PART SEVEN

ARRAIGNMENT, PLEA AND PRE-TRIAL

I. Arraignment

A. Nature and purpose

-Rule 116, sec 1 (a), (b), (e)

Section 1.Arraignment and plea; how made.
(a) The accused must be arraigned before the court where the complaint or information
was filed or assigned for trial. The arraignment shall be made in open court by the
judge or clerk by furnishing the accused with a copy of the complaint or
information, reading the same in the language or dialect known to him, and asking him
whether he pleads guilty or not guilty. The prosecution may call at the trial witnesses
other than those named in the complaint or information.
(b) The accused must be present at the arraignment and must personally enter his
plea. Both arraignment and plea shall be made of record, but failure to do so shall not
affect the validity of the proceedings.
xxxx
(e) When the accused is under preventive detention, his case shall be raffled and its
records transmitted to the judge to whom the case was raffled within three (3) days
from the filing of the information or complaint. The accused shall be arraigned within
ten (10) days from the date of the raffle. The pre-trial conference of his case shall be held
within ten (10) days after arraignment. (n)
-DOJ-NPS Manual, Part VII

PART VII. ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA

SECTION 1. Concept of arraignment. - Arraignment is a mandatory requirement that
seeks to give the accused the opportunity, at the first instance, to know why the prosecuting
arm of government has been mobilized against him and to plead. At the arraignment, the
accused may enter a plea of guilty or not guilty.

SEC. 2. Duties of trial prosecutor. -

a) Before the arraignment of the accused, the trial prosecutor shall examine the
information vis-a-vis the resolution of the investigating prosecutor in order to
make the necessary corrections or revisions and to ensure that the information is
sufficient in form and substance.
b) After arraignment, the trial prosecutor shall prepare his witnesses for trial.
Government witnesses, e.g. medico-legal officer, chemist, forensic experts,
examiners etc. should, as much as practicable, be presented in accordance with
the logical and chronological sequence of the technical aspects to be proved.

SEC. 3. Effect of filing a petition for review. - When an aggrieved partymanifests in court
that he has a pending petition for review with the Department of Justice and moves for a
deferment of the arraignment pending resolution of his petition, the Trial Prosecutor may
conform thereto once proof of said petition has been presented by the petitioner to his
satisfaction.

SEC. 4. Concept of plea. - The plea is the reply of the accused to the charge. It raises the
issue to be tried and on which the judgment/sentence of the court can be properly based.

-People v. Alicando, 251 SCRA 293 (1995) must be read in a language known to
the accused; accused must have full comprehension of his plea and its
consequences

Facts: Appellant was charged with the crime of rape with homicide of Khazie Mae Penecilla, a
minor, four years of age, choking her with his right hand. The incident happened after appellant
drank liquor. A neighbor, Leopoldo Santiago found the victims body and the parents and police
were informed. Appellant was living in his uncle's house some five arm's length from Penecilla's
house. Appellant was arrested and interrogated by PO3 Danilo Tan. He verbally confessed his
guilt without the assistance of counsel. On the basis of his uncounselled verbal confession and
follow up interrogations, the police came to know and recovered from appellant's house, Khazie
Mae's green slippers, a pair of gold earrings, a buri mat, a stained pillow and a stained T-shirt
all of which were presented as evidence for the prosecution. He was arraigned with the
assistance of Atty. Rogelio Antiquiera of the PAO. Appellant pleaded guilty. The RTC
convicted him. Hence an automatic review for the imposition of death penalty.

Issue: Whether or Not the death penalty proper.

Held: No. The records do not reveal that the Information against the appellant was read
in the language or dialect known to him. The Information against the appellant is written in
the English language. It is unknown whether the appellant knows the English language.
Neither is it known what dialect is understood by the appellant. Nor is there any showing that
the Information couched in English was translated to the appellant in his own dialect before his
plea of guilt. The RTC violated section 1(a) of Rule 116, the rule implementing the
constitutional right of the appellant to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him. It also denied appellant his constitutional right to due process of law. It is urged
that we must presume that the arraignment of the appellant was regularly conducted. When
life is at stake, we cannot lean on this rebuttable presumption. There could be no presumption.
The court must be sure.

The trial court violated section 3 of Rule 116 when it accepted the plea of guilt of the
appellant. Said section requires that the court shall conduct a searching inquiry the
voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and require the
prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may also
present evidence in his behalf. The trial court simply inquired if appellant had physical marks of
maltreatment. It did not ask the appellant when he was arrested, who arrested him, how and
where he was interrogated, whether he was medically examined before and after his
interrogation, etc. It limited its efforts trying to discover late body marks of maltreatment as if
involuntariness is caused by physical abuse alone.

-People v. Estomaca, 256 SCRA 421 (1996) completely understands the
consequences of his plea; if he admits, searching inquiry may be conducted by: (A)
make him relay to the court what happened; (b) find out if he has been forced or
coerced to admit; (c) ask defense counsel whether he explained to the accused the
consequences of his plea

PEOPLE vs ESTOMACA, 256 SCRA 421 (1996)

Regalado, J.:

FACTS:
Melita, the eldest daughter of the accused claims that she was raped by the accused.
There is some inconsistency in the statements on record as to what actually took place on June
14, 1994 during the arraignment of appellant, assisted by his government counsel de oficio,
Atty. Rogelio Antiquiera. The decision of the court below, dated July 15, 1994, declares that he
entered a plea of guilty to Criminal Cases Nos. 43568 and 43571, and a plea of not guilty to
Criminal Cases Nos. 43567,43569 and 43570. Obviously engendered by the insufficiency of the
proceedings conducted and the imprecision of the notes taken at this stage, this matter will be
further discussed hereafter. The two criminal complaints, both subscribed by the offended party
on April29, 1994 and which are the subject of the joint judgment of the lower court challenged
in this appellate review.
Proceeding upon the capital nature of the offenses involved, the trial court, after appellant
ostensibly waived the presentation of evidence for his defense, required the prosecution to
adduce evidence purportedly to establish appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, on
June 29, 1994, the complainant herself, Melita Estomaca, appeared in court and testified that
she was raped by her father once in December, 1993 and, again, on March 6, 1994. On the
authority of Republic Act No. 7659 which took effect on December 31, 1993, the lower court
imposed upon appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua for the sexual assault supposedly
perpetrated in December, 1993, and the supreme penalty of death with respect to the rape
allegedly committed on March 6, 1994. In each of the said cases, he was further ordered to
indemnify the offended party in the amount of P50,000.00 and to pay the costs.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the arraignment of the accused violated the due process.

HELD/RATIO DECENDI:
Yes. The arraignment is invalid.Section 1(a) of Rule 116 requires that the arraignment
should be made in open court by the judge himself or by the clerk of court furnishing the
accused a copy of the complaint or information with the list of witnesses stated therein, then
reading the same in the language or dialect that is known to him, and asking him what his plea
is to the charge. The requirement that the reading be made in a language or dialect that the
accused understands and knows is a mandatory requirement, just as the whole of said Section 1
should be strictly followed by trial courts. This the law affords the accused by way of
implementation of the all- important constitutional mandate regarding the right of an accused
to be informed of the precise nature of the accusation leveled at him and is, therefore, really an
avenue for him to be able to hoist the necessary defense in rebuttal thereof. It is an integral
aspect of the due process clause under the Constitution.

At threshold, what strikes this Court as peculiar is that the arraignment appears to have
consisted merely of the bare reading of the five complaints, synthetically and cryptically
reported in the transcript, thus: (Reading the information/complaint to the accused in
Ilonggo/local dialect). Since what was supposed to have been read was stated in the singular,
but there were five criminal complaints against appellant, this Court is then left to speculate on
whether all five criminal complaints were actually read, translated or explained to appellant on
a level within his comprehension, considering his limited education.

The Court takes judicial notice, because it is either of public knowledge or readily
capable of unquestionable demonstration, that in the central and northwestern part of Iloilo
province and all the way up to and throughout Antique, including necessarily San Joaquin
where the offenses were committed and of which appellant and his family are natives, the local
dialect is known as kinaray-a. Barring previous exposure to or as a consequence of extended
social or commercial intercourse, kinaray-a is not readily understandable to nor spoken by
those born to the Hiligaynon regional language or who have lived in the areas under its sway
for an appreciable period of time. The converse is true for those whose native tongue is the
dialect of kinaray-a, since they are generally not well-versed in Ilonggo, or Hiligaynon. Since
all the complaints are not only in English but in technical legal language, we are again at sea as
to whether and how the indictments were translated to Ilonggo and/or to kinaray-a, or that
the appellant was truly and honestly made aware of the charges and, especially, the
consequences of his guilty plea thereto. The records are silent and do not reveal anything on
this point, nor how the dialogue between the presiding judge and appellant was translated. Yet
a mans life is at stake while this Court wrestles with that dilemma created by an omission of
official duty.



B. Procedure; appointment of counsel de oficio

-Rule 116, secs. 1 (a), (f), (g), 6-8

(a) The accused must be arraigned before the court where the complaint or information
was filed or assigned for trial. The arraignment shall be made in open court by the
judge or clerk by furnishing the accused with a copy of the complaint or information,
reading the same in the language or dialect known to him, and asking him whether he
pleads guilty or not guilty. The prosecution may call at the trial witnesses other than
those named in the complaint or information.
(f) The private offended party shall be required to appear at the arraignment for
purposes of plea bargaining, determination of civil liability, and other matters requiring
his presence. In case of failure of the offended party to appear despite due notice, the
court may allow the accused to enter a plea of guilty to a lesser offense which is
necessarily included in the offense charged with the conformity of the trial prosecutor
alone. (cir. 1-89)
(g) Unless a shorter period is provided by special law or Supreme Court circular, the
arraignment shall be held within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires
jurisdiction over the person of the accused. The time of the pendency of a motion to
quash or for a bill of particulars or other causes justifying suspension of the arraignment
shall be excluded in computing the period. (sec. 2, cir. 38-98)

-Const. (1987), art III, sec 11


-RA 8493, sec. 7, par 2 ~ "Speedy Trial Act of 1998

Section 7. Time Limit Between Filing of Information and Arraignment and Between
Arraignment and Trial.- The arraignment of an accused shall be held within thirty (30) days
from the filing of the information, or from the date the accused has appeared before the justice,
judge or court in which the charge is pending, whichever date last occurs. Thereafter, where a
plea of not guilty is entered, the accused shall have at least fifteen (15) days to prepare for
trial.Trial shall commence within thirty (30) days from arraignment as fixed by the court.
If the accused pleads not guilty to the crime charged, he/she shall state whether he/she
interposes a negative or affirmative defense. A negative defense shall require the prosecution to
prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, while an affirmative defense may
modify the order of trial and require the accused to prove such defense by clear and convincing
evidence.
C. Pre-arraignment Procedure and Remedies

1. Attachment of PI Record, raffle and transmittal of records

- SC AM No. 03-1-09-SC, Part B1

1. Motion for Bill of Particulars

-Rule 116, sec. 9
Section 9.Bill of particulars. The accused may, before arraignment, move for a bill of
particulars to enable him properly to plead and to prepare for trial. The motion shall specify the
alleged defects of the complaint or information and the details desired. (10a)
People v. Gutierrez, 91 Phil. 876 (1952)

Upon this evidence the Court of First Instance of Laguna found Eugenio Gutierrez guilty of
treason and sentenced him to suffer reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P20,000 and costs. He
has appealed.
Counsel contends that as the information does not plead specific acts constituting treason, the
introduction and admission of evidence to prove such acts, despite objection to it, is a reversible
error.
Under section 5, Rule 106, the information filed in this case is sufficient. Granting, however,
that it is insufficient or defective, section 2, Rule 113, points out the way to object to a
defective or insufficient information. It must be by a motion to quash. A defendant in a
criminal case who believes or feels that he is not sufficiently informed of the crime with
which he is charged and not in a position to defend himself properly and adequately
could moved to quash the information on the ground of amnesty but the motion was
denied. Instead of moving for specifications, his counsel objected to the introduction of
evidence showing specific acts which constitute the crime of treason with which he is
charged. Failure to move for specifications or for the quashing of the information on any
of the grounds provided for in the Rules of Court (section 2, Rule 113) deprives him of
the right to object to evidence which could be lawfully introduced and admitted under
an information of more or less general terms but which sufficiently charges the
defendant with a definite crime. Furthermore, counsel for the defendant cross-examined the
witnesses for the prosecution on such specific acts. So it may as well be said that he was not
taken by surprise nor was he deprived of his opportunity to confront or face and cross-examine
the witnesses presented against him. The appellant's contention, therefore, on this point is not
well taken.
-People v. Abad Santos, 76 Phil. 744 (1946) - Ambiguous phrases therefore should not be
permitted in criminal complaints or informations

Facts: Joseph Arcache was charged with the crime of treason. The information specified the different
kinds of properties alleged to have been sold by him to the Japanese imperial forcesandother similar
equipments. Arcache was duly arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty. On the day of the trial,
counsel verbally petitioned respondent judges that the prosecutionMake specificthe phrase and other
similar equipments or have itstrickentherefrom, unlessthe prosecution should furnish abill of
particularsspecifying what the phrase means. Special prosecutor objected to said petition as it was filed
out of time or after the accused has entered a plea of not guilty. Nevertheless, respondent judges granted
the petition due to the fact that the allegation was too broad. The special prosecutor requested that trial be
postponed to give them time to prepare the bill of particulars. On the date of the scheduled trial, instead
of submitting such bill, the special prosecutor filed an MR of said order of the court, stating that it was
contrary to law and that the judge acted in excess of its jurisdiction. MR was denied.

WON a bill of particulars may be ordered after entering of plea.

Held: YES.

In the absence of specific provisions of law prohibiting the filing of specifications or bill of particulars in
criminal cases, their submission may be permitted, as they cannot prejudice any substantial rights of the
accused. On the contrary, it will serve to apprise of the accused clearly of the charges against him
considering that conviction in criminal cases involve the deprivation of the accused of his life and liberty.
In criminal cases, any defect in the accusation other than lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may
be cured by good and sufficient evidence introduced by the prosecution.

Ambiguous phrases therefore should not be permitted in criminal complaints
orinformationsand if such phrase has been included therein, on motion of the defense andbefore the
commencement of trial,the court should order itseliminationas surplusageORthefiling of the
necessary specification, which is but an amendment in mere mattersof form.

-People v. Arlegui, 128 SCRA 556 (1984)

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the order of the Court of First Instance of
Batangas, Branch VII, dismissing on a motion to quash Criminal Case No. 2170 entitled "People
of the Philippines v. William Espaola"on the ground that from the language used in the
information in relation to the Presidential Decrees punishing the alleged offense, it is not clear
that an offense was committed and that the supposed penal statutes "are not prohibitive but
rather permissive and preceptive statutes."
Respondent Espanola moved to quash the information on the following grounds:
The accusation against the accused is not a penal offense, but, more of
administrative in nature, because Sec. 4 of P.D. No. 381 as well as P.D. No. 189,
Sec. 4-B do not impose Criminal liability against the offender. The accused did
not commit any offense in the development of the beach resort because his
application, granting that the area is within the jurisdiction of the Philippine
Tourism Authority, was duly given due course by the said body as stated in
Annex "A". Instead of charging the accused, he ought to be commended for
assisting the government in the promotion of tourism. In fact, the beach resort
has become so famous that foreigners have been continuously and regularly
patronizing the place.
The land covered by the beach resort was also given due course by the Bureau of
Lands and covered by a Foreshore Lease Application as clearly reflected
in Annexes "B" and "C".
The grounds in the Fiscal's opposition to the motion to quash are:
1. That the accused has overlooked the fact that Presidential Decree No. 381
which was made principally as the basis of the charge against the herein accused
provides under Section I thereof 'that no development project for tourism purposes
shall be undertaken by any person without prior approval of the Philippine
Tourism Authority, in accordance with the provisions and guidelines prescribed by the
Department of Tourism.' As a corollary thereto, Section 4 provides that any
person violating or causing another to violate any provision of this decree or the
rules and regulations promulgated by the Phillippine Tourism Authority
pursuant to the next preceding section wig suffer the penalties provided for
under Section 4-B of P.D. No. 189, as amended. Presidential Decree No. 259
which took effect on August 1, 1973 which among others provides the penalties
for the violation of any provision of the said decree or of the rules and
regulations or circulars of the Department of Tourism is now known as Section
4-B of PD No. 189. Section 4-b has been misquoted because Section 4 of PD No.
189 was the one quoted by the accused. Section 4-b as we have stated is an
amendment to Section 4 of PD No. 189 which section is now included under PD
259 as an amendatory act to PD No. 189.
xxx xxx xxx
2. That it is not true that the Philippine Tourism Authority gave due course to
the application of the accused for the undertaking of a particular development
project at Sitio Putat, Barangay Papaya, Nasugbu, Batangas, for tourism
purposes because the letter itself dated February 14, 1979 does not indicate
approval of the authority of his application in the sense that the implications of
the phrase "we may give due course to your proposal" do not altogether give a
guarantee and assurance to the accused that his application will be approved. ...
An examination of the information shows on its face that it does not suffer from any material or
substantial defect or any so-called ambiguity or double meaning as to warrant the dismissal of
the case. Contrary to the respondents' claim, the information appears sufficiently explicit. It
does not suffer from the obscurity, unintelligibility, or vagueness alleged by the respondents.
Respondent Espanola created ambiguity where there was none. Resort to statutory
construction or interpretation was, therefore, unnecessary.
Assuming the information to have been vague and ambiguous, alternative courses of
action could have been taken. Respondent Espanola could have filed a motion for a bill
of particulars if he did not feel like researching into a Presidential Decree with a Section
4-b and a Section 4-B. A bill of particulars while provided for under Section 6 of Rule
116 is not a popular procedure among lawyers for the accused in criminal cases. For one
thing, it may invite an amended information which is not only clearer but may also be
stronger and more incriminating. However, it would have clarified and corrected at an early
stage the kind of doubt which the accused in this particular case alleged to have entertained.
Section 6 of Rule 116 provides:
SEC. 6. Bill of Particulars. Defendant may, at the time of or before
arraignment, move for or demand a more definite statement or a bill of
particulars of any matter which is not averred with sufficient definiteness or
particularity to enable him properly to plead or prepare for trial. The motion
shall point out the defects complained of and the details desired.
The more appropriate procedure under the circumstances would have been an order from the
courtdirecting the Fiscal to amend the information because the defect, if there ever was one,
was curable by the simplest of amendments or clarifications. There was no basis to grant the
motion to quash and dismiss the case.
2. Motion for Production and Inspection of Material Evidence in possession
of the Prosecution

-Rule 116, sec 10; - which are in the possession or under the control of the prosecution,
police, or other law investigating agencies

Section 10.Production or inspection of material evidence in possession of prosecution. Upon motion
of the accused showing good cause and with notice to the parties, the court, in order to prevent
surprise, suppression, or alteration, may order the prosecution to produce and permit the
inspection and copying or photographing of any written statement given by the complainant
and other witnesses in any investigation of the offense conducted by the prosecution or other
investigating officers, as well as any designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters,
photographs, objects or tangible things not otherwise privileged, which constitute or contain
evidence material to any matter involved in the case and which are in the possession or
under the control of the prosecution, police, or other law investigating agencies. (11a)
-People v. Roldan, 99 SCRA 422 (1980);





-People v Palacios, 108 Phil 220 (1960);






3. Suspension of arraignment

-Rule 116, sec. 11;
Section 11.Suspension of arraignment. Upon motion by the proper party, the arraignment
shall be suspended in the following cases:
(a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which
effective renders him unable to fully understand the charge against him and to
plead intelligently thereto. In such case, the court shall order his mental examination
and, if necessary, his confinement for such purpose;
(b) There exists a prejudicial question; and
(c) A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at either
the Department of Justice, or the Office of the President; provided, that the period
of suspension shall not exceed sixty (60) days counted from the filing of the petition
with the reviewing office. (12a)
-Rule 111, secs. 6,7;

Section 6.Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. A petition for suspension of the criminal
action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the
office of the prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary investigation. When the
criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same
criminal action at any time before the prosecution rests. (6a)
Section 7.Elements of prejudicial question. The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the
previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue
raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines
whether or not the criminal action may proceed. (5a)
-DOJ Department Order No. 70 (Series of 2000);

4. Diversion Program for Juveniles in Conflict with Law

-RJCL, secs. 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24 & 25

Section 19. Preliminary Investigation. - As far as consistent with this Rule, the preliminary
investigation of a child conflict with the law shall be governed by Section 3 of Rule 112 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. A specially trained prosecutor shall be assigned to
conduct the inquest, preliminary investigation and prosecution of the case involving a child in
conflict with the law. The child, on the other hand, shall be assisted by a private lawyer or if
none, a lawyer from the Public Attorney's Office. If there is an allegation or evidence of torture
or ill-treatment of a child in conflict with the law during custody or detention, it shall be the
duty of the prosecutor to investigate the same. (n)
Section 20. Conduct of Preliminary Investigation. - Preliminary investigation shall be conducted
in the following instances: (a) when the child in conflict with the law does not qualify for
diversion; (b) when the child, the parents or guardian do not agree to diversion as provided in
Sections 27 and 28 of Republic Act No. 9344; or (c) when, after considering the assessment and
recommendation of the social worker, the prosecutor determines that diversion is not
appropriate for the child in conflict with the law. (n)
At the preliminary investigation, should there arise a need for clarificatory questions to be
propounded on the child, the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness shall apply.
Section 21. Filing of Information. - If the investigating prosecutor finds probable cause to hold
the child in conflict with the law for trial, there being discernment, the corresponding
Resolution and Information shall be prepared for the approval by the provincial or city
prosecutor, a s the case may be. The child and the mother or father, or appropriate guardian or
custodian, or in the absence thereof, the nearest relative, and the child's private counsel or
lawyer from the Public Attorney's Office shall be furnished forthwith a copy of the approved
resolution and the Information.
The Information shall be filed with the court within forty-five (45) days from the start of the
preliminary investigation.(n)
No Information shall be filed against a child for the commission of the following:
(a) status offences;
(b) vagrancy and prostitution under Section 202 of the Revised Penal Code;
(c) mendicancy under Presidential Decree No. 1563; and
(d) sniffing of rugby under Presidential Decree No. 1619.
Children taken into custody for the foregoing shall, with their consent and that of their parents,
guardian or custodian, instead undergo appropriate counseling and treatment program. (n)
Section 22. Duties of the Clerk of Court Upon Receipt of information. - The Clerk of Court, upon
receipt of the Information, shall:
(1) Maintain a separate case docket or logbook for cases involving children in
conflict with the law. Whenever possible, the Clerk of Court shall use color
coding or other method to easily distinguish the records of children in conflict
with the law from the other case records;
(2) Determine whether the offense charged qualifies for diversion, that is it
punishable by imprisonment of not more than twelve (12) years, regardless of
fine, or fine alone regardless of the amount;
(3) If the crime charged is punishable by such imprisonment, immediately assign
a temporary case number in accordance with Sec. 23 of this Rule and raffle off
the case to a court so that its Diversion Committee can immediately undertake
the appropriate action under Section 33 of this Rule; and
(4) If the crime charged does not quality for diversion because it is punishable by
imprisonment of more than twelve (12) years, the case shall be assigned a
regular criminal case docket number raffled off to a court for formal
proceedings. (n)
Section 23. Docketing of the Case - a case that qualifies for diversion under paragraph 3 of the
preceding Section shall not be docketed as a regular criminal case but instead shall be assigned
a temporary case number as follows: CICL-(no.) ___- (year) ___ -D (which means diversion),
before the same is raffled off to the appropriate court.
Section 24. Venue - Subject to the provisions of Section 15, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, any criminal or civil action involving a child in conflict with the law shall
be instituted and tried in the appropriate court nearest the place where the offense was
committed or where any of its essential elements occurred.
Section 25. Released of Children on Recognizance to the Parents, Guardian, Custodian or Nearest
Relative. - The release of a child from a custody during the pendency of the case involving a
non-serious offense as defined in Sec. 4 (u) of this rule may be ordered by the court only after a
hearing for that purpose, and upon favorable recommendation of the social worker assigned to
the child, with the conformity of the public prosecutor and the private complainant. The child
shall be released to the custody of a willing and responsible mother or father, or appropriate
guardian or custodian or in their absence, the nearest relative, who shall be responsible for the
child's good behavior and appearance in court whenever required.
No child shall be ordered detained in jail pending trial or hearing of the child's case, subject to
the provisions of this Rule. (n)
Issues on Arraignment:
The Concept of Arraignment:
Arraignment is the proceeding in a criminal case, whose object is to fix the identity of the
accused, to inform him of the charge and to give him an opportunity to plead, or to obtain from
the accused his answer, in other words, his plea to the information.

Arraignment is indispensable as the means for bringing the accused into court and notifying
him of the cause he has to meet. (Borja v. Mendoza, 77 SCRA42)

Options of the accused before arraignment and plea

Before arraignment and plea, the accused mayavail of any of the following:

a.Bill of Particulars- The accused may, before arraignment, move for a bill of particulars to
enablehim to properly plead and prepare for trial.

The motion shall:

a. specify the alleged defects of the complaint orinformation, and shall
b.specify the details desired. (Section 9, Rule 116)

b.Suspension of arraignment- Upon motion, the proper party may ask for the suspension of
thearraignment in the following cases:

1. That the accused appears to be suffering from anunsound mental condition which effectively
rendershim unable to fully understand the charge againsthim and to plead intelligently thereto.
In such case,
the court shall order his mental examination and, if necessary his confinement for such
purpose;
2. That there exists a prejudicial question; and
3. There is a petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor which is pending at either
the DOJ,or of the Office of the President (
Section 11, Rule 116). The period of suspension shall not exceedsixty (60) days counted from
the filing of thepetition with the reviewing office.

c.Motion to QuashAt any time before enteringhis plea, the accused may move to quash
thecomplaint or information on any of the groundsunder Section 3, Rule 117 in relation to
Section 1 of the same rule;

d.Challenge the validity of the arrest or legality of the warrantissued or assail the
regularity orquestion the absence of preliminary investigation of
the charge otherwise the objection is deemed waived.

Place of arraignment

The accused must be arraigned before the court where the complaint or information was filed
orassigned for trial. (Section 1a, Rule 116)

Manner of arraignment

Arraignment is made:

1. in open court where the complaint orinformation has been filed or assigned for trial;
2. by the judge or clerk of court;
3. By furnishing the accused with a copy of the complaint or information;
4. Reading it in a language or dialect known to theaccused;
5. Asking accused whether he pleads guilty or not guilty.
6. Both arraignment and plea shall be made of record but failure to enter of record shall not
affectthe validity of the proceedings.

