Cab-66-23 UK War Cabinet Docume

W.P.
(42) 121
122
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Securi ty of Radi o Tel ephone Transmi ssi ons:
Note "by the Secretary of the War Cabi net.
Dominion Co- operati on: Note "by the
Secretary of the War Cabi net.
123 - Wel sh Representati on: Memorandum by the
Secretary of State f or Domi ni on A f f ai rs.
124 - The Press: Report by
of the Counci l .
the L ord Presi dent
125 - Pay of Bri ti sh Servi ce Of f i cers wi th
Uni ts and Formati ons: Memorandum by
Secretary of State f or War.
I ndi an
the
126 - A l l i ed Economic Warfare Strategy f or 1942:
Memorandum by the Mi ni ster of Economi c
Warf are.
127
128
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Ci vi l Suppl i es to the Mi ddl e East Area:
Note by the Secretary of the War Cabi net.
Manpower: - Note by the Mi ni ster of Labour
and Nati onal Servi ce.
129 - Naval , Mi l i tary
Resume.
and Ai r Si tuati on: Weekly
130 - Suppl y of Bri ti sh Of f i cers f or I ndi an Army
and thei r Pay; Memorandum by the Secretary
of State f or I ndi a.
131 - The "Dai l y Mi rror":
Home Secretary.
Memorandum by the
132 - J oi nt War Producti on Staf f :
the Mi ni ster of Producti on.
Memorandum by
133
'134
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Commi ttee on Reconstructi on Probl ems:
Revi sed Composi ti on and Terms of Ref erence.
Shi ppi ng Tonnage and L osses i n the Far East:
Note by the Mi ni ster of War Transport.
135 - Posi ti on of Ci vi l i ans evacuated from
Par East to the Domi ni ons and I ndi a:
Memorandum by the Secretary of State
Dominion A f f ai rs.
the
f or
Weekly Resume.
and Ai r Si tuati on:
137 - Vi chy Squadron
the F i r st Lord
at
of
Al exandri a: Memorandum by
the Admi ral ty.
138 - I ndi a: Tel egrams exchanged between the
Lord Pri vy Seal and the Pri me Mi ni ster.
139 - Report by the Ri ght
M.P., on hi s peri od
of State.
Hon. Ol i ver L yttel ton,
of Of f i ce as Mi ni ster
140 -
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3? aval?, Mi l i tary
;Weekly Restime.
and Ai r Si tuati on:
he
W.P.(42) 141
142
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I ndi a: draf t tel egramfrom the Pri me Mi ni ster
to the Lord Pri vy Seal .
Communist Party: Memorandum by the Home
Secretary.
143 - Functi ons of
Mi ddl e East:
Mi ni ster.
the Mi ni ster of State i n
Memorandum "by the Pri me
the
144 - Proposed Angl o-Sovi et Treaty:
by the Secretary of State f or
Memorandum
Forei gn A f f ai rs.
145 - The Mal ayan Campai gn: Note by the Secretary.
146
147
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Some Remarks made by J apanese Di pl omats
and Attaches i n European Capi tal at end
February.
I ndi a i Tel egrams to and from the Pri me
Mi ni ster.
of
148 - Coal Producti on:
Presi dent of the
Memorandum by the
Counci l .
Lord
149 - - I ndi a:
I ndi a,
Note by the Secretary of State f or
coveri ng a tel egram from the Vi ceroy.
150 - Pol i ti cal Meeti ngs i n Factori es: Memorandum
by the Lord Presi dent of the Counci l .
151 - J uri sdi cti on over members of the U.S. Armed
Forces i n the U.K. J oi nt Memorandum by the
Forei gn Secretary, the Home Secretary and the
Secretary of State f or Scotl and.
152 - Anti - gas Precauti ons:
of State f or Dominion
Report by the
A f f ai rs.
Secretary
153 - (1) Rel ease of Whol e-ti me Ci vi l Defence
Personnel f or War I ndustry.
(2) Rel ease of Pol i ce f or the Armed Forces.
Memorandum by the Home Secretary and Mi ni ster
of Home Securi ty.
Resume.
and Ai r Si tuati on: Weekly
155 - Propaganda at Home: Memorandum by
Mi ni ster of I nf ormati on.
the
155 - Angl o-Sovi et
Secretary of
T reati es:
State f or
Memorandum by the
Forei gn A f f ai rs.
157 - The Shi ppi ng Si tuati on: Memorandum by
Mi ni ster of War Transport.
the
158 - Enemy i ntenti ons:
the War Cabi net,
Note by the Secretary of
159 - External Monetary and Economi c Pol i cy:
Prel i mi nary di scussi ons wi th the U.S. :
Memorandum by the Paymaster- General .
160 - Evacuati on of I ndi ans from Burma: Memorandum j
by the Secretary of State f or Burma.
161 - Organi sati on
Conti ngents:
Commi ttee.
of A l l i ed Naval , Army and Ai r
Report by the Chi ef s of staf f I
W.P.(42) 162 -
163 -
164 -
165 -
166 -
167 -
168 -
169 -
Polio
Evacuati on of I ndi an Refugees from Burma:
Memorandum by the Secretary of State f or Burma.
Enemy Oi l Questi ons: Note by the Secretary
of the War Cabi net.
Naval , Mi l i tary and Ai r Si tuati on; Weekly
Resume.
Post- war Commodity Pol i cy and Rel i ef : Note
by the Secretary of the War Cabi net.
A tti tude of I ndi an Nati onal Congress:
Memorandum by the Secretary of State f or I ndi a.
Rel ease of Ex-Mi ners from the Army. Memorandum
by the Secretary of state f or War.
Communist Party: Memorandum by the Home
Secretary.
Vi chy Mi ni sters i n the Domi ni ons: Memorandum
by the Secretary of State f or Dominion A f f ai rs.
0 is not open to public inspection,
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BF K E P T U N O E R j C Â U ,
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DOCUMENT I S THE PROPERTY OP HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY' S GOVERNMENT.)"
S E C R E T .
2Q
W.P.(42)181.
COPY NO.
15!TH MARCH. 1942.
. WAR CABINET.
SECURITY OP RADIO TELEPHONE TRANSMISSIONS.
Note by the Secretary.
The attached Memorandum by the Chai rman of the
Wi rel ess Tel egraphy Board i s ci rcul ated to the War
Cabi net by di recti on of the Pri me Mi ni ster.
(Si gned) E.E. BRIDGES.
Secretary to the War Cabi net.
Great George Street, S.W.1.
13TH MARCH, 1942.
SECURITY OP RADIO TELEPHONE.
Memorandum by the Chairman of the Wi rel ess
Tel egraphy Board.
The Wi rel ess Tel egraphy Board i s seri ousl y
di sturbed by the i ncreasi ng use of R/T f or al l purposes.
The securi ty of the vari ous devi ces used f or di sgui si ng
radi o tel ephony transmi ssi ons has been'di scussed at the
Board wi th wi rel ess engi neers from the General Post
Of f i ce. The Board i s of the opi ni on that no securi ty
devi ce has yet been produced whi ch gi ves any r eal
securi ty to radi o tel ephony transmi ssi ons. Securi ty
devi ces ( e. g. scrambl i ng) are onl y of avai l agai nst the
casual eavesdropper, and af f ord no secrecy whatsoever when
tapped by a f ul l y qual i f i ed radi o engi neer wi th ample
resources.
As f ar , theref ore, as the enemy are concerned, al l
-radi o tel ephony trurûi ssi onR shoul d be l ooked on as havi ng
no more secrecy than i f they were i n ordi nary speech, and
we can be tol erabl y certai n that they are al l overheard by
the enemy, who, we know, watch our v/i rel ess tr af f i c.
I t i s requested, theref ore, that thi s opi ni on may
be brought to the noti ce of the War Cabi net, and that suitabllf
i nstructi ons may oe drawn up to ensure that nothi ng of
val ue to the enemy i s ever transmi tted over the radi o
tel ephone.
(Si gned) C.V.L. LYCETT.
16TH FEBRUARY.
TO 8F KEPT UNDER LOOK A N D KgV, '
't isA i q i v s ^ i that spepial care may be taken to
ôauiv tJae jjecrepy.of this document. \ /
\ /
(THIS DOCUMENT I S THE PROPERTY OP HIS BRITANNIC MAJ ESTY'S GOVERNMENT) ,
S E C R E T . M
W.P.CU-2) .122,
1U-TH MARCH, COPY NO.
WAR CABINET.
DOMINION C O-OPERATION
by the Secretary,
The attached most secret and personal tel egram i s
ci rcul ated to the War Cabi net by di recti on of the Pri me
Mi ni s tcr,
(Si gned) E.E. BRIDGES.
Secretary of the War Cabi net,
Great George Street', S . W. 1 .
11+TH MARCH, 191+2.
MOST SE CRE T AND PE RSONA L T E I ^GR A M TO T HE P R I M E M I N I S T E R ,
FROM T HE P R I ML- ^- Î Sl ^ uj A UST RA L I A T FTEOEI VED IJ TH" MARCH ,j 91+2
1, Desi re to i nform you that Dr. H.V. Evatt, Mi ni ster f or
External Af f ai rs and Attorney- General who i s accompani ed by
hi s v/i fe, i s l eavi ng A ustral i a i mmedi atel y f or the Uni ted
Kingdom and Uni ted States of Ameri ca. He i s travel l i ng by
ai r across the Paci f i c Ocean and wi l l vi si t the Uni ted
States f i r st.
2. Hi s vi si t i s bei ng made so that there can be di rect
Mi ni steri al representati on of the Government by a Mi ni ster
who i s f ul l y f ami l i ar wi th i ts present probl ems and vi ews
thereon.
3. On arri val i n the Uni ted Kingdom i t i s desi red that he
be accepted as the accredi ted"representati ve of the A ustral i an
Government i n the War Cabi net and admi tted to i ts del i berati ons
on the same basi s as Si:? Earl e Page. Dr. Evatt wi l l al so
be the Austral i an r-j prc tentati ve on the Paci f i c War Counci l .
C U R T I N ,
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I S DOCUMENT I S THE PROPERTY OF' HI S 3RITAITNIC IIAJ ESTY'S GOVERNMENT).
3 E 0 R E T .
W.P.(U2) 123.
15th March. 19U2.
WAR CABINET.
WEjCSH REPRESENTATION,
Memorandum by the Secretary of State f or Domi ni on A f f ai rs.
Y esterday I recei ved a deputati on representati ve of
the Wel sh M.P..S, They compl ai ned, that i n departments
general l y there i s a f ai l ure to recogni se the parti cul ar
posi ti on of Wal es as a di sti nct nati on. There i s too much
of a tendency to consi der al l questi ons on a narrow techni cal
poi nt of vi ew - Wal es bei ng consi dered merel y as a part of
a l arger geographi cal area. Thi s i gnori ng of Wal es provi des
powder and shot f or the extreme Welsh nati onal i sts who are
mi schi evous and tend to be agai nst the war ef f ort
0
I was
gi ven' qui te a number of i nstances i n whi ch the Wel sh cl ai m
f or representati on on vari ous i mportant-commi ttees had been
i gnored,,, and I consi der that the deputati on made i t s case,
I suggest to the Cabi net that a di recti ve shoul d be I ssued
to al l departments to thi s ef f ect.
I n al l departments attenti on shoul d be pai d to
adequate representati on bei ng gi ven on commi ttees, advi sory
counci l s and si mi l ar bodi es to Welsh persons, and to the
setti ng up of separate commi ttees or organi sati ons f or
Wal es where the separate i nterests of Wal es as a nati on may
be i nvol ved - and where there-, i s no strong admi ni strati ve
reason f or not doi ng so
0
,,r When Welsh men and women,
especi al l y when they are uni l i ngual , have for war reasons
to be pl aced outsi de Y /al es, care shoul d be taken to see
that so f ar as possi bl e they are posted to Welsh uni ts.
Unl ess securi ty grounds render i t undesi rabl e, they shoul d
be al l owed to p e n r j f-pri recei ve l etter s i n the Welsh
l angur.gc
a
. *,
( I ntl d. ) " C.R.A.
Dominions Of f i ce,
1^th March, 19U2..
l' KEPT U N D E R LOCK AND KEY.
l\ Is requested that special care may betaken to " " " '
ensure the secrecy of this document.
IS DOCUMENT I S THE PROPERTY OF HI S BRITANNIC MAJ ESTY'S GOVERNMENT)
S E C R E T .
W.P. (1+2) 12k.
17TH MARCH
4
WAR CABINET,
THE PRESS.
V COPY NO. &
/
Report by the L ord Presi dent of the Counci l .
At thei r meeti ng on the 9th March the War Cabi net
i nvi ted a Committee of . Mi ni sters to consi der what steps
coul d be taken to prevent the publ i cati on i n thi s country
of ar ti cl es, or the sendi ng out of thi s country of messages,
cal cul ated to undermi ne publ i c moral e at home or to create
i l l - f eel i ng between the Uni ted Nati ons (W.M.(k2) 32nd
Concl usi ons, Mi nute k) .
I submi t on behal f of the Commi ttee the f ol l owi ng
statement of thei r concl usi ons,
2, We consi dered f i r st what steps mi ght be taken to
prevent publ i cati on of such materi al i n thi s country.
We agreed that i t woul d not be practi cabl e to deal wi th
thi s by way of an extensi on of press censorshi p. The present
system i s a vol untary censorshi p concerned wi th statements of
f act. I t i s desi gned to prevent the publ i cati on of any
mi l i tar y i nf ormati on (i n the wi dest sense) l i kel y to be
usef ul to the enemy; and i t has been possi bl e to i ndi cate
wi th reasonabl e preci si on the ki nd of materi al whi ch shoul d
be submi tted for censorshi p on thi s ground,, I t woul d be
i mpossi bl e, to def i ne the ki nd of materi al whi ch mi ght
undermi ne publ i c moral e at home; and i t woul d be necessary
to requi re the' whol e of each edi ti on of a newspaper to be
presented to the censor bef ore i t went to pri nt* Thi s was
i n f act the system of censorshi p employed i n France duri ng
the months i mmedi atel y bef ore the f i nal col l apse of the
French Government.
I n our view such a system would be i mpracti cabl e, as a
matter of admi ni strati on, i n thi s country. I t i s al so arguabl e
that i t woul d be di f f i cul t to reconci l e i t wi th the conti nu-
ance of the posi ti on by whi ch Mi ni sters are responsi bl e to
Parl i ament and thei r acti ons can be chal l enged i n the Courts,,
3. We,have, theref ore, consi dered what other acti on coul d
be taken to check the publ i cati on of obj ecti onabl e materi al .
I n our vi ew i t i s necessary i n the f i r st i nstance that
the Government shoul d make i t cl ear that the conti nued
publ i cati on of thi s ki nd of unwarranted and mal i gnant
cri ti ci sm of those i n authori ty may do the State a mortal
i nj ury by sappi ng publ i c confi dence and breaki ng dov/n the
spi r i t of uni ty i n prosecuti ng the.war. I f a general
statement on these l i nes were made, by the hi ghest authori ty,
al l members of the Government shoul d fol l ow i t up by counteri ng
thi s type of cri ti ci sm, whenever i t occurs, by vi gorous
correcti on and counter- statement. Above al l , i t woul d be
hel pf ul i f an exampl e coul d be made of one of the newspapers
whi ch has been a f l agrant of f ender i n thi s respect.
kc Wi th thi s l ast poi nt i n vi ew, we have consi dered whether
i t i s necessary to strengthen the exi sti ng powers under the
Defence Regul ati ons. Under Regul ati on 2D, the Home Secretary
may suppress any newspaper i f he i s sati sf i ed that i t has
systemati cal l y publ i shed matter whi ch i s i n hi s opi ni on
cal cul ated to foment opposi ti on to the prosecuti on of the war
to a successf ul i ssue. We have consi dered whether i t would
be possi bl e to take acti on agai nst the "Dai l y Mi rror" under
thi s Regul ati on. We i nvi ted the Attorney- General i n consul ta-
ti on wi th the Lord Chancel l or to advi se whether the wordi ng of
thi s Regul ati on i s such that the Home Secretary must have
regard to the moti ve behi nd the publ i cati on or whether i t i s
suf f i ci ent i f he i s sati sf i ed that the natural consequences
of the publ i cati on woul d be to "foment opposi ti on to the
prosecuti on of the war to a successf ul i ssue". The opi ni ons
gi ven by the Lord Chancel l or and the Attorney- General on thi s
poi nt are reproduced i n the Appendi x.
* I n vi ew of these opi ni ons, we have no doubt that there
. has been i n the "Dai l y Mi rror" systemati c publ i cati on of
materi al whi ch woul d render i t l i abl e to suppressi on under
thi s Regul ati on.
' 5* At the same ti me, we doubt whether i t i s real i sed by
Parl i ament, Press or publ i c that materi al of thi s ki nd comes
wi thi n Regul ati on 2D - whi ch was desi gned, and i s at present
regarded, as an i nstrument f or use rather agai nst posi ti ve
propaganda i n opposi ti on to the war or i n f avour of a
negoti ated peace.
I f onl y f or thi s reason, we do not thi nk i t woul d be
expedi ent to take i mmedi ate acti on to suppress the "Dai l y
Mi rror" under Regul ati on 2D wi thout previ ous warni ng. I t
shoul d f i r st be made cl ear that, i n the vi ew of the Government,
the systemati c publ i cati on of i rresponsi bl e and mal i gnant
cri ti ci sm of thi s ki nd makes a newspaper l i abl e to be
suppressed under thi s Regul ati on. Thi s would serve as a
warni ng, not onl y to the "Dai l y Mi rror", but to such other
newspapers as may stand i n need of i t .
6. We theref ore recommend that the Home.Secretary shoul d
make a consi dered statement, i n answer to a Parl i amentary
Questi on, expl ai ni ng the Government's view of the publ i cati on
of such materi al and making i t cl ear that i t i s thei r
i ntenti on to act under thi s Regul ati on agai nst any newspaper
which offends i n the f uture*
We al so recommend that the Home Secretary shoul d at
the same ti me send f or the Edi tor of the "Dai l y Mi rror" and
him that the paper wi l l be suppressed i f the of f ence i s
repeated.
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7. We have al so consi dered what addi ti onal r estr i cti ons
shoul d be pl aced upon i ncomi ng and outgoi ng messages
cal cul ated to create i l l - f eel i ng between the Uni ted Nati ons.
We have had i n mi nd, parti cul arl y, messages such as those
recentl y transmi tted to certai n A ustral i an and New Zeal and
papers by thei r correspondents i n London,
There shoul d be no di f f i cul ty i n appl yi ng str i cter
control to outgoi ng messages by use of the exi sti ng censor-
shi p machi nery. Before thi s can be done, however, i t wi l l
be necessary f or a publ i c statement to be made wi thdrawi ng
previ ous Mi ni steri al assurances whi ch have been gi ven to
the ef f ect: -
s
that censorshi p wi l l be conf i ned to matters
af f ecti ng mi l i tary securi ty; and
that whatever has been publ i shed i n thi s country
may be cabl ed abroad wi thout f urther questi on,
B
8
We recommend that the Mi ni ster of I nf ormati on shoul d be
authori sed to make a statement i n Parl i ament wi thdrawi ng
these assurances and gi vi ng warni ng that i n fi xture a
str i cter control wi l l be exerci sed wi th a vi ew to stoppi ng
outgoi ng messages cal cul ated/ to create i l l - f eel i ng between *
the Uni ted Nati ons. '
9. I ncomi ng messages coul d not be deal t wi th by means of
censorshi p. Machi nery al ready exi sts to ensure that such
messages are brought to the noti ce of the authori ti es
Concerned, who can get i n touch wi th the edi tor of the
paper wi th a-vi ew to persuadi ng him to di scard or modi fy
the message bef ore publ i cati on here. Censors wi l l be
i nstructed i n f uture to wi den the categori es of messages
whi ch they report to the Mi ni stry of I nf ormati on f or thi s
purpose,,
10. I f the arrangements set out i n paragraphs 8 and 9 above
are approved, Dominion Governments shoul d be i nformed, i n
order that they may consi der taki ng correspondi ng acti on.
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( I ni ti al l ed) JvAo
Great George Street, S.W.1.
17th March, 1 9*4-2.
APPENDIX.
Note "by the Lord Chancel l or.
I do not f i nd any di f f i cul ty i n the words
^ca&cul atad to". I n order to sati sf y these words i t i s
not the purpose whi ch the wri ter had i n mind whi ch matters,
but the ef f ect whi ch the wr i ter ' s words may have on some
of those who read them. I t i s rather more di f f i cul t,
I thi nk, to be sure about the words "foment opposi ti on".
No doubt the newspaper would say that i t was fomenti ng
i ndi gnati on and urgi ng the di smi ssal of i ncompetents, al l
wi th a vi ew that the war mi ght be prosecuted to a successf ul
i ssue. But, speaki ng f or mysel f, even i f the wri ter sai d
so, I shoul d not bel i eve him. Words so outrageousl y
vi ol ent as these are cl earl y cal cul ated to foment opposi ti on
to the war, at any rate i n the mi nds of those who are
war-weary or dej ected by our reverses, to say nothi ng of
Qui sl i ngs and Fi f th Col umni sts. Suppose the l eader wri ter
met a Fi f th Col umni st i n the trai n and repeated these words
to hi m; can anybody doubt that he would have f orti f i ed the
Fi f th Col umni st i n hi s opposi ti on to the war?
I t i s, of course, enti rel y f or the Home Secretary to
deci de whether he "i s sati sf i ed" . So f ar as the
i nterpretati on and appl i cati on of the words of the
Regul ati on go, I venture to thi nk that he would be wel l
j usti f i ed i f he di d come to that concl usi on.
Two questi ons, of course, would then ari se on the
Secretary of State' s Order. F i r st, coul d the newspaper
take ef f ecti ve l egal acti on to recover i ts freedom? I do
not thi nk i t coul d,, short of establ i shi ng i n an acti on that
the Secretary of State was not sati sf i ed and that the Order
he had made was, theref ore, ul tr a vi res.
The more seri ous questi on, of course, i s what wi l l
be the ef f ect on the publ i c, on sol di ers who read the paper,'
on Fl eet Street, and on Parl i ament? As to thi s, I t seems
to me, i f I may say so, that the suddenness and compl eteness
of the acti on taken i s i n i t s f avour. The newspaper wi l l
not be abl e i n f uture i ssues to compl ai n. Perhaps a memory
from the l ast war may not be qui te out of pl ace. When the
then Home Secretary qui te i l l egal l y suppressed the Globe
newspaper because i t would go on sayi ng that Lord K i tchener
had resi gned and our A l l i es i n France became greatl y
di sturbed, there was a row i n the House i n one debate i n
whi ch the Government recei ved overwhel mi ng support, and
nothi ng was ever heard of the Globe newspaper agai n.
S.
12th March, 1942,
Note "by the Attorney General .
The questi ons rai sed are (l ) the meani ng of
"cal cul ated"; and (2) whether the ar ti cl es coul d "be hel d
to he wi thi n the words of Regul ati on 2D.
(l ) The word "cal cul ated" does not i mport the i dea of
moti ve to the ef f ect whi ch the words would he expected to
produce i f bel i eved. There- i s a certai n amount"of authori ty
on the word "cal cul ated" i n other contexts. I n the North
Cheshi re etc. Company and the Manchester Brewery Company,
1899, Appeal Cases 83, the name of the appel l ant was -hel d
to be cal cul ated to decei ve owing to i ts si mi l ari ty to the
name of the respondent company, al though i t was accepted
/that the appel l ant company were i nnocent and had no
i ntenti on to decei ve. I n Sax Lehner v. . A pol l i nari s 1897
1 Ch. 893 at page 900 - a trade-mark case - Kekewich J .
stated that no evi dence was requi red to prove the i ntenti on
to decei ve, the rul e bei ng that a man must be taken to have
i ntended the reasonabl e and natural consequences of hi s acts.
(2) Opposi ti on to the successf ul prosecuti on of a war can
take two f orms: (a) that the war and i ts ai ms are wrong;
(b) that i t i s no good goi ng on because i t i s bound to be
l ost i n the end. The ar ti cl es cl earl y do not come wi thi n (a),
whi ch i n present ci rcumstances i s not a form of opposi ti on
whi ch-woul d be put forward. The onl y form of opposi ti on
that i s possi bl e and potenti al l y dangerous- i s (b). The
ef f ect of the ar ti cl e, i f bel i eved, would be to undermi ne
the moral e of the army and to make the ci vi l i an popul ati on
bel i eve that the army was i ncapabl e of f i ghti ng the enemy
wi th any chance of success. The cartoon suggests that
sai l or s are drowned to enabl e those who sel l potrol to get
a penny more f or what they sel l . I t may be sai d that any
cri ti ci sm' of the hi gher command or of i nef f i ci ency of
admi ni strati on creates some di scouragement and theref ore
. mi ght make peopl e f eel doubts as to vi ctory. I t i s,
however, perf ectl y pl ai n that cri ti ci sm can be framed
wi thout any such i mpl i cati on. The questi on, however,
whether attacks on the army or the runni ng of the war come
wi thi n the words depends on thei r nature. I f they are
suf f i ci entl y mal i gnant and cannot be read as' exaggerati ons
of a l egi ti mate l i ne of cri ti ci sm, the ef f ect they are
cal cul ated to produce may di f f er i n ki nd from that of
reasonabl e or exaggerated cri ti ci sm. The ef f ect then i s,
or maybe, i f the ar ti cl es arc bel i eved, to spread def eati sm,
whi ch i s the onl y i nstrument avai l abl e to those who are
opposed to the war.
f D. S.
LAW OFFICERS' DEPARTMENT.
I 2th March. 1942.
This document is the property of His Britannic Majesty's Government
Printed for the War Cabinet, March, 1942
SECRET
COPY NO. 2 9
W.P. (42) 125
igth March, 1942
TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AMD KEY
It is requested that special care may be ttfken to ensure the
secrecy of this documenjf.
WAR CABINET
P A Y O F B R I T I S H S E R V I C E O F F I C E R S WI T H I N D I A N U N I T S
A N D F O R M A T I O N S
MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR
I regret that it is necessary to refer to my colleagues a question on which
there is a difference of opinion between the Secretary of State for India and
myself which we have not been able to reconcile and on which a decision is
long overdue.
- The details of the case are set out in the attached memorandum, and the
Secretary of State for India is also circulating a memorandum on the question.
So far as I am concerned the case presents itself not as a financial but as
a moral issue.
British officers serving in India, whether with British or with Indian troops,
receive in emoluments considerably more than British Service officers serving
outside India. I am asked to agree that any who happen to be selected to serve
with Indian troops shall receive the same favourable treatment when serving
outside India.
The question is whether it is right at a time when men in this country are
called upon to give up their civil occupation and perform military service in
the ranks, that those who are fortunate enough to be given commissions should,
if they are selected to serve with Indian troops, receive outside India consider-
ably better financial terms than their fellows serving with British troops in the
same area. I cannot think that it is.
The absolute advantage enjoyed by officers serving on Indian emoluments
is enhanced by the fact that the Indian rate of income tax (now to be levied both
in and out of India) is less than the British rate, though a larger proportion
of Indian emoluments are taxable than is the case with British emoluments. At
present the differences in net emoluments are (for example) 8 a month for
Captains and 3 5 for a Lieutenant-Colonel.
These differences are not insignificant and, though there may be some
increase of Indian income tax in the forthcoming budget, they are not likely
to be affected very materially.
I had proposed that the matter should be remitted to the Lord President
to act as conciliator, but the Secretary of State for India feels that the question
is of such importance that it must be settled by the War Cabinet.
P. J - G.
THE WAR OFFI CE,
14th March, 1942.
PAY OF BRI TI SH SERVICE OFFI CERS WI TH INDIAN UNITS AND
FORMATIONS
i. The question relates to the rates of pay which should be paid to officers
of the British Service serving with Indian units or formations outside India.
2 . Indian Army rates which are drawn both by Indian Army officers and
British Service officers in India attached to Indian Army units are more
favourable in themselves than the British rates admissible under the Pay
Warrant and Army Allowance Regulations, and the effect of these differences
is accentuated by the fact that Indian taxation is lighter than British taxation.
I t is possible that the forthcoming Indian budget may increase the rates of
taxation, but such an increase is unlikely to remove disparities of emoluments
in ranks above Lieutenant which, in the War Office view, cannot be justified,
even accepting (and it must not be taken that this is accepted, especially in
war time) that officers are entitled to higher pay if operating with Indian troops.
Higher pay is not given generally to British officers operating with other troops
from, e.g., East or West Africa in war time.
3 . British Army officers in British units in India draw slightly less favour-
able rates than Indian Army officers and British Service officers attached to
Indian Army units, in that they do not receive what is known as the " Indian
Army allowance ". But even so such officers, in both units and formations,
draw (in ranks higher than that of Lieutenant) appreciably higher emoluments
than British Service officers in British units and formations serving outside
India, and when their units and formations move outside India they drop to
the appropriate British rates and pay British and not the lower Indian income
tax.
4. The view of the Army Council is that in principle British Service officers
serving with Indian Army units or in Indian formations outside India should
be treated exactly the same as any other British Service officers serving in the
same theatre. Otherwise there is the anomaly of two British officers of the same
rank and roughly the same history both starting from this country but drawing
very different rates of net pay merely because one serves with an Indian unit
or formation and the other with a British.
5. Shortly after the outbreak of war it was agreed in principle, and instruc-
tions were sent to India in connection with certain forces then being sent out
of India to Egypt and Malaya, that all categories of British Service officers
serving outside India should receive British rates with the exception of:
(1 ) Staff Officers who before leaving India were serving for a definite
tenure and continued to hold the same appointment outside India, and
(2) officers who were serving with Sappers and Miners, Mountain Artillery
and Indian Signals.
These categories already serving in Indian appointments or units were
accepted by the. War Office as having vested rights to Indian rates. Unfortu-
nately the intention of this decision was not understood in the same sense by
the War Office, the India Office and the Government of India, and a lengthy
correspondence and exchange of telegrams ensued in the course of which further
misunderstandings arose resulting in considerable extensions of the vested right
categories. The Army Council, while recognizing the difficulty created by these
vested rights, have pressed that the principle of British rates and British tax
, out of India should be accepted for all future attachments to Indian units or
appointments to Indian formations so that at any rate the number of specially
privileged officers and instances of glaring disparity should not be increased.
As things stand there are such instances as that a Major with an Indian unit in
the Middle East may be receiving more in net emoluments than the Lieutenant-
Colonel of a British unit; a Brigade Major in an Indian formation more than
a Brigadier in a British, and a Lieutenant-Colonel commanding an Indian unit
more than a Major-General commanding a British Division. I t must also be
remembered that under the Indian expenditure plan the cost in effect falls on the
British Taxpayer.
6. There have been complaints from officers of British units that on
leaving India they are much worse off than officers with Indian Army units,
but clearly they have no more ground for complaint than British officers sent
to the same theatre from this country or elsewhere.
7. The view of the Government of India is that the anomalies of. the present
situation should be solved by the simple expedient of allowing Indian rates to
all officers who happen to be serving with Indian units and formations and
ignoring the differences between their net emoluments and those of British
officers with British units and formations. Mixed formations would be classified
for this purpose either as British or Indian, and a British formation might be
changed to Indian as dilution increases, altering the rates of the Commander
and staff to Indian, but leaving the British units on British rates.
8. A recent complication which makes the need for a decision of particular
urgency is that whereas British Service officers required for the Indian expansion
programme up to now have been attached without change of status and (apart
from those with vested rights) could be brought on to British rates outside
India there is now a proposal to transfer instead of attaching some 4, 00 0 officers
who would thereby acquire the privilege of Indian rates throughout their service.
The War Office has taken the view that these officers should not be transferred,
but should remain in the British Service and be attached, and that to avoid
further discrimination between these and other British candidates for service
with the Indian Army the Indian Army should also cease to take further
candidates direct from this country for appointment through O.C.T.Us.
in India or by appointing British other ranks to Indian Army commissions,
meeting all their requirements By" attachment. I t is felt strongly that in war
time British officers, most of whom are serving on temporary emergency
commissions and would otherwise be liable to compulsory service in the ranks,
should be sent to serve wherever required in the public interest on British rates
of pay, and that special financial privileges outside India should not be given
to some of them merely because they serve with Indian units.
9. The Secretary of State for India, it is understood, does not go so far as
the Government of India. He has intimated that he personally would be ready
to go a great way to meeting the War Office case in other respects provided the
War Office would be willing not merely to allow but to help the India Office to
the best of the War Office ability to obtain volunteers for employment as Indian
Service Officers on Indian Sen/ice terms in those branches of the Service which
are not normally manned by British Service officers. It is clear from what is
said above that this does not by any means meet the War Office point of view,
and in any case the Secretary of State for India feels that he must carry the
Viceroy and the Indian Military authorities with him in any concessions he
makes to the War Office point of view.
10 . As matters stand fresh vested rights continue to be created, increasing
the anomalies between one British officer and another and sowing the seeds of
serious discontent, and officers who are required for service with Indian units
are in a state of great uncertainty as to their position. I t is, therefore, imperative
from the War Office point of view that the question of principle should be
settled without further delay.
I I . A separate but smaller question raising similar considerations arises in
connection with the.rates.-of Indian Army officers in British Staff appointments.
The rule hitherto has been that an officer in this category should receive British
Staff rates or the Indian Regimental rates of his substantive rank whichever are
the more favourable. The Government of India asks that in all cases in which
it is accepted as desirable that the Indian Army officer should hold such an
appointment because of his special Indian experience, he should be paid at
Indian Staff rates.
12 . It is represented that the present rules prevent the best use of officers,
as Indian Army officers are unwilling to serve in British Staff posts or posts
in mixed formations to which British rates are applicable unless they are given
the financial benefits of Indian Staff rates.
13 . The War Office view is that there are no real grounds for paying an
Indian Army officer in a British Staff appointment more than a British Service
officer would receive in the same appointment except in so far as the Indian
Army officer has a vested right to Indian Regimental rates if more favourable.
(B41/66) So 3/42 W.O.P. 10362
29
THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT
Printed for the War Cabinet. March 1942.
SECRET.
Copy No.
W.P. (32) 126.
March 21, 1942.
\
TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY.
I t is requested that special care may be taken to
WAR CABINET.
ALLI ED ECONOMIC WARFARE STRATEGY I N 1942.
Memorandum by the Minister of Economic Warfare.
I hope that the War Cabinet will read with interest the attached memo-
randum prepared in my Department, drawing attention to certain important
changes in the economic factors affecting our own and the enemy's position, of
which Allied strategy must take account in 1942.
Ministry of Economic Warfare,
March 21, 1942.
SUMMARY.
The basic factors which condition the economic war have undergone
important changes, of which the principal are:
(1) The resources of the Far East have passed under the control of a new
enemy. These resources cover many of Germany's deficiencies; Germany could
supply many of J apan's needs. Each would be greatly strengthened if it could
make contact with the other. Both are planning to do so and expect to succeed.
. (2) Vichy France assumes greater importance
(a) because Metropolitan France and Vichy Colonial possessionsFrench
North and West Africa and Madagascar-form a link between the
two enemy worlds; -
(b) because the strain on the Allied Navies enhances the danger of any hostile
action by the French fleet.
(3) The German military threat to all adjacent neutrals (excepting perhaps
Sweden and Turkey) is much reduced by the Russian campaign. The relative
influence of the two belligerent sides over these neutrals has not yet greatly
changed, but. it has become unstable and may vary greatly and suddenly in either
direction with the course of the war in 1942.
(4) So much of the world's resources and shipping has now passed under
the control of the belligerents that the remaining neutrals find themselves
increasingly dependent on one side or the other and are correspondingly
susceptible to' economic pressure. The belligerents, however, as their needs grow,
their debts rise and their exports fall, become more reluctant to supply the
[23591]
B
neutrals with their essential needs, even in exchange for valuable supplies, whilst
the neutrals become less willing to part with their products on any other terms.
The possibility of denying to the enemy the resources from European neutrals
which he increasingly requires will depend largely upon the Allies' ability to
supply at least small quantities of the commodities which the neutrals most need
to maintain their internal economy.
(5) The occupied countries have become more important to German economy
and a greater potential source of danger to it.
(6) Germany has been forced to concentrate all her resources of men and
materials on preparing for this year's campaigns with greater intensity than
ever before; her economy has thereby become more inelastic and vulnerable.
(7) The Allies have built up a large air force which is available for
attacking enemy shipping and other economic objectives.
(8) The Allies are themselves subject to economic war on a scale far
exceeding anything which they have experienced hitherto. The Americas and
Africa may become the Allies' only trans-oceanic sources of supply.
CONCLUSIONS.
The principal objects of Allied economic warfare strategy during 1942
should be
(1) To prevent the two enemy dominions from establishing economic
exchange by blockade running; still more, of course, to prevent their opening
regular communications by land or sea.
(2) To develop the increased possibilities of economic pressure on the neutral
border States adjacent to German Europe and on Vichy French colonies to the
fullest extent which the military situation permits, with a view both'to obtaining
supplies and to denying to the enemy resources which are becoming more than
ever essential to him.
(3) To develop within occupied countries both in German Europe and in
the Far East all forms of passive and active resistance to economic exploitation.
(4) To develop methods for directing against the increasing weakness of
Germany's war potential attack from the air which shall really be effective.
(5) To devise combined operations against the most important accessible
economic targets in enemy-occupied territory and against his lines of
communication.
(6) To defend important sources of supply and access to them, including the
supplies of South America.
1. The conditions of economic warfare have abruptly changed. The
blockade has become more difficult. The counter-blockade has become vastly more
formidable. At the same time the scope and possibilities of our economic offensive
have widened and the relative' importance of its weapons has altered. The
principal changes are analysed below :
I . - T H E THREAT TO THE BLOCKADE..
2. During the first stage of the war-u p to the collapse of France-the
denial of supplies to the enemy was effected by the interception and examination
at British or French bases of vessels bound for the countries bordering on
Germany. War Trade Agreements and Shipping Agreements were negotiated
and helped the blockade but, in effect, it was exercised by, and depended on,
the Navy.
3. I n the eighteen- months following the fall of France, although the
ultimate deterrent to blockade-runners was still the' British Navy, hew methods
for denying Overseas supplies to Germany were developed. By the end of 1941,
these methods (compulsory navi certs, shi ps' warrants and thei r attendant
machi nery) were adequate, wi th very l i ttl e naval assistance, to deny to Germany
practi cal l y all ocean-borne suppl i es, except those carri ed in enemy or Vi chy
bl ockade-runners, or in Vi chy shi ps i n convoy.
4. Enemy bl ockade-runni ng: of whi ch there was a recrudescence in the
summer of 1941, had been practi cal l y stopped by naval acti on, and the
i mmobi l i sati on of enemy shi ps in Ameri can ports had greatl y reduced the fear
of i ts resumpti on. The overseas bl ockade was thus vi rtual l y complete except
for French Colonial produce reachi ng enemy terri tory from French North and
West Afri ca i n Vi chy shi ps. Naval acti on agai nst Vi chy shi ps had also stopped,
at least temporari l y, French convoys from the Far East and Madagascar.
5. The entry i nto the war of J apan and her subsequent conquests have
created a new enemy area of great size and economic weal th, and have pl aced at
the di sposal of J apan suppl i es of raw materi al s sufficient to make good most of
her own l ong-term deficiencies and also many of the pri nci pal exi sti ng deficiencies
of Germany. At the same ti me i t has greatl y increased the J apanese need for a
number of manufactured and semi -manufactured products obtai nabl e from
Europe.
6. Thus, the pri nci pal probl em of blockade, whi ch has hi therto been the
deni al of neutral resources to one enemy, has become in 1942 the deni al to two
enemies of access to the products of each other's dominions. Thi s can only be
done by the fi ghti ng services. So once agai n a maj or part of the blockade wi l l
depend di rectl y on naval i ntercepti on, assi sted probably more than in the earl i er
period by ai r reconnai ssance and attack.
7. Contact between the two enemy worl ds mi ght be establ i shed by four
possible routesacross Russi a; by Suez or the Persi an Gul f; round the Cape of
Good Hope; and round Cape Horn. The first is denied by Russi an arms; the
second by the Bri ti sh hol d on the Mi ddl e East. The thi rd and fourth are al ready
possible, al though precari ous, to bl ockade-runners. The Cape Horn route involves
a 17,000 mile passage wi thout refuel l i ng; since the J apanese war began two
bl ockade-runners have so far (13th March, 1942) attempted the i nward passage,
one successfully, whi l st another is believed to be l oadi ng for an outward voyage.
The route vi a the Cape of Good Hope involves a voyage of 11,000 miles (reckoned
from Si ngapore) on whi ch the only possible refuelling stati on is at present
Madagascar. No enemy or Vi chy shi ps, so far as is known, have used thi s route
since J apan entered the war. There are a number of ships capabl e of maki ng
ei ther voyage wi thout refuel l i ng. French West Afri ca, French North Afri ca and
the Atl anti c coast of Metropol i tan France provi de al ternati ve termi nal ports
more or less under Axi s control, whi l st the Atl anti c ports of Northern Spai n
can also be used for transhi pment wi thout serious danger.
8. The prospects of successful and frequent blockade runni ng by the Horn
or by the Cape woul d, of course, be i ncreased, if Bri ti sh and Ameri can naval forces
were deni ed bases appropri ate for i ntercepti on. Hence the i mportance, on the
one hand, of Bri ti sh and Ameri can bases and faci l i ti es on and off the Atl anti c
Coast of South Ameri ca; on the other, of the ports of South Afri ca. The South
Afri can ports are even more i mportant as safeguardi ng the suppl y routes l i nki ng
Bri tai n and the Uni ted States wi th Austral i a, Egypt and the Mi ddl e East. These
routes, however, must be held from both ends. Practi cal l y all the suppl i es for the
Al l i ed front whi ch stretches from Li bya to Afghani stan enter through two
relatively narrow i nl ets- the Red Sea and the Persi an Gul f - and almost all the
oil on whi ch that front, I ndi a and East Afri ca, depend, comes out through the
l atter channel. Reverses whi ch cUt communi cati ons between Egypt and the Cape,
or Egypt and the Persi an Gulf, by endangeri ng our posi ti on in the Mi ddl e East!
would give the enemy the hope of openi ng the di rect route from the Medi terranean
to the Far East. ' '
9. A few bl ockade-runners (say a dozen cargoes) woul d relieve Germany's
essential needs for 1942 in rubber, wol fram, ti n, hemp and woolif wool became
available to J apanand mi ght take back to J apan ball beari ngs, preci si on
i nstruments and machi ne tools sufficient to be of real assistance in the expansi on
of her i ndustry.
[23591]
B 2
I I .THE INCREASED SIGNIFICANCE OF VICHY.
10. Metropol i tan France and Vi chy colonial possessi onsFrench North and
West Afri ca and Madagascaracqui re greater significance as a l i nk between
two enemy worl ds. The appearance of J apan as a combatantand her earl y
successes--have increased the i mportance of that eni gmati c factor, the French
fleet.
I I I .THE COUNTER BLOCKADE.
11. J apanese successes have al ready denied to the Al l i es i mportant suppl i es
of rubber, ti n, wolfram, chrome, oil and food, and, if they conti nue, may leave the
Ameri cas and Afri ca as the Al l i es' only trans-oceani c sources of suppl y. Al l
the Al l i es now face economic war of the same ki nd and scale as that whi ch they
have waged agai nst Germany hi therto. The enemy, i n parti cul ar the J apanese,
are known to be fully conscious of the possibilities of economic war and essenti al
supplies are likely to be objectives for special attack. Even the vi tal suppl i es of
South Ameri ca, whi ch is still rel ati vel y remote from the battl e, are not i mmune
from attack from wi thi n, by methods rangi ng from obstructi on and sabotage to
armed revolt by the large and well-organised enemy mi nori ti es in these countri es.
The protecti on of these supplies and of access to them, as well as of the routes by
whi ch they move, has thus become a matter of hi gh i mportance and perhaps of
considerable urgency.
I V.THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN.
12. The neutral countri es borderi ng on German Europe have from the
begi nni ng of the war consti tuted an economic " No Man's L and," whose resources
have been in part denied to the enemy by war-trade agreements and pre-empti on
and i ndi rectl y by rati oni ng. There are now only five such countri esSweden,
Swi tzerl and, Spai n, Portugal and Turkey. The domi nant factor governi ng thei r
atti tude has been the menace of German mi l i tary power. I n March 1942,
al though the threat remai ns, i t i s di sti nctl y less. Weakened and preoccupi ed by
the Russi an campai gn, Germany wi l l not wi l l i ngl y extend the area of her
occupation, especially agai nst resistance, in any di recti on whi ch does not
contri bute di rectl y to the task of defeati ng Russi a. An occupati on of the
Peni nsul a, Swi tzerl and, Unoccupi ed France, French North or West Afri ca, or
perhaps even Sweden or Turkey, is therefore less probabl e than heretofore.
13. Thi s change does not appear as yet to have affected the enemy's influence
over these countries, except possibly Spai n; for Bri tai n, though enteri ng on 1942
wi th new allies and wi th armed forces strengthened in men and materi al , has
lost presti ge through her defeats in Li bya and the Far East; and she and her
Allies have had to divide thei r forces to meet a new enemy. The rel ati ve influence
of the two sides has therefore not yet greatl y changed; but it has become unstabl e
and may vary greatl y and suddenl y in ei ther di recti on wi th the course of the war
in 1942. The Allies must be ready to take advantage of any vari ati on i n thei r
favour.
V.THE ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE OF THE NEUTRALS.
14. Hi therto, for a number of thei r most i mportant requi rements, the
countries in " No Man's L and " have sought from Bri tai n only navi certs, that is
to say, the ri ght to i mport-?a faci l i ty whi ch wehave hesi tated to refuse at di s-
cretion. Now, however, the vastly i ncreased suppl y programmes of the Al l i es and
thei r claims on the di mi ni shi ng pool of available merchant shi ppi ng, are making-
it impossible for neutral s to obtai n thei r requi rements except through posi ti ve
action, and sacrifice by the Al l i es. Spai n and Portugal , for example, can at
present hope for adequate oil suppl i es only by the goodwill of the Uni ted States
Government, which, in order to ensure adequate suppl i es for the Allies, is taki ng
steps to control the di stri buti on of oi l produced i n the Ameri can conti nent. The
neutral s, in fact, are bound to become ever more dependent on one or other of the
belligerent groups. There is thus an opportuni ty to substi tute for the negati ve
conception of economic warfare whi ch has hi therto prevai l ed a posi ti ve policy
under Which the economic power of the Al l i es woul d be used to extort from the
border States economic advantages in return for guarantees of essenti al suppl i es.
By this means we may hope both to deny neutral European resources to the enemy
and to secure them for the Al l i esand at the same ti me to put an end to the
absurd si tuati on, so common hi therto, i n whi ch the Al l i es buy from a neutral at
fantasti cal l y inflated pri ces, whi l st suppl yi ng i ts needs at the pri ces rul i ng i n the
free world.
15. These possi bi l i ti es are of parti cul ar significance at a ti me when J apan's
conquests have depri ved the Al l i es of val uabl e sources of suppl i es, and thus made
the resources of the European neutral s far more i mportant to us, whi l st the
wastage of the Russi an campai gn has made them hO less i mportant to Germany.
VI .MORE SCOPE FOR ATTACK.
(i) Night Bombing.
16. Unti l rel ati vel y recently, the only weapon for attacki ng the enemy's
economy behi nd hi s fronti er was the ni ght bomber. Thi s new weapon has not yet
played a decisive part i n economic war, partl y because of the l i mi ted size of our
bomber force, partl y because the science of usi ng i t has not yet been mastered. I t
is understood that i n 1942 a greater force wi l l be avai l abl e. Thi s wi l l consti tute
an i mportant new factor i n the economic war if, but only if, i t can be so appl i ed
as to yi el d the resul ts expected of it.
(ii) Attacks on Shipping.
17. Sea transport has become of i ncreased i mportance to Germany. To
J apan i t is vi tal ; her capaci ty to conti nue the war beyond 1942 wi l l depend upon
extended lines of sea communi cati on. Enemy shi ppi ng has thus become an even
more i mportant target than hi therto for attack by sea and ai r.
(iii) Other Forms of Attack.
18. I n recent months, for the first time, attaeks upon economic targets behi nd
German Europe's fronti er have been successfully carri ed out by dayl i ght rai di ng
from the ai r and by combined operati ons from the sea. Many hi ghl y i mportant
targets i nvi te attenti on as the possibilities for such attacks grow greater.
(iv) Resistance in Occupied Territories.
19. The growth of organi sed resi stance throughout the occupied countri es
of Europe provi des a further weapon of i mmense potenti al i ty whi ch ha's only
recently begun to make itself felt. Germany grows more dependent on the
occupied countri es, and i n parti cul ar on thei r man-power, whether worki ng in thei r
countries or i n Germany. The countri es at present occupied by Germany are more
than si x ti mes the area of Greater Germany, and contai n a popul ati on two-and-
a-half ti mes as great. The extent to Which thi s vast commi tment can be made a
burden may decisively affect the war. The opportuni ti es for pol i ti cal warf are
and for all forms of subversion and sabotage are greater than ever before.
VI I .CHANGES IN GERMANY'S ECONOMY.
(i) Over-Mobilisation.
20. Havi ng developed her resources i n order to defeat Russi a i n 1941,
Germany is havi ng to prepare for another campai gn i n 1942 agai nst the same
enemy wi thout havi ng any wi nter respi te for refitting. I n order to achieve thi s she
is concentrati ng both men and materi al on her i mmedi ate war needs at the cost of
cutti ng all her other economic acti vi ti es to and beyond the danger-poi nt. Thi s
renders her economy more inelastic- than at any previ ous ti me.
(ii) Dependence on Occupied Countries:
21. Germany can only relieve the present si tuati on by the further expl oi ta-
tion of the occupied countri es. She al ready employs wi thi n Greater Germany
nearly 4 mi l l i on i mmi grant ci vi l i an workers and pri soners of war (more than
10 per cent, of her total l abour force), and there is evidence of her i ntenti on
greatl y to increase her i ntake of forced labour from the occupied countri es. She
also relies on these countri es for raw materi al s, for agri cul tural surpl uses and
for i ndustri al producti on. She must mai ntai n i n these countri es the forces
necessary for occupation, securi ty and admi ni strati on as well as for defence;
these demands grow and wi l l grow. The extent to whi ch she can extort by force a
di vi dend commensurate wi th the effort involved is l i mi ted.
(iii) Raw Material Shortages.
22. Her task is complicated by the growth of raw materi al shortages, notably
oil, rubber, leather, texti l es and some metals. These shortages l i mi t the use which
she can make of the vassal countri es. Al l these shortages are growi ng greater.
Al l are affecting the armed forces, or will shortl y do so, except in so far as the
si tuati on may be relieved by blockade runni ng from the Far East.
(iv) Germany^ Task for 1942.
23. Germany's war potenti al was mobilised to secure the maxi mum mi l i tary
effort duri ng the l atter part of 1941, and is al ready out of balance. Her only
hope of redressi ng the balance is to defeat the Russi ans decisively and establish
communi cati on wi th the Far East, or else (an i nadequate substi tute) to set the
occupied countri es to work for her wi th a success far beyond anythi ng which
at present seems likely.' She will, of course, try to do both, but duri ng 1942,
unless and unti l she has decisively defeated Russi a, Germany's economic
si tuati on is likely to be i nel asti c and vul nerabl e to a much greater extent than ever
before.
VI I I .THE ENTRY OF J APAN.
24. J apan's posi ti on differs from that of Germany i n almost every respect.
Her conquests have al ready secured to her all the raw materi al s she needs except
l ead (which is avai l abl e i n Burma and Austral i a), wool (which is avai l abl e in
Austral i a, Chile, Peru and Argenti na), cotton (which is avai l abl e i n I ndi a, Peru
and Brazi l ) and copper (which is available in Chi l e and Peru). Her weaknesses
are on the i ndustri al side. Her i ron and steel i ndustry is far smal l er by corn-
par ison wi th her popul ati on; her reserves of techni cal skill and experi ence are
less. Whereas German Europe is full of factori es wi thout raw materi al and
markets wi thout suppl i es, J apan's new domi ni ons are full of raw materi al
wi thout factories and suppl i es wi thout markets. The problem of "surpl uses"
i n these areas has been made much worse, and the odi um of fai l i ng to solve i t will
fall upon J apan.
25. J apan's chief needs from Europe are machi nery, machi ne tools,
precision i nstruments and techni cal advice. She can expect l i ttl e contri buti on in
i ndustri al output from her conquests (other than the producti on of raw materi al s)
and must expand her i ndustry at home. Her homel and, though probabl y more
vulnerable than Germany to aeri al attack, is far less accessible except to an
attack by Russi a; and her dominions are l i nked to it, not as Germany's, by an
overburdened, though efficient, system of rai l and ri ver transport, but by very
long sea routes along whi ch a chai n of i sl ands offers uni que opportuni ti es for
protecti on by shore-based ai rcraft.
26. J apan entered the war wi th substanti al stocks of her many deficiencies,
probably on^the average about a year's suppl y. Her four-fold task for 1942 is
to complete and consolidate her conquests, to damage the Al l i es as much as
possible, to develop her captured resources before her stocks are exhausted and
at. the same ti me to mai ntai n and develop her armament producti on. Thi s task
will make great demands on her capaci ty to produce pl ant and machi nery on a
l arge scale and to develop and transport from the areas whi ch she has overrun
such of thei r products as she needs.
O .1 ^
I gi S DOOUMEMT I S THE PROPERTY Off HIS BRITANNIC MAJ ESTY'S GOVERNMENT.)
WOR S T .
j .P,(42) 127 COPY NO
u
JjAlso A.S,E.( 42) 90
Ifand S
0
MoE
0
(42) l
0
)
l 8th.March
0
1942^ WAR CABINET
CR/ j j v^SU P P L I E E TO THE MIDDLE EAST-AREA.
Note by the Secretary of the War Cabi net,
TJ ie Pri me Mi ni ster has approved the consti tuti on
of a Commi ttee, under the Chai rmanshi p of the Fi nanci al
Secretary to the Treasury., to consi der questi ons of pol i cy
rel ati ng to ci vi l suppl i es to the Mi ddl e East area? i ncl udi ng
Persi a and I raq
Q
2o The Committee wi l l be composed of one representati ve
of each of the f ol l owi ng departments:-
Treasury,, '
Forei gn Of f i ce
?
I ndi a Of f i ce,
Col oni al Officer,
Beard of Trade
0
Mi ni stry of Suppl y,
Mi ni stry of War Transport
P
Mi ni stry of Food,
e
A representati ve of the Uni ted Kingdom Commerci al
Corporati on wi l l al so be a member of the Gorami ttee
0
3o The Committee wi l l not? l i ke i ts predecessor
P
be a
Sub-Commi ttee of the A l l i ed Suppl i es Executi ve I t wi l l
ref er any questi ons on whi ch i t i s not' i tsel f
a
competent
to reach concl usi ons to the appropri ate commi ttee of the
War Cabi nets For i nstance questi ons rel ati ng to i nl and
cl earance capaci ty i n Persi a
s
would be ref erred to the A l l i ed
Suppl i es Executi ve
P
whi l st questi ons rel ati ng to the
al l ocati on of shi ppi ng between the Uni ted Kingdom I mport
Programmes and Ci vi l Suppl i es to the Mi ddl e East would be
ref erred to the I mport Executi ve*
4,-: J oi nt Secr et ar i es to t he Committee wi l l be appoi nted
from t he Mi ni st r y or War Transport and the War Cabi net Of f i ce.
Papers f or ci r cul at i on t o t he Committee shoul d be
: :
sent to the
J oi nt Secr et ar y at t he War Cabi net Of f i ces
D
Admi ni strati ve Arrangements,
5
0
The f ol l owi ng admi ni strati ve arrangements have
been made f or the transacti on of day- to- day busi ness
rel ati ng to ci vi l suppl i es f or the Mi ddl e East area, A
speci al secti on i s bei ng set up i n the Mi ni stry of War
Transport. Thi s secti on, which wi l l be known as "The
Suppl y Secti on f or the Mi ddl e East"? wi l l be i n.charge
of Mr E
0
M* Ni chol son, who wi l l al so be the representati ve
c
of t he M i ni st r y of War T r anspor t on t he Mi ddl e E ast
Suppl i es Commi ttee^ The dut i es of t hi s Sect i on wi l l
i nc l ude: ^
f or t he Mi ddl e E ast , ot her than f or ci r cul at i on,
( a) Compi l ati on of r equi r ements programmes
f or submi ssi on to the Commi ttee.
( b) Handl i ng
Mi ddl e
of cor r espondence wi th
E ast Suppl y Centr e.
t he
( c) P r epar at i on f or the Commi ttee of paper s
on quest i ons of pol i cy ar i s i ng out of
the work of the Mi ddl e E ast Suppl y
- Cent r e.
6. A l l cor r espondence r el at i ng t o C i v i l Suppl i es
paper s
t o t he Mi ddl e E ast Suppl i es Commi ttee ( see par agr aph
4) , shoul d be addr essed to t he Suppl y Sect i on f or t he
Mi ddl e E ast i n the M i ni st r y of War T r anspor t. .
( Si gned) E. E. BRI DGES.
Secr et ar y of the War Cabi nets
Gr eat George S t r eet , S. W. 1. ,
18TH MARCH, 1942.
*(THISJQOOUMEM! IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY
f
S (MVERHMBMP).
SECRET. COPY NO.. ^
W.P.(42) 128.(Revise)
7th May. 1942, - .
WAR CABINET.
MAN POWER.
Note by the Minister of Labour and National Service.
I ci rcul ate herewith for the information of W colleagues a Memorandum
prepared i n my Department showing the Man Power requirements for the Forces
and Munitions I ndustri es for the second half of 1941, and the extent to
which those requirements have been met. The Memorandum has already been
ci rcul ated to the Man Power Committee under cover of the attached note
which summarises the position.
So B.
i
^nrggjjgCtfMEMr IS THE PROP&RTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY.
1
S GOVERNMEW:'
w.s.fM.P.P. )U2) 5. (Revise) ; COPY NO.
WAR CABINET.
jMJBtU^JtL MAN POWER M I S '
MOST SECRET.
*" MAN POWER
(NOTE BY MINISTRY OF LABOUR AID NATIONAL SERVICE).
1* The attached memorandum, showing the man power requirements for
the Foroes and the munitions i ndustri es for the second half of 1941
and the extent -to which those requirements have been met, i s ci rcul ated
for the information of the Man Power Committee.
2. The figures for the Services and for the Munitions I ndustri es
are given i n Tables A and B of the memorandum. These show that for
the Armed Forces and the nunitions i ndustri es (excluding cl eri cal and
administrative staff) there has been an increase i n the 6 months of
568,000 men and 453,000 women, a total of men and women of 1,021,000.
3. For the Forces, there was,an intake of 410,000 men, an excess
over estimated requirements of 71, 000; and an intake of 116,000 women,
a defi ci t compared with stated requirements of 69, 000, although the
numbers enrol l ed were not greatl y below what the Services could absorb.
o r
^ Industry, there was a net increase of men operatives employed on
Government work -in the munitions i ndustri es of 158,000, an excess over
estimated requirements of 28,O00j and a net increase of women opera-
tives of 357,000, an excess over estimated requirements of 67,000.
MAW-POWER HBQUIRBS.S5ITTS - SBOOND HALF OF 1941.
1, The Tables attached show the man-power requirements for the.Forces and
the munitions industries for the second half of 1941 and the extent to which
those requirements have been met. -. - --.
- - ' - -; -.. ' X . : .... ' . . "
2, The figures of requirements for the Forces are those given in the Ministry
of Labour memorandum-for the Man-Power Committee's Report of October,. 1941,
(N. S. (M. P. P. ) (41)41.) while those for industry have been taken as half the
numbers, speci fi cal l y stated by the-Committee as being required for the twelve
months ending J une, 1942, plus an allowance as shown in paragraph 6(2) below
-in respect of the numbers required for the September programme and the new
bomber programme of M.A.P.. -
3. The figures representing what, has . been, achieved.-show as regards the
Forcos the actual intake (including volunteers) and as regards the munitions
i ndustri es the estimated net - increases as derived from the Ministry of Labour
quarterly and weekly surveys of employment. - The i ndustri al figures'"relate --
to operatives only. -
:
4. Forces - Men. - - - . -.-."' .-. - - . - . .. ... ,.
(l ) Royal -Navy. . The actual intake.--exceeded estimated requirements by,
over 13,000, In the l atter-part of the. half-year new-vessels-became available
at a faster rate than had been- expected and non-tradesmen were therefore .
posted' up to' the limit of: the- numbers- available in the Allocation Registers. .
(^) Army (General Service). The actual intake exceeded estimated
requirements by 4*9,000, During the half-year the Army "ceiling" was fixed
and thereafter men were posted for General Service up to the limit of the
numbers available so as to enable the "ceiling" to be reached as quickly as
possible,
(3) Royal Air Force, Actual intake exceeded estimated requirements by
8,500.
5. Women
1
s Services.
(l ) ';!.R. N. S. The actual intake exceeded estimated requirements by
over 2,4oO.
(2) A.T.S. and W.A. A.F. In both these Services the intake was below
estimated requirements. The intake i nto the W.A.A.F. was as great as the Force
oould absorb for trai ni ng. While the intake into the A.T. S. was not sufficient
to meet requirements in the early months, i t was not greatly below what the
Service could absorb in the l ater months,
6, Munitions I ndustri es.
(l ) Numbers required. The Report of the Man-Power Committee gave the
following figures as the estimated requirements for the munitions industries
in the twelve months ending 30th J une, 1942:-
Men 315,000
Women 460,000
Total . 775, 000
These figures arc made up in the following way (N, S, (M. P. P. (41)41)).
^ Men Women
-
Total ^
Operatives 262,000 360,000 622,000
Administrative and cl eri cal
workers 25,000 100,000 125,000
Other unskilled labour 28,000^ - 28,000^
TotaI s 315,000 460,000 775,000
I
For. the six months ended December,- 1941, the. requirements'were 130,000
men operatives and 180,000 women operatives. , '
(2) The Man-rPower Committee's Report showed that, in addition,
400,000 workers of- al l classes wore stated to be requi red'to meet the demands
of the Ministry of Aircraft Production for .what ;is known as the September
programme and the new bonbor programme," The September programme was put-
into effect, in the autumn of 1941 but i t was not unti l '10th December ,that the
decision was taken to proceed with the new bomber programme, Tt i s not
possible to say how much of the- 400,000 ought to be added to the requirements
up to the end of 1941 but an addition of 90,000 operatives and 10,000 cl eri cal
and administrative workers i s a generous estimate. I t has been assumed. that
thi s additional 90,000 should have been women, making a total addition
required of 130,000 men and 270,000 women. '' - *' --. ".'...
(3) Not increase. On the foregoing basis the net "increase in the number
of male operatives as shown in Table 3 attached, "exceeds the. requirements up"
to December, 1941, by about 28,000. ' In the base of women operatives, there
has been a net increase of 537^000 in the number employed on Govertija^lfb orders . -
as compared with an.estimated roquirbraent of 270,000, showing an
:
;.exces.s of '67,"OQ0.
7, Although, the net increase in the numbers of men-and women for/jarinitienS' -'-'
was iti-excess .af the estimated i-oquirements, this.;does not moan that' all' demands, -
wore met, In parti cul ar, thoro were outstanding demands for./wc.rk of high , " '
r
pri ori ty, o'.g, the Fi l l i ng'Factori es, in certai n areas where", the requirements
can only be met- by the- transfer of mobile workers from other areas, . .' . - '
MOST SECRET.
Estimated man-power requirements for the Forces and for Munitions
I ndustries (Survey of Man-Power (N.S.(M.P.P.) (41)41)) and actual intake.
TABLE A.
SERVICES - J uly - December, 1941,
Service.
Numbers required
as shown by Man-
Power Committee
Report (N.S.
(M.P.P.)(4l )4l ).
Actual I ntake
Excess (4-)
or
Deficit (-)
Royal Navy 55,000
68,200
* 13,200
Army (General Service)
125,000
174,000/
+ 49,000
Men.
Royal Air Force 159,000 167,500 * 8,500
Total
339,000
409,700 * 70,700
Civil Defence 37,000 16,410
(posted)
- 20,590
W.R.N.S.
5,500 7,926 * 2,426
A.T.S.
100.000 45,494
- 54,506
Women.
W.A.A.F.
80,000 62,720
- 17,280
Total
185,500
116,140 - 69,360
Other Services
(N.A.A.F.I ,, Land
53,000 Not avai l abl e.
Army, Nursing etc )
K The figures of intake exclude transfers from Reserve,. These consist mainly
of men recal l ed after having been temporarily released for i ndustri al work,
but during the period of six months in question the number recal l ed was
almost exactly counterbalanced by the number of others rel eased. The
intake figures also take no account of i nter-servi ce transfers.
-
/ This figure includes al l men posted to the Arm;' for general service and al l
men who joined the Army as volunteers, including those who joined as
tradesmen. The number in the l atter i s not know&, but i t i s possibly of
the order of 7,000.
INDUSTRY - J uly - December, 1941.
Net I ncreases - Government Orders.
J L
I ndustry.
Numbers required
as shown by Man-
Power Committee
Report (N.S.
(M.P.P.) (41)41).
Actual I ntake
(or I ncrease)
Achieved.
Excess (H-)
or
Deficit (-)
Munitions I ndustri es:'
Men.
Operatives
Cl eri oal etc. staff
130,000
13,000
158,000
Not available
4- 28,000
Unskilled labour
(certain special
cl asses).
28,000 Not available
-
[/omen. Operatives 270,000 337,000 + 67,000
Cl eri cal etc. staff
50,000 Not available
liQ, 2 2 6 - 8 5 S.L
33 THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT
SECRET. Copy No. 29
I
W. P. (42) 129 \ J
(Also C.O.S (42) 178)
March 19, 1942
TO BE K EPT UNDER L OCK AND K EY .
WAR CABINET .
WEEKLY RESUME
(No. 133)
of the
NAVAL, MILITARY AND AIR SITUATION
from 0700 March 12th, to
0700 March 19th,
1942
[Circulated with the approval of
the Chiefs of Staff.]
Cabinet War Room
NAYAL SITUATION.
General Review.
1. An I tal i an U-boat has been sunk in the Medi terranean.
H.M. Destroyer Vortigern has been sunk by E-boats.
Shi ppi ng losses, pri nci pal l y due to U-boat attacks in the West Atl anti c, have
been heavy.
Northern Waters.
2. On the 12th the Russi an Submari ne 402 was damaged by depth charges
north of Murmansk.
H.M. Trawl er Stefa shot down a J u. 88 off the Murmansk coast on the 13th.
