he expr essi on of t hought , and hence linguistic meani ngs are t he noemat i c Si nne of underl yi ng i nt ent i onal acts or attitudes. (b) Ever y noemat i c Sinn is in pri nci pl e capabl e of bei ng expr essed in language, as t he meani ng of some appr opr i at e linguistic expressi on. To t hose who are suspicious of meani ngs, and in general of any mentalistic t heor y, Smith and Mcl nt yr e suggest t o be pragmatic. A t heor y - - t hey say - - is good if it works: To admit that there are limits to Husserl's analysis of the fundamental notions underlying his theory of intentionality, is not itself a criticism of Hussefl. Ultimately analysis must stop somewhere, and every theory must at that point accept some notions as primitive. The important question is whether what Husserl says about his basic notions is enough to enable us to understand them and the way they work. [...] As with any theory, much of its acceptability turns on its success in handling the problems that prompted the need for a theory in the first place. (pp. 144--45) So let us consi der a concr et e exampl e and appl y t he t heor y to it. Consi der my pr esent act of seeing an appl e t r ee ( t hi s appl e t ree) bl oomi ng in t he garden. Accor di ng t o Smith and Mcl nt yr e, t he noemat i c Sinn i nvol ved in my act mi ght be expr essed by t he descr i pt i on ' this appl e t r ee bl oomi ng in t he garden' , or bet t er ' this as an appl e t r ee bl oomi ng in t he garden' . But how exact l y is t he Sinn in quest i on supposed t o pi ck out t he obj ect ? Husser l says: [...] the predicates are predicates of 'something', and this 'something' [...] is the central point of connexion for the predicates, their 'bearer', but in no wise their unity in the sense in which any system or connection of predicates might be called a unity. It must be distinguished from these, although it should not be set alongside them and should not be separated from them, as inversely they themselves are its predicates, or more accurately REVI EW 141 from the predicate-noemata. (Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, 6 p. 337) I t woul d b e i nt er es t i ng t o c o mp a r e t he ' s ome t hi ng' Hus s e r l t al ks a b o u t he r e wi t h Ka nt ' s c o n c e p t of t he t r a ns c e nde nt a l obj ect , whi c h he al so s ome t i me s calls "t he c o n c e p t o f s ome t hi ng i n gener al ". ( A2 5 1 ) 7 Bo t h Ka nt and Hus s e r l r e ga r d t hi s c o n c e p t as wha t gi ves uni t y t o a sensi bl e ma ni f ol d a nd t r a ns f or ms it i nt o t he e xpe r i e nc e o f an obj ect . An d b o t h t hi nk t hat t he t r a ns c e nde nt a l obj ect is n o t an obj e c t o f exper i ence, a l t hough it is a c ondi t i on o f o u r exper i enci ng obj ect s. No r can we c a pt ur e it i n pur e l y c o n c e p t u a l t er ms ; all we can say is - - a nd Ka n t is cr yst al cl ear a b o u t t hi s - - t hat [...] this something [...] is only the transcendental object; and by that is meant a something ~ X, of which we know; and with the present constitution of our understanding can know, nothing whatsoever, but which [. . . ] can serve only for the unity of the manifold in sensible intuitions [...]. (A250--51) But Smi t h a nd Mc l n t y r e ar e n o t i nt er es t ed i n expl or i ng t hes e suggest i ons. The i r ma i n goal is t o f i nd a pl ausi bl e t h e o r y o f i nt ent i onal i t y, and wi t h t hi s goal i n mi nd, t hey f i nd Hus s e r l ' s a c c o u n t uns at i s f act or y. To begi n wi t h, he r e is t hei r r eadi ng o f pas s ages l i ke t he above: " Each Sinn is a complex that can be factored into two fundamental components: an aggregate of predicate-senses, which prescribes the properties an object is given as having: and a'component of a different sort, called an ' X' or a 'determinable X' , which prescribes the object to which these properties are ascribed in the act. By virtue of its X, each Sinn relates to a specific object and so determines what the act is directed towards; and by virtue of its predicate-senses, the Sinn ascribes properties to this object and so determines what is intended as. (p. 219) An d a c c o r d i n g t o t hem, t hi s X l eaves t o o ma n y ques t i ons una ns we r e d: If the [. . . ] meaning of 'this' on a given occasion is the X in the speaker's perception of the referent, then the X in a perception varies from case to case. But what does this mean? Is there a different X in every perception? That would entail that in principle no two perceptions could ever have the very same phenomenological content, which is implausible. Furthermore, if two perceptions with two different X' s are directed toward what is in fact the same object, what is it about the X' s in virtue of which the