Time of arraignment

Under the Rules of Court, the arraignment shallbe made within thirty (30) days from the date
thecourt acquires jurisdiction over the person of the
ON OF ARRAIGNMENT
Suspension of arraignment

Upon motion by the proper party, arraignment may be suspended on the
following grounds:

1.The accused appears to be suffering fromanunsound mental condition
whicheffectively renders him unable to fullyunderstand the charge against him and toplead
intelligently thereto;
2.There exists a validprejudicial question;
3. A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at the Department of
Justice or the Office of thePresident(Sec. 11); provided that theperiod of suspension shall not
exceed 60days counted from the filing of thepetition; The period of suspension shall not exceed
sixty (60) days counted from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office (Sec. 11)

4.There are pending incidents such as:
a.Motion to Quash
b. Motion for Inhibition
c.Motion for Bill of Particulars

II. Plea

A. Nature and purpose; procedure

-Rule 116, sec. 1 (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g)
-RJCL, sec 27
-SC AM No. 03-1-09-SC, Part B (2), (3), (4)
-DOJ-NPS Manual Part VII

B. Types of pleas

1. Not guilty

a. Denial; presumption of innocence

-Const. (1987), art. III, sec. 14 (2)

-People v. Alba, 305 SCRA 811 (1999)

PER CURIAM

Remark Sir, This is under II. Plea, B. Types of Pleas, 1. Not Guilty, a. Denial; Presumption of
Innocence but the case did not discuss the topic.

Facts
Herein accused-appellant ALFREDO Alba was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two
counts of rape against the person of his daughter Janette. The facts as established by the
prosecution are as follows: Janette, then only 9 year old, was bathing in a nearby creek when
her father ALFREDO went after her and succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her. A year
later, she was once again raped by him in their house when her stepmother was not around.
After the 2nd rape, Janette could not bear the abuse anymore and thats when she finally voiced
her complaint to a complete stranger, a fat man whose name she does not even know. Said fat
man took pity on her and helped her with the complaint.
ALFREDO, testifying on his own behalf for the defense, denied the charges against him and
cried that his daughter was imputing the crime to him just to get even because he has been hard
on her in punishment for her hardheadedness and wrongdoings. The trial court, as stated
above, was ultimately swayed by the prosecutions case and convicted ALFREDO, sentencing
him with the supreme penalty of death hence, this automatic appeal.
Issue: WON ALFREDO can question the substance of the information filed in court against
him
HELD: NO, the court correctly found ALFREDO guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Perforce,
the assailed decision should be AFFIRMED, in toto. The sentence of death is UPHELD.
RATIO:
ALFREDO questions the validity of the information against him by arguing that it states in
too general a term the crimes he allegedly committed depriving him of his rights to due process
and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him (1987 Const., Art III,
Sec 14(2)) this must FAIL. Consistent with Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, an information is valid as long as it distinctly states the statutory designation of the
offense and the acts or omissions constitutive thereof the information in the case at bar satisfies
this rule.
Also, there is proof on record that, in the proceedings of the trial, ALFREDO demonstrated
that he knew full well what the charges against him were. He denied them as only a person who
is aware of the gravity of the charge against him would do. It is now late for ALFREDO to
question the form or substance of the informations. In entering a plea of not guilty during his
arraignment, he waived all possible objections to the sufficiency of the informations against
him4
4 Sections 1 and 8 of Rule 117: SECTION 1. Time to move to quash- At any time before
entering his plea, the accused may move to quash the complaint or information. SEC. 8.
Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefor- The failure of the accused to assert
any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either
because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion shall be
deemed a waiver of the grounds of a motion to quash, except the grounds of no offense charged,
lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged, extinction of the offense or penalty and jeopardy,
as provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (f) and (h) of Section 3 of this Rule.

The informations against accused-appellant comply with the rules. They are not
susceptible of being construed as charging crimes other than incestuous rape. In addition, it is
sufficient if the acts complained of are alleged to have taken place as near to the actual date
when the offense was committed as the information or complaint will permit. As already
stated above, the precise time of its commission is not an essential element of the crime of rape,
without which there is no crime committed.
Indeed, the proceedings in the trial court demonstrate that accused-appellant knew
full well what the charges against him were. He denied them as only a person who is
aware of the gravity of the charge against him would do.
Moreover, it is now late for accused-appellant to question the form or substance of the
informations. In entering a plea of not guilty during his arraignment, he waived all possible
objections to the sufficiency of the informations against him. As Sections 1 and 8 of Rule 117
provide:
SECTION 1. Time to move to quash. At any time before entering his plea, the accused may
move to quash the complaint or information.
SEC. 8. Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefor. The failure of the accused to
assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either
because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion shall be
deemed a waiver of the grounds of a motion to quash, except the grounds of no offense charged,
lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged, extinction of the offense or penalty and
jeopardy, as provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (f) and (h) of Section 3 of this Rule.
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the trial court correctly found accused-appellant
guilty of two (2) counts of rape. The offended party was born on January 7,
1984.
[16]
Accordingly, when she was raped for the first time in May of 1993, she was just 9
years old. When she was raped a second time on February 7, 1994, she was 10 years old.

b. Refusal to enter plea; conditional plea

-Rule 116, sec. 1 (c)
(c) When the accused refuses to plead or makes a conditional plea, a plea of not guilty
shall be entered for him. (1a)
-People v Strong, 63 SCRA 113 (1975)

G.R. No. L-38626

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
STEPHEN DOUGLAS STRONG alias STEVE STRONG


Fernando, J.:


Facts: Stephen Douglas Strong aka Steve Strong was accused for and later on charged of
murder for the death of Cornelia Bartolaba. On February 6, 1974, during the continuation of
the arraignment, the accused Stephen Douglas Strong was asked by Judge Jesus Occena "And
it is also stated here, "that on the occasion and in pursuance of said robbery and to ensure his
felonious intent, the above-named accused with intent to kill, with treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with the use of a fork
and towel, attack, assault, stab, choke and strangle one Cornelia Bartolaba, which caused her
immediate death", what do you say to that? Strongs categorical answer: "No." Then when
interrogated further to explain why he answered in the negative considering that he had
entered a guilty plea and specifically questioned as to whether he meant to say that he did not
attack, nor assault, and that he did not stab, choke and strangle the victim Cornelia to death, he
simply answered "no" every time to each and ever question.
Thus it was quite unexpected when on February 8, 1974, the trial court rendered
judgment finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The Office
of the Solicitor-General manifested that the contention in appellant's brief that the plea of guilt
should be disregarded as it could not be considered definite and absolute. Instead, it should be
one of not guilty with the lower court being called upon to continue the trial on the merits. The
Sol Gen further more stated; It s clear from a perusal of the afore-quoted portion of the
transcripts that the accused denied the allegations contained in the information. It is well-
settled that when a plea of guilty is not definite or ambiguous, or not absolute, the same
amounts to a plea of not guilty. ... This Honorable Court has manifested its constant concern
with improvident pleas of guilt. Trial courts have been repeatedly admonished to be
circumspect in accepting pleas of guilty in capital offenses. It is in line with this salutary
principle and in the best interest of justice that appellee is constrained to agree with the stand
of the appellant."

Issue: Whether or not the due process requirement to justify the acceptance of the plea of guilt
was met in this case?


Held: No, due process was not met in the case at hand. As noted by the S.C. in their recent
decision of People v. Ybanez, trial judges are to "refrain from accepting with alacrity an
accuseds plea of guilty, for while justice demands a speedy administration, judges are duty
bound to be extra solicitous in seeing to it that when an accused pleads guilty he understands
fully the meaning of his plea and the import of an inevitable conviction."
The S.C. has invariably referred to it as furnishing the standard, and that in words too
plain to be misinterpreted. It could not be otherwise, if deference is to be accorded to the
constitutional right to due process as well as the rudimentary procedural principles. The
element of fairness cannot be satisfied in any other manner. There must be, for a plea of guilty
to be judicially acceptable then, a showing of full understanding of what is at stake. That is so
even when an accused does clearly admit the commission of the culpable act. In the case at
hand, while there was an admission of guilt hastily made, it turned out, on his being specifically
questioned, the accused denied most categorically the allegations in the information. How could
the plea of guilt earlier made be the basis of a judgment of conviction? It was indeed deplorable,
considering that as of the time the trial judge decided the case, the S.C. had reiterated Apduhan
in no less than twenty-nine separate occasions, that he did act the way he did, apparently
heedless of what is authoritatively ordained time and time again. Even a cursory perusal of this
Court's decisions should make clear the undeviating adherence to such a basic doctrine. Judicial
carelessness, it thus appears, has never been carried before to such extremes. It ought never to
have happened, and care should be taken that it does not happen again. The decision of the
lower court dated February 8, 1974 was set aside and nullified and the case remanded back to
the RTC to it for a trial to be conducted strictly in accordance with the requirements of the law.


c. Plea of guilt but with exculpatory evidence

-Rule 116, sec. 1 (d)


d. Withdrawal of improvident plea of guilt

-Rule 116, sec 5

Section 5.Withdrawal of improvident plea of guilty. At any time before the judgment of
conviction becomes final, the court may permit an improvident plea of guilty to be withdrawn
and be substituted by a plea of not guilty. (5)
-People v De Ocampo Gonzaga. 127 SCRA 158 (1984)


FACTS: Nov. 3, 1977 - An information was filed charging Gonzaga of the crime of murder for
fatally stabbing with a jungle bolo Amparo Quilatan, allegedly attended by the aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation, treachery and taking advantage of superior strength
deliberately making use of drunkenness or after having taken liquor, armed with an illegally
possessed jungle bolo.

On Nov. 8, 1977 Gonzaga appeared for arraignment without counsel. The Trial Court issued
an order appointing Atty. Saruca as counsel de officio for the purpose of arraignment only.
Atty. Saruca manifested that the accused was ready for arraignment and the accused pleaded
guilty to the offense charged.


The trial court then ordered the presentation of evidence but the prosecution was not ready for
trial. The prosecution witnesses had not been notified because the prosecution did not expect
that the accused would plead guilty and that trial would continue thereafter. The case was then
set for hearing the next day notwithstanding counsel de officios request that he be given 2 days
to prepare for trial and for purposes of trial Attys. Rodriguez and Koh were appointed as
counsels de officio.

ISSUE: WON Gonzagas plea of guilty is valid or should be accepted.

HELD: NO

RATIO: Records confirm the fact that the accused was not adequately informed of the nature
of the crime imputed against him and the consequences of his plea. Nor does it appear that the
averments in the information, including the qualifying and aggravating circumstances were
explained to him. No dialogue whatsoever transpired between accused and the trial judge.

In capital offenses, the trial judge should give ample opportunity to the counsel de officio to
examine not only the records of the case but also to acquire every relevant information on the
matter, such as conferring with the accused adequately so that he may properly, intelligently
and effectively represent his interests. This is but to accord substance to one of the great
principles of justice, guaranteed by the Constitution, which is the right of an accused to be
heard by himself and counsel as a requirement of due process. The enjoyment of such a right
would certainly be useless if the counsel of the accused is precluded from knowing fully the
facts of his client's case.


Under Sec. 5, Rule 116, whenever an attorneyde officioisemployed or assigned by the court to
defend an accused either at the arraignment or at the trial he should be given a reasonable time
to consult with the accused and prepare his defense before proceeding further in the case which
should not be less than 2 hours in case of arraignment and 2 days in case of trial. These
requirements were not complied with.

After accused's arraignment on November 8, 1977, the court immediately set the case for trial the next
day, November 9, 1977, disregarding counsel de ofifcio's manifestation that he be allowed the required
two-day period within which to prepare for trial.



In a long line of cases, this Court has repeatedly enjoined trial judges to refrain from accepting
with alacrity an accuseds plea of guilty, for while justice demands a speedy administration,
judges are duty bound to be extra solicitous in seeing to it that when an accused pleads guilty
he understands fully the meaning of his plea and the import of an inevitable conviction. 4 The
essence of a plea of guilty in a criminal trial is that the accused on arraignment admits his guilt
freely, voluntarily and with full knowledge of the consequences and meaning of his act. 5 If the
accused does not clearly and fully understand the nature of the offense charged, if he is not
advised as to the meaning and effect of the technical language so often used in formal
complaints and informations in qualifying the acts constituting the offense, or if he does not
clearly understand the consequences by way of a heavy and even a capital penalty flowing from
his admission of his guilt of the crime in the precise technical manner and form in which it is
charged, his plea of guilty should not be accepted and if accepted it should not be held to be
sufficient to sustain a conviction. 6

In capital offenses, the trial judge should give ample opportunity to the counsel de oficio to
examine not only the records of the case but also to acquire every relevant information on the
matter, such as conferring with the accused adequately so that he may properly, intelligently
and effectively represent his interests. 7 This is but to accord substance to one of the great
principles of justice, guaranteed by the Constitution, which is the right of an accused to be
heard by himself and counsel as a requirement of due process. The enjoyment of such a right
would certainly be viscerated if the counsel of the accused is precluded from knowing fully the
facts of his clients case. 8

Under Sec. 5, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, whenever an attorney de oficio is employed or
assigned by the court to defend an accused either at the arraignment or at the trial, he should
be given a reasonable time to consult with the accused and prepare his defense before
proceeding further in the case which should not be less than two (2) hours in case of
arraignment and two (2) days in case of trial. These requirements were not complied with.
After accuseds arraignment on November 8, 1977, the court immediately set the case for trial
the next day, November 9, 1977, disregarding counsel de oficios manifestation that he be
allowed the required two-day period within which to prepare for trial

Issues on Plea

The effect of a plea of guilty

A plea of guilty is a judicial confession of guilt( People v. Comendador G.R. No. L-38000,
September 19,1980). It is an unconditional plea of guilt admits
of the crime and all the attendant circumstances alleged in the information including the
allegations of conspiracy and warrants of judgment of conviction without need of further
evidence

Exceptions
1. Where the plea of guilt was compelled by violence or intimidation;
2. When the accused did not fully understand the meaning and consequences of his plea;
3. Where the information is insufficient to sustain conviction of the offense charged;
4. Where the information does not charge an offense, any conviction thereunder being void;
5. Where the court has no jurisdiction.

Exception to the Exception:

If what the accused would prove is an exempting circumstance, it would amount to a
withdrawal of his plea of not guilty.

For non-capital offenses, the reception of evidence is merely discretionary on the part of the
court. If the information or complaint is sufficient for the judge to render judgment on a non-
capital offense, he may do so. But if the case involves a capital offense, the reception of evidence
to prove the guilt and
degree of culpability of the accused is mandatory.

OF NOT GUILTY BE
A plea of not guilty shall be entered

1. When the accused so pleaded;
2. When he refuses to plead;
3. Where in admitting the act charged he sets up matters of defense or with lawful justification;
4. When he enters a conditional plea of guilty;
5. Where after a plea of guilty he introduces evidence of self- defense or other exculpatory
circumstances;
6. When the plea is indefinite or ambiguous.
3. WHEN MAY ACCUSED ENTER A PLEA OF GUILTYLESSER OFFENSE
Plea bargaining

Plea bargaining in criminal cases is a process whereby the accused and the prosecution work a
mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject
to court approval. It usually involves the defendants pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to
only one or some of the counts of a multi- count
indictment in return for a lighter sentence than that for the graver charge (Daan v.
Sandiganbayan GR No. 163972-77, March 28, 2008 ).

The accused may enter a plea of guilty to a lower offense

1. During arraignment

a. If the offended party is present, the latter must consent with the prosecutor consented plea;
and
b. That the lesser offense is necessarily included in the offense charged.

2. After arraignment but before trial provided the following requisites are present:

a. The plea of guilty is withdrawn;
b. The plea of not guilty and the withdrawal of the previous guilty plea
shall be made before trial;
c. The lesser offense is necessarily included in the offense charged; and
d. The plea must have the consent of the prosecutor and the offended party
(Section 2, Rule 116)

No amendment of complaint or information is necessary (Sec. 2).

3. After prosecution rests allowed only when the prosecution does not have sufficient
evidence to establish guilt for the crime charged.
4.
Duty of the court after the accusedpleads guilty to a capital offense

When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall:

1. Conduct a searching inquiry into the:
a. Voluntariness of the plea and
b. Full comprehension of the consequences of the plea;

2. Require the prosecution to prove guilt and the precise degree of his culpability.

3. Ask the accused if he desires to present evidence in his behalf and allow him to do so if he
desires.

However, the accused after pleading guilty may not present evidence as would exonerate him
completely from criminal liability such as proof of self-defense. This procedure is mandatory,
and a judge who fails to observe it commits grave abuse of discretion.


The rationale for the requirement of presentation of evidence after the plea of guilty

To preclude any room for reasonable doubt inthe mind of either the trial court or of the
SupremeCourt, on review as to the possibility that theremight have been misunderstanding on
the part of the accused as to the nature of the charges towhich he pleaded guilty; and to
ascertain thecircumstances attendant to the commission of thecrime which justify or require the
exercise of greater or lesser degree of severity in theimposition of prescribed penalties. (People
v. Basa,51 SCRA 317)
5. SEARCHING INQUIRY
The objectives of a searching inquiry by the judge after a plea of guilty

To determine the voluntariness of the plea and whether the accused understood fully the
consequence of his plea.

The meaning of the duty of the judge to conduct a searching inquiry (elements
of searching inquiry)

In all cases, the judge must convince himself:

1. The judge must convince himself that the accused is entering the plea voluntarily and
intelligently;
2. The judge must convince himself that there exists a rational basis for finding of guilt based
on accuseds testimony
3. Inform the accused of the exact length of imprisonment and the certainty that he will serve
it in a national penitentiary
6. IMPROVIDENT PLEA
The concept of an improvident plea?
It is a plea without information as to all the circumstances affecting it. It is based upon a
mistaken assumption or misleading information or advice.

Instances of improvident plea.

1. Plea of guilty was compelled by violence or intimidation;
2. The accused did not fully understand the meaning and consequences of his plea;
3. Insufficient information to sustain conviction of the offense charged;
4. Information does not charge an offense; and
5. Court has no jurisdiction.

An improvident plea be withdrawn

The court may permit an improvident plea of guilty to be withdrawn at any time before the
judgment of conviction becomes final and be substituted by a plea of not guilty.

The withdrawal of a plea of guilty is not a matter of right to the accused but addressed to the
sound discretion to the trial court (Sec. 5)

The effect of a withdrawal of an improvident plea

The court shall set aside the judgment of conviction and re-open the case for new trial.
7. GROUNDS FOR SUSPENSI

III. Pre-trial

A. Nature and purpose

-Rule 118, sec 1

Section 1.Pre-trial; mandatory in criminal cases. In all criminal cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan, Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in
Cities, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the court shall after
arraignment and within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the
person of the accused, unless a shorter period is provided for in special laws or circulars of the
Supreme Court, order a pre-trial conference to consider the following:
(a) plea bargaining;
(b) stipulation of facts;
(c) marking for identification of evidence of the parties;
(d) waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence;
(e) modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the charge but interposes a
lawful defense; and
(f) such other matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of the criminal and
civil aspects of the case. (secs. 2 and 3, cir. 38-98)
-SC AM No. 03-1-09-SC, Part B (5), (6)

-RJCL, sec 28


-DOJ-NPS Manual, Part VIII


SECTION 1. CoflcQpt of pre-trial. - A pre-trial is a process whereby the accused and the
prosecutors in a criminal case work out, usually at the arraignment stage, a naturally
satisfactory disposition of a case subject to court approval in order to expedite the trial of the
case.
1


The prosecutor shall enter into a pre-trial only when the accused and counsel agree and
upon order of the court.

SEC. 2. Duties of prosecutor before and after the pre-trial conference. -Before the pre-trial
conference, the prosecutor should know every fact and detail of the case. This can be
accomplished by interviewing the complainant and other witnesses and after a thorough
examination of the available documentary and other physical evidence. The prosecutor should
place importance on the testimony of the expert witness. The knowledge that the prosecutor
will gain from said witness will help him determine the procedures undertaken in the
examination of a subject or thing; the scientific or technical terms applied, and the reason/s in
arriving at a certain conclusion.

During the pre-trial process, the prosecutor shall bear in mind that he has to prove his

1
Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed. 1979, p.1037.


case beyond a reasonable doubt and that every act or incident should be proved by the
testimony of qualified and competent witnesses.

After the pre-trial conference, the prosecutor shall ensure that any agreement or
admission made or entered therein is in writing and signed by the accused and his counsel.

SEC. 3. Subject matters ofpre-tn.al. - The pre-trial conference shall consider the following:

a) Plea bargaining - This is a process where the defendants usually plead guilty to
a lesser offense or to only one or some of the counts of a multi-count indictment
in return for a lighter sentence than that for the graver charge
2
;
b) Stipulation of facts- This is the agreement of the parties on some facts admitted,
some facts covered by judicial notice (Sec. 1, Rule 129), judicial admissions (Sec.
2 Rule 129), or on matters not otherwise disputed by them. In cases requiring
the presentation of government witnesses or evidence, the Trial Prosecutor
should exert every effort to secure a waiver by the accused of objections to the
admissibility of certain documentary evidence, e.g., medical or death cenificare,
necropsy report, forensic chemistry report, ballistics report, PhilippineOverseas
and Employment Administration (POEA) Certification, and the like, if such
evidence has no relevance whatsoever to the theory of the defense, in order to
d~spense with the presentation and testimony in court of government witnesses.
Whenever appropriate or necessary, the counter-affidavit of the accused
submitted luring the preliminary investigation may be resorted to or availed of
to denions~rate or establish the defense theory;
c) Marking of documentary evidence in advance for identification;
d) Waiver in advance of objections to admissibility of evidence;
e) List of witnesses to be presented which should be qualified by the
following statement: "that other witnesses may be presented in the
course of the trial"; and
f) Such other matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial.

SEC. 4. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. - The following rules shall apply to cases where
the accused pleads guilty to a lesser offense:

a) The Trial Prosecutor shall immediately move for the suspension of the
proceedings whenever the accused manifests his intention in court to
plead guilty to a lesser offense. This will enable the Trial Prosecutor to
evaluate the implications of the offer.
b) If the lesser offense to which the accused will plead guilty is not a
capital offense, the Trial Prosecutor may dispense with the
presentation of evidence unless the court directs otherwise.
c) The Trial Prosecutor, with the consent of the offended party, may motu

2
ibid, p.1037.


propno agree to the offer of the accused to plead guilty to a lesser offense if
the penalty imposable therefor is prision correcional (maximum of six [61
years) or less or a fine not exceeding P12,OOO.OO.
d) When the penalty imposable for the offense charged is prision mayor (at
least six [6] years and one [11 day or higher) or a fine exceeding
~12,OOO.OO, the Trial Prosecutor shall first submit his
comment/recommendation to the City or Provincial Prosecutor or to the
Chief State Prosecutor, as the case may be, for approval. If the
recommendation is approved in writing, the Trial Prosecutor, may, with
the consent of the offended party, agree to a plea of guilty to a lesser
offense. For this purpose, the Chief State Prosecutor or the Provincial or
City Prosecutor concerned shall act on the recommendation of the Trial
Prosecutor within forty-eight (48) hours from receipt thereof. In no case
shall the subject plea to a lesser offense be allowed without the written
approval of the above respective heads of office.
e) In all cases, the penalty for the lesser offense to which the accused may
be allowed to plead guilty shall not be more than two (2) degrees lower
than the imposable penalty for the crime charged, notwithstanding
the presence of mitigating circumstances. The lesser offense shall also be
one that is necessarily related to the offense charged or the offense must
belong to the same classification or title under the Revised Penal Code or
therelevant special laws.
3


However, the plea of guilty to a lesser offense may not be allowed where it so
contravenes lo~ nd common sense as to be unconscionable, thereby resulting in
us, where the offense charged is homicide, a plea of guilty to a lesser offense of frustrated or
attempted homicide, may not be allowed, since the fact of death cannot be reconciled with the
plea of guilty to frustrated or attempted homicide. Homicide necessarily produces death, while
frustrated or attempted homicide does not.
4


SEC. 5. when accused pleads guilty to a capital offense. - If the accused pleads guilty to a
capital offense, the Trial Prosecutor must present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and
the precise degree of his culpability. This is mandatory.