Home Waters.
3. A l arge enemy merchant shi p, heavily escorted, passed down Channel
earl y on the morni ng of the 14th. An attack by Dover coastal craft was beaten
off. L ater five of our destroyers attacked wi th torpedoes, one of whi ch probably
hi t the merchant shi p. Two E-boats were probabl y sunk and a destroyer hi t by
gunfire. Three of our destroyers sustai ned superficial damage, but no casualties.
Subsequently the enemy force was reported i n Havre.
Duri ng the ni ght of the 14th/15th two convoys off the East coast were
unsuccessfully attacked by E-boats, one of whi ch was probabl y sunk and another
damaged. H.M. Destroyer Vortigern, escorti ng one of the convoys, was sunk:
three officers and seven rati ngs were rescued.
On the morni ng of the 15th three M.G.Bs. off I j mui den attacked and sank
an E-boat; ten pri soners were captured. L ater an engagement took place with
four E-boats, one of whi ch was seriously damaged. M.G.Bs. sustai ned above-
water damage and six casual ti es. Subsequentl y our ai rcraft located the E-boats,
setti ng one on fire and damagi ng the remai nder.
On the eveni ng of the 14th an enemy ai rcraft, whi ch was attacki ng a convoy
in the Bri stol Channel , was shot down by the Pol i sh Destroyer Kujawiak.
H.M. Destroyer Windsor was sl i ghtl y damaged in collision off the East coast
on the 16th.
Some typi cal exampl es of the performance of H.M. shi ps are given in
Appendi x A.
Mediterranean.
4. On the 6th March H.M. Submari ne P. 31 torpedoed and sank a 7,000-ton
south-bound merchant shi p, escorted by two destroyers, off the Tuni si an coast.
P. 31 sustai ned mi nor damage duri ng a counter-attack.
Duri ng the ni ght of the 14th/15th l i ght naval forces, in co-operation with
the R.A.F., bombarded the port and shi ppi ng i n the harbour of Rhodes.
Duri ng the week 22,157 tons of French shi ppi ng east bound and 21.641 tons
west bound have passed through the Strai ts of Gi bral tar under escort.
t
South Atlantic.
5. On the 12th, 300 miles south of Cape Verde-I sl ands, H.M.S. Pretoria
Castle (Armed Merchant Crui ser) i ntercepted the Spani sh s.s. Monte Gorbea
(3,720 tons), whi ch was taken i nto Bathurst for exami nati on. The' German
Ambassador to the Argenti ne was taki ng passage in the Monte Gorbea.
Anti-Submarine Operations.
6. H.M. Submari ne P. 34 sank the I tal i an U-boat Admiral Millo (1,500
tons) 100 miles south-east of the Strai ts of Messi na on the 16th. Some survivors
were rescued. Surface craft have attacked U-boats off the west coast of I reland,
to the west of Lisbon and off Vancouver I sl and.
An Ameri can ai rcraft made a promi si ng attack south-east of St. J ohn's,
Newfoundl and. Three attacks by our ai rcraft were carri ed out in the North-
Western Approaches, but, al though hi ts were claimed, i n no i nstance was there
evidence of destructi on.
Enemy Intelligence.
7. The Ti?yitz has been located at Trondhei m.
On the 15th five destroyers were reported north bound off the Skaw.
U-Boats.
' 8. The mai n concentrati on has continued to be in the Western Atl anti c and
Caribbean Sea. Others have been operati ng i n the North-Western Approaches,
off the east coast of I cel and (C) and off the Li beri an coast.
Japanese.
9. The mai n fleet is presumed to be in home waters. Nearl y al l i ts crui sers
and l i ght craft have been detached to other areas. The Southern Fl eet is now
concentrated on northern Sumatra, and there is a naval force whi ch is
consolidating the vari ous bases establ i shed or taken over i n the J ava Sea area.
The only uni t known to be operati ng i n the Phi l i ppi ne area is one flotilla of
four destroyers. The operati ons in New Gui nea are bei ng carri ed out by the
Fourth Fleet, whose strength, wi th rei nforcements from the mai n fleet, is
estimated to be : four 8-inch cruisers, two 6-inch cruisers, two 5-5-inch crui sers,
three seapl ane carri ers, two ai rcraft carri ers, ei ght destroyers and ni ne
submarines.
Protection of Seaborne Trade.
10. Duri ng the week endi ng 18th March 887 shi ps, i ncl udi ng 181 Al l i ed
and 16 neutral , were convoyed. Si x anti -ai rcraft ships, four ocean boardi ng
vessels, 77 destroyers (i ncl udi ng 16 Ameri can destroyers) and 102 sloops and
corvettes were employed on escort duti es. Duri ng the month of February 3,848
ships were convoyed, of whi ch ei ght were lost by enemy acti on. Since the
begi nni ng of the war 510 shi ps have been lost out of 107,453 shi ps whi ch have
been convoyed.
I mports i nto Great Bri tai n by shi ps i n convoy duri ng the week endi ng
March totalled 332,000 tons compared wi th 627,000 tons duri ng the previ ous
seven days and an average of 616,000 tons for the past ten weeks. Of the week's
imports, ,132,000 tons were oil of vari ous grades.
Enemy Attack on Trade.
11. Accordi ng to the i nformati on at present avai l abl e 22 shi ps, i ncl udi ng
11 tankers, have been attacked by U-boats duri ng the week, 20 in the West
Atl anti c and West I ndi es, one off the Li beri an coast and one off Madras; of these
11 are known to have been sunk. Two shi ps were mi ned off Aberdeen and
Al deburgh respectively, and one sni p was sunk, probabl y by a mine, off Capetown.
One shi p was bombed and sunk off the Portuguese coast, and one Dutch shi p is
known to have been seized by the J apanese i n Batavi a.
British Minelaying.
12. Duri ng the week mi nes have been l ai d by surface craft in the Faroes-
I celand (C) area, in the East coast Barri er and off the Dutch and Bel gi an coasts.
Mi nel ayi ng by ai rcraft has been carri ed out off the German North Sea coast
and in the Medi terranean off Benghazi and Tri pol i (L).
Enemy Minelaying, British Minesweeping.
13. Mi nel ayi ng by enemy ai rcraft took place on two ni ghts of the week off
the East Coast between Lowestoft and the Thames Estuary and in the Bri stol
Channel. E-boats were operati ng on one ni ght off the Norfol k coast.
Twelve magneti c and three acoustic mi nes have been destroyed duri ng the
week. The mi ne total s now are : 1,903 magneti c, 1,246 acoustic and 1,116 contact.
Foreign Waters.
14. On two ni ghts of the week E-boats l ai d mi nes off Val etta (Mal ta).
A submerged mi ne was reported off Capetown on the 17th and a dangerous
area has been decl ared.
A dri fti ng mi ne has been reported off Sydney, New South Wal es.
[23594]
l s
Enemy Merchant Shipping,
15. Between the 10th and the 27th J anuary the Russi ans claim to have sunk
four German merchant ships, total l i ng 4,000 tons, and to have damaged eight
others in Northern waters.
The I tal i an s.s. Calitea (4,013 tons) has been sunk.
The German s.s. Tacoma (8,268 tons), whi ch has been i nterned at
Montevideo, has now been seized by the Government of Uruguay.
vlCiiy intelligence.
Madagascar.
16. The following shi ps were recently seen at Di ego Suarez by ai r recon-
nai ssance : Three submari nes (one i n dry dock), sloop d'Iberville, the Armed
Merchant Crui ser Bougainville, the naval tanker Elorn, one Greek and two
I tal i an merchant ships. The s.s. Conde (7,202 tons) is reported to have left Dakar
at the end of February for Madagascar. The Armed Merchant Crui ser Quercy
arri ved at Tamatave on the 12th February from Dakar. On the 12th March it was
esti mated that there were six or seven submari nes at Madagascar, but all of
them were not based there.
Y i chy Merchant Shi ppi ng.
17. I t has been announced that the s.s. Ste. Marcelle (1,518 tons, ex Nor-
wegi an s.s. Vigor) was torpedoed i n the Medi terranean on the 14th March, and
that two of the crew are mi ssi ng. Thi s shi p has been engaged i n tradi ng between
Marseilles and Tuni s, and is known to have carri ed I tal i an l orri es and provisions
for troops in Li bya.
MI L I TA RY SI TUATI ON.
Russo-German Campaign.
(An outl i ne map showi ng operati ons i n Russi a is i ncl uded in thi s Resume as
inset.)
Lake Ilmen-Lake Seliger Sector.
18. - I n the Staraya Russa sector operati ons agai nst the encircled porti on
of the German 16th Army are reported to be progressi ng sati sfactori l y, despi te
strong German resistance and difficult snow conditions.
Central Sector.
19. There has been l i ttl e change, but much heavy fighting has taken place,
parti cul arl y in the following areas :'
(1) West and south-west of Rzhev, where the si tuati on is still confused.
(2) North-east of Gshatsk, where the Russi ans have agai n been attacki ng.
(3) South of Vyasma, where the Germans have apparentl y prevented the
. Russi an mai n forces from j oi ni ng up wi th the parachute troops at
Dorogobuzh and from cutti ng the German communi cati ons from
Vyasma to Smolensk.
(4) On a wide front south-west of Y ukhnov.
Ukraine.
20. There has been heavy fighting from Kharkov to Taganrog. The
Russi ans have had some success in the Kharkov area.
Crimea.
21. The Russi ans have agai n made heavy attacks in the Kerch Peni nsul a
and have made some sl i ght progress.
Summary.
22. The Russi an efforts to destroy the encircled German forces in the Staraya
Russa area continue. On many other sectors the Russi ans are exerti ng great
pressure under difficult conditions, and losses are likely to have been consi derabl e
on both sides. Al though terri tori al gai ns have been negligible, i t is i mportant
that the Germans have been given l i ttl e respi te.
Libya.
23. No change in the si tuati on has taken place.
Patrol l i ng on both sides has been active, parti cul arl y on the 16th March,
when an enemy force of about a company of i nfantry, wi th arti l l ery, advanced
some 15 miles i nto no-man's l and south of Tmi mi . On the same day some 30 enemy
tanks and a number of M.T. vehicles were located i n the vi ci ni ty of Guerat el
Mogaregh, 34 miles east of Meki l i . By the 17th, however, the enemy's columns
had wi thdrawn and acti vi ty had reverted to normal .
Burma.
24. On the 11th March our forces i n the Nyaungl ebi n area captured three
villages, i ncl udi ng Shwegyi n. Thi s l i mi ted offensive was carri ed out wi th a
view to creati ng a di versi on whi l e our mai n forces wi thdrew north of Rangoon.
I n capturi ng these villages heavy casual ti es were inflicted on the enemy. Our
troops i n thi s area have now wi thdrawn to thei r former positions, accordi ng to
plan, and a l i ne has been stabi l i sed runni ng approxi matel y east and west from
north of Shwegyi n to north of Tharrawaddy.
G.O.C., Burma, has organi sed an I rrawaddy Ri ver Patrol from Henzada to
the south, and an intelligence system of loyal local i nhabi tants has been i nsti tuted.
Army Headquarters are at Maynryo.
25. Chi nese forces stati oned on the Southern Shan States-Thai l and fronti er
have been in contact wi th Thai s, and i n one engagement a hundred of the l atter
were killed.
26. There are i ndi cati ons that the J apanese are attempti ng an advance up
the Toungoo road and enemy concentrati ons are reported at L etpadan and
Taikkyi.
I ntelligence.
Norway and Denmark.
27. There have been further i ndi cati ons that the foreshadowed strength-
ening of the coastal defences of Norway has begun. Reports have been received
of rei nforcements to South and South-West Norway vi a Oslo, and i t seems l i kel y
that from five to ten new Coast Defence Battal i ons (i.e., probably 3,500-7,000
men) may be involved. There have been no reports suggesti ng the arri val of any
fresh formati ons i n Norway, and the rei nforcements appear to represent merel y
a strengtheni ng of those di vi si ons al ready responsi bl e for coast defence. The
total number of divisions i n Norway remai ns, therefore, at ei ght.
Reports of rei nforcements to Denmark are conflicting, and unti l more
satisfactory evidence is obtai ned the esti mate of two divisions there must be
mai ntai ned.
AIR SITUATION.
General Review.
28. Al though in general weather condi ti ons severely restri cted ni ght bombi ng
operations, successful attacks were made on Cologne and Ki el .
Aerodromes at Mal ta were agai n heavi l y bombed.
United Kingdom.
29. Fi ghter Command flew 1,844 sorties by day and 210 by ni ght.
30. Enemy acti vi ty agai nst thi s country was agai n on a small scale, al though
larger than i n recent weeks, and consisted mai nl y of coastal operati ons.
[23594] R 2
Germany and Occupied Territory.
Day.
31. A total of 490 sorties were despatched by Fi ghter Command on offensive
operati ons and 29 were flown by Bomber Command.
32. Eleven Bostons carri ed out a successful rai d on the Rai l way Centre
at Hazebrouck, and a number of hi ts were made on the target. Other bombers
were despatched to attack enemy shi ppi ng off the French Coast, but owing to
poor visibility they fai l ed to locate thei r targets.
33. Thi rty-si x squadrons of fighters provi ded support for these operations,
duri ng which they shot down 18 enemy ai rcraft and probably destroyed
8 others, for the loss of seven Spitfires. Al l the bombers returned safely. The
enemy flew a considerable number of patrol s over the Cal ai s and Di eppe areas,
when our offensive operati ons were in progress, otherwi se German fighters were
used wi th great economy.
34. Small offensive rai ds were carri ed out by Spitfires agai nst a number of
targets i ncl udi ng the dock area at Le Treport, Le Touquet aerodrome, gun posts,
barges and five trai ns. I n addi ti on, two E-boats and a minesweeper were set on
fire, and three other E-boats damaged.
Night.
35. Bomber Command despatched a total of 327 sorties agai nst enemy
targets and released 273 tons of H.E. bombs. Owi ng to very unfavourabl e weather
i t was possible to operate on only two ni ghts of the week. Twenty-si x ai rcraft
were employed on sea mi ni ng as recorded under " Coastal Operati ons."
36. The heavi est attack wasi .madg
; :
agamst Cologne, when nearl y 100 tons
of H.E. bombs'and"abouT 25,000 i ncendi ari es (i ncl udi ng' 186 of 250 lbs.) were
released. Bursts were observed i n the area of the Ffi ndenburg Bri dge, and many
l arge fires were reported, one of whi ch appeared to involve a whole street. Only
one ai rcraft was mi ssi ng from thi s attack.
37. Ei ghty-four tons of bombs were released at Ki el in condi ti ons of good
visibility, but accurate identification of targets wi thi n the area was difficult on
account of intense flak and searchl i ght gl are. Large fires were seen in the centre
of Ki el and bursts were observed in the Deutsche Werke Shi pbui l di ng Y ards and
i n the dock area.
Attacks on a smaller scale were made on Emden, Boulogne and Dunki rk.
Coastal Operations.
38. Coastal Command despatched 288 sorties, of whi ch 50 sorties were on
convoy escorts. Shi ppi ng protecti on patrol s by Fi ghter Command involved 992
sorties.
39. Bomber Command despatched a total of 26 ai rcraft to lay sea-mines in
the mouth of the J ade and Weser Ri vers, off Hel i gol and and off the Fri si an
I sl ands.
40. Enemy acti vi ty by day consisted pri nci pal l y of shi ppi ng and weather
reconnaissances. An extensive reconnaissance was made of I rel and. Night
acti vi ty consisted almost entirely of anti -shi ppi ng and mi nel ayi ng operati ons over
the North Sea and, to a lesser extent, the South Western Approaches.
Mediterranean.
Libya and Egypt.
41. Our fighters carri ed out a number of offensive sweeps over the forward
area and provi ded protecti on for shi ppi ng off the coast.
42. Martuba l andi ng ground was heavily attacked three ti mes by Bostons,
escorted by Ki ttyhawks.' Fi ve enemy ai rcraft on the ground Were destroyed and
dumps were set on fire. The Ki ttyhawks, two of whi ch are missing, shot down
three enemy fighters and probably destroyed two others.
Wel l i ngtons bombed a concentrati on of M.T. near Meki l i , causi ng l arge
explosions among vehicles, and Bl enhei ms attacked M.T. between El Aghei l a and
J edabya. Small-scale attacks were made on Tri pol i (L) and Benghazi Harbours.
43. Enemy acti vi ty was di rected mai nl y agai nst Tobruk, but no damage
has been reported. Me. 109s conti nued to be employed on bombing and machi ne-
gun attacks on our forward l andi ng grounds.
Malta.
44. The I sl and was agai n heavi l y rai ded throughout the week by a total
of at least 550 ai rcraft. The aerodromes and seapl ane and submari ne bases were
the mai n objectives. Graters were caused on the aerodromes, several ai rcraft on
the ground were destroyed and others were damaged. At Takal i the admi ni stra-
tive bui l di ngs and stores were seriously damaged, and at Hal Far a hangar was
destroyed.
45. Al though our fighters were hampered by the parti al unservi ceabi l i ty
of the aerodromes, they shot down three enemy ai rcraft and damaged 23. Two
other ai rcraft were destroyed by our A.A. defences.
Italy and Sicily.
46. Wel l i ngtons whi ch were unable, owi ng to bad visibility, to locate Catani a
aerodrome attacked flak concentrati ons in the vi ci ni ty.
Reconnai ssances were made of aerodromes and harbours in Sicily.
Greece, Crete and the Dodecanese.
47. Wel l i ngtons from Egypt bombed Tymbaki aerodrome in Crete and the
docks at the Piraeus, where fires were started.
The aerodromes at Cal ato and Mari tza, in Rhodes, and at Herakl i on, in
Crete, were attacked by Wel l i ngtons, in support of the naval operati ons referred
to in paragraph 4.
Sea Communications.
48. Naval ai rcraft made a torpedo attack on a northbound merchant vessel
of 7,000 tons south of Lampedusa, and also on an eastbound merchant vessel of
2,000 tons east of Tri pol i (L). Both vessels were hi t and the smaller one was set
on fire.
Several reconnai ssances of the Tuni si an and Li byan coasts were made by our
ai rcraft.
Russia.
49. There has been no i mportant change in the ai r si tuati on on the Russi an
Front. " -
Burma.
50. Bl enhei ms carri ed out reconnai ssances in support of our ground forces,
and attacked enemy M.T. and vehicles loaded wi th troops, between Mi ngal adon
and Hmawbi . Fi ghters carri ed out small sweeps but encountered very l i ttl e
enemy opposi ti on.
51. Enemy ai r acti vi ty duri ng the week was on a small scale, and a recon-
naissance over Mi ngal adon aerodrome on the 13th showed that the enemy had
not, so far, establ i shed any ai rcraft there. I t is reported that the enemy heavi l y
bombed Nyaungl ebi n shortl y after the wi thdrawal of our troops.
Pacific Zone.
52. Reconnai ssance of Sal amoa and Lae (New Gui nea) disclosed the
presence of two crui sers, two destroyers and a number of transports. Enemy
fighters were also seen to be operati ng from the aerodrome. Ameri can heavy
combers were despatched to attack thi s force, and scored near misses on a shi p.
Bui l di ngs and a hangar at Sal amoa were destroyed i n thi s attack, and an enemy
ai rcraft was shot down.
53. Vunakanau aerodrome (Rabaul) was bombed by one heavy bomber and
a direct hi t made on an enemy ai rcraft, while two others were probably destroyed.
Thi rteen vessels (probably crui sers and destroyers) were observed in the harbour.
54. Three enemy attacks were made on Port Moresby by a total of 21 heavy
bombers and five fighters. A number of hi ts were made on the runway, but the
aerodrome was not rendered unserviceable.
Australia.
55. Ei ght bombers and ni ne T.O. fighters took part in a rai d on Horn
I sl and (near Thursday I sl and) and destroyed one Hudson on the ground. One
of the bombers and two fighters were shot down, and one Ameri can fighter is
missing.
The aerodrome at Port Darwi n was attacked by 14 heavy bombers and con-
siderable damage was caused to bui l di ngs.
HOME SECURITY SITUATION.
General.
56' Duri ng dayl i ght on the 18th two bombs fell i n Torquay harbour, causi ng
sl i ght blast damage.
On the ni ght 13th/14th some damage was caused to mi l i tary barracks at
Folkestone. On thi s ni ght, too, small i nci dents occurred in Li ncol nshi re and the
following ni ght in Cornwal l , wi th some machi ne-gun fire at Hugh Town, Scilly
I sl ands.
Casualties.
57. There were no civilian casualties for the week endi ng 0600 on the
18th March.
Typical Examples of Performance of His Majesty's Ships.
Capital Ships.
H.M.S. Renown.
Between the outbreak of war and 31st December, 1941, H.M.S. Renown was
at sea 390 days and duri ng thi s ti me she steamed 137,000 miles.
Aircraft Carriers.
H.M.S. Victorious.
Steamed 41,378 miles in the first 8 months of her service. 13,000 miles of
this di stance were steamed in the first 5 weeks of her service.
Cruisers.
H.M.S. Cumberland.
Steamed 195,876 miles from the outbreak of war to 31st December, 1941. '
From 18th November, 1940, to 18th May, 1941, H.M.S. Cumberland was at
sea for 206 days out of a total of 213.
Destroyers.
H.M.S. Forester.
Steamed 172,000 miles duri ng the war up to 31st December, 1941, and was
at sea for 601 days duri ng that period.
One destroyer flotilla consi sti ng of ei ght shi ps passed the million mi l e mark
steaming duri ng the war in J une 1941.
Submarines.
One of our submari nes covered a di stance of 25,800 miles in five months, of
which only 40 days were spent i n harbour, and these mostly wi thout a depot shi p.
Duri ng that time thi s submari ne went from 66
0
N. l ati tude to 26
0
S. l ati tude.
Another of our submari nes spent 251 days at sea in one year of war.
APPENDICES I, II and III will be published periodically.
Enemy Merchant Ship Losses as assessed to 28th February, 1942.
Sunk, Capt ur e d
Seri ous l y
or Cons t r uc t i ve Da ma g e d . Tot al .
Da ma g e d.
Gros s Gross ! Gros s Gros s
X T
No. No. m 1 No.
N
Tons . Tons . ! Tons . !
i N O
- Tons .
Ge r ma Ge r mann
I t al i a I t al i ann
Ot he Ot he rr e n e m e n e myy
s hi p s hi pss us ef u us ef ull
s hi p s hi pss
t t oo e n e m e n e
an and d
myy
400
415
118
1, 732, 087
1, 763, 685
206, 033
113
78
16
309, 903
364, 368
43, 706
190
84
12
605, 789
420, 984
48,82"4
703
577
146
2, 647, 779
2, 549, 037
298, 563
Tot a Tot all 933 3, 701, 805 207 717, 977 286 1, 075, 597 1, 426 5, 495, 379
This table does not include losses inflicted on the enemy by our Russian
Allies, which are estimated at about 556,000 gross tons sunk : nor does it include
losses inflicted on J apanese shipping in the Far East and Pacific, which are under
consideration by a Special Committee.
In addition, there is about 336,000 gross tons of Axis shipping in South
American ports which is no longer available to the enemy.
APPENDIX Y.
Casualties to H.M. Auxiliary Yessels and to Naval Personnel.
March 13.Boom defence lighter Sparsholt mined and sunk off Sheerness.
March 13.Auxiliary schooner Zuodochis Pigi sunk off Alexandria.
March 14.Trawler Monique slightly damaged by aircraft off St. Ann's
Head.
March 15.-M.G.Bs. 87, 88 and 91 damaged in action off Ijmuiden.
The following casualties to naval personnel have been reported :
Officers : 27 killed, 90 missing, 9 wounded.
Ratings : 260 killed, 22 missing, 10 wounded.
Provisional operational aircraft battle casualties compiled from reports
received during the period:
0700 hours, Thursday, 12th March, 1942, to 0700 hours, Thursday,
19th March. 1942.
Metropolitan Area.
British.
Bo mbe r s . . .
Fi ght e r s . . .
Coast al . . .
Ar my Co- Operat i on
... ...
In the
14
8
7
Air. On the Ground.
Tot al 29
Two pi l ot s are s af e.
Probably
Enemy.
Destroyed. Destroyed. Damaged.
2
Bo mbe r s
Fi ght e r s
19
7
4
Mi s c e l l a ne o us
1
Tot al 22
7
Middle East (including Malta).
British. In the Air. On the Ground.
Bo mb e r s . . . 5 3
Fi ght e r s 6 2
Ot hers 2*
Tot al 13 6
* Hur r i c a ne s on r e c c o nna i s s a nc e . f Sunde r l and.
Enemy.
Bo mbe r s . . .
Fi ght e r s . . .
Destroyed.
3
9
Probably
Destroyed.
2
6
Damaged.
17
12
Tot al 12
8
29
Of t he above t ot al s , t hr e e we r e de s t r oye d, one pr obabl y de s t r oye d and fi ve d a ma g e d b y A. A. fire
Far East.
British and Allied.
^ .
Bo mb e r s . . . .-- - - - - v-"
**-
A i r
-
i
1
0 n t h e G r o u n d
'
l
Fi ght e r s J
Mi s c e l l a ne o us . . . .-- - - - - --- "J
Total
3 1
One pi l ot i s s af e.
Probably
Enemy. Destroyed. Destroyed Damaged.
Bo mb e r s . . .
Fi ght e r s
3
Mi s c e l l ane ous 1
Total . . . . . . . 5
1
N0T K9. - ( a ) No a c c o unt i s t ake n of e n e my ai rcraf t de s t r oye d on t he ground i n a ny t heat re.
( 6) No a c c o unt i s t a ke n of Bri t i sh? Naval ai rcraf t c as ual t i e s .
[23594]
c
Air Attacks on Enemy Territory in Europe.
Extracts from Recent Raid Assessment Reports.
The following reports of damage have been received duri ng the past week
from Ai r Reconnai ssance and I ntel l i gence sources :
Germany.
1. Huts.This target was attacked on the 28th/29th December, and ample
ti me has el apsed for repai rs to have been carri ed out. Photographs taken on the
9th March, 1942, however, show that the pl ant is not as active as mi ght have
been expected, several cooling towers not bei ng i n operati on. I n addi ti on, five
gas holders, probabl y destroyed duri ng the attack have been removed. New
pi pe-l i nes are bei ng constructed, and there is reason to believe that repai rs have
been carri ed out to the roofs of bui l di ngs in the works.
2. Kiel.In the attack on the 27th/28th February a l arge shi p used as a
depot shi p was hi t and "sank.
Occupied France.
3. Poissy.-Photographs taken duri ng the attack on the 8th March, 1942,
on the Matford Works at Poi ssy show that seven di rect hi ts were obtai ned on
the mai n factory bui l di ng, one on a subsi di ary bui l di ng and four amongst parked
lorries.
The following reports of damage have been received duri ng the past week
from Ai r Reconnai ssance and I ntel l i gence sources :
Germany.
1. Huts.This target was attacked on the 28th/29th December, and ample
ti me has el apsed for repai rs to have been carri ed out. Photographs taken on the
9th March, 1942, however, show that the pl ant is not as active as mi ght have
been expected, several cooling towers not bei ng i n operati on. I n addi ti on, five
gas holders, probabl y destroyed duri ng the attack have been removed. New
pi pe-l i nes are bei ng constructed, and there is reason to believe that repai rs have
been carri ed out to the roofs of bui l di ngs in the works.
2. Kiel.In the attack on the 27th/28th February a l arge shi p used as a
depot shi p was hi t and "sank.
Occupied France.
3. Poissy.-Photographs taken duri ng the attack on the 8th March, 1942,
on the Matford Works at Poi ssy show that seven di rect hi ts were obtai ned on
the mai n factory bui l di ng, one on a subsi di ary bui l di ng and four amongst parked
lorries.
\
c
^ ^ c Mr
THIS D0CUMENTJ[3 THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT
Printed for the War Cabinet. March 1942:
SECRET . .
/ : C o p y N o
/
W.P. (42) 130.
March 20, 1942.
ensure the secrecy of thi s document.
WA R C A B I N E T . .
SUPPL Y OF BRI T I SH OFFI CERS FOR I NDI A N ARMY AND T HEI R
PAY .
Memorandum by Secretary of State for India.
I N ci rcul ati ng my comments on the Memorandum by the Secretary of State
for War (W.P. (42) 125) I share hi s regret that i t i s necessary to refer, thi s
question to the War Cabi net. I also do not regard the case as pri mari l y a
financial one; I consider i t rather as one whi ch vi tal l y affects the efficiency of the
I ndi an Army, and I would remi nd my colleagues that on the 5th February the
War Cabi net gave general approval to my submission wi th regard to the need for
ensuring an adequate suppl y of suitable officers for the I ndi an mi l i tary forces.
I t is not the case, as the Secretary of State for War suggests, that he is
asked to agree to a certai n course, as if I had. suggested a novel concession for
officers of the I ndi an Army; on the contrary, i t is I who am being asked by the
Secretary of State for War to depart from the accepted method of recrui ti ng
and payi ng the Bri ti sh officers of the I ndi an Army. I t has long been accepted
that the Bri ti sh officers of the I ndi an Army are pai d at a hi gher rate than those
of the Bri ti sh Service, and that they are composed of officers who freely choose
service wi th the I ndi an Army. I t is thi s settl ed policy whi ch my colleague wishes
to alter, and my memorandum expl ai ns at l ength the objections to his proposal,
which, basi ng itself on a questi on of pay, resul ts as shown i n paragraph 8 of his
memorandum in the deni al to the I ndi an Army of i ts own body of officers and in
its becoming dependent on the Bri ti sh Service for such officers as the l atter may
provide. I am strongl y of opi ni on that.a radi cal change of thi s sort is most
inadvisable at the present moment.
L. S. A.
India Office,
March 20, 1942.
[23595]
Comments by Secretary of State for India on Memorandum by Secretary of State
for War.
The submission of the Secretary of State for War (W.P. (42) 125) is not in
fact confined to the simple question set out in the first paragraph of his covering
note, namely, the rates of pay issuable to officers of the British Service serving
with Indian units or formations outside India, because, in paragraph 8, he makes
the much more radical proposal that the Indian Army should cease to take further
candidates direct from this country, whether appointed through O.C.T.Us. here
or through O.C.T.Us. in India, and whether schoolboy cadets or British Other
Ranks, and that all its requirements (except so far as recruitment takes place in
India itself) should in future be met by the attachment of British Service officers.
2. During the whole of the last war all the needs of the Indian Army for
officers were met by direct appointments, temporary or otherwise, to the Indian
Army, and the officers so appointed received full Indian Army terms. During
the present war the situation has been substantially different. To some extent
the needs of the Indian Army are now met by the appointment of Indian officers,
who serve on rates of pay lower than those for British officers. The balance of
the requirements of the Indian Army is met by the temporary appointment of
European officers and, according to the rules hitherto and at present in force,
these temporary European officers, whether holding Indian Army Commissions
or holding British commissions and attached to the Indian Army, draw in India
and elsewhere an allowance equal to half the normal Indian Army allowance,
that is to say, half the difference between the pay of officers of the British Service
in India and that of Indian Army officers.
3. The case which I am now arguing is
(1) that the Indian Army should not be deprived of the right, which it has
enjoyed so long and which I and the Indian authorities regard as
necessary for its efficiency, of obtaining its own officers as far as
possible on a voluntary basis; and
(2) that the officers who serve with the Indian forces should be paid alike,
whether commissioned direct to the Indian Army or obtained by
attachment from the British Service, and should, whether serving in
India or elsewhere with Indian troops, continue to draw, in addition
to basic Indian rates, the half-rate of Indian Army allowance hitherto
regarded as appropriate for service with Indian troops. I recognise,
that the Secretary of State for War is animated by a desire to secure
what he regards as fair treatment between one class of British officer
and,another, and to avoid possible causes of discontent. Like him,
I do not argue the case upon financial grounds, except so far as they
are inseparable from other considerations, and I base myself upon
the need for military efficiency and for a tolerably well satisfied body
of officers in the Indian Army, without which we shall not secure
efficiency and shall fail to take full advantage of I ndia's vast resources
of military manpower.
4. I will deal with the more fundamental question first. As the wa.
lengthens, and especially as it develops in eastern theatres, we become increasingly
dependent on India, where alone in the Empire is still to be found a great
reservoir of man-power suitable for military purposes. I t is well known and
generally accepted that Indian troops are particularly dependent upon their
officers and specially upon their British officers, and the fighting qualities of the
new Indian formations will be largely determined by the success with which the
commissioned cadres are filled. Indian units have much smaller establishments
of commissioned officersBritish and Indianthan those of the British Service.
The level of responsibility among the junior officers is consequently higher and
there is less room fjor misfits. Special qualities and qualifications are required
and I shall later refer to these in greater detail.
5. I do not accept any analogy between the Indian and the Colonial forces.
Without in any way wishing to depreciate the value and quality of the Colonial
forces, I must point out that the Indian Army is of very much greater importance
and stands upon an entirely different footing. Unlike the Colonial forces, the
Indian Army has a long and honourable history as a separate service, and it
would be bound to cause heartburning and misunderstanding if, suddenly and
for no reason that would be apparent, it were made entirely dependent upon the
British Service for its officers, just at a time when more is expected of it than
ever before. The proportion of British officers and n.c.os. is far higher with
the Colonial than with the Indian forces.
6. We may not be able to get officers for the Indian Army as good in all
respects as we should wish. But I submit that we should be taking an unnecessary
and an unjustifiable risk if at this critical juncture we do not continue to employ
the voluntary system so far as it will serve us. I t should be borne in mind that
Indian troops are themselves all volunteers. There has been some experience
lately on a comparatively small scale of the system which the Secretary of State
for War now proposes to apply wholesale, and I understand that this experience
does not point to satisfactory results. I n the last six months, for certain reasons
including the abnormal numbers required, the voluntary system has not produced
as many as have been needed and to make up the deficiency a number of British
Service officers have been compulsorily drafted to India for attachment to the
Indian Army. Preliminary reports which have been received on these officers
are by no means favourable. So far from agreeing to the substitution of the
compulsory for the voluntary system, I maintain that the voluntary system should
be the means of serving all the needs of the Indian Army, and I believe that with
improvements in its application which, are being discussed. between the two
departments it can, with the help of the Army Council, be made to do so.
7. The Viceroy and his advisers strongly support the view which I take,
and consider that the proposal which I am resisting involves undue risks without
compensating advantages. If further competent advice is desired, I suggest that
it should be sought from Generals Wavell and Auchinleck, both of whom are
familiar with the conditions of the problem and are directly concerned with the
efficiency of the forces that are to be supplied from India.
8. Turning now to the second question, that of pay, I appreciate the
importance of avoiding discontent on account of different rates being issuable to
officers whose circumstances and responsibilities are similar. But by abolishing
one differentiation the proposal of the Secretary of State for War creates another.
We should have officers in the same units getting different rates for precisely
similar duties, whereas the present differentiation, which the Secretary of State
for War desires to remove, is one between different Services, and is, moreover, a
differentiation which has invariably prevailed up to now both in peace and war
without, so far as anyone is aware, having given rise to any seripus clissatisfac-
tion or complaint. I t appears to me to be far the lesser evil of the two, if it is
an evil at all. Indeed, I believe i t to be generally understood and accepted that
service with Indian troops qualifies for some advantage in respect of pay. The
present system, as I have already pointed out, is an improvement on that of the
last war in the direction desired by the Secretary of State for War, in that, apart
from the fact that many of the officers of the Indian Army are now Indian officers,
the European temporary officers serving with it draw only half the normal rate
of Indian. Army allowance and not the full Indian Army terms. I may point
out, top, that if some of the officers serving with Indian units get British rates,
while others must, as the Secretary of State for War recognises, get Indian rates,
the officers of each unit will come under two pay codes and paymasters, and this
will result in great administrative inconvenience and an additional burden of
administrative routine.
9. I maintain strongly that the principle of extra pay for service with
Indian troops, as modified to the extent of issuing Indian Army allowance at
half rates for temporary service, is fully justified on its merits. The opinion pf
myself and the Indian authorities is fully supported by Generals Wavell and
Auchinleck. The position of British officers in command of Indian troops is one
of peculiar responsibility. There are, as I have observed, fewer commissioned
officers to the unit than in the British Service and the duties of the junior officers
are consequently on a higher level. The British officer has to adjust himself to
co-operate with his Indian colleagues and the troops under him are men of
different race and upbringing, whose mentality, traditions and customs he must
make a special effort to appreciate. Moreover, he has up to a point to learn their
languages. I t seems to me perfectly reasonable, if not necessary, that this should
continue to a moderate extent to be recognised in his pay, as it has been invariably
recognised in the past, just as specialist qualifications are recognised in various
branches of the British Service.
10. The Secretary of State for War accepts the position that these officers
should continue to serve on relatively favourable terms so long as they remain
in India, and his proposal relates only to their period of service overseas. It
seems to me that it will be regarded as particularly anomalous, and will be likely
to lead to serious misunderstanding, if officers lose the advantage they have been
enjoying in India as soon as they go on service to a possibly adjacent theatre of
active operations.
11. The comparison between the two pay syystems, as applied to the Middle
East, does not show startling advantages in favour of Indian Army officers.
Indeed, in the case of a typical lieutenant there is no difference worth mentioning.
In the case of a typical captain it amounts to 8 a month. In the higher
ranks it is greater. But we are dealing only with temporary officers and not very
many of these are likely to reach a' higher rank than that of captain. The
differences will be reduced as a result of the increase of income tax in the forth-
coming Indian budget.
12. The Secretary of State for War does not deny that, if officers are in
future to be commissioned as temporary officers of the Indian Army, they would
have to get, as in the past, additional pay as compared with the British Service.
I hope that I have sufficiently demonstrated the need for continuing to supply the
Indian Army with officers either by direct temporary appointment or by transfer.
The present arrangement, by which the temporary officer of the Indian Army
receives half the Indian Army allowance for regular officers, was the result of
agreement with the Army Council before the war. When the. system of
attachment of British Service officers, rather than of their transference to the
Indian Army, was introduced, it was done purely for reasons of administrative
convenience and not with the intention that it should have any bearing upon the
rates of pay issuable. So far as the officer and his duties and responsibilities are
concerned, there is no difference whatever between attachment as a result of
voluntary application and transference, and the arguments which I have advanced
for additional pay apply equally in both cases.
13. The conclusions which I therefore draw are :
:

(1) that the Indian Army should not be deprived of the right of obtaining its
officers by direct appointment on a voluntary basis; and
(2) that in principle, and subject to certain minor matters (including the
question of Indian Army officers serving in staff appointments referred
to at the end of the Memorandum of the Secretary of State for War)
which might be agreed to between the Secretary of State for War and
myself, the present system of pay, with the income tax anomaly
corrected, should continue, in order that all requirements, including
those of the technical arms of the Indian Army, may be adequately
and efficiently met. The two things hang together and I do not think
it is possible to approve one without also approving the other, or to
accept the contention of the Secretary of State for War with regard
to pay without incurring the risks involved in radically altering the
system of appointments to commissioned ranks in the Indian Army.
14. The War Cabinet on the 5th February (W.M. (42) 16th Conclusions,
Minute 4) gave their general approval to the submission made in my paper on
Indians War Effort, W.P. (42) 54, with regard to the. need for ensuring an
adequate supply of suitable officers for the Indian military forces. I look upon
the two propositions set out above as vital in this connection, and hope that I may
claim support for them on the strength of the approval which the War Cabinet
recorded on the 5th February. I t is for this reason that I felt that if the
Secretary of State for War wished to pursue the proposal which he had made to
me it should be brought to the attention of the War Cabinet itself.
Mil
TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY.'
IT IS requested that special care may be taken to
ENSURE THE SECRECY OF THIS DOCUMENT
ar oWT I S THE PROPERTY OF HI S BRI TANNI C MAJ ESTY' S GOVERNMENT)
COPY NO,
3S
'ef-it/.'
I M a r c h 19h2-
WAR CABI NET
THE "DAI LY MI RROR"- .
Memor andumToy t he Home, Secr et ar y *
I ci r cul at e, f or t he i nf or mat i on of t he War Cabi net ,
Bnote of my meet i ng wi th t he Vi ce- Chai r man and Edi t or of
lie "Dai l y Mi r r or " yest er day.
H. M.
I0ME OFFI CE.
IQth March 19k2.
Mr. . Harry, . Guy Bar t hol omew, Deput y Chai r man of t he
Dai l y Mi rro. r, . ; and Mr . C. E. . Thomas, Edi t or of t he Dai l y
Mi r r or , , saw t he Home Secr et ar y i n hi s r oom. at t he Home
Of f i ce at 1. 0. 15 t o- day ( Thur sday 19t h Mar ch, 1942) i n
r esponse t o t he r equest of t he Secr et ar y of St at e.
Mr . Bar t hol omew at t ended ' .i n pl ace of Mr . J ohn Cowl ey,
Chai r man' of . t he Dai l y l i i rror. '
:
. - -
- The Home Secr et ar y was accompani ed "by Si r Al exander
-
Maxwel l and Mr . Osber t / Peake. -
The Home Secr et ar y t hanked Mr . Bar t hol omew and -
Mr . Thomas f or comi ng at , such shor t not i ce and sai d he was
:
af r ai d t hat what he had. t o say woul d not sound ver y
pl easant . He had asked t hemt o come
:
al ong "because he wi shed
t o make a st at ement t o t hemabout t he l i ne t hat t he Dai l y
Mi r r or had "been pur sui ng f or some t i me past . ' The Gover nment
di d not obj ect t o cr i t i ci smand had no wi sh t o i nt er f er e
wi t h t he f r eedomof the", press. . Const r uct i ve cr i t i ci smhad
i t s val ue and he and t he Government ' ' were uphol der s of t hat .
But ' t her e was anot her ki nd of cr i t i ci sm, whi ch was somet i mes
put f or war d; i n t he gui se of cr i t i ci smhavi ng as i t s obj ect
; the i nt ensi f i cat i on . of the- war ef f or t but was i n f act
somet hi ng. ver y di f f er ent , especi al l y when t he count r y was at
war - sneer i ng at t acks, mi schi evous mi sr epr esent at i ons,
: i r r esponsi bl e exagger at i on; t he sor t of t hi ng t hat was
i nspi r ed by a desi r e f or r eckl ess sensat i on.
What he want ed t o t al k t o t hemabout - was t he gener al
l i ne of t he Dai l y Mi r r or . He f el t , and so
:
di d t he
Gover nment because t he paper had been st udi ed ver y cl osel y
and t he whol e mat t er had been f ul l y exami ned- by t he
Gover nment , t hat t hj peopl e i n cont r ol of the Dai l y Mi r r or
wer e ^pursui ng a l i no of denunci at i on and vi t uper at i on.
Nobody coul d pr et end t hat i t was const r uct i ve cr i t i ci sm.
I t was one t hi ng t o say t hat somet hi ng was wr ong, t o gi ve
t he f act s and poi nt out what was wr ong and suggest how i t
mi ght be r emedi ed and how si mi l ar mi st akes mi ght be avoi ded
i n' t he' f ut ur e. I t was anot her t hi ng t o be ' r eckl essl y and
per si st ent l y condemni ng ever yt hi ng and ever ybody. I f t hey
wer e/ cont i nual l y mi sr epr esent i ng event s and: denounci ng t he
conduct of t he war t he cumul at i ve r esul t must be an adver se
ef f ect on t he publ i c mi nd, whi ch mi ght l ead qui t e easi l y
t o peopl e wonder i ng whet her t he nat i onal cause was wor t h
f i ght i ng f or and wor ki ng f or . I t encour aged def eat i smand
i nduced peopl e t o bel i eve t hat i f ever ybody was i ncompet ent
and. al l was muddl e, ' i t was- usol es- s t o at t empt t o car r y on
'
r
t he war . * - ,
He coul d, gi ve many i l l ust r at i ons f r omt he pages of t he
Dai l y Mi r r or , but he t hought i t woul d be enough t o ment i on
t wo whi ch he r egar ded as. t ypi cal of t he pr esent l i ne of t he
paper . , He wi shed t o.
:
; emphasi se t hat he was not si ngl i ng out
Somet hi ng "that was a/ speci al , cause; of annoyance. The
i l l ust r at i ons he woul d gi ve wer e t ypi cal . One was a car t oon
whi ch appear ed i n t he i ssue of 6t h "March. The car t oon, a
ver y wel l dr awn pi ece of wor k, r epr esent ed a seaman l yi ng on
a r af t at sea. He was cl i ngi ng t o a bi t of r ope and i t was
obvi ous t hat t he poor f el l ow . was desper at e. The capt i on was
"' The Pr i ce of Pet r ol has boon i ncr eased by one penny
1
" -
Of f i ci al ".
:
What was the ordi nary reader to make of t h c
at cartoon? j
Home Secretary said, he did not know what me ni ng the paner
the cartooni st i ntended the cartoon to convey. But he (thy
0 r
Secretary of State) knew what the ef f ect was on him and he
imagined i t had much the same ef f ect on the average reader,
That cartoon meant that seamen were l osi ng thei r l i ves so
that somebody might make an addi ti onal prof i t out of the sale
of petrol . He di d not see what other meaning i t coul d have.
The Home Secretary proceeded to expl ai n that i t was
qui te true that at that ti me petrol had been i ncreased in
-nrice by one penny. But that i ncrease was.not f or the purpose
of increasing prof i t s. The i ncrease was made wi th the approval
of the Government wni ch had consi dered the whole questi on
before' agreei ng to the i ncrease, and i t was not made wi th the
obj ect of nutti ng more prof i ts i nto the pockets of the petrol
combines but because of i ncreased costs i n di stri buti on. He
i nvi ted Mr. Bartholomew and Mr.. Thomas to consi der f or a few
mi nutes what.the of f eet ' of that cartoon mi ght,be on
merchant seamen who saw - I t. The Mi ni ster of Labour had
:
"one
responsi bi l i ty of seei ng that
merchant seamen, who were
f i t
for the j ob, went to sea. . He had powers,
of compul si on.'
The
merchant seamen di d hot have a very good ti me at sea; there
was no doubt whatever about that. They were
brave men and-,
faced great peri l s. I f those men were'tol d,
as thi s -cartoon
tol d them, that they were f aci ng .those peri l s merel y i n order
that greater prof i ts shoul d go to the Combines,, was i t not
l i kel y that some of them might say- "I f that i s what i t' s for
why shoul d we go to sea?" And that way l ay defeat,,
The second i l l ustrati on he wi shed to gi ve was from the
l eadi ng arti cl e publ i shed i n the Dai l y Mi rror on the same day
6th -March. ,;.The arti cl e ref erred to an Army Counci l Instructic
that had been i ssued, and made thi s comment :
"The.accepted ti p. f or army, l eadershi p woul d i n pl ai n
truth.be thi s *- ......" ' -
"Al l who
v
a spi re to mi sl ead others i n war shoul d be brass-
s buttoned boneheads:, soci al l y prej udi ced, arrogant and
--fussy. A tendency to heart- di sease, apopl exy, diabetes
-and hi gh bl ood pressure i s desi rabl e i n the hi gher costs"
What was that sayi ng? I t was sayi ng that thi s was the kindol
peopl e to.-whom l eadershi p had been entrusted. i n. the army and
that i t-was the desi re of the Government, and the authori ti es
who made the appoi ntments, that onl y peopl e'of that kind shou
occupy those posi ti ons. I t was sayi ng that the army was he in
del i beratel y, f i l l ed wi th hopel essl y unheal thy -and incompetent
peopl e i n the hi gher posts. I f a paper sai d that ki nd of
thi ng to sol di ers i n the army - and he understood they had
readers there - what,ef f ect di d they i magi ne i t would have on
the sol di ers? I t must i mpai r the rel ati onshi p between office
and men and. be cal cul ated to undermi ne the moral e t f the Ar
And- what,,about the ef f ect on thei r rel ati ves - parti cul arl y
thei r women f ol k? He had tri ed to imagine how statements;??
that ki nd, and mi srepresentati ons of the sort conveyed hythe
cartbon, ever got i nto the paper. Surel y i t was somebody'
2
busi ness to consi der'the contents of each i ssue. He suppose"
that the paper'woul d say that i t stood for the more vigorous
prosecuti on' of the war. That di d not amount to very much i
1
they were conti nual l y tel l i ng thei r readers that the whole
thi ng was -muddle and i ncompetence.-
:
The l ogi cal end of that
sort of propaganda was hopel essness, def eati sm, and afeel i l t
there- was no poi nt i n goi ng through-wi th the war. I t there
f ore consti tuted the systemati e publ i cati on of matter
cal cul at ed. t o f oment opposi t i on to t he successf ul pr osecut i on
of t he war , He suggest ed t hat what ever t hey mi ght say about
t hei r mot i ves, what t hey wer e act ual l y doi ng was pr i nt i ng
Goebbel i sed pr opaganda, Dr , G- oebbel s coul d easi l y l i f t
t hat car t oon and pr i nt i t exact l y as i t st ood.
v The Home Secr et ar y went on t o expl ai n Def ence Regul at i on
2D. , The Regul at i on gave t he Gover nment power to "suppr ess a
paper- whi ch was syst emat i cal l y publ i shi ng. mat t er t hat was
cal cul at ed t o f oment opposi t i on to t he successf ul pr osecut i on
of t he war , No doubt , t hey r emember ed ^that t he Gover nment
some t i me ago t ook act i on under t he Regul at i on agai nst ' -
anot her. ' paper and a weekl y news sheet . They mi ght t hi nk t hat
t her e was a gr eat di f f er ence bet ween what t hat ot her paper
di d and what t he ' - Dai l y Mi r r or was'
:
. doi ng, and t hey mi ght
t hi nk t hat t hi s Regul at i on v/ as i nt ended mor e f or t he ot her
t ype .of paper t han f or t hei r s. HO had t o t el l t hemt hat
what mat t er ed was - ' What was i t r easonabl e t o bel i eve woul d be
the, ef f ect. ' of what t hey wer e publ i shi ng. The pr ovi si ons of
Regul at i on' ; 2D wer e such t hat i f the ef f ect of publ i cat i ons i n
t he; Dai l y. . Mi rror was i n the di r ect i on he had i ndi cat ed, t hen
. they came wi t hi n t he scope of t he Regul at i on. I t was . not '
enough -for t hemto say t hat t hey st ood f or t he mor e vi gor ous
pr osecut i on of t he war . Regar d must be had t o t he ef f ect
of
;
t he^publ i shed mat t or , ând . i f t he ef f ect was t o pr ej udi ce
t he successf ul pr osecut i on of t he. war t hen t he Regul at i on'
appl i ed. No: doubt t hey had t hei r: own l egal advi ser s; but
what he was t el l i ng- t hemwas t he vi ew of t he Gover nment , and
t he Gover nment had concl uded t hat t hat was what t he
Regul at i on . . meant * The Gover nment had no doubt t hat
Regul at i on 2D appl - i ed t o . publ i cat i ons of t he ki nd he had
quot ed' f r om
1
t he pages of t he Dai l y Mi r r or . I f t he r eal
i nt ent i on of a wr i t er - or car t ooni st l ay i n t he di r ect i on of
sabot agi ng t he war ef f or t , t he t hi ngs he had ci t ed wer e good
i l l ust r at i ons of how i nsi di ous met hods coul d be used t o
pr ej udi ce t he pr osecut i on of the war . " I f - somebody want ed t o
under mi ne t he war ef f or t i t coul d be: ' d' one by publ i shi ng
mat t er
1
of t he- ki nd he had quot ed, " whi l e mai nt ai ni ng t hat
:
t he
mot i ve was t he mor e vi gor ous pr osecut i on" of the- war , wel l
knowi ng t hat the' ef f ect must be somet hi ng ver y di f f er ent .
The Regul at i on t ook account of "the ef f ect and -i t cover ed- t hat
:
ki nd of case, - ' . - -
. : T-he. Gover nment had. deci ded t hat t he r i ght - way to deal
wi t h a newspaper ' whi ch per si st ent l y di sr egar ded t he nat i onal
i nt er est i n t he way. t hat t he Dai l y Mi r r or had done was t o use
t he power s of Regul at i on 2D - whi ch meant t he suppr essi on of
t he paper . That , of cour se, coul d have been done, as t hey
knew, at any t i me si nce t he syst emat i c publ i cat i on occur r ed.
I t coul d be done now. The Gover nment f el t , however , t hat
t he cont r ol l er s of t he Dai l y Mi r r or , and possi bl y ot her
paper s, mi ght not have r eal i sed t hat Regul at i on 2D coul d be
used wher e t he i nj ur i ous ef f ect of t he syst emat i c publ i cat i on
was uni nt ent i onal or was coupl ed wi t h a pr o- war pol i cy. For
t hat r eason t he Gover nment di d not pr opose t o suppr ess t he
paper j ust now. I t was hi s dut y on behal f of t he Gover nment
to expl ai n t hat t he r eason he had gi ven was t he onl y one
t hat r est r ai ned t he Gover nment f r omt aki ng act i on at once.
But i t v/as al so hi s dut y t o say t hat i f t he Dai l y Mi r r or
cont i nued i t s pr esent l i ne i t was t he i nt ent i on of t he
Gover nment t o suppr ess t he paper under t he power s of
Regul at i on 2D. I f t he Gover nment deci ded t hat act i on shoul d
be t aken, i t woul d act v/ i th deci si on, speed and an ef f i ci ency
t hat woul d ast oni sh t hem. He want ed t o make i t . cl ear that
t he Gover nment woul d not wai t unt i l a new case f or t he
suppr essi on of t he paper had "been bui l t up by a f ur t her
ser i es of r eckl ess publ i cat i ons. . ; The. - syst emat i c publ i cati on
r equi r ed by t he Regul at i on t.6.. j ust i f y.c.-acti on had al r eady
t aken pl ace. He want ed t hem, to- under st and- ver y cl ear l y that
al l - that had appear ed- i n t he, Dai l y Mi r r or up t o now woul d
count. . . They need not i magi ne.
:
' that- t he Gover nment woul d have
t o compi l e a new: f i l e of obj ect i onabl e ar t i cl es bef or e
anyt hi ng coul d be done. , The f i l e, al r eady exi st ed, and i t
woul d be on. t he basi s of t he êxi st i ng, f i l e and; of any
f ur t her conduct ' of t he ki nd t o whi ch he Mad r ef er r ed that
act i on woul d ' beV t aken. He' di d not want any mi sunderst andi ng
about t hat . I n t hese ci r cumst ances i f - t hey di d not wi sh to
be suppr essed t hey woul d have, t o amend t hei r ways at once
and be exceedi ngl y car ef ul . J, . ' -
J
The Home Secr et ar y, concl uded by sayi ng t hat , Mr, Barthomo
and Mr . Thomas need not ' t hi nk t hat t hese pr oceedi ngs were
pr i vat e i n t he sense t hat t hey wer e not at l i ber t y to- say
anyt hi ng about them. - "They mi ght , f or exampl e, want t o. get
i n t ouch wi t h M. P' s about what he had. sai d -to t hemand the
i nt i mat i on he had. made t hat t he Gover nment was' r eady t o tal
act i on agai nst t he paper ; he woul d l i ke t hemt o know that
t hey wer e qui t e' f ree- to" do so and t hat t hey wer e . at ' l i berty
t o publ i sh what he had sai d, , i f t hey wi shed to- do so. The
Gover nment f or i t s par t di d not i nt end t o r egar d t hi s as a
pr i vat e mat t er . A st at ement woul d be. made publ i cl y i n. the
House of Commons t oday. \ . .
Mr . Bar t hol omew sai d t hat Mr . Cowl ey, .
:
t he
:
Chai r man of th
Board, - was- sor r y t hat he coul d not be- pr esent , but he
( Mr . Bar t hol omew) woul d t el l hi mwhat , t he Home Secr et ar y ha
sai d, Mr . Bar t hol omew added t hat t he onl y comment he.;wanted
t o make on what , t he Home Secr et ar y had sai d" was t hat he had
mi sunder st ood f he car t oon. The Home Secr et ar y' s i nterprets!
of i t was not the: paper s; i t was not - what " they- i nt ended.
What t hey wer e get t i ng at was. t he waste. . . of pet r ol . ' .'' Large
number s of post er r epr oduct i ons of
:
t he car t oon had' been
di spl ayed at gar ages and M. T, . Depot s --as propaganda' . ; agai nst
t he wast e of pet r ol .
;
Di d t he Home; Secr et ar y want t hem
:
taken.down? - ' . ..- .'--'- "-':'
;:
'-;
The Home Secr et ar y sai d he was not now goi ng t o order
t hemt o r ecal l t he post er s, but he t hought i t woul d be wi se
i f t hey di d so. He di d not accept t he suggest ed
i nt er pr et at i on of t he car t oon.
,,. Printed for the War Cabinet. March 1942.
SECRET. Copy No. 21)
W.P. (42) 132.
March 20, 1942.
WAR CABINET.
J OI NT WAR PRODUCTION STAFF.
Memorandum by the Minister of Production.
THE Sub-committees of the London Munitions Assignment Board brought
into being as a result of the Washington Conference have been operating in the
past month, and assignments are being made in London and Washington in
accordance with the scheme.
The main Board will consist of :
The Assistant Chief of Naval Staff (Weapons),
The Assistant Chief of the Imperial General Staff,
The Air Member for Supply and Organisation,
together with representatives of the United States, sitting under my
chairmanship.
2. The Raw Materials Assignment Board, under Mr. Batt, is also in opera-
tion in Washington.
The arrangements for instructing and supplying information to our
representative on this Board are working smoothly. I n order that the
Empire situation may be fully presented, an Empire Clearing-house has been
set up in London to centralise the requirements and statistics of the
Dominions, India and the Colonial Empire.
3. The Washington Agreement provided for combined* action regarding
finished munitions, raw materials and shipping; but it did not make any proposal
for preparing a combined or co-ordinated production plan.
This is a serious gap, for production programmes must now be reconsidered.
In our own case, this review must take account of three sets of facts :
(a) When our present plans reach their peak, there will be no appreciable
margin for further expansion. Fresh requirements must therefore be
met by substitution and not by gross increase of programme.
(b) The change in the military situation must cause some radical shifts in
the balance of our war production.
(c) In order to avoid waste of effort, our production programmes must
dovetail into American plans much more closely than before.
I t is therefore proposed that:-- ,
A J oint War Production Staff t should be set up :/(i) to study and advise
the Minister of Production on adjustments or extensions of our war
production programmes in the light of the strategical needs of the United
Nations and the production programmes of Empire and Allied countries:
(ii) to keep the Chiefs of Staff informed on the production situation and
possibilities; (iii) to supply the information required by the British
representatives on the combined bodies set up under the Washington
* Ang l o - Ame r i c a n. f Mi l i t ary and Ci vi l .
[23601]
Agreement to deal with the pooling of Allied resources; (iv) and to control
and centralise the demands of British Production Departments on American
and other overseas sources of supply.
The J oint War Production Staff should consist of the chief adviser to
the Minister of Production on Programmes and Planning, the chief technical
officers of the Ministry of Supply and Ministry of Aircraft Production, the
Controller of the Admiralty and representatives of the Service Chiefs of
Staff. Representatives of the Ministers of Labour and of War Transport
would be consulted as occasion required.
The Minister of Production, or in his absence his representative, would
preside at meetings of the Staff.
The members of the J oint War Production Staff should be served by a
small permanent J oint War Production Planning Staff, which will include
Officers detailed by the Service Departments, Production Ministries and
Ministry of War Transport.
From time to time American representatives would be invited to sit with
the J oint War Production Staff and thus constitute a combined Production
Board.
I t is proposed to inform Mr. Nelson of this plan and it is expected that a
body with similar functions will be set up in Washington.
4. The J oint War Production Staff and the London portion of the combined
bodies referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this memorandum will be served by a
common Secretariat composed of Service and civil personnel.
0. L.
Office of the Minister of Production,
Great George Street, S.W. 1,
March 20, 1942.
v
3
DOCUMENT I S THE PROPERTY OP HI S BRI TANNI C MAJ ESTY' S GOVERNMENT- ) - ^
COPY n o .
J.7AR CABI NET
COMMI TTEE OH RECONSTRUCTI ON PROBLEMS.
Revi sed Composi t i on and Termsôf f Ref er ence
- f ^^Qgenbes; Wc P7C gO(41)- 2 4 and l O-IX
The' Pr i me Mi ni st er has approved, t he r eeonst i t ut i on of
the Commi t t ee
:
. , wi t h t he f ol l owi ng composi t i on
f Chai r man)
i Ui i C O. L j . C
t he Excheau
f or For ei gn Af f ai r s
0
Mi ni st er of Labour and. Nat i onal Servi ce. ;
Secr et ar y of St at e f or Scot l ando
Pr esi dent of t he Boar d of Educat i ons
; a l t r i o
Li ni st-er 01
?rade*
Ot her Mi ni st er s wi l l be i nvi t ed t o at t end, or t o bo
r epr esent ed ai , meet i ngs of t he Commi t t ee at whi ch mat t er s of
par t i cul ar concer n t o t hei r Depar t ment s ar e t o be deal t wi t h?
The terras of r ef er ence cf t he Commi t t ee wi l l r emai n
unchanged. ? namel y ?. -
( a) To ar r ange f or t he pr epar at i on of pr act i cal schemes
of r econst r uct i on. , t o whi ch ef f ect can be gi ven i n a
per i od of o say. t hr ee year s af t er t he war
D
These
pl ans shoul d have as t hei r gener al ai mt he per pet uat i on
of t he nat i onal uni t; / achi eved i n t hi s count r y dur i ng
t he war
?
t hr ough a soci al and economi c st r uct ur e desi gned
t o secur e equal i t y of oppor t uni t y and ser vi ce among al l
cl asses of t he communi t y
0
(b) To pr epar e a scheme f or a post - war Eur opean and wor l d
system, -, wi t h par t i cul ar r egar d t c t he economi c needs
of t he var i ous nat i ons, , and. t o t he pr obl em of adj ust i ng
t he f r ee l i f e of smal l count r i es i n a dur abl e
i nt er nat i onal orders
The Commi t t ee wi l l al so car r y out- t he f unct i ons hi t her t o
perf ormed by t he Commi t t ee on Economi c Aspect s of Reconst r uct i on
.v1*001 ems, whi ch i s her eby di ssol vedo
Si r Al f r ed Hur st
?
of t he Of f i ces of t he War Cabi net
P
wi l l act as Secr et ar y t o t he Commi t t ee on Reconst r uct i on Pr obl ems^
( Si gned) S
0
E, BRI DGESo
Secr et ar y of t he War Cabi net - ,
George St r eet , SOWVLO
l ^^nnUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY^S GOVERNMENT
COPY NO,
fyarcli, ^1*9421
WAR CABINET.
SHIPPING TONNAGE AND LOSSES IN THE FAR EAST.
Nota by Minister of War Transports '
At the Meeting of the War cabinet on March 4th
(W*M* (42) 28th Conclusions, Minute 2) I was asked to report to
to the Prime Minister any information I could obtain in regard
to overdue ships in Par Eastern waters. In this note I report
on the amount of shipping at risk in the Indian and pacific
Oceaas and on the losses we have suffered in those waters.
I. TONNAGE.
(1) According to the best information available, merchant
vessels of all nationalities, other than enemy vessels,
(but excluding troopships and vessels in Naval Commissioned
Service) exposed to risk in the Indian and Pacific Oceans v
in the first week of March were approximately as follows:-
(Tonnage in thousands)
Engaged in
Overseas Trade Local Trade Total
No, G*T.
No*
G . T . No,
(a) Non-tankers
313
2,196 308
953
621
3,149
(b; Tankers
147
1,088 12 32
159 1,120
Both 320 985 780
460 3,284 4,269
XU LOSSES,
(2) Losses require to be considered in three groups,
as follows
(i) Written off to 16th March, 1942
0
(ii) Initial stage: whereabouts not known and no
reports received - not written off*
(iii) Other vessels, known to have been in the area,
about which recent information is lacking;
these consist of -
(a) vessels known to have been at sea in most
dangerous area which are overdue,
(b) vessels last heard of in Netherlands East
Indies ports,,
Note: Item (i) has been agreed with Trade Di vi si on/ Admir^
- 1
'
Items (xi) and (iii) are appreci ati ons by the Mi ni stry uj
War Transport/.
(3) The losses or possible losses of vessels described in
paragraph (2), as at 16th March, 1942, exclusive of troopships
and Naval commissioned ships, were as follows:-
Non-tankers Tankers Total
Grouff No* G*T. No* G*T. No. Q, T*
(i) 11^ 424 12 58 131 482
(ii) 17 20 - 17 20
Total of (i)&(ii) 136 444 12 58 148 502
(iii) 57 189 3 15 6o 204
Total 193 633 15" 73 208 706
s All figures relate to merchant vessels of 1,000 gross tons
and over.
(4) Thus, on the information at present available, the losses
of merchant vessels of 1,000 g.t, and over experienced so far in
the Par East since the outbreak of war with Japan, are estimated
to be between 500,000 and 700,000 gross tons. As most of the
doubtful cases are ships last heard of in the Netherlands East
Indies, the actual losses will probably not fall far Short of
600*000 gross tons
8
of the total, rather more than one half
consists of vessels whioh were previously engaged in trading
solely in the Indian and pacific Oceans.
l i e
Ministry of War Transport*
.TH"ii-nfiii.ifiriiii"iriiiil Ifm urn mi ,i . 11111, 1. ' m*mmm 1 "V
1
hwwmm
23rd March. 1942.
z 7/.-3/W
fs- a a * )
""HI S DOCUMENT I S THE PROPERTY OP HI S BRI TANNI C MAJ ESTY ' S
SECRET..
; " " GOV. ERNMBNT. "
/
V
COPY NO.
$6th Mar ch, 1942.
WAR CABI NET
POSI TI ON OP CI VI LI ANS EVACUATED PROM THE PAR EAST TO THE
DOMI NI ONS AND I NDI A
Memor andum"by t he Secr et ar y of St at e
f or Domi ni on Af f ai r s.
I ci r cul at e t o my col l eagues a memor andumpr epar ed
by r epr esent at i ves of t he var i ous Depar t ment s concer ned, whi ch
descr i bes t he pr esent posi t i on as r egar ds ci vi l i ans i n
cer t ai n of t he Domi ni ons and i n I ndi a who have been evacuat ed
f r omt he Par East , and r ecommends t hat , / i n vi ew of var i ous
consi der at i ons whi ch ar e set out , a pol i cy of "st ay put "
shoul d be adopt ed as r egar ds al l r ef ugees f r omCol oni es and
ot her pl aces occupi ed or t hr eat ened by t he enemy and as
regards- per sons now r esi dent i n t hose t er r i t or i es f or whom
t he Uni t ed Ki ngdomGover nment or a Col oni al Gover nment ar e
r esponsi bl e. J
The det ai l ed r ecommendat i ons of t he Depar t ment s ar e
set out i n par agr aph 5 of t he memor andumand ar e concur r ed i n
by al l t he Depar t ment s concer ned, wi t h t he except i on of t he
I ndi a Of f i ce.