perceptions reach the same object? Or do perceptions apprehending what is in fact the same object all share the same X? That is, is there in the noematic realm a unique X corresponding to each object in the transcendent world? Surely that is implausible. Husserl simply doesn't tell us how, via its X, a perception intends the right object. For Husserl, it seems, the mystery and mystique of intuition reside in that special type of sense, an X. (ibid.) So s ome t hi ng mo r e mus t be b r o u g h t i nt o t he pi ct ur e, and agai n l i ngui st i c r e f e r e nc e pr ovi de s i nt er est i ng suggest i ons. Th e p r e s e n c e of t he X i n t he noe ma t i c Si nn suggest s t hat t he bes t mo d e l f or i nt ent i onal r e f e r e nc e is of f er ed not by def i ni t e des cr i pt i ons af t er all, but r a t he r by p r o p e r n a me s o r i ndexi cal expr es s i ons . I n ot he r wor ds , t he i nt e nde d obj e c t is not wha t e ve r sat i sfi es a cer t ai n des cr i pt i on, but r at her , i n t he cas e o f p e r c e p t i o n at least, a speci f i c obj ect . I f I pe r c e i ve s omet hi ng, t he obj ect I i nt end is t hi s obj ect , t he o n e i n f r ont o f me. Ho we v e r , if we ma k e i ndexi cal expr es s i ons t he mo d e l of t he i nt ent i onal i t y o f pe r c e pt i on, we mus t a b a n d o n t he st ri ct l y i nt er nal a c c o u n t t hat Hus s e r l want s t o gi ve o f i nt ent i onal i t y, si nce i n o r d e r t o est abl i sh t he r e f e r e nc e o f t he i ndexi cal we mus t br i ng i n t he cont ext o f t he per cept i on. An d [. . . ] there is no evidence of such a view in Husserl; throughout his work he consistently characterized perception -- and intuition in general -- as an experience whose intentional relation to an object is achieved by means of its phenomenological content, or Sinn [...]. For Husserl, then, demonstrative reference is 'direct' not because it is achieved in a physical, contextual relation between speaker and referent, but because it is founded on the speaker's 'direct' intention, or intuition, of the referent. (p. 217) Yet , as Smi t h a nd Mc l n t y r e r i ght l y poi nt out , Hus s e r l was n o t c ompl e t e l y i nsensi t i ve t o t he r e l e va nc e o f t he cont ext i n de t e r mi ni ng t he obj e c t o f a def i ni t e i nt ent i on, and t r i ed t o c a pt ur e t hi s r e l e va nc e t h r o u g h t he n o t i o n of hor i z on. Br i ef l y, any i nt ent i onal e xpe r i e nc e we ha ve o f an obj ect calls f or t h a s ys t e m o f o t h e r pos s i bl e exper i - ences we coul d ha ve o f t he s a me obj ect : t hes e exper i - ences cons t i t ut e t he h o r i z o n o f t he or i gi nal act. Th e y ar e associ at i vel y c o n n e c t e d wi t h t he bel i efs, expect at i ons , and me mo r i e s t hat t he obj ect as or i gi nal l y i nt e nde d stirs u p i n us and t hat cons t i t ut e a b a c k g r o u n d o f pr a gma t i c pr e s uppos i t i ons ope r a t i ng mo r e o r l ess c ons c i ous l y i n o u r i nt ent i onal behavi or . But t h i s a c c o u n t is still ext r emel y ment al i st i c, si nce t he h o r i z o n o f a gi ven act is "t he set o f pos s i bl e act s wh o s e Si nne ar e c o- r e l a t e d wi t h and c ompa t i bl e i n c ont e nt wi t h, but al so mo r e ' det er - mi na t e ' i n c ont e nt t han, t he Si nn o f t he gi ven act ". (p. 232) Fu r t h e r mo r e , "t he act ' s ' expl i ci t ' Si nn onl y t oge t he r wi t h t he Si nne o f t hes e f unda me nt a l b a c k g r o u n d bel i efs pr ovi de s t he ' f r a me o f i nde t e r mi na t e ne s s ' i nt o whi ch t he ' i mpl i ci t ' Si nne, t he Si nne o f t he act s i n t he hor i z on, mus t 142 REVI EW fi t ". ( p. 2 5 2 ) I n o t h e r wo r d s , t he b a c k g r o u n d o f p a s t e x p e r i e n c e s i s j us t a system of ment al contents, wh i c h i nf l ue nc e s o u r p r e s e n t e x p e r i e n c e s b y s e t t i ng b o u n d - a r i e s t o t he m. So Hu s s e r l ' s i n t r o d u c t i o n o f h o r i z o n s d o e s n o t c h a n g e t he p i c t u r e i n a s u b s t a n t i a l way, a n d we a r e st i l l l ef t f a c i ng t h e f act t ha t t he n o e ma t i c Si nn d o e s n o t a c c o u n t f o r t h e c o n t e x t o f p e r c e p t i o n . Ac c o r d i n g t o Smi t h a n d Mc l n t y r e , Hu s s e r l ' s t h e o r y r e l i e s t o o h e a v i l y o n an u n e x p l a i n e d d i r e c t i n t u i t i o n o f t he obj e c t . Th u s t he t h e o r y mu s t b e mo d i f i e d , a n d Smi t h ( a l one , t hi s t i me ) mo d i f i e s i t b y i n t r o d u c i n g a n a d d i t i o n a l e l e me n t i n t h e s t r u c t u r e o f t h e n o e ma t i c Si nn e n t e r t a i n e d b y a n a c t of p e r c e p t