B. Matters covered by pre-trial; effects of pre-trial agreement and pre-trial order

-Rule 118, secs. 1,2,4

Section 2.Pre-trial agreement. All agreements or admissions made or entered during the pre-
trial conference shall be reduced in writing and signed by the accused and

3
Department of Justice Circular No.55, dated 31 July 1990.

4
Amatan vs. Aujero 248 SCRA 511(1995).

counsel,otherwise, they cannot be used against the accused. The agreements covering the
matters referred to in section 1 of this Rule shall be approved by the court. (sec. 4, cir. 38-98)
Section 4.Pre-trial order. After the pre-trial conference, the court shall issue an order
reciting the actions taken, the facts stipulated, and evidence marked. Such order shall bind the
parties, limit the trial to matters not disposed of, and control the course of the action during the
trial, unless modified by the court to prevent manifest injustice. (3)

-SC AM No. 03-1-09-SC, Part B (7), (8), (9), (10)


-People v. Abelita, 210 SCRA 446 (1992)

FACTS: Sgt. Wilfredo V. Mendoza and his co-policemen, Pfc. Reynaldo Castil, Pat. Jesus
Echavez, Cpl. Eduardo Sablay and Police Aide Diosdado Tubig, were patrolling the fishport
compound at Northbay Boulevard, Navotas, when they were approached by a man who told
them that a certain Toto was selling marijuana at Gilmar Beerhouse inside the fish port. He
(Mendoza) then planne to have Toto arrested and asked the informant if he could by Marijuana
from Toto. Upon the informants agreement, he gave the former a P10.00 bill on which he
placed his initials. The policemen and the informant proceeded to Gilmar Beerhouse and the
latter entered inside while the policemen positioned themselves outside, where they could see
the interior of the beerhouse through the spaces of its walls. The policemen saw the informant
approach Toto, who was occupying a table at a distance of four arms length from where they
were positioned, and they saw the informant give the marked P10.00 bill to Toto. Soon enough,
Toto handed the informant a small white package. Upon exchange, the policemen entered the
beerhouse and met the informant, who handed the package to Sgt. Mendoza. Pfc. Castil
recovered from Toto a blue can of Bonna Milk, which contained 37 sticks of Marijuana and the
marked P10.00 bill. The small white package handed by the informant to Sgt. Mendoza, on the
other hand, contained three sticks of Marijuana. Toto, whom Sgt. Mendoza identified in open
court as herein accused, was brought to the Navotas Police Station for investigation. The 40
sticks of Marijuana were brought to the NBI for laboratory examination, which confirmed the
contents as Marijuana.
Toto was charged with violating RA 6429 for selling Marijuana, in which he pleaded
not guilty. His counsel filed a motion to dismiss, saying they never presented the informant in
court. However, it was denied and he was sentenced to life imprisonment and a fine of P20000
for the cost of the suit.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Forensic Experts testimony was essential for Totos conviction.
HELD: No.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
The failure of the prosecution to present the forensic expert who prepared the NBI report to
establish the corpus delicti of the crime is not fatal. The records show that the accused and his
counsel admitted the due execution and genuineness of the evidence submitted by the
prosecution witness Forensic Chemist Felicisima M. Francisco during the pre-trial
conference. Thereafter, the trial court issued an Order dated April 11, 1990 which
embodied the manifestation of the prosecution that since the accused and his counsel
admitted the genuineness and due execution of the forensic chemist report, it is
dispensing with the testimony of the forensic expert. The trial court's Order dated April 11,
1990 is hereunder quoted as follows, to wit:
Order
xxx xxx xxx
At the pre-trial today, the accused and his counsel admitted the due execution
and genuineness of the evidence submitted by the prosecution witness Forensic
Chemist Felicisima M. Francisco, to wit:
Exh. A Letter request dated February 16, 1990
Exh. B Report No. DDM90-265
Exh. C Three sticks of marijuana wrapped on a white paper
Exh. D Empty Bona Milk can
Exh. D-1 Thirty seven (37) sticks of marijuana cigarettes
In view thereof, the prosecution manifested that it is dispensing with the
testimony of F.M. Francisco and it is presenting two (2) witnesses. The defense
counsel manifested, he will present two (2) witnesses. (p. 26, Record) (Brief for
the Plaintiff-Appellee, p.6)
As pointed out by the Solicitor General, the accused-appellant must have overlooked his
admission as to the due execution and genuineness of the forensic chemist report when he
raised this first assignment of error.
We agree with the position of the Solicitor General that if the matters taken up and embodied
in the pre-trial order were not in accordance with what was really stipulated upon, then
accused-appellant should have interposed his objections earlier or as soon as the pre-trial order
was issued. Hence, it is clear that upon the accused-appellant's failure to interpose
objections, the facts stipulated during a pre-trial conference and embodied in a pre-trial
order bind the parties.
-People v. Uy, 327 SCRA 335 (2000)

During the pre-trial, the parties agreed on a joint trial and to dispense with the testimony of
Forensic Chemist Loreto F. Bravo. They also agreed on the marking of the exhibits for the
prosecution.
At the trial, the prosecution presented as witnesses SPO1 Alberto G. Nepomuceno, Jr., who
acted as the poseur-buyer, and SPO4 Eddie Regalado, another member of the buy-bust team, as
rebuttal witness. The defense presented RAMON and Maritess Puno.
We now address RAMONs contention that since the NBI Forensic Chemist did not testify, his
findings that the specimens submitted to him were indeed shabu and weighed so much, are
hearsay and leave the evidence of the prosecution insufficient to convict. RAMONs premise is
that at the pre-trial he did not waive the Forensic Chemists testimony but only "stipulated on
the markings of the prosecutions evidence." Indeed, the records disclose that during the
pre-trial, conducted immediately after the arraignment on 21 November 1995, RAMON,
duly represented by counsel de parte Atty. Gerardo Alberto,
[33]
and the prosecution
stipulated on the markings of the prosecutions exhibits, and agreed to dispense with the
testimony of Forensic Chemist Loreto F. Bravo. Thereafter the trial court issued a Joint
Order, which embodies its ruling granting the motion of the trial prosecutor for the joint trial
of the two cases and the withdrawal of the motion for reinvestigation by RAMONs counsel;
RAMONs plea of not guilty in each case; and the proceedings at the pre-trial. As to the latter,
the Joint Order states:
During the pre-trial, prosecution and defense agreed to stipulate on the
markings of the following prosecutions exhibits, thereby dispensing will the
testimony of Forensic chemist Loreto E. Bravo, to wit:
Exhibit "A" - Letter request;
Exhibit "B" - Preliminary report;
Exhibit "B-1" - Signature of forensic Chemist;
Exhibit "C" - Final Report for Chemical cases Nos.
16199 and 16200;
Exhibit "C-1" - Signature of Forensic Chemist in said
Report;
The five (5) plastic bags with markings containing
methamphetamine hydrochloride with a total weight of 401
grams will be marked as follows:
Exhibit "D" - Plastic bag with letter A;
Exhibit "D-1" - Plastic bag with letter B;
Exhibit "D-2" - Plastic bag with letter C;
Exhibit "D-3" - Plastic bag with letter D;
Exhibit "D-4" - Plastic bag with letter E;
Exhibit "E" - One (1) plastic sachet with
methamphetamine hydrochloride with a total weight of 5.8564
grams;
Exhibit "F" - Another Final report for Criminal
Case No. 16201;
Exhibit "F-1" - Signature of Chemist in said report;
The three (3) pieces of plastic scoop and two (2) plastic containers
with markings containing residue of methamphetamine
hydrochloride will be marked as follows:
Exhibit "G" - Plastic scoop color white;
Exhibit "G-1" - Plastic scoop color blue;
Exhibit "G-2" - Plastic scoop color tangerine;
Exhibit "H" - Selecta ice cream plastic cup;
Exhibit "H-1" - White plastic container;
By agreement of the prosecution and defense, set the presentation of evidence for
the prosecution on January 8, 9, 11 and 15, 1996; whereas evidence for the
defense will be on January 18, 22 and 25, 1996, all at 1:30 oclock in the
afternoon.
[34]

It may at once be noted that neither RAMON nor his counsel made express admission that the
contents of the plastic bags to "be marked" as Exhibits "D," "D-1," "D-2," "D-3," "D-4," and
"E" contain methamphetamine hydrochloride. That RAMON agreed to dispense with the
testimony of Forensic Chemist Bravo may not be considered an admission of the findings of
Bravo on the contents of the plastic bag. Strictly, from the tenor of the aforequoted portion of
the Joint Order, it is clear that RAMON and his counsel merely agreed to the marking of
the exhibits, and the clause "thereby dispensing with the testimony of forensic Chemist
Loreto E. Bravo" must be understood in that context.
Even granting for the sake of argument that RAMON admitted during the pre-trial that
Exhibits "D" to "D-4," inclusive, and Exhibit "E" contained methamphetamine
hydrochloride, the admission cannot be used in evidence against him because the Joint
Order was not signed by RAMON and his counsel. Section 4 of Rule 118 of the Rules of
Court expressly provides:
SEC. 40. Pre-trial agreements must be signed. No agreement or admission made or entered during
the pre-trial conference shall be used in evidence against the accused unless reduced to writing
and signed and his counsel.
[35]

Put in another way, to bind the accused the pre-trial order must be signed not only by
him but his counsel as well. The purpose of this requirement is to further safeguard the
rights of the accused against improvident or unauthorized agreements or admissions
which his counsel may have entered into without his knowledge, as he may have waived
his presence at the pre-trial conference;
[36]
eliminate any doubt on the conformity of the
accused to the facts agreed upon.
[37]

Nevertheless, RAMON cannot take advantage of the absence of his and his counsels
signatures on the pre-trial order. When the prosecution formally offered in evidence what it
had marked in evidence during the pre-trial, RAMON did not object to the admission of
Bravos Preliminary Report (Exh. "B"), Final Report (Exh. "C"), another Final Report (Exh.
"F"), and of the plastic bags (Exhibits "D" to "D-4" inclusive, and "E").
When asked to comment on the exhibits formally offered, RAMONs counsel merely stated:
ATTY. DOMINGO:
No objection to these exhibits Your Honor only insofar as to form part of the
testimony of the witness/ es who testified and identified said exhibits and only
insofar or in accordance with the stipulations the prosecution and the defense
had entered into during the pre-trial stage of the proceedings.
[38]

In its offer of the exhibits, the prosecution explicitly described what the foregoing exhibits was
and the purposes for which they were offered, thus:
FISCAL ALIPOSA:
We are now offering in evidence the following:
Exhibit "A", is the letter-request;
Exhibit "B", the preliminary report;
Exhibit "B-1", signature of the forensic chemist;
Exhibit "C", final report of Crim. Case Nos. 16199-MN and
16200-MN;
Exhibit "C-1", the signature of forensic chemist;
These exhibits are being offered to establish the fact that after the
apprehension of the accused, the necessary request was prepared
and findings in the preliminary and final reports are both positive
for shabu or methamphetamine hydrochloride.
Exhibits "D", "D-1", "D-2", "D-3", and "D-4", are plastic packs of
shabu found inside the attache case opened while inside the
vehicle of the accused together with the prosecution witness in
the course of the buy-bust operation;
Exhibit "E" is the 5.84 grams of shabu which was the subject of
the buy-bust operation;
Exhibit "F" and "F-1", final report and signature of the forensic
chemist in Crim. Case No. 16201-MN, showing the specimen
examined to be positive for shabu;
xxx
We likewise offered these exhibits as part of the testimony of the
witness or witnesses who testified thereon Your Honor.
[39]

In addition to the foregoing admission by RAMON of the prosecutions exhibits, he
likewise never raised in issue before the trial court the non-presentation of Forensic
Chemist Bravo. RAMON cannot now raise it for the first time on appeal. Objection to
evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; when a party desires the court to reject
the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of objection. Without such objection he
cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal.
[40]
The familiar rule in this jurisdiction is
that the inadmissibility of certain documents upon the ground of hearsay if not urged before the
court below cannot, for the first time, be raised on appeal.
[41]
In U.S. v. Choa Tong
[42]
where the
defense counsel did not object to the form or substance of a laboratory report that the specimen
submitted was opium, the Court ruled that "[t]he objection should have been made at the time
the said analysis was presented."
C. Effect of non-appearance

-Rule 119, sec. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9 & 10
Section 3.Non-appearance at pre-trial conference. If the counsel for the accused or the
prosecutor does not appear at the pre-trial conference and does not offer an acceptable excuse
for his lack of cooperation, the court may impose proper sanctions or penalties. (se. 5, cir. 38-98)
-Fule v. CA, 162 SCRA 446 (1998)

This is a Petition for Review on certiorari of the Decision of respondent Appellate Court, which
affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Lucena City, Branch LIV, convicting
petitioner (the accused-appellant) of Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (The Bouncing
Checks Law) on the basis of the Stipulation of Facts entered into between the prosecution and
the defense during the pre-trial conference in the Trial Court. At the hearing of August 23,
1985, only the prosecution presented its evidence. At the subsequent hearing on September 17,
1985, petitioner-appellant waived the right to present evidence and, in lieu thereof, submitted a
Memorandum confirming the Stipulation of Facts. The Trial Court convicted petitioner-
appellant.
On appeal, respondent Appellate Court upheld the Stipulation of Facts and affirmed the
judgment of conviction. Hence, this recourse, with petitioner-appellant contending that the
Honorable Respondent Court of Appeals erred in the decision of the Regional Trial Court
convicting the petitioner of the offense charged, despite the cold fact that the basis of the
conviction was based solely on the stipulation of facts made during the pre-trial on August 8,
1985, which was not signed by the petitioner, nor by his counsel. In Sec.4 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedures:
SEC. 4. Pre-trial agreements must be signed. No agreement or admission made or entered
during the pre-trial conference shall be used in evidence against the accused unless reduced to writing and
signed by him and his counsel. (Rule 118) [Emphasis supplied]
Having been effective since January 01, 1985, the above rule is applicable.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the omission of the signature of the accused and his counsel, as mandatorily
required by the Rules, renders the Stipulation of Facts inadmissible in evidence.
HELD:
YES. Judgment of respondent Appellate Court is REVERSED and this case is hereby ordered
RE-OPENED and REMANDED to the appropriate Branch of the Regional Trial Court of
Lucena City, for further reception of evidence.
RATIO:
By its very language, the Rule is mandatory. Under the rule of statutory construction, negative
words and phrases are to be regarded as mandatory while those in the affirmative are
merely directory (McGee vs. Republic, 94 Phil. 820 [1954]). The use of the term shall further
emphasizes its mandatory character and means that it is imperative, operating to impose a duty
which may be enforced (Bersabal vs. Salvador, No. L-35910, July 21, 1978, 84 SCRA 176). And
more importantly, penal statutes whether substantive and remedial or procedural are, by
consecrated rule, to be strictly applied against the government and liberally in favor of the
accused (People vs. Terrado No. L-23625, November 25, 1983, 125 SCRA 648).
The conclusion is inevitable, therefore, that the omission of the signature of the accused and his
counsel, as mandatorily required by the Rules, renders the Stipulation of Facts inadmissible in
evidence. The fact that the lawyer of the accused, in his memorandum, confirmed the
Stipulation of Facts does not cure the defect because Rule 118 requires both the accused and his
counsel to sign the Stipulation of Facts. What the prosecution should have done, upon
discovering that the accused did not sign the Stipulation of Facts, as required by Rule 118, was
to submit evidence to establish the elements of the crime, instead of relying solely on the
supposed admission of the accused in the Stipulation of Facts. Without said evidence
independent of the admission, the guilt of the accused cannot be deemed established beyond
reasonable doubt.
Consequently, under the circumstances obtaining in this case, the ends of justice require that
evidence be presented to determine the culpability of the accused. When a judgment has been
entered by consent of an attorney without special authority, it will sometimes be set aside or
reopened (Natividad vs. Natividad, 51 Phil. 613 [1928]).

PART EIGHT
TRIAL

I. Order and Procedure

A. Notice of trial; Speedy and continuous trial

-Rule 119, secs. 11,21
Section 11.Order of trial. The trial shall proceed in the following order:
(a) The prosecution shall present evidence to prove the charge and, in the proper case,
the civil liability.
(b) The accused may present evidence to prove his defense, and damages, if any, arising
from the issuance of a provisional remedy in the case.
(c) The prosecution and the defense may, in that order, present rebuttal and sur-rebuttal
evidence unless the court, in furtherance of justice, permits them to present additional
evidence bearing upon the main issue.
(d) Upon admission of the evidence of the parties, the case shall be deemed submitted for
decision unless the court directs them to argue orally or to submit written
memoranda.
(e) When the accused admits the act or omission charged in the complaint or
information but interposes a lawful defense, the order of trial may be modified.
(3a)
Section 21.Exclusion of the public. The judge may, motu proprio, exclude the public from the
courtroom if the evidence to be produced during the trial is offensive to decency or public
morals. He may also, on motion of the accused, exclude the public from the trial, except court
personnel and the counsel of the parties. (13a)
-RJCL, sec. 29

Section 29. Care of Child in Youth Detention Homes or Rehabilitation Centers. - The child in
conflict with the law who has been transferred to a youth rehabilitation center or youth
detention home shall be provided with a healthy environment. If the child is placed under the
care of the provincial, city or municipal jail, the child shall be provided with adequate quarters
separate from adults and prisoners of the opposite sex depending on the age, sex, sexual
lifestyle, and such other circumstances and needs of the child.
Cf. RA 8493, sec. 7 [par.2]; DOJ-NPS Manual, Part IX


PART IX. TRIAL

Purpose: mete out justice : protect the innocent and convict the guilty

SECTION 1. Definition of trial. - A trial is a judicial examination of the claims at issue in
a case which are presented by the prosecution and defense to enable the court to arrive at a
judgment pronouncing either the guilt or innocence of the accused.
2


SEC. 2. Concept of trial. - The object of a trial is to mete out justice, and to convict the
guilty and protect the innocent. Thus, the trial should be a search for the truth and not a
contest over technicalities and must be conducted under such rules as will protect the
innocent.
3


SEC. 3. Expeditious prosecution of criminal cases filed with the courts. -The Trial Prosecutor
shall always be prepared to conduct the prosecution with his witnesses who shall be
subpoenaed well in advance of the scheduled trial dates.
4
No postponement of the trial or other
proceedings of a criminal case shall be initiated or caused by the Trial Prosecutor except in
instances where the postponement is occasioned by the absence of material witnesses or for
other causes beyond his control or not attributable to him.

SEC. 4. Order of presentation of witnesses. -

a) The order in the presentation of witnesses will be left to the discretion of
the Trial Prosecutor. However, the prosecutor should take into consideration
the order of events as established by the evidence of the prosecution.
b) Witnesses who will testify for the first time shall be afforded the
opportunity to be advised to observe criminal proceedings in court to help them
overcome their anxiety, excitement and tension.

SEC. 5. Preparation of formal offer of exhibits. - The Trial Prosecutor shall safely keep
his documentary and other physical evidence and prepare a list thereof in the order they
have been marked as exhibits, identifying each by letter or number, describing it briefly,
and stating its specific purpose or purposes.

SEC. 6. Defense evidence. -

a) Before reception of evidence for the defense starts, the Trial Prosecutor shall ask
from the adverse counsel the number of witnesses he intends to present.
b) If the names of defense witnesses are disclosed the Trial Prosecutor shall elicit
from reliable sources the whereabouts of these witnesses, their moral
character,,background, reasons for testifying andrelationship with the accused,
among other things, to enable him to have a clear view of the defense of the
accused.

SEC. 7. Discharge of accused to he state witness. - When two or more persons are jointly
charged with the commission of any offense, upon motion of the prosecution before resting its
case, the court may direct one or more of the accused to be discharged with their consent so
that they may be witnesses for the state provided the court, after hearing, is satisfied that:

a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose
discharge is requested.
b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper
prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of said accused,as
when he alone has knowledge of the crime, and not when his testimony would
simply corroborate or otherwise strengthen the evidence in the hands of the
prosecution;
c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in
its material points. This is an indispensable requirement because it is a
notorious fact in human nature that a culprit, confessing to a crime, is likely to
put the blame on others rather than himself. Thus, even though a court may get
the statement of a discharged accused that other particular persons were
engaged in the crime, it is unsafe to accept without corroborating evidence, his
statements concerning the relative blame to be attached to different members of
his gang;~
d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty. The mere fact that the
witness sought to be discharged had pleaded guilty In the crime charged does
not violate the rule that the discharged defendant must not "appear to be the
most guilty. And even if the witness should lack some of the qualifications
enumerated by Sec. 9, Rule 119, his testimony will not, for that reason alone, be
discarded or disregarded.10 The ground underlying the rule is not to let a
crime that has been committed go unpunished; so an accused who is not the most
guilty is allowed to testify against the most guilty, in order to achieve the
greater purpose of securing the conviction of the more or most guilty and the
greatest number among the accused permitted to be convicted for the offense
they committed.'' However, although an accused did not commit anv of the
stabbing, it is a mistake to discharge him as a state \witness where he is bound
in a conspiracy. All the perpetrators of the offense bound in conspiracy are
equally guilty.
e) Said accused has not at anv time been convicted of any offense involving
moral turpitude.

Evidence adduced in support of the discharge sha11 automatically form part of the trial.
If the court denies the motion for discharge of the accused as state witness, his sworn statement
shall be inadmissible in evidence.

SEC. 8. Witness protection. - An accused who is discharged from an information or
criminal complaint in order that he may be a state witness as provided in the preceding section
may, upon his petition, be admitted to the Witness Protection Program under R.A. No.6981,
"The Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Act" if he complies with the other requirements
of said Act.

SEC. 9. Other persons who may avail of the Witness Protection Program. -The following may
also avail of the Witness Protection Program under R.A. No.
6981:

a) Any person who has witnessed or has knowledge of or information on the
commission of a crime and has testified or is testifying or is about to testify
before any judicial or quasijudicial body, or before any investigating authority,
Provided, that:

1. the offense in which his testimony will be used is a grave felony as
defined under the Revised Penal Code or its equivalent under special
laws;
ii. histestimony can be substantially corroborated on its material points;
iii. he or any member of his family within the second civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity is subjected to threats to his life or bodily injury
or there is a likelihood that he will be killed, forced, intimidated, harassed
or corrupted to prevent him from testifying, or to testify falsely or
evasively, because or on account of his testimony; and
iv. he is not a law enforcement officer, even if he would be testifying against
other law enforcement officers. In such a case, only the immediate
members of his family may avail themselves of the protection provided
for under the Act.

b) Any person who has participated in the commission of a crime and
desires to be a witness for the State, whenever the following circumstances are
present:

i. . the offense in which testimony will be used is a grave felony as
defined under the Revised Penal Code or its equivalent under special
laws;
ii. there is absolute necessity for his testimony;
iii. there is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution
of the offense committed;

iv his testimony can be substantially corroborated on its material points;
V. he does not appear to be the most guilty; and
vi he has not at any time been convicted of any crime involving moral
turpitude.

SEC. 10. Motions for postponement of accused. - Motions for postponement that are
initiated by the accused should be vigorously opposed by the Trial Prosecutor and he should
make of record his objections thereto, leaving to the court's discretion the disposition of the
subject motions.

SEC. 11. Discontinuance of proceedings. - During the presentation of the prosecution's
evidence, the Trial Prosecutor shall not cause or allow the discontinuance of the proceedings
except for other similarly compelling reasons not attributable to him.

SEC. 12. Presentation of evidence. - Each party is bound to complete the presentation of
his evidence within the trial dates assigned to him. After the lapse of said dates, the party is
deemed to have completed his evidence presentation. However, upon verified motion based on
serious reasons, the judge may allow the party additional trial dates in the afternoon; provided
that said extension will not go beyond the three-month limit computed from the first trial date.

Where a Trial Prosecutor, without good cause, secures postponements of the trial over
the objections of a defendant beyond a reasonable period of time, the accused is entitled to relief
by a proceeding in mandamus to compel a dismissal of the information, or if he be restrained of
his liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain his freedom
16
.

SEC. 13. Order of trial.-Upon receipt of the notice of trial, the prosecutor shall review
the record of the case for trial and complete his preparation therefore bearing in mind that trial,
once commenced, may continue from day to day until terminated, and that trial shall proceed in
the following order pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 119 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure:

a) The prosecution shall present evidence to prove the charge and, in the
proper case, the civil liability.
b) The accused may present evidence to prove his defense, and damages, if any,
arising from the issuance of any provisional remedy in the case.
c) The parties may then respectively present rebutting evidence only, unless
the court, in furtherance of justice, permits them to present additional
evidence bearing upon the main issue.
d) Upon admission of the evidence, the case shall be deemed submitted for
decision unless the court directs the parties to argue orally or to submit
memoranda.
e) However, when the accused admits the act or omission charged in the
complaint or information but interposes a lawful defense, the order of trial
may be modified accordingly.

SEC. 14. Presentation of witnesses.-The order in the presentation of witnesses shall, as far
as practicable, conform to he logical sequence of events obtaining in the case on trial in order to
present a clear, organized and coherent picture to the court of the prosecution's evidence.

For example, in the case of prosecution under the Dangerous Drugs Law, the Trial
Prosecutor should present the forensic chemist who examined the dangerous drug ahead
of the other witnesses in order that the court may at once have a view of the real
evidence (either the prohibited or regulated drug subject of the case) and so that such
evidence may immediately identified by the other witnesses thus avoiding the recall of
witnesses later on.

The rule of logical sequencing notwithstanding, a witness whose testimony is vital to
the case and whose life is in danger or who may be sick/injured arid may possibly die, should be
made to testify as early as practicable.

SEC. 15. Examination of witnesses for the prosecution.-Where it shall satisfactorily
appear that the witness for the prosecution is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial as directed
by order of the court, or has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of returning thereto,
he may forthwith be conditionally examined before the judge or the court where the case is
pending. Such examination in the presence of the accused, or after reasonable notice to attend
the examination has been served on him, will be conducted in the same manner as an
examination at the trial. Failure or refusal on the part of the accused to attend the examination
after notice herein before provided, shall be considered a waiver. The statement thus taken
may be admitted on behalf of or against the accused.

SEC. 16. Cross-Examination of defense witnesses.The prosecutor shall endeavor to secure
well in advance all available information about a defense witness in order to prepare for an
effective cross-examination. Where the testimony of a defense witness bears no effect on the
evidence of the prosecution, a cross-examination need not be conducted.

SEC. 17. Rebuttal evidence.-The presentation and nature of rebuttal evidence will depend
on the effect which the defense evidence may have caused on the prosecution's evidence-in-
chief. The recall of a witness who already testified during the evidence-in-chief presentation
merely to refute what a defense witness may have stated during his defense testimony is not
generally a rebuttal evidence. Where there is nothing to refute, rebuttal evidence is
unnecessary.

See also (1) Public Defenders duty where accused is detention prisoner

-Rule 119, sec 7

Section 7.Public attorney's duties where accused is imprisoned. If the public attorney assigned to
defend a person charged with a crime knows that the latter is preventively detained, either
because he is charged with a bailable crime but has no means to post bail, or, is charged with a
non-bailable crime, or, is serving a term of imprisonment in any penal institution, it shall be his
duty to do the following:
(a) Shall promptly undertake to obtain the presence of the prisoner for trial or cause a
notice to be served on the person having custody of the prisoner requiring such person
to so advise the prisoner of his right to demand trial.
(b) Upon receipt of that notice, the custodian of the prisoner shall promptly advise the
prisoner of the charge and of his right to demand trial. If at anytime thereafter the
prisoner informs his custodian that he demands such trial, the latter shall cause notice
to that effect to sent promptly to the public attorney.
(c) Upon receipt of such notice, the public attorney shall promptly seek to obtain the
presence of the prisoner for trial.
(d) When the custodian of the prisoner receives from the public attorney a properly
supported request for the availability of the prisoner for purposes of trial, the prisoner
shall be made available accordingly. (sec. 12, cir. 38-98)
(2) Appointment of acting prosecutor

-Rule 119, sec 20
Section 20.Appointment of acting prosecutor. When a prosecutor, his assistant or deputy is
disqualified to act due to any of the grounds stated in section 1 of Rule 137 or for any other
reasons, the judge or the prosecutor shall communicate with the Secretary of Justice in order
that the latter may appoint an acting prosecutor. (12a)
~ conflict arising from relationship
~ same prosecutor who conducted PI and is now to prosecute the case
~ judge used to be the prosecutor now hearing the case

B. Order of trial

1. Generally

-Rule 119, secs. 11,21

Section 11.Order of trial. The trial shall proceed in the following order:
(a) The prosecution shall present evidence to prove the charge and, in the proper case,
the civil liability.
(b) The accused may present evidence to prove his defense, and damages, if any, arising
from the issuance of a provisional remedy in the case.
(c) The prosecution and the defense may, in that order, present rebuttal and sur-rebuttal
evidence unless the court, in furtherance of justice, permits them to present additional
evidence bearing upon the main issue.
(d) Upon admission of the evidence of the parties, the case shall be deemed submitted for
decision unless the court directs them to argue orally or to submit written
memoranda.
(e) When the accused admits the act or omission charged in the complaint or
information but interposes a lawful defense, the order of trial may be modified.
(3a)
Section 21.Exclusion of the public. The judge may, motu proprio, exclude the public from the
courtroom if the evidence to be produced during the trial is offensive to decency or public
morals. He may also, on motion of the accused, exclude the public from the trial, except court
personnel and the counsel of the parties. (13a)

-DOJ-NPS Manual, Part IX, sec. 4, 12, 15, 16 & 17

Section 4.Factors for granting continuance. The following factors, among others, shall be
considered by a court in determining whether to grant a continuance under section 3(f) of this
Rule.
(a) Whether or not the failure to grant a continuance in the proceeding would likely
make a continuation of such proceeding impossible or result in a miscarriage of justice;
and
(b) Whether or not the case taken as a whole is so novel, unusual and complex, due to
the number of accused or the nature of the prosecution, or that it is unreasonable to
expect adequate preparation within the periods of time established therein.
In addition, no continuance under section 3(f) of this Rule shall be granted because of
congestion of the court's calendar or lack of diligent preparation or failure to obtain available
witnesses on the part of the prosecutor. (sec. 10, cir. 38-98)
Section 12.Application for examination of witness for accused before trial. When the accused has
been held to answer for an offense, he may, upon motion with notice to the other parties, have
witnesses conditionally examined in his behalf. The motion shall state: (a) the name and
residence of the witness; (b) the substance of his testimony; and (c) that the witness is sick or
infirm as to afford reasonable ground for believing that he will not be able to attend the trial, or
resides more than one hundred (100) kilometers from the place of trial and has no means to
attend the same, or that other similar circumstances exist that would make him unavailable or
prevent him from attending the trial. The motion shall be supported by an affidavit of the
accused and such other evidence as the court may require. (4a)
Section 15.Examination of witness for the prosecution. When it satisfactorily appears that a
witness for the prosecution is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial as directed by the order of
the court, or has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of returning, he may forthwith be
conditionally examined before the court where the case is pending. Such examination, in the
presence of the accused, or in his absence after reasonable notice to attend the examination has
been served on him, shall be conducted in the same manner as an examination at the trial.
Failure or refusal of the accused to attend the examination after notice shall be considered a
waiver. The statement taken may be admitted in behalf of or against the accused. (7a)
Section 16.Trial of several accused. When two or more accused are jointly charged with any
offense, they shall be tried jointly unless the court, in its discretion and upon motion of
the prosecutor or any accused, orders separate trial for one or more accused. (8a)
Section 17.Discharge of accused to be state witness. When two or more persons are jointly
charged with the commission of any offense, upon motion of the prosecution before resting its
case, the court may direct one or more of the accused to be discharged with their consent so
that they may be witnesses for the state when, after requiring the prosecution to present
evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the
discharge, the court is satisfied that:
(a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is
requested;
(b) The is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense
committed, except the testimony of said accused;
(c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material
points;
(d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and
(e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral
turpitude.
Evidence adduced in support of the discharge shall automatically form part of the trial. If the
court denies the motion for discharge of the accused as state witness, his sworn statement shall
be inadmissible in evidence. (9a)

2. Trial of several accused; discharge of accused to be state witness

-Rule 119, secs. 16, 17, 18

Section 18.Discharge of accused operates as acquittal. The order indicated in the preceding
section shall amount to an acquittal of the discharged accused and shall be a bar to future
prosecution for the same offense, unless the accused fails or refuses to testify against his co-
accused in accordance with his sworn statement constituting the basis for the discharge. (10a)
-RA 6981 - "Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Act".