C. R. A.
DOMI NI ONS OPPI GE,
26t h Mar ch, 1942.
"... 55
SECRET
Posi ti on of ci vi l i ans evacuated from the Far East i n the
Dominions and i n J l ndi a,
Memorandum prepared i n di scussi on between Departments.
X. This memorandum deal s wi th a problem which has ari sen at I nter-
departmental meetings concerned wi th the detai l ed arrangements to be made for
persons who have become, or might i n future "become, evacuees from terri tori es
in the Par East. The following Departments have been represented at these
meetings and have col l aborated i n the preparati on of the memorandum;- Treasury,
Foreign Office, Dominions Offi ce, Col oni al Office, I ndi a Office, Burma Office,
Admiralty, War Offi ce, Ai r Mi ni stry, Mi ni stry of Heal th, Mi ni stry of Labour,
Ministry of War Transport.
2, Bri efl y, the problem i s to determine whether those desi ri ng to return
to thi s country, or to move from terri tory to terri tory overseas, should be
allowed to do so, or whether a general "stay put" order should be enforced.
3* The present posi ti on may be summarised as follows: -
A, As a resul t of condi ti ons i n the Far East, the wives and fami l i es of
Service personnel , and of many ci vi l i ans, have been evacuated from Hong Kong,
Malaya, Singapore and elsewhere, mainly to Austral i a, South Afri ca, Burma and
I ndia. Many of these evacuees wish to return to the United Kingdom and there
i s a growing desi re, for vari ous reasons, on the part of the Dominions and of
I ndia to send back as many as possi bl e to thi s country. The numbers involved
are at present unknown but i t may be taken that they are of consi derabl e
magnitude. Upwards of 2,000 ci vi l i ans were evacuated from Hong Kong, and some
9,000 from Malaya. While a number of the l atter proceeded to I ndi a, i t i s
believed that the great maj ori ty i s now i n the Dominions, Evacuees have al so
reached the Dominions from occupied China, and elsewhere. Moreover there are
i n the Dominions a consi derabl e number of servi ce fami l i es some of whom were
evacuated from Middle East theatres of war,
B. The following i s a rough statement of the si tuati on i n the vari ous
terri tori es concerned:-
Austral i a. The United Kingdom High Commissioner has been asked by a
number of ci vi l i an evacuees now i n Austral i a whether passages to the United
Kingdom can be given to them at Government expense. I n addi ti on, the I mperi al
Paymaster has asked al l mi l i tary fami l i es evacuated to Austral i a whether they
wish to return to the United Kingdom, passages bei ng provided. The High
Commissioner poi nts out that i f passages are to be afforded to the fami l i es of
Service personnel i t would be di f f i cul t to refuse si mi l ar treatment to
ci vi l i ans.
South Afri ca. The l i ne which the High Commissioner, i n
consul tati on wi th the Government of the Union of South Afri ca, proposed to take
was to allow only women wi th chi l dren, who desi red to remain i n the Union, to
do so provided that adequate funds were avai l abl e from outsi de the war zone to
maintain them. The High Commissioner poi nted out, however, that the Union
Government were most hel pful and were ready to admit any Bri ti sh women and
chi l dren for the durati on of the war provided the United Kingdom Government would
assume responsi bi l i ty for maintenance and ul ti mate repatri ati on,
The High Commissioner was advised that the pol i cy should be to
discourage'women wi th chi l dren from returni ng to the United Kingdom and to
encourage them to settl e i n the Union for the war peri od, i f necessary at the
expense of H.M. Government, and that thi s should be appl i ed to anyone el se of
ei ther sex who was not able-bodied and f i t for acti ve employment. Maintenance
at publ i c expense could not, however, be afforded to chi l dl ess women capable
of work, except for an i ni ti al peri od of one month. The High Commissioner
agreed, but sai d that chi l dl ess women would not be encouraged to stay i n the
Union i n view of the probabi l i ty that they would not be able to mai ntai n
themselves by obtai ni ng work i n the Union.
I ndi a-
I ndi a. The Government of I ndia have pointed out that there are in '
I ndia large numbers of wives and families of Bri ti sh Service personnel, and that
the numbers wi l l increase with the arri val of families frcm Singapore and Burma
and with fixture moves overseas. Their presence i s said to present a serious '
i nternal security problem which, with the approach of hosti l i ti es to the
fronti ers of I ndia, causes the Government over increasing concern.
The Government of I ndia have been in communication with the
Government of the Union of South Africa about an offi oi al schemo of evacuation
to South Africa, but the response by the evacuees i s poor so far owing to
lack of information as to l i vi ng f aci l i ti es.
Gey Ion., The Commander in Chief, Ceylon, on the 12th March announced
plans for evacuating oertain categories of persons from Ceylon. Those
categories are:-
(1) Nonresident s.
Al l persons"Ifincluding wives and children of Service personnel) who
are not employed i n essenti al war work. These were instructed
to leave as soon as passages wore avai l abl e.
(2) Residents.
Non-Ceylonese wemen with young children who are not employed on war
or important social work. These have been advised to leave as
soon as they conveniently could.
These instructions were issued without reference to London, and the-
Commander in Chief has been asked to telegraph at once further information.
4. The Departments represented at the meetings were, with the exception
of the I ndia Office, i n f ul l agreement as to the desi rabi l i ty of enforcing
the "stay put" policy. The arguments advanced by individual Departments
may be summarised as follows
Dcminions Office. I t must be recognised that a "stay put" policy
would involve as a conseqxience leaving evacuees in places where they may be
exposed to enemy attack, especially i n Austral i a. I t would also involve
possibly exposing to the same dangers Children's Overseas Reception Board
children in Australia who were evacuated in order to secure thei r greater
safety. But, in view of the di ffi cul ti es set out in the rest of thi s paper
and of the overriding requirements of the war effort, i t seems cl ear that
thi s consequence must be faced. On the other hand an additional difficulty
in the way of adopting any but a "stay put" policy in the case of the Far
East evacuees i s that i t would be very di ffi cul t to extend to them faci l i ti es
for repatri ati on without offering similar f aci l i ti es for Chi l dren^ overseas
Reception Board children, whose parents, in view of enemy aggression in and
around Austral i a, must be alarmed over the safety of thei r children evacuated
there.
Moreover the Commonwealth Government and public might well be
cri ti cal of the use of shipping space, etc., and of the expenditure of effort
generally, in connection with repatri ati on from Australia at a time when the
population of Australia as a whole i s facing the dangers of J apanese attack.
There would be grave pol i ti cal objections in Australia to anything which might
be construed there as savoring of a "scuttl e' pol i cy. The same considerations
would apply, although i n a lessor degree, to the removal of evacuees at present
in New Zealand.
The Admiralty view i3 that, having regard to al l the factors in the ^
present si tuati on, they would encourage the restri cti on of movement of al l non-
essenti al persons to the absolute minimum both outward and homeward at any rate
during the next 3 or U- months.
The Admiralty i s not desirous that any privileged treatment should
be given to families of Naval personnel.
The Ministry of War Transport may be taken as sharing the view exprcs^
3
by the Admiralty. They have further represented that, whilst removal of
persons from I ndia to South Africa and from Australia to South Africa or Canaa-
ca*i
can be arranged by the use of such spare shi p accommodation as from time to
time becomes avai l abl e, the provi si on of speci al shi ps for the purpose,
ei ther i n the near future or as part of a long term pol i cy, could not be
j usti f i ed at the present ti me.
Al l passenger shi ps under the control of the Mi ni stry are now on
service as troop transports (or hospi tal ships).- YJhere these troop transports
are homward bound they are not necessari l y escorted and, i n the case of
unescorted shi ps, l i mi tati ons are pl aced upon the numbers which may be
embarked. Accordi ngl y, any proposal to embark passengers i n addi ti on to
Service personnel , up to the f ul l capaci ty of the shi ps, may involve the
Admiralty i n the provi si on of addi ti onal escorts. This has, i n f act,
already happened i n the case of a ship which brought refugees from the Par
East to the U.K.
As regards removal from Austral i a to the U.K., troopshi ps homeward
bound are used to f ul l capaci ty for troops and airmen on at l east one l eg of\
the journey; i f l arge numbers of other passengers were pl aced aboard i t
would not be possi bl e for these to continue on that ship for the f ul l journey \
to UiK, and they would have to be transhi pped, ei ther i n South Africa or Canada,
possi bl y having to wai t for a consi derabl e peri od before onward shipment
could be arranged*
-SBrojn I ndi a there are l i kel y to be more frequent sai l i ngs, but there
i s an exi stent demand to provide shipment for some thousands of I tal i an
pri soners whose presence i n the U,1Z, i s desi red owing to the shortage of man
power. Again, however, conveyance to South Afri ca would be l ess di f f i cul t
than from South Afri ca to the U,Iu
For these reasons, the view of the Ministry i s that, while provi si on
could be made to move ci vi l i an refugees and Servi ce fami l i es i n certai n
numbers from time to ti me, no rel i abl e esti mate can be given of the number
which coul d be moved. They urge that i t would not be j usti f i abl e, at thi s
ti me, to pl ace such a strai n on our shi ppi ng resources, and that the persons
concerned should remain where they are at present.
The War Office, are not prepared to ask for pref erenti al treatment
in respect of Bri ti sh Servi ce fami l i es domiciled i n I ndi a and agree, therefore^
that a "stay put" pol i cy should be accepted, i n general terms. They
emphasise, however, that i f thi s pol i cy i s accepted, i t must be capable of
vari ati on to meet speci al and. speci fi c cases, ei ther i ndi vi dual or group, as
and when occasion demands,
The' Ai r Ministry, has expressed i tsel f as i n agreement wi th the
view taken'"by"thel j ar Office-,
The Mi ni stry of Heal th are concerned wi th the problem of fi ndi ng
accommodation for refugees who come to thi s Country,
Demands an accommodation are acute. There have been practi cal l y
no new houses bui l t for the l ast two years and a number of houses have been
destroyed. As a resul t of evacuati on and the transfer of i ndustry the
popul ati on i n. certai n parts of the Country (notably the East and South East
coastsO have been thi nned out. The pressure on accommodation i n other parts
of the country has been correspondingly greater. Evacuation, the transf er
of i ndustry and the needs of the Servi ces have cal l ed for the widespread use j
of bi l l eti ng duri ng the l ast 2-j years. This has put a great strai n on
accommodation and on the servi ces of the householders affected. These
demands conti nue to be made for current war-time requi rements, and i t
becomes i ncreasi ngl y di f f i cul t to meet them.
Considerable provi si on has al ready been made duri ng the war for
refugees. I t i s becaning more and more di f f i cul t to bi l l et them even when
they are Bri ti sh, and refugees from the conti nent - both Bri ti sh and al i en -
are conti nual l y arri vi ng. Pl ans have been prepared to deal wi th refugees,
both Bri ti sh and forei gn, i ncl udi ng some thousands from Gi bral tar who may
come to thi s country i n the event of an attack on Gi bral tar through Spai n.
The posi ti on of refugees from the Continent i s, however, very di fferent"from
that of those from the Par East. For the former thi s country offers possi bl y
the only sanctuary; for the l atter the Dominions are avai l abl e and cl oser
at hand. The di f f i cul ti es of hel pi ng refugees wi l l be accentuated i n the
case
case of those from the Far East, accustomed to a very di fferent standard of living
and condi ti ons general l y, and i t may he doubted whether i n the matter of employing
they would be general l y of much use to the war effort.
Unless, thearefore, there are overwhelming grounds for bri ngi ng refugees
from the Far East to thi n country for reasons of general pol i cy, the Ministry
of Health consider that thi s acti on should be avoided i n view of the
di f f i cul ti es which thei r recepti on would undoubtedly cause.
Ministry of l ab our. A deci si on to aoply general l y a "stay put"
order should not affect the transfer overseas, to or from thi s country, of
persons accepted for employment as possessi ng qual i fi cati ons needed for the
War Effort, ei ther i n the Armed Forces or i n ci vi l employment.
(A). Treasury;. I f a "stay put" pol i cy were adopted, i t would, of course, be
necessary to make advances, as requi red, from publ i c funds for the maintenance of the
unable to support themsel ves. I n the case of evacuees formerly resi dent in
Col oni es, the charge would normally be on the funds of the Colony, supported,
i f these funds were i nadequate, by His Maj esty's Government i n the United
Kingdom. Grants would be made only where resources were not avai l abl e to the
i ndi vi dual s concerned, would be reduced i n cases where the i ndi vi dual could contrikt
to the cost of maintenance, and would be regarded as recoverabl e from the
i ndi vi dual i n so far..as recovery may prove practi cabl e. I t has al ready been
necessary to agree i n pri nci pl e that the cost of mai ntai ni ng evacuees received
by a Dominion should not be a charge on the Dominions own. funds. The
detai l ed arrangements present consi derabl e compl i cati ons, and affect a number
of" Departments, They are being worked out as expedi ti ous ly a3 i s possi bl e
wi th the Dominion authori ti es,
(B) On the Exchange si de, the Treasury would be concerned i f any
deci si ons were taken which l ed to a demand for dol l ars for the maintenance
of evacuees in Canada or the U.S.A,, or for travel l i ng expenses. From thi s
poi nt of view, there i s the strongest possi bl e obj ecti on to assi sti ng or
permi tti ng groups of evacuees to proceed to dol l ar countri es.
Foreign Offi ce, I t i s thought probable that there are a number of
evacuees from the Netherlands East I ndi es i n Austral i a, and possi bl y elsewhere.
I t i s cl ear that, i f a "stay put" pol i cy were enforced, Dutch evacuees, or
any other al l i ed nati onal s, could not be given pref erenti al treatment as
compared wi th Bri ti sh subj ects. The Foreign Office would be responsi bl e for
any communications which -would have to be made to Al l i ed Governments.
The I ndi a Office are concerned wi th the fol l owi ng three questi ons ;-
(i ) The di sposal of European evacuees arri vi ng i n I ndi a from Malaya,
Singapore, and Burma, For the reasons given i n ( i i ) , which apply
with even greater force i n thi s category, the Government of I ndi a
cannot readi l y acquiesce i n a "stay put" pol i cy. As a measure of
urgency and without prej udi ce to the general questi on, the Government
of I ndi a have been permi tted to evacuate a certai n number of the
refugees i n transports which recentl y l ef t Bombay.
(i i ) The evacuation of the fami l i es i n I ndi a of Bri ti sh Service personnel
who are servi ng overseas. On thi s subj ect a defi ni te recommendation
has come from the Government of I ndi a, who are most anxious to
evacuate such fami l i es immediately,
(a) because of the seri ous i nternal securi ty problem they present
which, wi th the approach of hosti l i ti es to the f ronti er of I ndia,
i s causi ng the Government of I ndi a, ever i ncreasi ng concern;
(b)
because of the great di f f i cul ty of fi ndi ng sui tabl e accommodation
for European fami l i es i n I ndi a, The strai n on accommodation i s
great, and i s l i kel y to i ncrease, and i t i s impossible to relieve
i t by bui l di ng camps and hutments except at the expense of
essenti al mi l i tary proj ects. Moreover cl i mati cal l y there are
few l ocal i ti es which ore sui tabl e for l arge concentrati ons of
Europeans, and such pl aces as are approximately sui tabl e are
al ready f ul l to capaci ty.
I t
I t wi l l be. real i sed tliat the posi ti on i n I ndi a as regards
accommodation i s fundamentally di fferent from that an a Dominion, or
i n the U.K., however great the pressure on actual accommodation may
be i n the l atter case.
(i i i ) The possi bl e evacuati on from I ndi a of European fami l i es general l y,
i . e. fami l i es of I ndi an Army Offi cers, of the Ci vi l Servi ces, and
of the busi ness and commercial community. Reference to thi s
category i s made only to complete the pi cture. The questi on has not
"been rai sed by, or wi th, the Government of I ndi a, and i t i s not
considered desi rabl e, that His l aj estv^s Government should take any
deci si on i n advance on thi s problem, which i s of greater pol i ti cal
importance than those fal l i ng under (i ) and ( i i ) . The connection of
these fami l i es wi th I ndi a i s pl ai nl y cl oser than that of the fami l i es
referred to above.
5 , I t seems necessary to ask for a rul i ng by hi gher authori ty on the
question of the general pol i cy to be adopted i n thi s matter. The conclusions
which seem to emerge from the foregoing anal ysi s, and are now recommended for
acceptance, the I ndi a Office di ssenti ng, may be summarised as fol l ows:-
(i ) A pol i cy of "stay-put" i n the terri tori es to which they have been
evacuated should be adopted as regards al l refugees from Colonies
and other pl aces occupied or threatened by the enemy. The same
pol i cy should be appl i ed to persons now resi di ng i n these
terri tori es for whom the United Kingdom Government, or a Col oni al
Government i s responsi bl e. I n so far as i s necessary, the
concurrence of Dominion Governments i n the pol i cy recommended should
be securedo I t i s understood that the "stay put" order proposed,
as regards evacuati on overseas, i s general l y i n l i ne wi th the
pol i c3r which the Terri tori es i n questi on are themselves adopting as
regards thei r own popul ati on.
The Admiralty have emphasized that for si mi l ar reasons movement
of non-essenti al persons from the United Kingdom to pl aces overseas
should al so be banned,
The adopti on of thi s pol i cy v/ould mean (e.) that assi stance from
publ i c funds, whether by way of grant or l oan, should not be given
to evacuees to enable them to return to the United Kingdom, or to
move overseas from one Empire terri tory to another, and (b) that
sea passages should be refused even to those who are i n a posi ti on
to pay thei r own way, or are normally enti tl ed to passages. Any
di f f erenti ati on between those two cl asses would seri ousl y weaken
the "stay-put" pol i cy, and would be open to cri ti ci sm as gi vi ng
unj usti fi abl e advantage to evacuees wi th means.
\ i i ) Under the Pol i cy so far communicated to the Dominions assi stance
from publ i c funds may be gi ven only as a purel y temporary measure, i n
the case of women not i n charge of chi l dren, who are "capable of
contri buti ng to the war ef f ort". The above proposal s would involve
a modi fi cati on of thi s pol i cy to the extent that f aci l i ti es for
return would not be gi ven, even to persons general l y capabl e, unl ess
there were some speci fi c and defi ni te demand for thei r servi ces i n
thi s country. Al l others would have to be given assi stance, as
requi red, from publ i c funds towards thei r maintenance i n the pl aces
to which they have been evacuated. But the strongest possi bl e
pressure should, of course, be put on evacuees to obtai n work, i f
avai l abl e, i n these pl aces.
(i i i ) I t wi l l be seen from the I ndi a Office contri buti on to thi s
memorandum that' there are di f f i cul ti es, which may or may not be
deci si ve, i n the way of applying an unqual i fi ed "stay-put" pol i cy
i n I ndi a, But, i n view of the opinion hel d so strongl y on a vari ety
of grounds that the general appl i cati on of such a pol i cy i s
desi rabl e, i f not essenti al , i t seems cl ear that the view of the
Government
Government of I ndi a i n favour of evacuating servi ce fami l i es at
present i n I ndi a, and refugees from occupied terri tori es, should
not he accepted, at l east unti l a reasoned case for l eavi ng
these categori es i n I ndi a has been put to the Government of I ndi a,
I f i n the future i t should be decided to evacuate from I ndi a or,
i n the l i ght of prevai l i ng circuriistances, from other terri tori es
certai n l i mi ted groups or cl asses, e,g,, servi ce fami l i es,
arrangement should i f possi bl e be made for thei r recepti on
elsewhere than i n the United Kingdom. (There are very strong
obj ecti ons on currency grounds to removing evacuees to pl aces
outsi de the sterl i ng area).
I f permission has to be given on speci al grounds for the evacuation
of a parti cul ar group or cl ass, thi s must be treated as excepti onal
and without prej udi ce to the deci si on about other categori es.
THIS DOCUMENT I S THE PROPERTY OF HI S p ,
R r o a M m
;
J ^^J HI SBBI TANNI C MAJESTY' S GOVERNMENT
SECEET
Copy No.
W.P, (42) 136
(Also C.O.S (42) 190.)
March 26, 1942
TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK KEY
It is requested that special.care may be taken to
WAR CABINET
WEEKLY RESUME
(No. 134)
of the
0700 March 26th,
- 1942. ' ' *
Cabinet War Room
NAVAL SITUATION.
General Review.
1. A successful naval operati on was carri ed out in the Medi terranean; in
which a convoy was escorted from Al exandri a to Mal ta, in spi te of opposition
by a greatl y superior I tal i an naval force and heavy German ai r opposition. Three
out of four shi ps of the convoy reached Mal ta, but in subsequent ai r attacks the
remai ni ng ships were all damaged.
The number of attacks on U-boats has increased and at least two have been
destroyed.
Shi ppi ng losses continue to be heavy; due mai nl y to U-boat attacks in the
West Atl anti c.
A number of successes have been reported by our submari nes in the
Medi terranean.
Home Waters.
2. ' I n an attack on a coastal convoy off the North Corni sh coast on the 20th,
a Do. 125 was destroyed, and a J u. 88 damaged, by gunfire from the convoy and
escorting shi ps.
Mediterranean.
3. A fast convoy of four shi ps carryi ng suppl i es to Mal ta left Alexandria
on the 21st. A few hours later, ELM. Destroyer Hurworth, whi ch was sweeping
ahead, was torpedoed and eventually sank. The following morni ng, when about
200 miles south-east of Mal ta and i n poor visibility, the covering force (H.M.
Crui sers Cleopatra, Dido, Euryalus, Penelope and ni ne destroyers) sighted four
enemy cruisers, whi ch they attacked and drove off wi thout receiving damage.
Two hours l ater, the enemy, then consisting of one '' Li ttori o '' class battleship,
two 8-inch and four other crui sers wi th a number of destroyers, were agai n sighted
and attacked by the covering force. I n thi s acti on the battl eshi p was torpedoed
ami dshi ps by. one of our destroyers and set on fire by gunfire from the cruisers.
Two of the enemy cruisers were damaged by gunfire and the enemy reti red with-
out havi ng made contact wi th the convoy. Some damage was suffered by
H.M. Ships Cleopatra, Kingston, Havock and Lively. Throughout the 22nd,
heavy but ineffective ai r attacks were made on the convoy and H.M. ships.
Ai r attacks were resumed the next morni ng when the convoy was about 45
miles south of Mal ta, wi th an easterl y gale blowing. The s.s. Clan Campbell
(7,255 tons) was sunk, H.M. Auxi l i ary Suppl y Shi p Breconshire (9,776 tons) was
disabled and H.M. Destroyer Legion was damaged. The remai ni ng two ships of
the convoy, the s.s. Pampas (5,415 tons) and the Norwegi an s.s. Talabot (6,798 tons),
entered the Grand Harbour. The heavy weather made i t impossible to bring in
the Breconshire and, after l yi ng at anchor off the I sl and, she was towed into
Marsaxl okk, south-east of Mal ta, on the 25th. H.M.S. Southwold, one of the
destroyers screening her while she was at anchor on the 24th, struck a mine and
sank some hours l ater.
On the 26th a heavy ai r attack was made on shi ppi ng at Mal ta. The Pampas
and Talnbot were hi t, a l arge part of the cargo of the l atter bei ng destroyed, and
the: Breconshire was set on fire. H.M.S. Penelope was holed and H.M. Submarine
P. 39 damaged by near misses. H.M. Destroyer Legion was agai n hi t and sunk.
The Fleet Oiler Plumleaf was hi t and beached and H.M. Destroyer A von Vale
x
was slightly damaged. . '
4. A reinforcement of ai rcraft for Mal ta consisting of ni ne Spitfires was
flown off from H.M. ai rcraft carri ers on the 21st.
H.M. Destroyer Jaguar, escorti ng a convoy from Al exandri a to Tobruk, was
torpedoed and sunk by a U-boat on the 26th to the north-east of Sollum.
The following successes have been reported" by H.M. submari nes : -
Unbeaten,' on the 16th, attacked off Cape Sparti vento a strongly escorted r
merchant ship of 11,000 tons, whi ch is believed to have sunk. On the following
day Unbeaten torpedoed and sank an I tal i an U-boat, probably of the A rgonmota
class (600 tons). Upholder, on the 19th, sank a U-boat by torpedo and a trawler
by gunfire off Bri ndi si . Turbulent, between the 27th February and the 13th March,
sank by gunfire a motor craft of 60 tons carryi ng troops Off the
1
west coast of
G-reece, four large schooners off the Gulf of Salonika and two schooners off south-
east Greece. Torbay, on the 27th February, sank a 1,000-ton merchant ship off
the west coast of Greece and, on the 5th March, torpedoed one merchant ship of
5,000 tons and probably another of 8,000 tons in Corfu Roads. Thorn, on the
5th March, destroyed a 200-ton brigantine off the west coast of Greece. Una, on-
the 13th, sank a 300-ton schooner bound for Tripoli.
During the week, upwards of 26,000 tons of French merchant shipping east-
bound and 6,589 tons westbound have passed Gibraltar under escort.
Pacific.
5. A successful operation was carried out on the 10th March by American
Naval aircraft against J apanese forces in New Guinea. Two heavy cruisers and
three transports were sunk and a number of other ships were either sunk or
damaged.
Two attacks on shipping in Rabaul Harbour were carried out by Australian
and American aircraft. One enemy cruiser was possibly sunk and two other
cruisers were damaged.
The Naval Quarters at Darwin were seriously damaged by enemy aircraft on,
the 19th.
A nti-Submarine Operations.
6. In addition to the U-boats destroyed by H.M. Submarines Unbeaten and
Upholder in the Mediterranean, an outward-bound U-boat was torpedoed by
ELM. Submarine Seawolf 170 miles to the westward of Trondheim. An attack
by ELM. Destroyer Hurricane and H.M. Corvette Anchusa off the Rockall Bank
probably resulted in the destruction of a U-boat. ELM. Minesweeper Sharp-
shooter, escorting a homeward convoy from Russia, rammed a U-boat south of
Bear Island (Barenfs Sea).
Promising attacks were carried out by the escorts of an outward convoy south
of Newfoundland and by Canadian aircraft to the southward of Nova Scotia.
Nine other attacks were made by surface craft, of which four were American
and two were Canadian ships. Aircraft, including three American aircraft,
carried out six further attacks. Of these attacks, eight took place off the American
and Canadian Atlantic coasts, three in the North-Western Approaches,, three in
the Mediterranean, and one to the southward of Sierra Leone.
Enemy Intelligence.
German.
7. The 8-inch cruiser Admiral Hipper was seen by air reconnaissance in
Hjeltfiord, north of Bergen, on the 20th. At Kiel, the Gneisenau has left the
floating dock and the Scharnhorst is now occupying the dock. The Gneisenau is
considered to be the most heavily damaged of any of the enemy main units.
U-boats.
8. The chief U-boat activity has been off the Atlantic "coast of North
America. There has been a reduction in activity in the Caribbean Sea, where
only one attack was reported during the week. A few U-boats have been;
operating in the North-Western Approaches. I n Northern Waters, there are
indications that several have reached the South Greenland Sea. In the South
Atlantic, two or three U-boats are operating between Takoradi and Freetown.
Focke-Wulf A ircraft.
9. There has been a transfer of Focke-Wulf 200 aircraft from Bordeaux to
Norway and Denmark, resulting in the largest concentration yet reported in this
area. The aircraft are probably intended to provide reconnaissance cover for,
operations by the German naval units.
Japan.
10. No major changes in the disposition of the main forces have been
reported.
A force of three cruisers and six destroyers has been sighted at Port Blair,
Andaman Islands.
A concentration of transports and landing craft has been reported at Timor.
[23617] B
Protection of Sea-borne Trade.
11. Duri ng the week endi ng the 25th March 897 ships, i ncl udi ng 245 Allied
and 22 neutral , were convoyed. Seven cruisers and anti -ai rcraft ships, two armed
merchant cruisers, 68 destroyers (including 17 Ameri can and two Russian
destroyers) and 114 sloops and corvettes were employed on escort duties.
I mports into Great Bri tai n by shi ps in convoy duri ng the week ending the
21st March totalled 541,000 tons, compared wi th an average of 601,900 tons for
the past ten weeks. Of the week's i mports, 71,000 tons were oil of vari ous grades.
Duri ng the month of February i mports, other than mi neral oil, were as
follows : Mi ni stry of Food, 987,200 tons, Mi ni stry of Supply, 865,000 tons, Board
of Trade, 47,300 tons. Total , 1,900,000 tons.
12. Duri ng the week U-boats are known to have torpedoed 14 ships,
i ncl udi ng ten tankers. Seven of these attacks were off the Atl anti c coasts of
Ameri ca and Canada, four in the Bermuda area, one north-west of Aruba, one
b'ff"Sollum and one off Cape Pal mas (Liberia).
Ai rcraft sank two ships and damaged three others. One shi p was sunk and
one damaged off Mal ta. One ship was sunk and another damaged in Channel
convoys and one shi p was damaged at Murmansk.
British Minelaying.
13. A few mines have been l ai d duri ng the week by M.L's off the Dutch and
Flemish coasts. There has been considerable mi nel ayi ng by ai rcraft off the
German North Sea coast and in the Bay of Biscay area.
Home Waters.
14. Enemy ai rcraft are believed to have l ai d mines on four ni ghts of the
week off the East Coast between the Thames Estuary and Lowestoft, off the South
Coast from Portsmouth to Lyme Bay and off the south coast of I rel and.
Twenty magneti c mines have been destroyed duri ng the week, eighteen of
them off the East Coast south of the Humber. The mine totals now are:
magneti c 1,924, acoustic 1.246 and contact 1,116.
Foreign Waters.
15. Enemy mines have been reported to the east of the Di amond Shoals, off
Cape Hatteras.
. The presence of a minefield off Capetown has been confirmed.
The J apanese are reported to have mi ned Mamatanai on the north-east coast
of New I rel and.
Enemy Merchant Shipping.
Germany and Italy.
16. An abnormal number of merchant shi ps were seen by ai r reconnaissance
on the 23rd at Kri sti ansand (South Norway). Most of the 45 ships present had
arri ved since the 1st of the month.
The Venezuelan Government have attached the German s.s. Durazzo
(1,153 tons) and six I tal i an tankers, total l i ng 37,167 tons, i n Venezuelan ports.
Japan.
17. The J apanese possess 77 tankers wi th a total tonnage of 517, 000 tons,
whi ch is considered to be barely sufficient for their present commitments.
Yichy Merchant Shipping.
18. No supplies for Li bya appear to have been sent from France since the
s.s. St. Fernard (4,312 tons) sailed from Marseilles on the 19th February from
Tuni s.
American Intelligence.
19. The Ai rcraft Carri er Yorktown and five heavy crui sers are in the Anzac
area. The force lately in the Suva area is on i ts way to Pearl Harbour; other-
wise, dispositions are l argel y unchanged.
MILITARY SITUATION.
Russo-German Campai gn.
(An outline map showi ng operati ons in Russi a is included in thi s Resume
as an inset.)
20. The Russi ans consider that the el i mi nati on of the encircled porti on of
the German 16th Army in the Staraya Russa sector is only a question of ti me.
Their Ai r Force is concentrati ng agai nst the German transport ai rcraft, whi ch
are the sole means of suppl y of the beleaguered troops.
Central Sector.
21. There has been conti nued fierce fighting but l i ttl e change in posi ti ons.
The Russians are maki ng determi ned efforts to reduce the Rzhev sal i ent by
concentric attacks from the west of Rzhev itself and from the. area north-east of
Gshatsk. Further south they appear to have gai ned ground in the di recti on of
Vyasma from the Y ukhnov area, despi te stubborn German resistance. They are
thus nearer to the mai n German communications. Gshatsk-Vyasma-Smol ensk.
Dorogobuzh, whi ch was seized by parachute troops about a month ago, is still
in Russian hands but remai ns isolated from thei r mai n forces. There are, however,
indications that they may have made some progress towards Y elnya from the
south-east.
Ukraine.
22. There has been heavy fighting al l along the front in the Ukrai ne as
far south as Taganrog, but no posi ti onal change except north-east of Kharkov.
Crimea.
23. The Russi ans are sti l l mai ntai ni ng pressure from the Kerch Peni nsul a,
but there has been l i ttl e change in the position.
Libya.
24. Acti vi ty duri ng the week on both sides has been confined to patrol l i ng,
except for a successful rai d on a fai rl y Large scale carri ed out by our forces on
the 21st and 22nd March. I n thi s action some columns of our forward troops
raided the enemy's forward defended localities and brought back about 120
prisoners, the maj ori ty of whom are Germans. On the 21st March our arti l l ery
shelled Martuba and Tmi mi l andi ng grounds duri ng the day and Free French
Troops shelled enemy transport at El Hamari n about 30 miles S.S.E. of Meki l i .
Some of our patrol s penetrated to a poi nt 20 miles N.E. of Mekili. The pri nci pal
enemy resistance was met in the area seven miles south of Tmi mi and an enemy
counter-attack wi th tanks was staged in the area Gabr El Al ei ma. On the 22nd
all columns completed thei r allotted tasks and wi thdrew. Our casual ti es were
approximately 50.
Burma.
Sittang Front.
25. Duri ng the 18th and 19th March the J apanese tri ed to advance up the
loungoo road but wi thout much success. On the 20th J apanese i nfantry and
cavalry, strength about 600, were engaged by Chinese caval ry and i nfantry. The
J apanese reti red, losing 100 killed.
[23617]
B
2
The Chinese commenced to take over thi s sector from the Bri ti sh on the 2lst,
the Bri ti sh moving i nto reserve on the ri ght flank.
Duri ng the 23rd and 24th a great deal of hand-to-hand fighting occurred.
The J apanese managed to cut the road to Mandal ay at Kyungon, seven miles north
of Toungoo. The aerodrome at Toungoo is in J apanese hands, though the Chinese
still hold thei r positions at thi s town.
Irrawaddy Front.
26. On the 18th one of our guerri l l a squads, supported by Royal Marines,
engaged some enemy at Herizada, inflicting casualties. Thi s front has been
fai rl y quiet.
The Gloucestershire Regi ment, supported by tanks, attacked Letpadau
successfully on the 20th March, di spersi ng the J apanese who occupied it.
An I ndi an Bri gade has arri ved for the defence of Akyab.
Pacific Area.
27. The J apanese claim to have occupied Buka I sl and in the Solomons is
not confirmed.
Intelligence.
France and Spain.
28. I n the l i ght of recent i nformati on i t is esti mated that there are at
present 26 German divisions in France, practi cal l y all of whi ch are of poor
quality.
There is no likelihood of any German action agai nst the I beri an Peninsula
in the near future.
Bulgaria.
29. Rumours, i ndi cati ng that Bul gari a is prepari ng to take a more active
part in mi l i tary operati ons i n support of the Axi s, are ci rcul ati ng freely. No
mi l i tary developments of i mportance, however, appear to be taki ng place and,
as far as is known, the Bul gari an army is well below mobilization strength. The
garri son of five full strength divisions on the Turki sh fronti er is normal .
Far East.
30. I t is esti mated that there are still 29 Divisions employed in the area of
operati ons in the South-West Pacific, but it is believed that the J apanese Forces
in Thai l and have been reinforced by one Division, and that one Di vi si on has left
the Canton-Hong Kong area. These changes suggest the bui l di ng up of a reserve
in Thai l and whi ch can be made i mmedi atel y available in Burma should the
necessity arise.
n
, - . AIR SITUATION.
General Review.
31. Bomber Command ai rcraft carri ed out a heavy rai d on Essen
t t o
^ S M S S ^ ? * * * * * " - - e, - heavy
y
a e r o d r o m e s
J apanâi rSaf f * Akyab were heavily attacked by
United Kingdom.
:, 32. Fi ghter Command flew 1,724 sorties by day and 202 by ni ght.
33. Enemy acti vi ty agai nst thi s country was on a small scale and
handi capped by adverse weather.. Small attacks at dusk were made on Weymouth,
Portl and and Dover. Two J u-. 88s were shot down and three others damaged.
Day.
34. Fi ghter Command despatched 392 sorties on offensive operati ons. I n
addition, a total of 27 Bostons of Bomber Command attacked three targets in
Northern France- the thermi c power stati on at Comines, the rai l way centres at
Abbeville, and the shi pyards at Le Trai t. Al l three attacks were carri ed out i n
good visibility. At Comines, the target is believed to have been hi t, and at Le
Trai t many hi ts were observed on the mai n bui l di ngs and the western pi er, and.a
5,000-ton merchant vessel was probably damaged. No results were observed at
Abbeville.
35. Twenty squadrons of Spitfires provi ded support for these operati ons
but only small enemy fighter opposition was encountered. FoUr F.W. 190's were
destroyed, another was probably destroyed, and a further four were damaged.
Nine Spitfires were lost, but two pilots are safe.
36. Two sweeps by a total of 20 squadrons of Spitfires were carri ed out over
the Pas-de-Cal ai s. Very few.combats resulted, al though a considerable number
of enemy fighters were identified, and the general impression was that the enemy
had little desi re to come to close quarters. One F.W. 190 was destroyed and a
Me. 109 was damaged for the loss of one Spitfire.
Night.
37. Prol onged bad weather restri cted operati ons by Bomber Command
against l and targets to one ni ght only, when 254 ai rcraft were despatched agai nst
Essen. Two hundred and twenty-three tons of HE . and over 27,000 i ncendi ari es
were dropped over the target area, but al though cloud was negligible, ground
haze hampered the observation of results. Many l arge fires and explosions were,
however, seen in the town, in the Krupps works, and in a rai l way centre.
Numerous scattered fires were observed over the whole area. Ni ne ai rcraft are
missing from thi s attack.
38. On the same ni ght, in excellent visibility, a small scale but successful
attack was carri ed out on St. Nazai re. A further 26 ai rcraft dropped leaflets
over the Lille and Pari s areas.
39. Bostons and Havocs of Fi ghter Command attacked aerodromes in
Northern France, bombs being dropped at Di nard, Rennes, Poi x, Beauvai s,
Evreux, Lille, Vendeville and St. Andre.
Coastal Operations.
40. Coastal Command despatched 320 sorties, of whi ch 83 were engaged
on convoy escort. Shi ppi ng protecti on patrol s by Fi ghter Command involved
796 sorties.
41. Bomber Command despatched 19 ai rcraft by day to lay sea mines off
the Fri si an I sl ands, and a total of 90 by ni ght were engaged on si mi l ar operati ons
off Lorient. One hundred and sixty-six mi nes were laid.
42. There were few attacks on enemy shi ppi ng. A patrol boat was attacked
with depth charges and left si nki ng; an armed trawl er and a 1,000-ton merchant
vessel were machi ne-gunned; and a 2,500-ton tanker off the Dutch Coast was
bombed from mast-hei ght, but results were not observed owi ng to evasive action.
43. Two Spitfires on a shi ppi ng reconnaissance in the Channel saw an
enemy float-plane shot down by German A A . fire.
44. Apart from the usual shi ppi ng and weather reconnaissances, the enemy
made three small-scale attacks on convoys off the East and South Coasts. A total
of approxi matel y 25 enemy ai rcraft were engaged in mi nel ayi ng by ni ght in the
Thames Estuary/Harwi ch area and oft' the Dorset Coast. One long-range recon-
naissance flight was carri ed out over Northern I rel and and Ei re.
Mediterranean.
Libya and Egypt.
45 Our bombers concentrated on enemy l andi ng grounds. These attacks
coincided wi th the despatch of the Mal ta convoy from Al exandri a on the
20th March.
46. I n dayl i ght, Bostons wi th fighter escort made three rai ds on Martuba
aerodrome, where i t is esti mated half of the I tal i an fighter force in Cyrenaica is
based, and also attacked Barce. Bombs burst on and near ai rcraft on the ground
and some fires were started. These attacks were i ntercepted by enemy fighters,
three of which were destroyed and three others probably destroyed by the escort.
Three Bostons were shot down and four Ki ttyhawks are missing.
47. At ni ght, Wel l i ngtons attacked aerodromes at Berca and Benghazi and
also bombed Benghazi harbour. Twelve Hurri canes effectively bombed and
machine-gunned M.T. camps and A.A. gun positions in the Mar.tuba-De.rna-
El Tmi mi area.
48. Our fighters mai ntai ned offensive sweeps over the forward area, and
on the 20th made 87 sorties in protecti on of shi ppi ng. No serious enemy opposi-
tion was encountered.
49. Several bombing attacks, chiefly by fighter bombers (Me. 109s) were
carri ed out agai nst our forward aerodromes, and at Gambut three aircraft
suffered some damage. There were also dive-bombing attacks on our ground
forces.
Malta.
50. The enemy attacks on the i sl and and shi ppi ng in the vi ci ni ty were on a
very heavy scale, involving approxi matel y 940 sorties. Thi s is at least 60 per
cent, in excess of the total for the previous week.
51. The heaviest attack whi ch has yet been delivered agai nst Mal ta was
made on the 21st March, when Takal i aerodrome was the mai n objective. A
mixed force of nearl y 220 enemy ai rcraft parti ci pated in thi s rai d, and great
devastation was caused among bui l di ngs, and a reservoir was destroyed. Duri ng
the day small reinforcements of Spitfires and Blenheims reached the island.
52. Duri ng the ai r attacks on our shi ppi ng referred to i n paragraph 3 the
limited force of Spitfires and Hurri canes available was continuously i n action.
I n one of these attacks by 30 J u. 88s heavily escorted by fighters, our fighters
either destroyed or seriously damaged 16 of the attackers.
53. Other targets attacked duri ng the week were Hal far, Luqa, Grand
Harbour and the submari ne bases. Considerable damage to property resulted
and there were a number of service and civilian casualties. Fourteen of our
ai rcraft were destroyed on the ground and 34 others were damaged.
54. I n all a total of thi rty-one enemy ai rcraft were shot down and a greater
number damaged. Nearl y half of these enemy casualties were caused by A.A. fire.
Greece and Crete.
55. Wel l i ngtons made ni ght attacks on l andi ng grounds in Crete and
southern Greece.
56. The submari ne base, and port facilities and shi ppi ng at Sal ami s were
bombed by ei ght Wel l i ngtons, causing a l arge explosion and some fires on the
quay.
Sea Communications.
57. Naval ai rcraft attacked a south-bound convoy off Messina. Hi ts with
torpedoes were believed to have been obtained on a merchant vessel of 2,000 tons
and a cruiser. The convoy was seen to turn back towards Messina.
Russia.
58. There is no i nformati on of special i nterest concerning ai r operations on
the Russi an Front.
Burma.
59. Blenheims, Hurricanes and American Tomahawks attacked the aero-
dromes at Mingaladon, Moulmein and Chiengmai. In these operations, at least
41 enemy aircraft were destroyed or damaged on the ground. I n addition, two
enemy fighters were shot down, and a further three were probably destroyed in
combat.
Other targets attacked were Hmawbi (where a number of fires were started),
and shipping at Yandoon and Moulmein.
60. The main weight of the enemy attack was concentrated on the
aerodromes at Magwe and Akyab. At the former, which was subjected to five
raids, almost all aircraft of the two and a half squadrons located there were
either destroyed or damaged. Akyab aerodrome was attacked three times by a
total of 80 bombers with fighter escort, and nine of our aircraft were destroyed
and a further six were damaged on the ground. I n addition, an ammunition
dump was hit and a hangar demolished.
Our fighters shot down four enemy aircraft, probably destroyed three and
damaged manyothers. Five of our aircraft were lost but two pilots are safe.
Pacific Zone.
61. Fortresses and Hudsons bombed the aerodrome at Lae, destroying
15 aircraft and damaging five on the ground. Hits were also made on an
ammunition dump.
In the course of two attacks on Koepang, large fives were started on the
aerodrome, and buildings and barracks in the town were hit.
A Fortress dropped bombs on the runway at Vunakanau, and probably
destroyed two enemy fighters in combat.
62. A total of 50 enemy aircraft made four attacks on Port Moresby, but,
apart from two Tomahawks destroyed on the ground, no serious damage is
reported. Two enemy aircraft were destroyed and a further two were probably
destroyed by fighters and A.A. fire.
Small-scale attacks were made by enemy aircraft on Tulagi (Solomon
Islands), Beru (Gilbert Islands), and Florida Island (Solomon Islands).
Australia^
63. A total of 19 enemy aircraft attacked the aerodromes at Broome, Derby
and Wyndham. A civil, aircraft was destroyed on the ground at Broome, and
some damage was done to the runway at Wyndham.
H O ME S E C U R I T Y S I T U A T I ON .
General.
By Day.
64. There was only one minor incident at Newhaven. where two people were
killed.
By Night.
65. Bombs were dropped along the South and South-East Coasts on six
nights during the week, on five of which only insignificant damage was caused and
there were no casualties.
On the night of 23rd/24th March Dover was bombed and 14 people were
killed and 7 seriously injured. Twenty-six houses were wrecked and public
utilities were affected. Bombs also fell at Portland, where some damage was done
to house property, but there were only two casualties.
Casualties.
66. Estimated civilian casualties for the week ending 0600 on the
25th March are 16 killed and 8 seriously injured.
APPENDICES I, II and III, will be published monthly,
and APPENDIX IV fortnightly.
APPENDI X Y.
Casualties to H.M. Auxiliary Yessels and to Naval Personnel.
The following casualties to H.M. Auxi l i ary Vessels have been reported:
March 19th.M/S Trawl er Damito, sl i ghtl y damaged by ai rcraft off
Portl and.
March.20th.Trawl er Stella Capella overdue at I cel and (C) and
considered lost.
Officers : 10 killed, 6 missing, 8 wounded, 2 pri soners of war.
Rati ngs : 10 killed, 9 missing, 4 wounded.
26th March, 1942.
Metropolitan Area.
British.
In the Air. On the Ground.
Bo mb e r s . . .
12
Fi ght ers . . . 10
Coastal . . .
3
Army Co- Operat i on
Tot al 25
Enemy.
Destroyed.
Probably
Destroyed. Damaged.
Bombe r s 3 7
Fi ght ers
Mi s c e l l ane ous
5
2
5
Tot al 10 12
Of t he a bo v e t ot al s , t wo e n e my ai rcraf t we r e de s t r oye d by A. A. fire.
Bo mbe r s . . . 16( a) 7
Fi g ht e r s . . . 14 11
Ot hers 1 1
Tot al 31 19
Fi v e pi l ot s are s af e. (a) Si x bombe r s c r as he d and are pr e s ume d de s t r oye d.
Probably
Enemy. Destroyed. Destroyed. Damaged.
Bo mbe r s . . . 19 2 28
Fi ght e r s . . . 11 3 10
Tot al 30 38
Of t he above t ot al s , f i f t een we r e de s t r oye d, and t we nt y - t hr e e d a ma g e d by A. A. fire.
Far East.
British and Allied. In the Air. On the Ground.
Bo mbe r s . . . 1 9
Fi ght ers . . .
6
2
15( b)
Tot al
26
Fo u r pi l ot s are saf e. (b) I n c l u d e s one ci vi l ai rcraft.
Probably
Enemy.
Destroyed. Destroyed Damaged.
Bo mbe r s . . . 4 1
Fi ght ers . . . 6 6
Mi scel l aneous 1
To t a l 11
Of t he above t ot al s , o n e wa s de s t r oye d by A. A. fire.
NOTKS.(a) No a c c o unt i s t a ke n of e n e my ai rcraft de s t r oye d on t he ground i n any t heat re
(b) No a c c o unt i s t a ke n of Br i t i s h Naval ai rcraf t c as ual t i e s .
[23617]
1. The following reports of damage have been received during the past week
from Air Reconnaissance and Intelligence services :
Dortmund.
2. On the 10th/11th March the Hoesch Iron and Steel Works, which cover a
large area about one mile north-east of the town and employ between 20.000 and
30,000 people, received several direct hits. One-third of the works was severely
affected and temporarily closed.
Cologne.
3. Residents have reported the attack on the night of the 13th/14th March
as being the heaviest yet experienced, causing widespread destruction of property.
Mannheim.
4. A further report tells of the success of the attack on the night of the
11th/12th February. The police headquarters were seriously damaged.
St. Nazaire.
5. I n the raid of the 15th/16th February, there were direct hits on a
loaded cattle train about to depart from the goods stations and on ten buildings
between the harbour and the railway station.
Sea Mining.
6. The German A 7,463 tons, was mined and sank on the
21st February about 5 miles north of Terschelling.
1. The following reports of damage have been received during the past week
Dortmund.
2. On the 10th/11th March the Hoesch Iron and Steel Works, which cover a
large area about one mile north-east of the town and employ between 20.000 and
30,000 people, received several direct hits. One-third of the works was severely
affected and temporarily closed.
Cologne.
3. Residents have reported the attack on the night of the 13th/14th March
as being the heaviest yet experienced, causing widespread destruction of property.
Mannheim.
4. A further report tells of the success of the attack on the night of the
11th/12th February. The police headquarters were seriously damaged.
St. Nazaire.
5. I n the raid of the 15th/16th February, there were direct hits on a
loaded cattle train about to depart from the goods stations and on ten buildings
between the harbour and the railway station.
Sea Mining.
6. The German A 7,463 tons, was mined and sank on the
21st February about 5 miles north of Terschelling.
Oi l
Thi l J l gi *
meT r t
. i
3
the property of Hi s Bri tanni c Ma,j esty
t
s
i
Government.
Copy No.
9
WA R C A B I N E T ,
jM3 R E J E *
Vichy Squadron at Al exandri a.
1 9 4 2 6
' r 2 LZ
j 0 t , h
'
Memorandum "by the F i rst Lord of
the Admi ral tyt
When Prance col l apsed a French Squadron consi sti ng
of one battl eshi p^ four crui sers, two destroyers and one
submari ne under Admi ral Godfroy was based at Al exandri a under
the supreme command of Admi ral Cunningham. On the 4th J ul y
1940 Admi ral Godfroy agreed to di scharge al l the oi l f uel
from hi s shi ps and to pl ace them i n a condi ti on i n whi ch they
coul d not f i ght. On the 7th the Commander-i n-Chi ef reported
that he had made the agreement f or the i mmobi l i sati on of the
French Squadron, set out i n the Appendi x to thi s paper.
Admi ral Cunningham states that the agreement i s essenti al l y
a personal one,
2, The Commander-i n-Chi ef, Medi terranean, who i s
gi vi ng up hi s Command on the 1st A pri l , now i nforms us that
the agreement "being essenti al l y a personal one between
hi msel f and the French Admi ral , requi res to "be re- af f i rmed
by Admi ral Godfroy wi th the new Commander-i n-Chi ef, He
f urther states that al though i t mi ght now he pref erred to -
change certai n poi nts i n the agreement, the attempt to do so
would probabl y di sturb what i s a very del i catel y bal anced
si tuati on, and that hi s i ntenti on i s to ask Admi ral Godfroy
to conti nue the agreement,
3, Under the agreement, the French Squadron has been
rendered al most i nnocuous. Parts of al l guns, except the
A/A guns, have been removed and torpedo war heads pl aced
ashore, Creivs have been reduced to one- thi rdôf thei r normal
compl ement,.,
complement
Havi ng l ai n nearl y two years i n a harbour
noted fo
:,? i ts mari ne growths, the speed of the shi ps must
have been very seri ousl y af f ected; i n any case, they are
nl y gi ven a weekl y rati on of f uel suf f i ci ent to operate
the!
i n auxi l i ary engi nes.
The Squadron i s theref ore, f or practi cal purposes,
di sarmed and i mmobi l i sed and al though our own Fl eet at
Al exandri a i s much reduced, I do not thi nk that there i s any
great danger to be encountered from the Vi chy Squadron,
5
0
The al ternati ves to conti nui ng the present
agreement are ei ther to al l ow the agreement to l apse, thus
f reei ng our own and Admi ral Godfroy's hands, or el se to
sei ze the ahi pso '
6
0
Admi ral Godfroy has, i n the past, scrupul ousl y
observed hi s undertaki ngs and apart from occasi onal personnel
di f f i cul ti es ashore, the Squadron has gi ven no real troubl e,
When we entered Syri a and the Medi terranean Fl eet was engagi ng
Vichy uni ts off the Syri an coast, great anxi ety was f el t
concerni ng the Squadron, but Admi ral Godfroy's. conduct
throughout the i nci dent was i mmacul ate, i t theref ore appears
that the confi dence reposed by Admi ral Cunningham i n the personal
undertaki ngs of Admi ral Godfroy i s j usti f i ed,
7, The sei zure of the French shi ps was seri ousl y
consi dered at the ti me of the Syri an operati ons and agai n
l ater f or the purpose of "repl aci ng our own crui ser l osses.
The Commander-i n-Chi ef has l ong had detai l ed pl ans f or the
sei zure of the shi ps but has al ways been opposed to thi s step,
not onl y because i t would be a breach of f ai th, but on
practi cal grounds. The French are bel i eved to have prepared
scuttl i ng charges whi ch coul d be f i red merel y by pressi ng a
button, so tihnt i t i s very unl i kel y that we shoul d obtai n
possessi on of the shi psi ntact. Admi ral Cunningham has sai d
categori cal l y that we shoul d get no assi stance from sympathi sers
on the shi ps.
s
8, Even i f we were successf ul i n capturi ng the ships
i ntact, i t would he a long ti me bef ore they boul d be of any
use to us. They would have to be docked and would require
consi derabl e ref i tti ng bef ore they coul d be employed on
acti ve servi ce. Furthermore, they have onl y one outf i t of
ammuni ti on and special arrangements would have to be made
i n U.K. to produce a f urther suppl y, The political
repercussi ons at Vichy and Toul on of f orci bl e action against
the Squadron need no emphasis. Admi ral Cunningham has
hi msel f expressed greater apprehensi on at the possibility
of troubl e wi th the main French Fl eet than wi th the Squadron
at Al exandri a. .
S
0
The Admi ral ty theref ore consi der that sb.*-4Lo.hg as
Admi ral Godfroy remai ns i n command of the Squadron, i t is. to
our i nter est to conti nue the present arrangements. The
agreement contai ns provi si ons, f or i ts termi nati on i n the
event of French warshi ps bei ng taken over by the enemy or
of war breaki ng out wi th Prance,
10. Accordi ngl y, the Admi ral ty propose that Admi ral
Cunningham shoul d.be authori sed to request Admi ral Godfroy
to re- af f i rm the agreement wi th the new Commander-i n-Chi ef.
A. V. A.
Admi ral ty, S.W,1.
March 30th, 1942.
A P P E N D I X .
CUNNINGHAM - GODFROY AGREEICEiNT
a
JULY.7th 1940
a
(a) French ships to he ma i n t a i n e d with sufficient
-.u*ews ';o allow upkeep of material
c
. Precise number to
"os di s c us seda Note: I am aiming a t one quarter of full
o r e W p
( b) French guarantee not t o " s c u t t l e their ships?
a t t e mp t to leave harbour or t o commi t any act hostile to
U S o
(.c.) The British will not a t t e mp t to seize the French
s h i p s by force (but see (f) and .(g))
4
( d) Supplies and pay for war - s hi ps detained at
Alexandria to be a responsibility of t h e British^
( e ) Ships to be returned a t s i g n i n g o f peace*-
( f ) In the event of French warships being taken
ovei F by t he Italians or Germans t h i s agreement to be
reconsideredo
(g) If war is declared between. England and France
a new situation not covered by t h i s agreement will arisen
RoBo (f) Frees both parties "out only after consultation^
(g) Frees both parties without consultation but as
stated there is no hope of obtaining any
guarantees if war is declaredo
T O B E K E P T U N D E R L OOK AND KEY.
7
it is requested that special care may be taknn to
, poGUMENT I S THE PROPERTY OP HIS BRITANNIC MAJEOTY^S^GOVERNMENT-J
j f^SECRET.
OPY NO.
1ST APRIL. 1942,
WAR CABINET,
INDIA,
Tel egrams exchanged bjetweejijbhe Lord Pri vy Seal and
:
the Prime Mi ni ster,,
3 BE KEPT UNDER LOCK A
ND
n is requested that special care may be taken'fo
ensure the secrecy of thi s document.
SECRET XXX
8635,
Fr om Vi cer oy t o Secr et ar y of st at e f or *i nd?, a*
Dat ed New Del hi
s
16*50 hour s, 1st Apr i l . 1948.
Recei ved 16. 15 hour s. / 1st Apr i l 1948
0
Per sona; Fol l owi ng f omSi r S. Or l pps f or t he Pr i me
Mi ni st er o
io Fr omal l appear ances i t seems cer t ai n t hat Congr ess wi l l
t ur n down t he pr oposal s. Ther e ar e a mul t i t ude of cur r ent s and
cr oss cur r ent s but. t hey ar e sel ect i ng t he quest i on of def ence as
t hei r mai n pl at f or mf or opposi t i on, .
S* The Mosl emLeague who ar e pr epar ed t o accept wi l l no
doubt i f Congr ess r ef use al so f i nd some r easons f or r ef usal as
wel l as al l t he ot her sect i ons of opi ni on^
So Ther e has been an al most unani mous pr ot est f r om
r epr esent at i ves i ncl udi ng t he Eur opean communi t y as to t he
compl et e r et ent i on of t he exi st i ng cont r ol of def ence by H, M. G,
( 1 shoul d however add t hat the. Vi cer oy doubt s whet her t hi s i s
r epr esent at i ve of t he at t i t ude of Eur opeans i n Bengal ) * Thi s
pr ot est ar i ses par t l y f r oma mi sunder st andi ng of t he posi t i on
whi ch I have t r i ed t o cl ar i f y i n successi ve st ages and par t l y
because peopl e f eel t hat t he maxi mumof appeal must be made t o
t he I ndi an peopl e by- t hei r l eader s i f t hey ar e t o be gal vani sed
t o t hei r def ence, and t hat unl ess t hose l eader s can cl ai msome
cont r ol over t hei r def ence of I ndi a t hey cannot mal es t hei r
appeal ef f ect i ve t o t he I ndi an peopl e. -
4* Except i n t he Punj ab and t he Nor t h West Fr ont i er t he
pr esent si t uat i on as t o mor al e amongst t he I ndi an and i n many
cases t he Bur opean popul at i on i s depl or abl e The Ant i - Br i t i sh
f eel i ng i s r unni ng ver y st r ong and our pr est i ge i s l ower t han I t-
has ever been owi ng t o t he event s i n Bur ma and mor e par t i cul ar l y
i n Si ngapore, , - The st or i es - ci r cul at i ng on al l si des as to Mal aya
and Si ngapor e convey an i mpr essi on of i ncompet ence whi ch
i s
i nd e ed a 1 ar mi ng *
5 , Unr est i s. gr owi ng among t he popul at i on and unempl oyment
i s devel opi ng i n cer t ai n cent res. , ' The f ood si t uat i on i s
causi ng di squi et and r ef ugee pr obl em i n vi ew of compl ai nt s of
di scr i mi nat i on agai nst t he I ndi ans, of whi ch t he admi ni st r at i on
i s accused, and "v/ hi ch I have asked, t he Vi cer oy t o l ook i nt o I s
a
sour ce of ser i ous i nt ensi f i cat i on of Ant i - Br i t i sh f eel i ng.
6, The out l ook so f ar as i nt er nal si t uat i on goes i s
exceedi ngl y bad and i f we cannot per suade I ndi an Leader s t o come
i n now and hel p us we shal l ' have t o r esor t t o suppr essi on whi ch
may devel op t o such a scal e t hat i t may wel l get out of hand even
t hough we use f or t hi s pur pose a par t of our f r ai l mi l i t ar y
resources. .
f
0
I gi ve you t hi s pi ct ur e so t hat you. may gudgs as t o t he
i mpor t ance- f r oma Def ence poi nt of vi ew of get t i ng I ndi an
Leaders i nt o j ob of cont r ol l i ng? encour agi ng and l eadi ng I ndi an
peopXe
6
Thi s cannot t oe done under exi st i ng ci r cumst ances by.
any appeaserc.
q,, The pr esent si t uat i on as to - Def ence Mi ni st er i s t hat
new wor ds whi ch wer e dr af t ed by Vi cer oy wer e put i nt o par agr aph
( e) wi t h f ul l consent of Commander - i n- chi ef who consul t ed wi t h
vi ceroy upon t hi s poi nt wi t hout my bei ng pr esent s,
9, An expl anat or y l et t er - was sent t o I n mrm-' rj ^y
cont ai ni ng f ol l owi ng mat er i al par agr aph' : - """I t must , he cl ear l y
under st ood t hat ""f i nal def i ni t i on of di vi si on of r esponsi bi l i t i es
between- I LM. G. and Gover nment of I ndi a i s as st at ed i n
par agr aph ( e) of document . The Vi cer oy woul d be pr epar ed . to i
consul t wi t h I ndi an Leader s on t hi s basi s t o see whet her i t 1
were possi bl e t o desi gnat e an I ndi an t o some of f i ce connect ed I
wi th Gover nment of I ndi a Def ence r esponsi bi l i t i es wi t hout i n j
any way I mpi ngi ng upon f unct i ons and dut i es of Gommander- - - i n' - GhJ j !
ei t her i n hi s capaci t y as supr eme commander of ar med f or ces i n I
I ndi a or as member of Execut i ve Counci l i n char ge of Def ence" , I
1 0 o 1 have consequent l y, addr essed a l et t er ( t ext i n my J
i mmedi at el y succeedi ng- t el egr am) suggest i ng i nt er vi ew wi t h 1
Congr ess Leader s wi t h Cor nmander - i n - Chi ef *,
l l I f some adj ust ment can be so ar r i ved at wi l l you gi ve
a
ae f ul l aut hor i t y subj ect t o agr eement of Cormvahder- ' I n- - - Chi ef
and Vi ceroy. ,
J NDER Lnr.it
SECRET XXX
n
a y be ta!
74
6 s ec,
'
eo o f
y thi s document.
aott. eci __._feo J Pr i yj at Seej ^^r y S56,
Co
c
fcJ iiLJ LgiLJ LJ P. JLJL- JL&i l P ,g, RjUE-
Fr om Vi cer oy t o Secr et ar y of St at e f or I ndi a,
Dat ed' New Del hi 16, 30 hour s, 1st Apr i l 1948,
v
Recei ved 14*30 hour s, 1st Apr i l 1942.
MOST- ' I MMS
Dl A T Ec
to s f o " f t .
Personal - , Fol l owi ng f r omSi r S. Or l ops f or
Pr i me Mi ni st er. . Fol l owi ng i s t ext of l et t er
r ef er r ed t o r n ray i mmedi at el y pr ecedi ng t el egram, .
Begi ns? I under st and f r omHi ndu pr ess that-
di f f i cul t i es ar e st i l l i n mi nd of Congr ess as t o
quest i on of r esponsi bi l i t y f or Def ence of I ndi a,
X have done what 1 coul d t o cl ar i f y t hi s poi nt
but as I. t hi nk i t woul d be a t r agedy i f negot i at i ons
wer e t o br eak down upon any mi sunder st andi ng of t he
posi t i on I shoul d l i ke uo suggest t hat I shoul d ask
Commander - - i n- Chi ef x,o meet your sel f ând Pandi t
J awahar- Lai Nehr u wi t h mysel f i n or aer t hat he may
expl ai n f ui l y^fcw you t he (? t echni cal ) di f f i cul t i es
of t he si t uat i on and i n or der t hat you may make to
ai many suggest i ons you wi sh as t o di vi si on of
r esponsi bi l i t i es i n t hi s spher e of gover nment *
TJ nf or %unat el y
gnf ortunat- el y he i s at t he moment away i n Cal cut t a
but he i s expect ed hack on Sat ur day next at t he
l atest ( and possi bl y ear l i er ) - . I f you consi der
thi s a hel pf ul suggest i on - as I hope you wi l l -
I wi l l ask hi mt he moment ha r et ur ns whet her he
wi l l he pr epar ed t o at t end such a meet i ng and I do
not ant i ci pat e t hat t her e wi l l t oe any di f f i cul t y
about it.-, .
I amsur e you wi l l r eal i se t hat I do not want
to be met wi t h a i mpasse i f t her e i s any r easonabl e
way out . Ends; ,
PRIME MINISTER-TO SIR STAFFORD CRIPPS.
Personal and Seoiêt
3
I cannot give you any authority to compromise
on defence without submitting issue both to Cabinet and
Ministers above the Line- I will bring your telegram
before Cabinet tomorrow, Everyone admires the manner in
which'you have discharged your difficult mission and the
,\ev." tt\ '
effect of our proposals has been most beneficial in the
United States and in ln?ge circles here.
HIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT-^ ^ g
T
Printed for the War Cabinet. April 1942.
SECBET. Copy No. 29
W.P. (42) 139.
February 25, 1942.
TQ BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY.
It is requested that special care may be taken to
WAR CABINET.
REPORT BY T HE RI GHT HON. OL I V ER L Y TTEL TON. M.P., ON
HI S PERI OD OF OFFI CE AS MI NI ST ER OF STATE.
PRIME MINISTER.
THE posi ti on of the Mi ni ster of State in the Mi ddl e East is one of some
difficulty, because he is conti nuousl y deal i ng wi th matters for whi ch other
Ministers have parl i amentary responsi bi l i ty, and he cannot carry out hi s
functions wi thout a great deal of forbearance and confidence being shown towards
him by Mi ni sters at home. I woul d like to say that I enjoyed both these
advantages duri ng my tenure of the Office.
I feel that if the duti es of the Mi ni ster of State could be set down very
shortly, they are these :
To arrange, by hi s personal influence, that one agreed recommendati on from
the three Services and the vari ous Departments of State represented in the
Middle East goes home to the Cabi net in London, whi ch can ei ther rej ect i t or
accept i t on grounds of hi gh policy. I f he is unabl e to do thi s, each Department
would make i ts own representati ons to London, and a decision would have to be
reached by those who are necessarily remote from local condi ti ons. I t is not, of
course, al ways easy to avoi d an agreed recommendati on bei ng in the nature of a
compromise, and thi s should be avoi ded. I must say, however, that Hi s Maj esty's
Ambassador, the three Commanders-i n-Chi ef, and other representati ves of the
Crown and the Departments of State, al ways deal t wi th the questi ons which cirose
on the broadest lines, and were wi l l i ng to si nk any i ndi vi dual differences for the
benefit of a sharpl y defined and unequi vocal recommendati on. I must express my
deepest grati tude to them for thi s atti tude, and for the hel p they constantl y gave
me, wi thout whi ch i t woul d have been impossible for me to have di scharged any
of my duti es.
The following report deal s chiefly wi th facts.
(I ntl d.) O. L.
I arri ved in Cai ro wi th a staff of three admi ni strati ve officers on the
5th J ul y. Further staff was sent out duri ng J ul y, and by the begi nni ng of
August my office was establ i shed as I had pl anned.