i o n , wh i c h h e cal l s p e r c e p t u a l l y a c q u a i n t i n g s ens e. Suc h a s e ns e is t he s e n s e o f an o b j e c t as s i ngl e d o u t i n a p e r c e p t u a l f i el d. I t p r e s c r i b e s t h e o b j e c t as s e n s u o u s l y b e f o r e t he p e r c e i v e r at a c e r t a i n l o c a t i o n , a n d mu s t b e d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m t he X i n t he Si nn: [ . . . ] the X merely presents the object ' itself' that is prescribed by the acquainting sense. We may say the acquainting sense ' intro- duces' the X, for it is precisely in virtue of the presentation of an object as sensuously before the perceiver that a definite object - - 'this' object - - is presented [ . . . ] it is not the X but the acquainting sense that is most properly and fundamentally a ' demonstrative' sense [. . . ]. Prescribing an object as sensuously before one, it specifically appeals to the environment of the perceiver at the time of the perception. Consequently, the object it prescribes depends on the context of the perception [. . . ]. (p. 364) But t h o u g h t hi s s e ns e a l l ows o n e t o di s t i ngui s h v a r i o u s f o r ms o f i nt ui t i on, a n d ma k e s t he t h e o r y mo r e s e ns i t i ve t o c o n t e x t u a l p h e n o me n a , I t h i n k t ha t i t d o e s n o t a v o i d Smi t h ' s o wn ma j o r c r i t i c i s m o f Hu s s e r l . An e l e me n t o f i n t u i t i o n o f t he o b j e c t i s u n a v o i d a b l e , a n d t he p e r s i s t e n t p r e s e n c e o f t h e X i n t he n o e ma t i c Si nn i s t he t r a c e i t l e a v e s (cf. p. 391) . Smi t h ' s mo v e mi ght t hus b e s e e n as t he a d d i n g o f o n e mo r e e pi c yc l e , as a n a d d i t i o n a l c o mp l i c a t i o n i n a n a l r e a d y qui t e c o mp l i c a t e d ma c h i n e r y , wh i c h d o e s n o t r e s o l v e t h e or i gi na l p r o b l e m s i mp l y b e c a u s e t ha t p r o b l e m c a n n o t b e r e s o l v e d : b e c a u s e i f t he a i m i s t ha t o f goi ng ' z u d e n Sa c h e n s e l bs t ' , t h e r e wi l l a l wa ys b e a n e l e me n t e s c a p i n g c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n , a n d t h e r e wi l l a l wa ys r e ma i n , t o s o me e xt e nt , wh a t he cal l s t he " my s t e r y a n d my s t i q u e o f i nt ui t i on" . ( p. 2 1 9 ) 8 N o t e s l ' Husserl' s notion of noema', Journal of Philosophy 66 (1969), 680--87. 2 Before this paper was published, the standard American inter- pretation of Husserl' s theory of intentionality was the one proposed by Aaron Gurwitsch (' On the intentionality of consciousness', in Marvin Farber (ed.), Philosophical Essays in Memory of Edmund Husserl (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1940), pp. 65- - 83). The basic disagreement between Follesdal and Gurwitsch con- cerns the notion of noematic Sinn. Gurwitsch thinks of noematic Sinne as the objects of our intentional experiences, as they are intended. The objects as intended can be seen as aspects of complex objects which we can never completely grasp. Follesdal, on the other hand, thinks that objects and noematic Sinne are different kinds of entities. The latter are meaning-entities or concepts, which prescribe the objects of intentional experiences. 3 'Intentionality', in Paul Edwards (ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy (MacMillian and the Free Press, New York, 1967), pp. 203--4. 4 If the object does not exist, then the act will still retain its intentional character, though it will be directed to nothing. 5 Husserl's theory, and Smith and McIntyre's elaboration of it, are more complex than my account shows. But I think that this account should give an idea of the basic features of the theory. 6 Translated by W. R. Boyce Gibson, Collier MacMillian, London, 1962. 7 Quotes from Kant are from the Critique of Pure Reason, transl, by Norman Kemp Smith (St. Martin' s Press, New York, 1965). 8 Smith addresses this point again in ' Content and context of perception' (Synthese 61, 1984, pp. 61--87). There he analyzes perception as having an intrinsic demonstrative character, which he tries to capture by considering the '.'interplay between [its] phenomenological content and [its] physical context" (p. 61). And he refers once more to the "demonstrative, or perceptually acquainting, content of the perception" (p. 73). But I do not think that this new articulation meets my objection. Although he presents his view as an improvement on Husserl's account of the intentionality of percep- tion, all he does is just add some cmer conceptual elements to the picture: the illusion of reaching the object is still bound to remain such. CLOTI LDE CALABI University of Milan 20100 Milan, Italy