Section 3. Admission into the Program. - Any person who has witnessed or has knowledge
or information on the commission of a crime and has testified or is testifying or about to testify
before any judicial or quasi-judicial body, or before any investigating authority, may be
admitted into the Program:
Provided, That:
a) theoffense in which his testimony will be used is a grave felony as defined under the
Revised Penal Code, or its equivalent under special laws;lawphi1
b) his testimony can be substantially corroborated in its material points;
c) he or any member of his family within the second civil degree of consanguinity or
affinityis subjected to threats to his life or bodily injury or there is a likelihood that he
will be killed, forced, intimidated, harassed or corrupted to prevent him from testifying,
or to testify falsely, or evasively, because or on account of his testimony; and
d) he is not a law enforcement officer, even if he would be testifying against the other
law enforcement officers. In such a case, only the immediate members of his family may
avail themselves of the protection provided for under this Act.
If the Department, after examination of said applicant and other relevant facts, is convinced
that the requirements of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations have been
complied with, it shall admit said applicant to the Program, require said witness to execute a
sworn statement detailing his knowledge or information on the commission of the crime, and
thereafter issue the proper certification. For purposes of this Act, any such person admitted to
the Program shall be known as the Witness.
Section 4. Witness in Legislative Investigations. - In case of legislative investigations in aid
of legislation, a witness, with his express consent, may be admitted into the Program upon the
recommendation of the legislative committee where his testimony is needed when in its
judgment there is pressing necessity therefor: Provided, That such recommendation is
approved by the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives, as the
case may be.
Section 8. Rights and Benefits. - The witness shall have the following rights and benefits:
(a) To have a secure housing facility until he has testified or until the threat, intimidation or
harassment disappears or is reduced to a manageable or tolerable level. When the
circumstances warrant, the Witness shall be entitled to relocation and/or change of personal
identity at the expense of the Program. This right may be extended to any member of the
family of the Witness within the second civil degree of consanguinity or affinity.
(b) The Department shall, whenever practicable, assist the Witness in obtaining a
means of livelihood. The Witness relocated pursuant to this Act shall be entitled to a
financial assistance from the Program for his support and that of his family in such
amount and for such duration as the Department shall determine.
(c) In no case shall the Witness be removed from or demoted in work because or on
account of his absences due to his attendance before any judicial or quasi-judicial body
or investigating authority, including legislative investigations in aid of legislation, in
going thereto and in coming therefrom: Provided, That his employer is notified through
a certification issued by the Department, within a period of thirty (30) days from the
date when the Witness last reported for work: Provided, further, That in the case of
prolonged transfer or permanent relocation, the employer shall have the option to
remove the Witness from employment after securing clearance from the Department
upon the recommendation of the Department of Labor and Employment.
Any Witness who failed to report for work because of witness duty shall be paid his
equivalent salaries or wages corresponding to the number of days of absence occasioned
by the Program. For purposes of this Act, any fraction of a day shall constitute a full
day salary or wage. This provision shall be applicable to both government and private
employees.
(d) To be provided with reasonable travelling expenses and subsistence allowance by
the Program in such amount as the Department may determine for his attendance in the
court, body or authority where his testimony is required, as well as conferences and
interviews with prosecutors or investigating officers.
(e) To be provided with free medical treatment, hospitalization and medicines for any
injury or illness incurred or suffered by him because of witness duty in any private or
public hospital, clinic, or at any such institution at the expense of the Program.
(f) If a Witness is killed, because of his participation in the Program, his heirs shall be
entitled to a burial benefit of not less than Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) from the
Program exclusive of any other similar benefits he may be entitled to under other
existing laws.
(g) In case of death or permanent incapacity, his minor or dependent children shall be
entitled to free education, from primary to college level in any state, or private school,
college or university as may be determined by the Department, as long as they shall
have qualified thereto.
Section 10. State Witness. - Any person who has participated in the commission of a crime
and desires to be a witness for the State, can apply and, if qualified as determined in this Act
and by the Department, shall be admitted into the Program whenever the following
circumstances are present:
(a) the offense in which his testimony will be used is a grave felony as defined under the
Revised Penal Code or its equivalent under special laws;
(b) there is absolute necessity for his testimony;
(c) there is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense
committed:
(d) his testimony can be substantially corroborated on its material points;
(e) he does not appear to be most guilty; and
(f) he has not at any time been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude.
An accused discharged from an information or criminal complaint by the court in order that he
may be a State Witness pursuant to Section 9 and 10 of Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court
may upon his petition be admitted to the Program if he complies with the other requirements of
this Act. Nothing in this Act shall prevent the discharge of an accused, so that he can be used as
a State Witness under Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court.
-People v. Ocimar, 212 SCRA, 771, (1992) co-accused in a case charging them of
conspiracy, one can still be discharged as state witness
What the law prohibits is that the most guilty will be set freewhile his co-accused who
are less guilty will be sent to jail. And by "most guilty" we mean the highest degree of
culpability in terms of participation in the commission of the offense, and not necessarily
the severity of the penalty imposed
Facts:
Eduardo Labalan Ocimar, Alexander Cortez Mendoza, Alfonso Ramos Bermudez and 2
others were charged with PD 532 or the Anti-Highway Robbery Law for robbing P36,000
worth of jewelry and valuables of the passengers in Baliuag Transit while en route along the
North Expressway, and ended up killing an army officer.

Ocimar and Mendoza were arraigned and pleaded not guilty while Bermudez pleaded
guilty while the 2 others escaped before arraignment. After prosecution presented 4 witnesses,
they moved to discharge Bermudez to become a state witness. Although he pleaded guilty,
there was no judgement rendered against him. He testified and was then released.

Ocimar and Mendoza were convicted.

Issue:

Whether or not turning Bermudez as state witness was proper even if he pleaded guilty
already.

Held:

YES

Ratio:

The held that it was properly decided that Bermudez can turn state witness as can be
gleaned from Sec. 9, Rule 119 of 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, now Sec.17, Rule 119 on
the Discharge of accused to be state witness. When two or more persons are jointly charged
with the commission of any offense, upon motion of the prosecution before resting its case, the
court may direct one or more of the accused to be discharged with their consent so that they
may be witnesses for the state when after requiring the prosecution to present evidence and the
sworn statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge, the
court is satisfied that: (a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose
discharge is requested: (b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper
prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of said accused; (c) The testimony of
said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points; (d) Said accused does not
appear to be the most guilty; (e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense
involving moral turpitude.

As may be gleaned from the aforequoted Sec. 9 (now Sec 17) of Rule 119, the trial court
must be satisfied that the conditions prescribed by the rule exist. The court therefore, upon
prior determination by the public prosecutor, retains the prerogative of deciding when a co-
accused may be discharged to become a state witness. With Sec. 9 (now Sec 17) providing the
guidelines, the discharge of an accused depends on sound judicial discretion. Once that
discretion is exercised under those guidelines and a co-accused is discharged to become a state
witness, and subsequently testifies in accordance with his undertaking with the government,
any legal deficiency or defect that might have attended his discharge from the information will
no longer affect the admissibility and credibility of his testimony, provided such testimony is
otherwise admissible an credible.

First, there is absolute necessity for the testimony of Bermudez. For, despite the
presentation of four (4) other witnesses, none of them could positively identify the accused
except Bermudez who was one of those who pulled the highway heist which resulted not only
in the loss of cash, jewelry and other valuables, but even the life of Capt. Caeba, Jr. It was in
fact the testimony of Bermudez that clinched the case for the prosecution. Second, without his
testimony, no other direct evidence was available for the prosecution to prove the elements of
the crime. Third, his testimony could be, as indeed it was, substantially corroborated in its
material points as indicated by the trial court in its well--reasoned decision. Fourth, he does not
appear to be the most guilty. As the evidence reveals, he was only invited to a drinking party
without having any prior knowledge of the plot to stage a highway robbery. But even assuming
that he later became part of the conspiracy, he does not appear to be the most guilty. What the
law prohibits is that the most guilty will be set free while his co-accused who are less guilty
will be sent to jail. And by "most guilty" we mean the highest degree of culpability in terms of
participation in the commission of the offense, and not necessarily the severity of the penalty
imposed. While all the accused may be given the same penalty by reason of conspiracy, yet one
may be considered least guilty if We take into account his degree of participation in the
perpetration of the offense. Fifth, there is no evidence that he has at any time been convicted of
any offense involving moral turpitude.

Besides, the matter of discharging a co--accused to become state witness is left largely
to the discretion of the trial fiscal, subject only to the approval of the court. The reason is
obvious. The fiscal should know better than the court, and the defense for that matter, as to
who of the accused would best qualify to be discharged to become state witness. The public
prosecutor is supposed to know the evidence in his possession ahead
of all the rest. He knows whom he needs to establish his case.

-People v. Ramirez, 169 SCRA 711 (1989)

FACTS
Paterno and his family was killed alledgedly by Hermenegilido, his brother, by inducing other
people do so. He was convicted based on his co-accuseds testimonies. Apolnio, the new
housboy, who claimed to be approached appellant so many times and finally gave in for 3k. and
conviced the Bagispis and Maghinay to help him. Vidal, who said appellant approached him in
his house and offered 100 to kill victims.

ISSUE
WON Co-Accused/witnesses were credible and enough to convict appellant?

HELD
NO
Interlocking or not, the extrajudicial confessions taken from Bagispas and Maghinay are
worthless scraps of paper that do not deserve the attention of the Court. These confessions
were obtained without observance of the rights guaranteed by the Constitution to a person
under custodial investigation and so should be rejected outright Confessions obtained in
violation of what is now Article III, Section 12(l) of the Constitution are not admissible in
evidence against the declarants and much less against third persons, like the accused-
appellants in this case. Police and prosecutors are reminded that such statements are
completely useless except possibly as evidence against them for violation of the suspect's rights.

-People v. Morneno, 208 SCRA86 (1992)

N. Avenue Manila, to report that his soc, Oscar Guevarra, Jr. was missing and was last seen
driving a Toyota Corolla car.October 17, 1981, Oscar Guevarra Sr. found the body of his son at
Funeraria Popular lifeless on the steel table and had 13 wound stabs. Apparently, the dead body
of Oscar Guevarra Jr. was first found on October 13, 1981 in Meycauyan Bulacan. Four persons
were charged for his brutal death. Alfredo Moreno Jr., Noli Rivera, Antonio Gonzales, and
Froilan Jacinto.Froilan Jacinto having been discharged as a state witness was acquitted, while
Noli Rivera is at large and unapprehended up to present. Accused Alfredo Moreno Jr. and
Antonio Gonzales were both Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide as defined in Art. 293 and penalized by Art. 294 (1) of the Revised Penal
Code and considering the aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior strength, were
sentenced to Reclusion Perpetua. The antecedent facts as related by Froilan Jacinto was
corroborated by the report submitted by Cpl. Edgardo Calderon.

Issue: Whether or not the trial court made a mistake in giving credence to the testimony of
state witness Friolan Jacinto and in finding conspiracy existed among them?

Held: Yes, because Froilan Jacinto was discharged as a state witness. And that we find no
reason, therefore, to reverse the finding of guilt of accused-appellants by the trial court.

Ratio: Accused Froilan Jacinto was discharged as state witness in a resolution of this court
dated November 6, 1984, it appearing from the memorandum for prosecution that he appears to
be the least guilty among the four accused, considering among others that he never inflicted the
fatal wounds that led to the victims death. We do not find the testimony of Froilan Jacinto to
be incredible. On the contrary his testimony and the statement he made during investigation
are consistent on the relevant and material points. At any rate, the trial court is the best judge
of whether or not a witness is credible. Its findings on the credibility of a witness are entitled
to great weight and respect and will not be disturbed on appeal unless some facts or
that conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence, but may be proven through a series
of acts done in pursuance of a common unlawful purpose. The present case, there are strong
evidences which indicate that the accused conspired to commit robbery. And when they did so,
armed themselves, no member of the group may disclaim responsibility for any act of violence
that is perpetrated by reason or on occasion of the robbery. Robbery with homicide is a special
complex crime. It is inconsequential that homicide preceded the robber, where robbery was the
real motive of the perpetrators. What is essential is that there was a direct link which is the
prospect of monetary gain which impelled the malefactors to place filthy lucre above the value
of human life.Conspiracy to commit the crime of robbery having been established by the
concerted acts of the accused, and homicide occurred as a consequence. Therefore all those who
participated in the crime robbery are principals in the complex crime of robbery with homicide.
In the case at bar, accused Moreno commenced the hold-up of the victim, co-accused Gonzales
and Noli Rivera assisted him by poking their knives at the victim and all took part in killing
him.

3. Consolidation of trials of related offenses

-Rule 119, sec 22
Section 22.Consolidation of trials of related offenses. Charges for offenses founded on the same
facts or forming part of a series of offenses of similar character may be tried jointly at the
discretion of the court. (14a)
C. Examination of witness outside or in advance of trial

1. Witnesses for the prosecution

-Rule 119, sec 15& 14
Section 14.Bail to secure appearance of material witness. When the court is satisfied, upon
proof or oath, that a material witness will not testify when required, it may, upon motion of
either party, order the witness to post bail in such sum as may be deemed proper. Upon refusal
to post bail, the court shall commit him to prison until he complies or is legally discharged after
his testimony has been taken. (6a)
Section 15.Examination of witness for the prosecution. When it satisfactorily appears that a
witness for the prosecution is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial as directed by the order of
the court, or has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of returning, he may forthwith be
conditionally examined before the court where the case is pending. Such examination, in the
presence of the accused, or in his absence after reasonable notice to attend the examination has
been served on him, shall be conducted in the same manner as an examination at the trial.
Failure or refusal of the accused to attend the examination after notice shall be considered a
waiver. The statement taken may be admitted in behalf of or against the accused. (7a)

2. Witnesses for the accused

-Rule 119, secs 12, 13 & 14

Section 12.Application for examination of witness for accused before trial. When the accused has
been held to answer for an offense, he may, upon motion with notice to the other parties, have
witnesses conditionally examined in his behalf. The motion shall state: (a) the name and
residence of the witness; (b) the substance of his testimony; and (c) that the witness is sick or
infirm as to afford reasonable ground for believing that he will not be able to attend the trial, or
resides more than one hundred (100) kilometers from the place of trial and has no means to
attend the same, or that other similar circumstances exist that would make him unavailable or
prevent him from attending the trial. The motion shall be supported by an affidavit of the
accused and such other evidence as the court may require. (4a)
Section 13.Examination of defense witness; how made. If the court is satisfied that the
examination of a witness for the accused is necessary, an order will be made directing that the
witness be examined at a specified date, time and place and that a copy of the order be served
on the prosecutor at least three (3) days before the scheduled examination. The examination
shall be taken before a judge, or, if not practicable, a member of the Bar in good standing so
designated by the judge in the order, or if the order be made by a court of superior jurisdiction,
before an inferior court to be designated therein. The examination shall proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the prosecutor provided he was duly notified of the hearing. A
written record of the testimony shall be taken. (5a)
Section 14.Bail to secure appearance of material witness. When the court is satisfied, upon
proof or oath, that a material witness will not testify when required, it may, upon motion of
either party, order the witness to post bail in such sum as may be deemed proper. Upon refusal
to post bail, the court shall commit him to prison until he complies or is legally discharged after
his testimony has been taken. (6a)
Section 15.Examination of witness for the prosecution. When it satisfactorily appears that a
witness for the prosecution is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial as directed by the order of
the court, or has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of returning, he may forthwith be
conditionally examined before the court where the case is pending. Such examination, in the
presence of the accused, or in his absence after reasonable notice to attend the examination has
been served on him, shall be conducted in the same manner as an examination at the trial.
Failure or refusal of the accused to attend the examination after notice shall be considered a
waiver. The statement taken may be admitted in behalf of or against the accused. (7a)
D Examination of Child Witnesses - create and maintain an environment that
will allow children to give reliable and complete evidence, minimize trauma to
children, encourage children to testify in legal proceedings, and facilitate the
ascertainment of truth.chanrobles virtual

1. Child Witness Rule (CWR), secs. 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18,
19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27 & 31 (c)

2. Demurrer to the evidence

-Rule 119,sec. 23
Section 23.Demurrer to evidence. After the prosecution rests its case, the court may dismiss
the action on the ground of insufficiency of evidence (1) on its own initiative after giving the
prosecution the opportunity to be heard or (2) upon demurrer to evidence filed by the accused
with or without leave of court.
If the court denies the demurrer to evidence filed with leave of court, the accused may adduce
evidence in his defense. When the demurrer to evidence is filed without leave of court, the
accused waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of
the evidence for the prosecution. (15a)
The motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence shall specifically state its grounds
and shall be filed within a non-extendible period of five (5)days after the prosecution rests its
case. The prosecution may oppose the motion within a non-extendible period of five (5) days
from its receipt.
If leave of court is granted, the accused shall file the demurrer to evidence within a non-
extendible period of ten (10) days from notice. The prosecution may oppose the demurrer to
evidence within a similar period from its receipt.
The order denying the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence or the demurrer
itself shall not be reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before judgment. (n)

-Ocampo v. CA, 180 SCRA 27 (1989)
As regard the second issue presented, the answer is in the affirmative. Section 15, Rule 119 of
the Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, provides:
Section 15. Demurrer to Evidence. after the prosecution has rested its case, the
court may dismiss the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence (1) on its
own initiative after giving the prosecution an opportunity to be heard; or (2) on
motion of the accused filed with prior leave of court.
If the court denies the motion for dismissal, the accused may adduce evidence in
his defense. When the accused files such motion to dismiss without express leave
of court, he waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for
judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution. (Emphasis supplied).
The amendment to Section 15, Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure took effect
only on October 1, 1988, but the same was given retroactive effect in the case of Bonalos vs.
People, in its resolution dated, September 19, 1988. Well-settled is the rule that "statutes
regulating the procedure of the court will be construed as applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and
to that extent" (People vs. Sumilang, 77 Phil. 784; Alday vs. Canilon, 120 SCRA 522). The
amendment would therefore apply in this case.
In the case at bar, nowhere does the record show that accused-petitioner's demurrer to evidence
was filed with prior leave of court, the retroactive effect of the amendment aforestated would
therefore work against herein petitioner.
By moving to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of evidence, accused-petitioner waives his
right to present evidence to substantiate his defense and in effect submits the case for judgment
on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution. This is exactly what petitioner did, and he
cannot now claim denial of his right to adduce his own evidence. As the Solicitor General aptly
opined, "petitioner gambled on securing an acquittal, a gamble which he lost." (pp. 31-32,
Rollo)
More than that, petitioner raises as issue whether his motion to dismiss bars him from
presenting his evidence, but nowhere in his petition does he endeavor to argue in his favor.
Such a question should have been raised by the petitioner in the court a quo and on appeal yet
he failed to do the same.
-Onas v. Sandiganbayan, 178 SCRA 261 (1989)
The Sandiganbayan was, to be sure, quite correct in emphasizing to Oas on July 1, 1988 that
by filing a demurrer to evidence, she was waiving the right to present evidence. That
cautionary advice was entirely justified by the governing provision then in force, Section 15,
Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure-a provision having no counterpart in the
1964 Rules and obviously meant to alter the jurisprudential principle theretofore obtaining 7-
said Section 15 reading as follows:
SEC. 15. Demurrer to Evidence.- When after the prosecution has rested its case,
the accused files a motion to dismiss the case on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence, he waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for
judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution.
But the law was changed after Oas' demurrer to evidence had been overruled, verdict rendered
against her, her motion for reconsideration of her conviction denied by Resolution promulgated
on November 9, 1988, and before she could take an appeal to this Court.
8
On November
13,1988, the 1988 amendments to the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure (Rules 110-126, Rules
of Court) went into effect.
9
Section 15, Rule 119, was amended to read as follows:
SEC. 15. Demurrer to evidence.- After the prosecution has rested its case, the
Court may dismiss the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence: (1) on its
own initiative after giving the prosecution an opportunity to be heard; or (2) on
motion of the accused filed with prior leave of court.
If the Court denies the motion for dismissal, the accused may adduce evidence in
his defense. When the accused files such motion to dismiss without express leave
of court, he waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for
judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution. (n)
Pursuant to the time-honored rule to which attention is drawn by the Solicitor General,
10
that
adjective statutes may be made applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of
their passage, the amended provision should have been applied to Oas, specially since it is
favorable to her. So does this Court now rule: Section 15 of Rule 119, as lastly amended, applies
as regards Oas. Since she sought and was granted leave to file a demurrer to evidence, and she
made an explicit reservation to present evidence in the event of denial of her demurrer
(withdrawing an earlier waiver made by her), her situation falls within said Section 15, Rule
119, as amended. Not having expressly waived the right to adduce evidence, she did not
lose the right to do so after her motion for dismissal was denied. Hence, the Court is
constrained to regard as grave error, because contrary to the letter and spirit of the
applicable law (albeit probably unintended), the Sandiganbayan's act of ruling otherwise
under the circumstances, and convicting Oas on the basis only on the evidence of the
prosecution.
It is worthy of note that by an extended Resolution dated September 19, 1988 in G.R. No.
78759 entitled Bonalos v. People, the Third Division of this Court, also on recommendation of
the Solicitor General, similarly gave retroactive effect to said Section 15 of Rule 119, as revised
by the 1988 Amendments, upon the authority of the same precedents above cited.
The conclusion here expressed makes unnecessary (and premature) consideration of the other
errors assigned to the Sandiganbayan by the petitioner.
Issues on Pre-Trial

When is pre-trial held?

After arraignment and within thirty (30) daysfrom the date the court acquires jurisdiction
overthe person of the accused unless a shorter period is provided by special laws or circulars of
the SupremeCourt
(Sec. 1, Rule 118).

When the accused is under preventivedetention, wherein his case shall be raffled andrecords
transmitted within 3 days from the filing of thecomplaint or information. The accused shall
bearraigned within 10 days from the date of the raffle[Sec. 1(d), Rule 116].

Pre-trial in criminal cases ismandatory.

The order for pre-trial conference contain must contain

It must contain orders:

1.Requiring the private offended party toappear thereat for purposes of plea-
bargaining and for other mattersrequiring his presence;
2.Referring the case to the branchclerk of court , if warranted, for a preliminaryconference to be
set at least three (3)days prior to the pre-trial to mark thedocuments or exhibits to be presented
bythe parties and copies thereof to beattached to the records after comparisonand to consider
other matters as may aidin its prompt disposition; and
3.Informing the parties that no evidenceshall be allowed to be presented andoffered during the
trial other than thoseidentified and marked during the pre-trialexcept when allowed by the
court forgood cause shown. In mediatable cases,the judge shall refer the parties and
theircounsel to the Philippine MediationCenter unit for purposes of mediation if available
(A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC).

The form of a valid pre-trial agreement?

The pre-trial agreement must be in writing andsigned by both the accused and his counsel. If
therequired form is not observed, the pre-trialagreement cannot be used against the accused
(Sec. 2, Rule 118)

The agreements covering the matters in the pre-trial conference shall be approved by the court.

Matters considered during pre-trial?


1.Plea bargaining;
2.Stipulation of facts;
3.Marking for identification of evidence of parties;
4.Waiver of objections to admissibility of
evidence;
5.Modification of the order of the trial if one of the accused admits the charge butinterposes a
lawful defense (reverse trial);and
6.Such other matters as will promote a fairand expeditious trial of the civil andcriminal aspects
of the case
(Sec. 1).

During the preliminary conference, the branchclerk of court shall assist the parties in reaching
asettlement of the civil aspect of the case, mark the
documents to be presented as exhibits and copiesthereof attached to the records after
comparison,ascertain from the parties the undisputed facts and
admissions on the genuineness and due execution of documents marked as exhibits and
consider such othermatters as may aid in the prompt disposition of thecase. The proceedings
during the preliminaryconference shall be recorded in theminutes of preliminary conferenceto be
signed by both parties
and counsel.

Theminutes of preliminary conferenceand the exhibitsshall be attached by the branchclerk of
court to thecase record before the pre-trial
(A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC).

What is plea bargaining?

Plea bargaining is the process whereby theaccused, the offended party and the prosecutionwork
out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval. It usually
involvesthe defendants pleading guilty to a lesser offenseor to only one or some of the counts
of a multi-count indictment in return for a lighter sentencethan that for the graver charge.