I have sought to carry out the functi ons assi gned to me by establ i shi ng a
small office, aki n to the Cabi net Office in London, rather than an executive
department. My office has not undertaken executive duti es, except for the
control whi ch I was asked to exercise over our rel ati ons wi th the Free French i n
Syria. Executi ve acti on in other matters, whi ch has to be taken under my
direction, is taken by associated departments, l ooki ng to me for gui dance on
general policy.
Thi s small and si mpl e organi sati on has proved flexible and adequate to meet
the strai n whi ch has on occasion been put upon it.
[23589] R
Earl y in J ul y the Mi ddl e Eastern War Counci l was created. Thi s body is
of course, oniy an advi sory body and has no corporate responsi bi l i ty. Neverthe-
less, the Counci l and i ts Sub-Commi ttees have served as a valuable central
organi sati on to enable the Services and other authori ti es i n the Mi ddl e East to
consult together and act on a common pl an.
2. Relations with the Commanders-in-Chief.
I n August, at the suggesti on of the Commanders-i n-Chi ef. a Defence
Commi ttee was set up as a Sub-Commi ttee of the War Counci l .
The purpose of the Defence Commi ttee has been to concert acti on between
the three Services and to avoid bri ngi ng to the War Counci l techni cal or detailed
problems on mi l i tary subjects.
The Commi ttee has proved of great val ue and some exampl es of the manner
i n whi ch a Mi ni ster of Cabi net rank can assi st Commanders-i n-Chi ef should be
placed on record.
Fi rstl y, the presence of an i ndependent Chai rman has hel ped to resolve
conflicts of i nterest between the three Services.
Secondly, discussion on the Commi ttee has enabled me to send to London
an agreed view i nstead of separate views bei ng expressed by each of the Services.
Thi rdl y, i n emergency I have been able to assume responsi bi l i ty as a member
of the War Cabi net for decisions of hi gh moment. For exampl e, General
Auchi nl eck was, as he has i nformed me, gl ad to have the support of a Minister
on the spot when it was necessary to take the difficult decision to relieve General
Cunni ngham of hi s command shortly after operati on " Crusader " began.
Fi nal l y, a Mi ni ster, who is served wi th an adequate staff, is able to relieve the
Heads of the three Services of responsi bi l i ti es in many fields of politics and
economics and so permi t them to exercise thei r pri mary functi ons as Commanclers-
in-Chief.
3. Foreign A fairs.
Syria.
I n the real m of foreign affairs a l arge part of my ti me has been devoted to
Syri an and Lebanese matters andl the i nti matel y connected questi on of relations
wi th the Free French in the Mi ddl e East. On the 14th J ul y an Armi sti ce was
si gned wi th the Vi chy French at Fort St. J ean dA cre. General de Gaulle's
di ssati sfacti on wi th the terms, coupled wi th French suspi ci ons in regard to British
i ntenti ons in Sj^ria. led to the conclusion of the so-called Lyttelton-die Gaulle
agreements of the 25th J ul y.
Havi ng been charged by you wi th the general di recti on of affairs in Syria,
I arranged for the establ i shment of a branch of the Spears Mi ssi on under my
di recti on at Bei rut i n whi ch all pol i ti cal acti vi ti es w
T
ere concentrated. My chief
object has been to secure for the two Levant States the greatest possible measure
of i ndependence compati bl e wi th our mi l i tary requi rements, whi l e at the same
ti me mai ntai ni ng the predomi nant pol i ti cal posi ti on of the French over other
European nati ons. Wi th these objects, acti ng in close co-operati on wi th General
Spears, I parti ci pated in a series of negoti ati ons, first wi th General de Gaulle
and l ater wi th General Catroux, on such vari ed questi ons as the repatri ati on
of the Vi chy Forces; the settlement of the Druze and Dei r-ez-Zor i nci dents; the
decl arati ons of Syri an and Lebanese i ndependence; the suppl y of wheat to Syria
and the Lebanon; the arrangements for the establ i shment of etat de siege and
desert control ; the constructi on of the Hai f a-Tri pol i rai l way; the el i mi nati on of
undesi rabl e ex-Vi chy officials, and finally the establ i shment of Bri ti sh legations
at Bei rut and Damascus.
On l eavi ng the Mi ddl e East I am able to record that rel ati ons between the
Bri ti sh and French authori ti es i n the Levant States have i mproved immeasurably
though the fundamental difficulty of dual , or rather tri pl e, control under war
condi ti ons remai ns as great as ever. Furthermore, the pol i ti cal si tuati on in the
two Republ i cs has l atterl y deteri orated, partl y owi ng to the rel uctance of the
French to make the necessary surrender of powers to the States' Governments,
and partl y to ri si ng prices, food difficulties, the general nervousness ari si ng out of
the mi l i tary set-backs of the Allies and the expectati on of a German attack in the
spri ng.
Egypt.
From the moment of my arri val I received the greatest assi stance from Flis
Mai esty's Ambassador, Si r Mi l es Lampson, and hi s staff. Apart from
certain economic questi ons, in whi ch my hel p was requested by the Embassy, the
outstandi ng event of my stay here has been the pol i ti cal cri si s l eadi ng to the
resignation of the Hussei n Si rry Government and the acceptance of a Wafdi st
Government by the K i ng under a threat of deposi ti on. The unani mi ty wi th'
which the decision to use force, if necessary, was taken and the smoothness wi th
which the arrangements worked were, I thi nk, in no small measure due to the
existence of the Mi ddl e Eastern War Council.
Iraq.
I had l i ttl e need to i ntervene in affairs i n I raq unti l the l atter part of my
term of office here, but I natural l y followed wi th i nterest the energeti c steps
taken by Sir K. Cornwal l i s, through the medi um of Nuri el Sai d Pasha, to
eradi cate the worst anti -Bri ti sh elements in I raqi publ i c life. After the tri al
and condemnati on of Rashi d Al i and hi s associates, Nuri Pasha i nformed us of
his i ntenti on to bri ng I raq i nto the war. Thi s welcome development coincided
with a proposal whi ch I had put forward that K i ng I bn Saud of Saudi Arabi a
should be i nvi ted to take si mi l ar acti on. Some care was therefore needed to ensure
agreement between the two parti es and proper ti mi ng. The negoti ati ons are sti l l
in progress as I leave Egypt.
Saudi Arabia.
I n the autumn I sent an officer, who was on terms of fri endshi p wi th K i ng
I bn Saud, to vi si t Hi s Maj esty at Ri yadh. On hi s return Colonel de Gaury
reported that he had formed the opi ni on that I bn Saud would be prepared to
join the Al l i es openly. After consul ti ng our representati ves i n other Moslem
terri tori es I recommended to the Forei gn Office that, in view of its propaganda
i mportance if not i ts mi l i tary val ue, thi s proposal should be followed up. An
approach is about to be made to I bn Saud by Hi s Maj esty's Mi ni ster at J edda.
The i ntenti on is that a decl arati on of war, if made, could take place si mul taneousl y
with a decl arati on by I raq. Meanwhi l e the I tal i an Mi ni ster has been removed
from J edda by I bn Saud at the request of Hi s Maj esty's Government.
Yemen.
The Y emen was added to my area in August. I have been l i ttl e concerned
with thi s country, but recent threats of i nsurrecti on agai nst the I mam have led
me to suggest to the Forei gn Office that consi derati on should be given to the
possibility of cl eani ng up thi s l ast centre of Axi s influence in Arabi a.
Persia.
After protracted negoti ati ons the Angl o-Sovi et-Persi an Treaty was si gned
on the 29th J anuary. Persi a had been added to my j uri sdi cti on a week or two
before and I accordi ngl y arranged to pay a vi si t to Tehran on the 9th February.
I was received by the Shah and I met the Pri me Mi ni ster and l eadi ng members
of the Government. I have sent a memorandum to the Forei gn Office contai ni ng
my prel i mi nary views and recommendati ons, whi ch are l argel y of a financial and
economic character.
Arab Federation.
The Forei gn Secretary^ speech at the Mansi on House on the 29th May,
followed by the Al l i ed occupati on of Syri a, led to a revi val of suggesti ons for
Arab Federati on. These came from many quarters and vari ed from proposal s
for a Great Syri a to a more grandi ose scheme for a federati on of all the Arab
nations under the segis of K i ng I bn Saud and i ncl udi ng an autonomous J ewi sh
State. The matter was discussed at a meeti ng of Mi ni sters duri ng my vi si t to
London i n September and, as a resul t, the Mi ddl e East (Official) Commi ttee were
asked to study the questi on after consul ti ng Hi s Maj esty's Representati ve i n
the countri es concerned. Thei r report, whi ch has now been received and in
which I agree, i ndi cates that at the present ti me no scheme for pol i ti cal
federation is possible and that for the moment our efforts must be l i mi ted to
[23589] 2
B
faci l i tati ng closer economic co-operation and the removal of economic barriers
between Syri a, the Lebanon, Pal esti ne and Trans J ordan, and to encouraging
cul tural contacts between the Arab States. The best way of carryi ng out these
recommendati ons is now being i nvesti gated.
French Somaliland.
At the ti me of my arri val in the Mi ddl e L ast our policy was, by economic
pressure and propaganda, to ral l y Trench Somal i l and to the Tree Trench. In
August 1941, after consul tati on wi th General de Gaul l e (then in Cairo), I
approved i nstructi ons to the G.O.C., L ast Afri ca, i n thi s sense.
I t soon became apparent, however, that there was no prospect of J i buti
peaceably j oi ni ng the Tree Trench, and I obtai ned your approval to accept the
Trench Governors surrender if offered to ourselves, even if thi s meant the
exclusion of the Tree Trench from the area. Meanwhi l e, blockade measures were
strengthened, in the hope of enforci ng surrender.
I n October there were i ndi cati ons that the Governor of J i buti mi ght he
prepared, in return for our l i fti ng the blockade, to concede the use of the port and
rai l way and most of our other requi rements provi ded the Trench flag were
respected. I formed the opi ni on that our best course was to expl oi t thi s Oppor-
tuni ty and seek a compromise settlement, provi ded that thi s woul d not prejudice
our general policy towards Vi chy Trance. I t was subsequentl y decided, however,
to conti nue the blockade for the ti me being and awai t devel opments. Meanwhile,
I was asked to draf t terms whi ch woul d meet our requi rements in the event of it
being decided to open negoti ati ons. These were prepared in consul tati on with
the Service authori ti es and sent home at the end of November.
I n J anuary 1942, it was decided that, in present ci rcumstances, it would be
a sign of weakness to open negoti ati ons. Meanwhi l e, however, developments in
the Tar East had made i t impossible to conti nue the seaward blockade of J i buti ,
and shortl y before my return to London I agai n urged that we had no practicable
al ternati ve but to reach some modus vivendi wi th the exi sti ng regi me in Trench
Somal i l and.
Near East Minorities.
I have kept myself general l y i nformed of the probl ems presented by the
acti vi ti es of the vari ous mi nori ti es in the Near East through the medi um of
the Mi d-Asi ati c Bureau, whi ch was establ i shed at the end of J ul y. Of the
different popul ati ons concerned, the Kurds have been the most active, parti cul arl y
those i n Persi an Kurdi stan, where a successful revolt agai nst the central
Government still gives cause for anxi ety. General l y speaki ng, i t has been possible
to do very l i ttl e wi th these mi nori ti es by personal contact or propaganda, owing
to the danger of adverse repercussi ons on the Turki sh and Soviet Governments
and, to a lesser extent, the I raqi and Persi an Governments.
Roman Catholic Church in the Middle East.
I tal i an clerics still occupy most of the key-posts i n Pal esti ne. Egypt, the
Sudan and Ethi opi a. I n nearl y all these terri tori es the Roman Cathol i c Church
has' developed Fasci st and pro-Axi s tendencies, whi ch domi nate i ts spiritual
functions. For many years i t has been a medi um of di ssemi nati ng Fascist
pol i ti cal propaganda, and since the war i t has l ent encouragement to espionage,
sabotage and the escape of pri soners of war. After consul ti ng the Mi ddl e Eastern
War Council I recommended to the Forei gn Office that our policy towards the
Roman Cathol i c Church in the Mi ddl e East should be revi ewed and that as a
first step a number of l eadi ng I tal i an clerics should be removed and thei r places
taken by non-enemy nati onal s. The Forei gn Office have now i nstructed His
Maj esty's Mi ni ster to the Hol y See to rai se thi s matter wi th the Vati can.
Turkey.
Al though Turkey is not i ncl uded i n the Mi ni ster of State's area, I have from
the outset mai ntai ned close touch wi th Hi s Maj esty\s Ambassador at Angora.
Si r H. Knatchbul l -Hugessen has kept me fully i nformed of pol i ti cal develop-
ments in Turkey, and the Embassy have also col l aborated wi th my Office over
numerous detai l s ari si ng out of the occupati on of Syria,. Towards the end of
J ul y I received from Hi s Maj esty's Ambassador a proposal by the Turkish
General Staff for the hol di ng of further secret staff conversati ons. Thi s proposal
was welcomed by the Commanders-in-Chief, but the conversati ons di d not take
place, apparentl y owi ng to opposi ti on on the part of the Turki sh Mi ni stry for
Foreign Affairs. Subsequent contacts deal i ng wi th the furni shi ng of mi l i tary
assistance to Turkey i n case of attack, the suppl y of war materi al s and the
improvement of communi cati ons, ports and aerodromes, have been pursued
through Hi s Maj esty's Ambassador and the Service Attaches, all of whom have
paid visits to Cai ro. Al l these matters have been the subj ect of di scussi on i n the
Defence Commi ttee.
Greece.
Duri ng my vi si t to Engl and i n September, the K i ng of the Hel l enes asked
me to enqui re i nto the state of feelings of the Greek communi ty i n Egypt
regardi ng whi ch he expressed some anxi ety. My enqui ri es revealed not only
that there were seri ous di ssensi ons among the Greeks here, but that suspi ci ons of
the i ntenti ons of the K i ng and Government were growi ng in Greece itself.
Eeports showed that a real danger exi sted that, at the end of the war, a
pro-Bri ti sh but Republ i can Government woul d, by uni versal consent, be
established i n Greece, and that we should be faced wi th the i nvi di ous al ternati ves
of abandoni ng the K i ng or i mposi ng his return by force. I represented strongl y
and repeatedl y to the Forei gn Office the necessity of some pol i ti cal concession.
The Ki ng and the Pri me Mi ni ster were unwi l l i ng to accept the truth of these
reports, and over a peri od of months only made hal f-hearted and total l y
i nadequate efforts to conci l i ate Greek publ i c opi ni on. The volume of evidence
has grown steadi l y, however, and recentl y under pressure, from the Forei gn Office
they have made several i mportant concessions, notabl y the cancel l ati on of the
decrees establ i shi ng the di ctatori al regi me and the recogni ti on of the val i di ty of
the 1911 Consti tuti on. The forthcomi ng vi si t of the K i ng and M. Tsouderos to
the Mi ddl e East wi l l also hel p, but the strengtheni ng of the Greek Government
and the reorgani sati on of the hi gher command of the army i n the Mi ddl e East
are still badl y needed.
I n vi ew of the appal l i ng food condi ti ons i n Greece, I fel t constrai ned to send
you a personal tel egram on the 9th February urgi ng some rel axati on of the total
blockade. As a resul t, some 8,000 tons of wheat shoul d shortl y reach Greece,
and I have represented that thi s consi gnment shoul d be followed by other suppl i es
of foodstuffs over the next si x months wi thi n a l i mi t of 50,000 tons.
Arrangements are also bei ng made to evacuate numbers of chi l dren from
Greece to countri es wi l l i ng to receive them. The difficulties are formi dabl e, but
the present devel opments of the scheme i ndi cate that the attempt should be
successful.
Yugoslavia.
My i nterventi on wi th the Forei gn Office was recentl y sought by the
Commiander-in-Chief, Mi ddl e East, i n regard to pol i ti cal di ssensi ons among
members of the Y ugosl av Hi gher Command. There have for some ti me been
rumblings of di scontent i n the Y ugosl av forces i n the Mi ddl e East. After the
dismissal of the Y ugosl av Chi ef of Staff and hi s repl acement by a comparati vel y
junior officer, thi s di scontent now shows si gns of boi l i ng over. -
4. Colonies and Mandates.
Palestine.
I have kept in conti nuous touch wi th pol i ti cal devel opments. The views I
have formed are contai ned i n a paper whi ch I am ci rcul ati ng to the War Cabi net.
Trans Jordan.
I vi si ted Hi s I Tighness the Ami r Abdul l ah at Amman i n September 1941.
He and hi s Pri me Mi ni ster pressed on me Transj ordan's cl ai m to some consti tu-
tional advance to match the i ndependence granted to Syri a and the Lebanon.
have recentl y endorsed certai n proposal s submi tted by the Hi gh Commi ssi oner to
meet thi s l egi ti mate desi re.
Cyprus.
I n the summer of 1941 i t seemed likely that Cyprus mi ght be the next object
of the enemy's attack. I vi si ted the i sl and l ate i n August, i n company wi th the
Commander-in-Chief, Mi ddl e East Forces, to i nspect the defences, and was very
satisfied wi th the state of preparati ons. Subsequentl y I have been able to gi ve the
Cyprus Government advice and assi stance on vari ous defence questi ons.
[23589] B 3
I
Aden.
Aden and the Aden Protectorate were added to my j uri sdi cti on in August
1941. They are comparati vel y remote from the Mi ddl e Eastern war, and few
questi ons involving my i nterventi on have ari sen. The Governor of Aden came
to Cai ro in November 1941 at my i nvi tati on and attended a meeti ng of the Middle
Eastern War Council.
British Somaliland.
I n September 1941, at the j oi nt request of the Secretari es of State for War
and the Colonies, I i nvesti gated the proposed transfer of responsi bi l i ty for
Bri ti sh Somal i l and back to the Colonial Office whi ch had been approved in
pri nci pl e by the War Cabi net i n Tebruary 1941. My conclusion was that local
condi ti ons di d not yet j usti fy repl aci ng the Mi l i tary Governor (i nstal l ed on our
reoccupati on of the terri tory) by a civil admi ni strati on. I have recently advised
(J anuary 1942) that the questi on should be reconsidered in J une.
5. Occupied Enemy Territory.
On my arri val in the Mi ddl e East occupied enemy terri tory was confined
almost exclusively to the former I tal i an East Afri ca, i ncl udi ng Ethiopia.
Mi l i tary operati ons conti nued around Gondar unti l November 1941. British
authori ty i n these terri tori es deri ved from mi l i tary occupati on and was in
consequence the responsi bi l i ty of the Commander-i n-Chi ef
;
Mi ddl e East (later
of the Commander-in-Chief, East Afri ca, when that separate Command was
created in October 1941), who exercised his functi ons through a Chief Political
Officer. Maj or-General Si r Phi l i p Mi tchel l . I n accordance wi th my terms of
reference I gave di recti ons that the Chief Pol i ti cal Officer, whi l e remaining
responsible i n hi s mi l i tary capaci ty to the Commander-i n-Chi ef, and continuing
to correspond di rect wi th the War Office on day-to-day business, should refer to
me for gui dance on i mportant questi ons of policy affecting the I tal i an colonies
and our rel ati ons wi th the Emperor of Ethi opi a.
My objective was that O.E.T.A. should consti tute an " associated
Department '' under my general supervi si on on anal ogous lines to the I ntendant-
Generaks Department and the subsequently created Di rectorate of Propaganda.
I n practi ce, however, the l ocati on of Pol i ti cal Headquarters at Nai robi and the
vast di stances involved made i t extremely difficult for me to exercise useful or
effective control. Moreover, the maj or pol i ti cal issue for most of the period
was the negoti ati on of our Agreement wi th the Emperor of Ethi opi a, and although
I had. discussions on thi s subject wi th Si r P. Mi tchel l in Cai ro on several
occasions, in the nature of the case decisions on thi s could only be taken in London,
The si tuati on was radi cal l y al tered by the si gnature of the Ethi opi an
Agreement (repl aci ng O.E.T.A. there by a Bri ti sh Di pl omati c Representative),
the reversion of Eri trea to Mi ddl e East Command, and the reoccupati on of enemy
terri tory in Cyrenai ca. A small central pol i ti cal staff has now been set up in
Cai ro to deal wi th occupied enemy terri tory in Eri trea and Cyrenai ca. I thi nk it
i mportant that the mai n wei ght i n O.E.T.A. should be in the terri tori es themselves
and that there should be at the centre no more than a small staff to form a channel
of communi cati on between the terri tori es and the Commander-i n-Chi ef and
myself.
Duri ng my visit to London in the autumn of 1941 I rai sed i n Cabinet the
questi on of our atti tude to the Senussi of Cyrenai ca. Thei r leader, Sayi d I dris-
el-Senussi, had al ready expressed to me thei r desire for pol i ti cal recognition,
and I had come to the conclusion that thi s should be met. As soon as the new
Li byan campai gn had got under way, the Torei gn Secretary announced in
Parl i ament (J anuary 1942) our determi nati on that, after the war, the Senussi
i n Cyrenai ca should in no ci rcumstances agai n come under I tal i an domination.
Thi s decl arati on has given considerable sati sfacti on here.
Before the offensive in Li bya was resumed i n November pl ans were approved
for an admi ni strati ve staff to take over enemy terri tory as occupied. These
arrangements worked smoothly and swi ftl y in contrast to the i mprovi sati ons of
the previous campai gn.
6. Pool of Junior Political Officers.
At the end of October the Commanders-in-Chief, with my approval, agreed
to a proposal under which some twenty young Service Officers were to be with-
drawn from their units and employed on political duties. The immediate object
was to provide additional British political officers for service in Syria and else-
where. Looking further ahead, its object was to build up a cadre of officers who
have practical experience of the Middle East and who can be available for
political work in these parts after the war. Some difficulty was felt by the War
Office in allocating military personnel for this purpose, and it was not until the
beginning of February that approval was finally obtained. Meanwhile a number
of candidates had been interviewed and selected and the scheme is now being
brought into force.
7. Subversive Activities.
When I arrived in J uly I found S.O. 1 (Propaganda) and S.O. 2 (Sabotage)
in a state of chaos. There had been charges of corruption and inefficiency, and
neither organisation was trusted by the Services.
I called for expert advice, and Sir Frank Nelson came out to report. Certain
officers were removed; Mr. Maxw
7
ell was appointed Controller of S.O.E. in
August.
S.O. 1, S.O. 2, and G(R) have been amalgamated as the
:
' Special Operations
Executive, Middle East and Balkans " under Mr. Maxwell, and a Sub-Committee
of the Defence Committee has been set up to review and direct its activities.
Through this Sub-Committee, of which I have been Chairman, it has been
possible to relate S.O.E. activities closely with the strategical policy and plans
of Commanders-in-Chief, to co-ordinate overt and covert propaganda, and to
ensure that all these are properly related to Government policy.
The organisation is now complete, although many items of equipment have
yet to be provided, and the Executive is regaining the confidence of the Services.
Although S.O.E. has still to show its value by results, I am confident that the
organisation is now sound.
8 . propaganda.
Shortly after my arrival in Cairo I caused an enquiry to be made into the
administration of propaganda in the Middle East. As a result of this enquiry
I recommended the immediate appointment of a Director of Propaganda.
Mr. O. Tweedy was appointed Director of Propaganda in October, and
Sir Walter Monckton arrived on the 20th November, 1941, to take charge of ail
Information Services in the Middle East. He took control not only of the
Directorate of Propaganda which was organised to conduct all the activities for
which the Ministry of Information is ultimately responsible, but also, with the
consent of the Minister of Economic Warfare, of all S.O.E. propaganda work.
The broad lines of propaganda policy are laid down in directives received
from London from P.W.E. and the Ministry of Information. These indications
of policy are considered from time to time by the Directorate of Propaganda and
Area Propaganda Committees, who issue directives to the posts in the field, both
overt and secret, throughout the Middle East. But it has been the aim of the
Middle East Propaganda organisations to leave discretion to the posts them-
selves in adapting the directives from London and from Cairo to the needs of
particular territories. The work of the posts is constantly under reviews and the
senior officers concerned with propaganda, at Cairo frequently visit various parts
of the territory for which they are responsible.
In the last two months the influence of Sir Walter Monckton's organisation,
on the Services has been greatly increased. From the time of his arrival he has
presided over an Inter-Service Propaganda Committee which deals with all the
publicity problems affecting the Services.
9. Censorship.
I t was recently decided to attach to my Office a Censorship Adviser with the
task of supervising, under Sir Walter Monckton. the postal and telegraphic as
Well as the Press censorship throughout the Middle East. Mr. Willbourne has
been appointed to this post and will take up his duties shortly.
Al ready much has been done to i mprove the Press Censorshi p, particularly
in Egypt. The Angl o-Egypti an censorshi p is, however, very different from the
censorship in force in London. Most of the effective censors are Bri ti sh, but
there are Egypti ans who hold the nomi nal l y key-posts and who i nsi st on a strong-
pol i ti cal censorship. There are from ti me to ti me compl ai nts from the Press
whi ch in London could not be ignored, but here a stronger hand is necessary, and
less effect can be given to the pri nci pl e of allowing the Press free expression of
opi ni on.
The local popul ati on in Egypt and elsewhere i n the Mi ddl e East is. in
general , too pusi l l ani mous to be treated" as Angl o-Saxon peoples. Though for
these reasons censorship in the Mi ddl e East is ri gi d and l argel y unscientific,
constant effort is being made to i mprove the system by doi ng away wi th blind
censorship, by provi di ng a twenty-four hours' service and by greater speed and
certai nty in the execution of the work.
10. Ministry of Economic Warfare.
Wi th the approval of the Mi ni ster of Economic Warf are, I asked Si r Walter
Monckton to report whether i t was desi rabl e that an M.E.W. uni t should be
established in Cai ro for the Mi ddl e East. He eventually decided that no such
uni t was needed, but that i t w
r
as advi sabl e that a representati ve of the Ministry
should i nvesti gate the control of trade across the fronti ers between Turkey and
Syri a, I raq and Persi a. The Mi ni ster agreed, on my recommendati on, to appoint
such an officer, and an appoi ntment will be made very shortl y.
11. Supply.
On the departure of the I ntendant-General work on civil suppl i es became
the responsi bi l i ty of the Mi ddl e East Suppl y Centre under my di recti on. At the
same time I made arrangements for the staff of the Centre to be strengthened and
brought under the direction of the Suppl y and Transportati on Sub-Committee of
the Mi ddl e Eastern War Council. I t is worki ng in close l i ai son wi th the Services
and the U.K.C.C.
The suppl y of cereals remai ns the greatest i ndi vi dual suppl y probl em within
the Mi ddl e East. Each terri tory has been encouraged to take all possible action
to sti mul ate producti on. The recent measures taken to restri ct the cotton acreage
i n Egypt should increase the pl anti ng of cereals.
The general standard of consumpti on of foodstuffs in certai n countri es has
not yet been reduced to the level requi red by war ti me economy. Acti on is being
taken to deal wi th thi s.
I n view of the i ncreasi ng i mportance of oil suppl y, I have recentl y set up a
Petrol eum Sub-Commi ttee in Cai ro to report on all questi ons of policy to the
Suppl y and Transportati on Sub-Commi ttee of the Mi ddl e Eastern War Council.
A si mi l ar Commi ttee has been set up in Bagdad. Thus, co-operation locally and
between the appropri ate body i n London will be assured.
I t had been my i ntenti on to i nvesti gate at an earl y date one further aspect
of the suppl y problem. At present purchases of suppl i es on behalf of His
Maj esty's Government are being made by several Departments, and there appears
to be every reason for establ i shi ng some form of a Central Purchasi ng Organisa-
ti on in the Mi ddl e East whi ch would undertake the purchase of all local supplies
requi red by the Services and the vari ous Government Departments. Thi s matter
should be studi ed as soon as possible.
12. Shipping and Port Clearance.
The turn round of shi ppi ng and cl earance of ports have steadi l y improved
wi thi n the past few months. The quanti ty of cargo handl ed through the Middle
East ports has increased, and there is at present no acute congestion, either of
shi ps or cargo, in any of the ports i n Turkey whi ch presents a speci al problem.
I n parti cul ar, the posi ti on at Suez shows a vast i mprovement, and the United
States flag shi ps both at. Port Tewfik and Ataka are now bei ng worked much
more smoothly, al though the unavoi dabl e i mportati on of substanti al quanti ti es of
commercial cargo (which has to be cleared to a Customs si te i n the desert owing to
the destructi on of the Customs sheds at. Port Tewfik by enemy acti on) has caused
an accumul ati on of cargo in the desert dump.
Most of the Mi ddl e East ports "could probabl y handl e greater tonnages than
are at present being received if cl earance faci l i ti es could be i ncreased. But the
records of the tonnages at present bei ng di scharged in the Mi ddl e East are
encouraging, as shown by the following figures for the months of November,
December and J anuai y, viz. :
Tons.
November 1941 562,116
December 1941 582,081
J anuary 1942 ... 533.680
I f l oadi ngs i n the Mi ddl e East ports are added to the foregoi ng dischai^ge
figures, J anuary in fact shows a sl i ght i ncrease over December i n the total
tonnages handl ed.
13. Development of Rearward Areas.
The I ntendant-General deal t in hi s reports wi th the devel opment of
communications and workshops in rearward areas. Since hi s departure, my
Office has conti nued to be actively concerned to ensure that the three Services
work to a common pl an and to an agreed scheme of pri ori ti es throughout the
Middle East. Speci al efforts have been made to attai n thi s end in Eri trea, where
all three Services, as well as the Ameri cans and the Bri ti sh Overseas Ai rways
Corporation have undertaki ngs of i mportance.
I have not yet been able to exami ne in detai l the port and i nternal transport
facilities in I raq and I ran.
14. American Aid.
I have been concerned to ensure close co-operati on wi th Ameri can repre-
sentatives in the Mi ddl e East.
My contacts wi th Mr. Bul l i tt on hi s several vi si ts to Cai ro were frequent and
of great value.
Li ai son between my office and the Ameri can Mi l i tary Mi ssi on under
Bri gadi er-General Maxwel l has also been close.
Consi derati on of Ameri can Ai d probl ems has been assi sted by the appoi nt-
ment of an Ameri can Ai d Sub-Commi ttee of the War Council, over whi ch the
I ntendant-General and, after hi s departure, I myself presi ded.
15. Man-Poiver.
The questi on of man-power, whi ch was i nvesti gated by the I ntendant-
General, is now the responsi bi l i ty of the L.G.A. A special commi ttee has been
set up to determi ne the extent to whi ch it is possible to di l ute Bri ti sh personnel
in Field Uni ts and in the admi ni strati on services by the i ntroducti on of man-
power from other parts of the Empi re. I t is hoped that a report on the
possibilities wi l l be avai l abl e shortl y.
I may menti on two further steps whi ch have been taken to achieve some
economy in whi te man-power :
(a) An exhausti ve enqui ry i nto the establ i shment of Army admi ni strati ve
staff and services has been carri ed out by a General Officer appoi nted
by the War Office. Acti on is now bei ng taken on hi s report.
(b) My office has been di rectl y concerned in an enqui ry of ci vi l i an office staff
and arti sans wi th the object of setti ng up machi nery to prevent corn-
peti ti on for these two classes of l abour.
Cairo, February 25, 1942.
SECRET - Copy No.
W.P. (42)- 140
(Also C.O.S (42) 197)
April 2, 1942
WAR CABINET
WEEKLY RESUME
(No. 135)
of the
0700 April 2nd,
1942 ,
Cabinet War Room
COMBINED OPERATIONS.
1. On the night of 27th/28th March, an attack on St. Nazaire was made
by a force consisting of ELM. Destroyers A therstone and Tynedale with a number
of M.Ls. and M.T.Bs. and ELM. Destroyer Campbeltown, whose bows had been
specially strengthened and filled with explosiye. ELM. Destroyers Brocklesby and
Cleveland acted in support.
, The main object was to destroy the gates of the large lock leading to the
inner basin, as this lock is the only one on the Atlantic seaboard of" France in
which the Tirpitz could be docked. The lock lies some three miles up the Loire
where the river is only amile broad and the channel itself very narrow. When
our forces reached the mouth of the river, searchlights were switched on to them
and the last part of their approach had to be made under heavy fire.
A diversionary bombing attack was carried out but, owing to heavy cloud,
the majority of the aircraft were unable to distinguish their targets.
Campbeltovm rammed the lock gates only four minutes behind scheduled
time. Delay fuses were then set and special service troops landed to carry
out demolitions in the-dockyard. The pumping station was destroyed but heavy'
opposition was encountered and the enemy retained control of the two landing
stages which made re-embarkation very difficult. Some of the M.Ls. had
previously taken off the Campbeltown's crew to the destroyers lying in the mouth
of the river and the remaining M.Ls. then took off as many troops as could reach
them.
During their withdrawal our small craft were subjected fo a heavy fire, and
the four M.Ls. that reached the destroyers were so damaged that they had to
be sunk after their crews' had been taken off.
Considerable confusion prevailed among the enemy, who sank one of their
own flak ships and used their guns without any regard for their personnel on the
opposite bank.
As our forces withdrew aheavy explosion was seen and heard at the time
when Campbeltown's charges were due to explode.'
I n the early morning when clear of the Loire, five German torpedo boats
(ships of about 500 tons, mounting one 4-inch and several smaller guns) attacked
our forces but retired after ashort action with our destroyers.
Air escort for the returning force, which was provided by Coastal Command,
destroyed aJ u. 88 and damaged aHe. 115 for the loss of one Beaufighter and
one Blenheim.
Four M.Ls. failed to make contact with our destroyers, but made their way
independently to Falmouth. where they arrived at mid-day of the 29th.
Air reconnaissance shows that no trace of the seaward lock gate is now
visible.
Our casualties were :
CJb V CLJ. . 1 U 1 l l i l O O l l l g .
Military : 172 missing, 4 Officers, 13 other ranks wounded.
Ten naval small craft have not returned from the operation.
NAVAL SITUATION.
General Review.
2. An I talian 8-inch cruiser has been sunk in the Mediterranean.
A convoy to Russia has been attacked by air, surface craft and U-boats. In
the course of the attack our forces sank aGerman destroyer and themselves
suffered some damage. Aircraft have also attacked the harbour and shipping
at Murmansk.
Two of our submarines have been sunk in aheavy air raid on Malta.
Shipping losses are less than of late.
Home and Northern Waters.
3. An M.G.B. attacked an enemy trawler off Ymuiden on the night of
26th/27th andleft her sinking and in flames.
A convoy to Murmansk, which had been somewhat scattered by heavy
weather, was attacked by aircraft off the north of Norway on the night of
28th/29th. On the following morning H.M. Cruiser Trinidad, in poor visibility
and frequent snowstorms, engaged three enemy destroyers. A chase ensued,
iiH one destroyer was seen to be on fire, but the ships were lost in a
snowstorm. Trindad was hit by a torpedo, but reached harbour under her own
steam. Two Russian destroyers reported engaging a German destroyer about
this time, and two hours later H,M. Destroyer Eclipse hotly engaged a stationary
destroyer, until she was forced to break off the action by the arrival of two more
enemy destroyers. Eclipse suffered some above-water damage and two of her four
guns were put out of action.
U-boats were reported in the vicinity of the convoy, one of them being
attacked by the Minesweeper Gossamer on the 29th, and two ships of the convoy
were torpedoed. I t is thought that at least six U-boats were operating against
this convoy.
The majority of the convoy have now safely arrived at Murmansk, but there
are still two stragglers unaccounted for.
Two air attacks have been made on the port of Murmansk in the second
half of March : there was no damage to ships, but some to the port facilities.
Up to the 31st March, 127 British and Allied ships have been escorted to
North Russia, of which only four have been lost.
Ten Norwegian merchant ships, which were under British charter, attempted
to reach the United Kingdom from Gothenburg, which they left on the evening
of the 31st. They were attacked off the south of Norway in the afternoon of the
1st by air and surface craft, when two were reported sunk, and the majority
returned to Scandinavian waters. The tanker B. P. Newton (10.324 tons) safely
arrived in the Firth of Forth, but the tanker Rigmor (8,305 tons) was sunk by
aircraft when 180 miles east of Aberdeen.
a
Mediterranean.
4. On the 24th. seven Spitfires were flown off from FI.M. Aircraft Carrier
Eagle and safely reached Malta. Two Beauforts and three Blenheims arrived
from Gibraltar at the same time.
H.M. Submarine Proteus obtained two torpedo hits on a north-bound convoy
off Cephalonia on the 29th and two hits oh a merchant ship, also off the west coast
of Greece, on the 30th. FI.M. Submarine Urge reported sinking an Italian 8-inch
cruiser off Stromboli on the morning of the 1st of April, and on the night of
29th/30th she blew up a goods train.
Motor launches Nos. 129 and 132, which were on passage from Gibraltar to
Malta, are overdue and are considered lost.
During a heavy air raid on Malta on the 1st April HM. Submarines Pandora
and P. 36 and the Drifter Sunset were sunk and H.M. Submarine Unbeaten and
the Minesweeper A bingdon were damaged. One officer and 33 ratings are missing
from Pandora.
During the week upward of 7,000 tons of French shipping have passed
Gibraltar eastbound under escort.
Pacific,
5. An unopposed enemy landing was reported at Christmas Island (south of
J ava) during the night of 30th/31st from two transports. I t was covered by a
force of three light cruisers and four destroyers. The flag-ship was hit by a
torpedo from an American submarine.
J apanese forces are reported to have occupied Santa Cruz and Tucopia
Islands (north of the New Hebrides) and Faisi, south of Bougainville, in the
Solomons.
6. A Russian submarine reported sinking a U-boat in Vavanger Fjord
(Mu rmansk coast) on the night of the 28th/29th. Nine attacks by surface craft,
two of them American, have been reported, but in none was there evidence of
destruction. A Sunderland aircraft probably destroyed a U-boat north of
Sidi Barrani on the 27th. Five other attacks by aircraft, one of them American,
were made and of these an attack north of Algiers on the 31st appeared promising.
A belated report has been received from the Greek destroyer Aetos of a
promising attack carried out west of Colombo on the 14th March.
Enemy Intelligence.
German.
7. The Tirpitz, Admiral Scheer and Prinz Eugen
berths in Trondheim on the 31st. The Admiral Hipper
fjord, apparently exercising.
were sighted at their
was under way in the
Channel Islands.
8. Since J anuary the A.A. defences of J ersey and Guernsey have been
increased to one Regiment each (i.e., 24 heavy and 60 light A.A. guns) and
considerable coastal defences have also been installed. This forms the largest
known concentration of A.A. defences in any part of the German occupied areas.
Alderney has also been heavily fortified and has 33 light and 12 heavy A.A
guns.
U-boats.
9. Activity has been considerable near Cape Hatteras and moderate south of
Freetown and off Liberia. I t is estimated that the number of U-boats operating
in the Atlantic remains rather below 50.
Japanese.
10. There have been no major changes in dispositions.
I t is possible that the slight lull in J apanese activities in southern Asiatic
waters may be due to the necessity for repairing and refitting of ships after a
period of intensive activity extending over four months.
11. During the week ending the 1st April, 1,134 ships, including 267 Allied,
and 26 neutral, were convoyed. Six cruisers and anti-aircraft ships, four armed
merchant cruisers, 74 destroyers (including 16 American and 2 Russian) and
112 sloops, corvettes and minesweepers, were employed on escort duties.
Imports into Great Britain by ships in convoy during the week ending
28th March totalled 1,006,000 tons compared with 541,000 tons during the
previous seven days and an average of 684,000 tons for the past ten weeks. Of
the week's imports 160,700 tons were oil of various grades.
Enemy Attack on Seaborne Trade.
12. The numbers of ships known to have been successfully attacked during
the week shows a considerable reduction. U-boats attacked six ships, one of them
a tanker; five of these attacks took place in the Western Atlantic and one off the
north of Norway. Aircraft have damaged or sunk four ships, two off Northern
and two off Southern Norway. One ship was sunk by mine off Cromer.
British Minelaying.
13. Mines have been laid during the week in the' North Sea and in the
Faroes-Iceland (C) area. There has been considerable minelaying by aircraft off
the German North Sea coast and in the Bay of Biscay area and to a less extent off
the Norwegian Coast.
14. Enemy minelaying by aircraft was suspected on two nights of the week,
off the north-east coast of England and in the Bristol Channel.
E-boats were operating off the East Anglian coast on two nights and may
have laid mines.
Seven magnetic and seven acoustic mines have been destroyed during the
week, all of them between Harwich and the Humber.
The mine totals now are : Magnetic, 1,931; acoustic, 1,253; and contact, 1,116.
15. Spanish armed guards have been put on board the German tankers at
Vigo.
The Italian Honor, 5,303 tons, arrived at Bona (Tunisia) towards the end of
February with her engines damaged by bombs.
The German Wartenfels, 6,181 tons, which is at Diego Suarez, Madagascar,
is reported to have been loading coffee, graphite, leather and other products.'
She was expected to sail soon after 25th March.
Yichy Merchant Shipping.
16. The United States Consul at Dakar has reported that there is no truth
in the statement that three army transports sailed recently from Dakar for
Madagascar. The Vichy ships which were reported last week to have sailed south
from Dakar m convoy are believed to be still in West African ports.
American Intelligence.
- 17. The third of the new battleships of the "Washi ngton" class, the
South Dakota, has been commissioned.
MILITARY SITUATION.
(An outline map showing operations in Russia is included in this Resume.
as an inset.)
Staraya Russa Sector. ..
18. No further information has been received regarding the encircled
portion of the German 16th Army in this area.
Central Sector.
19. Tierce and confused fighting has taken place in the area west and
south-west of Rzhev. The town itself is still held by the Germans, who are
endeavouring to cut the neck of the Russian salient to the south-west. In the
Gshatsk area the Russians continue their attacks. Between Yukhnov and
Zanoznaya the Russians are exerting considerable pressure and their forward
elements have penetrated towards Yelnya. Further south, however, the line
appears to have been withdrawn from the Dyadkovo area and now runs approxi-
mately from Kirov to Sukhinichi. I n the whole of this area the fighting has
been bitter and the situation remains far from clear. A report from Moscow on
the 27th March stated that a marked thaw had been in progress for three days
on the Moscow front and was almost certainly the beginning of the real Spring-
thaw.
Ukraine.
20; Fierce fighting continues from Kharkov to Taganrog, with local German
successes near the former and.indications of a considerable Russian advance from
the Petrovskaya area towards the Dnyepropetrovsk-Taganrog railway.
Summary.
21. The Russians are believed to have made some slight progress in their
attacks from the Kerch Peninsula. -
Comment.
'22. During the week heavy fighting has continued on many parts of the
front. I n the Central Sector particularly, the Germans are doing their utmost
to hold their positions and stave off Russian pincer attacks which, if successful,
might force a German withdrawal to the Smolensk area. Meanwhile, the thaw
appears to be definitely setting in, and this will soon affect the scope of offensive
operations in the Southern and Central Sectors.
Libya.
23. Activity during the week was confined to patrolling by both sides.
On the 28th a Tree French column successfully engaged an enemy force,
compelling them to withdraw, whilst on the following day another enemy patrol
was shelled by our artillery 10 miles west of Gazala.
Burma.
Prome Front.
24. On the 29th infantry, supported by our mobile forces, moved down
' to attack a large mixed J ap/Burman force which had reached a point 30 miles
south of Prome. The town of Paungde was captured by our troops. In
the meantime, another mixed enemy, force had crossed the Irrawaddy and
attacked Shwedaung, 12-15 miles below Prome. Heavy fighting took place and
an Indian Frontier Battalion inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy, but were
unable to dislodge them from their position on the main road.
In view of the danger from the west and the possibility of our forces beino-
cut off at Paungde, it was decided to withdraw. On the 30th a combined attack
from the north and south was launched by us on Shweclaung. After heavy
fighting, in which the enemy suffered severe losses, the road was cleared, and by
the 31st our forces had returned to their defended positions near Prome.
I t is reported that the local population is giving active assistance to the
enemy on this front.
Toungoo Front.
25. Severe fighting in and north of Toungoo has continued throughout the
week. On the 28th Chinese reinforcements launched an attack from the north to
relieve the Chinese Division holding out in Toungoo, where the J apanese had
been reinforced. Heavy resistance was met and fighting continued for two days,
the enemy being gradually pushed back. On the 31st a new Chinese Division had
joined forces with the defenders of Toungoo and a fresh line was formed just
north of the town, with two battalions apparently isolated south-west and
south-east of it.
Intelligence.
Italy.
26. Information recently received indicates that three new infantry
divisions have been formed. This brings the total of I talian divisions identified
up to 76. I n addition, there are reports that a new armoured division is being
formed near Rome. New infantry regiments for a further eight divisions exist
in embryonic form.
Mediterranean A rea.
27. There has been a revival of reports of an imminent German attack on
Malta, to which the recent intensive air bombardments may be a prelude. It is
also alleged that German parachute troops have been assembled in South Italy
and Sicily. There is, however, no concrete evidence to confirm these statements.
AI R SI TUATI ON.
General Review.
28. Liibeck was heavily and successfully attacked by aircraft of Bomber
Command.
Our fighters inflicted numerous casualties during sweeps over occupied
territory.
The Grand Harbour and aerodromes in Malta were again heavily bombed.
United Kingdom.
29. Tighter Command flew 2,301 sorties by- day and, 455 by night.
30. Enemy activity against this country was again on a small scale, and
consisted mainly of coastal operations.
Day.
31. Tighter and Bomber Commands despatched 678 and 65 offensive sorties,
respectively.
32. Warehouses and docks at Havre were bombed by Bostons and three hits
on a ship are claimed. The fighter escort destroyed eight enemy aircraft in
combat and damaged two, for the loss of two Spitfires. On the following day..
Spitfires (one of which is missing) shot down an enemy fighter, probably destroyed^
three more and damaged a further ten.
33. Later in the week, after four offensive operations by fighters had failed
to stir up opposition, a further sweep at dusk, over Dunkirk-Hardelot,
encountered considerable numbers of hostile fighters, 13 of which were destroyed,
six more probably destroyed and six damaged; we lost six aircraft but one pilot
is safe.
Night.
34. Bomber Command despatched 668 sorties on offensive operations and a
further 102 sorties on sea-mining. A total of 523 tons of H.E. bombs and
57,950 incendiaries (including 827 of 250 lb.) were dropped. The main objectives
were industrial targets and communications in West and North-West Germany.
35. On the 27th/28th, a raid on Ltibeck was carried out by 186 aircraft
under excellent weather conditions. H.E. bombs totalling
1
163 tons (including
17 of 4,000 lb.) and 146 tons of incendiaries were dropped with satisfactory
results, the latter figure being the highest incendiary tonnage concentrated on a
specific target during one raid. Attacks were pressed home from, in some
instances, as low as 2,000 feet. A number of photographs taken during the
attack show very extensive fires, particularly on the island town and in areas
north and south of the main station and south-east of the city. Visual observation
of individual results was rendered difficult by the glare from these fires. Severe
opposition by enemy fighters was encountered en route and 12 of our aircraft
did not return.
36. About 61 tons of H.E. bombs were dropped at Havre, where bursts were
seen on and near the docks. Hits are claimed on the Ford (Matford) factory at
Poissy; these included two with 4,000 lb. bombs and a third fell 20 yards from the
target,
37. Thirteen bombers failed to return from an attack on railway communi-
cations. Reports indicate that a 4,000 lb. bomb burst on the south end of the
railway centre at Hanau and that bombs dropped on the railway centre at
Aschaffenburg caused severe damage to the tracks. The railway bridge over the
river at Mainz is claimed to have been destroyed. Rolling stock at Karlstadt
was set on fire and a number of attacks were made on trains in the area.
38. A total of 38 offensive sorties were flown by Fighter Command, including
"intruder " patrols and attacks on enemy aerodromes. Oil refineries at Ghent
and Ertvelde, and railway targets near Amiens, Lille, Abbeville and Gravelines
were also attacked. In the course of these operations, two enemy aircraft were
destroyed in the air, another probably destroyed and a fourth damaged.
Coastal Operations.
39. Coastal Command flew 463 sorties and despatched 103 additional sorties
on convoy-escorts. Shipping protection patrols by Fighter Command totalled
1,064 sorties.
4
40. Attacks on enemy shipping were made by aircraft of Coastal and
Fighter Commands; no sinkings are claimed, though hits were reported on three
vessels, the results of other attacks being unobserved.
41. Bomber Command despatched a total of 102 aircraft to lay sea-mines off
Heligoland and the Frisian Islands and in the rivers Gironde, Weser and J ade.
185 mines were successfully laid.
42. Enemy activity against our coastal shipping was negligible. The usual
reconnaissances were flown and mine-laying took place on. two nights.
Mediterranean.
Libya and Egypt.
43. Our fighters continued to carry out offensive sweeps over the forward
area, including attacks on landing grounds and camps, and to provide protection
for shipping off the coast. In addition, they flew defensive patrols of the
Alexandria and Port Said areas.
44. Bostons, escorted by Kittyhawks, made three attacks on Martuba
landing ground, and Wellingtons attacked Berca and Derna landing grounds.
Benghazi Harbour was raided on five occasions by Wellingtons. The quays were
hit, a ship was set on fire and mines were laid in the harbour.
45. Enemy activity was directed mainly against Tobruk, and the railway
line east of Fort Capuzzo. An attack on a troop train resulted in 19 being killed
and 69 wounded. The line was cleared the following morning.
M alta.
46. Enemy attacks on the Island were again on a heavy scale, involving
580 sorties, about half of which were flown on the 31st March and 1st April. The
Grand Harbour and aerodromes were again the main objectives.
The attacks on the Grand Harbour have already been reported in the Naval
Section.
The aerodromes at Luqa and Hal Far were hit, and the latter was rendered
unserviceable. Eight aircraft were destroyed on the ground and eight others
were damaged. In addition M.T. vehicles were destroyed and barracks damaged.
47. During these operations, 21 enemy aircraft were destroyed by fighters
and A.A. defences, 13 were probably destroyed and 22 damaged.
Italy and Sicily.
48. Wellingtons attacked Catania aerodrome, and bursts were observed
among dispersed aircraft.
Reconnaissances were made of Reggio Calabria, in Southern Italy, and of
aerodromes and harbours in Sicily.
Greece.
49. Wellingtons from Egypt made an attack with torpedoes on shipping in
Patras Roads. A cargo ship of 8,000 tons was hit.
Sea Communications.
50. Our aircraft made several reconnaissances of the Sicilian and Tunisian
Coasts and of the Mediterranean between Greece and Libya.
Russia.
51. There is again no information of special interest concerning air opera-
tions on the Russian Front.
Burma.
52. I t is not possible, from information received, to give details of the
daily raids. Prome and Toungoo areas were, however, constantly bombed and
machine-gunned. In the former town considerable food stocks were destroyed
in one raid.
During these attacks eight J apanese aircraft were destroyed, three more
probably destroyed and two damaged; three of our fighters were shot clown
and eight aircraft destroyed on the ground.
53. In the Eastern Shan States, heavy enemy raids took place on the
landing grounds at Namsang and Loiwing, some damage being sustained.
Pacific Zone.
54. During attacks by Hudsons on Koepang (Timor), a 7.000-ton ship was
set on fire and at least six bombers were destroyed on the ground. B. 17 s
(Fortresses) bombed Lae aerodrome and hits were scored on the hangar area and
runways. A Hudson, on reconnaissance, was attacked over Salamoa by three
enemy fighters, one of which was shot down and the other two probably destroyed.
55. On the 27th, Port Moresby sustained its twentieth raid and was
again attacked the following day; no damage resulted. P. 40's (Tomahawks)
destroyed one enemy bomber, probably destroyed two fighters and damaged
another; two P. 40's are missing. Small-scale enemy raids were also made on
Kieta (Bougainville Island). Garaina and Peila (100 miles north of Port
Moresby).
Austral i a.
56. Darwin aerodrome was attacked on three days by bombers escorted by
fighters; slight damage was caused to the runway. Three enemy aircraft were
destroyed by fighters, another was probably destroyed and two more were
damaged; one P. 40 (Tomahawk) was shot down. On the night of 31st March-
lst April, twelve aircraft made the first night attack on Darwin aerodrome.
Philippine Islands.
57. I t is reported that, after a period of only slight activity, a large scale
attack was launched by the enemy on the 24th. A force of 54 bombers
attacked Corregidor and American-Philippino positions on the Bataan Peninsula
for six hours but only slight damage to military installations resulted. Two days
later, Corregidor was heavily bombed, the enemy making seven air attacks in
24 hours.
HOME SECURITY SI TUATI ON.
General.
By Day.
58. On 27th March bombs were dropped on Torquay Harbour and off
Brixham and on the 31st a coal hulk was sunk in Brixham harbour.
By Night.
59. On the night of 26th/27th March bombs were dropped at several points
in Berwickshire, Durham and Yorkshire. A Benzole plant was destroyed at
Malton Colliery. On two other nights minor incidents occurred at Dunwich,
Scarborough and Southwold.
60. Estimated civilian casualties for the week ending 0600 on the 1st April
are two seriously injured.
APPENDICES I and II will be published monthly.
APPENDIX III.
(1) Vessels on the British Register or on Time Charter to the United Kingdom.
Non-tankers and Tankers. 1,600 gross tons and over.
Tradi ng between
Coasting Trade of the I mporti ng Services
Allocated to the Countries other than Repairing, Damaged
Total. Uni ted Kingdom of the
Fi ghti ng Services. the Uni ted Ki ngdom or not in use.
and Eire. United Kingdom.
Month Month.. and Ei re.
(1)
. (2) (3)
No. Gross Tons. No. Gross Tons. No. Gross Tons. ** No No.. Gross Tons. No. ' Gross Tons. No. Gross Tons.
1941 -
March
April
May
J une
J ul y
August ...
September
October ...
November
December
3,684
3,628
3,619
3,575
3,566
3,619
3,613
3,613
3,616
3,641
20,925,000
20,599,000
20,427,000
20,167,000
20,136,000
20,474,000
20,543,000
20,609,000
20.674,000
20,823,000
.
704
691
654
653
640
668
674
696
- 707
745
5,440,000
5,515,000
5,237,000
5,209,000
5,059.000
5,287,000
5,227,000
5,318,000
5,325,000
5,677,000
158
155
158
155
149
144
145
160
175
171
370,000
366,000
370,000
360,000
351,000
340,000
346,000
371,000
411,000
419,000
71 7199
72 7233
74 7455
74 7400
76 7699
79 7977
78 7855
81 8111
83 8344
82 8255
3,175,000
3,170,000
3,216,000
3,124,000
3,322,000
3,434,000
3,374,000
3,512,000
3,674,000
3,607,000
403
413
388
431
445
441
444
444
.444
458
2,232,000
2,199,000
2,129,000
2,454,000
2,597,000
2,571,000
2,677,000
2,654,000
2,799,000
2,771,000
'
1,700
1,646
1,674
1,596
1,563
1,569
1,565
1,502
1,456
1,442
9 708,000
9,349,000
9,475,000
. 9,020,000
8,807,000
8,842,000
8,919,000
8,754,000
' 8,465.000
8,349,000
1942 -
J anuary ...
February
3,615
3,599 '
20,729,000
20,621,000
818
830
5,985,000
6,095,000
175
167
419,000
400,030
81 8100
83 8322
3,611,000
3,782,000
503
517
3,037,000
3,03S,000
1,309
1,253
7,677,000
7,306,000
N ote.The above tabl e is an aggregation of the materi al in the empl oyment tabl es of non-tankers and tankers in Stati sti cal Digests E and F respectively. I n
combining the figures for non-tankers (wliich are compiled as at the end of the month) wi th those for tankers (which are compiled as at the 15th of the month) certain
slight differences have had to be brought i nto a common form.
(1) (a) Tankers on Admi ral ty service include vessels i mporti ng oil fuel to the Uni ted Ki ngdom; in February 1942 these comprised 27 tankers of 225,000 gross tons.
(b) Non-tankers allocated to the fighting services' which are under repair are excluded from this column. All tankers on Admi ral ty service are, however, included.
(c) A substanti al part (in recent months nearly one-half) of the tonnage in these col umns brings commercial cargoes to the United Kingdom on completion of the
outward voyage (see note (3) ).
(2) These col umns gi ve vessel s out of empl oyment (apart from tankers on Admi ral ty Servi ce), bei ng mai nl y those i mmobi l i sed by damage or repai r. They do not,
theref ore, i ncl ude vessel s under repai r whi l e l oadi ng or unl oadi ng cargo.
(3) T hese c ol umns i ncl ude vessel s (apar t f r om t anker s on Admi r al t y Ser vi c e) whi c h are br i ngi ng i mpor t s to t he Uni t ed K i ngdom but whi ch were' allocated on the
APPENDI X IY.
This will be inserted in a subsequent Resume.
APPENDIX M.
Casualties to H.M. Auxiliary Vessels and to Naval Personnel.
The following casualties to H.M. Auxiliary vessels have been reported :
27 th March.M/S Trawler Portia ran aground and sank in the River
Orwell.
1st April.M/S Trawler Solomon sunk by mine north of Cromer.
Officers : 12 killed, 5 missing, 2 wounded.
Ratings : 104 killed, 25 wounded.
2nd April, 1942.
Metropolitan Area.
British.
Bo mb e r s . . .
56
Fi ght e r s . . .
Coas t al
10
9
Ar my Co- Operat i on
75
Tot al
Enemy.
Bo mb e r s
Destroyed.
4
Probably
Destroyed. Damaged.
2
Fi g ht e r s
25
1
10
19
Tot al 30
10
21
Of t he above t ot al s , one bo mbe r was de s t r o y e d by A. A. fire.
British.
Bo mb e r s . . .
Fi g ht e r s . . .
Ot he r s
In the Air.
5
8
1
On the
4
3
Ground.
Tot al 14
Two pi l ot s and one c r e w are s af e.
Enemy. Destroyed.
Probably
Destroyed. Damaged.
Bo mb e r s . . . 18 9 27
Fi g ht e r s . . . 5 5 6
Tot al 23 14 33
Of t he above t ot al s , e l e v e n we r e de s t r oye d, one pr obabl y de s t r oye d,
and ni ne d a ma g e d by A. A. fire.
Far East.
Bo mb e r s . . . 2
Fi ght e r s . . . -8 10
Mi s c e l l a ne o us , 3
Total 8 15
One pi l ot i s s af e.
Probably
Enemy. Destroyed. Destroyed Damaged.
Bo mb e r s . . . 5 4 2
Fi g ht e r s 2 3 1
Mi s c e l l ane ous 4 1
Tot al 11 8
Of t he above t ot al s , s i x were de s t r oye d by A. A. fire.
"NOTES.:(a) No a c c o unt i s t a ke n of e n e my ai rcraf t de s t r oye d on t he ground i n a ny t heat r
(b) No a c c o unt i s t a ke n of Br i t i s h Naval ai rcraf t c as ual t i e s .
The following reports of damage have been received during the past week
Germany.
Recent photographic reconnaissance has revealed the following damage:
Cologne.The Nippes railway workshop received very heavy damage, a large
four-bay building being completely destroyed and a shop of six bays at the
south-east end of the works being extensively damaged. The Franz Clouth
rubber works is almost certainly completely destroyed. Damage to civilian
property consists of two severe high explosive incidents in built-up areas and the
block of railway administration offices south-east of the main station has had a
direct hit. Part of this building has been demolished and cleared and damage
must undoubtedly have occurred to any premises housed under the adjacent
elevated railway track.
Hambom.The Thyssen steel works has been damaged in a number of places
and damage is also seen to houses east and south-east of the works. The principal
feature comprises the destruction of the roof of the finishing mill over an area
approximately 100 yards by 40 yards.
Kiel.Only part of the town and docks is covered but damage is seen to
sheds at Germania and Deutsche Werke Yards, to buildings north of the naval
academy, and there are seven or eight fresh points of damage in the town to
domestic property.
Emden.A letter dated 3rd March, 1942, states that two merchant ships
in the harbour were both severely damaged, one, of about 5,000 tons, heeling over.
A new U-boat which was all ready to leave at any moment was destroyed and
three large buildings in the docks levelled to the ground.
General.Recent photographs of Kiel show that a liner of the " Monte
Olivia " class, of 13,800 tons, has been damaged and is believed to be burnt'out.
It is thought that this is the depot ship previously reported to have been hit, and
that she is resting on the bottom on an almost even keel in shallow water.
An encouraging sign on the success of recent attacks has been the renewed
receipt of reports from Germany of the effect of our heavy bombs.
An informant present in an air raid shelter during the attack on Hamburg
on the night of 14th/15th J anuary was struck by the fact that his fellow
occupants were more concerned about whether "an aerial torpedo or mi ne"
might fall than anything else. I n fact, on that night one fell, demolishing
completely 14-15 large houses and damaging over 50 others in the neighbourhood.
In the course of this attack the Altona Station and the permanent way outside
were damaged.
I n the second case an informant states that the raid on Aachen on
)th/8th December was the worst he had experienced, as on that occasion " aerial
torpedoes '' were dropped. One fell in open ground a mile from his house, which
was rocked by the force of the explosion, All the houses within a radius of about
600 yards had their windows smashed, and in the case of houses within 400 yards
fte floors and ceilings completely collapsed.
Occupied France.
Le Trait.Photographs taken during the attack on 25th March show at least
20 bursts in the shipyard. Six of these were direct hits on buildings and one on
a small vessel on the building slips.
Le Havre.'Photographs taken during the daylight attack on 26th March
show bursts on sheds on the Quai du Rhone and other buildings in the neighbour-
hood, on the railway lines serving the deep-water quay and adjacent to a merchant
vessel of 490 ft., and on the adjoining quay.
DOCUMENT I S THE PROPERTY OP HI S BRI T. OTI C MAJ ESTY
4
S GOVERNMENT
COPY NO, J ^
WAR OA3I NET,
I NDI A,
Dr af t Tel egr amf r om t he Pr i me - Mi ni st or t o
t he Lor d Pr i vy Seal o
Of f i ces of t he War Cabi net ,
Gr eat Geor ge St r eet , S
9
W. i -
DRAFT TELEGRAM FROM PR I ML MI NI STER TO SI R STAFFORD CRI PPS,
Per sonal and Secr et ,
1. War Cabi net and I ndi a Commi t t ee t hi s mor ni ng
consi der ed your t el egr ams 859, 860 and 866S. We ent i r el y
appr ove your i nvi t i ng Azad and Nehr u to t al k Def ence
quest i on over wi t h you and Commandor - i n- Chi ef and aski ng
t hemt o st at e t hei r pr oposal s. We f eel however , t hat
we must know what t hose pr oposal s ar e bef or e you ar e i n
any way commi t t ed t o t hei r accept ance. I must , as I
t ol d you, consul t not onl y t he Cabi net but t he Mi ni st er s
above t he l i ne.
2, . Cabi net showed i t sel f di si ncl i ned t o depar t f r om
t he publ i shed, t ext of t he Decl ar at i on or t o go beyond
i t i n any way
0
I t has made our posi t i on pl ai n t o t he
wor l d and has won gener al appr oval , - We al l r eached
an agr eement on i t bef or e you st ar t ed and i t r epr esent s
our f i nal posi t i on.
The r est at ement of par agr aph ( e) t oget her wi t h
your expl anat i on i n par agr aph 9 of 859S has made i t
pl ai n - that, as l ong as t he Commander - i n- Chi ef r et ai ns hi s
posi t i on on t he Vi cer oy' s Counci l and/ hi s exi st i ng cont r ol
and di r ect i on of t he def ence oP I ndi a/ t her e i s no
-^-S
obj ect i on i n pr i nci pl e t o t he appoi nt ment / of a new I ndi an
member on t he Counci l t o cooper at e i n t he spher e of
mi l i t ar y or gani sat i on.
3. I f Congr ess l eader s have some bet t er way of
pr ovi di ng f or I ndi an associ at i on wi t h def ence, as saf eguar ded
by you i n your 859S, and. i f t hey assur e you t hat subj ect t o
t hi s t hey ar e pr epar ed t o accept t he whol e scheme, t hen
sorne mor e pr eci se i nt er pr et at i on t o meet t hi s out st andi ng
poi nt woul d bo wor t hy of consi der at i on. But ar e you
sat i sf i ed t hat t hi s i s t he act ual posi t i on? Up t o t he
pr esent Congr ess spokesmen appear t o have avoi ded, anyt hi ng
whi ch coul d, be const r ued as even a condi t i onal accept ance
of t he post - war pr oposal s
TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY, ^ v y W
IT is requested that special cai-e may be taken TO
ensure the secrecy OF this DOCUMENT.
9 5
^ TP. n P Hi n FROTW. PY 0? HI S BRI TANNI C MAJ SSTTS OQmm&mi
P
CO NO.
WAR CABI NET.
COMMUNI ST PARTY.
Memor andum"by t he Home Secr et ar y
I n or der t hat t he Cabi net may "be I cept i nf or med of t he
l i cy and act i vi t i es of t he Communi st Par t y, I ci r cul at e
0
? i nf or mat i on -
( l ) a pol i ce r epor t of a meet i ng on 7t h Mar ch of
of f i ci al s and or gani ser s of t he Par t y;
( S) a st at ement made l ay Mr . Har r y Pol l i t t on
14-th Mar ch and ci r cul at ed by t he Communi st Par t y.
H. M.
ME OFFI CE.
3rd Apr i l 1942.
SPECI AL BRANCH REPORT.
The di st r i ct secr et ar y, Ted Br aml ey, r epor t ed on t he
pr ogr ess of t he London Di st r i ct of t he Communi st Par t y of
Gr eat Br i t ai n at a meet i ng on 7t h Mar ch at t he Cambr i dge
Theat r e whi ch al l br anch secr et ar i es, ar ea gr oup or gani ser s
and f act or y gr oup l eader s wor e i nst r uct ed t o at t end. .
- '- ' Wi t h -very f ew except i ons, owi ng t o si ckness or
pr essur e of ' wor k, t he f ul l number of London Di st r i ct
of f i ci al s at t ended, each br i ngi ng a wi f e, husband or f r i end.
281 f act or y . group l eader s wer e pr esent , and about 80 br anch
secr et ar i es. ' Near l y hal f t he audi ence was composed of
women. Ther e wer e t wo sol di er s i n uni f or m.
Behi nd t he pl at f or m, on whi ch wer e t he l eadi ng
of f i ci al s, of t he London Di st r i ct Commi t t ee and some Cent r al
Commi t t ee member s, a l ar ge post er was exhi bi t ed whi ch bor e
t he f ol l owi ng
. Âi mf or ' Mar ch- 51st . 1942: member s 15, 000; f act or y
gr oups 500: l i t er at ur e sal es 7, 000 per mont h; Mar xi st ...