When is plea bargaining not applicable?

Violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act regardlessof the imposable penalty.

What shall the court do if the plea bargainingfails?

The court shall:
1.Adopt the minutes of preliminaryconference as part of the pre-trialproceedings, confirm
markings of exhibitsor substituted photocopies and
admissions on the genuineness and dueexecution of documents and list objectand testimonial
evidence;
2.Scrutinize every allegation of theinformation and the statements in theaffidavits and other
documents which form part of the record of the preliminaryinvestigation and other
documentsidentified and marked as exhibits in determining farther admissions of
facts,documents and in particular as to thefollowing:

a.The identity of the accused;
b.Courts territorial jurisdiction relativeto the offense/s charged;
c.Qualification of expert witness;
d.Amount of damages;
e.Genuineness and due execution of documents;
f.The cause of death or injury, inproper cases;
g.Adoption of any evidence presentedduring the preliminary investigation;
h.Disclosure of defenses of alibi,insanity, self-defense, exercise of public authority and justifying
orexempting circumstances; and
i.Such other matters that would limitthe facts in issue.
3. Define factual and legal issues;
4.Ask parties to agree on the specific trialdates and adhere to the flow chart
determined by the court which shallcontain the time frames for the differentstages of the
proceeding up topromulgation of decision and use thetime frame for each stage in setting
thetrial dates;
5.Require the parties to submit to theBranch COC the names, addresses and
contact numbers of witnesses that neeD to be summoned by subpoena; and
6.Consider modification of order of trial if the accused admits the charge butinterposes a lawful
defense
(A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC).
3. WHAT THE COURT SHOULD DO WHEN
Effect if the prosecution and theoffended party agree to the plea offered by theaccused?

The court shall:

1.issue an order which contains the pleabargaining arrived at;
2.proceed to receive evidence on the civilaspect of the case; and
3.render and promulgate judgment of conviction, including the civil liability ordamages duly
established by the evidence
(A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC).
3. PRE-TRIAL AGREEMENT
What is pre- trial agreement?

All agreements or admissions made or enteredinto during the pre- trial conference shall
bereduced to writing and signed by the accused and
counsel, otherwise the same shall not be used in evidence against the accused.

The requisites before a pre- trialagreement may be used as evidence?

1. They are reduced to writing;
2. The pre-trial agreement is signed by the accusedand his counsel
4.
The effect of non-appearance of counselfor the accused or the prosecutor during the pre-
trial without valid justification?

The court may impose proper sanctions orpenalties in the form of reprimand, fines
orimprisonment if he does not offer an acceptableexcuse for his lack of cooperation(Sec. 3, Rule
118).
These sanctions are not applicable on theaccused, because to include him among the
mandatoryparties to appear might violate his constitutional right
to remain silent.
5. PRE-TRIAL ORDER
Pre-trial order

It is an order issued by the court reciting theactions taken, the facts stipulated and the
evidencemarked during the pre-trial conference. Such orderbinds the parties and limits the trial
to thosematters not disposed of (Sec. 4).

It must be issued within ten (10) days after thetermination of the pre-trial. It shall set forth
thefollowing:

1. Actions taken during the pre-trialconference;
2. Facts stipulated;
3.Admissions made;
4.Evidence marked; and
5.Number of witnesses to be presented andthe schedule of trial(Sec. 4).



PART NINE
JUDGMENT

I. Definition and form

-Rule 120, sec 1


Section 1.Judgment definition and form. Judgment is the adjudication by the court that the
accused is guilty or not guilty of the offense charged and the imposition on him of the proper
penalty and civil liability, if any. It must be written in the official language, personally and
directly prepared by the judge and signed by him and shall contain clearly and distinctly a
statement of the facts and the law upon which it is based. (1a)

-People v. Lizada, G.R. Nos. 143468-71, 24 January 2003

Lizada is being charged with 4 counts of raping his stepdaughter (first rape occurred when she
was about 11 yrs old). TC and CA found him guilty. On appeal to the SC, Lizada assails the
information against him for violating Rule 110, Section 11 of the Revised Rules on CrimPro
because the phrase on or about August 1998"stated in the information is too indefinite. SC
says the failure to specify the exact date when it was committed does not make the Information
defective because the gravamen of rape is not the date and time of its commission, but the
carnal knowledge under any of the circumstances in RPC 335.

Facts:
Lizada is charged with 4 counts of qualified rape, and meting on him the death penalty
for each count. (He is charged of raping a certain Analia Agoo in August, September,
October, and November of 1998)
The words used in the complaints were:
First: sometime in August 1998
Second: on or about September 15, 1998
Third: on or about October 22, 1998
Fourth: on or about November 5, 1998

The prosecution:
A couple in Bohol had 3 children, one of them being Analia (born 1985). They separated
and the wife left to settle in
Manila, took with her the kids, and worked as a waitress.
1994: Wife met Lizada and lived together.
The wife put up a video shop in the house and sold Avon products door to door. When
she was out, her kids tended to the video shop.
1996: By this year, Analia was about 11 yrs old. One night, Lizada entered Analias room and
removed her clothes, had intercourse with her, and threatened to kill her if she told anyone
what happened. This happened in less than an hour.
This happened again the following year.
And from 1996-98, Lizada sexually abused Analia twice a week.
1998: Lizada, wearing only shorts, entered Analias room. Analia was not afraid because
her younger brother was just around the house. However, Lizada was still able to have
intercourse with her.
The brother passed by Analias room and saw Lizada on top of her. Lizada dismounted
and berated the brother, told him to go to his room and sleep.
4 days later, Analia was in the video shop when Lizada ordered her to go to the sala.
She refused bec no one would tend to the video shop. They fought.
When the mother arrived, she sided with Lizada which prompted Analia to shout
Ayoko na, ayoko na. Analia then left to retrieve unreturned tapes.
When she got home, the mother asked her what she meant by ayoko na so Analia told
her that Lizada had been touching her private parts.
They then went to the police and made a report.
She was examined by a doctor who found her hymen intact.
Later on, she also told her mother of the rapes. Analia then executed a Dagdag na
Salaysay ng Paghahabla and charged Lizada with rape.

The defense:
Lizada denied the rapes, claimed that he loved the children as if they were his own.
Analia was har headed and often disobeyed him. This caused Lizada and the mother to
quarrel. The relatives of the husband also frequently visited, which irritated him. He
says that the mother probably coached the children so that she could manage the
business and take control of all the property (VHS, 2 TVs, washing machine, scooter,
sala set, CD player, videoke).
Issue: Whether or not the information filed against Lizada is sufficient to hold him guilty of
rape

Held: Yes. That his conviction for rape in December 1992 was so remote from the date
(November 1995) alleged in the Information, so that the Nov 1995 could no longer be
considered as being "as near to the actual date at which the offense was committed" as provided
under Section 11, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure.

-People v. Pablo, 98 SCRA 289 (1980)

FACTS:
Rogelio Carace, Godofredo Carace, Gil Castrence, Rogelio Caranza and Damian Senit
were charged with Homicide for the killing of Benjamin Atcha. The accused pleaded not guilty.
Several postponements were made upon motion by the prosecutors and without objection on
the part of the defense.

On July 17, 1973, for failure of its last witness, Dr. Francisco Q. Duque, to arrive, the
prosecution moved for postponement on the ground that Dr. Duque is a vital and indispensable
witness who
would testify on the cause of death of the victim.

The presiding judge, Hon. Magno B. Pablo, denied the motion for postponement and
ordered the prosecution to proceed with the presentation of its evidence. The prosecuting fiscal
asked for reconsideration of the order denying the motion for postponement, but the judge
denied the motion for reconsideration, prompting the prosecution to file a second motion for
reconsideration in writing, signed by both the fiscal and the private prosecutor.

Judge denied the motion. Prosecution asked for 10 days within which to elevate the
question of the propriety of denial to the appellate court. Judge allowed, but still granted the
Motion to Consider Prosecution's Case Rested and Motion to Dismiss filed by the defense that
afternoon. Accused were also acquitted for failure of the prosecution to prove guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the judge committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the
prosecutions motion to postpone and granting defenses motion to consider the prosecutions
case rested and to dismiss the case.

Held/Ratio Decendi:

The motion for postponement is justified because Dr. Duque is a vital witness as he can
testify with regard to the causal relation between the wounds inflicted by the accused and the
victims death. The alleged denial of the right to speedy trial as constitutionally granted to the
accused was a flimsy ground for the court to deny the postponement as requested by the
prosecution, much less to dismiss the case, without even a recital of the facts as established by
the evidence already presented, which appears to have at least proved the commission of a
crime by the accused against the victim, although perhaps a lesser one than the offense charged.

The records also disclose that trial was never postponed due to the non-appearance of
Dr. Duque. The first and only postponement sought on that ground was denied.

The respondent aggravated his indiscretion by not only denying the motion for postponement,
but also in immediately granting the defense written motion to consider the prosecution's case
rested, without giving the prosecution a chance to oppose the same, and without reviewing the
evidence already presented fora proper assessment as to what crime has been committed by the
accused of which they may properly be convicted thereunder, acquitted the said accused,
although, realizing later the improvidence in his action, he amended his order of acquittal of the
accused to that of dismissal of the case. The order of dismissal, under the circumstances pointed
out above, would amount to an acquittal because evidence had already been presented by the
prosecution. An evaluation of said evidence is thus indispensably required, where, as in this
case, the evidence presented even if the prosecution's case is considered submitted at a stage
short of the presentation of its complete evidence, obviously suffices to prove a crime, even if a
lesser one than the offense charged.

-People v.Escober, 157 SCRA 541 (1988)




-People v Toling, 91 SCRA 382 (1979)


Facts: The accused were found of Robbery in Band withHomicide. Death penalty was imposed.
The prosecution sought to establish that at about 11:45 o'clock in the evening of February 5,
1966, the accused, conspiring and confederating with each other, robbed the house of Francisco
Lumpayao after mortally wounding Isabelo Caseres who had responded to Lumpayao's call for
succor. The evidence consisted the testimonies of Francisco Lumpayao, Marcelino
Campomanes and Florentino P. Omandam, and the extrajudicial statements of Hilario Gahito
Candelario Bolando and Rogelio Cometa (Exhibits "C", "D", and "E", respectively). To prove
the voluntariness and due execution of Exhibits "C", "D" and "E", the prosecution introduced
the testimonies of Gualberto B. Bacarro, Municipal Judge of Tambulig, Zamboanga del Sur and
Acting Municipal Judge of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, and Paciano Guillen, Municipal Mayor
of the same municipality.

Lumpayao said he saw the accused trying to get the chickens on the roof of his house.
He shouted, and the accused went far away. He saw his neighbor Caceres and warned him
about the robbers, but Caceres got shot by Toling. Then when morning came, he saw that he
lost some stuff.

Campomanes corroborated the story.

On the other hand, the defendants presented their defense consisting of denials and
alibis. Hilario Gahito Candelario Bolando and Rogelio Cometa repudiated their respective
extrajudicial statements, all contending that they were mauled or maltreated into signing the
same. When the trial court was preparing its decision it discovered that the Fiscal
inadvertently omitted to present as evidence the admission of Rogelio Cometa. Hence, the
court, motu proprio, ordered the reopening of the case to enable the Fiscal to offer in evidence
the extrajudicial statement of Rogelio Cometa. Thereafter, the case was submitted anew for
decision. In convicting appellants Rolando Cometa, Rogelio Cometa and Candelario Bolando,
the trial court appears to have relied principally on the extrajudicial statements of Hilario
Gahito Candelario Bolando and Rogelio Cometa (Exhibits "C", "D" and "E", respectively).
Gahito basically corroborated Lumpayaos testimony. Bolando said he was threatened and then
said the same story. Cometa said that Toling told him that he (Toling) got hired to kill Caseres
for P250 and promised him P50 if he would also go.


ISSUE: In their brief, appellants contend, among others, that the trial court erred in reopening
motu proprio the proceedings after the case had been submitted for decision, simply to enable
the prosecution to present evidence which it overlooked or failed to submit at the trial; that the
trial court erred in admitting and relying upon the confessions of Hilario Gahito-Candelario
Bolando and Rogelio Cometa as competent evidence against each other and as against their co-
accused Rolando Cometa; and that the trial court erred in holding that the crime committed
was Robbery in Band with Homicide under Article 294, paragraph I of the Revised Penal Code.

HELD: With reference to the reopening of the proceedings after both sides had rested and the
case submitted for decision, We hold that the trial court was not in error. As early as in 1907,
this Court held in U. S. v. Cinco, 5 that "judges of the Courts of First Instance are judges of
both fact and law, and after all the evidence adduced by the attorneys, if the court is not
satisfied, we see no reason why he should not be permitted to call additional witnesses for the
purpose of satisfying his mind upon any questions presented during the trial of the case." Also,
in U. S. v.
Base, et al, 6 it has been held that "if the lower court is not satisfied with the evidence adduced
by the attorneys in criminal cases, with reference to a particular point, he may, on his own
motion, call additional witnesses or recall some of the same witnesses, for the purpose of
satisfying his mind with reference to particular facts involved in the case.

Confessions voluntary. Under the facts, the extrajudicial confessions of appellants
Rogelio Cometa and Candelario Bolando should have been admissible only against said
declarants and not as the basis for the conviction of Rolando Cometa. The rule on interlocking
confessions is where extrajudicial confessions has been made by several persons charged
with a conspiracy and there could have been no collusion with reference to the several
confessions, the fact that the statements are in all material respects Identical is confirmatory of
the testimony of an accomplice. In other words, such extrajudicial declarations may, under
certain conditions, be taken into consideration a. a circumstance in judging the credibility of the
testimony of an accomplice. In the case of Rolando Cometa, there is no testimony implicating
said appellant which the aforesaid extra-judicial confessions would confirm or corroborate.




II. Types of judgments and remedies against such judgment

A. Acquittal

-Rule 120, sec. 2 [par.2]

In case the judgment is of acquittal, it shall state whether the evidence of the prosecution
absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which
the civil liability might arise did not exist. (2a)

-Const. (1987), art. III, sec. 21


-Rule 117, secs 3 (h) & 7

Section 3.Grounds. The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of
the following grounds:
(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification;
-Galman v Sandiganbayan, 144 SCRA 43 (1986)


-Rule 65, sec. 1, 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure

Section 1.Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby
may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying
that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or
officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution
subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a
sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of section 3, Rule
46. (1a)

-Manantan v CA, 350 SCRA 387 (2001)

Facts
Petitioner George MANANTAN was acquitted by the trial court of homicide through reckless
imprudence without a ruling on his civil liability. On appeal from the civil aspect of the
judgment, the CA found petitioner Manantan civilly liable and ordered him to indemnify
private respondents (Sps. Nicolas) for loss of support, death indemnity, and moral damages for
the death of their son, RUBEN Nicolas.
Prosecutions Version: The deceased RUBEN and accused MANANTAN together with 2 other
friends were on a (boys) night out, driving around Santiago, Isabela in MANANTANs car
from one place to another (night clubs, bowling alley, lugawan, etc.) where accordingly that
had drinks and even took some lady companions. After a long night, with MANANTAN
manifestly drunk, they meant to drive back home. MANANTAN was accordingly driving fast
and was not staying on his side of the road. Ultimately, they figured in a head-on collision with
a passenger jeepney causing their vehicle to turn turtle twice. RUBEN died as a result of the
accident
Defenses Version: Substantially the same, only that MANANTAN was supposedly sober and
was driving at normal speed and following traffic rules.
The Trial Court found MANANTAN not guilty, from which RUBENs heirs/parents (Sps.
Nicolas) interposed an appeal before the CA on the civil aspect of the judgment praying that
MANANTAN be ordered to pay the proper indemnities. The Court of Appeals modified the
Trial Courts judgment and awarded civil indemnity to the Sps. Nicolas ratiocinating that
MANANTANs negligent and reckless act of driving his car which was the proximate cause of
the vehicular accident. In effect, the Court of Appeals gave judicial notice to MANANTANs
intoxication while driving, considered a violation of the Traffic Code from which a presumption
of negligence is provided
MANANTAN moved for reconsideration but the same was denied, hence this petition
ISSUES:
1. WON the assailed CA decision puts him in double jeopardy for the same offense.
2. WON his acquittal before the TC extinguished his civil liability.
HELD: No. Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed decision of the CA is
AFFIRMED.
RATIO:
1. No Double Jeopardy - The constitution provides that no person shall be twice put in
jeopardy for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or
acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.
When a person is charged with an offense and the case is terminated either by acquittal or
conviction or in any other manner without the consent of the accused, the latter cannot again
be charged with the same or identical offense. This is double jeopardy
For double jeopardy to exist, the following elements must be established: (a) a first jeopardy
must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have terminated; and (3) the
second jeopardy must be for the same offense as the first.
IN THE INSTANT CASE, true, MANANTAN had once been placed in jeopardy by the filing
of the criminal case for reckless imprudence and, indeed, the (first) jeopardy was terminated.
Meanwhile, for the first jeopardy to attach, the following requisites must be attendant: (a) upon
a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having
been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express
consent of the accused by his discharge. HOWEVER, what was elevated to the CA was the civil
aspect of the criminal case!
Petitioner was not charged anew with a second criminal offense identical to the first offense in
that appeal! No second criminal offense was being imputed to MANANTAN on the appeal
before the CA
In modifying the TC, the CA did not modify the judgment of acquittal. Nor did it order the
filing of a new criminal case against petitioner for the same offense. Obviously, therefore, there
was no second jeopardy to speak of
2. On ACQUITTAL. Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the
civil liability of the accused:
(a) Acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the act or omission complained
of under such a judgment, no more door for civil liability for the simple reason that it has
already been settled that the accused is not the perpetrator of the offense, for which, naturally,
he cannot be held civilly liable. There being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the
question, and the civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds other
than the delict complained of (Rule 111, ROC)
(b) Acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt
of the accused has not been satisfactorily established beyond reasonable doubt, he is not exempt
from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only (Art 29, CC).
Although the two actions have different purposes, the matters discussed in the civil case are
similar to those discussed in the criminal case. However, the judgment in the criminal
proceeding cannot be read in evidence in the civil action to establish any fact there determined,
even though both actions involve the same act or omission. The reason for this rule is that the
parties are not the same and secondarily, different rules of evidence are applicable.
Acquittal did not Extinguish Civil Liability The Courts diligent scrutiny of the records,
particularly the TCs decision of acquittal, supports the CAs conclusions. The acquittal was
based on reasonable doubt; hence, MANANTANs civil liability was not extinguished by his
discharge
A closer look at the TCs judgment shows that the judgment of acquittal did not clearly and
categorically declare the non-existence of petitioners negligence or imprudence. Hence,
MANANTANs acquittal must be deemed based on reasonable doubt, allowing Article 29 of
the Civil Code to come into play
The Court gives judicial notice to the TCs declaration that it did not discount the possibility
that the accused was really negligent; only that it could not ultimately it could not
categorically put its mind to rest on a verdict of conviction due to certain circumstances
presented that creates a hypothesis inconsistent with MANANTANs negligence. These
statements from the TCs ruling clearly shows that MANANTANs acquittal was predicated on
the conclusion that his guilt had not been established with moral certainty.

B. Conviction

-Rule 120, sec. 2 [par1]

Section 2.Contents of the judgment. If the judgment is of conviction, it shall state (1) the legal
qualification of the offense constituted by the acts committed by the accused and the
aggravating or mitigating circumstances which attended its commission; (2) the participation of
the accused in the offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory after the fact; (3) the
penalty imposed upon the accused; and (4) the civil liability or damages caused by his wrongful
act or omission to be recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there is any, unless
the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate civil action has been reserved or waived.

-Rule 121, 122-125

RULE 121
New Trial or Reconsideration
Section 1.New trial or reconsideration. At any time before a judgment of conviction becomes
final, the court may, on motion of the accused or at its own instance but with the consent of the
accused, grant a new trial or reconsideration. (1a)
Section 2.Grounds for a new trial. The court shall grant a new trial on any of the following
grounds:
(a) The errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused have
been committed during the trial;
(b) The new and material evidence has been discovered which the accused could not with
reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial and which if introduced and
admitted would probably change the judgment. (2a)
Section 3.Ground for reconsideration. The court shall grant reconsideration on the ground of
errors of law or fact in the judgment, which requires no further proceedings. (3a)
Section 4.Form of motion and notice to the prosecutor. The motion for a new trial or
reconsideration shall be in writing and shall state the grounds on which it is based. If based on
a newly-discovered evidence, the motion must be supported by affidavits of witnesses by whom
such evidence is expected to be given or by duly authenticated copies of documents which are
proposed to be introduced in evidence. Notice of the motion for new trial or reconsideration
shall be given to the prosecutor. (4a)
Section 5.Hearing on motion. Where a motion for a new trial calls for resolution of any
question of fact, the court may hear evidence thereon by affidavits or otherwise. (5a)
Section 6.Effects of granting a new trial or reconsideration. The effects of granting a new trial
or reconsideration are the following:
(a) When a new trial is granted on the ground of errors of law or irregularities committed
during the trial, all proceedings and evidence affected thereby shall be set aside and taken anew.
The court may, in the interest of justice, allow the introduction of additional evidence.
(b) When a new trial is granted on the ground of newly-discovered evidence, the evidence
already adduced shall stand and the newly-discovered and such other evidence as the court
may, in the interest of justice, allow to be introduced shall be taken and considered together
with the evidence already in the record.
(c) In all cases, when the court grants new trial or reconsideration, the original judgment shall
be set aside or vacated and a new judgment rendered accordingly. (6a)


RULE 122
Appeal
Section 1.Who may appeal. Any party may appeal from a judgment or final order, unless the
accused will be placed in double jeopardy. (2a)
Section 2.Where to appeal. The appeal may be taken as follows:
(a) To the Regional Trial Court, in cases decided by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal
Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court;
(b) To the Court of Appeals or to the Supreme Court in the proper cases provided by law, in
cases decided by the Regional Trial Court; and
(c) To the Supreme Court, in cases decided by the Court of Appeals. (1a)
Section 3.How appeal taken.
(a) The appeal to the Regional Trial Court, or to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the
Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, shall be taken by filing a notice
of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and by
serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party.
(b) The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review under Rule 42.
(c) The appeal to the Supreme Court in cases where the penalty imposed by the Regional Trial
Court is death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, or where a lesser penalty is imposed but
for offenses committed on the same occasion or which arose out of the same occurrence that
gave rise to the more serious offense for which the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment is imposed, shall be by filing a notice of appeal in accordance with paragraph (a)
of this section.
(d) No notice of appeal is necessary in cases where the death penalty is imposed by the Regional
Trial Court. The same shall be automatically reviewed by the Supreme Court as provided
in section 10 of this Rule.
(e) Except as provided in the last paragraph of section 13, Rule 124, all other appeals to the
Supreme Court shall be by petition for review on certiorari under Rules 45. (3a)
Section 4.Publication of notice of appeal. If personal service of the copy of the notice of appeal
can not be made upon the adverse party or his counsel, service may be done by registered mail
or by substituted service pursuant to sections 7 and 8 of Rule 13. (4a)
Section 5.Waiver of notice. The appellee may waive his right to a notice that an appeal has
been taken. The appellate court may, in its discretion, entertain an appeal notwithstanding
failure to give such notice if the interests of justice so require. (5a)
Section 6.When appeal to be taken. An appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days from
promulgation of the judgment or from notice of the final order appealed from. This period for
perfecting an appeal shall be suspended from the time a motion for new trial or reconsideration
is filed until notice of the order overruling the motion shall have been served upon the accused
or his counsel at which time the balance of the period begins to run. (6a)
Section 7. Transcribing and filing notes of stenographic reporter upon appeal. When notice of
appeal is filed by the accused, the trial court shall direct the stenographic reporter to transcribe
his notes of the proceedings. When filed by the People of the Philippines, the trial court shall
direct the stenographic reporter to transcribe such portion of his notes of the proceedings as
the court, upon motion, shall specify in writing. The stenographic reporter shall certify to the
correctness of the notes and the transcript thereof, which shall consist of the original and four
copies, and shall file the original and four copies with the clerk without unnecessary delay.
If death penalty is imposed, the stenographic reporter shall, within thirty (30) days from
promulgation of the sentence, file with the clerk original and four copies of the duly certified
transcript of his notes of the proceedings. No extension of time for filing of said transcript of
stenographic notes shall be granted except by the Supreme Court and only upon justifiable
grounds. (7a)
Section 8.Transmission of papers to appellate court upon appeal. Within five (5) days from the
filing of the notice of appeal, the clerk of the court with whom the notice of appeal was filed
must transmit to the clerk of court of the appellate court the complete record of the case,
together with said notice. The original and three copies of the transcript of stenographic notes,
together with the records, shall also be transmitted to the clerk of the appellate court without
undue delay. The other copy of the transcript shall remain in the lower court. (8a)
Section 9.Appeal to the Regional Trial Courts.
(a) Within five (5) days from perfection of the appeal, the clerk of court shall transmit the
original record to the appropriate Regional Trial Court.
(b) Upon receipt of the complete record of the case, transcripts and exhibits, the clerk of court
of the Regional Trial Court shall notify the parties of such fact.
(c) Within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the said notice, the parties may submit memoranda
or briefs, or may be required by the Regional Trial Court to do so. After the submission of such
memoranda or briefs, or upon the expiration of the period to file the same, the Regional Trial
Court shall decide the case on the basis of the entire record of the case and of such memoranda
or briefs as may have been filed. (9a)
Section 10.Transmission of records in case of death penalty. In all cases where the death penalty
is imposed by the trial court, the records shall be forwarded to the Supreme Court for
automatic review and judgment within five (5) days after the fifteenth (15) day following the
promulgation of the judgment or notice of denial of a motion for new trial or reconsideration.
The transcript shall also be forwarded within ten (10) days after the filing thereof by the
stenographic reporter. (10a)
Section 11.Effect of appeal by any of several accused.
(a) An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal,
except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter;
(b) The appeal of the offended party from the civil aspect shall not affect the criminal aspect of
the judgment or order appealed from.
(c) Upon perfection of the appeal, the execution of the judgment or final order appealed from
shall be stayed as to the appealing party. (11a)
Section 12.Withdrawal of appeal. Notwithstanding the perfection of the appeal, the Regional
Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court,
or Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as the case may be, may allow the appellant to withdraw his
appeal before the record has been forwarded by the clerk of court to the proper appellate court
as provided in section 8, in which case the judgment shall become final. The Regional Trial
Court may also, in its discretion, allow the appellant from the judgment of a Metropolitan Trial
Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court
to withdraw his appeal, provided a motion to that effect is filed before rendition of the judgment
in the case on appeal, in which case the judgment of the court of origin shall become final and
the case shall be remanded to the latter court for execution of the judgment. (12a)
Section 13.Appointment of counsel de oficio for accused on appeal. It shall be the duty of the
clerk of the trial court, upon filing of a notice of appeal, to ascertain from the appellant, if
confined in prison, whether he desires the Regional Trial Court, Court of Appeals or the
Supreme Court to appoint a counsel de oficio to defend him and to transmit with the record on a
form to be prepared by the clerk of court of the appellate court, a certificate of compliance with
this duty and of the response of the appellant to his inquiry. (13a)