- Cl asses 609^ I ncome 5, 000 per mont h; . and GROWTH J anuar y,
1941, t o December , 1941: Member s 3, 500 i ncr eased t o 9, 000;
f act or y gr oups 200 i ncr eased. t o 300; Li t er at ur e sal es ( per
mont h
1
) 922
:
i ncr eased t o 4, 500; . Mar xi st Cl asses 60 i ncr eased
to- 350; ' I ncome per mont h i ncr eased, f rom. 450 t o 1, 500". . !
:
; Br aml ey sai d t hat i n t he opi ni on of t he Di st r i ct .
Commi t t ee and t he Cent r al Commi t t ee, London had made good
pr ogr ess, but i t appear ed t hat some comr ades wer e not
convi nced of t he ul t i mat e success of - t he Par t y, and some ..
' wer e "pessi mi st i c and easi l y set back by an i ndi f f er ent .
at t i t ude on t he par t of t hei r f r i ends and wor kmat es. For
t he benef i t of t hese- poor communi st s he woul d gi ve some
i nf ormat i on' - about t he ' t erri f i c", suppor t - now, r eeei ved f r om
unexpect ed quar t er s. Recent l y Gener al Gough had spoken. ,
f r om-a pl atf orm. ' , and' "prai sed the-; Soyl ot Army, and sai d-, he .:
was' gl ad t o cal l t hemhi s. "comrades". , . He, Brarol ey, - had .--
;
- spoken duri ng- - ' the past f ew mont hs "wi th- no f ewer t han 24
Member s of Par l i ament , ; ; al l pr evi ousl y ant - i - communi st . ;
out of 56- Angl o- Sovi et commi t t ees i n- London, 46 commi t t ees
had communi st s publ i cl y and' ef f i ci ent l y r epr esent ed. The
cooper at i ve movement had def i ni t el y, j oi ned wi t h Mar x House
I n ar r angi ng cl asses, and' had j oi ned' i n "wi t h t he . demand to.:
r ai se t he ban on' t he - "Dai l y Wor ker ". ' I ndust r y, he sai d,
was t he mai nspr i ng of agi t at i on.
On t he Amal gamat ed Engi neer i ng Uni on Comr ade. J . R. Scot t
had been el ect ed by an over whel mi ng- . maj or i t y, and Wal Hanni ngt o
had been el ect ed by a cl ear cut maj or i t y. Of t he ot her
cont est ant s some ot her "comr ades" had' r ecei ved sat i sf act or y
vot es, even t hough beat en by Scot t . . The.
:
A. E. U. was t he, mai n
weapon -of t he Communi st Par t y now and i t r emai ned f or - each
Comr ade
:
t o agi t at e i nsi de t he Labour Movement and t o bri ng-
about -the;, downf al l ' of "Tr anspor t House" and t he "Dai l y Her al d".
On t he Tr anspor t and Gener al Wor ker s Uni on' el ect i on,
Comr ade' Kapl an. had been successf ul , and. t hi s was -an equal l y
- I mpor t ant vi ct or y i n' vi ew of t he l ar ge number of women i n
that Uni on. ; .;' ;.' . '.,.'
The quest i on of br i ngi ng mor e women member s, was an
: i mport ant one and . the comr ades i n f act or y gr oups must not
hesi t at e i n r ecr ui t i ng t hem. . St r angel y, enough, - support
f or t he women had come f r omsome management s, f or i nst ance
E. M. I . , Hoover s, and Har r i s Lcbus had sent a r epr esent at i ve
of t he management s t o a r ecent Women' s Par l i ament conf erence.
Br oml ey t hen deal t wi t h t he member shi p of t he London
Di st r i ct . " The member shi p dr i ve v/as ver y sat i sf act or y,
but 5, 000 mor e wer e r equi r ed bef or e Mar ch 31st , 1942.
Di st r i ct s had gr eat l y i ncr eased, par t i cul ar l y i n Sout h East
and Sout h West London. Brarnl oy i nst anced Camber we 11 and
Ber mondsey as tv/o di st r i ct s whi ch had shown t he gr eat est
i ncr eases. Bob Cot t on, he sai d, had been det ai l ed t o
whi p up ent husi asm i n a di st r i ct away f r omhi s own and
had succeeded beyond al l expect at i on. I n Sout h' East
London t he member shi p of al l t he br anches i n J anuar y, - 1941,
was 238, and at t he end of Febr uar y, 1942, was 1, 116. I n
Sout h West London t he member shi p was onl y 308 i n J anuar y 1941
and at t he end of Febr uar y 1942, i t was 1, 208.
Each member must use ener gy and det er mi nat i on, and
each member must become an act i ve pr opagandi st , sai d Braml ey.
He must equi p hi msel f wi t h i deas, and agi t at e, l ead and
or gani se hi s"f el l ow wor ker s. The f ut ur e of t he Soci al i st
St at e ai med at depended upon t he next f ew weeks, and wi t h
t he r ai si ng of t he ban on t he "Dai l y Wor ker " al l opposi t i on
woul d be cr ushed, wi t h t he wonder f ul per f or mance of t he
Red Ar my t o br i ng as t he out st andi ng exampl e of a Soci al i st
St at e.
Br aml ey sai d t he dr i ve f or money had been mor e t han
di sappoi nt i ng, as t he l i f e of t he par t y depended ver y much
on f i nance. Of t he t ot al ai med at , 13, 680, onl y 4, 607
had been pai d i n. To get money i t was essent i al t o get
member s, and t he ai mof each r epr esent at i ve i n t he audi ence
shoul d be t o i ncr ease hi s or her br anch or gr oup. He had
hear d some obj ect i ons t o t he dr i ve f or member shi p. One ol d
member had obj ect ed agai nst i t on t he gr ounds t hat "a
r evol ut i onar y par t y ceased t o become r evol ut i onar y i f i t
was f l ooded wi t h members". . Thi s pecul i ar f r ame of mi nd shou
be cor r ect ed at once. Onl y wi t h a l ar go member shi p, wi t h
t he sei zur e of t he wonder f ul oppor t uni t y now open t o t he
Par t y coul d t he Soci al i st St at e, pl anned on t he l i nes of
t he gr eat St al i n, be. obt ai ned i n t hi s count r y. Never
bef or e was t her e such a need f or a Communi st r ul e. London
coul d be made i nt o a communi st st r onghol d.
Br aml ey sai d t he f our mai n i ssues conf r ont i ng t he
Par t y wer e: f i r st t o compl et e t he r ai si ng of t he 13, 680,
and t he r ecr ui t ment of 5, 000 new member s t o obt ai n t he total
of 15, 000 f or London, and t o bui l d 500 f act or y gr oups.
Secondl y, t o or gani se t he Labour movement i n t he f act or i es
t o t he communi st way of t hi nki ng. Thi s was i mper at i ve
t o br i ng about t he. change i n t he pol i t i cal l i f e of t he worker
and as out of 980, 000 f act or y wor ker s i n t he London Di stri ct
t her e wer e onl y 300 gr oups, much wor k was i n f r ont of each
member of t he audi ence. The si l ent maj or i t y must be brougn
i nt o t he par t y and t he f act or y wor ker s must be made aware of
t he power t hat was t hei r s. Thi r dl y, , i t was essent i al to wi-
r eal i sat i on of ent i r e pol i cy i n t he next f ew weeks by the
est abl i shment of a Second f r ont i n Eur ope t hi s Spr i ng; "by
i ncr easi ng pr oduct i on; and by demandi ng t he i ndpendence
of I ndi a. The f our t h and l ast poi nt was t he demand f or trie
r enewal of t he "Dai l y Wor ker ", t he most power f ul weapon i n
t he hands- of t he Communi st Par t y.
Br aml ey t hen r ef er r ed t o t he necessi t y f or each
member t o agi t at e f or t he i ndependence of I ndi a, and depl or ed
t he bad at t endance at a r ecent I ndi a Meet i ng at Ki ngsway Kai l
when onl y 500 member s out of London' s 10
9
000 t r oubl ed t hemsel ves
to at t end.
He i nst anced t he r esponse t o mass pr essur e by-
r ef er r i ng t o t he r ecent changes i n t he Gover nment , and sai d
Moor e- - Br abazon and Mar gesson out , and Cr i pps i n, at l east
r epr esent ed a new pol i cy. The same pr essur e coul d be exer t ed
f or t he r eal i sat i on of t he second f r ont i n Eur ope- and f or
t he r ai si ng of t he "Dai l y Wor ker " ban. "We want a vi ct or y
i n 1942 not i n 1943" , and "London i s t o be t he Moscow of
Br i t ai n".
Wi l l i amRust t hen spoke. He sai l t hat t he
demand f or t he r ai si ng of t he ban on t he "Dai l y Wor ker "
was al most l i ke a r el i gi ous r evi val . The need f or a f r ee
expr essi on of t he wor ker s' vi ews was now gr eat er t han ever ,
and t he r enewal of t he paper woul d br i ng t he par t y t he
oppor t uni t y i t was wai t i ng f or and t he vi ct or y i t deser ved.
As soon as Mr . Mor r i son spoke i n t he House about t he "Dai l y
Wor ker ", sai d Rust , hi s of f i ce was f l ooded wi t h l et t er s
pl edgi ng suppor t and pr omi ses of f i nanci al ai d and i f
Mor r i son coul d see t he cor r espondence he woul d not be so
conf i dent i n t he House. However , t he movement f or t he
r ai si ng of t he ban was gr owi ng gr eat er and gr eat er and the
suppor t of f or emost j our nal i st s and edi t or s was now addi ng
to t he voi ce of t he wor ker s f or a newspaper t hat woul d gi ve
t he wor ker s' news and t he wor ker s' i deas. Leni n' s
i nst r uct i on to TomBel l , many year s ago, was t o have a
newspaper f or t he r evol ut i onar y movement .
Rust t hen asked t he member s of t he audi ence t o
spread pr opaganda f or t he "Dai l y Wor ker " and t o ar ouse publ i c
consci ousness. The great est - enemi es of pr ogr ess came f r om
t he Labour st r onghol ds. Tr anspor t House and such pl aces.
The "Dai l y Her al d" woul d l ose i t s ci r cul at i on among t he wor ker s'
and t he men behi nd t he "Dai l y Her al d" i nt ended t o f i ght , agai nst
t he r esumpt i on of t he "Dai l y Wor ker ". To of f set t hat
pr essur e was t he wor k i n f r ont of each per son pr esent , and
i t was t hei r dut y t o agi t at e f or t he newspaper t hat woul d
t r ul y r epr esent t he Soci al i st St at e.
St at ement made by Mr . Har r y Pol l i t t on
14t h Mar ch and ci r cul at ed by t he Communi st .
- Par t y.
' Sp. eVak. l xi g. on: . behal f of The Cent r al - Commi t t ee of t he Communi st
Party. , . . . i n. Vthd ; . 3rahgwyn Hal l , Swansea/ - on Sat ur day, March. 14t h,
Har r y Bol l i t . st at ed: - ' '
"On. Mar ch 11t h. I l i st ened t o t he Pr i me Mi ni st er ' s st at ement
;
on. . I ndi a, ' . . - ' \. " . -
^\ ^t was; t he f i r st - t i me
:
I - had been i n- t he House t o l i st en t o
' a. - statement si nce "Sept ember 2nd, 1939. . I- was st r uck wi t h t he
: ; f eel i ng.
;
' of , demor al i sat l bh t hat had come over Par l i ament , I t
- ref l ect ed t he
;
pol i t i cal si t uat i onof Our count ry. : ., ..' ' ,..
A deadl y par al ysi s- i s cr eepi ng over ; Br i t ai n, one t hat i s
danger ous i n t he ext r eme. I t
;
iS'af f ect i ng, t he wor ker s i n
- i nd. Ust. ry, . , c i y i 1.. de f enc e and the' a
;
rmed - f or c e sV -
I t i s. not caused by t he heavy bl ows and def eat s. , t hat Br i t ai n
has r ecei ved' i n, . rec"ent mont hs, f or , , gi ven compl et e- conf i dence i n
-; . j she^; l eader\shipV^^^Pf5' i i ' cy ' of t he government.-,...' -these can ser ve t o
i ncr ease t he "worki ng' - and - f i ght i ng, spi r i t of -the ent i r e , peopl e,
as experi ence- i . n t he Sovi et Uni on has proved. , -; . .
;
. J""'
I t' i s t he sense, of gr opi ng i n t he dark; ; of absence of cl ear
pol i cy or, , speci f i c; al ms; -of l i vi ng f r omhand t o mout h. I n shor t
i t r epr esent s" l ackof "l eader shi p t hat can no l onger be t ol er at ed,
-:'-;".-- I f t hi s "opi ni on i s^rddubt ed, t hen l et t he cont r ar y evi dence
,.be. br ought f or war d, but
;
I chal l enge: any ser i ous, pol i t i cal
obser ver , t o t al k. t o t he v/ orkers i n any- - f act or y, t o any spl di er
.;home on- l eave, t o any c i vi l def ence - wor ker at any War den
1
s. Post
or Fi r e St- atl bn and pi ôd-uce a di f f er ent pi ct ur e. ' / \
Demor al i sat i on of t he most'-', seri . o. usl ^l hd has sei zed . a sect i on
of t he Rul i ng Cl ass. , who have l ost i n a ni ght , t hei r Empi r e,
conquest s. of cent ur i es, and l ost t hemt o t hose whomt hey
consi der ed of ' an "i nf er i or r ace.
ckct . ' i ndl a. i s bel at edl y and be gr udgi ngl y now t-o be wooed, ; , ; "by
. some. - magi c .f or mul a, not as an act of j us ti c/ a - and equi t y, ' hut
onl y because "J apan i s at i t s gat es". . . " .
, We ki l l hundr eds of Fr ench ci vi l i ans t hr ough ai r r ai ds, but
make, no at t empt t o ki l l t he t housands, of - Nazi sol di er s on Fr ench
"soi l . ' ' . .' .
The
;
newspaper s ar e f ul l of t al k about . "Hi t l er ' s gi gant i c
Spr i ng of f en&l yb". , . but '
;
- deadl y
:
si l ence about Br i t ai n, or gani si ng
any of f ensi ve "of "' any ki nd. i.
1
-'-- ;-::-'; .;-
;
., ' -'-':- ; "' ';
- Ther e i s... endl ess specul at i on on what St al i n m&ant by cer t ai n
st at ement s he made' i n hi s -' Order
;
of t he Day on. t he . occasi on of t he
S3rd Anni ver sar y of t he Red Ar my, but no one want s t o ment i on
Stal i n-' .;spl ai n, . st at ement t hat t he Red Ar my i s st i l l f i ght i ng al one,
:
Ml sehi evons - tal k i s bei ng cl rcul at et d about , whet her or not
"when. : t he Red
:
:
Ar my has "beat en -"the vNazl s . St al i n "wi l l . make a
- separat e peace wi t h Hi t l er ; "; Thi s - i s . t he cover used by t hose -
el ement s who wo u1dl i ke t o make t hei r - separ at e peace wi t h Hi t l er
nowi'
r
' - ;' i \ ; . - - . ' ' "';'""
i
.
g
- 2-
" No one
1
i n l eadi ng Gover nment ci r cl es dar es t o t hi nk, tal k
and i nspi r e -the peopl e wi t h t he wi l l t o wor k, f i ght and
or gani se i n t er ms of smashi ng Hi t l er t hi s year - i n f act no one
now dar es t o ment i on any year i n whi ch t hey wi l l smash Hi t l er
- : I t i s an i mpossi bl e si t uat i on i nt o whi ch Br i t ai n has teen
al l owed t o dr i f t . - I t i s/ i mper mi ssi bl e' t hat i t shoul d be al l owed
t o cont i nue f or anot her day, f or i t coul d be changed i n a day"
4
once t he peopl e v&re gi ven a cl ear l ead' , and or gani sed t o opQr
a
*
i t, - Unl ess t hi s i s doneand done now, - , t hen l et t her e be no"
whi ni ng or beat i ng of br east s t hat - l at er on we have to, pay s
U
ch
a heavy pr i ce as t he r esul t of pr esent i ndeci si on and hesi tancy
. f or t he spi r i t t hat domi nat es t he l eader shi p of t he / count r y i '
not. even mi l i t ant l y def ensi ve.
s
Def ence can evoke r esponse j but we' r epeat t hat throughout
t he count r y at "t he pr esent ti me, f r ust r at i on i s t he predomi nati ng
char act er i st i c - st ronger' f ar t han t he desi r e of achi evement ,
Compl acency i s st r onger t han t he wi l l - to f i ght . At t ent i on to
pet t y t hi ngs t akes mor e t i me and t hought - t han t he gr eat deci si ve
i ssues conf r ont i ng t he peopl e. y
Br i t ai n i s i n danger. . . Br i t ai n i s not mer el y experi enci ng
a. l ul l j i t i s bei ng under mi ned pol i t i cal l y. and mor al l y i n away
t hat i s wor t h, a hal f dozen f asci st , mi l i t ar y vi ct or i es.
Contrast' . our Vsi t uat i on wi t h ""that of t he- "Sovi et Uni on. No
nat i on- has suf f er ed. auch l osses i n t er r i t or y; ' such suf f eri ng;
' such at r oci t i es; - such a sel f l ess dest r uct i on of i t s ov/n resourc
' and' yet , because of t he ' pol i t i cai and
v
mor al - uni t y of t he peopl e,
t hr ough t hei r compl et e' , conf i dence i n t hei r, l eader shi p, despi te
al l , - , t hey have f ound the. way t o past f r omt he def ensi ve to the
of f ensi ve under condi t i ons whi ch make our ov/n t asks chi l d' s plaj
s
i n compar i son. ' ' : -. :"-'--''' . .-. -.; .
. . npr-dm' t he f i rst , days of . December unt i l ' t hi s ver y hour they
have never once r et ur ned t o, t heedef ensl ve, t hey have pai d a
t er r i bl e- pr i ce, but t hey - st eadi l y - push t he Nazi s back, regai n
l ost ground' , l i ber at e t hei r' peopl eunder mi ne, key Nazi posi ti ons
gi vi ng- i t hemno r est or r espi t e, / st r i ki ng "every concei vabl e Mn-f.
bl ow i n t he most unl i kel y pl aces. "' ,.
;-. Whi l e' we t al k about' ; "Hi t l er ' s Spr i ng -of f ensi vei ' t hey calral
pur sue t hei r pol i cy of maki ng t hi s of f ensi ve i mpossi bl e on the
^s-cal e i t was f i r st , cont empl at ed. - Whi l e peopl e her e t al k about
"t hey wonder how soon t he Red Ar my wi l l be i n Ber l i n" t o sal ve
t hei r cowar dl y consci ences t hat t hey are. not pr epar ed t o l and ai
ar my at al l even i n Pr ance, onl y
:
. t went y one Hj&es away f r om
Br i t ai n. ' ' J * -* ^
.
r
. ^ The. ' cont r ast bet ween Br i t ai n and t he Sovi et Uni on, brands
us wi t h; shame. ' . - -"'..,. ;'".'.-.,. '-"':'
Whi l e t he Sovi et peopl e f i ght : "and endur e, t hei r onl y thougl
bei ng , of' : . vi ctory, t hi s, year, -- her e we are- i n' Br i t ai n wonder i ng M
whe- t herwe wi i l ^^wi hi the' w' ar i n any year at al l , - g i v i n g
5
mo r e attoB
to. - I ncome\ : . tax- agi i ati on t han we do t o demandi ng a Second Front B
so' , t hat ! t he Br i t i sh and Sovi et ar mi es can j oi nt l y f i ni sh of f Hi
Here, we "at e. wonder i ng i f wei canl i ve wi t h dog r aci ng onl 3' -B
one day a- week, and. expect i ng t he' Red' Ar my t o go on ki l l i ng tne*
Nazi dogs ever y day. Her e we ar e seeki ng out t he most el abor at e
j udi ci al measur es ( because i t i s our - way of doi ng t hi ngs) t o end
the Bl ack Mar ket r acket eer s/ who onl y exi st because t he r i ch want
what t hey pr ovi de, ' whi l e the' Red Ar my st r ai ns ever y ner ve t o ki l l
every Nazi on Sovi et soi l .
We si t back and smugl y say "The Red Ar my are doi ng f i ne,
we hope t hey, wi l l keep i t up, we di d- our shar e by what we went
t hr ough when, we . st ood al one I n 1940- 1",
What hypocr i sy. Why t he wor d "sacr i f i ce" has no r eal meani n
or si gni f i cance f or t he over whel mi ng maj or i t y of t he Br i t i sh
peopl e. -We are- st i l l l i vi ng i n . l uxury compar ed t o t he gi gant i c -
sacr i f i ces t hat t he Sovi et peopl e gl adl y i mpose upon t hemsel ves.
Thi s cannot go on. Ther e i s no si ngl e t hi ng t he Sovi et
peopl e, have done t hat we cannot do al so, gi ven t he l eader shi p t o
or gani se t he necessar y - measures and necessar y conf i dence.
Let us f ace f acts". . The t er r i t or i al . . l osses "i n t he Far East
have not r oused a r i ppl e amongst , t he common peopl e of Br i t ai n.
They do not see t hemas. t hei r dosses, but onl y as par t s of an
I mper i al i st Empi r e, whi bh had onl y been i ncr eased t o expl oi t t hem
f or pr i vat e gai n. ' But what i s not seen, and i t i s t he
r esponsi bi l i t y ' 6f t he l eader shi p t o make t hi s cl ear , . i s t hat i t i s
Br i t ai n whi ch now st ands i n deadl y danger , and. unl ess we t ake t he -
of f ensi ve, qui t e a di f f er ent ki nd of danger t han was f aced i n
1940- 1. .
:
- \ "" .' '. ...
The t i me- has come t o st op t he r ot . What . shoul d be done?
Fi r st , t o f i r ml y decl ar e what our pol i cy i s, st r engt hen- t he
Gover nment , r est or e t he conf i dence t o t he peopl e i n t he l eader shi p
of Br i t ai n. Show t hat t he mai n enemy- i n t hi s wor l d war i s
Hi t l er i t e Ger many, and t hat every- r esour ce of Br i t ai n . . i s, -goi ng t o
be subor di nat ed to: def eat i ng Hi t l er . Once t hi s i s done J apan and
I t al y wi l l soon be f i ni shed of f .
Second. . Take ever y st ep t hat wi l l st r engt hen t he Al l i ance
-
bet ween Br i t ai n and t he Sovi et Uni on, , j so - that t her e can be-: coi npl e
uni t y of per spect i ve, st rat egy. , di pl omacy . pr opaganda and
s
r esour ces, wi t h absol ut e guar ant ee t o t he peopl e t hat i t i s. an
Al l i ance i n Peace as wel l as i n war .
Thi r d. . Open up t he Second Fr ont i n Eur ope, and f or-, t hi s
pur pose mobi l i se and or gani se ever yt hi ng t hat t hi s deci si ve' . -
oper at i on demands, what ever t empor ar y set backs may have sx-i .l l t o
be exper i enced i n ot her l ess. --deo-l si vo t heat r es of t he st r uggl e
agai nst t he Axi s Power s. Sooner o r l ater' , t he f i ght agai nst
Hi t l er di r ect l y i n Eur ope wi l l have t o t ake pl ace. No. member of
the Gover nment has a. mor al r i ght t o cal l on Fr ench wor ker s t o
st ri ke and sabot age, unl ess t hey ar e pr epar ed t o l and Br i t i sh
t roops t o f i ght agai nst t he Nazi s.
The Second Fr ont i s t he onl y mi l i t ar y oper at i on- t hat can be
under t aken: t hat wi l l r est or e not onl y conf i dence, ' , but evoke any
ent i r el y new out l ook t hr oughout i ndust r y, t he armed, f or ces, and .
ci vi l . def ence, whi l e si mul t aneousl y i t wi l l secur e equal i t y of
sacr i f i ce i n a way and on a - scal e t hat no moral - - , "exhortati ons or
l egi sl at i on can ef f ect . The common peopl e wi l l - know how t o
f orce t hr ough equal i t y of sacr i f i ce.
Four t h.
Est abl i sh a r eal Mi ni st r y of Pr oduct i on, wi t h f ul l
power t o t ake over al l war i ndust r i es, mat er i al s and manpower-
t aki ng t he wor ker s i nt o f ul l cooper at i on i n r egar d t o ever y'
aspe c t --of pr o duo t i on.
- Fi f t h. ' I ncr ease t he pay and al l owance t o t he men an-i ^
i n" the. - armed "f orces. Compl et el y r evi se al l t r ai ni ng i n the.
of act ual ' "bat t l ef i el d exper i ences. Abol i sh al l ol d school tie
met hods of : appoi nt i ng of f i cer s. I nt ensi f y t he pol i t i cal trnj p
1
and educat i on of t he ar med f or ces. * Sack al l t he' "Gi ve emPiv
general s. ' ' Revi se
:/
' tdi e whol e wel f ar e ^syst emassoci at ed wi t h the
ar med forces"", so t hat of f dut y t her e ar e no. cl ass bar r i er s, and
gi ve t he r ank and f i l e t he f ul l est oppor t uni t y f or br i ngi ng for
t hei r i deas and i ni t i at i ve.
Si xt h. Recogni se wi t hout qual i f i cat i on, t he r i ght , of - M
t o have i t s i ndependence; cal l on t he I ndi an Nat i onal Congress
l eader s t o' est abl i sh a Nat i onal Gover nment / r epr esent at i ve of al
deci si ve sect i ons of I ndi an opi ni on.
Seven. Pr ocl ai mt he ai mof def eat i ng Hi t l er i n 1942, and
al l ow not hi ng, and no one t o st and i n t he way of i t s achi evement
Thi s i s t he way t o e n d t he pr esent si t uat i -n of hesi tancy,
i ndeci si . von. ess and demor al i sat i on.
I t needs a bol d hand and l eader shi p t o car r y i t t hrough,
t hat has no f ear of t he common peopl e, h u t i s"pr epar ed t o draw
upon t hei r i nexhaust i bl e r esour ces of geni us, cr eat i ve energy a
i ni t i at i ve; BO t hat f r omt hi s t her e wi l l . be such a uni t y,
conf i dence and det er mi nat i on t hat wi l l sweep r ut hl essl y asi de
ever y weakl i ng and obst acl e.
The dead hands of t he past can no l onger "be al l owed to fal
k
and f umbl e. , d''*'-
Br i t ai n can be r oused, and i t s f i nest hour can be i n vi cto
and not i n def eat .
Br i t ai n i s hel d back t oday, because t he i nt er est s of so fen
ar e st i l l al l owed t o st and i n t he pat h of t he many t hat are so
r eady t o do and dar e t hei r al l t o secur e i t .
Br i t ai n must and shal l f i nd i t sel f .
Br i t ai n- must and shal l be r oused t o a new concept i on of
purpose- and dut y. To a new sense of di gni t y and vi ct or y. To
new sense of l oyal t y t o Al l i es who ar e pour i ng out t hei r l i fe' s
bl ood t hat we may l i ve. To a new consci ousness of the sacrecl n
of t he Cause f or whi ch we f i ght .
Once t hi s i s done t hen sacr i f i ce wi l l "be ennobl ed wi t h a
new wi l l i ngness and maj est y.
Our f i nest pages wi l l . be wr i t t en not i n bat t l es f or conques
but f or f r eedom, f or t he vi ct or y over f asci sm, f or t he ri ght to
l i ve i n peace and al l t he new avenues of soci al advance that nrll
t hen be open t o wor l d humani t y.
On "behal f of THE COMMUNI ST PARTY I pl edge i t t o do al l
i n i t s power t o see t hat what i s needed shal l be accompl i shed.
SECRET.
W.P. (42) 143.
(Revise of W.P.
April 18, 1942.
(41) 148.)
Copy No.
O Q
^,7
WAR CABINET.
FUNCTIONS OF THE MI NI STER OF STATE I N THE MIDDLE EAST.
Memorandum by the Prime Minister.
I HAVE approved the annexed revised directive to the Minister of State in
the Middle East. This revised directive embodies a number of amendments on
points of detail, and replaces the original directive issued in J une, 1941
(W.P. (41) 148).
W. S. c.
10 Downing Street, S.W. 1.
1. THE Minister of State in the Middle East will represent the War
Cabinet in that area and will act in its name.
2. The principal task of the Minister of State will be to ensure a successful
conduct of the operations in the Middle East by
(a) relieving the Commanders-in-Chief as far as possible of extraneous
responsibilities:
(b) giving the Commanders-in-Chief political guidance;
[23655]
(c) settling promptly matters within the policy of His Majesty's Govern-
ment, more particularly where several local authorities or Departments
are concerned;
(d) keeping the War Cabinet and Ministers generally informed of what i
s
happening in his sphere.
3. Examples of (a) above are :
(i) Relations with the Free French.
(ii) The administration of occupied enemy territory (subject to paragraph 4
below).
(iii) Propaganda, and subversive and economic warfare.
(iv) Financial questions of an emergency character.
(v) Civil supply questions, including the Middle East Supply Centre.
4. As regards the administration of occupied territory, the Commander-in-
Chief, Middle East, and the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, East Africa,
have delegated their powers to the Chief Political Officers at Cairo and Nairobi
respectively. These two Officers will keep the Minister of State generally
informed. With the concurrence of their respective Commanders-in-Chief, they
have discretion to refer matters to him and take his instructions when reference
to London is unnecessary or would entail unacceptable delay. The Minister of
State for his part will be entitled to give directions to the Chief Political Officers,
with the agreement of the Commanders-in-Chief, on matters which seem to him
to require such directions.
5. The Minister of State will be fully informed of the approved policy of
His Majesty's Government on all major issues. If any question should arise on
which he requires special guidance, he will, provided that there is time, refer the
matter home. He will, in any case, report constantly to His Majesty's Government
and will receive from time to time their directions. His normal channel of
communication will be through the medium of His Majesty's Embassy in Cairo
and the Foreign Office, but he may also make use of any other available and
convenient channel. He will also address personal telegrams directly to the Prime
Minister and Minister of Defence whenever convenient. -On Departmental matters
he will communicate with Departments direct. I n general, except where an
immediate decision is required, he will consult the Minister concerned on any
proposed action before it is taken if it is not clearly in accordance with approved
policy. When on grounds of urgency the Minister" acts on any important matter
without prior consultation with London, he will report the circumstances as soon
as possible to the appropriate Department.
6. The Minister of State will preside over meetings of the Middle East
War Council and Defence Committee.
7. On the diplomatic and political side, the Minister of State will
co-ordinate so far as is necessary the activities and recommendations of HisA
in
Majesty s representatives in Egypt, the Sudan, Palestine and Trans-J ordan
Iraq. Saudi Arabia (subject to certain reservations), Aden, the Aden
Protectorate the Yemen Persia, Abyssinia, British SomaliiandVoccupied enemy V * . J H P * * ;
territories (Eritrea and Italian Somaliland), Syria, the Lebanteana Cyprus
This instruction in no way detracts from the existing individual responsibilities
of His Majesty s representatives m the above territories, or their official relation-
ships with their respective departments at home.
THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HI S BRITANNIC MAJ ESTVS GOVERNMENT
. - : a .
SECRET. / Copy No
W.P. ($2) \m.
April 5, 1942.
WAR CABI NET.
PROPOSED ANGLO-SOVIET TREATY.
Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
I CI RCULATE herewith to my colleagues three telegrams from and to
Lord Halifax which show the position we have now reached with President
Roosevelt (Annex I) as regards our concluding with the Soviet Government a
treaty which would embody our recognition of the Soviet Union's frontiers, other
than the frontier between the Soviet Union and Poland, as they existed before
the German invasion of Russia.
2. I t will be seen that the President is prepared to acquiesce reluctantly
in our concluding a treaty recognising such Russian frontiers, but that he hopes
it may be possible to persuade Stalin to agree that any persons wishing to
emigrate from the territories which the Soviet Government propose thus to
reoccupy shall be given the opportunity to do so.
3. I now propose to inform the Soviet Ambassador that His Majesty's
Government are ready to negotiate a treaty on the basis desired by Stalin, and
that I should like these negotiations to take place in London, since it will be
easier for me if I am in direct charge of the negotiations to decide questions
which may arise involving points on which American repercussions may be
important. Since President Roosevelt intends to invite M. Molotov to pay a
visit to Washington, it might be tactful to suggest that M. Molotov should try
so to time his journey as to be able to sign the treaty in London on his way to
Washington.
4. I would invite M Maisky to agree that we should take as the starting
point of our discussions the draft treaty which was communicated to. and
amended by, Stalin when I was in Moscow. The text of this draft will be found
in Annex I I .
5. I n this draft the first paragraph of article 3 constitutes the text proposed
by Stalin in order to embody the undertaking to be given regarding the Soviet
pre-war frontiers. I t will be necessary to supplement this provision with a
stipulation to the effect that our recognition of the Soviet Union's claim to these
frontiers does not apply to the frontier between Poland and the Soviet Union.
Incidentally, I have assured General Sikorski that the proposed treaty will be
of benefit to Polish interests, since it will establish the right of His Majesty's
Government to concern themselves with the future frontier settlement in Eastern
Europe, including the Polish-Russian frontier.
6. I t will be desirable to redraft the second part of article 3 of the treaty
so as (a) to bring out the fact that in encouraging confederations of States the
object we have in mind is not merely to strengthen their economic and political
11681 [23660] B
independence, but also their capacity to defend themselves militarily against
foreign aggression; and (b) to prevent misconceptions on the part of Allied
Governments and populations, as well as European neutrals generally, as to the
role of the Soviet Union in the economic reconstruction of post-war Europe.
7. I t will also be necessary that we should do our best to persuade the Soviet
Government to agree to the insertion in the treaty of a stipulation which will
meet President Roosevelt's request that the populations of the territories which
the Soviet Union is to reoccupy under the treaty shall have the right to emigrate.
I fear it will be difficult to persuade Stalin to agree to such a concession, and.
even if he does, it has the disadvantage that any attempt on our part to implement
it in practice is bound to arouse Soviet ill-feeling and resentment without
achieving any satisfactory results.
8. The Allied Governments and the remaining neutral Governments in
Europe will be on the look-out for any suggestion that the Soviet Government is
to play a predominant part in the social and economic reconstruction of Europe.
They will require, therefore, to be reassured, and I would propose that this should
be done
(a) by carefully drafting the relevant articles in the treaty itself (see
paragraph 7);
(b) by making some reassuring statement at the same time as the treaty
is signed;
(c) by launching suitable propaganda to counteract the propaganda we may
expect from Germany.
9. In particular the signature of the treaty is bound to cause anxiety to
the Governments of the States adjacent to the Soviet Union : Poland, certain
Balkan States, and Turkey. In order to dispel this anxiety it will be desirable
that agreement should be reached on the following points with the Soviet
Government outside the actual framework of the political treaty :
(a) There should be some Anglo-Soviet instrument reaffirming Stalin's
declaration in favour of a strong Poland and stating that nothing in
the present treaty conflicts with the assurance given by His Majesty's
Government to the Polish Government at the time of the signature of
the Polish-Soviet agreement, to the effect that "Hi s Majesty's
Government do not recognise any territorial changes which have been
effected in Poland since August 1939." I am committed to consult
General Sikorski on the subject of the treaty, and I propose to take
an early opportunity to inform him of the position and of our
intentions. .
(&) There should be some Anglo-Soviet instrument in elaboration of
paragraph 2 (a) of article 3 of the treaty to the effect that the Soviet
and British Governments hope that all the States in the Danubian
Basin and the Balkan peninsula will find their place in confederations,
for which bases have already been laid in the treaties recently
concluded between Czechoslovakia and Poland on the one hand, and
Yugoslavia and Greece on the other. I t is important to obtain such
a statement from Stalin so as to counteract any claim which he
might be tempted to make to treat Roumania and Bulgaria as coming
within the Russian sphere of influence, and therefore not suitable for
absorption into any Balkan confederation.
(c) In order to reassure Turkey it is most important that His Majesty's
Government and the Soviet Government should before the signature
of the treaty address either joint or simultaneous declarations to the
Turkish Government explaining that the motive of the two Govern-
ments in concluding the treaty is the better to pursue their common
object of defeating Germany, and reaffirming to the Turkish Govern-
ment in the most solemn manner the assurances of the 10th August,
1941. These assurances stated that His Majesty's Government"and
the Soviet Government had no aggressive intentions or claims with
regard to the Straits; that they remained faithful to the Montreux
Convention, which regulates the regime of the Straits; that both
Governments were prepared scrupulously to observe the territorial
integrity of the Turkish Republic; and that both Governments were
prepared to send Turkey every help and assistance in the event of her
being attacked by any European Power.
10. I n addition to the political treaty a military treaty was also discussed
in Moscow. The draft then prepared is attached as Annex I I I . I t does not give
rise to any questions of policy with which I need trouble the Cabinet, but its
wording and its relationship with the Anglo-Soviet agreement of J uly 1941 will
require further consideration. .
11. I n order to meet Stalin's expressed wish I would like authority, if he
presses for it, to agree that the two treaties should be treaties between Heads of
States instead of as at present between Governments.
12. There is no question of the Dominions being asked to be parties to the
treaties.
A. E.
Foreign Office, April 5, 1942.
[ 23660]
ANNEX I.
(1)
Mr. Eden to Viscount Halifax (Washington).
(No. 1960. Most Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, March 26, 1942.
YOU will have seen from my telegram No. 1899 that President Roosevelfs
attempt to move Stalin on the Russian frontier question has been unavailing.
We, are therefore faced with a position where we are bound to take a decision
of our own in this matter: I am convinced that we cannot allow it to drag on
any further without incurring grave responsibilities and dangers. I feel
convinced, too, that no continuance of the present discussion, either with the
President or with Stalin, will lead to any satisfactory result, whereas it may
well make it more difficult than it is at present for His Majesty's Government
to take a decision of their own.
2. I fully realise that the President will not like it if we now tell Stalin
that we are prepared to go ahead with our treaty negotiations on the basis of
his frontier claims, and that in doing so we shall be creating trouble for him
with his public opinion. Had circumstances been more favourable I should have
naturally wished to spare him this embarrassment, but things being as they are
I cannot take the risk of keeping Anglo-Russian relations in a state of suspended
animation any longer. The war situation has now become too serious for such
dilatory tactics.
3. I must ask you therefore to take up the matter at once with the President
and speak to him on the lines of my immediately following telegram. Before
doing so I hope that you will be able to discuss the matter with Lord Beaverbrook,
who knows all about this question and has taken part in our many Cabinet
discussions upon it. You would, I know, find him helpful to you as expressing
at first hand the War Cabinefs view.
(2)
Mr. Eden to Viscount Halifax (Washington).
(No. 1961. Most Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, March 26, 1942.
MY immediately preceding telegram.
Stalin's reply to President and supplementary explanation of Soviet Govern-
ment's views given to me by Soviet Ambassador on their instructions make it clear
that they are unwilling to accept settlement of frontier question outstanding
between us and them on basis suggested by President in his conversation with
M. Litvinov, and that they now await further move from us.
2. While we appreciate the Presidents difficulties, this country, as a
European Power for whom collaboration with a victorious U.S.S.R. after the war
will be essential, cannot afford to neglect any opportunity of establishing intimate
relations of confidence with Stalin. Fact is that at present time there is no frank
discussion with Russians at all on major questions concerning conduct of the war.
However unreasonably Russians take the attitude that question of Stalin's
demand must be cleared out of way before such frank relations can exist. Matter
has become more urgent now in that we have to make arrangements, in common
with United States Government, for renewal of Supplies^Protocol after its
expiry in J une.
3. I n a word, His Majesty's Government cannot run the risk of allowing
this question to drag on any longer. Anglo-Russian relations cannot be left in
suspense at this critical moment in the war. Still less can His Majesty's Govern-
ment incur the danger of antagonising the Soviet Government at a moment when
the closest Allied co-operation in Europe is of such vital and urgent importance.
They have reached the conclusion, therefore, that they must in the common
interest tell the Soviet Government that they are prepared to negotiate a treaty
whereby, among other things, we would recognise the Soviet Governments claims
to the 1940 frontiers (other than the Russo-Polish frontier).
4. We hope that the President, whatever his views may be with regard to
bur policy, will agree that His Majesty's Government have taken all possible steps
to consult the United States Government before taking action.
5. We fully realise that the President will find it difficult, in view of his
public opinion, to express approval of the Anglo-Russian treaty which we hope
will result from these negotiations. But even if he cannot approve our proposed
line of action we trust that he will at least understand our reasons, will make due
allowance for them and will abstain from any overt action which would indicate
that there is any divergence between us.
6. Incidentally, you should make it clear, with reference to paragraph 3 of
your telegram No. 1477, that there is no question of the President being asked
to " subscribe " to any treaty, nor has it ever been contemplated that the treaty
should be secret.
7. We hope that the President will, in judging our action, bear in mind
that we, too, have our public opinion to consider. There is no doubt that if
things go ill with Anglo-Soviet relations we should be bitterly blamed for having
rejected Stalin's demand, and the position might well become catastrophic if
Stalin were to adopt a policy more or less hostile to our interests and were to
justify it publicly on the ground that, owing to the obstinacy and short-sighted-
ness of His Majesty's Government, he had been unable to establish any basis of
co-operation with Great Britain.
8. Looked at from the practical point of view the concession which we are
called upon to make does not involve us in any onerous commitment.
9. I did not fail to observe that the President in his communication to
Stalin offered at the successful conclusion of the war to support all legitimate
measures by the Soviet Government to obtain complete future security for the
territories of the Union. Similar assurances were offered to Stalin by myself
during the discussions of last December. The fact that Stalin rejected them
then, as he rejects them now, shows clearly that this matter cannot be dealt with
merely as a security problem. I t has a ps3
r
chological character, which derives
from the fact that for twenty years the Soviet Government has not been in
relations of equality or confidence with any of the great Western Powers.
Stalin's admittedly discreditable deal with Germany does not affect Russians
claim in his eyes. Indeed, he has chosen the case of the 1940 frontiers as
a criterion of our intentions precisely because we had at the time refused to
recognise the Soviet Union's annexation of the Baltic States as a strategic
necessity, and because he cannot admit either to himself or to the Russian people
that the Government with which he is now in alliance still maintains its formal
disapproval of the Soviet Governments action and still declines to acknowledge
the Soviet Governments right to recover from the common enemy what they
consider to be their own territory.
10. Meanwhile the Soviet Government is bearing the brunt of the fighting,
and Great Britain, apart from supplying war material, is not in a position to
give direct assistance bo the Soviet army in the coming German attack in the
Ukraine. This unfortunate situation at what may be the crisis of the war
makes it all the more necessary that we should not appear any longer to be
refusing to make the political concession which the Soviet Government have at
this juncture asked of us.
The recognition of the Soviet Governments claim to their 1940 frontiers
can, of course, be no substitute for the material help which we should like to be
able to give them in the battlefields of Europe, but as a timely gesture in evidence
of our sympathy in the Russian struggle and our confidence in Russian success
it may be of inestimable value.
Viscount Halifax to Mr. Eden.
(No. 1921. Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) Washington, April 1, 1942.
MY telegram No. 1892 and your telegram No. 2110.
1. I saw the Under-Secretary of State this afternoon. He told me that the
Presidents views remained the same and that they both thought concessions on
this frontier question would only encourage further demands.
2. The President had instructed him to speak as follows :
I n Stalin's version of what he wanted (see first sentence of second
paragraph of your telegram No. 1989, which I had read to the Under-
Secretary of State two days ago), there was nothing safeguarding the Baltic
peoples.
I t would be helpful from the point of view of the Atlantic Charter and
United States public opinion if you could get some stipulation inserted,
whereby, when Russia was again able to take over these countries, Stalin
would agree that any people who wished to emigrate could be entitled to do
so with their property. This should also apply to the parts of Finland and
East Poland that might be concerned.
If it made it easier to have this arranged on a reciprocal basis, exchange
of populations, there was no objection.
3. When the matter was made public the President would have to say that
he had been informed, and he would try to say no more. He could certainly
indicate no approval, and it must be expected that this silence would be construed
as disapproval.
4. I told the Under-Secretary of State that I would transmit the Presidents
suggestion, but that I anticipated that Stalin would think that acceptance of it
would be destructive of his main case.
I think the Under-Secretary of State appreciated this, but repeated that it
would make a tremendous difference here if you could get anything of the sort in.
5. He told me that the President had not made any arrangement to see the
Soviet Ambassador, but that he was conveying a message to Stalin proposing
visit here by Molotov in order to discuss the projects, military and others, that
the President might have in mind.
6. General atmosphere was sorrowful, but much less resentful than I
had feared.
If and when you get so far, I hope you will do everything you can in any
publication to have regard to the reaction of United States opinion that is much
less sympathetic to Russia than I imagine British opinion to be, and as usual
is a good deal more emotional.
ANNEX I I .
Draft Agreement between the U.S.S.R. and Great Britain for the Settlement of
Post-War Questions and for Common Action to ensure Security in Europe
after the Termination of the War with Germany.
HI S Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of
Soviet Socialist Republics have concluded the following agreement :
ABTI CL E 1.
The two Contracting Parties jointly affirm their acceptance of the principles
of the declaration made on the 14th August, 1941, by the President of the United
States and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom.
The two Contracting Parties undertake that, in the settlement of post-war
questions connected with the organisation of peace and security in Europe, they
will act by mutual agreement.
ARTI CL E 2.
The two Contracting Parties agree that after the termination of hostilities
they will take all measures in their power to render impossible a repetition of
ggression and violation of the peace by Germany.
a
ARTI CLE 3.
The two Contracting Parties undertake to work for the reconstruction of
Europe after the war with full regard to the interests of both parties in their
security as well as to the desire of the U.S.S.R. for the restoration of its frontiers
violated by the Hitlerite aggression, and in accordance with the two principles
not to seek territorial aggrandisement for themselves and not to interfere in the
affairs of European peoples.
The objectives of this task of reconstruction will include, in particular :
(a) The safeguarding and strengthening of the economic and political
independence of all European countries either as unitary or
federated States.
(b) The reconstruction of the industrial and economic life of those countries
whose territories have been overrun by Germany or her associates.
ARTI CL E 4.
The two Contracting Parties agree to render one another all possible
economic assistance after the war.
The present agreement has been concluded in duplicate in the English and
Russian languages.
Both texts have equal force.
By authority of His Majesty's Govern- By authority of the Government of the
raent in the United Kingdom : Union of Soviet Socialist Republics :
ANNEX I I I .
Draft Agreement for Mutual Military Assistance between the U.S.S.R. and
Great Britain in the War against Germany.
HI S Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Government
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have concluded the following
agreement:
ARTI CL E 1.
An Alliance is hereby established between the Soviet Union and Great
Britain and the two allied Powers mutually undertake to afford one another
military assistance and support of all kinds in the war against Germany and
those associated with her acts of aggression in Europe.
ARTI CL E 2.
The two Contracting Parties undertake not to enter into negotiations with
the Hitlerite Government or any other Government of Germany that does not
clearly renounce all aggressive intentions and not to conclude any armistice or
peace treaty with Germany except by mutual consent.
ARTI CL E 3.
Each Contracting Party undertakes not to conclude any alliance and not to
take part in any coalition directed against the other Contracting Party.
ARTI CL E 4.
The present agreement enters into force immediately upon signature and is
subject to ratification at the earliest possible date.
The exchange of the instruments of ratification shall take place in London.
The present agreement has been concluded in duplicate in the English and
Russian languages.
Both texts have equal force.
By authority of His Majesty's Govern- By authority of the Government of the
ment in the United Kingdom : Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:
MOST SECRET. Copy No.
W.P. (42) 145.
April A, 1942.
TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND .KEY.
WAR CABINET.
THE MALAYAN CAMPAIGN.
NOTE BY THE SECRETARY .
THE attached telegram, summarising Major-General Bennetts report on
the Malayan campaign, is circulated to the War Cabinet by direction of the
Prime Minister.
(Signed) E. E. BRIDGES,
Secretary of the War Cabinet.
April 4, 1942.
Telegram from C.G.S., Australia, to War Office.[Received April 3, 1942.)
(M.C. 5694.) (Most Secret.)
Reference your 73149 (M.O. 10), 26/2, 75821 (M.O. 10), 12/3, and my
M.C. 5232, 3/3.
Following is summary Major-General Bennetfs report on Malayan
campaign :
Part 1.Causes of Failure.
(a) Prime cause low morale Indian troops. Due-'
1. Eastern races less able to withstand strain modern war.
2. Lack attention by officers to deliberate building troops' morale, viz.,
troops quartered in camps in rubber plantations never saw sunlight.
3. Homesickness and lack of entertainment.
(b) Lack of offensive spiritretreat complex.
1. Many commanders and senior officers imbued with retreat complex.
Spirit of resignation prevailed.
2. Repeatedly slightest enemy opposition checked our local offensives.
Many withdrawals without pressure from enemy. I n short, lack of spirit
in junior officers:
[23659]
B
(c) Poor quality of staff work.Especially in certain departments
e:g., ordnance, also 3rd Indian Corps. Broadly, staffs too cumbersome, many
officers inefficient, efficient officers hamstrung by complications of British system.
Operations little better than administration, viz., lack of system in obtaining and
disseminating information, no transmitter sets left behind enemy lines. Also,
orders frequently given, altered, then cancelled.
(d) Lack of air support.Quality and quantity air support inadequate.
Undue proportion aircraft lost on aerodromes. Adequate air support could have
protected navy, thus obstructing coastal landings. Immediately previous assault
on island, enemy able to make perfect reconnaissance defence positions under
construction.
(e) Wishful thinking.^2nd December Malaya Command advised no likeli-
hood J apanese attack. Reports promulgated among formations under-estimated
enemy.
(f) Training neglected.Training in jungle fighting, patrols, &c. neglected.
(g) Lack appreciation effect climatic conditions on stamina.
(h) Poor quality 18th British Division.
Part 2.Tactics.
(a) British.
1. Weak because unable pro vide relief fighting troops from reserves,
thus avoiding fatigue.
2. Existence of retreat complex.
3. Absence of offensive spirit due to 1 and 2.
(b) Amplification of press statements reference 1918 text book methods.
1. In 1918 British method attacking position pound it heavily with
artillery until opposition reduced, then advance under artillery barrage.
Since 1939 this method obsolete, yet large conservative element officers
adhered such obsolete methods. Repeatedly commanders adhered rigid
methods of defence.
2. Beach defence systems provided long thin line posts along beach
without depth with vulnerable flanks whereas modern perimeter system of
defence on shorter flank much more effective.
(c) Japanese tactics.
1. Infiltration and outflanking.
2. Through above enemy established forces which coalesced into larger
groups behind our lines, causing withdrawal due rigid system defence and
morale. - .
3. Soft spot tactics avoiding frontal attack or close contact where
possible.
4. Tricksuse of noise to induce terror, especially behind positions at
night. ,
11
, , ^, . , , x - ^
5. Use of fishing craft to advance along coastline by night.
6. Leapfrogging methods used to keep troops fresh.
7. Aircraft not used by night.
Part 3.Training.
Training in jungle, jungle patrols neglected. Unlike J apanese no
appreciation many British commanders that different conditions required
different tactics. Too much emphasis on barrack square training. Lack of
equipment accompanying earlier units affected standard reached.
Part .4.Organisation.
Seven. Bren carriers per battalion sufficient in this terrain. Mortars 3-inch
most useful infantry * weapon. Establishment reduced minimum provide
concentration fire. A.I.F. Mechanical Transport with infantry reduced 50 per
cent. Anti-Tank guns needed in forward posts, transport suitably provided by
Bren carriers. Artillery equipment could be varied. Rarely whole regiment
required to support brigade. Large number wheeled vehicles burden. A.I.F-
patrols stripped to minimum. Gas capes J ioods discarded altogether, gas masks
stored B echelon vehicles. . A.I.F.. by reducing infantry equipment, increased
\
numbers fighting infantry. Re-organisation Headquarters Company provided
extra platoon. Surplus' battalion transport, mortars carrier personnel and
addition of half first reinforcements enabled fourth rifle platoon be added each
company. Such rifle fire power badly needed.
Part 5.Equipment.
1. British equipment unsuitable, following war establishments instead of
being adapted to climatic conditions.
2. J apanese equipfnent suitable. Comprised light automatic weapons, light
mortars, no artillery except what was captured. Transport just sufficient to meet
needs and not clutter roads and prevent movement. British too mechanically-
minded.
3. J apanese infantry clothed suitably, travelled light and used bicycles..
18th British Division went into battle full equipment, troops worn out in
few hours.
4. British technical equipment weak, especially signal equipment.
Part 6.Problem of Defence of Singapore Island.
Decision to defend from positions far away from island itself sound.
Decision to forestall enemy landing Singora and Patani by sending expedition
from Kedah unsound, becauseJ apanese would occupy towns prior casus belli.
Insufficient troops undertake operation successfully. Wrong to absorb only
reserve for this task.
Part 7.Defences Constructed during Campaign.
1. I t must have been anticipated retreat which commenced 7th December
would end on Singapore Island. When troops reached island 30th J anuary they
found no defences prepared except those prior to hostilities.
2. Work immediately begun to install beach lights, beach guns (mostly
taken from Mersing), and construct posts, obstacles.
3. No doubt Singapore Island shouldjhave been strongly fortified against
attack from mainland. Strong perimeters,"support and reserve positions could
have been prepared.
Part 8.Own and Enemy Casualties.
(a) Own
1. Difficult to assess because nature of country facilitated isolation of units.
When attacked, parties were often surrounded and following subsequent
disintegration survivors broke off fight and made back to mother unit, sometimes
taking days. Missing personnel thus continually reappeared. Meanwhile, units
reported casualties "as heavy, also as units withdrew wounded, killed and missing
were left behind, many of whom were never recovered. Some units suffered heavy
casualties by desertion. At first deserters were collected and returned units,
1
towards the end this impracticable as morale low.
2. 11th February, A.I.F. casualties were approximately 7,000 killed
or missing, while approximately 2,000 in hospital. Impossible to estimate total
casualties till enemy report number of prisoners.
3. White population suffered heavily.
(b) Enemy
1. Impossible even to guess total casualties inflicted on enemy.
2. I n Gemas battle conservatively estimated 1,000 killed.
3. Throughout retirement, A.I .F. inflicted losses in many counter-attacks.:
4. At Bakri enemy also severely punished.
Part 9.Conduct of Defence of Singapore Island.
. A Defences of island divided into three sectors. Eastern 11th Indian
division. Western A.I.F., and 44th Indian Brigade, Southern, troops from
Singapore defences. 3rd Indian Corps consisting 18th British Division and
remnants of 9th Indian Division in reserve.
n
2. Work immediately commenced preparing positions. Soon realised coast-
hne could only be held thinly.
[23659] 2
B
3. Night 4th/5th February, patrol encountered large enemy concentrations
mainland overlooking straits J ohore.
4. 7th February, enemy aircraft and artillery started bombardment.
Concentrated attention on headquarters and roa,ds western sector. Due effective
air reconnaissance, communications cut. Defences destroyed. Information that
night enemy had landed large force. Two battalions holding position overrun.
5. Reserves thrown in to counter-attack, but unable to stem enemy advance.
New line between Sungei Kranji and Sungei J urong formed.
6. Further enemy landing and continuous pressure forced line back to road
between Bukit Panjong and Bukit Timah villages.
7. After conference with General Wavell line to be pushed forward easy
stages on 11th and 12th February. This impossible. Enemy tanks first
encountered on island. Thorn force, which attacked morning 12th February,
ended up well behind starting line.
8. A.I.F. and remnants 2nd/15th Indian Brigade formed perimeter vicinity
Reformatory Road. To right, Thorn force held racecourse. * To left, 44th Indian
Brigade and fortress troops extended line to Pasir Panjang.
9. Decided hold reservoirs if possible. Understood enemy then landed
somewhere northern sector and force line back reservoir.
10. Thorn force fell back further. Australians remained in position, which
held to end with battalion 2nd Gordons. On left, 44th Brigade melted away.
11. Meanwhile "enemy aircraft concentrated on city, causing heavy
casualties.
12. 13th February. First conference Fort Canning. Commanders each
gave opinion further resistance useless. Pei'cival suggested attack, but possible
scale rendered useless, and arrangements made to evacuate specialists.
13. 14th and 15th, situation worse. City surrounded, plight population
most serious.
14. 15th February. Second conference. Commanders confirmed previous
opinion. Decided suggest hostilities cease that day, and ask if sufficient troops
could remain under arms to preserve order. Destruction technical equipment
discussed left to unit commanders to implement.
15. At 2030 hours the cessation of hostilities ordered J apanese allowed
1,000 men remain under arms.
Part 10.Japanese Forces on Singapore Island.
I n first attack on island it seems enemy used one division against positions
held by two battalions north-west sector island. Having created gap, he poured
troops this division towards Bukit Timah village. Believed elements second
division also pushed through this sector. Simultaneously, enemy were in
occupation Pengerang Peninsula and island Palau Ubin opposite Changi. Later
. he appeared on Welau Blakang Mati. These two divisions were identified as
same as operated on mainland.
Part 11.Guerillas still Fighting On.
During operations in mainland many Chinese trained in guerrilla fighting
were passed behind enemy lines. Reported that over 1,000 were still fighting in
northern Malaya when operations ceased. Also large parties Malays from N.E.I.
under Dutch officers were operating behind enemy lines. Dumps of food were
established beyond Segamat.
Part 12.Attitude of Civil Population to Military Authorities.
1. Contrary reports that natives were unfriendly, not one case of fifth
column activity was reported by A.I.F. Malays, Chinese assisted as guides,
provided food boats, &c.
2. During campaign in north desertions of Malay volunteers were reported.
Men of a Malay regiment contacted by A.I.F. fought as well as I ndian troops.
3. Civilian population cleared from areas where fighting was expected
displayed no antagonism as result.
4. Generally, natives showed disinterestedness in war.
5. During aerial bombardment Singapore Chinese showed great stoicism.
They, Malays, Indians, provided personnel for fire-fighting ambulance service
until casualties too heavy.
6. Special mention is due to white population for devotion to duty.
Volunteer forces displayed great bravery.
Part 13.Relations between Civil and Military Authorities.'
1. As martial law was proclaimed Singapore civil authorities could not be
blamed for shortcomings.
2. Civilian labour problem was acute. Labourers often refused unload
ships over 24-hour periods; also, scarcity labour accentuated difficulties
towards end.
3. Reliably stated that protector of Chinese did not treat them
sympathetically.
4. His Excellency the Governor, justifiably or not, was adversely criticized
in many quarters.
5. A.I.F. found Sultan of J ohore most helpful. Although antagonistic to
British officialdom was not unfriendly to cause.
Part 14.Details Effectiveness Demolitions.
1. Reports revealed that in beginning campaign destruction of property
useful to enemy was not organised, viz., Penang.
2. Destruction rubber, machinery, tin. dredges. &c, thoroughly executed
later. Rolling stock, road making plant was generally removed and oil, petrol
tanks, aerodromes, bridges demolished.
3. Accumulation of material removed to Island was not all destroyed.
Much of value Was left in naval dockyard.
4. Dumps ammunition, petrol, food, were partly demolished by enemy in'-;
last phase.
5. J apanese repaired aerodromes and bridges with utmost expedition.
6. Scorched earth policy was too enthusiastically applied. Destruction of'
dumps, &c, behind our lines visible afar and gave troops feeling that positions
were temporary.
Part 15.Conditions, Time of Surrender.
(a) Civil population.Civil hospital without water for over 24 hours. City
water supply exhausted. Impossible collect bombing casualties as fast as caused:
Many buildings collapsed on occupants. Insufficient medical aid available.
Limited supply of food.
(b). Army.Water supply ceased. Only three days' supply rations remained.
No artillery ammunition available. Morale of troops was extremely weak.
In conclusion A.I .F. found nothing but full co-operation when staff Malaya
Command was approached. Relations most friendly throughout.
Printed, for the War * Cabinet,. - A;
SECRET. Copy No.
W.P. (42) 146.
April 5, 1942.
TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK fD KEY.
WAR CABINET.
BY direction of the Prime Minister the attached N.I.D. Report, dated the
31st March, 1942, is circulated to members of the War Cabinet for information.
(Signed) E. E. BRI DGES, Secretary.
April 5, 1942.
Sorae Remarks made by Japanese Diplomats and Attaches in European Capitals
at end of February.
THE war in the Far East was now a foregone conclusion. No one had
expected that England would prove so weak and so passive. During the 2^years
of the war the British had not carried out a single serious operation with really
prepared and concentrated forces.
2. The losses suffered by Great Britain in the Far East were important,
not only militarily, but politically. A proof of this was the attitude of Siam
and the number of Hindu detachments who appeared to have passed over to the
J apanese side.
3. Naval losses had shown that, although the British Navy fought well,
they fought with antiquated methods and without adequate co-operation and
support from other arms.
4. J apan would not take too much. The capture of Singapore and the
possibility of the J apanese Fleet entering the Indian Ocean, as well as the
liquidation of British, American and Dutch forces on the remaining islands of
the Archipelago, would allow J apan to organise defensive bases and to liquidate
the Chinese problem.
5. The J apanese are following a similar policy to that of Soviet Russia;
that is, they received counsels from their allies, but kept their own military
measures in complete secrecy. This policy had admirably justified itself, for
J apan's opponents had been completely surprised by the extent of her prepara-
tions. The J apanese added to this : " We know very well that on the one hand
our great ally Germany is exceedingly pleased with our remarkable, well-prepared
and calculated victories. On the other hand, they are worried lest it may be us
who will say the decisive word in the decision of the war against Russia and,
indeed, of the whole war generally, and are afraid lest after the war we become
too strong."
[23661]
6. Should the German' offensive in Russia prove successful, then the question
of J apanese-German co-operation would arise.
7. The J apanese would not wait till the Allies had mobilised real strength
in the Pacific. The intention was to conclude peace at an early date, which would
be quite easy, as if the British and the Americans suffered further territorial
losses, their Parliaments would raise a howl and would change their Govern
ments or their policy.
8. Hong Kong, in point of fact, defended itself bravely to the end against
superior J apanese strength. The Filipinos strike the J apanese as very good
soldiers and are admired. Singapore was an English scandal. The General
commanding was a weakling who, at the decisive moment, lost his head. The
preparations for the defence of Singapore were carried out literally at the last
minute. The J apanese losses were relatively very small, because 99 per cent, of
the garrison surrendered almost without fighting.
9. " I t is essential at any price to force a final decision as early as possible,
both in Europe and in the Far East, and at the very latest before the spring
of 1943."
Comment.
The remark in paragraph 7, indicating that J apan would attempt to make
peace as soon as they had consolidated their position in the Burma, Malay,
-Netherlands East Indies line, may well have been her original policy. The ease
of her conquests has probably whetted her appetite for more. Also the quotation
in paragraph 9 saying an early peace is essential is of interest.
MOST SECRET. ^ . " "
' ' - I O r UNDER LOOKA i
COPY NO
. 13
IfH APRIL. 1942.
e n s u t
'
6
the seci ;j , ij
l i a
documeiit.
WAR CABINET.
INDIA.
By direction of the Prime Minister the
attached telegrams are circulated for consideration
by the War Cabinet
0
(Signed) E.E, BRIDGES.
Secretary.. .
Great Geor ge St r eet , S*W*. Is
X TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KfcV S E C R E T
It Is requested that special care may be ta!o
ensure the secrecy of thi s document
Allotted to Pri vate Secretary
1
3
t Ps i r^" D- M on tea ih"2
8943
'
OF T E L E G R A M
to- 8" of So f or.1ndi a*
Fran vi ceroy
Dated New Del hi 21-45 hrs., 4th A pri l , 1942*
Rece
i ved 08* 55 br s, 5 th Apr11
1
1943*
?,iOST IMMEDIATE
890,3y, Pef apnal ,,and very secreto Superi ntendent
Fol l owi ng from Si r? S.* Cri pps. f or Pri ms Mi ni ster^
series-
l o The ti me-has now arri ved when- a f i nal
decision must he arri ved at as to how f ar we are prepared to
go on the- chance of getti ng a- settl ement.--- My best esti mate of
the'si tuati on i s as f ol l ows!
2 ! The Moslem League are sati sf i ed and prepared
to accept scheme as i t s t ands ' ..
Congress reacti on you know fx^cm my tel egram
of Aprl 1 2n&* Accordi ng to nest i nf ormati on I can get
No* 871
ernal -a-u tresses there are at l east three secti ons of
S3 tO l i l t
opi ni ons- -
The :Ga
ndhi wi ng of non-vi ol ence wno are a gai ns'c
scheme aI
together
*- They.are i ndi f f erent as to what happens
i n t he wa
r and iê
gard Great, Bri tai n as def eated and uni mportant
so f ar as
f uture
of I ndi a i s concerned" They are def i ni tel y
a mi nor i t
T he
remainder' are al l i n f avour of
*I ghti ng the
-
J apanese
and wou3.
d parti ci pate i n war gi ven condi ti ons which
i n t hei r
vi ew eou
I d make thei r parti ci pati on ef f ecti ve^
5,, I t I s i mpossi bl e to, esti mate rel ati ve strength
of the two groups?, but the l atter mi ght i f sati sf i ed be abl e t o
swing Working Commi ttee parti cul arl y i f of f er on Defence were
suf f i ci entl y f avourabl e to make any refusal, on that ground l ook
ri di cul ous * - - *
6a Nothi ng can be done to meet Congress on the
oints other than Defence- The f i r st poi nt upon." i ndependence"
is pot a vi tal one- The second as to I ndi an States cannot be
met wi thout upsetti ng seri ousl y the States
8
Rul ers which i eoutct
not recommend" at thi s stage- The thi rd on on-Ac cessi on i s
vi tal to get Moslem League i n and any change i n that now would ,
only resul t i n l osi ng thei r support and we shoul d be no hetter
off,
The onl y poi nt theref ore for negoti ati on i s our
Clause (S) whi ch as you know was purposel y l ef t vague apart, from
general pri nci pl e of . retenti on of defence^
8* I must make i t cl ear that so f ar as thi s
Point i s concerned,-- the demand f or transf er responsi bi l i ty has
come from al l si des except Moslem League and'Si khs. Many Moslems
'P*T*0*
have demanded, i i i ndi vi dual l y e. g. Pri me Mi ni ster Bengal i General
trend of press i s that i t i s a uni versal demand and i f Congress
ref use on thi s poi nt whatever thei r actual vi ews may be al l other
communi ti es i ncl udi ng Moslem League wi l l probabl y poi nt to i t
as a reason f or ref usal s
9- I must poi nt out that i f Congress do not accept no one
wi l l daise to state that they wi l l accept scheme^ I shoul d expect i t
to be turned down by al l secti ons i ncl udi ng Moslems al ready although \
they have i n f act passed a unanimous resol uti on accepti ng i t i n
thei r Working Committee-
10* I n the' event of acceptance by Congress I am informed
from a good source that non vi ol ent group wi l l probabl y reti re from
al l parti ci pati on i n Working Committee duri ng the war and wi l l leave
other l eaders ( Maulana Azadj, Nehru and Ral agopal achari ) to carry
Oi l s - .
11- These three are (? combatant) and Working Committee
under thei r. control s I am sati sf i ed that i f once they come i n they
wi l l go al l out to maximise I ndi an resi stance to J apan and wi l l
f i ght wi th courage and determi nati on to gal vani se I ndi an peopl e to
acti on^ They have tol d me that there would be no questi on whatever of
any separate peace and I am certai n thi s can be rel i ed upon.--
12 Esti mates wi l l di f f er as to how f ar thei r.comi ng
i n wi l l or
u
can hel p i n the actual prosecuti on of the war*
The two main f actors i n my view are- f i r st that they wi l l
be abl e to assi st greatl y i n preventi ng pani c and mai ntai ni ng morale
amongst the great masses of ci vi l i an popul ati on and organi si ng them
i n ci vi l defence of al l ki nds, and second the Moslems al so wi l l
come i n and throw thei r wei ght I nto the war..
13- I n addi ti on I thi nk that general psychol ogi cal effect
on Al l i ed cause vri.ll be good especi al l y i n al l eastern theatres
of war i ncl udi ng the Near and Mi ddl e Basta-
14. There wi l l of course be ri sks of di f f erences between
Hi s Maj esty
?
s GcvU and I ndi an Government, but these seem to me to
be iimimportant an view of maj or consi derati ons stated i n paragraphs
12 and 13*
15* I f they do not accept,-, then si tuati on wi l l i n my-view
become very di f f i cul t as we shal l be attempti ng to carry on the war
i n at best a neutral atmosphere and at the worst a hosti l e one; a
great deal &f suppressi on wi l l be necessary and thi s wi l l agai n exace:
nati onal i st f eel i ng and no secti on of- the peopl e wi l l be prepared to
come out i n open support of H*M* Govt*
18. i t i s i n these ci rcumstances that we must deci de how far
can go wi th saf ety i n gi vi ng to an I ndi an Mi ni ster control of defers"
, ^
Q V l v
,
3
;
7
\ ,
S o
?
a
**
a s
f uncti ons of the Commander i n-Chi ef as such al
concerned, there can be no questi on whatever as to taki ng any exi st!
power away from Commander- i n-Chi ef *
18. I t i s onl y i n hi s capaci ty as Defence Mi ni ster that airy
quesci on can ari se.. Under the new arrangement whereby the Executive
counci l w i n approxi mate to a Cabi net presumabl y any questi on coming
wi tni n -che competence of the Govt. of I ndi a (. s def i ned i n the
m
a
amended Cl ause (E)) wi l l be f or deci si on by Govt. of I ndi a as a whole
and not by any parti cul ar Mi ni ster-
19- Thi s Wi l l rel ate to al l questi on of *pol i cy as'di sti nct
from admi ni strati on.
20* Ther e seems t o "be t hr ee possi bl e cour ses open - ( a) t o
stand upon pr esent posi t i on t hat not hi ng f ur t her can be done by way
t compr omi se.
Q
("b) To t ake r i sks ent ai l ed and. t o - hand over- Def ence Mi ni st r y
to an I ndi an
t
subj ect t o a convent i on i n wr i t i ng t hat Def ence
( Mi ni st er wi l l not i n any mat t er af f ect i ng pr osecut i on of t he war act
cont rary t o t he pol i cy l ai d, down by Hi s Maj est y
8
s. Gover nment and
commnni cat ed, t hr ough G* i n. 5 .
( e) To cr eat e some new of f i ce f or an I ndi an Mi ni st er
connect ed wi t h Def ence and. t o. hand over t o hi many f unct i ons of
Def ence Mi ni st r y whi ch i n Ci consi der s can. be so handed over saf el y
and pr act i cabl ya
21. . As t o ( a) above? t hi s woul d be a f at al pol i cy f or
two reasons, . Fi r st i t makes f ai l ur e i nevi t abl e and second i t l eaves- .
Hi s Maj est y
5
s Gover nment open t o cr i t i ci smt hat we wer e mer el y
st ubborn when some smal l concessi on mi ght have made al l t he
di f f er ence, .
22, I shoul d- per sonal l y pr ef er t o of f er ( b) as t hi a woul d
I t hi nk have t he best chance of accept ance. But i n vi ew of t he
i mmedi at e danger s and G* i n G*
s
s vi ew of conf usi on t hat mi ght be
caused I cannot pr ess i t as st r ongl y as ot her wi se I woul d.
25, As t o ( e) I doubt ver y much t hat t her e i s any chance
of accept ance. But never t hel ess i f you deci de t hat you cannot act
i n accor dance wi t h par agr aph 22 t hen I t hi nk t hi s shoul d be "tri ed
?
on t he of f - chance of accept ance and i n any event so as t o show we
have done our ut most t o r each an. accommodat i on,
24, . I n t hi s r egar d af t er di scussi on I t hi nk t hat best
that coul d be done t o gi ve ef f ect t o par a. 3d, , 20 ( c) woul d be t o
( a) make C^- dn- GD War member i nst ead of Def ence member and t ur n
Def ence Depar t ment i nt o War Depar t ment s ( b) set up a Def ence
Co- or di nat i on Depar t ment t o t ake cn dut i es of pr esent Def ence-
Co- or di nat i on Sect i on and cer t ai n t hi ngs now done- by Def ence
Depart ment e. publ i c r el at i ons and any/ ot her f unct i ons agr eed t o
tjr C. - i n-Go
- 25, . I f you apbr ove pr i nci pl e of Co) I can wor k out det ai l s
of act ual wor di ng' of of f er wi t h C. - i n- C* and Vi cer oy.
25, , Ther e I s a smal l chance of accept ance as r egar ds
Para. No, 20 Cc) and a bet t er chance as r egar ds par a. No. 20 ( bj . I f
there i s accept ance by Congr ess, I ant i ci pat e t he Mosl em l eague
wi l l come I n and t hi s wi l l be a l ar ge enough measur e of accept ance
to pr oceed wi t h scheme, Ot her bodi es t oo wi l l pr obabl y come I n
so as not t o l ose chance of seat s i n new Gover nment .
27, I n t he event of accept ance, , t her e wi l l of cour se "be
di f f i cul t i es as t o appor t i onment of seat s when Vi cer oy comes t o
f ormhi s new Gover nment and I - woul d pr opose i n t hat event t o st ay
ti l l new Gover nment i s f or med.
28* I t i s a mat t er of ur gency t o deci de as t o how we
Propose t o pr oceed and I ask you t o consi der quest i on most ur gent l y
a s
I am. convi nced we must make some of f er t o meet t he si t uat i on.
I amaski ng Vi cer oy and Commander - - i n- Chi ef t o t el egr aph
t hei r own comment s separ at el y and ur gent l y,
30o When you come t o a deci si on pl ease t el egr aph most
i mmedi at e wor ds . "Your par agr aph Jô.20(Jd) appr oved
11
or "Your
par agr aph No. 20( c) appr oved
5
' si s t he. case may "be and send any
comment s "by separ at el y i mmedi at el y f ol l owi ng t el egr am.
31. I have pr ovi si onal l y pr omi sed Congr ess my. f i nal
answer af t er consul t i ng you by Tuesday morni ng. -
EXTRACT FROM TELEGRAM FROM PRIME MINISTER
TO SIR STAFFORD CRIPPS.
MOST IMMEDATE, SECRET.
Your 89OS,
1 . I ndi a Committee and War Cabi net wi l l consi der
-
your proposal s Monday eveni ng,, I hope by then we shal l
have heard from Vi ceroy and C- i n- C. . I t woul d"be a
great hel p i f we knew exactl y what f uncti ons i t would
be proposed to hand over as matter cannot be deci ded
purel y on pri nci pl e.
3 ' 5E 55 55 35
INWARD TELEGRAM
TYP&X
TOM; SOUTH AFRICA ( H C o )
u
TO: DcOc
D
0
4th Apr,, 1942, 12,, 54 p,ra
c
IMMEDIATE
go, 60'7 MOS.T SECRET -
Fol l owi ng for- Pri me Mi ni ster from
General Smuts,, Begi ns..
I ndi a. I do not wi sh to put spanner i nto
the works and si ncerel y wi sh Cri pps Mi ssi on al l
successj, at same ti me I ndi a i s now key to our whol e
Empire defence and putti ng that Key i n unski l l ed.
I ndi an hands may have f atal resul ts f or thi s was?.
Pl ease i nsi st that f i nal responsi hi 1 i ty f or defence:
measures wi l l rest wi th our High Command whatever
anci l l ary defence powers are devol ved on I ndi an
Divided mi l i tary control may spel l rui n both to
I ndi an and Empire defences,. Ends.-?
SECRET XXX
All2-
;
ted to.. Private Secretary* 9049*
Telegram from Viceroy to Secretary of
State for India*dattjd iSew DelhiK,17*55
hours, 5th A p r i l 1 9 4 8 o
MOST IMMEDIATE.
904aS.g
Priyate. and îêrsonal.^ S up erint eiders t series; * Pol lowing
for your own and Prime Minister
5
a information.. - Cripps handed to
Commando r-ir^ Chief and myself yesterday a draft memorandum on
defence for our views and CcnraandoivChief had discussion with
Azad and Nehru from which it appeared that even if satisfied on
point of defence they would not- concede other points^ We are
preparing our final views on defence in the light of Cr-ipps
telegram 2Jo*690 and though X do not accept as a "balanced picture
hie diagnosis of present morale in India nor h:is gloomiest fore-
bodings of consequences of rejection. I agree that given the
movements of world opinion resulting from his visit v?e must do all
that we safely can to meet him on lines of paragraph &4 of his?
telegram 236*890* We should welcome an early success if it she fid
prove possible but. at the same time I should say that I am more
concerned at dangers arising from prolonged negotiations *-*.i"n
Congress when all minorities and Princes have already t e c f l
seriously upset., than at possible propaganda difficulties a;lsin^
In the event of failure from inability to deprive Congress of a
presentable excuse on defence point * I also apprehend that line
taken in paragraph 18 of his telegram wi l l preclude possibility of
Moslem League co-operation unless they are assured of either (a)
a majority in such a Cabinet or (b)'substantial proportion of
member s reinforced by clear maintenance of Governor-General and
Secretary of State
5
s control during the Interim period^
JL (\J JL
Thi s t el egr am i s ci r cul at ed,
i n connect i on wi t h W. P. ( 42) 147,
( whi ch cont ai ns t he pr evi ous
t el egr amt o whi ch i t - r ef er s) , f or
consi der at i on at t he meet i ng of
t he I ndi a Commi t t ee t o be hel d at
1. 2o 15. p m t o- day and at t he
n 0
meet i ng of t he War Cabi net t o be
hel d at , 6g0 pf f l . , t o- day,
e a
MONDAY, 6t h APRI L, 1942
0
ill
MOST SECRET
CI PHER TELEGRAM-i
COPY NO.
/ 3
042898
Pr om Co- i n-Cr, , I ndi a
0
Despc 0500 6/ 4/ 42o
To: The War Of f i ce, , Reed. 0215 6/ 4/ 42, ,
MOST I MMEDI ATE
8230/ C ci pher 5/ 4 MOST- SECRET.
Pr i vat e f or Pr i me Mi ni st er f r omGener al Wavel l
0
I amsur e you r eal i se t hat I amdoi ng my ut most
i n cl ose consul t at i on wi t h Vi cer oy and Lor d Pr i vy Seal
t o go t o f ur t hest l i mi t possi bl e on quest i on of def ence
i n or der to secur e accept ance of s cherne put f or war d by
H, M. Go I amconvi nced af t er car ef ul consi der at i on
t hat i t woul d not he possi bl e t o separ at e my dual
f unct i ons as ci vi l and def ence member wi t hout causi ng
compl et e di sl ocat i on of machi ne hut I amwor ki ng out
pr oposal t o gi ve ef f ect t o par a, 20( c) of Lor d Pr i vy Seal ' s
t el egr amNo, 890 on t he - l i nes suggest ed i n hi s par a 24
a e
I have l ef t i t t o Vi cer oy t o saf eguar d posi t i on of ci vi l
so t hat he cannot be over r i dden by maj or i t y deci si on i n
counci l on essent i al mat t er s on def ence.
C o 4 ( Tel egr ams) . To: ' Col o E. I . C. J acob, onl y.
i 9Q
JL *J
o
. y \
JS E G R E To COPY
w o
The at t ached t el egr amf r om
t he Pr i me Mi ni st er t o t he Lor d
Pr i vy Seal i s ci r cul at ed i n
connect i on wi t h W, P. ( 42) 147,
whi ch cont ai ns t he t el egr am
No, 890- S t o whi ch i t r ef er s.
124
1
T j j NPf j R L OCK AMD KEY. SECRET XXX
BE!
. , .
requejtcj that speci al care may be taken to
ur'e the secrecy of this document.
!ns
O P T W A R D Is C* H A IL-
l?r.'omSecr et ar y of St at e "O -/ vj ercy' .
despat ched 03, 00 hour s. ' 6f h Apr i l I I
a MOST .
W29,
Sl i p or i ntendent- ser i es.
Fol l owi ng f r ompr i me Mi ni st er t o Lor d Pr i vy
Secret; o
- 3 u
Your 890- S par agr aph 1.8, We have not
hear d anyt hi ng her e ye": about t he wor ds begi nni ng
nder t he new", down *co end of par agr aph. What
does - t hi s mean? Repeat , t o Vi ceroy":
I
i I oO SECRET.
COPY WOoj ^L
The at t t ched t el egr amf r omt he
; 1/ i oeroy I s
ci r cul at ed f or con-
si der at i on at t he meet i ng of t he
War Cabi net t o be hel d at
G^Sp^p^mo. TO- DAY, MONDAY, . 6TH
APRI L, 1942. The t el egr amf r om
t he Lor d Pr i vy Seal t o whi ch i t
r ef er s has al r eady been
ci r cul at ed i n W. P. ( 42) 147*
f Cr i pps'
d
p r i m
c o n
8 9 0 ,
o n t h
v e r
h a n d
p o r t f
p r e s e
s u e t o
D e f e n
i n c l u
p a r s u
a w a y f
D e f e n
e n t r u s
c o n t i
a t p r e
i s f e l
t o C o
1 2
B E K E P T w
J*T
,,
s*. &
SECRET
I t I s r e q u e s t e d t h a t s p e c i a l
a a r e m a y b e t a k e n t o e n s u r e
t h e s e e r e o y o f t h i s d o c u m e n t .
Tel egr amf r omVi cer oy t o Secr et ar y
of St at e f or I ndi a. , dat ed- Del hi ,
03c 38. hour s, 6t h Apr i l 1948 s
r ecei ved 04, 00 hour s, 6t h Apr i l 1942
0
XATE
j .st of . 3 par t s.
P r i v a t e a n d P e r s o n a l ^ F o r y o u r o w n a n d
e M i K T s t e r ^ s i n f o i m l a i l o n . - u n f u r t h e r
0
s i d e r a t i o n o f p a r a g r a p h s 2 0 ( e ) a n d
a n d g i v e n t h e p r e s e n t s t a t e o f w o r l d opi ni on
e s u b j e c t , , C o m f n a n d e r - i n - G h i e f a n d I f e e l no
y s e r i o u s r i s k s a r e i n v o l v e d i n s e t t i n g
i n g o v e r t o a n I n d i a n M e m b e r o f C o u n c i l a
o l i o D e f e n c e C o - o r d i n a t i o n i n c l u d i n g d u t i e s o f
n t D e f e n c e C o - o r d i n a t i o n s e c t i o n a l o n g w i t h
t h e r n o n - e s s e n t i a l f u n c t i o n s o f p r e s e n t
c e D e p a r t m e n t a s W a v e l l t h i n k s - - h e c a n s a f e l y
d e i n t h e n e w p o r t f o l i o .
B u t w e a r e b o t h s a t i s f i e d t h a t i n e x i s t i n g
m s t a n c e s i t i s h o t r e p e a t n o t p o s s i b l e t o t a k e
r o m C o m m a n d e r - i n - C h i e f t h e s u b s t a n c e o f
c e P o r t f o l i o a s n o w h e l d b y h i m i n o r d e r t o
t I t t o a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e I n d i a n ,
W e s e e n o r e a s o n . : w h y G o n r a a n d e r - i p r - G h i e f w h i l e
n u i n g t o p e r f o r m a l l h i s e s s e n t i a l f u n c t i o n s a s
s e n t s h o u l d n o t b e s t y l e d W a r M i n i s t e r i f i t
t t h a t t h i s w o u l d m a k e o f f e r m o r e a t t r a c t i v e
n g r e s s
f
,
84 o
up an
4, There can however be no question of majority
decisions of Council being effective against the
requirements of His Majesty"s Government, and it
st be for Commander-in-Chief and Governor-General
m U
f eo decide whether in a particular instance the
directions of His Majesty'^ Government are to be
enf orced without further argument, or whether
circumstances permit and render it desirable to
di scuss the matter further with 11,hU Government
hef or e H, M. Government's decision is enforced,-.
Go
128
SECRET XXX
D E QYj PJ g. g
R
0. . ^- ,- . .B. L J LG. R- AJ '
Fr om Vi cer oy t o Secy, of St at e for- I ndi a.
Dat ed New. Del hi * 08*40 hour s, 6t h Apr i l / 1948,
Reed. 10. 00 hour s; 6t h Apr i l , 1942*
gl g^g, To pr eser ve r el at i onshi ps st i pul at i on
in pr ecedi ng- par agr aph i t i s essent i al t hat t he posi t i on
of the Execut i ve Counci l shoul d not he gl ossed over i n
ny cl ar i f i cat i on of of f er . Thi s i s mor e necessar y
because of t he popul ar r ef er ences t o an I ndi an Cahi net
or Nat i onal Gover nment s
a
The vi t al t est of t he Cabi net Gover nment ,
Inaraely r esponsi bl e t o an I ndi an Legi sl at i ve, does not
and cannot exi st i n t he i nt er i mper i od. The
Consti tuti onal r esponsi bi l i t y of Gover nor - Gener al i n
loouricil must r emai n t o Par l i ament . , t he Gover nor - Gener al
i
iimst r et ai n hi s power s of over - r i di ng t he Execut i ve
Counci l , and Secy- of St at e hi s power s of di r ect i on and
control over Gover nor s- Gener al i n Counci l . On t he
other- hand non- of f i ci al member s of t he Execut i ve Counci l
appoi nted f or t hei r pol i t i cal i nf l uence wi l l al ways
[possess i n t hei r hands t he weapon of r esi gnat i on. On a
part i cul ar i ssue, on t he whol e of t he pr ocedur e or of
sub s t- ance 3
substance $ t he quest i on t o he deci ded woul d he
Set her t he Gover nor - Gener al and Hi s Maj est y
2
a
Government at t ached so much i mpor t ance t o t hei r own
views t hat t hey woul d he pr epar ed t o f ace the-
r esi gnat i on of t he nonôf f i ci al members. .
gg. On t he whol e t he t est woul d i mmedi at el y
ari se were a maj or i t y of non- of f i ci al member s t o
oppose f or exampl e t he dest r uct i on of t he I ndust r l a
property as a mi l i t ar y measur e.
130
SECRET XXX
fliiatted to Private Secyc, 224.
D E C Y P H E R 0 F T E L E G R A M-
-"-,11 ""-wni imiiPBrirw-WB-rrusKM. xjiupjiar a 11'iryI mmi 11in" n i* a . an iinjmn ii n nun nai i nnu u i aa
From. ViceriOy to Secyôf State for I ndi a-
Dated New Del hi ,, 08,55 hours, 6,4, 42,
Reed, 10,00 hours, 6th April, 1942,
MOST, .
THIRD AND LAST PART,
I t coul d ari se i n i ts most acute form i f the
were to demand cessati on of hosti l i ti es i n I ndi a
agai nst guns of Hi s Maj esty
5
s Government-.
7, There shoul d he no doubt that Co^ln- C. wi l l
he i n ef f ecti ve control of al l f uncti ons of defence
Department asmai ni ng i n hi s hands* Moreover 0. in--C*
(through over- ri di ng powers of (?Governor-G-eneraI )
I f necessary)' roust al so have as much control as i s
necessary and practi cabl e^ - i n areas outsi de f i el d
of acti ve, mi l i tary operati ons^ over f uncti oni ng of
other departments i n matters af f ecti ng f i ghti ng vai n
of and f aci l i ti es for Army, On' the other- hand the
views of al l members.of Counci l at Counci l l evel an
any matter (i ncl udi ng matters f al l i ng, wi thi n defence
department portf ol i o,) would of course have al l
i nfl uence that would i nevi tabl y flow from danger of
thei r resi gnati on^
Q-. Gi ven, a real desi re to f i ght wa?
3
t hi s
posi ti on shoul d sati sf y I ndi an demands f or . a real
and,substanti al -degr ee of control and responsi bi l i ty
over whol e f i el d -of def enceo.
9
S. Q CR E T. COPY NO."l i t
The at t ached, t el egr amf r om
t he Lor d Pr i vy Seal t o t he
Pr i me Mi ni st er i s ci r cul at ed i n
connect i on wi t h W. P. (4- 2) 147,
The t wo t el egr ams r ef er r ed t o
have "been ci r cul at ed separ at el y. -
132
SECRET XXX
TO BE KEPT UNDER L OCK AND KEY.
.It is requested that speci al care may be taken to
jsnsure the secrecy of thi s uouuê; !. "
i i ot t e&j t o Pr i vat e Secy. 227,
A
0 Fr om Vi cer oy t o Secy, of St at e f or I ndi a.
I yat ed New Del hi 16*80 hour s 6*4*42.
s s
- Reed. 3- 4. 30 hours. , 6t h Apr i l , 1942,
917- S, Fol l owi ng f r omLor d Pr i vy Seal
f or Pr i me Mi ni st er , Your 6229 "dat ed Apr i l 6th. , i am
i n agr eement wi t h t he posi t i on a8 st at ed i n Vi cer oy
?
s
912=8 whi ch wi l l make cl ear what i s i nt ended i n
passage t o whi ch you r ef er ?
VI. . 0 Noon,
enaure the seoreey 0*
w & i
Lgg DOCUMENT I S THE PROPERTY OP HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT
TMENT)l^
OPY NO . Jl
film APRIL ,,.,,1942.
WAR CABINET
COAL PRODUCTION
Memorandum by the L ord Presi dent of the Counci l .
1. The Lord
Presi dent' s Committee i nvi te the attenti on of the
War Cabi net to the i ncreasi ng di f f i cul ty of ensuri ng
a l evel
of
coal producti on adequate to meet essenti al needs.
The producti on target f or the year begi nni ng the 1st May,
1942 i s 215 mi l l i on tons. Thi s does not take i nto account the
economi es to be secured by the proposed scheme f or rati oni ng
domesti c f uel consumpti on. I f thi s scheme i s not
i ntroduced unti l October, and al l owance i s made f or the
i ni ti al di f f i cul ti es l i kel y to be encountered, I doubt whether
i t wi l l save more than about 5 mi l l i on tons i n the peri od under
revi ew, I have, theref ore, assumed f or the purposes of thi s
memorandum, that the minimum output requi red duri ng the peri od
i s 210 mi l l i on tons.
2
C
On thi s basi s, about 107 mi l l i on tons must be produced
i n the si x summer months, and 103 mi l l i on tons i n the wi nter
months - i . e. weekl y output must run at the rate of 4.35
mi l l i on tons i n summer and 4 2 mi l l i on tons I n wi nter.
a
The l abour f orce requi red to mai ntai n thi s rate of output
i s not l ess than 720,000. The numbers i n the i ndustry have
f al l en to 705,000. I ts weekl y output i s now 4.1 mi l l i on tons*
and may be expected to ri se to 4,15 mi l l i on tons under summer
condi ti ons. To rai se the weekl y output to the requi red
fi gure of 4
0
35 mi l l i on tons, i t i s necessary to i ncrease the
ef f ecti ve l abour f orce of the i ndustry by 15,000 men, al l of
whom must be acti ve coal - f ace workers a Moreover, thi s must be
done at once i f advantage i s to be taken of the summer
condi ti ons f avourabl e to peak producti ons Output l ost
duri ng the summer months cannot be made good, under wi nter
condi ti onso
3b There i re onl y two sources from which addi ti onal man-
power can b* drawn - (a) other i ndustri es, and (b) the
Army,
(a) Other I ndustri es
As a resul t of speci al f ^ f ^ l ^ ^ s w ^h a f
of Labour duri ng the autumn of 1941, J ÔCO
ex
the
M o f
dri f ted away i nto other i nJ UBtri j fl , tftg P
coal export trade, returned to work i n the ^ g b o u r . f or ce
al l owi ng f or wastage, the. net i ncrease i n the ^
resul ti ng from thi s scheme has ên ],000. i n d u s t r i e s and
b e
drawn from t h i s source Wi thout tappi ng k^y i n scheme,
occupati ons whi ch have hi therto been exc.
A ri r*
The Mi ni st er of Labour i s now consul t i ng wi t h t he ot her
Mi ni st er s concer ned wi t h a vi ew t o ar r angi ng f or t he r el ease of
a pr opor t i on of t he ex- mi ner s now i n . these vi t al i ndust r i es.
The Pol i ce ( War Reser ve) and Ci vi l Def ence Ser vi ces wi l l al so
make t hei r cont r i but i on. But i t I s est i mat ed t hat t he number
l i kel y t o be obt ai ned f r omt hese sour ces i s not mor e t han 3, 000,
( b) The Ar my.
Anot her 12, 000 wi l l have to be f ound i f t he l abour f or ce
of t he i ndust r y i s to be br ought up t o t he t ot al of 720, 000;
and t hese can onl y be f ound, qui ckl y by wi t hdr awi ng men f r omt he
f i ght i ng Ser vi ces. The mi ni ng i ndust r y has l ost some 82, 000
of i t s younger men to t he Ar med For ces; and, enqui r i es made l ast
aut umn i ndi cat ed t hat t her e wer e t hen over 25, 000 coal - f ace
wor ker s ser vi ng' as r ank and f i l e i n t he Ar my at home ( excl udi ng
men i n cer t ai n speci al cl asses, e, g. t r adesmen and men i n R$A. C*
f or mat i ons, whose r el ease t he War Of f i ce wer e not pr epar ed t o
consi der ) .
Af t er di scussi on wi t h t he Secr et ar y of St at e f or War , t he
Lor d Pr esi dent ' s Commi t t ee r ecent l y deci ded t hat al l coal - f ace
wor ker s now ser vi ng as r ank and. f i l e i n t he Ar my at home,
ot her wi se t han i n Fi el d For ce uni t s, shoul d be r el eased as soon
as pr act i cabl e f or empl oyment i n t he mi nes ( L. P. ( 42) 17t h
Meet i ng, Mi nut e 2) . I t i s not yet known how many men may be
cover ed by t hi s deci si on. Out of a l i st of 10, 000 men
pr ovi ded by t he Mi nes Depar t ment , not mor e t han 2, 500 wer e
t hought to f al l wi t hi n t he def i ni t i on of t hose who mi ght be
r el eased. The Mi nes Depar t ment ar e now col l ect i ng a l i st of
anot her 10, 000 names: and, i f t he pr opor t i ons ar e t he same, i t
may be possi bl e t o f i nd as many as 5, 000 men out si de t he Fi el d
Force uni t s.
Even so, we shoul d st i l l be shor t of t he number s
i mmedi at el y r equi r ed by about 7, 000. A cer t ai n number mi ght
be combed out f r omgr ound st af f of t he R*A. F But t he mai n
e
i ssue f or deci si on by t he War Cabi net i s whet her a subst ant i al
number of ex- mi ner s shoul d be wi t hdr awn f r omFi el d For ce uni t s
i n t he Ar my at home f or wor k i n t he pi t s*
The Secr et ar y of St at e f or War i s opposed t o t he r el ease of
any men ser vi ng i n Fi el d For ce uni t s. The Mi ni st er s concer ned
wi t h pr oduct i on, on t he ot her hand, ar e sat i sf i ed t hat t he coal
out put r equi r ed dur i ng t he comi ng summer cannot be at t ai ned
unl ess t he l abour f or ce of t he i ndust r y i s br ought up t o 720, 000
And t he Lor d Pr esi dent ' s Commi t t ee can see no way of f i ndi ng t he
a
numbers of men r equi r ed, by t he begi nni ng of t he summer , unl ess
subst ant i al number s of ex- mi nor s ar e r el eased f r omt he "Army
at homo.
- 2-
4 o a
4, Even i f i t i s possi bl e by t hese expedi ent s t o r ai se
t he l abour f or ce of t he i ndust r y t o t he r equi r ed f i gur e
dur i ng t he comi ng summer , we have st i l l t o f ace t he pr obl em
of mai nt ai ni ng i t t her eaf t er at a l evel suf f i ci ent t o meet
essent i al war - t i me needs. The aver age age of t he men
empl oyed i n t he i ndust r y has r i sen subst ant i al l y i n r ecent
year s, and 40, 6%of t he men ar e now aged 40 or over , As
a r esul t , wast age i s hi gh - t he net wast age r at e i s now
r unni ng at t he r at e of 28^000 a year . Thus, even t hough
t he l abour f or ce i s i ncr eased t o 720, 000 by t he 1st May, 1942,
i t wi l l dr op agai n al most t o i t s pr esent l evel by t he
begi nni ng of t he wi nt er . By t he summer of 1943 wast age
woul d have r educed t he. l abour f or ce t o a l evel at whi ch t he
annual out put woul d be l ess t han 200 mi l l i on t ons, f e may
be abl e t o secur e f ur t her economi es i n consumpt i on, but we
coul d not expect by t hese means t o cl ose t he gap bet ween
t hi s l evel of out put and our essent i al needs, - And i t wi l l
not be possi bl e' t o r emedy t he si t uat i on a second t i me by
wi t hdr awi ng ex- mi ner s f r omot her i ndust r i es or t he Ar med
For ces -.- t hat i s not an expedi ent whi ch can be r epeat ed year
by year .o
5, I n t hese ci r cumst ances, we cannot r est cont ent wi t h
emer gency measur es f or i ncr easi ng t he man- power i n t he
i ndust r ya Mor e l ast i ng r emedi es ar e cal l ed f or
n
We must cl ose t he gap bet ween nor mal i nt ake- i nt o, and
wast age f r om, t he i ndust r y - by at t r act i ng l ar ger number s of
yout hs i nt o t he i ndust ry, , The Mi ni st er of Labour i s
di scussi ng wi t h t he Depar t ment al Mi ni st er s concer ned t he
measur es necessar y t o ensur e, as par t of a l ong- t er mpl an,
a mor e, r egul ar f l ow of boys i nt o t he mi nes, ,
Secondl y, we must secur e such measur es of r e- or gani sat i on
as ar e necessar y t o i ncr ease t he war - t i me ef f i ci ency of t he
i nduct r y
t
,
6o The Lor d Pr esi dent s Commi t t ee ar e sat i sf i ed t hat ,
apart al t oget her f r omt he r educt i on i n t he l abour f or ce,
some l oss of out put i s at t r i but abl e t o def ect s of or gani sat i on
and f ai l ur e t o make t he most ef f i ci ent use of t he man- power
avai l abl e t o t he i ndust r y^ They ar e conf i dent t hat , wi t h
t he sam-e l abour f or ce, out put coul d be mat er i al l y i ncr eased
i f t he or gani sat i on of t he i ndust r y wer e so adopt ed as t o
ensur e t hat t he men wer e empl oyed at t he poi nt s, gi vi ng t he
hi ghest r et ur n f or t hei r l abour and t hat t he mi nes wer e wor ked
i n t he manner best ser vi ng t he nat i onal i nt er est Sc
By t hi s t hey do not mean t hat al l ef f or t shoul d be
concent r at ed on wi nni ng t he maxi mumamount of coal f or war - t i me
needs r egar dl ess of t he f ut ur e. Such a pol i cy woul d be
di sast r ous. I t woul d r ai se di f f i cul t pr obl ems of compensat i on
i n r espect of t he uneconomi c devel opment of t he mi nes, But -
and t hi s i s f ar mor e i mpor t ant - i t - woul d i mpai r t he val ue of
t he mi nes as a nat i onal asset and woul d l eave t hem at t he end
of t he war wi t h a cr i ppl i ng l i abi l i t y t o capi t al expendi t ur e
on devel opment wor k whi ch woul d pr event t hemf r omr ecover i ng
t hei r expor t - mar ket s. The sound pol i cy i s t o ensur e such a
bal ance bet ween maxi mumout put and economi c devel opment as
wi l l gi ve t he l ar gest war - t i me pr oduct i on consi st ent wi t h
pr eser vi ng t he capaci t y of t he i ndust r y t o r ecover i t s
expor t t r ade af t er t he war
0
7, My Committee are also agreed that the lost effective
method of securing this extended direction over the practical
working of the mines is by development of the system of
Regional control. They think it essential that Regional
Controllers should be put in a position to exercise full
and effective control over the practical working of all the
mines in their Region.
8* The issue which emerges, and which the War Cabinet
will eventually have to decide, is whether it is possible
to secure effective "operational" control of the mines in
the national interests, while leaving untouched the financial
responsibility of the mine-owners. - In determining that
issue, and in deciding what form this operational control
should take, the test must be whether any changes proposed
in the organisation of the industry can be shown to be
necessary for the more efficient prosecution of the war.
In the case of other industries, including agriculture,
it has been found possible to secure a sufficient measure
of war-time control by powers of direction over management
and men without interference with ownership5 and if it is
found necessary in the case of the mining industry - as in
the case of the railways - to go further and introduce a
measure of control affecting the ownership of the undertakings
it should be made clear beyond dispute that this course is
taken solely on the ground that it is necessary for the more
efficient prosecution of the war.
The issue is one which must be brought to the notice
of the War Cabinet at once. I suggest, however, that
before any decisions are formulated a small Committee of
Ministers should be appointed to assist the president of
the Board of Trade in working out, subject to any directions
which the War Cabinet may give on the general issues of
policy involved, detailed proposals for securing such
practical control over the working of the mines as is
necessary to increase the war-time efficiency of the
industry and to put it in a position at the end of
hostilities to compete for the early recovery of our export
markets.
(Initialled) J. A.
Great George Street, S,W.1*,
6th April, 1942,
DOCUMENT I S T HE PROPE RT Y OP H I S B R I T A N N I ^M A J E S T Y ' S GOVERNMENT)
COPY NOo ( 3
WAR CA BI NE T
E
I NDI A.
Not e by t he Secr et ar y of St at e f or, , I ndi a,
cover i ng a t el egr amf r omt he Vi cer oy
0
The at t ached t el egr amNo. 919- S f r omt he
Vi cer oy i s ci r cul at ed f or t he i nf or mat i on of t he
War Cabi net ,
Tel egr amNo
P
890- S f r omt he Lor d Pr i vy Seal t o
t he Pr i me Mi ni st er has al r eady been ci r cul at ed i n
W. P. ( . 42) 147e
L. S i Ao
9
I ndi a J ?j ffi .ce
A l l o t t e d to Private Secretary. 230*
gbpy to Sir Do Monteath*
B E G Y P eTS R 0 P y E L..B...G .R A Ma
From Viceroy to Secretary of state fop' India *
pated Ifew Delhi, 18* 10 hours* 5th Aprils 1942*
Received. 19* 15 hours * 6th -April, 1942a
MOST XBMBPIAm
919 *S.
Reference paragraphs 800 and 24 of telegram 890
from Sir Stafford Gripps to the Prime Minister^ Following
are Commanderîn^Chief *s proposals agreed "by Lord Privy Seal
and myself B^ginsa
Xo I agree to suggested change of t l t l eo
2* As regards handing over to a Defence Co-ordination
Papartment certain activities now undertaken "by Defence
Department^ I make following suggestions;- (a) public
relations*
(h) Demobilisation and postwar reconstruction^
(e) Petroleum Officer? whose functions are to
calculate the requirements of, and make provision for,, all
petroleum products required for Army* Navy and Air Force?,
and for Civil departments^ including storage end distribution*
(d) Indian representation on Eastern Group Supply
Council-
(e) Amenities for*. and welcome of- troops and their
dependents * including Indian soldiers "boards
(f) All canteen organisations^
(g) Certain non-technical edxicstional institutions
e*g* Laurence Schools^ Sing George Royal Indian Military
Schools and the Prince, of Wales
7
Royal Indian Military College *
(h) Stationery, printing and forms for- the Array-
(i) Reception,. ("? accommodation) and social
arrangements for all foreign missions^ representatives and
offices^
3* In addition to above
s
the Defence Co-ordination
Department has immense potentialities if properly developed*
It could take over many major questions which bear
directly "on defence, which concern- many other departments but
which are difficult to locate in any particular one- Good
-examples ares denial policy, policy of evacuation from
threatened areas, signal (? co-ordination,) economic warfare..
,gnds*
-rs DOCUMENT I S THE PROPERTY OF HI S BRI TANNI C MAJ ESTY' 3 GOVERNMENT
7
.
S E C R E T
W. P.(42) 150. ^ COPY NO. -? y
7t h Apr i l , 1948.
WAR CABI NET
POLI TI CAL MEETI NGS I N FACTORI ES
Memor andumLy t he Lor d Pr esi dent of t he Counci l
1- At t hei r meet i ng on t he 29th Sept ember , t he War
Cabi net appr oved t he r ecommendat i on of t he Security
Execut i ve t hat i t be made a def i ni t e pol i cy chat no
pol i t i cal meet i ngs of any ki nd shal l be hel d i n Gover nment
of f i ces or i n f act or i es or ot her est abl i shment s di r ect l y
under Gover nment cont r ol ( W. N. ( 4l ) 98t h Concl usi ons,
Mi nut e 9) .
2c Some di f f i cul t y has been exper i enced i n pr act i ce
i n det er mi ni ng whet her a pr oposed meet i ng i s a "pol i t i cal "
meet i ng.
Ther e have been occasi ons on whi ch speaker s have
cont r i ved t o addr ess meet i ngs of wor ker s under t he auspi ces
of one or ot her of t he Angl o- Sovi et associ at i ons, many of
whi ch ar e i nspi r ed by t he Communi st par t y; and t her e i s
r; ) means by whi ch Depar t ment s can know i n advance whet her
such speaker s wi l l expl oi t , f or pol i t i cal pur poses, t he
f aci l i t i es ext ended t o t hem.
3, I n t hese ci r cumst ances t he Mi ni st r y of Ai r cr af t
Pr oduct i on have made i t a r ul e of pr act i ce t hat meet i ngs
in f act or i es' under t hei r cont r ol shal l be addr essed onl y
by member s of . t he A. rmed. For ces i n uni f or mor by speaker s
pr ovi ded by t he Mi ni st r y of I nf or mat i on,
( The Mi ni st r y of I nf or mat i on have so f ar f ound no
di f f i cul t y i n excl udi ng undesi r abl e i ndi vi dual s f r om t hei r
panel of speaker s; and t hey ar e wi l l i ng t o add t o t hei r
panel , speaker s r ecommended by ot her Depar t ment s. )
4. The r ul e adopt ed by t he Mi ni st r y of Ai r cr af t Pr oduct i on
seems t o be a usef ul pr act i cal means of appl yi ng t he
pr i nci pl e appr oved by t he War Cabi net on t he' 29t h Sept ember
j . as &n
The Secur i t y Execut i ve, who have agai n had t he mat t er
under r evi ew, suggest t hat i t woul d be conveni ent i f al l
Gover nment Depar t ment s wer e t o adopt t hi s ruHe of pr act i ce,
as r egar ds meet i ngs i n Gover nment of f i ces, or i n f act or i es
or ot her est abl i shment s di r ect l y under Gover nment cont r ol .
5,. I f t he War Cabi net appr ove, I r ecommend t hat Depar t ment s
bo i nst r uct ed accor di ngl y; and t hat , as r egar ds f act or i es
under pr i vat e management , t he Tr ades Uni on Congr ess and t he
1 & *A
* 1 V
British Employers' Confederation should he informed that
this practice will in future he followed by Government
Departments,
(Initialled) J.A.
Great George Street, S.W.1,
?TH APRIL, 1942,
T H I S D O C U M E N T I S T H E P R O P E R T Y O F H I S B R I T A N N I C " M A J E S T Y ' S G O V E R N M E N T
Printed for the War Cabinet/ April 1942.
SECRET. V Copy No.
W.P. (42) 151.
. 4 ^ 8, 1942.
WAR CABINET.
J URI SDI CTI ON OVER MEMBERS OF THE UNI TED STATES ARMED
FORCES IN THE UNI TED KINGDOM.
Joint Memorandum by the Foreign Secretary, the Home Secretary and the
Secretary of State for Scotland.
THE arrival of substantial American Forces in the United Kingdom has
made it urgent to make arrangements for jurisdiction in respect of offences
committed by members of those Forces against the criminal law of the United
Kingdom.
2. In the last war the French Government concluded Agreements with His
Majesty's Government and the United States Government whereby British and
American courts-martial were allowed to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over
members of their national Forces in France. The United States Government
pressed for a similar Agreement in respect of their Forces in the United
Kingdom, but the war ended before any definite decision had been reached. A
Defence of the Realm Regulation (No. 45 F.) was, however, passed early in 1918
with the concurrence of the United States Government, under which the civil and
military authorities of the United Kingdom were empowered to hand over to the
American Service authorities for trial by American courts-martial, members of
their Forces committing any type of offence. I t is understood that all American
offenders who came into the hands of our authorities were in fact handed over
under this Regulation, The administrative arrangements worked without
friction and the United States Government were thus, in practice, granted the
exclusive jurisdiction which they claimed.
3. The question of jurisdiction over foreign forces in the United Kingdom
arose in practical form in the present war when Allied Governments and the
remnants of their forces arrived here in the summer of 1940 and the Allied
Governments set to work with our assistance to reconstitute their forces and to
mobilise the man power still available to them. To meet this situation Parlia-
ment passed, in August 1940, the Allied Forces Act, which is in general terms
and authorises the competent Allied authorities and courts to exercise in respect
of members of their own Forces the powers conferred upon them by their national
law in matters concerning discipline and internal administration, while reserving
the concurrent jurisdiction of the civil courts of the United Kigdom in respect of
offences against the law of the United Kingdom. The powers of the Allies' courts-
martial are, however, limited in practice by the stipulation, accepted by the
Allied Governments in this country, that the offences of murder, manslaughter
and rape committed against whomsoever by members of those Allied Forces shall
always be tried by the civil courts of the United Kingdom.
4. When the arrival of American Forces in this country became imminent
m November of last year, the American Ambassador raised in general terms with
[23672]' '
B
the Foreign Secretary the question of jurisdiction as a matter of urgency, and
indicated that his Government considered that the arrangements made under the
Allied Forces Act of 22nd August, 1940, in respect of jurisdiction over the
national Forces of the Allied Governments temporarily established in this
country were unsuitable for the American Forces as they would interfere with
the exercise by United States Commanders of the necessary jurisdiction under
American law. The question was at once excimined by the Departments in
consultation with the Attorney-General, further information was obtained
through the United States Embassy of the views of the responsible departments in
Washington, and two exploratory meetings have been held with representatives
of the Embassy and of the Commanding Officers of the American Army and Navy
Forces in this country. Meanwhile, in order to avoid as far as possible an
awkward controversy arising with the United States authorities pending a
decision of policy by Ministers, the Home Office have advised the police
authorities in England and Wales to hand over to the United States Service
authorities all Americans alleged to have committed offences against our law,
except persons alleged to have committed murder, manslaughter or rape against
a victim not a member of the American Forces, in which reserved cases the police
have been asked to refer to the Home Secretary before instituting any proceed-
ings. Arrangements have also been made in Scotland and Northern Ireland
with a view to avoiding any immediate difficulty. It is apparent, however, that
this arrangement can only hold the position temporarily and that a definite
decision must now be taken as a matter of long term policy.
5. The conversation with the representatives of the .United States fell
broadly under two heads, namely, (i) that of the form of the necessary British
measures to regularise the exercise of jurisdiction by the American courts-martial
and to authorise the British civil and military authorities to co-operate, and
(ii) the policy to be followed in disposing of offences against the criminal law of
the United Kingdom where there is concurrent jurisdiction by American courts-
martial and our own civil courts.
6. As regards (i), the Americans objected at the outset to the application
to them in any way of the Allied Forces Act, as they considered (largely on a
misreading of the Act) that this would be to assimilate their Forces to those of
the small "refugee" Allied Governments and to subject them to unacceptable
restrictions. They also urged that it would be unacceptable to the United States
authorities if any instrument issued by His Majesty's Government purported to
confer jurisdiction on the American service courts and authorities over American
forces in this country. They claimed that they already possessed such juris-
diction over all members of their Forces wherever situated outside the United
States, both under their own municipal law and by virtue of International Law.
Some time was spent in persuading the American representatives that the object
of any United Kingdom legislation, whether Parliamentary or subordinate, was
not to confer jurisdiction on the American service courts and authorities, but to
ensure that our courts and authorities did not interfere with the exercise of
jurisdiction by the Americans over their Service personnel. I t is unnecessary to
pursue this aspect of the matter further, as at the close of the discussions the
representatives of the United States were brought to appreciate the necessity for
an Order in Council under the Allied Forces Act, and were completely satisfied
with a draft Order specially worded to meet their susceptibilities and point of
view. This draft, which is annexed, has now been submitted by the American
Representatives at the discussions to the Officers commanding the United States
Army and Navy Forces in the United Kingdom, who have expressed their agree-
ment and appreciation for the trouble taken to meet their wishes on the questions
of form and ask that the Order may be made as soon as possible to regularise the
position. I t is proposed to submit the Order to His Majesty in Council on the
next occasion, without prejudice, of course, to the eventual decision of policy.
7. As regards head (ii), paragraph 1 (5) of the Schedule to the draft Order
in Council empowers, but does not require, the arrest and handing over by our
authorities to the American authorities of American Service personnel alleged
to have committed offences against American Service law. The question for
decision is now how far this power shall be exercised by our authorities. The
Americans claim exclusive jurisdiction over men on duty and men " within the
rayon of the fortress," basing themselves on the following passage from
Oppenheim's International Law .--
Whenever armed forces are on foreign territory in the service of their
home State, they are considered exterritorial and remain, therefore, under
its jurisdiction. A crime committed on foreign territory by a member of
these forces cannot be punished by the local civil or military authorities, but
only by the commanding officer of the forces or by other authorities of their
home State. This rule, however, applies only in case the crime is committed,
either within the place where the force is stationed, or in some place where
the criminal was on duty; it does not apply if, for example, soldiers belonging
to a foreign garrison of a fortress leave therayon of the fortress, not on duty
but for recreation and pleasure, and then and there commit a crime. The
local authorities are in that case competent to punish them."
The Americans assert that they have also concurrent jurisdiction over their
men outside these limits, and they go on to request, but not to claim as of right,
complete exclusive jurisdiction over their men everywhere. The American
argument in favour of their being allowed complete exclusive jurisdiction even
within the field of admitted concurrent jurisdiction runs on these lines. An
American soldier is conscripted and sent overseas against or at least without
his will. The American public will look with jealousy on the treatment which
he receives while outside his native country, and particularly at any sentence
passed upon him by a foreign court. American military and naval law extends
"discipline" in respect of troops overseas to cover any offence whatsoever
against the law of the country where those troops are stationed; American
discipline is severe and condign punishment would be inflicted for any offences
against our law. The American representatives urged, therefore, that in the
interests of good relations between the two countries it would be far better that
British courts, and so far as possible British authorities, should not be involved
in the making, prosecution or adjudication of charges against American service
personnel. Moreover, apart from the political agitation and misrepresentation
which would certainly arise in the United States of America if American soldiers
were tried by a British court and subsequently detained in a British prison, they
feared that a British court would, for obvious reasons, tend to show undue
leniency to American offenders. The American representatives went on to give
a formal assurance that any trial by an American court-martial would be in open
court, except where security considerations forbade it, and that the trial of an
American soldier or sailor who had committed an offence against a member of
the civilian population would be arranged to take place within a reasonable
distance from the place where the offence had been committed, so as to reassure
civilian opinion; for example, an American soldier stationed in Northern
Ireland, who, when on leave, committed an offence in Southern England, would
be tried in the neighbourhood where the crime was committed and not removed
to Northern Ireland for the purpose. Every facility would be given to the British
authorities and British public to follow the proceedings and to learn their results,
and bearing in mind the common source of British and American law, the
American representatives felt strongly that there would be no ground for public
dissatisfaction if their courts-martial were allowed to deal with all offences
committed by their Service personnel. On the other hand, if we insisted on trying
an American soldier or sailor in a British court the United States Government,
instead of taking full responsibility for his proper punishment and for meeting
any reasonable claim for damages by injured parties, would be bound to assume
responsibility for the man's defence, which might well lead to an awkward
situation.
8. The American argument was put forward by the American representa-
tives with great conviction and made a great impression upon the British
representatives at the discussions. I t is reinforced by practical considerations.
It would be extremely difficult to lay down a workable line of demarcation between
the cases to be tried by American courts-martial and those to be tried by the
criminal courts of the United Kingdom. The expression " on duty '' is one which
it is almost impossible to define. The meaning of the phrase Avas discussed
sufficiently far to ascertain that if pursued further we should become involved
in a direct conflict with the Americans. They sketched out a claim that the
soldier, from the moment he leaves American shores, is,continuously pn duty-a
r
proposition which, if admitted, would result in a complete concession of exclusive
jurisdiction to the American courts-martial, and said that if necessary they
would be prepared to issue the necessary orders to this effect. Limitation of
jurisdiction by locality" rayon of the fortress "is equally impossible to apply
in modern conditions when soldiers may be billeted outside the limits of any
defined camp; and engaged in manoeuvres or in driving army vehicles at great
distances from it. A third possibilitylimitation by the character of the offence
(which is the basis for the present interim and unilateral arrangement, see
paragraph 4 above) was also discussed, but was rejected by the Americans both
on general grounds and as cutting across their conception of all offences
committed on duty being completely reserved to American courts on the principle
of extra-territoriality. The drawing of any line would clearly present great
difficulties, and if any line is drawn there is a grave danger that friction will
arise in considering whether any particular case falls within or without it. A
further consideration is the difficulty, if not impossibility, which our authorities
would encounter if they tried (as they might well have to) to enter an American
camp to enforce process, or subpoena or question witnesses.
9. The American representatives made it clear that their instructions to
obtain complete exclusive jurisdiction as a matter of practice were rigid, and
it is plain that they could only be altered by reference to very high authority in
Washington. The position is, therefore, that the interim arrangements described
in paragraph 4 will not satisfy the Americans and it is necessary to reach an
early decision on the policy we are to follow. I t seems clear that for political
as well as practical reasons this policy must be to allow the American Service
Courts and authorities to deal as widely as possible with their own offenders. If
this is accepted the question is whether we should aim at allowing them exclusive
jurisdiction or whether we should reserve, on the lines of the present
arrangements with the police, certain offences, at any rate for discussion between
the British and American authorities. The argument in favour of reserving
certain offences is, of course, the risk that public feeling might be aroused in this
country if serious crimes against civilians were not tried in our own courts.
This is a matter of opinion, on which all the British authorities so far drawn into
the discussions are not entirely agreed; but we would draw particular attention
to the assurances which the American Service representatives gave to meet public
opinion (see paragraph 8 above).
:
10. We feel that the balance of advantage is in favour of letting the
Americans deal with all offences committed by members of their Forces, as they
were allowed to deal with all such offences in the last war.
11. If the Cabinet agree with this view, the question is, how can effect to
this policy best be given? There appear to be the following two broad
alternatives :
(i) To make a " gentleman's agreement" with the Americans that, acting
under the wide powers conferred upon the British civil and military
authorities in Clause 1 (5) of the annexed draft Order in Council, His
Majesty's Government will take all practicable steps, by means of
guidance or instructions to the competent British civil authorities, to
hand over all offenders for whatever offences to the American
authorities, subject to certain safeguards as to the conduct of the trial
in the case of offences against civilians (as already promised by the
Americans). This course would have the great advantage of avoiding
a frontal attack by way of legislation on a very difficult question of
principle (i.e., the ousting of the jurisdiction of our civil courts). It
would also have the considerable political advantage of not ventilating
publiclyat least at the outsetthe privileged position conferred
upon the American Forces by comparison with those of the Allied
V Governments established in this country/There is further the
consideration that a similar gentleman's agreement worked without
friction in the last war. As against these advantages, there is the
obvious difficulty that without legislation the central Government in
England and Wales cannot prevent a private prosecution and have
:
not. complete control over the local police forces in the matter of
/prosecutions, and an extremely awkward situation would arise if a
member of the American Forces had been actually charged with an
!
offence, or arrested on warrant. The Lord Advocate has made it clear
that without the authority of an Act of Parliament he cannot bind him-
self not to prosecute in the Scottish courts a member of the American
forces. There is further the risk of criticism in Parliament and the
press and the Government might be accused of giving away in secret
a fundamental principle of the Constitution,
(ii) To introduce legislation to secure that all American Service offenders
are handed over to the American authorities and that after they
have been so handed over our Courts shall not exercise any jurisdic-
tion over them. The advantages of legislation are that it alone can
ensure a completely water-tight arrangement and avoid the risk of
awkward criticism and complications such as might well arise from
arranging matters ad hoc behind the scenes. The main disadvantage
of legislation, apart from the trouble of going to Parliament, is that
it would ventilate a difficult problem, which, as already observed, is
complicated by the less favourable arrangements obtaining in the
case of the small Allies. I t would be necessary either to put the
latter in the same position as the Americans, which is open to grave
objection in the case of certain of the Allies and would be sure to
arouse much criticism in Parliament, or publicly to defend giving a
specially favoured position to the United States Forces, which would
certainly create some resentment among the Allied Governments in
this country, despite the obvious differences between the situation of
their forces (which, in fact, depend wholly upon us) and those of the
United States.
12. If it is decided to legislate so as -to enable us to give the Americans
the exclusive jurisdiction they desire, the question of reciprocity will arise. Our
position would be much easier if we could say that the arrangements would be
reciprocal. The legislation could then be in the form of a Bill enabling effect
to be given to the reciprocal agreement with the United States Government,
which could be scheduled. We should probably have a much easier passage in
Parliament and we should have a good argument for justifying to the Allied
Governments in this country the discrimination in favour of the United States.
The representatives of the United States Army and Navy at the discussions
stated definitely that their proposal was for an Anglo-American agreement
whereby each country conceded exclusive jurisdiction within its territory
to the forces of the other, and seemed to be of opinion that effect could be given
to such an agreement in the United States without legislation. The United
States Embassy, on the other hand, are far less sure of this, on account of the
rights of the individual American States, and it is significant that when a
similar agreement was mooted in the last war the State Department expressed
doubts whether it could be enforced in the United States.
13. We do not feel that our policy can be made dependent upon reciprocity,
as we believe that in the paramount interest of the co-operation of the United
States Government with us in the war we must give them satisfaction as regards
their forces in this country. But we suggest that if the Cabinet approves in
principle the grant to the Americans of exclusive jurisdiction we should inform
the United States Ambassador that his Majesty's Government are prepared to
conclude an agreement to that effect with the United States Government, but
should press as strongly as possible for the agreement to be on a reciprocal basis.
We should point out that reciprocity would greatly facilitate the passage of the
necessary legislation through Parliament.
: 14. Finally, we would draw attention to the existence of a similar problem
in the self-governing Dominions, India, Burma and the Colonial Dependencies.
The United States Government will, of course, have to make their own arrange-
ments with the Governments of the Dominions concerned, but it is highly
desirable that we should keep in touch with the latter, as any marked difference
between the attitude adopted by them and that of His Majesty's Government in
the United Kingdom would be most unfortunate. The Governments of India
and Burma will be consulted in the matter, but, subject to their views, it is
thought unlikely that there would be any difficulty in arranging, preferably by
[23672] ' c
1
local legislation (probably in the form of an Ordinance), for the practice finally
adopted in the United Kingdom to be followed in India and in Burma when
occasion arises.
15. As regards the Colonies, the United States Government will certainly
wish to enjoy exclusive jurisdiction over their forces; they have not so far
specifically raised the question of the Colonies, but we understand that the
Governors of certain Colonies where American forces have already arrived have
sought urgent guidance from the Colonial Secretary. We understand that the
Colonial Secretary proposes to provide the necessary immediate machinery by
extending to the Colonies the proposed application Order in Council when made
(cf., paragraph 6 above). As regards policy, he contemplates that there will be
no difficulty in following the line taken in the United Kingdom if the decision
in that case should be in favour of granting the Americans exclusive jurisdiction.
16. A special case is, however, presented by. Newfoundland and the
Colonies where military bases have been leased to the United States. The
situation there is very different from that dealt with in this memorandum;
American forces will normally be stationed in well defined areas over a period of
99 years, whereas in the case of the United Kingdom and the other territories
of the British Empire concerned we must proceed on the basis that the arrange-
ments to be made will be limited to the period of the war and the forces concerned
may be serving anywhere in the United Kingdom or other British territories
concerned. J urisdiction in Newfoundland and the Bases Colonies is specifically
dealt with in the Bases Agreement (Cmd. 8259) which covers the contingency of
the United States being at war. The question whether the jurisdiction of the
United States service courts in these territories is exclusive is a matter of the
interpretation of the Agreement, and this is at present under discussion with the
United States. I t is relevant, however, to observe that the Bases Agreement
expressly gives American Courts the prior right to try members of the United
States forces for all offences committed within the leased areas and certain
specified offences committed elsewhere, although whether this applies to courts-
martial is a point involved in the current discussion mentioned.
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSI ONS AND RECOMMENDATI ONS.
17. W e recommend that the American service Tribunals in this country
should be allowed to deal with all offences committed by the American Forces in
the United Kingdom whether or not those offences were committed on duty.
(2) Effect could be given to this recommendation either :-
(a) by a " gentleman's agreement " whereby British authorities would hand
over to the American authorities American service personnel who
offend against our laws, or
(b) by legislation requiring alh American service offenders to be handed over
to the American authorities and providing that after they have been
so handed over our courts shall not have any jurisdiction over them.
The arguments for and against these alternative methods are discussed in
paragraph 11 of this memorandum. In our view, the balance of advantage lies
oh the side of the legislation.
(3) If the Cabinet agree that legislation is the right course, we recommend
that we should do our best to secure reciprocity from the United States in respect
of British service personnel in American territory. We do not, however, consider
that our policy should be dependent on securing reciprocity in this matter.
' " - . ' A
1
, E.
H. M.
T. J .
April 8, 1942. \ '
:
"
S T A T U T O R Y R U L E S A N D O R D E R S
1942 No.
THE UNI TED STATES OF AMERICA (VISITING FORCES) ORDER, 1942.
At t he Court at Buc ki ng ha m Pal ac e , t he da y of ,
, . . ; - , 1942. ' *
PRESENT,
The Ki ng ' s Most Excel l ent Maj est y i n Counci l .
Whe r e as i t is desi rabl e t o def i ne t he rel at i onshi p of t he ci vi l and
servi ce aut hori t i es and court s of t he Uni t ed Ki ng do m t o t he mi l i t ary
and naval forces of t he Uni t e d St at es of Ameri ca wh o are or ma y here-
after be present i n t he Uni t e d Ki ng do m or on board a ny of Hi s Maj es t y' s
s hi ps or ai rcraft, and t o f aci l i t at e t he exerci se i n t he Uni t e d Ki ng do m
or on board any s uch s hi p or ai rcraft of t he j uri sdi ct i on conf erred on
t he servi ce court s and aut hori t i es of t he Uni ted. St at es of Ameri ca b y
t he Jaw of t hat c ount r y:
No w, therefore, Hi s Maj est y, i n exerci se of t he powers conf erred on
Hi m b y s ubs ect i on (3) of sect i on one of t he Al l i ed For c e s Ac t , 1940,
and of all ot her powers enabl i ng Hi m i n that behal f, i s pl eas ed, b y
and wi t h t he advi c e of Hi s Pr i v y Counci l , to order, and it i s hereby
ordered, as f ol l ows :
1. Subs ect i ons (2) t o (5) of sect i on one, sect i on t wo , s ubs ect i ons (1) Appl i ca-
and (3) of s ect i on fi ve, a nd s ect i on si x of t he Vi s i t i ng For c e s ( Bri t i sh t i on of 23
Commonwe al t h) Act , 1933, shal l ha v e effect, as set out i n t he Sc he dul e Geb. 5. c. 6.
to t hi s Order wi t h adapt at i ons and modi f i cat i ons, i n rel at i on t o t he t o. forces ot
mi l i t ary and naval f orces of t he Uni t ed St at es of Ame r i c a. U. S. A.
2.(1) I n t hi s par agr aph and i n t he Sc he dul e t o t hi s Order, unl es s Interpreta-
t he cont ext ot herwi s e requi res, t he f ol l owi ng expres s i ons ha v e t he me a n- t i on.
i ngs he r e by res pect i vel y as s i gned t o t he m, t hat is t o s a y : .
" Ame r i c an force me ans a ny body, cont i ngent or de t ac hme nt
of the mi l i t ary or naval forces of t he Uni t ed St at es of Ame r i c a whi c h
i s for t he t i me bei ng present i n t he Uni t e d Ki ng do m or o n board
a n y of Hi s Maj es t y' s s hi ps or aircraft;
" Ho me f orces '.' me a ns t he naval , mi l i t ary a nd ai r f orces of Hi s
Maj es t y rai sed i n t he Uni t ed Ki ng do m; and " h o me f orce " me a ns
any body, cont i ngent , or de t ac hme nt of a n y of t he h o me f orces;
" Servi ce aut hori t i es " me a ns naval , mi l i t ary and ( i n rel at i on t o
home f orces) air f orce aut hori t i es;
" Servi ce court s " me a ns naval , mi l i t ary and (i n rel at i on to ho me
forces) ai r f orce court s, and i ncl udes a servi ce court of i nqui ry, a nd
a ny officer wh o i s e mpowe r e d t o revi ew t he proceedi ngs of a s ervi ce
court, or t o i nves t i gat e charges or hi msel f t o di s pos e of charges ,
a nd t he expres s i on " s ent ence " shal l be cons t rued accordi ngl y.
(2) An y powe r conf erred b y t he provi s i ons herei nbef ore reci t ed, a s
appl i ed b y t hi s Order, t o make a n Order i n Counc i l or Order shal l be
const rued a s i ncl udi ng a powe r t o revoke or v a r y t he Order- i n- Counci l or
Order.
Short ti tl e.
Privileges and
proceedings of
Service Courts
of U.S.A.
Relations of
American forces
to the ci vi l
power and
civilians.
(3) The Int erpret at i on Act 1889, appl i es to t he i nt erpret at i on of t hi s
Order as it appl i es to t he i nt erpret at i on of an Ac t of Parl i ament .
3. Thi s Order ma y be ci ted as t he Uni t ed St at es of Ameri ca ( Vi si t i ng
Forces) Order, 1942.
SCHEDUL E.
The Provi si ons of 23 Geo. 5. c. 6. appl i ed wi th A daptati ons and
Modi f i cati ons.
' i.-(1) '.. '
(2) The members of any servi ce court of the Uni ted States of Ameri ca
exerci si ng wi thi n the Uni ted K i ngdom or on board any of Hi s Maj esty's
shi ps or ai rcraft, i n rel ati on to members of an Ameri can force, j uri sdi cti on
conferred by the l aw of the Uni ted States of Ameri ca, and any wi tnesses
appeari ng before any such court, shal l enj oy the like i mmuni ti es and
pri vi l eges as are enj oyed by a servi ce court exerci si ng j uri sdi cti on by
vi rtue of the Naval Di sci pl i ne Act, the Army Act or the Ai r Force Act, as
the case may be, and by wi tnesses appeari ng before such a court.
(3) Where any sentence has, whether wi thi n or wi thout the' Uni ted
K i ngdom, been passed upon a member of an Ameri can force by a servi ce
court of the Uni ted States of Ameri ca, then for the purposes of any l egal
proceedi ngs before a court of the Uni ted K i ngdom the sai d servi ce court
shal l be deemed to have been properl y consti tuted, and i ts proceedi ngs
shal l be deemed to have been regul arl y conducted, and the sentence shal l
be deemed to be wi thi n the j uri sdi cti on of the court and i n accordance wi th
the l aw of the Uni ted States of Ameri ca, and if executed accordi ng to the
tenor of the sentence shal l be deemed to have been l awful l y executed; and
any member of an Ameri can force who is detai ned i n custody i n pursuance
of any such sentence, or pendi ng the determi nati on by such a servi ce court
as aforesai d of a charge brought agai nst hi m, or pendi ng any prel i mi nary
exami nati on by the servi ce authori ti es of the Uni ted States of Ameri ca, shal l
for the purposes of any such proceedi ngs as aforesai d be deemed to be in
l egal custody.
For the purposes of any such proceedi ngs as aforesai d a certi fi cate under
the hand of the officer commandi ng an Ameri can force that any person
is bei ng detai ned for any of the causes aforesai d shal l be concl usi ve evi dence
of the cause of hi s detenti on, and a certi fi cate under the hand of such an
officer that the persons specified i n the certi fi cate sat as a servi ce court of
the Uni ted States of Ameri ca shal l be concl usi ve evi dence of that fact.
(4) No proceedi ngs i n respect of the pay, terms of servi ce or di scharge
of a member of an Ameri can force shal l be entertai ned by any court of the
Uni ted K i ngdom.
(5) For the purpose of enabl i ng the servi ce courts and servi ce authori ti es
pf the Uni ted States of Ameri ca to exerci se more effectively thei r j uri s-
di cti on i n rel ati on to members of an Ameri can force, a Secretary of State,
the Admi ral ty, the Army Counci l , or the Ai r Counci l , if so requested by the
officer commandi ng an Ameri can force,. or by the Government of the
Uni ted States of Ameri ca, may from ti me to ti me by general or speci al
orders authori se the arrest and custody of members of an Ameri can force
al l eged to have been gui l ty of offences puni shabl e under the l aw of the
Uni ted States of Ameri ca, and the handi ng over of any such persons to the
appropri ate authori ti es of the Ameri can force.
2.(1) Any Government department, Mi ni ster of the. Crown, or other
person i n the Uni ted Ki ngdom, may perform, at the request of the officer
commandi ng an Ameri can force, any functi on in rel ati on to that force and
members thereof whi ch that department. Mi ni ster, or person performs or
coul d perform i n rel ati on to a home force of l i ke nature to the Ameri can
force, or in rel ati on to members of such a force and, for the purpose of
the exerci se of any such functi on, any power exerci sabl e by vi rtue of any
enactment by the Mi ni ster, department or person i n rel ati on to a home
force or members thereof shal l be exerci sabl e by hi m or them i n rel ati on
to the Ameri can force and members thereof:
Provi ded that nothi ng i n thi s subsecti on shal l authori se any i nterference
wi th the Ameri can force in matters rel ati ng to di sci pl i ne, or to the i nternal
admi ni strati on of the force.