RULE 123
Procedure in the Municipal Trial Courts
Section 1.Uniform Procedure. The procedure to be observed in the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall be the same as in the
Regional Trial Courts, except where a particular provision applies only to either of said courts
and in criminal cases governed by the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. (1a)


RULE 124
Procedure in the Court of Appeals
Section 1.Title of the case. In all criminal cases appealed to the Court of Appeals, the party
appealing the case shall be called the "appellant" and the adverse party the "appellee," but the
title of the case shall remain as it was in the court of origin. (1a)
Section 2.Appointment of counsel de oficio for the accused. If it appears from the record of the
case as transmitted that (a) the accused is confined in prison, (b) is without counsel de parte on
appeal, or (c) has signed the notice of appeal himself, the clerk of court of the Court of Appeals
shall designate a counsel de oficio.
An appellant who is not confined in prison may, upon request, be assigned a counsel de oficio
within ten (10) days from receipt of the notice to file brief and he establishes his right thereto.
(2a)
Section 3.When brief for appellant to be filed. Within thirty (30) days from receipt by the
appellant or his counsel of the notice from the clerk of court of the Court of Appeals that the
evidence, oral and documentary, is already attached to the record, the appellant shall file seven
(7) copies of his brief with the clerk of court which shall be accompanied by proof of service of
two (2) copies thereof upon the appellee. (3a)
Section 4.When brief for appellee to be filed; reply brief of the appellant. Within thirty (30) days
from the receipt of the brief of the appellant, the appellee shall file seven (7) copies of the brief
of the appellee with the clerk of court which shall be accompanied by proof of service of two (2)
copies thereof upon the appellant.
Within twenty (20) days from receipt of the brief of the appellee, the appellant may file a reply
brief traversing matters raised in the former but not covered in the brief of the appellant. (4a)
Section 5.Extension of time for filing briefs. Extension of time for the filing of briefs will not
be allowed except for good and sufficient cause and only if the motion for extension is filed
before the expiration of the time sought to be extended. (5a)
Section 6.Form of briefs. Briefs shall either be printed, encoded or typewritten in double
space on the legal size good quality unglazed paper, 330 mm. in length by 216 mm. in width.
(6a)
Section 7.Contents of brief. The briefs in criminal cases shall have the same contents as
provided in sections 13 and 14 of Rule 44. A certified true copy of the decision or final order
appealed from shall be appended to the brief of appellant. (7a)
Section 8.Dismissal of appeal for abandonment or failure to prosecute. The Court of Appeals
may, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio and with notice to the appellant in either case,
dismiss the appeal if the appellant fails to file his brief within the time prescribed by this Rule,
except where the appellant is represented by a counsel de oficio.
The Court of Appeals may also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal
if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country
during the pendency of the appeal. (8a)
Section 9.Prompt disposition of appeals. Appeals of accused who are under detention shall be
given precedence in their disposition over other appeals. The Court of Appeals shall hear and
decide the appeal at the earliest practicable time with due regard to the rights of the parties.
The accused need not be present in court during the hearing of the appeal. (9a)
Section 10.Judgment not to be reversed or modified except for substantial error. No judgment
shall be reversed or modified unless the Court of Appeals, after an examination of the record
and of the evidence adduced by the parties, is of the opinion that error was committed which
injuriously affected the substantial rights of the appellant. (10a)
Section 11.Scope of judgment. The Court of Appeals may reverse, affirm, or modify the
judgment and increase or reduce the penalty imposed by the trial court, remand the case to the
Regional Trial Court for new trial or retrial, or dismiss the case. (11a)
Section 12.Power to receive evidence The Court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases
and conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual
issues raised in cases (a) falling within its original jurisdiction, (b) involving claims for damages
arising from provisional remedies, or (c) where the court grants a new trial based only on the
ground of newly-discovered evidence. (12a)
Section 13.Quorum of the court; certification or appeal of cases to Supreme Court. Three (3)
Justices of the Court of Appeals shall constitute a quorum for the sessions of a division. The
unanimous vote of the three (3) Justices of a division shall be necessary for the pronouncement
of a judgment or final resolution, which shall be reached in consultation before the writing of
the opinion by a member of the division. In the event that the three (3) Justices can not reach a
unanimous vote, the Presiding Justice shall direct the raffle committee of the Court to designate
two (2) additional Justices to sit temporarily with them, forming a special division of five (5)
members and the concurrence of a majority of such division shall be necessary for the
pronouncement of a judgment or final resolution. The designation of such additional Justices
shall be made strictly by raffle and rotation among all other Justices of the Court of Appeals.
Whenever the Court of Appeals finds that the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment should be imposed in a case, the court, after discussion of the evidence and the
law involved, shall render judgment imposing the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment as the circumstances warrant. However, it shall refrain from entering the
judgment and forthwith certify the case and elevate the entire record thereof to the Supreme
Court for review. (13a)
Section 14.Motion for new trial. At any time after the appeal from the lower court has been
perfected and before the judgment of the Court of Appeals convicting the appellant becomes
final, the latter may move for a new trial on the ground of newly-discovered evidence material
to his defense. The motion shall conform with the provisions of section 4, Rule 121. (14a)
Section 15.Where new trial conducted. When a new trial is granted, the Court of Appeals may
conduct the hearing and receive evidence as provided in section 12 of this Rule or refer the trial
to the court of origin. (15a)
Section 16.Reconsideration. A motion for reconsideration shall be filed within fifteen (15)
days after from notice of the decision or final order of the Court of Appeals, with copies served
upon the adverse party, setting forth the grounds in support thereof. The mittimus shall be
stayed during the pendency of the motion for reconsideration. No party shall be allowed a
second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final order. (16a)
Section 17.Judgment transmitted and filed in trial court. When the entry of judgment of the
Court of Appeals is issued, a certified true copy of the judgment shall be attached to the original
record which shall be remanded to the clerk of the court from which the appeal was taken. (17a)
Section 18.Application of certain rules in civil to criminal cases. The provisions of Rules 42, 44
to 46 and 48 to 56 relating to procedure in the Court of Appeals and in the Supreme Court in
original and appealed civil cases shall be applied to criminal cases insofar as they are applicable
and not inconsistent with the provisions of this Rule. (18a)


RULE 125
Procedure in the Supreme Court
Section 1.Uniform procedure. Unless otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law, the
procedure in the Supreme Court in original and in appealed cases shall be the same as in the
Court of Appeals. (1a)
Section 2.Review of decisions of the Court of Appeals. The procedure for the review by the
Supreme Court of decisions in criminal cases rendered by the Court of Appeals shall be the
same as in civil cases. (2a)
Section 3.Decision if opinion is equally divided. When the Supreme Court en banc is equally
divided in opinion or the necessary majority cannot be had on whether to acquit the appellant,
the case shall again be deliberated upon and if no decision is reached after re-deliberation, the
judgment of conviction of the lower court shall be reversed and the accused acquitted. (3a)
-Rule 119, sec 24

Section 24.Reopening. At any time before finality of the judgment of conviction, the judge
may, motu proprio or upon motion, with hearing in either case, reopen the proceedings to avoid
a miscarrage of justice. The proceedings shall be terminated within thirty (30) days from the
order grating it.


C. Judgment in particular instances

1. Judgment for two or more offenses

-Rule 120, sec 3

Section 3.Judgment for two or more offenses. When two or more offenses are charged in a
single complaint or information but the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may
convict him of as many offenses as are charged and proved, and impose on him the penalty for
each offense, setting out separately the findings of fact and law in each offense. (3a)

2. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof

-Rule 120, sec 4

Section 4.Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. When there is variance
between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as
charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted
of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which
is included in the offense proved. (4a)


-People v. Guevarra, 179 SCRA 740 (1989)



-Sayson v. People, 166 SCRA 680 (1988)

Facts: An information for the crime of Estafa through Falsification of a
Commercial Document was filed against the herein petitioner, Ramon SAYSON before the CFI
of Manila. TheProsecutions Version: A blank US dollar check of Bank of America came into
the possession of SAYSON. With intent to defraud one Ernesto Rufino and/or the Bank of
America, SAYSON allegedly filled out said blank check and made it appear as though said
check was issued to one Atty. Norberto Perez (as payee) in the amount of US$ 2,250 by the
Bank. By means of similar deceits, SAYSON allegedly induced Rufino to
change the check at the prevailing exchange rate, the total sum
amounting to P14, 850.7 SAYSON was duly arraigned were he pleaded not guilty. Then,
trial ensued. Despite several postponements, the prosecution rested its case.

When the time came for the defense to present its evidence on the scheduled day of the
hearing, only SAYSON appeared in court. He said that his counsel had another case in a
different court. Contrary to such statement, in the morning of the said day, his
counsel has sent a telegram to the court requesting cancellation of the hearing because he was
sick. The trial court denied the motion for postponement and the case was considered
submitted for decision without petitioner's evidence. The trial court ultimately found accused
SAYSON guilty of the crime charged and sentenced him to an indeterminate penalty of prison
correccional and to pay a fine of P2,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment.

Upon appeal, the CA affirmed but modified the penalty by imposing six months of
arresto mayor and eliminating the fine. Unsatisfied, SAYSON comes now with this petition for
review on certiorari.



ISSUE: Whether or not accused SAYSON was denied due process when he was unable to
present his counter evidence and convicted thereupon?

HELD: No, Sayson was not denied due process and the decision of the CA was upheld in
toto. The right to be heard by himself and counsel is one of the constitutional rights of the
accused. But while the accused has such a right, the same is not exempt from the rule on
WAIVER
as long as the waiver is not contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs
or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.There is nothing in the
Constitution nor in any law prohibiting such waiver. Accordingly, denial of due process cannot
be successfully invoked where a valid waiver of rights has been made.

SAYSON, however, avers that he was not inclined to waive his right to present
evidence and his actuations during trial only suggests that he was vehemently asserting such a
right by way of his verbal motion of postponement due to absence of counsel de parte.
Unfortunately for SAYSON, it is too well established a rule that the grant or refusal of an
application for continuance or postponement of the trial lies within the sound discretion of the
court. And the ruling of the court will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a clear abuse
of discretion

-Vino v People, 178 SCRA 626 (1989)

FACTS: At around 11pm of March 1985, while ERNESTO was resting, he heard two
gunshots. Thereafter, he heard ROBERTO (his son) cry out in a loud voice saying that he had
been shot He immediately switched on the lights of their house and when he looked outside, he
saw his son ROBERTO wounded. Together with his wife and some neighbors, they went down
to meet ROBERTO who was crying and calling for help

After coming down, ERNESTO saw Lito VINO and Jessie SALAZAR riding a bicycle coming
from the south towards from their direction ROBERTO was brought to the hospital. He was
still conscious and alive such that and PC/Col. Cacananta was able to take his ante-mortem
statement. In the said statement which ROBERTOsigned with his own blood .SALAZAR was
identified as his assailant. Then ROBERTO died.

On account of said ante-mortem statement and the testimonies of the other witnesses, VINO
and SALAZAR were charged with murder before the MTC of Balungao, Pangasinan MTC
referred case for PI to fiscal and an information for murder against VINO was ultimately filed
before the RTC of Pangasinan

Upon arraignment, VINO entered a plea of not guilty. Trial then commenced with the
presentation of evidence for the prosecution. Instead of presenting evidence in his own behalf,
VINO filed a motion to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence

RTC then rendered decision finding VINO guilty as an accessory to the crime of murder and
imposing on him the indeterminate penalty of prision correccional as minimum to prision mayor as
maximum. He was also ordered to indemnifythe heirs of the victim

VINO appealed said conviction with the CA but the same was denied, TCs decision was
affirmed in toto hence this appeal

ISSUES: WON his conviction as accessory can be sustained even when the information
charged him as a principal

WON a finding of guilt as an accessory to murder can stand in the light of the acquittal of the
alleged principal in a separate proceeding

HELD: Court ruled BOTH issues on the AFFIRMATIVE

RATIO: This is not a case of a variance between the offense charged and the offense proved or
established by the evidenceIn this case, the correct offense of murder wascharged in the
information. The commission of the said crime was established by the evidence; ergo, there is
no variance as to the offense committed. The variance is in the participation or complicity of the
petitioner. While the petitioner was being held responsible as a principal in the information, the
evidence adduced, however, showed that his participation is merely that of an accessory.

The offense as charged in this case is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved in
court, in which case the defendant shall be convicted of the offense proved included in that
which is charged, or of the offense charged included in that which is proved

Under Art 16 of the Revised Penal Code, the two other categories of persons responsible for
the commission of the same offense, aside from the principal, are the accomplice and the
accessory. After the Trial Courts findings of fact, there is no doubt that the crime of murder
had been committed and that the evidence tended to show that SALAZAR was the assailant
and VINO was his companion

The trial of an accessory can proceed without awaiting the result of the separate charge against the
principal- Thecorresponding responsibilities of the principal, accomplice and accessory are
distinct from each other. As long as the commission of the offense can be duly established in
evidence the determination of the liability of the accomplice or accessory can proceed
independently of that of the principal

It goes without saying therefore that notwithstanding the acquittal of the principal (say, due to
the exempting circumstance of minority or insanity), the accessory may nevertheless be
convicted if the crime was in fact established

The acquittal of the principal will only work as an acquittal for the accessory if such acquittal
was based on the finding that no crime was committed inasmuch as the same has happened by
accident

IN THE CASE AT BAR, the commission of the crime of murder and the responsibility of the
VINO as an accessory was established. As to SALAZARs acquittal, it must be noted that he
was acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt. In
SALAZARs trial, prosecution was not able to present convincing evidence such that the
identity of the assailant was not clearly established

In SALAZARs case, the ante-mortem statement was competently controverted by the defense.
There were also some fatal omissions on the part of the law enforcers that constrained the TC
judge to acquit SALAZAR on reasonable doubt


3. Guidelines for judging Juveniles in Conflict with the Law

-RJCL, sec 30

Section 30.Case Study Report. - After the institution of the criminal action, the social worker
assigned to the child shall immediately undertake a social case inquiry of the child and the
child's family, the child's environment and such other matters relevant to aid the court in the
proper disposition of the case. The report shall be submitted to the court preferably before
arraignment. If not available at that time, the Report must be submitted to the court as soon as
possible.

III. Promulgation

A. Promulgation

-Rule 120, sec 6

Section 6.Promulgation of judgment. The judgment is promulgated by reading it in the
presence of the accused and any judge of the court in which it was rendered. However, if the
conviction is for a light offense, the judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel
or representative. When the judge is absent or outside of the province or city, the judgment
may be promulgated by the clerk of court.
If the accused is confined or detained in another province or city, the judgment may be
promulgated by the executive judge of the Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the
place of confinement or detention upon request of the court which rendered the judgment. The
court promulgating the judgment shall have authority to accept the notice of appeal and to
approve the bail bond pending appeal; provided, that if the decision of the trial court convicting
the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for
bail can only be filed and resolved by the appellate court.
The proper clerk of court shall give notice to the accused personally or through his bondsman
or warden and counsel, requiring him to be present at the promulgation of the decision. If the
accused tried in absentia because he jumped bail or escaped from prison, the notice to him shall
be served at his last known address.
In case the accused fails to appear at the scheduled date of promulgation of judgment despite
notice, the promulgation shall be made by recording the judgment in the criminal docket and
serving him a copy thereof at his last known address or thru his counsel.
If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without justifiable
cause, he shall lose the remedies available in these rules against the judgment and the court
shall order his arrest. Within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of judgment, however, the
accused may surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall
state the reasons for his absence at the scheduled promulgation and if he proves that his
absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within fifteen
(15) days from notice. (6a)


-RJCL, sec 31

Section 31.Diversion Committee - In each court, there shall be organized a Diversion Committee
composed of its Branch Clerk of Court as chairperson; the prosecutor, a lawyer of the Public
Attorney's Office assigned to the court, and the social worker assigned by the court to the child,
as members.

B. Modification

-Rule 120, sec 7

Section 7.Modification of judgment. A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the
accused, be modified or set aside before it becomes final or before appeal is perfected. Except
where the death penalty is imposed, a judgment becomes final after the lapse of the period
for perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served,
or when the accused has waived in writing his right to appeal, or has applied for probation. (7a)

-Rule 119, sec 24

Section 24.Reopening. At any time before finality of the judgment of conviction, the judge
may, motu proprio or upon motion, with hearing in either case, reopen the proceedings to avoid
a miscarrage of justice. The proceedings shall be terminated within thirty (30) days from the
order grating it. (n)

Cf. Rule 121



RULE 121
New Trial or Reconsideration
Section 1.New trial or reconsideration. At any time before a judgment of conviction becomes
final, the court may, on motion of the accused or at its own instance but with the consent of the
accused, grant a new trial or reconsideration. (1a)
Section 2.Grounds for a new trial. The court shall grant a new trial on any of the following
grounds:
(a) The errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused have
been committed during the trial;
(b) The new and material evidence has been discovered which the accused could not with
reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial and which if introduced and
admitted would probably change the judgment. (2a)
Section 3.Ground for reconsideration. The court shall grant reconsideration on the ground of
errors of law or fact in the judgment, which requires no further proceedings. (3a)
Section 4.Form of motion and notice to the prosecutor. The motion for a new trial or
reconsideration shall be in writing and shall state the grounds on which it is based. If based on
a newly-discovered evidence, the motion must be supported by affidavits of witnesses by whom
such evidence is expected to be given or by duly authenticated copies of documents which are
proposed to be introduced in evidence. Notice of the motion for new trial or reconsideration
shall be given to the prosecutor. (4a)
Section 5.Hearing on motion. Where a motion for a new trial calls for resolution of any
question of fact, the court may hear evidence thereon by affidavits or otherwise. (5a)
Section 6.Effects of granting a new trial or reconsideration. The effects of granting a new trial
or reconsideration are the following:
(a) When a new trial is granted on the ground of errors of law or irregularities committed
during the trial, all proceedings and evidence affected thereby shall be set aside and taken anew.
The court may, in the interest of justice, allow the introduction of additional evidence.
(b) When a new trial is granted on the ground of newly-discovered evidence, the evidence
already adduced shall stand and the newly-discovered and such other evidence as the court
may, in the interest of justice, allow to be introduced shall be taken and considered together
with the evidence already in the record.
(c) In all cases, when the court grants new trial or reconsideration, the original judgment shall
be set aside or vacated and a new judgment rendered accordingly. (6a)

C. Finality of judgment

-Rule 120, sec. 8


Section 8.Entry of judgment. After a judgment has become final, it shall be entered in
accordance with Rule 36. (8)

-Rule 120, sec. 7 [second sentence] (in death penalty cases)


Section 7.Modification of judgment. A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the
accused, be modified or set aside before it becomes final or before appeal is perfected. Except
where the death penalty is imposed, a judgment becomes final after the lapse of the period for
perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or
when the accused has waived in writing his right to appeal, or has applied for probation. (7a)

PART TEN
POST JUDGMENT REMEDIES

I. Remedies from a Judgment of Acquittal

-Rule 65, 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure


RULE 65
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
Section 1.Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby
may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying
that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or
officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution
subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a
sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of section 3, Rule
46. (1a)
Section 2.Petition for prohibition. When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board,
officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are without
or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper
court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the
respondent to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter specified therein, or
otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
The petition shall likewise be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or
resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto,
and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of section 3,
Rule 46. (2a)
Section 3.Petition for mandamus. When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and
enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered commanding the respondent, immediately or at some other time to be
specified by the court, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner,
and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the
respondent.
The petition shall also contain a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the
third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46. (3a)
Section 4.When and where petition filed. The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60)
days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or
new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall
be counted from notice of the denial of said motion.
The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a
lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising
jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the
Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the
Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a
quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these Rules, the petition shall be
filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for compelling reason and in no
case exceeding fifteen (15) days. (4a) (Bar Matter No. 803, 21 July 1998; A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC)
Section 5.Respondents and costs in certain cases. When the petition filed relates to the acts or
omissions of a judge, court, quasi-judicial agency, tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person,
the petitioner shall join, as private respondent or respondents with such public respondent or
respondents, the person or persons interested in sustaining the proceedings in the court; and it
shall be the duty of such private respondents to appear and defend, both in his or their own
behalf and in behalf of the public respondent or respondents affected by the proceedings, and
the costs awarded in such proceedings in favor of the petitioner shall be against the private
respondents only, and not against the judge, court, quasi-judicial agency, tribunal, corporation,
board, officer or person impleaded as public respondent or respondents.
Unless otherwise specifically directed by the court where the petition is pending, the public
respondents shall not appear in or file an answer or comment to the petition or any pleading
therein. If the case is elevated to a higher court by either party, the public respondents shall be
included therein as nominal parties. However, unless otherwise specifically directed by the
court, they shall not appear or participate in the proceedings therein. (5a)
Section 6.Order to comment. If the petition is sufficient in form and substance to justify such
process, the court shall issue an order requiring the respondent or respondents to comment on
the petition within ten (10) days from receipt of a copy thereof. Such order shall be served on
the respondents in such manner as the court may direct together with a copy of the petition and
any annexes thereto.
In petitions for certiorari before the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, the provisions of
section 2, Rule 56, shall be observed. Before giving due course thereto, the court may require
the respondents to file their comment to, and not a motion to dismiss, the petition. Thereafter,
the court may require the filing of a reply and such other responsive or other pleadings as it
may deem necessary and proper. (6a)
Section 7.Expediting proceedings; injunctive relief. The court in which the petition is filed may
issue orders expediting the proceedings, and it may also grant a temporary restraining order or
a writ of preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties pending such
proceedings. The petition shall not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary
restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against the public
respondent from further proceeding in the case. (7a)
Section 8.Proceedings after comment is filed. After the comment or other pleadings required
by the court are filed, or the time for the filing thereof has expired, the court may hear the case
or require the parties to submit memoranda. If after such hearing or submission of memoranda
or the expiration of the period for the filing thereof the court finds that the allegations of the
petition are true, it shall render judgment for the relief prayed for or to which the petitioner is
entitled.
The court, however, may dismiss the petition if it finds the same to be patently without merit,
prosecuted manifestly for delay, or that the questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to
require consideration. (8a)
Section 9.Service and enforcement of order or judgment. A certified copy of the judgment
rendered in accordance with the last preceding section shall be served upon the court, quasi-
judicial agency, tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person concerned in such manner as the
court may direct, and disobedience thereto shall be punished as contempt. An execution may
issue for any damages or costs awarded in accordance with section 1 of Rule 39. (9a)
-Const. (1987), art. III, sec. 21

-Dimatulac v Villon, 297 SCRA 679 (1998)

FACTS: On or about November 2, 2005, all the accused under the leadership of Mayor
Santiago Yabut went to the house of PO3 Virgilio Dimatulac. Some of the accused positioned
themselves around the house while the others stood by the truck and the mayor remained in
the truck with his bodyguard. Accused Billy Yabut, Kati Yabut, and Francisco Yambao went
inside the house and they strongly suggested to Dimatulac to go down and see the mayor
outside to ask for an apology. However, as Dimatulac went down, he was gunned down by the
perpetrators and died as a consequence of his multiple gunshot wounds.
The Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Sylvia Alfonso-Flores found that the Yabuts were
in company with one another, and held in her reinvestigation results that the crime that they
committed was not murder but homicide and that they are subject to bail for P20000 each. The
herein petitioner appealed the resolution of Alfonso-Flores to the Secretary of Justice. Pending
appeal to the DOJ, Judge Roura hastily set the case for arraignment.
ISSUE: Whether or not arraignment to a lesser penalty of homicide is proper while the case is
pending in the SOJ subject for review.
HELD: No.
RATIO DECIDENDI: There was on the part of the public prosecution an indecent haste in
the filing of information of homicide. He should have asked the petitioner as regards to the
status of the appeal or warned them that the DOJ would not decide the appeal within the
certain period. It is indubitable that petitioner had the right to appeal to the SOJ, as provided in
Section 4 of Rule 112. There is nothing that forecloses the power of authority to the SOJ to
review resolutions of his subordinates in criminal cases despite having the information already
filed in court. The SOJ is only enjoined to refrain, as far as practicable, from entertaining a
petition for review or appeal from action of the prosecutor once the complaint or information is
filed in court. In any case, the grant of a motion to dismiss, which the prosecution may file after
the SOJ reverses an appealed resolution, is subject to the discretion of the court. We do not
hesitate to rule that the court committed grave abuse of discretion in rushing the arraignment
of the Yabuts on the assailed information of homicide. The DOJ could have, even if belatedly,
joined cause with petitioners to set aside arraignment. So must it be where the arraignment and
plea of not guilty are void.


-Galman v. Sandiganbayan, 144 SCRA 43 (1986)

II. Remedies from a Judgment of Conviction

A. Before finality of Judgment

1. Motion for New Trial

-Rule 121, secs. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 & 6

RULE 121
New Trial or Reconsideration
Section 1.New trial or reconsideration. At any time before a judgment of conviction becomes
final, the court may, on motion of the accused or at its own instance but with the consent of the
accused, grant a new trial or reconsideration. (1a)
Section 2.Grounds for a new trial. The court shall grant a new trial on any of the following
grounds:
(a) The errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused have
been committed during the trial;
(b) The new and material evidence has been discovered which the accused could not with
reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial and which if introduced and
admitted would probably change the judgment. (2a)
Section 3.Ground for reconsideration. The court shall grant reconsideration on the ground of
errors of law or fact in the judgment, which requires no further proceedings. (3a)
Section 4.Form of motion and notice to the prosecutor. The motion for a new trial or
reconsideration shall be in writing and shall state the grounds on which it is based. If based on
a newly-discovered evidence, the motion must be supported by affidavits of witnesses by whom
such evidence is expected to be given or by duly authenticated copies of documents which are
proposed to be introduced in evidence. Notice of the motion for new trial or reconsideration
shall be given to the prosecutor. (4a)
Section 5.Hearing on motion. Where a motion for a new trial calls for resolution of any
question of fact, the court may hear evidence thereon by affidavits or otherwise. (5a)
Section 6.Effects of granting a new trial or reconsideration. The effects of granting a new trial
or reconsideration are the following:
(a) When a new trial is granted on the ground of errors of law or irregularities committed
during the trial, all proceedings and evidence affected thereby shall be set aside and taken anew.
The court may, in the interest of justice, allow the introduction of additional evidence.
(b) When a new trial is granted on the ground of newly-discovered evidence, the evidence
already adduced shall stand and the newly-discovered and such other evidence as the court
may, in the interest of justice, allow to be introduced shall be taken and considered together
with the evidence already in the record.
(c) In all cases, when the court grants new trial or reconsideration, the original judgment shall
be set aside or vacated and a new judgment rendered accordingly. (6a)


-Rule 124, secs. 14 & 15


Section 14.Motion for new trial. At any time after the appeal from the lower court has been
perfected and before the judgment of the Court of Appeals convicting the appellant becomes
final, the latter may move for a new trial on the ground of newly-discovered evidence material
to his defense. The motion shall conform with the provisions of section 4, Rule 121. (14a)
Section 15.Where new trial conducted. When a new trial is granted, the Court of Appeals may
conduct the hearing and receive evidence as provided in section 12 of this Rule or refer the trial
to the court of origin. (15a)

-People v Almendras, 401 SCRA 555 (2003)

FACTS:
June 19, 1998 - Vilma and Arsenio Almendras, residents of Sta. Ana, Manila, were arrested by
operatives of the PNP Narcotics Command in Calamba, Laguna as a result of a buy bust
operation.
August 4 - An information was filed by the Office of the Prov. Prosecutor of Laguna charging
both the accused of violating Sec. 21 (b) in relation to Sec. 15, Art. III, of Republic Act No.
6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by Rep. Act No.
7925.
May 6, 1999 the prosecution rested its case. Reception of the defense evidence was then set
for May 12, 13, and17.