For the purposes of thi s subsecti on, the Admi ral ty, the A rmy Counci l
and the Ai r Counci l shal l be deemed to be Government departments.
(2) The fol l owi ng provi si ons shal l have effect i n any case where a member
of an Ameri can force is sentenced by a servi ce court of the Uni ted States
of Ameri ca to any form of i mpri sonment or detenti on:
(a) the member of the Ameri can force may, under the authori ty of a
Secretary of State or the Admi ral ty, gi ven at the request of the
officer commandi ng the Ameri can force, be temporari l y detai ned
i n custody i n a pri son or detenti on barrack i n the Uni ted K i ng-
dom, or may, under the l i ke authori ty, be i mpri soned or detai ned
duri ng the whol e or any part of the term of hi s sentence i n a
pri son or detenti on barrack i n the Uni ted K i ngdom;
(b) the Admi ral ty, the Army Counci l or the Ai r Counci l may make
arrangements wi th the servi ce authori ti es of the Uni ted States
of Ameri ca wi th respect to the recepti on from those authori ti es
of persons who are to be detai ned or i mpri soned as aforesai d,
and thei r return to those authori ti es, and wi th respect to the
ci rcumstances under whi ch any such persons are to be rel eased;
(c) the provi si ons of any enactment, regul ati ons, rul es or orders
rel ati ng to the treatment of pri soners servi ng sentences of
i mpri sonment or penal servi tude in pri sons i n the Uni ted K i ng-
dom, and the manner.i n whi ch such persons are to be deal t wi th
i n the event of thei r unsoundness of mi nd, shal l appl y to persons
detai ned or i mpri soned i n pri sons in the Uni ted K i ngdom under
thi s subsecti on i n like manner as if
(i) any such person who has been' sentenced to detenti on or
i mpri sonment for a term of l ess than three years were
a person sentenced to i mpri sonment by a court of the
Uni ted K i ngdom;
(ii) any such person who has been sentenced to detenti on or
i mpri sonment for a term of three years or more were a
person sentenced to penal servi tude by a court of the
Uni ted K i ngdom;
(d) the provi si ons of any enactment, regul ati ons, rul es or orders
rel ati ng to the treatment of members of the home forces detai ned
in detenti on barracks in the Uni ted K i ngdom, and the manner
in whi ch they are to be deal t wi th i n the event of thei r unsound-
ness of mi nd, shal l appl y i n l i ke manner to persons detai ned i n
detenti on barracks in the Uni ted K i ngdom under thi s subsecti on;
(e) any costs i ncurred i n the mai ntenance and return of, or otherwi se
i n connecti on wi th, any person deal t wi th i n accordance wi th
the provi si ons of thi s subsecti on shal l be defrayed i n such manner
as may, wi th the consent of the Treasury, be agreed between
the Secretary of State or the Admi ral ty and the Government of
the Uni ted States of Ameri ca.
(3) Subj ect as herei nafter provi ded, any enactment (whether contai ned
i n the Naval Di sci pl i ne Act, the Army Act, the Ai r Force A ct or any
other statute) whi ch
(a) exempts, or provi des for the exempti on of, any vessel , vehi cl e,
ai rcraft, machi ne or apparatus of, or empl oyed for the purposes
of, the home forces or any of them from the operati on of any
enactment; or
(b) i n vi rtue of a connecti on wi th the home forces or any of them,
confers a pri vi l ege or i mmuni ty on any person; or
Application of
Act and of
3 & 4 Geo. 6.
c. 51 to Colonies.
Application to
mandated
territories.
(c) i n vi rtue of such a connecti on, excepts any property, trade or
busi ness, i n whol e or i n part, from the operati on of any enact-
ment, or from any tax, rate, i mposi ti on, tol l or charge; or
(d) i mposes upon any person or undertaki ng obl i gati ons i n rel ati on to
the home forces, or any of them, or any member or servi ce
court thereof; or
(e) penal i ses mi sconduct by any person i n rel ati on to the home forces
or any of them,, or any member or servi ce court thereof,
shal l , wi th any necessary modi fi cati ons, appl y i n rel ati on to an Ameri can
force as i t woul d appl y in rel ati on to a "home force of a l i ke nature to the
Ameri can force:
Provi ded that the provi si ons of the Naval Di sci pl i ne Act, the. Army Act
and the Ai r Force Act rel ati ng to wi tnesses at servi ce courts, shal l appl y i n
rel ati on to servi ce courts of the Uni ted States of Ameri ca' as if for the
method of summoni ng wi tnesses there were substi tuted such method as may
be prescri bed by orders made by the Admi ral ty, the Army Counci l or the
Ai r Counci l , and Hi s Maj esty may by Order i n Counci l di rect that any
other enactment referred to i n thi s subsecti on ei ther shal l not appl y, or
shal l appl y wi th such excepti ons and subj ect to such adaptati ons or
modi fi cati ons as may be specified i n the Order.
(4) A n Order i n Counci l under thi s secti on may appl y ei ther general l y, or
i n rel ati on to any parti cul ar Ameri can force, or in rel ati on to any parti cul ar
pl ace.
5.(1) Hi s Maj esty may as regards any col ony by Order in Counci l
di rect that the provi si ons of subsecti on (1) of secti on one of the Al l i ed
Forces Act, 1940, together wi th the provi si ons, as appl i ed by thi s Order,
of secti ons one and two of the Vi si ti ng" Forces (Bri ti sh Commonweal th)
Act, 1933, or such of those provi si ons as may be specified in the Order,
shal l , subj ect to such adaptati ons and modi fi cati ons as may be so speci fi ed,
appl y i n that col ony in- rel ati on to the forces of the Uni ted States of Ameri ca
as they appl y in the Uni ted K i ngdom.
An Order in Counci l under thi s subsecti on may appl y any such pro-
vi si ons ei ther general l y or in rel ati on to any parti cul ar Ameri can force.
(2) . . . . . .
(3) I n thi s secti on the expressi on " col ony
i ncl udes any terri tory whi ch
is under Hi s Maj esty's protecti on.
6. The l ast foregoi ng secti on shal l appl y i n rel ati on to any terri tory i n
respect of whi ch a mandate on behal f of the L eague of Nati ons is bei ng
exerci sed by Hi s Maj esty's Government in the Uni ted K i ngdom as if that
terri tory were for the ti me bei ng a col ony.
Pri nted by Hi s Ma j e s t y 's S t a t i o n e r y Of f i c e P r e s s ,
Drury L ane, W. C.2.
(3709) Wt. 8 - i 30,60, 70, 82 4/42 D.L. G. 416
CO
VO
"f t
DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OP HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT).
- ^ . . .
S j C R E T.
W^P. (42) 152. \/ COPY NO.
9TH APRIL, 1942.
WAR CABINET.
ANTI-GAS PRECAUTIONS.
REPORT BY THE SECRETARY OP STATE FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS.
In accordance with the decision of the War Cabinet
(W.M.(42) 36th Conclusions, Minute 3) I have reviewed the state
of our civilian anti-gas precautions and submit the following
report on the results of ray inquiry.
2. Since the previous review which I carried out a year ago
(see W.P. (-1-1)94) there has been an all round improvement in the
state of preparedness achieved, . In certain instances, however,
to which I refer below, I have found it necessary, to arrange
for further steps to be taken in order to stimulate progress or
to check the results already achieved.
Publicity.
3. With the lull in raiding since last spring, there has
inevitably been a slackening of interest in gas questions on the
part of the public and this has had some effect upon the
standard of training in the special anti-gas services and also
upon the general education of the public. While any large-
scale publicity campaign would clearly be undesirable in present
circumstances, public exercises using tear gas preceded by a
public warning, which have been carried out throughout the
country during the past months, should be continued, exeept
where these would, cause serious dislocation of the war effort.
The canvass referred to in paragraph 12 below, should also
prove useful in stimulating public interest.
Resp irators.
4. There has been no general inspection of respirators since
the review a year ago, but a running check is kept on their
condition through inspection by wardens, and it is, for the most
part, believed to be satisfactory. The civilian respirator is
a comparatively fragile article and wastage is governed primarily
by the extent to which it is carried. The carrying of
respirators is now comparatively rare except by school children
but among that group wastage up to 100^ a year has been reported
from some areas. Wastage on this scale is obviously undesirable
now that there is a shortage of rubber. Nevertheless I do not
regard it as practicable at the present time to vary the
instructions issued to local education authorities and to the
Public generally that respirators should be carried. I have
asked that Regional Commissioners should be instructed to report
on the frequency with which inspections of gas masks have been
carried out in each local authority area and on the results
obtained.
Gas Identification Service.,
5* As a result of the introduction of a new method of
testing, the practical value of the Gas Identification Service
has been much enhanced. This service consists of approximately
1,500 part time but highly trained workers, and it is essential
that its strength should not be depleted by other calls of
national service. I have invited the Ministry of Labour and
the Ministry of Home Security to consider each case
individually and to arrange wherever possible for deferment of
call-up.
Gas Warnings.
6. An improved form of hand rattle has been introduced
and progress has been made in providing a special form of
warning signal in coastal areas. The possibility of damage to
commercial factories producing gas for industrial or war
purposes creates a special problem, since the danger might
arise very suddenly. I have asked the Ministry of Home
Security, in consultation with the Ministry of Supply, to
consider whether special arrangements can be made, e.g. by the
use of factory sirens, for giving rapid warning to the public
in the immediate neighbourhood in the event of damage to these
factories. I have also recommended that vehicles used for
transporting large gas containers should be equipped with hand
rattles for use in case of accident.
Cleansing of the Public.
7. Some bi million ounces of anti-gas ointment No,2
have been sold to industry and to retail chemists. Sales to
the public have fallen off in recent months.
8. There has been a considerable expansion during the
past year in the number of public gas cleansing centres
-completed. Present plans provide for 3,000 of these, of
which 1,800 are attached to first aid posts. Most of the
latter have now been completed. The position is less
satisfactory in the case of separate cleansing centres since
on 31st December last some 400 out of a total of 1,200 were
not ready. The position will be reviewed in the light of
the returns due for 31st. March.
9i In addition to fixed cleansing centres, 800 mobile
cleansing units have been supplied to local authorities snd
another 200 are either on order or awaiting distribution.
10. Equipment is being supplied to these centres including
emejrgency clothing for the use of the public, and protective
clothing for the staff. ' The stocks of emergency clothing
are small but are being supplemented in various ways.
11. The staffing of cleansing centres is presenting some
difficulty. To meet the first gas attacks, authorities have
been urged to secure a first line team with a small trained
reserve. To meet continued attacks, however, a larger staff
would be necessary. Authorities are being urged to train
other civil defence workers in gas cleansing, and in London
endeavours are being made to use part time Wardens to
staff the centres. If found satisfactory, these arrangements
will be adopted in other parts of the country.
12, In dealing with mustard gas, the first line of defence
must .be the use of washing facilities in private houses, and
the public has been so instructed in a leaflet issued on the
subject. In some parts of the country good progress has been
made in organising a home gas cleansing service, but little has
been done as regards the country as a whole. I have requested
the Ministry of Health to instruct Regional Commissioners to
press on vigorously with arrangements for a selective canvass
of householders in their Regions to enlist their co-operation
in providing cleansing facilities in their homes. It is also
hoped that volunteers may be obtained by this means to serve at
the public gas cleansing centres.
13. Good progress has been made in providing cleansing
facilities at railway stations. Satisfactory arrangements
have been made for the reception in hospitals of those who
have been injured as well as contaminated.
Decontamination of Clothing.
14. Some 880 centres are being provided for the
decontamination of clothing, mainly at commercial laundries.
Although the laundries have undertaken to do the work, the
final preparations have been held up by difficulties in the
training of staff and in settling the charges to be made.
In order that there may be no further delay on this score, I
have asked the Department concerned to give urgent
consideration to the question whether compulsory powers should
be taken
15. There has been some complaint of a shortage of labour
in laundries and I have asked the Minister of Labour to
consider the position of the laundry industry with a view to
ensuring that sufficient staff is available to deal with the
decontamination of clothing.
Decontamination. -.
16. The manpower position in the decontamination service
still gives some cause for anxiety but certain new factors
should make the situation less acute.
17. A new technique has been introduced for the
decontamination of streets, by using dry bleach. This will
enable the work to be done much more rapidly and easily,
though larger quantities of bleach will be necessary. Present
supplies amount to some 36,000 tons and the target figure of
40,000 tons will be reached by the end of May. Oh the basis
of this new technique a special effort is now being made to
improve training and to bring decontamination squads up to the
proper degree of efficiency. Rescue and first aid parties
have been trained in decontamination work in order that they
may be able to assist the regular decontamination personnel,
and a number of other steps are being taken to supplement
the available staff.
Foodstuffs.
18. Good progress has been made during the past year in
the development of precautions against contamination of
foodstuffs. The schemes of 95% of the local authorities have
either been approved or are nearing completion. In addition
to privately-owned tarpaulins, 40,000 specially proofed
anti-gas sheets ore now held by Divisional Food Officers
throughout the country. The total strength of Pood Treatment
Squads i s now approxi matel y 20,000
9
but i t i s becomi ng
i ncreasi ngl y di f f i cul t to mai ntai n i t at thi s l evel owing to
other demands upon manpower.
19. Speci al arrangements have been made to deal wi th food
contami nated i n port areas.
I ndustry and Publ i c Uti l i ti es.
2 0 , Si nce the general revi ew of anti - gas precauti ons i n
f actori es l ast year there has been conti nuous f ol l ow- up acti on
by means of vi si ts of i nspecti on and detai l ed i nstructi ons.
The Mi ni stry of Suppl y report that anti - gas measures i n
f actori es- on thei r vi tal l i st are practi cal l y compl ete. I
hove asked f or a speci al report on the devel opment of
emergency cl eansi ng f aci l i ti es par ti cul ar l y i n smal l
f actori es- .
21. Further progress has al so been made i n the measures
adopted by the rai l way compani es and by publ i c ut i l i t y
undertaki ngs.
22. Speci al arrangements have been made for the
venti l ati on of mi nes i n the event of gas attack and squads
have been provi ded to deal wi th decontami nati on at the
pi thead. The precauti ons taken are bei ng caref ul l y revi ewed.
Co- ordi nati on between Ci vi l and Mi l i tary Preparati ons.
23. Provi si on has been made f or cl ose l i ai son between the
ci vi l and mi l i tary authori ti es i n al l anti - gas precauti ons
parti cul arl y i n exchange of i nf ormati on and i n the
s
decontami nati on of cl othi ng.
24. Anti - gas precauti ons i n the three Servi ces have
recentl y formed the subj ect of an exhausti ve revi ew by the
I nter- Servi ces Chemi cal Warfare Commi ttee i n a report
submi tted to the Chi ef s of Staf f ,
( I ntl d, ) CP . A.
Great George Streets S*W. 1.
9th APRIL, 1942. '
fir 0 (S r*)
^TS r Q01I ? P
N T
I S THE PROPERTY OF HI S BRI TANNI C MAJ ESTY ' S GOVERNMENT)
COPY FNO. *
53 n
WAR CABI NET J
(1) RELEASE OF WHOLE- TI ME CI VI L DEFENCE PERSONNEL
FOR WAR I NDUSTRY, '
(
' i)
( 2) RELEASE OF POLI CE FOR TEE
Memor andumby t he Home Secr et ar y and
Mi ni st er of Home Secur i t y,
1. The demands of pr oduct i ve i ndust r y f or addi t i onal \ \ if
manpower have f ocussod - at t ent i on on t he quest i on at t he ( A Â K / ^
pr esent st age of t he war of mai nt ai ni ng l ar ge number s of \ j \ I
whol e- t i me per sonnel i n t he ci vi l def ence ser vi ces io *fjl^,
st andi ng- by ni ght and day, and, i n vi ew of t he need t o / '
concent r at e our ef f or t s on of f ensi ve r at her t han def ensi ve
measur es, t he possi bi l i t i es' of r educt i ons i n whol e- t i me
per sonnel have been under i nt er - depar t ment al exami nat i on,
2. Accor di ng to t he l at est f i gur es avai l abl e t he f ol l owi ng
number s of men and women ar e at pr esent empl oyed on a
whol e- t i me basi s i n t he Nat i onal Fi r e Ser vi ce and t he
Local Aut hor i t y Ci vi l Def ence Gener al Ser vi ces.
Men
Women
Tot a
Nat i onal , Fi r e Ser vi ce --
Engl and & Wal es 101, 035 19, 707
120, 742
Scot l and 7, 145
671
7, 816
Local Aut hor i t y Ci vi l
Def ence Gener al Ser vi ces. 118, 076 50, 277 168, 553
296, 911
3. I t i s gener al l y agr eed t hat t her e i s need t o r epl ace
def ensi ve t hi nki ng by an of f ensi ve wi l l t o vi ct or y. I n i t s
appl i cat i on t o ci vi l def ence t hi s changed out l ook i nvol ves
t he accept ance by t he ci vi l popul at i on of a r educed degr ee'
of cover i n passi ve def ence. Compl et e i mmuni t y f r omdanger
i s not i n any ci r cumst ances obt ai nabl e and i t becomes a
quest i on what amount of t he pr esent scal e of pr epar at i on may
pr oper l y be sacr i f i ced i n or der t o t r ansf er i nt o war-
pr oduct i ve i ndust r y consi der abl e number s. of t hose now
i mmobi l i sed i n ci vi l def ence.
4. I bel i eve i t i s possi bl e t o make a val uabl e cont r i but i on
t o i ndust r y by r el easi ng f r omt he ci vi l def ence ser vi ces an
appr eci abl e number of whol e- t i me per sonnel and at t he same
t i me t o mai nt ai n t r ai ned ser vi ces of suf f i ci ent st r engt h,
i ncl udi ng many mor e par t - t i me per sonnel t han have hi t her t o
been empl oyed. The Mi ni st er of Heal t h and t he Secr et ar y of
St at e f or Scot l and shar e my vi ew and associ at e t hemsel ves
f or t he ser vi ces f or whi ch t hey ar e r espect i vel y r esponsi bl e,
wi t h t he pol i cy her e set out . The r el eases of men and
women under t hese pr oposal s wi l l be gover ned by t he r at e
at whi ch t he Mi ni st er of Labour and Nat i onal Ser vi ce can
ar r ange t hei r absor pt i on i nt o i ndust r y and I shal l have hi s
assi st ance bot h i n t he r ecal l of r el eased per sonnel wher e
necessar y and i n di r ect i ng per sons to per f or mpar t - t i me
ser vi ce i n ci vi l def ence, I n t he event of r ai di ng bei ng
r esumed on i t s f or mer scal e t he ser vi ces woul d. be r est or ed
t o st r engt h by t he exer ci se of exi st i ng power s t o r ecal l t he
gr eat er par t of t hose who have been condi t i onal l y
r el eased t o war i ndust r y. Mor eover i t i s pr oposed t o
amend Def ence Regul at i on 29( B) t o make i t a f ur t her condi t i on
of r el ease t hat men and women r et ai n t hei r connect i on wi t h
ci vi l def ence by per f or mi ng par t - t i me ser vi ce as r equi r ed.
N a t i o n a 1 F i r e S e r vi c e.
5. The scope f or r educt i on i s l ess i n t he Nat i onal Pi r e
Ser vi ce t han i n t he Local Aut hor i t y Ci vi l Def ence Gener al
Ser vi ces. The Nat i onal Pi r e Ser vi ce has not been r ecr ui t ed
up t o t he number s aut hor i sed i n November l ast . Even when
t he number s al r eady al l ocat ed have been post ed t her e wi l l
st i l l be a shor t age of 5, 000 men on t he number s t hen f i xed.
Economi es i n t he Nat i onal Pi r e Ser vi ce woul d, t her ef or e, t ake
t he f or mof not r ecr ui t i ng to t he f ul l ext ent aut hor i sed,
r el easi ng men wi t h speci al qual i f i cat i ons t o i ndust r y, and
not r epl aci ng wast age. The pr eci se si ze of t he cut and t he
per i od dur i ng whi ch i t wi l l be ef f ect ed cannot yet be st at ed
' but , so f ar as Engl and and Wal es ar e concer ned, I have i t i n
I mi nd t hat t he pr esent st r engt h of t he Ser vi ce woul d be
r educed by about one- si xt h. The Secr et ar y of St at e f or
Scot l and does not consi der t hat , havi ng r egar d t o t he ser i ous
exi st i ng shor t age of per sonnel , r ecr ui t ment t o t he f ul l - t i me
mal e st r engt h of t he Nat i onal Pi r e Ser vi ce i n Scot l and can
be suspended i mmedi at el y but he pr oposes t o r educe t he
maxi mumnumber of f ul l - t i me men i n t he Ser vi ce f r omt he
t ot al of about 11, 000 pr oposed i n November l ast t o a t ot al
not exceedi ng 8, 000.
Local Aut hor i t y Ci vi l Def ence ( Gener al ) Ser vi ces.
6. I n. t he Local Aut hor i t y Gener al Ser vi ces, i n whi ch speed
i n deal i ng wi t h i nci dent s, t hough i mpor t ant , i s not so much
of t he essence as i n t he Fi r e Ser vi ce and par t - t i me
per sonnel not act ual l y on dut y at t he depot s at t he t i me
of t he "al er t " woul d of t en be avai l abl e i n suf f i ci ent t i me,
a l ar ger "pr opor t i onat e r educt i on of per sonnel shoul d be
t
possi bl e. A gener al scheme of r eor gani sat i on i s t aki ng'
pl ace, as a r esul t . of whi ch I f eel t hat , wi t hout undue r i sk,
a r educt i on of per sonnel up t o one t hi r d of whol e- t i me
st r engt h wi t hi n t he next mont h of si x weeks i s j ust i f i abl e.
7. Reduct i ons on t hi s scal e wi l l onl y be j ust i f i ed on t he
assumpt i on t hat t he Mi ni st r y of Labour and Nat i onal Ser vi ce
can di r ect consi der abl e number s of men and women t o f i l l
r esul t ant vacanci es on a par t - t i me basi s. As t he maxi mum
per i od of unpai d par t - t i me ci vi l def ence ser vi ce whi ch can
be r equi r ed of any man or woman i s 48 hour s per mont h t he
number s t o be provi ded; , i f ever y vacancy has t o be f i l l ed,
mi ght amount t o si x t i mes as. many as are t o be r el eased.
On t he ot her hand, I hope t hat t he r eor gani sat i on of t he
gener al ser vi ces, whi ch i ncl udes r educi ng t he degr ee of
- speci al i sat i on, - i mpr ovi ng t he di r ect i on and cont r ol , and
i ncr easi ng t he r adi us i f act i on of t he mobi l e ser vi ce, wi l l
make i t unnecessar y t o r epl ace by par t - t i me vol unt eer s
ever y whol e- t i me ci vi l def ence wor ker who i s r el eased t o
i ndust r y.
8 . I have r eason t o bel i eve t hat l ocal aut hor i t i es wi l l be
bet t er pr epar ed t o accept t he r educt i on i n t he ci vi l . .
def ence ser vi ces i f t he Gover nment wi l l announce t hei r
assumpt i on of f ul l r esponsi bi l i t y f or t he pol i cy. Per haps i n
London Regi on obj ect i ons wi l l be l ouder t han el sewher e,
f or r el eases cont empl at ed f r om t hat Regi on t ot al near l y .
20, 000 and ar e on a l ar ger scal e t han f r omany ot her Regi on.
9. The r el ease of so consi der abl e' a pr opor t i on of t he-
whol e- t i me ci vi l def ence wor ker s i n t he mor e popul ous ar eas
i nvol ves t he accept ance of a cer t ai n r i sk i f r ai di ng on a
l ar ge scal e i s r esumed but i n vi ew of t he Ai r St af f
1
s
f or ecast t he r i sk i s one whi ch I t hi nk we ought t o t ake i n
pr esent ci r cumst ances. The l at est appr eci at i on of t he Ai r
St af f suggest s t hat t he pr eoccupat i on of t he Ger man Ai r For ce
on t he Russi on Fr ont woul d pr event any speedy r esumpt i on of
r ai di ng on t he scal e' exper i enced a year ago and t hat , even
i f t he' Russi on Fr ont - wer e to col l apse, i t woul d t ake si x
weeks f ul l y t o reorgani se the Ger man Ai r For ce f or heavy scal e-
r ai ds on t hi s count r y. I n t he i nt er val much can be done t o
t r ai n t he new par t - t i me ent r ant s and many of t he r el eased
per sonnel , who ar e f ul l y t r ai ned, can be cal l ed back i f
exi st i ng st r engt h pr oves i nsuf f i ci ent .
10, I need not t r oubl e my col l eagues - wi t h pr oposal s,
whi ch al so f or ma par t of t he schei me, i nvol vi ng t he pr ovi si on
of al t er nat i ve wor k f or member s of t he ci vi l def ence ser vi ces
who cannot be r el eased;
Pol i ce.
11. The possi bi l i t y of appl yi ng t o t he Pol i ce Ser vi ce t he
pol i cy out l i ned above has al so been exami ned. Ther e i s not
much scope f or t he r el ease of whol e- t i me per sonnel , si nce -
t he peacet i me st r engt h of t he f or ce has been i ncr eased onl y
f r omsome 62, 000 t o some 90, 000 i n Engl and and Wal es and
f r om6, 800 t o 9, 500 i n Scot l and, and t he pr esent whol e- t i me
st r engt h cannot be r egar ded as excessi ve i n vi ew of t he
addi t i onal bur dens and r esponsi bi l i t i es whi ch f al l on t he
pol i ce i n war t i me. Never t hel ess, I t hi nk- t hat t he Pol i ce
Ser vi ce al so shoul d make i t s cont r i but i on t o t he sol ut i on of
t he manpower pr obl em. I suggest , wi t h t he concur r ence of
t he Secr et ar y of St at e f or Scot l and, t her ef or e, t hat t he
r egul ar pol i ce Who wer e under 25 at t he t i me of r egi st r at i on
i n 1940 ( est i mat ed at some 6, 000 i n Engl and and Wal es and
about 1, 000 i n Scot l and) shoul d be r el eased t o t he Ar med
For ces, unl ess t her e are good r easons why i ndi vi dual s wi t hi n
t hi s age gr oup shoul d be r et ai ned. The r el ease of
pol i cemen of t hi s age gr oup wi l l r esul t i n some i mpai r ment
of t he ef f i ci ency of t he Pol i ce Ser vi ce i n case of heavy ai r
r ai ds or i n i nvasi on, but t he r i sk i s one whi ch i n pr esent
ci r cumst ances I t hi nk we are j ust i f i ed i n t aki ng, havi ng
r egar d t o t he val uabl e mat er i al whi ch woul d be r el eased t o
t he f i ght i ng ser vi ces,
12. I ask f or Cabi net sanct i on to r el ease on t he scal e
pr oposed, vi z. up t o one- si xt h of t he Nat i onal Fi r e Ser vi ce
i n Engl and and Wal es, one- t hi r d of t he Gener al Ci vi l Def ence
Ser vi ces and some 7, 000 young pol i cemen.
H. M. .
HOME OFFI CE.
I Ot h Apr i l . 194
ij
SECRET
Copy No,
W. P. (42) 154
(Also C.O.S (42) 213)
Ai?n7 9, 1942
T O B E K E P T U N D E R L OC K A N D KEY,
WAR CABINET
WEEKLY RESUME
(No. 136)
of the
from 0700 April 2nd, to
0700 April 9th,
1942
Cabinet War Room
NA Y A L SI TUATI ON.
General Revi ew.
1. Strong J apanese naval forces, including battleships and aircraft-
carriers, have been operating in the Bay of Bengal. Carrier-borne aircraft have
caused severe losses among H.M. ships, including two 8-inch cruisers and a small
aircraft-carrier. Naval bases in Ceylon and merchant shipping at sea have also
been attacked.
Heavy air raids on Malta have caused considerable damage to naval units.
Shipping losses reported have been comparatively light.
Home Waters.
2. The Norwegian s.s. Lind (461 tons), which left Gothenburg on the
31st March, has arrived at a British port.
The American Battleship Washington, Aircraft-Carrier Wasp, 8-inch
Cruisers Wichita and Tuscaloosa, with six destroyers, arrived at Scapa on
the 4th.
The officers' mess, W.R.N.S. Headquarters and R.N. sick quarters were
damaged by blast during an air raid on Dover on the 3rd.
Northern Waters.
3. Kola Inlet and Murmansk were twice raided by enemy aircraft on the
3rd. A divisional headquarters was destroyed and three merchant ships were
damaged.
Medi terranean.
4. Heavy air raids on Malta on the 4th, 5th and 8th caused the following
casualties :
On the 4th the Greek Submarine Glaucos was sunk and H.M. Cruiser
Penelope, H.M. Destroyer Lance and H.M. Minesweeper A bingdon were damaged.
On the 5th H.M. Destroyers Gallant and Kingston were damaged; the former
had to be beached. H.M. Ships Lance and A bingdon were again seriously
damaged. There was considerable damage to the dockyard.
On the 8th there was extensive damage to the harbour area. Kingston received
a direct hit, which did not explode, a tug was sunk and an Admiralty oiler and
two minesweeping trawlers damaged. Admiralty House was largely demolished.
I n an air raid on Alexandria on the 8th H.M. Minesweeper Svana and
H.M. Whaler Thorgrim were sunk.
H.M. Destroyer Havock ran aground on the north-east coast of Tunis on
the 6th, and as it was impossible to refloat her she was destroyed. One rating
was killed, and the remainder of the crew, including five wounded, were reported
to be on shore.
On the 7th the hospital ship Somersetshire (9,716 tons) was damaged by a
mine or torpedo off the Libyan coast, but was able to proceed. There were no
wounded on board at the time.
A French report states that the crews of H.M. Motor Launches Nos. 129
and 132, which were presumed lost on passage from Gibraltar to Malta, have
been interned in Algeria, having arrived after an engagement with Italian
aircraft, in which one motor launch was sunk.
During the week 15,990 tons of French shipping westbound and 3.894 tons
eastbound have passed through the Straits of Gibraltar under escort.
I ndi an *Ocean.
5. I n an. attack by American aircraft on enemy shipping at Port Bl ai r on
the night of the 2nd, one cruiser is reported to have been set on fire and a troopship
and two other ships damaged.
I n the afternoon (local time) of the 4th a Catalina aircraft located a large
enemy force, which was later estimated to contain three battleships and four
aircraft carriers, 360 miles S.S.E. of Ceylon, steering to the north-westward.
At 0800 on the 5th, during an air attack from the aircraft carriers on Colombo,
H.M. Destroyer Tenedos, which was under repair, was rendered a total loss, H.M.
Armed Merchant Cruiser Hector was set on fire and the submarine depot-ship
Lucia was slightly damaged. Casualties were slight.
H.M. Cruisers Cornwall and Dorsetshire, which had left Colombo in the
afternoon of the 4th to join Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Fleet, to the south-
westward, were attacked and sunk by about fifty enemy dive-bombers while on
passage. Each aircraft carried one large bomb, and the attack was made in
groups of three. Both ships were hit by the first salvo and sank within fifteen
minutes ofter explosions in the magazines. There were 1,122 survivors, including
both captains. The naval force under the command of Commander-in-Chief, -
Eastern Fleet, left their base on the 4th and proceeded to the eastward, but failed
to make contact with the enemy.
I n the morning of the 6th shipping was attacked at various points off the
east coast of I ndia between Calcutta and Vizagapatam by enemy naval forces,
which included ia&fektesfe&âs, aircraft carriers, cruisers and destroyers.
An enemy force of battleships and aircraft-carriers was sighted by
reconnaissance aircraft to the eastward of Ceylon, P . M. on the 8th : and the
following morning Trincomalee was attacked by a large force of carrier-borne
aircraft. Some damage was done in the harbour and one merchant vessel was
hit.
H.M. Aircraft Carrier Hermes, with H.M. Australian Destroyer Vampire,
H.M. Corvette Hollyhock and eight fleet auxiliaries, which had left Trincomalee
in the evening of the 8th, was attacked and sunk by dive-bombers when about
50 miles to the southward of Trincomalee at 0700 on the 9th. I t is feared that
Vampire, Hollyhock and possibly the tanker A thelstane (5,571 tons) were also
sunk. 200 survivors have been picked up. Six of the auxiliaries have returned
to Trincomalee.
Pacific Ocean.
6. American submarines report having sunk two. laden enemy tankers
south of the Carolines on the 4th.
7. Attacks on U-boats have been made by surface craft off the American
Atlantic coast, to the southward of Freetown, by an American destroyer off the
Hebrides and by a Russian destroyer off the North Russian coast.
Aircraft, including four American aircraft, have carried out eleven attacks;
two in the Bay of Biscay, three in the Mediterranean and six off the American
Atlantic coast.
Hits were claimed in one attack in the Mediterranean, but in no case was
there evidence of destruction.
Enemy Intelligence.
8. Air reconnaissance on the 8th showed the Tirpitz, Scheer, Hipper and
Prinz Eugen still in Trondheim Fiord.
U-boats.
9. TJ -boats have continued to be active, though to a less extent than of late,
in the area between Cape Hatteras, Bermuda and Nantucket. There has also
been some activity in the Caribbean Sea and south of the Liberian coast. More
U-boats have been operating in Norwegian waters, and it is estimated that
twenty-three German U-boats are in the Mediterranean. J apanese U-boats have
been active to the south of Ceylon.
10. During the week ending the 8th April, 1,036 ships, including 272 Allied
and 36 neutral, were convoyed. Four anti-aircraft ships, 66 destroyers (including
13 American destroyers) and 73 sloops, corvettes and minesweepers were employed
on escort duties. During the month of March 4,192 ships were convoyed, of which
six were lost by enemy action.
Imports into Great Britain by ships in convoy during the week ending the
4th April totalled 606,000 tons compared with 1,006,000 tons during the
previous seven days, and an average of 643,700 tons for the past ten weeks. Of
the week's imports, 191,000 tons were oil of various grades.
11. According to the information at present available, thirteen ships,
including eight tankers, have been attacked by U-boats during the week, nine in
[23683] B 2
the West Atlantic and West Indies, three off Ceylon and one off the Liberian
Coast; of these, only four are known to have been sunk. Two British ships were
sunk by J apanese surface craft in the Bay of Bengal. Three ships were damaged
by aircraft in Murmansk and one was sunk by a mine in the Bristol Channef
British Minelaying.
12. During the week aircraft have laid mines off the German North Sea
coast, in the Bay of Biscay and off Benghazi.
Enemy Minelaying and British Minesweeping.
13. Enemy aircraft over the Thames Estuary are suspected of laying mines
on three nights of this week, and also off the Ilumber on the night of the 7th/8th.
A number of mines destroyed off the East Coast are believed to have been laid
recently by E-boats.
The mine totals are : 1,966 magnetic, 1,258 acoustic, 1,116 moored mines.
14. Four I talian merchant ships engaged in the repatriation of non-
combatant Italians from East Africa have arrived and left Gibraltar during the
week.
MILITARY SITUATION.
Finland.
15. Continued German air attacks have caused some damage at Murmansk.
Central Sector.
16. Local Russian attacks and German counter-attacks have resulted in no
appreciable territorial change. Russian attempts to strengthen the isolated
localities, which they have captured behind the German forward defences north
and south of the Smolensk-Moscow railway, have probably met with some success.
Ukraine.
17. Local Russian attacks east of Kharkov and in the Donets and Taganrog
areas have not caused any change in the general situation in this sector.
Summary.
18. While Russian attacks have gained little ground, they have prevented
the Germans from disengaging formations for rest. The prevailing thaw,
however, is probably limiting the scope of operations on the whole front and may
give the Germans some opportunity for resting and refitting.
Libya.
19. Normal patrol activity continued throughout the week and some small
engagements took place.
On the 6th April an advance by three enemy columns began at dawn
(a) The main thrust south-east through Bir Temrad to Sidi Breghisc
(5 miles south-east of Bir Temrad).
(&) By a route further south to Sidi Breghisc.
(c) From the Mekili area towards El Telim (31 miles north-west of Bir
Hakeim).
The combined strength of the first two columns was 80 tanks and 100 M.T.
The third column consisted of 20 tanks and 50 M.T.
I n the evening one of our columns was ordered forward to engage 100 M.T.
in the areas north and west of Bir Temrad and patrols were sent to investigate
the Sidi Breghisc area.
20. During the 7th the enemy were digging in at Bir Temrad and Sidi
Breghisc. An enemy column including 100 tanks moved from El Cherima
(19 miles south-west of Gazala) to a point 12 miles south of Gazala and 50 tanks
and 300 M.T. were observed in the area south-west of El Cherima. Our artillery
shelled enemy guns and M.T. 3 miles north-west of Bir Temrad and our armoured
car patrols were in contact with enemy patrols. The enemy made no attempt to
reconnoitre our positions.
Burma.
Irrawaddy Front.
21. On the morning of the 1st April the enemy attacked Prome in consider-
able strength and secured the high ground to the south of the town. Fighting-
continued during the night and the following day, when our forces withdrew to
positions just north of Prome.
22. During the 3rd and 4th our withdrawal continued. The enemy followed
up strongly but were successfully dealt with and our troops took up positions
on the Bwetkyi Chaung just south of Allanmyo. During the 4th enemy action
was confined to bombing and air reconnaissance, but owing to the fatigue of our
troops it was decided to withdraw to the area Glinban Chaung (60 miles north
of Prome). This withdrawal was carried out on the night of the 5th/6th after
the oilfields, power station and cement factory in Thayetmyo had been successfully
demolished. Allanmyo and Thayetmyo were fired after all our supplies, ammu-
nition and fuel had been removed.
23. A strong enemy column has been located at Nyaung Binzeik with
elements moving north-east. Another enemy column is reported on the west bank
of the Irrawaddy, 10 miles north of Kama.
Sittang Front.
24. North of Toungoo the Chinese have taken up a defensive position in the
Swa-Yedashe area, where heavy fighting is going on. East of Toungoo the
J apanese are now about 30 miles west of Mawchi, which is held by the Chinese.
The Karen levies have been completing demolitions and holding up this J apanese
advance.
General.
25. The British and Chinese have suffered from a severe lack of air support
and have been constantly dive-bombed and machine-gunned.
Indian Ocean.
26. On the 30th/31st March an unopposed enemy landing took place on
Christmas Island.
Netherlands East Indies.
27. The Dutch Headquarters in Australia reports that guerillas in J ava
are maintaining an active resistance.
Pacific Islands.
New Guinea.
28. There is no indication of a renewal of the advance from Huon Gulf
area on Port Moresby but the enemy are reported to have occupied points in
West (Dutch) New Guinea.
Solomon Islands.
29. The enemy has made further landings on Bougainville Island and has
shelled and occupied Faisi Island.
Intelligence.
France and the Low Countries.
30. The eastward movement of forces from France, coupled with their
replacement by troops returning from Russia, is believed to be continuing; two
more divisions have been reported as about to move from France. The estimated
total of divisions remains at 26 in France and three in the Low Countries.
Italy.
31. A further new I talian infantry division has been identified in the
Ancona area. This brings the total number of I talian divisions identified to 77.
Bulgaria.
32. There are still no indications of any impending military action by
Bulgarian forces. I t is, however, reported that a call-up was carried out during
March, which involved as many as 100,000 men. The addition of these recruits
brings the Bulgarian forces almost to their full mobilisation strength of about
370,000.
AIR SITUATION.
General Review.
33. The Matford Works, at Poissy, was successfully attacked by aircraft
of Bomber Command.
Enemy attacks on Malta were intensified and caused widespread damage.
J apanese aircraft attacked Colombo Harbour and Trincomalee.
United Kingdom.
34. Fighter Command flew 2,479 sorties by day and 449 by night.
Enemy activity against this country was on a small scale. By day, some
offensive operations were carried out by fighter bombers and two attacks were
made on a R.A.F. station near Swanage.
Eighteen enemy aircraft were reported overland in daylight and 48 at night.
Night fighers shot down three enemy bombers and probably destroyed
another.
Day.
35. Fighter and Bomber Commands despatched 541 and 12 offensive sorties
respectively.
36. The railway junction at St. Omer was attacked by Bostons, escorted by
14 squadrons of Spitfires. Bombing results were not observed, but the fighter
escort encountered large numbers of enemy fighters five of which were destroyed,
three probably destroyed and ten damaged for the loss of eleven Spitfires.
Following on this attack several squadrons of Spitfires gave support to Air Sea
Rescue searches in the Straits.
37. Five fighter sweeps involving a total of 25 squadrons of Spitfires were
carried out during the week over the coastal areas of North-West France, but
met with very little opposition. One Spitfire was lost.
Night.
38. Bomber Command despatched 834 sorties against land targets. The
main weight of the attack involving a total of 692 aircraft was directed against
Cologne, Essen and Hamburg, but on each night extremely bad weather condi-
tions were encountered, and numerous aircraft were forced to abandon their
primary task. From these three attacks, fifteen bombers are missing.
39. At Cologne, the early arrivals attacked in fair visibility, which
rapidly deteriorated. Numerous fires were observed in the town, and a power
station north-east of the town was seen to be burning. About 313 tons of H.E.
and incendiaries were dropped in this attack.
Essen and Hamburg were attacked in very bad weather conditions. Apart
from scattered fires, results were not observed. About 340 tons of bombs were
dropped.
40. The most successful operation of the week was a medium scale attack
on the Matford Works at Poissy, which is engaged in the production of' motor
transport vehicles for Germany. About 100 tons of H.E. were dropped in
excellent visibility, and both the factory and the adjacent power station were left
in flames.
41. At Gennevilliers (Paris) the Gnome and Rhone Works, which manu-
factures aero-engines was subjected to a small scale attack in good weather
conditions. Numerous fires are reported, particularly in a subsidiary factory
situated to the east of the main works.
42. About 75 tons of H.E. were dropped during three attacks on the docks
at Havre.
43. Leaflets were released over Northern France and Belgium by a total of
24 aircraft.
44. Fighter Command despatched a total of 42 aircraft to patrol enemy
aerodromes. Bombs were dropped at Lille, Conches, Beauvais, Evreux,
Eindhoven and Fouville. A He. I l l was destroyed whilst landing at Evreux.
Coastal Operations.
45. Coastal Command flew 381 sorties, and an additional 49 sorties on
convoy escorts. Shipping protection patrols by Fighter Command involved 1,231
sorties.
46. Bomber Command despatched 21 aircraft by day to lay sea mines off the
Frisian Islands, and a total of 54 aircraft operated by night on similar operations
in Quiberon Bay and off Heligoland. Sixty-nine mines were laid. Two aircraft
are missing. .
47. A number of attacks on enemy shipping were made during the week,
but no sinkings are claimed. A 5,000-ton merchant vessel was hit with a torpedo
off Obrestad. Following a low-level bombing attack two columns of smoke were
seen issuing amidships from a 6,000-ton vessel off Statland. Two hits with bombs
are estimated on a 3,000-ton vessel off Katwijk. Spitfires attacked three trawler-
type vessels.
48. Beaufighters covering the escape of Norwegian shipping from Sweden
(vide paragraph 3 of Resume No. 135), destroyed three enemy aircraft and
damaged a further three without loss.
49. About 60 enemy aircraft carried out shipping and weather reconnais-
sances off our coasts. A total of about 75 enemy aircraft were engaged in sea-
mining.
Mediterranean.
Libya and Egypt.
50. Two daylight attacks were made on Derna aerodrome by Bostons escorted
by fighters. Enemy fighter opposition was encountered but all our bombers
returned safely. I n combats with our fighters three enemy aircraft were
destroyed, seven probably destroyed and eight damaged, for the loss of two
Kittyhawks.
Attacks were also made by escorted light bombers on enemy M.T. columns
advancing in the Bir Temrad area.
51. Fighters carried out offensive sweeps over the forward areas and also
provided patrols to protect our shipping. A force of 20 J u. 87s with fighter
escort was intercepted whilst attacking a convoy near Tobruk; three enemy
aircraft were shot down, one probably destroyed, and eight damaged for a loss
of four fighters.
52. The harbour installations and shipping at Benghazi were bombed by
Wellingtons on each night and sea-mines were laid in the Harbour.
The landing grounds at Berca and Derna were also attacked.
53. Hurricanes carried out a series of night patrols over the forward areas
and attacked enemy transport vehicles with bombs and machine-gun fire.
54. Enemy activity was not on a large scale. Small formations of long-
range bombers made two night attacks on one of our landing grounds near Dhaba
(Egypt) but caused negligible damage. On one day the enemy carried out a
number of offensive sweeps over our forward landing grounds and two Kittyhawks
were shot down.
55. Two night raids were made on Alexandria by 20 and 16 enemy bombers
respectively. Some damage was caused to a quay, to small naval units and to
civilian property. A Beaufighter shot down two enemy aircraft and A.A. fire
probably destroyed one more.
Malta.
56. Enemy bombing of the Island was intensified, the number of sorties
reaching the unprecedented total of 1,562. The heaviest attack was on 7th April,
when 318 enemy aircraft were engaged.
57. Attacks were concentrated on Grand Harbour and Valetta, on the
aerodromes at Hal Far, Luqa and Takali, and on the seaplane base at Kalafrana.
The damage was extensive and included considerable destruction of civilian
property. Seven aircraft were destroyed on the ground and eleven others
damaged. I t was noticeable, however, that there was a marked decrease in the
accuracy of the enemy bombing.
58. The small number of available fighters intercepted the enemy on every
possible occasion and destroyed 14 enemy aircraft, probably destroyed nine more
and damaged 25 others, with very few losses to themselves. I n addition,
anti-aircraft fire destroyed 25, probably destroyed another and damaged 18 more.
Russia.
German Air Force Operations.
59. The German Air Force on the Russian Front continues to receive
reinforcements and it is considered that the force now engaged consists of
approximately 2,000 I E . aircraft compared with the force of 1,600 aircraft
operating at the beginning of the year. A large proportion of the reinforcements
are believed to comprise units which have again become operational after a period
of overhaul and rest following their withdrawal from Russia at the end of 1941.
60. The thaw, which has now extended to a large area of the front, is likely
to affect the serviceability of aerodromes. I t is believed that the average
serviceability of units in Russia remains low and consequently the scale of effort
by the present force is likely to be substantially below that achieved by the
G.A.F. under normal conditions.
61. Several attacks have been made on Murmansk and on convoys by
formations of J u.87's, Me.ll0's and J u.88's, operating from Northern Norway.
Little damage has been caused to shipping but some hits were made on port
installations.
62. Operations on the remainder of the front appear to have been confined
mainly to close support of the land forces in resisting Russian attacks. Long-
range bomber operations have been directed against railway communications,
which have assumed increased importance owing to the difficulties of road
transportation under thaw conditions. Russian air forces have maintained a
heavy scale of attack against the German-occupied aerodromes and communica-
tions in this area.
Ceylon.
63. On the 5th, about 75 enemy aircraft, chiefly fighters carrying bombs
and some dive-bombers, operating from aircraft carriers, attacked the harbour
at Colombo and the aerodrome at Ratmalana. On shore, the harbour workships
were destroyed and some damage was caused to the railway workshops.
Thirty-three Hurricanes and naval Fulmars were airborne, and these
destroyed 23 enemy aircraft, probably destroyed five and seriously damaged
many others. A further two aircraft were shot down by A.A. Our losses were
14 Hurricanes, four Fulmars, three Catalinas and two naval Swordfish, but some
of the personnel are safe.
64. On the morning of the 9th, 27 enemy bombers and a large number of
fighters attacked Trincomalee. Preliminary reports indicate that considerable
damage was caused to hangars and buildings at China Bay, and a large fire,
probably oil, was started. Seven enemy aircraft were reported destroyed. Seven
Hurricanes and one naval Fulmar are missing.
65. Nine Blenheims were despatched to attack the enemy naval force
and claim three near misses on an aircraft carrier. Five Blenheims are missing.
India.
66. On the 3rd, six American Fortresses carried out their first operation
from I ndian territory and attacked enemy shipping at Port Blair Ândaman
Islands). One cruiser and a transport were set on fire.
67. I n the Bay of Bengal, our fighters intercepted enemy aircraft which
were attacking merchant shipping and damaged three float-planes.
. 68. Other raids were made by J apanese aircraft on the harbours at
Vizagapatam and Cocanada.
Burma.
69. No reports have been received of any air operations by the R.A.F. or
Allied aircraft.
70. Bombing by the J apanese has been maintained consistently throughout
the week. At Mandalay, parts of the town and the base supply depot were burnt
out, and at Yamethin the railway station was destroyed. Akyab aerodrome was
raided four times in two days by a total of 36 aircraft and the aerodrome was
rendered temporarily unserviceable.
71. Other attacks were made on Thazi, Pyinmana, the Pade-Sindok valley,
Taungwingyi (twice), and on Maymyo, where the hangar and remount depot
were damaged. The landing ground at Loiwing was machine-gunned.
Pacific Zone.
72. Successful attacks were made on the aerodromes at Koepang and Lae
by R.A.A.F. and American aircraft, respectively. At the former six enemy air-
craft were destroyed, eight were probably destroyed, and six were damaged, all on
the ground. At Lae five aircraft were set on fire, at least ten more were badly
damaged, and bombs fell among a group of six fighters.
73. American bombers attacked the runway at Salamoa, the aerodromes at
Gasmata and Vunakanau, and shipping at Rabaul. No definite results are
reported.
Australia.
74. There have been three attacks on Darwin, and two attacks on Port
Moresby aerodromes, but no serious damage resulted. Of the total of 30 bombers
and 26 fighters engaged in these attacks, six aircraft were destroyed, two were
probably destroyed and two were damaged. Our losses were four Tomahawks.
HOME SECURI TY SI TUATI ON.
General.
By Day.
75. Bombs have been dropped
(a) On the Gloucester Aircraft Factory and on the adjacent R.A.F. aero-
drome.
(b) At Bognor Regis.
(c) On a telecommunications experimental establishment on two occasions.
Damage was nowhere extensive but there were a number of casualties.
By Night.
76. On the night of the 2nd/3rd bombs were dropped on the coasts of Dorset
and Kent. Considerable damage was done to house property at Weymouth and
Dover. Utility services were affected and casualties were comparatively heavy.
On the following nights bombs were dropped in Dorset and Somerset without
effect and on the night of 7th/8th there was scattered bombing in the eastern
coastal areas and slight damage was done at Grimsby docks.
Casualties.
77. Estimated civilian casualties for the week ending 0600 hours on the
8th April are 55 killed and 104 seriously injured, the majority occurring at
Weymouth and Dover on the night of the 2nd/3rd.
[23683]
c
APPENDICES I, II and III, will be published monthly.
APPENDIX IY.
Enemy Merchant Ship Losses as assessed to 15th March, 1942.
Sunk, Capt ur e d
Se r i ous l y j
or Cons t r uc t i ve T- s Da ma g e d . Tot al .
Da ma g e d .
Lo s s .
Nat i onal i t y Nat i onal i t y..
Gros s Gros s 1
X T
Gr os s Gros s
No . No.
No .
N o
Tons . Tons . i - To ns . Tons .
1
Ge r ma Ge r ma nn 406 1, 746, 735 114 310, 103 192 609, 889 7 1 2 2, 666, 727
I t al i a I t al i ann
4 3 0 1, 792, 801 80 375, 368 85 429, 984 595 2, 598, 153
Ot he Ot herr e n e m e n e myy s hi p s hi pss an andd
121 215, 358 16 43, 706 12 48, 824 149 307, 888
s hi p s hi pss us e f u us e f ull t t oo enemy enemy--
Tot a Tot all
957 3, 754, 894 210 729, 177 2 8 9 1, 088, 697 1, 456 5, 572, 768
This table does not include losses inflicted on the enemy by our Russian
Allies, which are estimated at about 556,000* gross tons sunk : nor does it include
losses inflicted on J apanese shipping in the Far East and Pacific, which are under
consideration by a Special Committee.
In addition, there is about 336,000 gross tons of Axis shipping in South
American ports which is no longer available to the enemy.
* No c l a i ms ma d e s i nc e l as t report .
APPENDIX Y.
The following casualties to FLM. Auxiliary vessels have been reported :
April 8.M/S Trawlers Swona and Jade and Drifter Girl Margaret
damaged by aircraft at Malta.
The following casualties to naval personnel have been reported : -
Officers : Killed 14; wounded 17; missing 34.
Ratings : Killed 149; wounded 25; missing 52.
Provisional operational aircraft battle casualties compiled from reports received
between dawn, Thursday, 2nd April, 1942, and dawn, Thursday, 9th April,
Metropolitan Area.
Bo mb e r s . . . 20
Fi ght e r s . . . 14
Coas t al . . .
Ar my Co- Ope r at i on
To t a l 41
No pi l ot s s af e.
Probably
Enemy.'
7
Fi g ht e r s 6 4 14
Mi s c e l l a ne o us 1
Bo mb e r s 1 11
To t a l 13 26
Of t he a bo v e t ot al s , one bombe r wa s de s t r o y e d by A. A. fire.
British. hi the Air. On the Ground.
Bo mb e r s . . . 5 5
Fi g ht e r s . . . 22 5
Ot he r s . . . 2
To t a l . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
12
Two pi l ot s and t wo c r e ws are s af e.
. Probably
Snemy.
Bo mb e r s . . . 40 16 43
Fi g ht e r s . . . 15 9 18
Mi s c e l l a ne o us 4 3 8
Tot al 59 28 69
Of t he a bo v e t ot al s , t hi r t y- one we r e de s t r o y e d, o ne probabl y de s t r o y e d,
and e i g ht e e n d a ma g e d by A. A. fire.
Far East.
British and Allied. hi the Air. On the Ground.
Bo mb e r s . . .
Fi g ht e r s . . .
19
2
To t a l 2 1
S o me pi l ot s are s af e.
Probably
snemy.
Destroyed. Destroyed Damaged.
Bo mb e r s . . . 6 1 1
Fi g ht e r s 6 3 2
Mi s c e l l a ne o us 25* 5*
28f
. To t a l . . . . . . 37 9 31
Of t he a bo v e t ot al s , fi ve were de s t r o y e d by A. A. fire'.
* Mo s t l y Na v y " O " f i ght ers e a c h c ar r yi ng one bo mb ( Co l o mbo ) ,
f Pr e s s c o mmu n i q u e s gi ve d a ma g e d as t we nt y - f i v e at Col ombo.
NOTBS.- - ( a) No a c c o u n t i s t a k e n of e n e my ai rcraf t de s t r o y e d on t he gr ound i n any t heat re.
(b) No a c c o u n t i s t a k e n of Br i t i s h Na v a l ai rcraf t c as ual t i e s .
Germany.
Kiel.Photographs taken on the 29th March, 1942, show :
(i) Damage to a building at the Deutsche Werke and to the jetty leading to
the northern floating dock;
(ii) Two buildings in a works reported to be making torpedo components
and shells have been destroyed; and
(iii) Additional damage to residential property on the east and west sides
of the town.
Dortmund.Further details of the damage caused on the 10th/11th March
to the Hoesch Iron and Steel Works have been received. A machine assembly shed,
a lathe shed, the main smithy, a large warehouse, the despatch department and
adjoining office buildings were all seriously damaged.
On the same night a large bomb fell near the main station causing damage to
the station itself as well as to surrounding buildings.
Occupied France.
Poissy.Photographs taken on the 6th April, 1942, are of very poor quality
and prevent any detailed interpretation being made. I t is, however, clear that
the Matford Works have been severely damaged both b)' H.E. and fire. In
addition, factories lying to the south and south-west of the works have been
damaged, in some cases severely, and it is believed that the transformer station
has been affected.
Le Trait.-Photographs taken the day after the recent attack on the ship-
yards confirm the success of the attack and show that considerable damage has
been caused. Most of the important workshops have sustained varying degrees
of damage as well as at least one of the slipways. From the position of certain
craters seen on the photographs, it would also be reasonable to assume that
considerable damage has been done by blast to the interior of the workshops,
which is not otherwise apparent upon the photographs.
St. Nazaire.Photographs taken on 25th March show that damage caused
between 1st J anuary, 1942, and that date was almost entirely confined to the
dock area, where important workshops have been destroyed or damaged.
THIS DOCUMENT I S THE PROPERTY OF HI S BRI TANNI C MAJESTY' S GOVERNMENT
SECRET. Copy No.
W. P. (42) 155.
April 10, 1942.
WAR CABINET.
PROPAGANDA AT HOME.
Memorandum by the Minister of Information.
I AM anxious to have the guidance of the War Cabinet upon the formulation
of a propaganda policy at home. One of the main functions of the Ministry of
Information was defined bv the Cabinet last J uly as follows (W.P. (41) 149,
2/7/41) : -
" (6) to publicise and interpret Government policy in relation to the war, to
help to sustain public morale and to stimulate the war effort, and to
maintain a steady flow of facts and opinions calculated to further
the policy of the Government in the prosecution of the war."
2. At this stage of the war public feeling and the public's reactions to the
war cannot any longer be taken for granted. To study them, to assess them and
to adjust our publicity to meet them is now a much more important concern of
the Government than it was two years ago. Yet this publicity cannot be wholly
effective unless it interprets the considered policy of the War Cabinet as a whole
and unless the actions of Ministers and Departments generally are consistent
with it.
3. I t is easy to exaggerate disquieting features by a morbid attention to
the various techniques of taking the public pulse. However, making all allowances
for overstatements and obsessions, there are some currents of feeling in the
country about which there can be no dispute, and I venture to mention two of
them.
4. There has been in recent months a widespread decrease in confidence. To
some extent this confidence will ebb and flow with the course of events, but we
should be altogether too complacent if we merely waited for a run of successes
to restore it.
5. There is a prevalent sense of frustration. I n some ways this is a good
sign, even though an awkward companion. I t is a sign of energies unused and
enthusiasms unabsorbed, but it also induces a loss of interest in the grim realities
of the present. Many people want the war to be over so that they can be free to
start on something positive and constructive for the future. They do not find in
our present avowed purposes the impulse to a crusade or to a genuine fervour
of endeavour.
6. With a view to formulating a propaganda policy which will heal public
ailments of this sort as they develop, I should like to suggest for the consideration
of the War Cabinet the following procedure :
(a) The Minister of Information should circulate to the War Cabinet oncf/
a month an appreciation of the state of public morale. This should
take into account, in its preparation, the views of any other Depart-
ments primarily concerned with the Home front.
[23687]
(b) This appreciation would contain recommendations as to any general
lines which publicity should take in the ensuing month.
(c) The decisions of the War Cabinet would be taken as a Directive binding
on all Departments until further notice.
7. I n the meantime I suggest that approval should be given now to the
following positive directions on the general lines which Government publicity
should follow :
(i) There must be more explanation : not only about the armed forces and
the war situation but also about production, labour, war-time restric-
tions and the big problems that affect the life of everyone to-day.
When the public is bewildered by something new a failure to explain
means the risk of driving a wedge between Government and public,
and this fact must be given full weight when security risks suggest
the withholding of explanation,
(ii) We must stop appealing to the public or lecturing at it. One makes
it furious, the other resentful. General appeals to the public or
particular sections of it to work harder should not be made. There
are too many people already working to the limit of their capacity
or unable to do so for reasons beyond their control.
(iii) I n dealing with the news it is essential not merely to be but to give the
public the impression of being candid and objective. Harm can be
done to public confidence by failure to allow for this. An official com-
munique must be a report to the public; and every tendency to special
pleading should be eliminated.
(iv) Great care must be taken to deal with any rumours or complaints that
have wide acceptance. These are either justified or groundless. If
they are groundless, they must be exposed. If they have substance,
there must be an authoritative statement, as soon as possible, showing
either that their cause is being rectified or that it cannot be
rectified, and why.
B. B.
April 10, 1942.
a . /.v, - * - r; . /
SECRET. / CopylNo
W.P. (42) 156.
April 10, 1942.
WAR CABINET.
ANGLO-SOVIET TREATI ES.
Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
WI TH reference to Conclusion 4 of the meeting of the War Cabinet on the
8th April, I circulate to my colleagues drafts, which I would propose to use as
a basis for my discussions with the Soviet Ambassador on the two proposed
jl
f
Anglo-Soviet treaties. Unless I hear to ^^^^c^touryÎ ^cjilA^-pXQpxJ Seâ^baw
[I these ^^^JtQmMm^M^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^M^. Stalin has intimated"
1 1 tEaFne will wish to propose amenHments^to the drafts discussed in Moscow, but
these have not yet been received.
I would draw the attention of my colleagues to the passage in brackets in
article 3 of the draft treaty for the settlement of post-war questions (Annex I I ).
The proposal to include such a passage was on balance rejected by my colleagues
on the ground that the Soviet Government could not be expected to recognise in
a treaty the desire of His Majesty's Government to recover territory occupied
by the J apanese with whom the Soviet Government are not at war. I am advised,
however, that such a stipulation could not be held to apply to territory occupied
by J apan since the whole treaty is confined to Europe. On the other hand, the
inclusion of this provision would establish a principle which would be very useful
if Russia is later at war with J apan. Moreover, I think it would be liable to
adverse crticism, both in this country and abroad, if the obligations in this
article were entirely one-sided.
A. E.
April 10, 1942.
11684 [23685]
ANNEX 1.
[Draft Military Treaty.']
THE Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics and His Majesty The King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British
Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of I ndia :
Desiring to confirm the stipulations of the Agreement between His Majesty's
Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics for joint action in the war against Germany, signed at Moscow
on the 12th J uly, 1941, and to replace them by a formal Treaty :
Have decided to conclude a Treaty for that purpose and have appointed as
their Plenipotentiaries :
The Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics :
His Majesty The King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions
beyond the Seas, Emperor of I ndia :
For the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland :
The Right Honourable Anthony Eden, M.P., His Majesty's Principal
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs;
Who, having communicated to each other their full powers, found in good
and due form,
Have agreed as follows :
ARTICLE 1.
I n virtue of the Alliance established between them and in accordance with
the Declaration by the United Nations, signed at Washington on the
1st J anuary, 1942, the High Contracting Parties mutually undertake to afford
one another assistance and support of all kinds in the war against Germany and
those associated with her acts of aggression in Europe.
ARTICLE 2.
The High Contracting Parties undertake not to enter into negotiations with
the Hitlerite Government or any other Government of Germany that does not
clearly renounce all aggressive intentions, and not to negotiate or conclude except
by mutual consent any armistice or peace treaty with Germany, or any Power
associated with her acts of aggression in Europe.
ARTICLE 3.
The present Treaty shall be ratified and the ratifications shall be exchanged
in London as soon as possible.
I t shall come into force on the exchange of ratifications and shall thereupon
replace the Agreement between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, signed at
Moscow on the 12th J uly, 1941.
, The present Treaty shall remain in force until the re-establishment of peace
between the High Contracting Parties and Germany and the Powers associated
with her acts of aggression in Europe.
In witness whereof the above-named Plenipotentiaries have signed the
present Treaty and have affixed thereto their seals.
Done in duplicate in London on the day of , 1942, in
the/English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.
ANNEX 2.
[Draft Political Treaty.']
Republics and His Majesty The King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British
Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of I ndia; . ;
Desiring to work together in close and friendly collaboration after the
re-establishment of peace for the organisation of security and economic prosperity
in Europe, and taking into account the interest of the United Nations in these
objects :
Have decided to conclude a Treaty for that purpose and have appointed as
their Plenipotentiaries :
Republics :
His Majesty The King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions
beyond the Seas, Emperor of I ndia :
For the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland :
The Right Honourable Anthony Eden, M.P.. His Majesty's Principal
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs;
Who, having communicated to each other their full powers, found in good
and due form,
Have agreed as follows :
ARTICLE 1.
The High Contracting Parties jointly affirm their acceptance of the purposes
and principles of the Declaration made on the 14th August, 1941, by. the
President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
The High Contracting Parties undertake that, in the settlement of post-war
questions connected with the organisation of peace and security in Europe, they
will act by mutual agreement and in concert with the other States concerned.
ARTICLE 2.
The High Contracting Parties agree that after the termination of hostilities
they will take all the measures in their power to render impossible a repetition
of aggression and violation of the peace by Germany or the Powers associated
with her acts of aggression in Europe.
. ARTICLE 3.
The High Contracting Parties undertake to work for the reconstruction of
Europe after the war in accordance with the two principles of not seeking terri-
torial aggrandisement for themselves and of non-interference in the internal
affairs of European peoples. In so doing, they will take account of the interests
of both parties in their security, and will have full regard to the desire of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for.the restoration of its frontiers violated
by the Hitlerite aggression [and of the Government of the United Kingdom for
the recovery of British territory occupied by enemy forces.]
I t is understood that the reference to the frontiers of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics in the first paragraph of the present article does not affect
the frontier with Poland. The position of the two High Contracting Parties in
this regard remains as stated respectively in the agreement between the Govern-..:
ment of the U.S.S.R. and the Polish Government signed on the 30th J uly, 1941,
and in the communication made by His Majesty's Government in the United
Kingdom to the Polish Government on the same date.
ARTICLE 4.
In the case of European territories which now are or in consequence of the
peace settlement may be placed under a sovereignty other than that under which
they were on the 1st J anuary, 1938, the High Contracting Parties recognise the
desirability of making appropriate provision in the peace settlement to ensure
to inhabitants of such territories who may wish to do so the right to leave such
territories without hindrance and to carry their movable property with them.
ARTICLE 5.
The objectives of the High Contracting Parties in the work of reconstruction
include in particular :
(a) The encouragement of regional understandings and confederations among
States in Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe where such
understandings or confederations are desirable in order to safeguard
and strengthen the political, military and economic security of such
States;
(b) Full collaboration in inter-Allied plans of assistance in rebuilding the
economic life of the Allied territories overrun by enemy forces.
ARTICLE 6.
Each High Contracting Party undertakes not to conclude any alliance and
not to take part in any coalition directed against the other High Contracting
Party.
ARTICLE 7.
The High Contracting Parties agree to render one another all possible
economic assistance after the war.
ARTICLE 8.
The present Treaty shall be ratified and the ratifications shall be exchanged
in London as soon as possible.
I t shall come into force on the exchange of ratifications and shall remain in
force for a period of years.
Thereafter, unless twelve months' notice has been given by either Party to
terminate the Treaty at the end of the said period of years, it shall
continue in force until either High Contracting Party shall have given twelve
months' notice to the other in writing of his intention to terminate it.
I n witness whereof the above-named Plenipotentiaries have signed the
present Treaty and have affixed thereto their seals.
Done in duplicate in London on the day of . , 1942,
in the English and Eussian languages, both texts being equally authentic.
T H I S D O C U M E N T I S T H E P R O P E R T Y O F H I S B R I T A N N I C M A J E S T Y ' S G O V E R N M E N T
Printed for the War, Cabinet. April 1942.
MOST SECRET Copy No.