May 10 - defense counsel moved for leave to file a Motion for Demurrer to Evidence and the
admission of said Demurrer with Alternative Prayer for Bail. The defense submitted that the
prosecution failed to establish the element of lack of authority to sell and deliver the alleged
shabu. It further alleged that the prosecution failed to present any concrete evidence
establishing that the substance tested at the PNP Crime Laboratory was the same substance
seized from appellants. The defense then prayed for an acquittal.
The lower court cancelled the schedule hearings for May and new settings were made for June
8, 14, and 21.

June 8 Trial Court denied the Demurrer to Evidence. It ruled that what is material in a
prosecution for a sale of an illegal drug is proof that the transaction took place. The trial court
pointed out that both the marked money and the shabu were presented in open court. The trial
court also pointed out that the poseur buyer, the police investigator, and the forensic chemist
identified in court the shabu seized from the Almendras couple, had placed their initials on the
bag containing the same, and hence, established that it was the same drug seized from
appellants. The lower court likewise denied appellants prayer for bail since the amount of
shabu involved was990.97 grams, for which the imposable penalty was reclusion perpetua to
death, making the offense non-bailable.

June 21, 1999 - , the defense manifested that it was seeking a review of the trial courts
Resolution denying its Demurrer to Evidence from the Supreme Court. The reception of the
defense evidence was then reset anew to September 7, 15, and 23, 1999.

The defense then filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus with Preliminary
Injunction with the Court of Appeals alleging that the TC gravely abused its judicial discretion
in denying their Demurrer to Evidence and in denying their prayer for bail.

Trial Court moved the dates for the hearing of the criminal case to March 7, 14 and 21, 2000.
March 14 - defense counsel Jimenez was not present at the hearing. The trial court then
ordered him to appear for the defense on March 21, 2000, failing which it would appoint a
counsel de officio for the Almendras couple, to expedite the disposition of the case.



March 20 defense counsel moved to suspend proceedings pending the final disposition by the
Court of Appeals on their petition. The prosecution was then given 10 days to comment on the
motion and trial dates were moved anew to April 6 and 10, 2000 and May 10, 2000.
May 10 Trial Court cancelled the scheduled hearing and reset new hearing dates for July 5,
12 and 19.

Oct. 5 defense counsel Jimenez was absent once again. Atty. Carambas then manifested that
the Almendras spouses refused to testify in court. Trial Court then reset the hearing for Oct. 26
and ruled that in the event the defense failed to adduce its evidence on said date, the defense
would be considered as having waived its right to present evidence and the case would be
deemed submitted for decision.

October 10 Almendras spouses filed a Motion for an Order Enjoining Observance of Judicial
Courtesy with the Court of Appeals. They prayed that the appellate court issue an order
enjoining the TC to observe judicial courtesy by suspending proceedings in the criminal case so
as not to pre-empt the decision of the appellate court. They contended that the order of the TC
compelling them to present their evidence with assistance of counsel de officio was violative of
their right to due process.

October 24 Almendras spouses moved that the Trial Court Judge voluntarily inhibit himself
from hearing the case.

October 26 The Trial Court denied the Motion for Voluntary Inhibition for lack merit. Since
defense counsel Jimenez was again not in court, Atty. Carambas appeared for Almendras
spouses. Atty. Carambas manifested that the Almendras spouses told him that they would not
testify in court unless assisted by Atty. Jimenez. The prosecution then moved that the defense
be deemed to have waived its right to present its evidence and the case be considered submitted
for decision. Trial Court granted the prosecutions motion and set promulgation of judgment
for Nov. 23.

Nov. 15 Almendras spouses filed a Very Urgent Motion for the Issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order before the Court of Appeals.

Nov. 23 - RTC of Calamba promulgated its judgment finding appellants guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Sec. 15 of Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended, and sentenced both
appellants to death. Since defense counsel Jimenez was not around for the promulgation
of judgment, appellants were assisted by Atty. Carambas as counsel de oficio.

Sept. 6, 2001 PAO manifested to SC that they talked to Vilma Almendras to ascertain if she
wanted to be represented by them. Said appellant told the PAO that her counsel was Atty.
Jimenez. Out of respect for the right of appellants herein to be represented by a counsel of
their choice, the PAO moved for the suspension of the period to file appellants brief.

ISSUE:

WON Almendras spouses should be allowed to adduce evidence







HELD: YES

The postponement of the trial of a case to allow the presentation of evidence of a party is a
matter which lies in the discretion of the trial court, but it is a discretion which must be
exercised wisely, considering the peculiar circumstances obtaining in each case and with a view
to doing substantial justice.

Almendras spouses lost their chance to present evidence due to the delaying strategies of their
original counsel of record.

Defense counsel Jimenez caused no less than 15 continuances in a span of two years. Delay is
obviously the name of his game.

The case for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction, which was filed
by defense counsel with the CA to assail the TCs denial of their demurrer to evidence, did not
interrupt the course of the principal action in criminal case nor the running of the
reglementary periods involved in the proceedings.

Settled is the rule that to arrest the course of the principal action during the pendency
of certiorari
proceedings, there must be a restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction from the
appellate court directed to the lower court.

However, in view of the death penalty imposed on appellants, we are constrained to rule
that accused-appellants be allowed to present evidence for their defense now.


-People v Datu, G.R. No. 136796, 19 February 2003
Facts:

Romeo Datu managed his fathers business of selling hardware and construction
materials. The victim, Antonio Chan, was a compadre of Datus father. Datu family sold a
dump truck to the victim. Out of the 4 postdated checks issued, only three were encashed. Datu
confronted the victim about the dishonored check. Datu was in a foul mood and refused to
entertain the victims explanation. Datu approached one of his workers, Madayag, and told him
that somebody in Burgos had fooled him and he needed
Madayags help. Magadayag agreed. Datu sent of one of his workers (Batuelo) to apply as a
driver of the victim. Datu approached Madayag and told him that he wanted somebody killed
and that he would have 5 or 6 companions. Datu promised to pay Madayag P10,000 for his
participation in the killing.

Batuelo, Madayag, and their four companions arrived at Burgos at almost one oclock in
the morning of April 17, 1997. They alighted from the van and walked through a rice field to
the house of the victim, with Batuelo leading the way. Upon reaching the victims house, they
scattered on Batuelos order and found hiding places behind the piles of hollow blocks in the
Chan compound. The group waited for about an hour until the victim came out of his house.
Madayag then rushed to the victim and tried to grab him. The latter, however, saw Madayag
and was able to grab a piece of wood. He struck Madayag with the piece of wood, hitting him
on the left side of the forehead, causing a bleeding wound. Batuelo and the others then joined
Madayag and managed to take hold of their victim. Batuelo then sprayed tear gas directly on
the victims face. The latter continued to resist but was finally subdued and thrown to the
ground. One of the assailants then strangled him, while another tried to twist his head. Another
assailant went inside the house to get rope, tied it around the victims neck, then they carried
him inside the house and hung one end of the rope from a railing above the basement of the
house. Thereafter, Batuelo took hold of the victims body and forcibly pulled it down.

Bothered by his conscience and unable to concentrate on his work, Madayag disclosed
to his wife that he had participated in the killing of Antonio chan. They decided to refer his
problem to his wifes 2nd cousin, an Army intelligence operative, Sgt. Flordelito Sabuyas.
Madayag met with the victim/s wife. The latter agreed to forgive him if he would tell the truth.
She then accompanied him to the Prov. Prosecutor where he executed a statement implicating
Datu and Batuelo in the killing of Antonio Chan.

Sept. 30, 1997 Datu, Batuelo and several Does were charged with the murder.
Oct. 13, 1997 Datu and Batuelo were arraigned and with assistance of counsel, pleaded
not guilty to the charge. Trial Court directed the prosecution to amend the information to
include one Domingo Madayag as an accused, in view of his extrajudicial confession
admitting participation in the crime.

Nov. 20 the prosecution filed an amended information, naming Madayag as one of the
accused.

Dec. 2 Madayag was arraigned with the assistance of counsel de oficio. Due to his
refusal to enter a plea, the Trial Court directed that a plea of not guilty be entered for him.

During trial, Madayag moved for discharge as a state witness.

The Trial Court granted Madayags motion for discharge as a state witness. Datu raised
the defense of alibi. He denied knowing both Madayag and Batuelo. Bautelo interposed the
defense of denial and alibi.

The Trial Court then rendered a judgement finding Datu guilty as principal by
induction and Batuelo by direct and indispensable participation and sentenced them
to suffer the supreme penalty of death by lethal injection.

Appellants moved for reconsideration in which the Trial Court denied the motion.
Appellants then filed a motion for new trial/mistrial on the ground that the prosecution
witness, Sgt. Flordelito Sabuyas, executed an affidavit on Dec. 11, 1998 retracting his previous
statements and instead declared that the wife of the victim and Madayag framed up Datu and
Batuelo. The prosecution opposed the motion.

The motion for new trial/mistrial for being pro forma was denied by the trial court.
That appellants filed a supplemental motion for new trial, to which was attached an affidavit
executed by one Roosevelt Salvador, who alleged that Madayag lied under oath and was
physically manhandled to testify for the prosecution.

The Trial Court denied the supplemental motion on the ground that since the case
records had been elevated to SC for automatic review, the motion had become moot and
academic.

Issue:

Whether or not the Trial Court erred in denying the motion for new trial based on newly
discovered evidence.

Held:

YES

Ratio:

As to the appellants - The Trial Court deprived them of due process when it
perfunctorily denied their supplemental motion for a new trial based on newly discovered
evidence, consisting of Roosevelt Salvadors sworn statement. They only managed to learn of
and obtain Salvadors affidavit after the TRIAL COURT had rendered the decision under
automatic review. Apparently, his statement could not be discovered and produced at the trial,
despite reasonable diligence on their part. Hence, said statement must be deemed newly
discovered evidence that may be properly presented in a new trial. Salvadors testimony in a
new trial will effectively demolish the credibility of the prosecutions star witness and cast
reasonable doubt as to the guilt of appellants. By refusing to consider this new evidence of how
Madayag was tortured by military men given financial consideration the wife of the victim to
feign participation in the killing of her husband and implicate appellants herein, the trial court
deprived appellants of their day in court by denying their
supplemental motion for new trial. The recantation by prosecution witness Sgt. Sabuyas of his
testimony in open court as a further ground for granting a new
trial.

As to the Office of the Solicitor General - since the proffered affidavit of Salvador assails
only the credibility of state witness Madayag, it would not suffice to justify the holding of new
trial. Otherwise put, it would be insufficient to overcome the prosecutions other evidence
which show the culpability of appellants. Furthermore, Salvadors affidavit is suspect for being
a concoction and prevarication, since it is highly improbable that Sabuyas would cooperate in
abducting and torturing Madayag to wrongfully admit complicity in a crime, knowing him to
be the husband of a close relative. The claim that Madayags testimony was rehearsed and
fabricated is belied by the observation of the trial court that it entertained no doubt as to his
credibility, as his testimony was unwavering, straightforward, and bereft of any pretension.

Section 2 (b), Rule 121 - an accused may move for new trial on the ground of newly
discovered material evidence. For newly discovered evidence to be a ground for new trial, the
following requirements must be met: (1) the evidence is discovered after trial; (2) such evidence
could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable
diligence; and (3) the evidence is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching,
and of such weight that, if admitted, would probably change the judgment.

In this case, the alleged newly discovered evidence consists of the affidavit of Roosevelt
Salvador declaring that he and several military men, including Sgt. Sabuyas, abducted, then
manhandled and physically abused Domingo Madayag to admit complicity in the killing of
Antonio Chan and, as state witness, implicate appellant Datu. Salvador further declared that
Madayag only agreed to cooperate after the victims wife offered him a more than reasonable
financial package in exchange for his testimony in court pinning down appellants herein.
Salvador also declared that he would state the rest in court, if required to testify.
over. But the statement made by Salvador after the trial a quo was finished, is evidence which
appellants could not have secured during the trial, such that it must be considered as newly
discovered evidence that may be presented in a new trial. More so, as his statement as evidence,
while mainly of an impeaching character, is material enough that could change the results.

With respect to Sabuyas recantation, as a rule, we have often regarded a recantation
with disfavor as it can be easily secured from a poor and ignorant witness for monetary
consideration. But, as appellants correctly point out, Sabuyas is a professional soldier, an
intelligence operative who is not ignorant of the actions he took but risked prosecution for
perjury when he recanted his testimony. Under the circumstances, the rules governing the
matter should be construed and applied liberally on the broader ground of substantial justice.
In the present case, moreover, the penalty imposed by the trial court upon appellants is death.
Sabuyas testimony in court has been described as worthy of note and the key to the solution
of the case. But with his recantation, it is as if that key no longer fits to unlock completely
the truth in the case. A trial is primarily a quest for truth, where the parties are given full
opportunity to adduce evidence to ferret out the truth. Given the gravity of the offense charged
and the severity of the sentence imposed, even a mere shadow of doubt in this case might vitiate
the result reached below. Hence, we are favorably disposed to make sure that every piece of
pertinent material evidence be adduced before the trial court.

In People vs. Ebias - we cannot in good conscience convict accused-appellant and
impose upon him the death penalty when evidence which would possibly exonerate him may be
presented by him in a new trial.

DISPOSITION the assailed decision by the Regional Trial Court of Ilagan, Isablea is
VACATED and the case is hereby REMANDED for further proceedings. Both the accused
Datu and Batuelo should be allowed to present newly discovered evidence in their defense and
such other evidence as the court may allow to be introduced and taken for consideration
together with the evidence already in the records.

-People v Ebias, G.R. No. 127130, 12 October 2000

FACTS
On Dec. 13, 1994, Ebias and a John doe were charged with murder with frustrated murder in
an information filed by the Prov. Prosecutor of Laguna. When arraigned, Ebias pleaded not
guilty. During the trial, Ronaldo reiterated in open court that Ebias and Boy Marantal were
one and the same person. However, he could not identify Ebiass companion as the latters face
was covered with a yellow handkerchief.
On May 15, 1995 , TC rendered a decision, finding Ebias guilty of the crime of murder with
frustrated murder and imposed the penalty of death.
Ebias' prosecution failed to comply with the rules for the protection of the rights of the accused
during confrontations with alleged eyewitnesses before the police. The TC erroneously gave
credence to the testimony of a perjured eyewitness upon whose sole testimony hinged the
entire case against him. The TC failed to appreciate uncontroverted facts established by the
defense as well as admissions against interests made by the prosecution witnesses.
Ebias filed a motion seeking the appointment of a counsel de oficio for Leonardo Eliseo, a death
convict at the National Bilibid Prison, who wrote a letter confessing to the commission of the
crime for which Ebias was held liable. The Court denied Ebias motion for lack of merit.Then
Ebias moved for new trail on the ground of newly-discovered evidence. He averred that new
and material evidence had been discovered by the defense, consisting of a confession made by
Eliseo, also a death row convict, that he committed the crime for which Ebias was convicted
and sentenced to death. Such evidence could not have been discovered and produced during his
trial because it was only after his conviction that he came to know of Eliseos responsibility for
the crime and his willingness to confess. He asserted that Eliseos confession would probably
change the judgment if it was introduced in evidence. Attached to Ebiass motion for new trial
was an affidavit executed by Eliseo narrating his participation in the shooting of Tirso and
Ronaldo. Eliseo explained that the initial plan was to hold-up a Bombay. While waiting for
the target, Tirso and Ronaldo suddenly appeared and started walking towards them. Eliseo got
nervous and missed the Bombay. This made Eliseo furious thus he shot Tirso and Ronaldo.

ISSUE
WON Eliseos confession constitutes newly-discovered evidence warranting a new trial in
favour of Ebias

HELD: YES
For newly-discovered evidence to be a ground for new trial, the following requisites must
concur: (a) the evidence is discovered after trial; (b) such evidence could not have been
discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; and (c) the
evidence is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching, and of such weight
that, if admitted, could probably change the judgment.
The uncorroborated testimony of a lone witness is sufficient basis for the conviction of the
accused if it is credible, positive, and constitutes proof beyond reasonable doubt that the latter
is guilty. In this case, the trial court relied primarily on the positive identification made by
Ronaldo in convicting Ebias.
The defense was not able to overthrow the testimonies of the prosecution, which was
straightforward, convincing as to leave no space for doubt. Accused was positively identified to
be the author of the crime. It is a well settled rule that greater weight is given to the positive
identification of accused by prosecution witness.
-
appellant whom he saw shoot him and his cousin. However, questions arise regarding the
circumstances surrounding the identification made by Ronaldo Narez of accused- appellant as
the person who shot him and his cousin resulting in the latters death.

-People v Alicando, 251 SCRA 293 (1995)

Facts: Accused Alicandro was charged with the crime of rape with Homicide for allegedly
raping one Khazie Mae in his house. One witness, Luisa Rebada, testified that she saw the
victim at the window of appellants house. She offered to buy her yemas but appellant closed the
window. Later on, she heard the victim crying. When she approached appellants house and
peeped through an opening between its floor and door, she saw appellant naked and on top of
the victim with his left hand choking her neck. She retreated to her house in fright. Soon, Luisa
told the parents of the victim what happened. Then, appellant was arrested and interrogated by
PO3 Danilo Tan. During such interrogation, the accused verbally confessed his guilt without
the assistance of counsel. Subsequently, on the basis of his uncounselled verbal confession and
follow up interrogations, the police was able to know and recovered all the evidences regarding
the commission of the crime from the appellants house which were later on presented as
evidence for the prosecution against the appellant. The trial court found him guilty and
imposed the supreme penalty of death.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court was correct in convicting the appellant
Held: No
Ratio Decidendi:
Section (1) (a) of Rule 116 provides that: The accused must be arraigned before the court where the
complaint or information has been filed or assigned for trial. The arraignment must be made in open
court by the judge or clerk by furnishing the accused a copy of the complaint or information with the list of
witnesses, reading the same in the language or dialect known to him and asking him whether he pleads
guilty or not guilty. The prosecutor may, however, call at the trial witnesses other than those named in the
complaint or information.
In this case, the records do not reveal that the Information against the appellant was read in the
language or dialect known to him. The Information against the appellant is written in the
English language. It is unbeknown whether the appellant knows the English language. Neither
is it known what dialect is understood by appellant. Nor is there any showing that the
Information couched in English was translated to the appellant in his own dialect before his
plea of guilt.
Moreover, Section 3 of the same Rule provides that: When the accused pleads guilty to a capital
offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the
consequences of his plea and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability.
The accused may also present evidence in his behalf.
In this case, the questions of the trial court failed to show the voluntariness of the plea of guilt
of the appellant nor did the questions demonstrate appellants full comprehension of the
consequences of his plea. The age, socio-economic status, and educational background of the
appellant were not plumbed by the trial court. The questions were framed in English yet there
is no inkling that appellant has a nodding acquaintance of English. A cursory examination of
the questions of the trial court to establish the voluntariness of appellants plea of guilty will
show their utter insufficiency. The trial court simply inquired if appellant had physical marks of
maltreatment. It did not ask the appellant when he was arrested, who arrested him, how and
where he was interrogated, whether he was medically examined before and after his
interrogation. Likewise, the trial court warned the appellant he would get the mandatory death
penalty without explaining the meaning of mandatory. Thus, appellants plea of guilt is void
and the trial court erred in using it to sentence him to death.

-People v Del Mundo, 262 SCRFA 266 (1996)





-Agulto v CA, 181 SCRA 80 (1990)



-Alegre v Reyes, 161 SCRA 226 (1988)

FACTS:
Petitioner Alegre was indicted in the Court of First Instance of Manil for the felony of
malversation of public funds under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. On arraignment,
Alegre entered a plea of not guilty. Alegre's evidence, consisted only of his sole testimony, and
a few exhibits. He submitted his proofs during only two trial settings, on September 24, and on
September 29,1980. Memoranda were thereafter submitted by the parties, inclusive of replies
by both of them. Twelve (12) days or so after receiving a copy of the prosecution's reply
memorandum and before rendition or judgment Alegre filed under date of February 12, 1981 a
"Motion to Reopen Trial for Presentation of Additional Evidence" to prove "that the funds in
question are not public funds and are not impressed with a public character," and "that he is not
a public officer."Alegre quote candidly admitted his mistake and oversight in failing to lay these
additional proofs before the Court prior to his resting his case, realization of the gravity of the
error, and the gaping omissions in his evidence having dawned on him in the course of drawing
up his memorandum-in-chief and reply memorandum. The motion was opposed by the
prosecution, it being argued in substance that the additional evidence would not affect the
essential question of the defendant's guilt or innocence, and that the latter had been accorded
adequate time and opportunity to put on all his proofs but he had failed to do so. Alegre filed a
reply. Thereafter the motion was denied by the Trial Court. It said that the points raised would
only be unnecessarily cumulative and a superfluity.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in not granting
Alegres motion to re-open trial.

HELD/RATIO DECENDI:
Yes. The trial Court committed grave abuse of discretion in not granting Alegres
motion to re-open trial.
In light of the foregoing jurisprudence, and the relevant facts, it appears that the Trial
Court had acted unreasonably, capriciously, whimsically, and oppressively in spurning Alegre's
plea for reopening the trial so that he might present additional evidence. The record shows that
it took the prosecution no less than two and a half years to adduce its proofs; the accused
presented evidence a span of five (5) days and only on two (2) hearing dates. The prosecution
called to the stand twenty nine (29) witnesses and introduced more than sixty (60) exhibits; the
accused offered naught but his sole testimony and a few documents. There was withal no undue
delay in Alegre's presentation of his motion to reopen.

Of significance, too, is the absence of showing of any substantial prejudice to the State
which would have been occasioned by the reception of Alegre's proferred additional evidence.

There was moreover a frank avowal of error and oversight on Alegre's part; he had
quite apparently underestimated the State's evidence and overrated his own meager proofs. All
these circumstances, taken together, should have persuaded the Trial Judge to give the accused
the few hearing dates that the presentation of his additional evidence would have entailed; and
the resultant delay in the termination of the trial would certainly not have caused serious or
substantial injury to the State's cause, It was moreover unreasonable, in the premises, for the
Trial Court to justify denial of the application for reopening by simply adverting to the fact
that "the accused had (been given) all the opportunity to present his evidence" which the
accused does not at all deny, but as to which he pleads that serious error on his part prevented
him from fully availing of that opportunity or by stressing that "the record has been
extensively saturated with evidence on the points raised in the motion such that further
evidence on said points would only be unnecessarily cumulative and a superfluity" since the
"saturating evidence" did not proceed from the appellant, in the first place, and hence his
additional evidence would not be cumulative thereto but in refutation thereof, and could not, in
any event, be characterized as "a superfluity."

-Valdez v Aguilizan, 133 SCRA 150 (1984)




-People v Amparado, 156 SCRA 712 (1987)

Facts: Norman Amparado was found guilty of Murder for the death of Manuel Maghanoy. He
seeks a new trial, citing as grounds therefor: [1] the discovery of new and material evidence
[2] errors of law or irregularities committed during the trial prejudicial to his substantive
rights as an accused; and, [3] interest of substantial justice and avoidance of a failure of justice.
Plaintiff-appellee People of the Philippines thru the Solicitor-General opposes said motion. The
newly-discovered evidence relied upon by accused-appellant consists of the testimonies of
Antonio Cachin Jr., Manuel Henry Auza and Violeta Amparado.

While, as contended by the Solicitor, the testimony of Violeta Amparado could not be
considered as newly-discovered nor could it materially affect the judgment, said testimony
being merely cumulative in character, We find the proposed testimonies of Antonio Cachin Jr.,
and Manuel Henry Auza to be newly-discovered and of sufficient weight and character as to
alter the outcome of the case.

Part of the affidavit:

Q: Why, please state the reason when according to you, you exerted earnest
effort and reasonable diligence to produce evidence and witnesses for your defense
during the trial?
A: Because I did not know then of any person or persons who were in the road
and able to render assistance to late Manuel Maghanoy after he was stabbed,
considering that after the stabbing in self-defense, I was just inside the house; when I
went with the Policemen that same evening, Manuel Maghanoy was no longer there
and during the trial and the pendency of the appeal, I did not go back to the scene,
premises and environment of the incident of Estaka, Dipolog City, to gather information
as to the possibility of any person or persons who might have rendered assistance to
Manuel Maghanoy after he was stabbed in the house or who could be present in the
road when the incident happened, for fear of retaliation from his relatives and friends,
especially that I received information that they were hunting me.

Q: When, for the first time did you discover that Antonio Cachin Jr. and Manuel
Henry Auza were present in the road in front of the home of Deling Velasco when the
incident between Manuel Maghanoy and you happened in the house where you were
boarding and that they were the first persons who rendered assistance to Manuel
Maghanoy after he was wounded by you in self-defense or to repel his unlawful
aggression?

A: Only after I received a copy of the decision of the Honorable Supreme Court
on October 15, 1985.

Q: How did you discover it?

A: After I received the decision of the Honorable Supreme Court, I went to
Dipolog City to look for a lawyer for an advice or consultation. Coincidentally, I met
Roseller Ladera who was one of the prosecution witnesses and I regretably told him
that I was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment principally due to the
testimony of Rogelio Patangan, and Roseller Ladera told me that it was surprising for
the reason that Rogelio Patangan was not present during the incident, it was a certain
Antonio Cachin Jr.and his companion who were present based on what he knew.
ISSUE: Should the motion for new trial be granted?

HELD: Yes. Under these circumstances, there can be no doubt that the evidence sought to be
presented are newly-discovered as defined by the Rules of Court. Furthermore, the proposed
testimonies of Antonio Cachin Jr. and Manuel Henry Auza, who aver to be the first persons to
render assistance to the victim immediately after the stabbing incident, if admitted, would tend
to show that the alleged eyewitness Rogelio Patangan, whose version of the crime was given
full faith and credence by the trial court and sustained by this Court, was not present at the
scene of the crime. 4 If this is true, then, the version of the prosecution might perforce fail and
that of the defense prevail. Consequently, the judgment of conviction could be reversed, or at
the very least, modified. Finding that the evidence sought to be presented by accused-appellant
conforms to the requisites laid down by Section 2[b] of Rule 121 of the Rules of Court, the
Court Resolved to GRANT accused- appellant's motion for new trial.


2. Motion for Reconsideration

-Rule 121, sec 1, 3, 4, 5, 6 (Supra)

-Rule 124, sec 16

Section 16.Reconsideration. A motion for reconsideration shall be filed within fifteen (15)
days after from notice of the decision or final order of the Court of Appeals, with copies served
upon the adverse party, setting forth the grounds in support thereof. The mittimus shall be
stayed during the pendency of the motion for reconsideration. No party shall be allowed a
second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final order. (16a)


-People v Enriquez, 90 Phil. 423 (1951)



3. Reopening

-Rule 119, sec 24


Section 24.Reopening. At any time before finality of the judgment of conviction, the judge
may, motu proprio or upon motion, with hearing in either case, reopen the proceedings to avoid
a miscarrage of justice. The proceedings shall be terminated within thirty (30) days from the
order granting it.

4. Appeal

a. Generally

-Rule 122, secs. 1, 2, 3, 6 & 9 (supra)


-Rule 123, 124 & 125 (Supra)

-People v Molina, G.R. Nos. 141129-33, 14 December 2001




b. Specific Procedures on Appeal

(1) Death penalty cases

-Rule 122, sec 3,10 (as amended by SC A.M. No. 00-5-03 [ October 15, 2004];
Amendments to the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedureto Govern Death Penalty Cases [** Subject to
the new law abolishing the death penalty in the Philippines]


Section 3.How appeal taken.
(a) The appeal to the Regional Trial Court, or to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the
Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, shall be taken by filing a notice
of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and by
serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party.
(b) The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review under Rule 42.
(c) The appeal to the Supreme Court in cases where the penalty imposed by the Regional Trial
Court is death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, or where a lesser penalty is imposed but
for offenses committed on the same occasion or which arose out of the same occurrence that
gave rise to the more serious offense for which the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment is imposed, shall be by filing a notice of appeal in accordance with paragraph (a)
of this section.
(d) No notice of appeal is necessary in cases where the death penalty is imposed by the Regional
Trial Court. The same shall be automatically reviewed by the Supreme Court as provided in
section 10 of this Rule.
(e) Except as provided in the last paragraph of section 13, Rule 124, all other appeals to the
Supreme Court shall be by petition for review on certiorari under Rules 45. (3a)


Section 10.Transmission of records in case of death penalty. In all cases where the death penalty
is imposed by the trial court, the records shall be forwarded to the Supreme Court for
automatic review and judgment within five (5) days after the fifteenth (15) day following the
promulgation of the judgment or notice of denial of a motion for new trial or reconsideration.
The transcript shall also be forwarded within ten (10) days after the filing thereof by the
stenographic reporter. (10a)


-Rule 124, sec 12,13 (as amended by SC A.M. No. 00-5-03 [October 15, 2004]
Amendments to the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure to Govern Death Penalty Cases

Section 12.Power to receive evidence The Court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases
and conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual
issues raised in cases (a) falling within its original jurisdiction, (b) involving claims for damages
arising from provisional remedies, or (c) where the court grants a new trial based only on the
ground of newly-discovered evidence. (12a)
Section 13.Quorum of the court; certification or appeal of cases to Supreme Court. Three (3)
Justices of the Court of Appeals shall constitute a quorum for the sessions of a division. The
unanimous vote of the three (3) Justices of a division shall be necessary for the pronouncement
of a judgment or final resolution, which shall be reached in consultation before the writing of
the opinion by a member of the division. In the event that the three (3) Justices can not reach a
unanimous vote, the Presiding Justice shall direct the raffle committee of the Court to designate
two (2) additional Justices to sit temporarily with them, forming a special division of five (5)
members and the concurrence of a majority of such division shall be necessary for the
pronouncement of a judgment or final resolution. The designation of such additional Justices
shall be made strictly by raffle and rotation among all other Justices of the Court of Appeals.
Whenever the Court of Appeals finds that the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment should be imposed in a case, the court, after discussion of the evidence and the
law involved, shall render judgment imposing the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment as the circumstances warrant. However, it shall refrain from entering the
judgment and forthwith certify the case and elevate the entire record thereof to the Supreme
Court for review. (13a)

-Rule 125

(2) Appeal by any of several accused

-Rule 122, sec 11

Section 11.Effect of appeal by any of several accused.
(a) An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal,
except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter;
(b) The appeal of the offended party from the civil aspect shall not affect the criminal aspect of
the judgment or order appealed from.
(c) Upon perfection of the appeal, the execution of the judgment or final order appealed from
shall be stayed as to the appealing party. (11a)


(3) Withdrawal of appeal

-Rule 122, sec. 12

SECtion 12.Withdrawal of appeal. Notwithstanding the perfection of the appeal, the
Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal
Trial Court, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as the case may be, may allow the appellant to
withdraw his appeal before the record has been forwarded by the clerk of court to the proper
appellate court as provided in section 8, in which case the judgment shall become final. The
Regional Trial Court may also, in its discretion, allow the appellant from the judgment of a
Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court, or Municipal
Circuit Trial Court to withdraw his appeal, provided a motion to that effect is filed before
rendition of the judgment in the case on appeal, in which case the judgment of the court of
origin shall become final and the case shall be remanded to the latter court for execution of the
judgment. (12a)

-PD 968 (as amended), sec. 4

Section 4.Grant of Probation. Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the court may, after it
shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant and upon application at any time of said
defendant, suspend the execution of said sentence and place the defendant on probation for such
period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best.
Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of imprisonment or a fine only.
An application for probation shall be filed with the trial court, with notice to the appellate court
if an appeal has been taken from the sentence of conviction. The filing of the application shall be
deemed a waver of the right to appeal, or the automatic withdrawal of a pending appeal.
An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable.


(4) Even split or no majority in Supreme Court

-Rule 125, sec. 3
Section 3.Decision if opinion is equally divided. When the Supreme Court en banc is equally
divided in opinion or the necessary majority cannot be had on whether to acquit the appellant,
the case shall again be deliberated upon and if no decision is reached after re-deliberation, the
judgment of conviction of the lower court shall be reversed and the accused acquitted. (3a)


-People v Saliling, 249 SCRA 185 (1995)

this should have been the correct citation:

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1976/feb1976/gr_27974_1976.html
kindly check the link.



(5) Effects of death of accused pending appeal
-Villegas v CA 271 SCRA 148 (1997)


Facts:
The case is a libel suit filed by assemblyman Raquiza against Manila Mayor Antonio Villegas,
who allegedly imputed against him acts constituting violations of the anti-graft law through a
speech before the Lions Club of Malasiqui, Pangasinan and in a Radio TV interview in Davao
before appearing in a Senate Committee. The committee observed that the allegations are
merely based on unsubstantiated claims of a certain incredible witness, Pedro. Information for
libel was filed, Villegas denies the charge.
Villegas left for America after the 1971 elections, and stayed there until his demise. The case
proceeded in absentia, and by the time of his death, the prosecution already rested its case.
Judge ordered the dismissal of the case, but ordered the estate to pay Assemblyman Raquiza
Two hundred million pesos. The heirs appealed. CA modified the decision and reduced the civil
indemnity to a lower amount of Php2 million.
Heirs appealed to the Supreme Court
Issue: Whether or not the death of Villegas before the decision by the trial court on the
criminal charge extinguish his civil liability?
Held: YES. Petition is GRANTED. CA and RTC decision is REVERSED.
Ratio: Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability
as well as his civil liability based solely thereon.
1. However, the claim for civil liability survives despite the death of the accused if it is based on
a source of obligation other than delict (crime).
2. If the civil liability survives, an action for recovery may be brought about.
3. The statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of
the criminal action, and may still therefore be filed.
4. In the Bayotas case, this court ruled that the death of the accused during the pendency of the
appeal extinguishes not only his criminal liability but also his civil liability if the latter is based
upon it. Except, if the civil liability is based on the other sources of obligations.
The court noted that the act committed by the accused could also be a quasi-delict but the
Prosecution made an error in not asking for the proper substitution of parties, and therefore the
court cannot render judgement against the heirs of Villegas. Fortunately, Raquiza is not barred
from filing a separate action for the same against the proper party because the prescriptive
period for filing the civil action instituted with the criminal action has been suspended with the
filing of the criminal action.

B. After finality of Judgment

-Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 132601, Resolutions dated 4 and 19 January
1999

FACTS: On January 4, 1999, the SC issued a TRO staying the execution of petitioner Leo
Echegaray scheduled on that same day. The public respondent Justice Secretary assailed the
issuance of the TRO arguing that the action of the SC not only violated the rule on finality of
judgment but also encroached on the power of the executive to grant reprieve. The Sec. Of
Justice cited Sec. 19 of Art. Vll of the Constitution; Except in cases of impeachment, or as
otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons,
and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. He shall also have the power to grant
amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the members of the Congress.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court abused its discretion in granting a Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO) on the execution of Echegaray despite the fact that the finality of judgment has
already been rendered.
HELD: No, The Court did not abuse its discretion in granting the TRO in question. Sec
19, Art VII of the Constitution, simply enumerates or explains the source of power of the
President to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures after
conviction by final judgment. The provision cannot be interpreted as denying the power of
courts to control the enforcement of their decisions after their finality. The powers of the
Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not exclude
each other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life. For the
public respondents therefore to contend that only the Executive can protect the right to life of
an accused after his final conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and coordinate powers
of the three branches of our government.
The Court's resolution temporarily restraining the execution of petitioner must be put
in its proper perspective as it has been grievously distorted especially by those who make a
living by vilifying courts. Petitioner filed his Very Urgent Motion for Issuance of TRO on
December 28, 1998 at about 11:30 p.m. He invoked several grounds, viz: (1) that his execution
has been set on January 4, the first working day of 1999; (b) that members of Congress had
either sought for his executive clemency and/or review or repeal of the law authorizing capital
punishment; (b.1) that Senator Aquilino Pimentel's resolution asking that clemency be granted
to the petitioner and that capital punishment be reviewed has been concurred by thirteen (13)
other senators; and (b.2) Congressman Salacrib Baterina, Jr., and thirty five (35) other
congressmen are demanding review of the same law.The suspension was temporary "until
June 15, 1999, coeval with the constitutional duration of the present regular session of
Congress, unless it sooner becomes certain that no repeal or modification of the law is going to
be made." The extreme caution taken by the Court was compelled, among others, by the fear
that any error of the Court in not stopping the execution of the petitioner will preclude any
further relief for all rights stop at the graveyard. As life was at, stake, the Court refused to
constitutionalize haste and the hysteria of some partisans. The Court's majority felt it needed
the certainty that the legislature will not petitioner as alleged by his counsel. It was believed
that law and equitable considerations demand no less before allowing the State to take the life
of one its citizens.
-People v Parazo, G.R. No. 121176, July 8, 1999

FACTS: RTC decision: Parazo (28 years old) was guilty of rape (sentenced to death) and
homicide.
May 29, 1997-Motion for Reconsideration under consideration, bringing to the attention of the
Court facts and circumstances, such as the absence of a sign language expert, which if true
would warrant the setting aside of his judgment of conviction.

February 10, 1998- the Court resolved to grant appellant's Urgent Omnibus Motion: (1) to
hold in abeyance consideration of his motion for reconsideration pending his medical
examination; (2) to allow a supplemental motion for reconsideration after his medical
examination; and (3) to submit him (appellant) for examination by a physician of the Supreme
Court.

The results of medical examinations conducted on appellant also indicate that appellant is
really a deaf-mute, a mental retardate, whose mental age is only seven (7) years and nine (9)
months, and with low IQ of 60 only.

Parazos mother testified that he was born deaf and mute and she has no money for medical
intervention. Barangay Captain that Parazo was known as mute since childhood. His school
teacher says he was never active in class and he never finished grade I. DSWD says that he was
a beneficiary of their projects relative to "Persons with Disability." During his early childhood,
he was an active participant of the project. As he grew older however, he did not anymore
bother to visit their office.

ISSUE: WON he deserves a re trial for he was sentenced to death without the aid of a language
expert although he is deaf and mentally retarded.

HELD: YES

RATIO: Based on the collateral information's (sic) gathered from persons who have known the
patient since childhood, together with the results of the diagnostic test at UP-PGH and
evidenced by the psychological report, it is now established that Marlon Parazo is suffering
from (1) Profound Hearing Loss, left ear; (2) Severe Hearing Loss, right ear; and (3) Mild
Mental Retardation,

Records on hand show that appellant was tried below without the benefit of a sign
language expert. He deserves a re-arraignment and re-trial, to the end that only upon proof of
guilt beyond reasonable doubt may he be consigned to the lethal injection chamber.

-People v Gallo, G.R. No. 124736, September 29, 1999

FACTS: The supreme penalty of death was imposed upon Romeo Gallo after conviction of
qualified rape.
The accused seeks the lowering of the penalty imposed upon him from death to reclusion
perpetua, saying that seven attendant circumstances must be present in order to subject him to
the penalty of eternal demise.
Furthermore, he contends that the indictment does not specifically mention the
qualifying circumstances to aggravate the crime, which would give legal basis to the conviction
of death penalty to him.
ISSUE: Whether or not the finality of judgment by the court (death penalty) is permanent and
irrevocable.
HELD: No.
RATIO DECIDENDI: The SC has the authority to suspend the execution of a final judgment
or to cause the modification thereof as and when it becomes imperative in the higher interest of
justice or when supervening events warrant such judicial intervention. Finding merit in the
contention of Romeo Gallo, they granted his motion and lowered the penalty from death to
reclusion perpetua.


C. Effect of failure to appeal a patently wrong judgment

-People v Barro Sr., 338 SCRA 312 (2000)


Notes on Judgment and Appeals/Post Judgment Remedies

Judgment - It is an adjudication by the court that the accusedis guilty or not guilty of the
offense charged and theimposition of the proper penalty and civil liability, if any
(Sec. 1).

It is a judicial act which settles theissues, fixes the rights and liabilities of the parties,and is
regarded as the sentence of the lawpronounced by the court on the action or questionbefore
it(Sec. 1, Rule 120).

Requisites of judgment

It must be:

1.Written in official language;
2.Personally and directly prepared by the
judge;
3.Signed by the judge; and
4.Contain clearly and distinctly a statementof the facts and the law upon which it is
based(Sec. 1, Rule 120).

Decisions of the court shall contain the facts andthe law on which they are based
(Sec. 14, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution).

The rationale is that the losingparty is entitled to know why he lost, so he may appeal
to a higher court.

How is entry of judgment made?

The recording of the judgment or order in thebook of entries of judgments shall constitute
itsentry. The record shall contain the dispositive partof the judgment order and shall be signed
by theclerk, with a certificate that such judgment or orderhas become final and executory(Sec.
2, Rule 36).

Mittimus

It is a process issued by the court after convictionto carry out the final judgment, such as
commanding a prison warden to hold the accused in accordance with the terms of judgment.

What is reasonable doubt?

Reasonable doubt is defined as the state of thecase which, after full consideration of all
evidence,leaves the mind of the judge in such a condition that he cannot say that he feels an
abidingconviction toa moral certainty of the truth of thecharge.

What isacquittal?

An acquittal is a finding of not guilty based on the merits, that is, the accused is acquitted
because the evidence does not show that his guilt is beyondreasonable doubt, or a dismissal of
the case afterthe prosecution has rested its case upon motion of the accused on the ground that
the evidence fails toshow beyond reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty.

It is well settled that acquittal, in a criminal caseis immediately final and executory upon
itspromulgation, and that accordingly, the State may notseek its review without placing the
accused in doublejeopardy (Barbers v. Laguio Jr., AM No. RTJ-00-1568, February 15, 2001).

Maximum duration for the courts sentence

In the service of sentence, the maximumduration of the courts sentence shall not be morethan
three- fold the length of time corresponding tothe most severe of the penalties imposed upon
theaccused, and such maximum shall in no case exceedforty years.
2. CONTENTS OF JUDGMENT
Contents of judgment?

The judgment must state:

1.If of conviction

a.Legal qualification of the offenseconstituted by the acts committed bythe accused, and the
aggravating or mitigating circumstances attendingits commission;
b.Participation of the accused whetheras principal, accomplice or accessory;
c.Penalty imposed upon the accused;and
d. Civil liability or damages caused bythe wrongful act or omission unless a
separate civil action has been reserved or waived.

2. If of acquittal

a.Whether the evidence of theprosecution absolutely failed toprove the guilt of the accused
ormerely failed to prove his guiltbeyond reasonable doubt; and
b.In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil
liabilitymight arise did exist(Sec. 2, Rule 120).
The rule regarding a judgment for twoor more offenses charged in the complaint or
information

The court may convict the accused of as many offenses as are charged and proved, and
imposethe penalty for each offense, setting out separatelythe findings of fact and law in each
offense(Sec. 3)

Failure of the accused to object to the duplicity of offense charged in the complaint or
information, is deemed a waiver thereof.

Rule regarding a judgment in case of variance between the offense charged and
proved

General Rule:An accused can be convicted of an offense onlywhen it is both charged and
proved; if it is notcharged although proved, or if it is not provedalthough charged, the accused
CANNOT beconvicted thereof.

Exception:
Where there is a variance between theoffense charged in the complaint or information
and that proved AND the offense as charged is included in or is necessarily includes the
offenseproved, the accused shall be convicted of theoffense proved which is included in the
offensecharged, or of the offense charged which isincluded in the offense proved.(Sec. 4).

An accused cannot be convicted of an offense not charged or included in the information for
this willbe in violation of the constitutional right of theaccused to be informed of the nature of
the offensecharged against him
(Herrera, Vol. IV, p. 882, 2007 ed.).

Effect of the judgment of conviction upon a minor

The courts shall promulgate the sentence andascertain any civil liability which the accused
mayhave incurred. The sentence, however, shall besuspended without need of application
pursuant toP.D. 603 or the Child and Youth Welfare Code. Inwhich case, the child shall have
been committedunder the care of the DSWD or any other accreditedgovernment institution
until he reaches the age of twenty one (21) or until the court so determines(Sec. 40, R.A. 9344,
Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006).

Exceptions for suspension of sentence of youthful offenders

Offender:
1.has enjoyed previous suspension of sentence;
2.is convicted of a crime punishable bydeath or life imprisonment;
3.is convicted by a military tribunal; or
4.is already of age at the time of sentencingeven if he was a minor at the time of the
commission of the crime (Declarador v.Gubaton, G.R. No. 159208, Aug. 18,2006).

Consequence if the minor already reached the age of majority upon the promulgation of
his sentence

He is no longer entitled to the suspension of sentence. However, the time he spent during
theperiod of his confinement shall be credited to his actual service of sentence. Furthermore, he
shallstill be entitled to the privileged mitigatingcircumstance of minority
(People v. Francisco, G.R. No. 102976, Oct. 25, 1995; R.A. 9344, Juvenile Justice and Welfare
Act of 2006).

Probation

A disposition under which a defendant, afterconviction and sentence, is subject to
conditionsimposed by the court and under the supervision of a probation officer
(Sec. 3, PD 968, Probation Law).
4. PROMULGATION OF JUDGMENT; INSTANCES OF
Promulgation of judgment?

It is the official proclamation or announcementof judgment. It consists of reading the judgment
orsentence in the presence of the accused and anyjudge of the court rendering the judgment.

How is judgment promulgated?

It is promulgated by reading it in the presence of the accused and any judge of the court
whichrendered it(Sec. 6).

Is the accused required to be present during thepromulgation of judgment?

Generally, yes.

Except:
1.In case of acquittal;
2. Conviction of light offense wherein the judgment may be pronounced in thepresence of the
accuseds counsel orrepresentative; and
3. Promulgation of judgment when theaccused was tried
in absentia(Sec. 6)
.
Who promulgates the judgment?

General Rule:

The judge of the court who renders thejudgment.

Exceptions:

When:
1.The judge is absent or outside the province or city judgment may bepromulgated by the
clerk of court; and
2.Accused is confined or detained in another city judgment may be promulgated by
the executive judge of the RTC having jurisdiction over the place of confinement
or detention (Sec. 6).

Is the presence of the accusedindispensable in the promulgation of judgment?

No. The promulgation shall still be made byrecording such judgment in the criminal docket
and serving him a copy thereof in his last known addressor through his counsel. If
judgment is one of convictionand the accused is absent withoutjustifiable cause, the court shall
order his arrest andhe shall lose the remedies available in the rulesagainst judgment and his
bail shall be forfeited.However, the accused may surrender and file a
motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies within fifteen (15) days from the
promulgation of judgment. If such motion is granted, he may avail of these remedies within
fifteen (15) days from noticeof such order granting the motion(Sec. 6).

He must however, state the reasons for his absence at the promulgation and prove that his
absence was for a justifiable cause.

Instances when judgment may bepromulgated even if the accused is not present

1.Judgment is for a light offense, in whichcase judgment may be promulgated in thepresence of
the counsel for the accusedor a representative.
2. Accused fails to attend the promulgationdespite due notice or if he jumped bail or
escaped from prison. Notice must be given to the bondsmen, warden,accuseds bailor and
counsel(Sec. 6).

Promulgationin absentia

Promulgation shall be made by:
1.Recording the judgment in the criminaldocket; and
2.Serving the accused a copy thereof at hislast known address or through his
counsel.

What is the remedy if the judgment fails toaward civil liability?
1. Appeal;
2. Certiorari; or
3. Mandamus
4. WHEN DOES JUDGMENT BECOME FINAL (FOUR
INSTANCES)
When does judgment becomes final?

Judgment becomes final:
1.After the lapse of time for perfecting anappeal
2.When the sentence has been partially ortotally satisfied
3.When the accused has expressly waivedin writing his right to appeal
4.When the accused has applied forprobation

Notes on Appeal of judgment
FFECT OF AN APPEAL
What are the modes of review?

The Rules of Court recognize four modes bywhich the decision or final order of the court
maybe reviewed by a higher tribunal:
1. Ordinary Appeal;
2. Petition for Review;
3. Petition for Review on Certiorari;
4. Automatic Appeal

What is appeal?

It is a proceeding for review by which the wholecase is transferred to the higher court for a
finaldetermination. It is not an inherent right of aconvicted person. The right of appeal is
statutory.Only final judgments and orders are appealable.

Who may appeal?

Any party may appeal from a judgment or finalorder, unless the accused will be placed in
doublejeopardy(Sec. 1).

Effect of an appeal

An appeal in a criminal case opens the wholecase for review and this includes the review
of penalty, indemnity, and the damages involved.Consequently, on appeal, the appellate court
mayincrease the penalty and indemnity of damagesawarded by the trial court although the
offendedparty had not appealed from said award, and theparty who sought a review of the
decision was theaccused.

When an appeal has been perfected, the court a quo loses jurisdiction.

What is the difference between the appeal of ajudgment and the appeal of an order?

The appeal from a judgment must be perfected within 15 days frompromulgation. The appeal
from an order should be perfected within 15 days fromnoticeof the final order.
3. WHERE TO APPEAL
When is appeal taken

An appeal must be filed within fifteen (15) dayscounted from the promulgation or notice of
thejudgment or order appealed from.

Where is the appeal taken

To the:

1.RTC, in cases decided by the MTC, MTCC,MeTC, or MCTC;
2.CA or to the SC in the proper casesprovided by law, in cases decided by theRTC;
3. SC, in cases decided by the CA (Sec. 2)

May the prosecution appeal a judgment of acquittal?

General Rule:
No, because the accused would be subjected todouble jeopardy.

Exceptions:
1.If the dismissal is made upon motion orwith the express consent of the accused.
However, double jeopardy will still attachif the dismissal is based on:
a.Insufficiency of the prosecutionevidence; or
b.Violation of the accuseds right tospeedy trial.
2.If the dismissal is not an acquittal orbased upon consideration of the evidence
on the merits;
3.If the question is purely legal so thatshould the dismissal be found incorrect,
the case shall be remanded for further proceedings to determine the guilt orinnocence of the
accused; and
4.If there is a showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, certiorari under Rule 65 may be available.

How is appeal taken

From MTC decision to RTC:

1. File a notice of appeal with the MTC;
2. Serve a copy of the notice to the adverse party.

From RTC to CA

1. RTC Exercising its original jurisdiction for offenses with imposable penalties less tha n reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment

1. File a notice of appeal with the RTC;
2. Serve a copy of the notice to the adverse party.

2. Exercising its appellate jurisdiction

File a petition for review under Rule 42

3. Where the imposable penalty is:
a. life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua; or
b. a lesser penalty for offenses committed on the same occasion or which arose from the same occurrence
that gave rise to the offense punishable reclusion perpetuaor life imprisonment

1. File a notice of appeal with the RTC;
2. Serve a copy of the notice to the adverse party.

4. Where the imposable penalty is death

Automatic review to CA (Sec. 10)

Effects of appeal by any of the several accused

1.An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who
did not appeal, except insofar as thejudgment of the appellate court isfavorable and applicable
to the latter;
2.The appeal of the offended party fromthe civil aspect shall not affect the
criminal aspect of the judgment or orderappealed from; and
3. Upon perfection of the appeal, theexecution of the judgment or final order
appealed from shall be stayed as to theappealing party(Sec. 11).

In People v. Fernandez(G.R. No. 80481, June 27,1990),the SC applied the benefit of an
acquittalhanded down in an appeal to an accused who jumpedbail or escaped.
5. GROUNDS FOR DISMISSAL OF APPEAL
Grounds for the dismissal of an
appeal

1.Failure of the record on appeal to showon its face that the appeal was taken
within the period fixed by these Rules;
2.Failure to file the notice of appeal or therecord on appeal within the period
prescribed by these Rules;
3.Failure of the appellant to pay the docketand other lawful fees as provided in
section 5 of Rule 40 and section 4 of Rule41;
4.Unauthorized alterations, omissions oradditions in the approved record on
appeal as provided in section 4 of Rule 44;
5.Failure of the appellant to serve and filethe required number of copies of his brief
of memorandum within the time providedby these Rules;
6.Absence of specific assignment of errorsin the appellants brief, or of page
references to the record as required in section 13, paragraphs (a), (c), (d) and (f)
of Rule 44;
7.Failure of the appellant to take thenecessary steps for the correction or
completion of the record within the timelimited by the court in its order;
8.Failure of the appellant to appear at thepreliminary conference under Rule 48 or
to comply with orders, circulars, ordirectives of the court without justifiablecause; and
9.The fact that the order or judgmentappealed from is not appealable(Rule 50)