W. P . ( 42) 157.
April 9, 1942.
WAR CABI NET.
THE SHI PPI NG SI TUATI ON.
Memorandum, by the Minister of War Transport.
1. The uncertainties of the shipping situation are probably now greater
than at any previous time, partly because of movements in the Middle and Far
East and partly because we do not know at what rate the output of United
States merchant shipping will be made available for our assistance.
Effect of Diversion of Tonnage to Middle and Far East.
2. The diversion of tonnage to the Far East for military purposes has
reduced the proportion of our shipping loading for the United Kingdom from
the near North American sources from about 50 per cent, of the total a
year ago to about 40 per cent., a figure which it will be difficult to increase
substantially in the near future.
This is a mal-distribution of tonnage, from the importing point of view,
and will be one of the most disturbing aspects of the situation during the next
three or four months.
British and British-controlled Tonnage.
3. In estimating the amount of British, Allied and Neutral shipping
available for our service we have taken credit for replacements. We have lost
an output of about 60,000 gross tons a year which we should have obtained from
Hong Kong. We look for a total output of 1^million gross tons, including
tankers and coasting ships, from United Kingdom yards during 1942; on a
conservative estimate the output of non-tanker ocean-going tonnage over 1,600
tons gross which we may expect is about 800,000 gross tons, being the equivalent
of the output of this class of vessel in 1941. Further, we expect delivery of
nearly 400,000 gross tons from United States yards under the Todd shipbuilding
agreement; and from recent advices from Sir Arthur Salter it appears that the
output in Canada during the year may be put at about 420,000 gross tons (of
which about 260,000 gross tons will be constructed under Lease-Lend; arrange-
ments). A small amount of tonnage may be built in Australia. The total of
these items is about 1,650,000 gross tons of non-tanker ocean-going shipping.
4. Over the year a reasonable estimate of losses of British-controlled
tonnage from all causes would be 4,500,000 gross tons for vessels over 1.600 tons
gross, of which 1,200,000 gross tons would apply to tankers.
5. A main factor in the computation of our importing capacity is the
amount of the non-tanker tonnage allocated to Naval, Military and Air Force
[23680]
requirements. Including the related vessels under repair, this has risen, with
the progress of the war," as follows :
Thousand Thousand
gross deadweight
tons. tons.
December 31, 1939 2,120
:
1.880
December 31, 1940 ... 3,960 3 480
J une 30, 1941 4,230 3,670
December 31, 1941 4,800 4 360
J anuary 31, 1942 5,180 4,930
February 28, 1942 (provisional) ... 5,354 5,211
The deadweight figure at the 31st J anuary, 1942, represented about 24 per
cent, of the total British and British-controlled tonnage over 1,600 gross tons,
but it must be borne in mind that much of this allocated tonnage is employed
homeward to carry cargo to the United Kingdom.
Prospects of United Kingdom Import Programme.
6. Imports of 1941.The non-tanker imports of 30^million tons in 1941
were assisted during the second naif of that year by a much lower rate of loss
than we were entitled to assume when the earlier estimates were made. This
marked falling off in losses had the effect of substantially increasing our imports
and, being of a " capital " nature, also gave us additional shipping for subsequent
voyages.. Moreover, during the last six months of 1941, there was little
interference with shipping in our ports by " blitz."
7. Imports of 1942.In a recent estimate of our non-tanker ocean-borne
imports in British and British-controlled tonnage during 1942 (assuming the
continuance of the existing measure of American assistance), which was
subsequently adjusted to allow for further movements of troops and equipment
to the East, just decided on, the conclusion was arrived at that we might meet
the demands of the Fighting Services as known' at present and import into the
United Kingdom about 25 million tons.
This estimate may be reduced by adverse contingencies. Thus, losses may
exceed the allowances made; there may be a recurrence of severe air raids upon
our ports; and still further tonnage may be diverted to the Eastern theatres of
war. I t should also be borne in mind that such adverse factors may show
themselves in the immediate or near future, while any accretion of our resources
to be expected from additional United States building is likely to be deferred.
8. On the other hand, the estimate is subject to increase in so far as
additional assistance from the United States is secured.
Prospects of American Assistance.
9. The tendency at the moment is for United States assistance to us to
diminish rather than increase. At the beginning of the year we were warned by
Sir Arthur Salter that the future general position of American shipping
assistance to the United Kingdom and to Red Sea and other services was becoming-
worse, that he could hardly overstate the difficulties of the tonnage position on
that side of the Atlantic in the near future, and that United States ships did
not exist in sufficient numbers to meet all the new demands and projects, even if
all United States ships were withdrawn from our services.*
10. I n these circumstances, the only practical course has been to estimate
our carrying capacity on the basis of our own resources and to assume that we
retain the existing measure of United States assistance (including new tonnage
under the Todd agreement). We can then interpret the result with reference to
any margin to be secured by the development of the closer control now being taken
by the United States over their shipping, and to the rapid increase in their
construction as the year 1942 proceeds.
11. The probable extent of this increase is not at present easy to express in
any figure.
,,,,,, Balance of shipping gains and losses in 1942.
12. I n Appendix I an estimate is given of the new building completions of
United States merchant ocean-going tonnage, between the 30th September, 1941,
and the end of J une next.
* Tonnage , a mo u n t i n g t o about 300, 000 gros s t ons , whi c h f or me r l y s uppl i e d t he ne e ds of
t he Ne t he r l a nds Ba s t I ndi e s and adj ac e nt areas , wi l l be avai l abl e for ot he r work.
13. Subject to all necessary qualifications and reserves, and pending better
information, a provisional summary of the net gain in tonnage during 1942 may-
be attempted, taking British, British-controlled and United States, tonnage
together. Eliminating coasters, colliers and other small vessels, and assuming
that the United States programme of 8 million deadweight tons will be achieved,
new building inj.942 may be summarised as follows :
[Figures in million gross tons.)
Non-tankers. Tankers.
Great Britain ... -80 -30
Canada and Australia . . . . . . -45
U.S.A. (on British account) ... -40(a)
Total, British 1-65 -30
U.S.A 4-40(a) ..." -80(a)
Less coasters, &c. ... -15 4-25 ... -80
5-90 . 1- 10 y .
[NOTE(u) Th e s u m of t he s e t hr e e i t e ms i s 5-6 mi l l i on gros s t ons , whi c h is approxirrijjvutj
equi val ent t o t he Un i t e d S t a t e s p r o g r a mme of 8 mi l l i o n de a dwe i g ht t ons . ] /
14. In 1942 losses of British-controlled tonnage have been assessed in para-
graph 4 at 4 - 5 million gross tons, including tankers. Losses of British-controlled,
Allied and United States tonnage, taken together, from all causes, have been
assessed, after discussion with the Admiralty, at 6-5 million gross tons
(4-5 million gross tons non-tankers and 2 million gross tons tankers).
15. Bringing the figures together we have :
[Million gross tons.)
Non-tankers. Tankers. Both.
Gains 5-90 1-10 7-00
Losses 4-50 2-00 6-50
Net gain or loss (-f) 1 - 40 (- ) - 90 (+) - 50
On the basis of these figures the net gain by the end of the year in the case
of non-tankers would amount to 1 - 4 million gross tons; for tankers there would
be a net loss of nearly a million gross tons.
16. I t was stated in a recent telegram from the British Shipping Mission,
Washington, that the United States building programme for 1942 might slip
back by 400,000 tons deadweight, i.e., approximately 300,000 gross tons.
17. An analysis of the gains and losses by speed suggests that the greater
average speed of the new tonnage would represent an effective gain, in terms of
existing tonnage, of some 200.000 gross tons in the case of non-tankers and
100,000 gross tons for tankers. If, therefore, "sl i p " in the United States
programme occurred to the extent mentioned, the shortage thus arising would
approximately neutralise the effective gain in tonnage due to increased speed.
If, however, " slip " exceeded this figure, the estimated net gain of tonnage
during 1942, mentioned in paragraph 15, viz., 500,000 gross tons, would require
to be reduced by the amount of the excess.
Summary.
18. The dominant factors affecting the result will be United States
assistance, losses and the effectsdirect or indirectof military operations.
Steps are being taken to expedite the restoration to ocean service, during the
I' summer, of certain vessels engaged in the coasting trade during the winter, but
the effects upon imports can only be very limited. The position would be helped
by an increase in our own rate of construction, by an even more intensive attack
upon repairs (if only to offset congestion in ports abroad, which must result
from the loss of repair centres in the Far East, &c.) and by even greater efforts,
such as are now being made, to improve turn-round.
19. Taking the various factors into consideration, an allowance of about
10 per cent, either way On a target of 25 million tons may be regarded as indi-
cating the probable range within which importation may lie, i.e., a range of from
23 to 27 million tons.
Our imports are at present estimated to amount to about 1\ million tons in
the first four months of the year, and, if they are to reach a total of 25 million
tons, should amount to about 9-^million tons in the next four months, leaving to he
brought in during the last four months something in excess of 8 million tons.
Estimate of tonnage gains and losses in 1943.
20. Any estimate for 1943 which can be made at this moment must iieces-
sarily be speculative, but a rough approximation is made in Appendix I I , from
which it will be seen that there is a prospect of a net gain of 5 million gross tons
by the end of the year.
: L.
Ministry of War Transport. W. 1.
APPENDI X I.
United States New Building of Merchant Tonnage from October 1. 1941. to
June 30, 1942.
(Excluding vessels being built on British account.)
(Figures in thousand gross tons.)
Passenger
and Freight
Period. V essels. Tankers. Both.
October 1 to December 31,
1941 102* 61* 163*
J anuary 1942 401 801 120t
February 1942 140* 451 185t
March 1 to J une 30, 1942
(estimated) 1,070* 195* 1,265*
1,352 381 1,733
* Fi gures extracted from Uni ted States War Producti on Board consol i dated statement
prepared as at the 31st December, 1941.
f Fi gures furni shed by Mr. Harri man on the 11th March, 1942.
APPENDI X I I .
Estimate of Tonnage Gains and Losses in 1943.
I .New Building.
(a) United States.A recent telegram from the British Shipping Mission,
Washington, suggests that new building during the two years
1942-1943 may amount to 22 million tons deadweight. After allowing
for the new building in 1942 (7-6 million tons deadweight) and for
the building of small vessels in 1943, the balance of ocean-going
vessels in 1943 may be put at 14 million tons deadweight.
Million
gross tons.
This, in terms of gross tons, is equivalent to ... 9-8
(b) Great Britain ... ... ... ... ... ... 1-1
(c) Canada and Australia, say ... ... ... ... -5
11-4
I I .Losses.
Deduct allowance as for 1942 ... ... ... ... 6-5
Net gain ... ... ... 4-9
Say, 5 million gross tons.
THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OP HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTYS GOYERNMENT
S ECEET. Copy No.
W. P. ( 4 2 ) 158.
April 11, 1942.
TO BE K E P T U N D E R L OCK A N D K E Y
It is requested that special care may be taken h
WAR CABINET.
ENEMY I NTENTI ONS.
NOTE BY THE SECRETARY.
BY direction of the Prime Minister the attached Report by the J oint
Intelligence Sub-Committee is circulated to the War Cabinet for information.
The Chiefs of Staff agree with the conclusions of the Report.
(Signed) E. E. BRI DGES, .
Secretary of the War Cabinet.
Great George
April
Street,
11, 1942.
S.W.1.
ENEMY I NTENTI ONS.
REPORT BY THE JOINT INTELLIGENCE SUB-COMMITTEE.
We have been instructed to bring up to date our paper, J. I.C. (42) 75 of the
14th March, 1942, and report as follows :
We have examined German and J apanese strategy in the light of the
development of the war in Europe and in the Far East, and have reached the
following conclusions, which do not differ materially from our previous views.
A. - CONCLUSIONS.
I. - GERMANY .
2. Germany's Major Offensive.
(o) Germany's first major offensive effort in 1942 will be made against
Russia.
(b) I t will start in the south.
(c) I ts objects will be to defeat the Russian armies and to get oil.
3. Subsidiary Operations.
(a) Germany will maintain and intensify her attacks on allied shipping. I n
particular she will attack the Northern supply route to Russia by sea
and air.
[23693] B
(b) Germany will support her forces in Libya to enable them to maintain, and
if possible, to exploit their position. She will try to maintain her
present air power in the Mediterranean.
4. Germany is unlikely to attempt, until after the defeat of Russia
(a) An invasion of the British Isles.
(b) An occupation of the Iberian Peninsula, Sweden, or French North or
West Africa.
(c) An attack on Egypt through Cyprus and Syria.
(d) An attack on Iraq and Persia through Cyprus and Syria or Turkey.
(e) An attack on Caucasia through Turkey.
(/) A move into Turkey, unless Turkey acquiesces.
I I .- J APAN.
5. J apan will aim at:
(a) Consolidating as quickly as possible her East Asiatic sphere and com-
pleting it by the occupation of Burma.
(b) Achieving peace in China.
(c) Occupying bases in the South-Western Pacific to cut the sea-route from
America to Australia.
(d) Compelling us to dissipate our troops and disperse our naval forces by
raids and threats of raids.
B. - ARGUMENT.
PART I .-GERMANY .
We believe that the following courses of action have been considered by the
German High Command.
6. Germany's Immediate Object.
Germany is committed inextricably to the Russian front.
I t is characteristic of Hitler's strategy to try to defeat his enemies one by
one, and to concentrate the greatest possible effort at the decisive point selected.
We therefore believe that Germany's primary object is the complete defeat of the
Russian army.
7. Germany's Offensive against Russia.
Recent evidence indicates that Germany is mobilising and will concentrate
the whole of her available resources to defeat Russia, starting in Spring, 1942.
For example, garrisons in occupied territory are being, depleted, industry is being
combed out and satellite countries are being ruthlessly called upon to provide
man-power. The only exception to this is the continued retention in the Medi-
terranean of the large German air force contingent taken from Russia late in 1941.
, j
A full-scale campaign against Russia this year Would involve further cuts,
outside the armed forces, in Germany's use of men and materials, especially oil.
This would weaken her industry and reduce her war production. But although
it would be likely to leave her with stocks of war materials exhausted, and
industrial potential impaired, she would hope that, if Russia were decisively
defeated, the effect on the allied nations might be sufficient to persuade them to
come to terms. If this hope should prove false she might still feel she had time
to build up before our offensive effort and that of the United States had reached
proportions with which she could not cope.
All evidence, however, shows this weakening is accepted as a^risk necessary
to obtain a military decision in 1942.
We attempt to assess the scale, fronts and date of a
1
German offensive against
Russia.
(a) Scale.
The German forces in Russia are at present: fully extended,: but we must
assume that by the Spring or early Summer some 20 infantry divisions could have
been withdrawn and rested, taking into account the fact that certain, reliefs have
taken place to and from Russia, and that certain divisions may possibly be in
course of preparation in Germany itself, whence we get little reliable information.
I n the case of armoured divisions, we have no information indicating the
withdrawal of any such divisions to Germany to refit. In fact, our identifications
have recently, been fairly complete, though it is possible that these identifications
may have been those of detachments of which the main elements have been
withdrawn to rest.
Moreover, two new armoured divisions have recently been created, and more
may possibly be being formed in Germany, though this does not seem likely. I t
would, however, be unwise not to assume that some 10 Panzer divisions would be
ready for a Spring campaign to act as a spearhead for the 20 infantry divisions
mentioned above.
The Germans are being forced to employ on the Russian front air forces
which they hoped to rest during the winter. Whereas they withdrew all but,
1,250 aircraft from the Russian front in October, they have now been compelled
to bring this figure up to 1,900 in order to meet the Russian attacks. This may
limit the power of the offensive in the Spring.
Contributions by the minor Axis Powers towards the renewed offensive may,
by the 1st May, amount to some 9 or at the most 17 additional divisions. Though
these can hardly form the offensive spearhead, they will release German divisions
whilst themselves occupying less vital sectors. ;
The maximum total, however, of rested or relieved German divisions would
not initially permit of a main offensive on more than one major front. Evidence
points to this being a drive to the South to the Don; and thereafter operations
to occupy the whole of Caucasia and the oilfields.
(b) Possible Fronts.
At the present time there are indications of the development of railways in
the Ukraine. We had indications of a programme by which gauge changing was
to have been completed in that region by the 15th March. There is evidence of
the preparations of aerodromes in the forward areas, from Kharkov southwards
and of troop movements towards the South Russian front in excess of what would
be expected for defensive operations.
Indications are lacking of work carried on at similar pressure on the railways
and aerodromes in the Centre and North of the Russian front, though it is too
early to make positive deductions from this.
To sum up, the indications are, therefore, that the main thrust will start in
the South with a view to occupying Caucasia and obtaining oil.
Subsequent operations in the Centre and the North will depend on the
progress of this operation, on the number of rested reserve divisions available,
the support from the Axis allies, and Russian weaknesses.
These operations may be : -
(i) A drive on Leningrad with the primary object of bolstering up the Finns
and keeping them in the war.
(ii) A drive on Moscow, with its political implications, and its threat to the
hub of the European Russian communication system.
I n any case, attack will be made by sea and air on our supply route to Russia
via Archangel. If circumstances prove favourable, attack on the railway leading
southwards therefrom may be a subsequent operation.
(c) Date.
Previously, we estimated that the earliest date of German offensive would
be the 1st May. Although there are now indications that the zero date may well
be put off till, say, the 15th May or later, there is not sufficient evidence yet to
warrant a firm opinion.
8. Attack on Shipping.
The recent move of German naval units to Norway, the use of Trondheim as
a naval base, the increase in the production of torpedo-carrying aircraft, and the
concentration of German naval construction on U-boats, all point to the intensi-
fication of attacks on our shipping. Efforts will be made to interfere with our
supply convoys to Russia.
[23693] B 2
9. Efforts in Libya and Central Mediterranean Area.
There is possibly one German infantry division in Sicily or Southern Italy,
which could be made available to reinforce Libya. The I talians might increase
their force in North Africa by two or three divisions. There is evidence that the
Germans will try to maintain the force of some 600 to 700 aircraft at. its present
level in the Central and Eastern Mediterranean. The role of this force would be
to cover the sea-routes to Tripoli, to neutralise Malta, to support Rommel in
Libya and, from bases in Crete, Rhodes and other iEgean Islands, to harass our
naval forces and shipping and ports in the Eastern'Mediterranean.
German forces in Libya are likely to be reinforced for the maintenance and,
if possible, exploitation of their position in North Africa. Long-term prepara-
tions are undoubtedly going onsuch as port development at Benghazi.
There is no evidence of any concentration of troops or transport aircraft such
,as would suggest the intention to invade Malta, Heavy air attacks aimed at
depriving us of the use of Malta as a base from which to attack the Axis supply
route will continue, but may decrease in intensity as the demands of the
campaigns in Russia increase.
10. Invasion of the British Isles. ,
There are no indications of an attempted invasion of the British Isles.
We still do not believe that Germany would make an attempt until she had
defeated Russia. I t would take at least three months after the collapse of
Russia before an invasion could be mounted.
11. Occupation of the Iberian Peninsula, Morocco, French North Africa or
Sweden.
There is no evidence of a German intention to undertake operations against
any of the above territories. So long as the Russian campaign continues, the
necessity for concentrating all available forces in that area will prevent Germany
from embarking on new commitments elsewhere. I t had been suggested that
the recent movement of aircraft to Norway might have constituted a threat tb
Sweden, but the bulk of these aircraft have now been withdrawn.
12. An A ttack on Cyprus and Syria.
A drive to the Persian Gulf and the capture and destruction of Abadan
would deny to us the oil resources on which our whole Middle East position
depends. The I raq oilfields would supply Germany's needs.
Germany would riot have sufficient air forces to renew the offensive on the
Russian Front and at the same time to support a seaborne attack on Syria and
Cyprus. If Germany were able to remain on the defensive in Russia, sufficient
air forces could be provided. She would not, however, have sufficient troop-
carrying aircraft to stage a purely airborne attack on Cyprus, as was done in
Crete, and a combined operation would therefore be necessary, with all the
attendant difficulties. The British naval forces in the Eastern Mediterranean
are at present so much reduced that, given Axis air superiority, the operation is
a possibility.
On the other hand, the offensive spirit of the Italian navy as yet shows little
sign of developing. Until such time, moreover, as the Germans obtain the use of
air bases in Southern Anatolia, any operation against Syria via Cyprus would
be impracticable.
There is no evidence of a German reinforcement in the Balkans and Êgean
area, where there are at present insufficient forces for such an operation.
The land forces required to capture Cyprus and invade Syria prior to a,
move on the Persian Gulf would be of the order of six divisions, including
elements of an armoured division and airborne troops.
Germany could not spare the requisite land and air forces until the Russian
army had been defeated.
We have no indication that Germany will remain on the defensive in Russia
and attempt the occupation of Cyprus arid a thrust through Syria. The weight
of evidence is to the contrary.
13; An A ttack through Turkey.
(a)' To the Middle East.
I n the present situation a German drive through Turkey is unlikely. The
effort required on land and in the air would be such as to jeopardise success in
any major operation in Russia. Turkey wants, above all, to remain neutral, and;
probably looks to Great Britain and to the United States as the best guarantors
of Turkish territorial integrity after the war. The policy of Turkey is likely to
be, therefore, to withstand German demands for passage of troops whilst Russia
remains undefeated, and Turkey feels confident that the United States and'
ourselves will prevent the Russians obtaining control over East and South-East
Europe after the war.
(b) Against Caucasia.
Operations against Caucasia through Anatolia can be ruled out owing to
difficulty of communications. Under optimum weather conditions, and with
Turkey acquiescent, a force of about eight divisions would take some four months
to reach the Russian frontier in Caucasia. The latter part of the route, from
Erzeroum onwards, is highly vulnerable to air attack.
As to concrete evidence of Germany's plans in this direction, far from there
being any signs of a concentration of forces against Turkey, there are indications
that German forces in the Balkans are being reduced, and that railway construe-
tioh and- bridging units are being withdrawn to South Russia.
Admittedly there has been some building up of stores in the ^gean Islands
and in Greece, but this is chiefly for the German Air Force. There have also been
indications of a proportion of barges and invasion craft in the Black Sea, and in
J Egean, but this is normal work, probably a preparation for seaborne operations
in the Black Sea, if the offensive in South Russis is successful.
14. A German-Russian Peace.
The objects of Germany in attacking Russia were to gain possession of
Russian economic resources and to put an end to the potential military threat on
Germany's Eastern Frontier. Whilst such a peace might at first be greeted with
enthusiasm in Germany and in the German army, it would secure neither of the
objects for which Germany embarked on her Eastern Campaign. A compromise
peace is improbable at present.
PART I I .J APAN.
15. J apan's-object is to secure for herself exclusive control of the whole
of the East Asiatic area. Within that area she will, when she has developed
the resources, be substantially self-sufficient on a, war-time economy. Because of
the distance separating the areas from the Alied bases, attack on J apanese
communications Would necessarily be limited to submarine warfare. J apan has
seen the comparative failure of the formidable U-boat effort made by Germany
against Britain, and is therefore unlikely to fear that submarine warfare could
vitally affect her, in her enclosed waters and with her multiplicity of air bases.
16. J apan will be concerned with the protection of the extremities of her
East Asia sphere. Taking these in turn :
(a) East.She is likely to avoid a major fleet action. She has a large
force of ocean-going submarines, and we believe^that her policy will be to use
her submarines for protection against the American fleet. The American fleet
could only attack the J apanese by moving fleet bases further west. As a defensive
measure J apan is likely therefore to seek to occupy a chain of bases extending
from New Guinea to the Samoan Islands to prevent the Americans from
forestalling her. From these bases she could prevent the early establishment by
us or the Americans of strong points essential for American land and ai r
reinforcements.
(b) West.J apan aims at occupying Burma and possibly pushing beyond
the frontier into parts of Bengal and Assam. By propaganda and subversion
she will try to cause us as much trouble as possible in I ndia. Her future actions
will be governed by the success she achieves in this respect. I n any event, she
will go far enough into Burma and I ndia to cut effective communication with
China. With China isolated, she would hope to force Chiang Kai-shek to make
peace or to weaken and discredit him sufficiently to end organised Chinese
resistance.
Raids on Trincomalee, Colombo and our other bases in the Indian Ocean are
probable. J apan may be expected to harass our shipping routes in the Indian
Ocean and interfere as much as possible with our supply routes between Australia,
India and the Middle East. A fuelling base in Madagascar would be of great
value to J apan for this purpose. I t is "possible, therefore, that, with the connivance
of the French, she may try to establish a base there.
(c) South.We do not believe that J apan aims at the occupation of Australia
and New Zealand, but believe that she would be content with their isolation,
through her occupation of bases on islands covering the approaches. The
occupation or denial of the area of Darwin for the protection of the southern
extremity of the greater East Asia area is probable. Raids on otiher parts of the
coasts of Australia and New Zealand to disperse our forces are also likely.
(d) North.As soon as operations in the South permit, J apan might begin
to re-group her forces for an attack on the Russian Maritime Provinces in order
to eliminate the menace of bombing of J apan proper. At the present juncture
it is impossible to state whether she will adopt this course or not.
17. A Russo-Japanese War.
I t would clearly be to Germany's immediate advantage if she could persuade
the J apanese to attack Russia at the same time as she renewed her offensive
against the Red Army. J apan, however, will probably choose her own time. She
will almost certainly attack Russia if she believes her about to be defeated by
Germany. She may, although this is much more uncertain, attack Russia if she
thinks that Germany is in danger of defeat. On the other hand, Russia, if she
defeats Germany, might quite conceivably attack J apan.
In all the circumstances, war between Russia and J apan seems probable,
but it is too early to say when it will break out.
18. Attitude towards Germany.
J apan's strategy in the Eastern Asiatic Area aims at ensuring secure control
of tlhat area, and not at contributing to the outcome of the war between the
European Powers. J apan will fall in with Germany's plans only to the extent
to which they further her own intentions.
influence from the Eastern Asiatic Area.
She will try to eliminate German
(Signed) V. CAVENDI SH-BENTI NCK.
J . H. GODFREY.
F. H. N. DAVIDSON.
C. E. H. MEDHURST.
C. G. VI CKERS.
April 6, 1942
THIS DOCUMENT IS TUB PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GO VERMMENT
SECRET: i Copy No. 2
W.P. (32) 159.
April 10, 1942.
Si
WAR CABINET.
EXTERNAL MONETARY AND ECONOMIC POLI CY.
PRELIMINARY DISCUSSIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES.
Memorandum by the Paymaster General.
THE primary objective underlying the declaration in Article VI I of the
Mutual Aid Agreement of the 23rd February, 1942, is the attainment of the
greatest possible expansion of trade, and especially of international trade. The
further objective is the elimination of all forms of discriminatory treatment in
international commerce and the reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers.
The last branch of the Article provides that at an early convenient date
conversations shall be begun between the United States Government and the
United Kingdom Government with a view to determining, in the light of governing
economic conditions, the best means of attaining the above-stated objectives by
their own agreed action, and of seeking the agreed action of other like-minded
Governments.
Mr. Winant has suggested that the best way of beginning these conversa-
tions would be for a body of some five or six expert representatives of the United
States Government to come to this country at an early date for the purpose of
preliminary talks. Mr. Winant is understood to be discussing this question in
Washington at the present time, and it is anticipated that a visit of this character
may be expected within a few weeks.
2. I n the meanwhile, the Treasury, in consultation with other Depart-
ments, have prepared a Note which endeavours to envisage the probable
conditions of the post-war world both generally and in particular as they affect
this country, and reviews a number of projects and proposals in the external
economic sphere such as call for consideration under the terms of the declaration.
This Note is prefaced by a short Memorandum suggesting topics for
discussion, together with the general point of view from which they might be
approached, in preliminary exploratory talks. (The Memorandum is attached
as Annex A to this paper; it has not been thought necessary to annex the Note.)
3. My Committee on Reconstruction Problems have had these documents
under consideration, and they recommend to the War Cabinet as follows :
(1) That the War Cabinet should give authority to begin as soon as possible
informal, non-committal and exploratory talks with American repre-
sentatives in the course of which the United Kingdom representatives
should compare notes with the Americans on a number of
constructive ideas, some of which have been formulated in the
Treasury Memorandum.
(2) That in view of the desirability of bringing Russia into consultation
at an early stage the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs should be
invited to discuss the matter with the Russian Ambassador at the
appropriate time.
T23694]
B
(3) That it should be left to the Secretaries of State for the Dominions,
I ndia and Burma to decide when the suggested basis of discussion
should be communicated to the Governments of the Dominions, India
and Burma.
(4) That the accompanying draft telegram (Annex B) to His Majesty's
Ambassador at Washington regarding the opening of the preliminary
conversations should be approved.
4. I should propose to select the United Kingdom representatives for these
preliminary talks in consultation with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the President of the Board of Trade.
The Ministers in charge of Departments not represented on my Reconstruc-
tion Committee will be kept informed, so far as their Departments are concerned,
of the course of the talks with the Americans, and consulted when necessary.
I ought, perhaps, to add that on the question of Imperial Preference, on
which there have been previous exchanges with the United States Administra-
tion, any preliminary talks will naturally be of
character. *
an especially non-committal
- (Initialled) W. A. J .
Richmond Terrace, S.W.\,
April 10, 1942.
ANNEX A.
ARTI CLE VI I OF THE MUTUAL AI D AGREEMENT OF THE
23rd FEBRUARY, 1942.
MEMORANDUM SUBMITTED BY THE TREASURY ON PRELIMINARY DISCUSSIONS WITH
THE UNITED STATES.
1. The starting-point of the forthcoming discussions with representatives
of the United States Administration will no doubt lie in the relevant passages
of the Atlantic Charter and the Mutual Aid Agreement as follows :
At l ant i c. .'' Fourth, they will endeavour, with due respect for their
Charter. existing obligations, to further the enjoyment by all States, great or
small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade
and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their
economic prosperity.
Fifth, they desire to bring about the' fullest collaboration
between all nations in the economic field, with the object of securing
for all improved labour standards, economic advancement and social
security."
'' ARTICLE VI I .
Mut ual Ai d.
" I n f,he final determination of the benefits to be provided to
Agreement .
the Uniteo
1
States of America by the Government of the United
Kingdom in return for aid furnished under the Act of Congress of
the 11th March, 1941, the terms and conditions thereof shall be
such as not to burden commerce between the two countries, but to
promote mutually advantageous economic relations between them
and the betterment of world-wide economic relations. To that end,
they shall include provision for agreed action by the United States
of America and the United Kingdom, open to participation by all
other countries of like mind, directed to the expansion, by
appropriate international and domestic measures, of production,
employment, and the exchange and consumption of goods, which
are the material foundations of the liberty and welfare of all
peoples; to.the elimination of all forms of discriminatory treatment
in international commerce, and to the reduction of tariffs and other
trade barriers; and, in general, to the attainment of all the economic
objectives set forth in the J oint Declaration made on the
12th August, 1941, by the President of the United States of
America and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom.
At an early convenient date conversations shall be begun
between the two Governments with a view to determining, in the
light of governing economic conditions, the best means of attaining
the above-stated objectives by their own agreed action and of seeking
the agreed action of other like-minded Governments."
2. The primary objective underlying these declarations is the attainment of
the greatest possible expansion of trade and especially of international trade.
No country can have a greater interest than this country in such an objective.
Lack of employment was for long before the war a continuing anxiety. This
country also, with its dependence on overseas trade, has a vital interest in the
prosperity of other nations, which is the most important single factor in the flow
of international trade.
3. I t is in the subsidiary points of the declaration, especially in regard to
questions concerned with the elimination of so-called discriminatory practices
and arrangements (including in particular Imperial Preference), that divergences
of view may be expected to be found.
. [23694] B 2
I
4. Of necessity the more general declarations are no more than aspirations:
until they have been clothed in policies calculated to attain them, and the object
Of the preliminary exploratory conversations must no doubt be to interchange
views and seek points of agreement upon such policies. The present is, no doubt,
the most favourable moment for initiating Anglo-American co-operation in
relation to the expansion of international trade and other economic questions.
5. The attitude of the United States Administration is likely to be much
influenced by our general approach to these discussions. If we start by accepting
the desirability of restoring multilateral exchange and trade to the fullest
possible extent, but explain the very serious practical difficulties which confront
not only the United Kingdom but other countries before these objectives can be
realised and the need to work out bold and constructive measures on an inter-
national basis which will help the world to make progress in overcoming these
difficulties, it may be hoped that the United States Administration will be
prepared to give full consideration both to the difficulties and to any solutions
which we may have to propound.
6. The United States representatives, it may be assumed, will be aware of
the general initial attitude of the Administration towards all these questions,
and it seems probable that certain particularised proposals (referred to below)
will be brought up at an early stage. Ministers will no doubt wish, without
reaching final decisions upon any matters at this stage, to give to the United
Kingdom representatives, for their guidance in discussion, broad indications of
lines of exploration which they would prima facie regard as expedient and
inexpedient respectively. The object of this note is to indicate some of the
matters about which such guidance may be required.
7. So far as this country is concernedand the same will probably be true
of most countriesthe new policies will fall to be applied in a period of
unexampled economic difficulty in the external sphere. We shall start the period
of peace with great liabilities and with small reserves both of exchange and of
resources that could be turned into exchange. The Economic Section of the. War
Cabinet have made estimates which suggest that in the absence of corrective
measures our adverse balance of payments over the first five years taken as a whole
may be in the region of 1,000 millions.
8. The Treasury have in these circumstances prepared a note* analysing
these difficulties and discussing possible remedies, including, in particular,
ambitious remedies designed to further the objects set out in the general
declarations and to set up an expansionist trend in the trade of the world.
9. The declarations are especially concerned with expansion of production,
interchange of goods and improved labour standards. But at the outset a general
problem presents itselfthat of exchange control. This instrument may be used
for control of both capital movements and of current trade transactions : in the
latter connection it is capable of being highly discriminatory to the extent that it
is possible to refuse or allow exchange for particular trade transactions. Thus
the relaxation and eventual abolition of the use of exchange control for regulating
trade transactions must be an important objective. But the question remains
whether its machinery ought not to be retained! for use in connection with capital
movements.
10. A principal factor of economic disturbance in recent pre-war years was
the irresponsible mass movement of private speculative funds from one country
to another from fear of loss or hope of gain. There seems little prospect that after
the war such complete security will be restored as to eliminate the underlying
economic and political mistrusts which engendered these speculative movements
and so long as this is the case some measure of governmental regulation appears
to be the only means of checking the injury they cause. Such regulations may also
be required to prevent private investment on foreign stock exchanges and private
subscriptions to foreign loans being undertaken on a scale inconsistent with the
country's balance of payments on current account.
11. To-day, in almost every country save the United States, the external move-
men t of private capital is regulated. I t is suggested that that regulation ought
-r't * No t reproduced.
to continue, notwithstanding that without postal censorship the regulation cannot
be fully effective and that for practical reasons it must involve centralisation of the
management of exchange business and some degree of vexatious formality for all
engaged in overseas transactions, including possibly those within the Empire.
From our point of view it would be desirable, though it may well prove impractic-
able, that the United States should also establish such a regulative system. I t is
suggested that this is an important subject and should be explored as such in the
forthcoming discussions.
12. The prevention of undesirable capital movements would be one
important step towards ending, or at least mitigating, the immense currency
malaise which afflicted European countries and many other countries in the
nineteen thirties, which ended in the United States becoming the depository of
the main part of the stock of monetary gold, and which contributed materially
to the tying up of international trade in elaborate and harmful involutions. I n
addition, on any long view, there is great need for a new or improved system or
organisation for the settlement of international balances on current account.
Such a system or organisation would not of itself set at rest the immense
disequilibria from which the world is likely to suffer at the end of the war, but it
would provide a medium which, in conjunction with other agencies and actions,
would give the best chance of a prosperous world.
13. There has accordingly been drawn in the Treasury an ambitious plan
for a new organisation (styled for short a Clearing Union) which aims at
substituting an expansionist for a contractionist pressure on world trade
generally. I ts objective is to provide in the international sphere an organisation
which will perform for participating States the functions performed for
individuals by the ordinary banking system, i.e., the clearance of accounts, debit
and credit, between different customers and the provision of overdrafts for those
who need them. To this Clearing Union the principal countries of the world
would adhere and it would have the function of settling international balances
of payments, no longer by the delivery of gold, but by credits and debits in a
new international currency (called bancor) which would have a fixed value in gold
and would be accepted as in all respects the equivalent of gold. I t has been
provisionally assumed that any such organisation would be founded by the United
States and United Kingdom, who would permanently retain the management and
control. A member State which on balance owed to countries payments which it
was not in a position to discharge would be given facilities in the nature of an
overdraft. A member State, on the other hand, which on balance was owed money
by the other member States could not recover it except by accepting goods or
services from the rest of the world. The relative value of the currencies of
member States would be determined in the first instance in agreement with the
Governing Board and thereafter could (except under prescribed conditions) be
varied only in agreement with that Board.
14. The debit or credit balance of member States with the Clearing Union
would give a measure of the balance of payments of the countries concerned and
this might well facilitate agreed undertakings to forgo certain types of trade
restrictions subject to reservations relating to the protection of the country's
balance of payments.
15. The Clearing Union would be a centre round which other international
agencies could gather. I t would provide convenient means for financing
Post-War Relief, "International Development Schemes and Commodity Control
Schemes. I t could co-operate also in schemes to control the trade cycle and thus
secure the maximum degree of employment.
16. Neither the full argument for such a scheme, nor the fall details, nor a
full indication of its difficulties can be explained in brief compass, though atten-
tion should perhaps be drawn to the fact that like all schemes for the creation of
international institutions it raises difficult problems of permanent management
and control.
17. I t would appear unnecessary to attempt at this stage to form any final
judgment on the practicability or desirability of such a plan. The question is
rather whether the United Kingdom representatives in the preliminary discussions
should put forward the general aims and characteristics of such a plan (perhaps
using the plan as an illustration of a possible means of attaining the objectives)
as a basis for discussion and exploration.
18. The United States Administration has shown itself greatly pre-
occupied with schemes for the regulation of production, marketing and price of
primary commodities. There is much to be said for an attempt at an international
organisation for steadying the prices of primary products and the holding of
buffer stocksa plan designed, inter alia, to limit the necessity for individual
restriction schemes with all the international friction they engender. The
drawing of such a plan is now nearing completion, and when it is ready it is
proposed to ask Ministers whether this subject should be introduced into the
discussions.
19. Two American Professors, Messrs. Hansen and Gulick, have produced
plans for attaining some of the general objectives, and of these plans more is
likely to be heard.
20. Firstly, they propose an International Economic Board, with research
staffs in various centres, to advise collaborating Governments in regard to internal
policy to promote full employment, a rising standard! of living and the world-wide
use of productive resources, together with an International Resources Survey for
exploring opportunities for internal and regional development projects through-
out the world. If it should prove practicable to establish an Advisory Economic
Board of this character at the outset, its first function might well be to advise
participating Governments upon measures to avoid excesses of initial boom and
subsequent slump in the early post-war period.
21. The second is a more ambitious and difficult proposal for the revival of
international lending under international control through a corporation with
capital stock subscribed by the United States Government, the British Govern-
ment, the Dominion Governments and other participating Governments, and
bonds privately subscribed under guarantee by the several Governments " in
appropriate proportions."
22. The first of these proposals must, it is suggested, be discussed recep-
tively; the second also has attractive features, though it may come to grief oii
difficulties of a severely practical kind. I t is suggested, further, that if a
Clearing Union plan is found to have prospects of fruition, methods of linking
the second proposal with that Union should be explored with a view to overcoming
some of the difficulties.
23. I t is judged likely that among plans to secure the major objectives the
United States representatives may bring up the question of nutritional policies
(with their reactions on demand for primary commodities). There is, however,
at present little evidence of the nature of probable proposals in this field. They
may include such diverse questions as relaxation of agricultural protection
(especially in the form of tariffs), encouragement of higher standards of con-
sumption (either by a general lowering of prices of desirable foods or by special
arrangements for distribution of such foods to poor consumers), and improvement
of live-stock and diminution of cereal production.
24. The foregoing projects probably cover the main types of proposal likely
to come forward to attain the general objectives of securing full employment and
general prosperity. There remain the questions raised by the second branch of
Article VIIthe aim of eliminating all forms of discriminatory treatment in
international commerce and reducing tariffs and other trade barriersand by
the corresponding passage in the Atlantic Charter. The United States aim
appears to be (a) the reduction (presumably on the basis of reciprocity) of trade
restrictions which are not, or supposedly are not, discriminatory in their effect
-"tariffs and trade barri ers" are the words usedand (b) the elimination
(presumably on a like basis) of trade restrictions which are, or supposedly are,
discriminatory : control of current exchange transactions, payments agreements,
import restrictions and quotas, and State trading systems will all probably come
under discussion under this head.
25. The ambitious schemes mentioned earlier in this note do not profess to
be automatic solutions of all the economic disorders with which the world will be
afflicted after the war, nor do they get rid of the fundamental need to re-establish
after the war a proper equilibrium in the international balance of payments.
Whether they are adopted or not, there will remain grave doubt whether for some
period after the war this country, or indeed many other countries, could afford
to forgo various forms of control of trade and exchange without the most serious
economic risks, including the risk of a currency collapse such as many countries
experienced after the last war. Our own difficulties in this respect have been
recognised by the United States Administration. There is also the question of
Imperial Preference and the somewhat analogous question raised by regional
economic arrangements possibly to be instituted in Europe or South America.
Added to this is the problem how far the elimination of discriminatory practices
can go without becoming incompatible with the trend of internal social and
economic policy likely in future to prevail both i n this country and elsewhere.
There is also the question of the applicability of this policy in the relations of fully
developed countries with low-cost producers such as J apan, or with countries, if
any there be, still contemplating aggression.
26. I t may well prove that the United States Administration will equally
need to reserve powers which might be made the subject of objection. We shall
have to explore with their representatives what should be the rules of the economic
game in the post-war world. I t is suggested that the exploratory discussions
should include an explanation, on the United Kingdom side, of the dimensions of
our special problem and discussion of the intrinsic difficulties involved in the
total elimination of safeguarding devices, but that, if it should appear that a
substantial clash of views is likely to arise, all question of the formal
commitments we could afford to enter into on this subject should be deferred until
;
after exploration of the constructive economic arrangements and new
international institutions or practices which Anglo-American influence could be
used to establish or encourage in the post-war world.
;
27. Both on political and economic grounds our policy must contemplate
the co-operation of the Dominions and I ndia with us in any new economic
arrangements which may take shape. I t is important, therefore, that we should
endeavour to consult them and to carry them with us throughout. The Australian
and New Zealand Governments have already made it clear that they expect to
be given full opportunity of learning our views and presenting their own.
Although representatives of the Dominions and India cannot conveniently
participate in the initial stages of the exploratory discussions, it would seem very
desirable that these discussions should not begin without the knowledge, and if
possible, the active sympathy and support of Dominion Governments and the
Government of India. I t is assumed, therefore, that Ministers would wish a
statement of their general attitude and initial standpoint to be communicated to
those Governments forthwith.
28. I t should be added that, at the International Labour Conference held
in New York last November, which the Deputy Prime Minister attended, a
Resolution on Reconstruction after the War, proposed by the United States
Delegation, was passed unanimously. An Emergency Committee of the Governing
Body of the I.L.O. is to meet in London on the 15th April to discuss the action
to be taken on this Resolution.
29. The principal questions for consideration of Ministers arising out of
this Memorandum appear to be
(a) Whether, in the preliminary discussions with the United States, the
United Kingdom representatives should put forward the general aims
and characteristics of a Clearing Union plan described in outline
in paragraphs 13 to 16 (perhaps using the plan as an illustration of
a possible means of attaining the objectives) as a basis for discussion
and exploration.
(&) Whether proposals, if they emerge from the American side, for the
establishment of
(1) an Advisory International Economic Board, and
(2) an International Corporation for the revival of foreign lending
should be discussed receptively, subject to the qualification in the
second case that serious practical difficulties are undoubtedly
involved.
(c) Whether the question of the regulation of international movement of
private capital, and especially of mass movement of speculative
capital, should be brought up as an important objective for
exploration.
(d) Whether the general approach to the problem of. " discriminatory
treatment in international commerce '' indicated in paragraphs 24
to 26 of this Memorandum is approved.
(e) Whether there should be consultation with the Governments of the
Dominions and of India designed, if possible, to secure their active
sympathy and support as regards the general standpoint at the start
of the preliminary discussions.
ANNEX B.
Draft telegram to His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington.
Please inform the Government to which you are accredited that His
Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have been carefully considering
how best to make a start on the conversations provided for in Article VI I of the
Mutual Aid Agreement. We welcome Mr. Wi nants proposals. Our present
view is that preliminary informal exploratory and non-committal talks should
be begun as soon as possible. The experts engaged should have the fullest
discretion to discuss all possible lines of action which appear to them to be worth
exploring and we would not propose to limit in any way their terms of reference.
The purpose of the talks would be to thrash out on broad lines measures designed
to deal with the outstanding problems of post-war economic reconstruction. The
conclusions arrived at by the J oint Meeting would then, of course, have to be
submitted to the two Governments, and the two Governments would be in a
position to widen the discussion by bringing in the Dominions, India, Russia and
the other Allies.
- - - - - -
Sn?!
( THI S DOCUMENT I S THE Pr i PP- o
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^
H I S
BRITANNIC MAJESTY
1
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Sj&RET kept"uMDERTdtf*" w f t
w B E
f.P, (42j 160 It J 8 requested that speci al
,
e 6 m a
be taken to ensure
w y
EVACUATI ON OP . DTOI ANS FROM, BUf ?MA.
a
Memor andum by t he Secr et ar y ot. St at e XOi l B u m
A ser i ous pr obl eml i as ar i sen i n Bur ma i n connexi on- wi t h
t he r ef ugees who ar e t r yi ng t o get t o I ndi a, The I ndi an
popul at i on i n Bur ma i n nor mal t i mes i s r at her mor e t han
1, 000, 000, Many of t hese as wel l as Eur opean, women and
chi l dr en l ef t Bur ma bef or e t he sea r out e was cl osed, and
si nce t hen up t o t he end of Mar ch 35, 000 I ndi ans and 700
Eur opeans have passed over t he r out e of t he new r oad now
under const r uct i on. But l ar ge number s of I ndi ans r emai n i n
t he ar eas whi ch we hol d ( e. g. some 70, 000 i n t he Mandal ay
di st r i ct al one) and, shoul d t hese be occupi ed by t he enemy,
have st r ong gr ounds f or f ear s as' t o t hei r t r eat ment not so
much by t he J apanese as by t he Bur mese popul at i on owi ng t o
t he st r ong Bur mese ant i pat hy f or t he I ndi an; t hus one danger
i s- t hat as t he enemy advances t her e may be a st ampede,
f al l i ng adequat e f aci l i t i es f or or der l y evacuat i on.
2, I t i s par t i cul ar l y desi r abl e t o move 15, 000 dependant s
of essent i al wor ker s on t he r ai l ways, oi l f i el ds, et c. , as
soon as possi bl e, si nce anxi et y aboi ro t hem i s t hr eat eni ng t o
l oad t o st r i kes and deser t i ons,
3, The Gover nor has t hr oughout been maki ng ever y endeavour
to cope wi t h t he whol e pr obl em. The pr esence of masses of
r ef ugees woul d hi nder ur gent const r uct i onal wor k on t he l and
r out e t o I ndi a, Congest i on at pl aces al ong t he appr oaches
to t he r out e has al r eady l ed t o an out br eak of chol er a. I t
was or i gi nal l y i nt ended t o l i mi t t he number of r ef ugees on
t he l i ne of t he new r oad t o 500 a day. At pr esent i t i s
t aki ng 1, 500 a day and t hi s number may be somewhat i ncr eased
but t wo - i mpor t ant l i mi t i ng f act or s ar e t hat t he wat er i n t he
Chi ndwi n Ri ver by whi ch par t o-f t he j our ney i s made, i s now
and f or t he next f our or f i ve weeks . at i t s l owest l evel , and
t hat t he pr ovi si on of f ood and shel t er f or l ar ge number s i n
t he i nhospi t abl e count r y t o be t r aver sed pr esent s gr eat
probl ems. , I n any case t her e ar e many women and chi l dr en and
aged and i nf i r mwho cannot make t he ar duous l and j our ney.
I n or der t o suppl ement t he f aci l i t i es f or evacuat i on by
l and and t o pr ovi de f or t hose who cannot f ace t he' r i gour s
of t he l and j our ney, t he onl y possi bl e t r anspor t i s by ai r
and i t i s a mat t er of ur gency t o see whet her some means can-
not be f ound of maki ng addi t i onal t r anspor t ai r cr af t avai l -
abl e. Ther e was pr evi ousl y a l i mi t ed amount of evacuat i on
by ai r but t hi s has now been r educed t o l i t t l e or not hi ng.
The Gover nor r epor t s t hat i f adequat e ai r cr af t can be
suppl i ed and oper at ed he may be abl e t o br eak t he back of
11
t he pr obl em' but t hat ot her wi se he ant i ci pat es a ver y t r agi c
si t uat i on, "
2. The pr obl emhas an i mpor t ant pol i t i cal aspect i n I ndi a.
The Gover nor has r epor t ed t hat he i s t r yi ng har d t o avoi d
r aci al or cl ass di st i nct i on, and t hat at - Magwe aer odr ome
( f romwhi ch, whi l e i t was i n' use, evacuat i on was ef f ect ed)
al l ci vi l i an ai r cr af t wer e bei ng used al most ent i r el y f or
I ndi ans qui t e i r r espect i ve of t hei r abi l i t y t o pay; but t hat
t he pr obl emof Eur opeans, Angl o- I ndi ans, and hi gh- cl ass
I ndi ans i s so di f f er ent f r omt hat of t he cool i es t hat he
f ear ed t he Gover nment coul d not hope t o avoi d al l cr i t i ci sm.
But , however successf ul t he aut hor i t i es may be i n avoi di ng
di scr i mi nat i on, f ai l ur e t o evacuat e a l ar ge number of - I ndi ans
i s bound t o ar ouse an out cr y i n I ndi a coupl ed however
unj ust i f i abl y - wi t h char ges of di scr i mi nat or y t r eat ment ;
and t hi s i s exact l y t he t ype of i ssue most l i kel y t o cause
I l l - f eel i ng agai nst t he Br i t i sh aut hor i t i es on t he par t of
I ndi ans of al l pol i t i cal par t i es. The r ef ugee quest i on i s
al r eady becomi ng a f i r st - cl ass pol i t i cal i ssue i n I ndi a
( and accor di ng t o one pr ess cor r espondent has been
i nf l uenci ng t he at t i t ude of t he Congr ess Par t y t owar ds t he
const i t ut i onal pr oposal s) ,
5. A r equest by t he Gover nor made on t he advi ce of Ar my
Headquar t er s i n Bur ma f or t r anspor t ai r cr af t was r ef er r ed
to t he - Chi ef s of St af f . Thei r r epl y st at es t hat t her e ar e
10 i n I ndi a and t hr ee wer e ar r i vi ng shor t l y f r om t he Mi ddl e
East whi l e si x mor e dest i ned f or I ndi a had been del i ver ed
to us i n t he U. S. A. ; but t hat al l t hese ai r cr af t woul d be
used f or vi t al Ser vi ce r equi r ement s and t hat i t i s ext r emel y
unl i kel y t hat Gener al Wavel l wi l l be abl e t o di ver t t hemf or
t he pur pose of evacuat i ng ci vi l i ans.
6, Apar t f r omt he Br i t i sh al l ocat i ons of ai r cr af t f r omt he
U. S. A, we hear d a mont h ago t hat t he Uni t ed St at es Gover n-
ment have deci ded t o al l ocat e 100 f r ei ght - car r yi ng ai r cr af t
f r omAmer i can ci vi l ai r l i nes f or oper at i on bet ween I ndi a
and Chi na and t hat 35 of t hese ar e t o be sent i n t he f i r st
i nst ance. I t i s most desi r abl e f ronv ever y aspect , and f or
t hei r pr i mar y pur pose of suppl yi ng Chi na, t hat t hey shoul d
r each I ndi a at t he ear l i est possi bl e moment . I f t hey wer e
i n ser vi ce i t seems pr obabl e t hat some space on t hese ai r -
cr af t coul d be pr ovi ded f or' r ef ugees on t he r et ur n j our ney
f r omChi na t o I ndi a vi a Bur ma. The Gover nor of Bur ma
t el egr aphed on 4t h Apr i l di r ect t o Hi s Maj est y' s Ambassador ,
Washi ngt on, aski ng ver y ur gent l y f or i nf or mat i on as t o t he
number and expect ed ar r i val s of t hese ai r cr af t and whet her
t he Amer i cans woul d, be wi l l i ng t o al l ow t hese machi nes t o
car r y r ef ugees back t o I ndi a. I n r epl y t o t hi s t el egr am
Lor d Hal i f ax r ef er r ed t he Gover nor t o Gener al Br er et on,
Commander of t he UvS, Ar my Ai r For ces i n I ndi a.
7. I consi der t hat t he i ssues i nvol ved ar e so i mpor t ant
t hat a speci al ef f or t shoul d be made t o get t he Amer i cans t o
push on wi t h t hei r del i ver i es of ai r cr af t , and f eel t hat
t hey woul d r espond i f t he whol e case i n i t s mi l i t ar y,
pol i t i cal and humani t ar i an aspect s wer e put bef or e t hem.
suggest t her ef or e t hat Hi s Maj est y' s Gover nment shoul d
i nst r uct Hi s Maj est y' s Ambassador , Washi ngt on, t o make a
speci al appr oach t o t he Uni t ed St at es Gover nment put t i ng t o
t hemt he f act s gi ven above and ur gi ng t hemt o make avai l abl e
at t he ear l i est possi bl e moment some t r anspor t ai r cr af t
whi ch coul d be used and t o gi ve t hei r consent t o t hei r bei ng
used, whi l e t he need, subsi st s, f or t he evacuat i on of
r ef ugees f r omBur ma t o I ndi a even t o t he excl usi on of
expor t s f r omChi na.
8. Apar t f r omt hi s suggest i on, i t seems desi r abl e t o
consi der ur gent l y whet her any f ur t her st eps coul d be t aken
to assi st i n sol vi ng t hi s r ef ugee pr obl em, t he pr opor t i ons
I
and possi bl e consequences of whi ch I have t hought i t r i ght
to br i ng t o t he at t ent i on of t he War Cabi net .
L .S. A.
WYMk OFFI CE.
11t h Apr i l 1942.
THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HI S BRITANNIC MAJESTY' S GOVERNMENT ... J g y
SECRET. - rj c\
fcl
- Copy No.
W. P . ( 4 2 ) 161.
(Also C.O.S. (42) 222.)
April 22, 1942.
TO B E K E P T U N D E R L OC K A N D K E Y .
WAR CABINET.
Chiefs of Staff Committee.
ORGANI SATI ON OF ALLI ED NAVAL, ARMY AND
AI R CONTINGENTS.
TWENTI ETH REPORT.
(Previous reference : C.O.S. (42) 14.)
I N accordance with the Prime Minister's instructions, we submit the
following report for the Quarter ended the 31st March, 1942, on the Organisation
of Allied Naval, Army and Air Contingents.
(Signed) ALAN F. BROOKE.
C. PORTAL.
H. R. MOORE (V.C.N.S.).
April 22, 1942.
[23709] B
CONTENTS.
R E P OB T .
-
A. Or gani s at i on of Fr e e Fr e nc h Naval , Ar my a nd Ai r Co nt i ng e nt s
B. Or g a ni s a t i o n of Po l i s h Naval , Ar my and Ai r Co nt i ng e nt s
C. Or gani s at i on of Du t c h Naval , Ar my and Ai r Co nt i ng e nt s
D. Or g a ni s a t i o n of Cz e c h Ar my a nd Ai r Fo r c e Co nt i ng e nt s
B. Organi s at i on of No r we g i a n Naval , Ar my and Ai r Co nt i ng e nt s
F. Or gani s at i on of Be l g i a n Naval , Ar my and Ai r Co nt i ng e nt s . .
G. Or gani s at i on of Gr e e k Na v a l and Ai r Co nt i ng e nt s
H. Or g a ni s a t i o n of Yug o s l a v Ai r Co nt i ng e nt s
A P P E N D I C E S .
I . Re ma r k s on We l f a r e of Al l i e d Na v i e s
-
I I . Ge ne r a l St a t e of Al l i ed Na v i e s
I I I . Or de r of Ba t t l e of Al l i e d Ai r Fo r c e s . . . :.
I V. S t r e n g t h of Al l i ed Ai r Fo r c e s on Ma r c h 20, 1942
V. Sc a l e of Ope r at i ons by Al l i e d Ai r Fo r c e s
VI . - - h n e my Ai rcraf t de s t r oye d by Al l i ed Ai r Fo r c e s
VI I . Ca s u a l t i e s suf f ered by Al l i e d Ai r Fo r c e s
VI I I . No t e on t he t r ans f e r of c e r t ai n t r ai ni ng t o Ca na da
A . - FREE FRENCH.
(i) Navy.
Changes in the Higher Command.
The long-existing friction between General cle Gaulle and Admiral Muselier
culminated recently in the resignation of the latter from the Comite National
and subsequently in his suspension as Commander-in-Chief. The General has
promoted Captain Auboyneau to Rear-Admiral and appointed him Commander-
in-Chief. Captain Gayral acts for Auboyneau until the latter returns from the
Pacific. Captain Moret has been relieved as Chief of Staff by Commander
J aequet.
2. On Admiral Muselier's supersession some forty officers sent him letters
of resignation, but he did not accept these or pass them on to de Gaulle. About
sixteen officers of the Staff actually resigned, but, mainly on British advice, all
except three or four withdrew their resignations and have been reinstated. So
far as can be ascertained, there have been no serious manifestations on the part
of the men. Considering that a large proportion of the officers and men have a
feeling of affection for the Admiral, and are aware of the difficulties put in his
way by the General, it may be considered somewhat surprising that the Free
French Navy has not been more disturbed than it has been. This is due mainly
to the following factors :
(a) The elementary sense of duty which, whatever the rights or wrongs of
the case, make resignation or refusal of duty repugnant in war.
(&) Fear of the consequences, whether disciplinary or economic, due to
dismissal.
(c) Pride on the part of the personnel in their little Nayy and determination
not to do anything that might do it serious harm.
3. The latter factor is probably the one that has had most influence on the
men, and, indeed, on many of the officers. Had the present events happened some
months ago, this incentive to remain passive would probably not have existed. I t
is only comparatively recently that the Free French Navy has, as a whole, taken
itself seriously. I t has taken time for them to have confidence in themselves or in
us, but now that they see that, despite many difficulties (and there have been
many, particularly, the paucity of Officers and Petty Officers of the regular Navy)
their Navy has become a live organisation capable of useful work with successes
to its credit, they have taken heart and are proud of the force they have helped
to build up.
4. Be this as it may, the disturbances at the top cannot be healthy for any
Service, especially one composed of such temperamental people as the French, and
of whom so many are politically minded. I t will, therefore, be necessary to keep
a very close watch on the situation for some time to come.
5. The reports received from Senior Naval Officers who have had Free
French ships under their commands during the past quarter have, on the whole,
been favourable. Discipline and efficiency have tended to improve, and about
some ships it has been said that they are comparable to British ships in carrying
out their duties.
Losses.
6. The Free French Navy have lost, during the quarter, the corvette
A lysse, torpedoed while on convoy escort in the North Atlantic, and the submarine
Surcouf, rammed during the night by a merchant ship in the Caribbean. Half
the crew of the A lysse were saved, but there were no survivors from the crew of
135 in the submarine.
Successes and A ttacks on Enemy Submarines.
7. Rubis.This submarine has carried out several minelaying trips in
enemy waters and is considered to be most efficient. Her captain and" first
lieutenant have both been awarded bars to their D.S.C's. Four D.S.M's have
been given and six mentions in despatches.
" [23709] 2
B
8. The corvette Roselys rammed a submarine in the North Atlantic. She
sustained damage to her keel and must, therefore, have at least damaged the
submarine.
9. . The corvette A conit sighted a submarine on the surface and attacked
with depth charges, but no result could be claimed.
Ships Commissioned or to Commission shortly.
10. The corvette Commandant Drogov, was commissioned in J anuary.
11. The Admiralty have allocated the corvette Phlox to the Free French
in replacement of theAlysse. The name Commandant d'Estienne d'Orves has
been suggested for her, and it is hoped she will commission in April. The
Admiralty have also agreed to turn over two more corvettes as soon as crews are
available.
12. The manning of the second four M.L's by the French, which it had been
hoped would take place in February, has been postponed and they are now
expected to be available in May.
13. The refit and rearming of the destroyer Leopard, which has lasted for
eleven months, is now expected to be finished in a few weeks' time.
Ships Paid Off.
14. The three V.T,B's which had been operating from Cowes have been
paid off and placed in reserve on account of their unsuitability for the work
required of them.
Movements of Ships.
15. The corvettes Commandant Detroyat and Commandant Drogou have
joined the South Atlantic Command for convoy escort duties.
16. The sloop Savorgnan de Brazza, which had been based on Aden, is
now on her way to the United Kingdom to refit, Admiral Muselier having asked
that Free French ships should no longer be used in the blockade of Djibouti. The
sloop Commandant Domine, which was to relieve her. is proceeding to the
Mediterranean. The torpedo boat Moqueuse and the trawler Reine des Flots
will also be stationed in the Mediterranean.
Training.
17. Training has been continued in most of the special branches and a
further sixty men have passed through BZ.M.S. Royal Arthur.
Recruiting.
18. The number of officers in the F.N.F.L. has increased by eighty and
the number of men by 450 during the quarter. The majority of
these men were recruited from St. Pierre and Miquelon and include a number of
naval reservists. I t is this which will render the commissioning of two more
corvettes possible.
Depot.
19. The construction of a depot for 400 men at Emsworth, near Portsmouth,
was started in February and should be finished during the summer.
Frenchmen in the Royal Navy.
20. A few more ratings have transferred to the F.N.F.L. Amongst those
remaining in the Royal Navy there are a number of men who are either incapable
of making themselves useful in British ships or who do not try to do so. I t was
thought that these men might do better if they were formed into complete crews
for small ships, but this has not been found practicable. I t is considered that
the time is approaching when some of them, after a final warning, will have to be
disohRT-cvc"-
1
(ii) Army.
Location.
21. Old Dean Common Camp, Camberley.
Strength.
Officers Other Ranks.
22. Army
39 519
Air Force
9 104
Marines (Navy)
6 86
Free French A.T.S.
13
54 722
Employment.
23. At the beginning of J anuary 1942 a draft of Air Force left for the
Middle East, providing reinforcements for the Free French Bomber Squadron
which has been active in the Libyan campaign. A small army draft also left for
the same destination. At the end of J anuary 1942 a further army draft of forty-
seven all ranks left for Equatorial Africa, including the personnel for the second
Light A.A. Battery in the Chad.
24. Training has continued normally, the present organisation of the camp
being as follows :
A administration
Services Generaux (H.Q. Offices, &c).
Pare d'Armee (M.T. Park and Storehouse).
Service de Sante.
Police Militaire.
Subsistence (Personnel in transit).
Volontaires Francaises (A.T.S.).
Training
Escadron mixte (Mounted units).
Compagnie Portee (Infantry units).
Aviation (Air Force under primary instruction).
Fusiliers Marins (Marines).
General de Gaulle visited the camp on the 27th February, 1942, and inspected the
training in progress. Items included minor tank manoeuvres, an infantry attack,
and demonstrations by officer cadets. A highly successful and instructive field
exercise took place on the following day in conjunction with a battalion of the
Royal West Kents.
25. Instructional courses with British Schools and Training Units continue.
Two officers have attended gunnery courses at Larkhill, two officers are now
attending a British commando course, and a party of parachutists, sixteen strong,
attended a course of training at the Polish parachute training centre. Para-
chutists are now part of the Free French Air Force. Six n.c.os. attended a course
of A.F.V. driving and maintenance at Bovington, and a party of armourer-
mechanics and driver-mechanics have been attached to Canadian units for
instructional courses.
26. The results of the examination held in March 1942 showed that few of
the officer cadets (Eleves-Aspirants) came up to expectation, only two of the class
qualifying, but that of the n.c.o's. class did much better, and, in fact, beat most
of the cadets in the tests.
27. The first party of women of the Corps des Volontaires Francaises have
started living at the camp. I t is intended gradually to replace men as drivers,
office clerks and telephone operators.
Equipment.
28. Some of the weapons authorised for release in November 1941 have not
yet been delivered and none of the ammunition has yet been supplied. Shortage
of - 300-inch ammunition in particular remains a problem.
Welfare.
29. Satisfactory. Under a newly appointed sports officer there are welcome
signs of organized classes in P.T., boxing and fencing for all ranks. The camp
has managed extremely well through the very cold winter, and there has been
little sickness.
Morale.
30. Good.
(iii) Air Force.
Recruiting.
31. During the period twelve officers and sixty-six other ranks have been
incorporated into the Free French Air Force in the United Kingdom.
Morale.
32. Morale in the United Kingdom is good, but in the Middle East it has
fallen somewhat since the Free French Bomber Squadron were informed, after
being withdrawn from the line, that they could not be re-equipped for some
months.
Training (see also Appendix VI I I ).
33. During the period under review
34 Free Frenchmen entered I nitial Training Wing.
1 Free Frenchman entered Elementary Air Observer School.
3 Free Frenchmen entered Air Gunnery School to complete their
training as Wireless Operator /Air Gunners.
9 Free Frenchmen qualified as Service pilots.
General.
34. No. 340 (Free French) Fighter Squadron has been re-equipped with
Spitfires Mark V, and is about to be moved into a more active theatre of operations.
General de Gaulle visited this Squadron on the 13th February.
35. The Air Ministry have agreed in principle to a proposal made by the
Free French Authorities that they should send a number of pilots to man a
Fighter Squadron on the Russian Front. The Air Ministry have made a condition
governing their acceptance of the proposals that the Royal Air Force is not
committed to train French pilots to replace wastage in Russia, or to provide from
the United Kingdom resources aircraft or maintenance personnel.
36. With reference to the second paragraph of paragraph 22 of the
Nineteenth Report, General Odic has been dismissed from the Free French Air
Force by General de Gaulle.
Communication Aircraft.
37. As a result of a recent request from the United States for the use of
Pointe Noire as an air base, General de Gaulle has demanded eight Lockheed
Lodestars for the defence of his territory and for use on internal air lines
connecting French Equatorial Africa with Syria, I t is unlikely that the Air
Ministry will be able to make any aircraft of this type available for the present.
B.POLISH.
(i) Navy.
38. I t has been said by a British officer who has had Polish and other Allied
ships under his command : " They share our sorrows and rejoice at our victories
in a manner which makes them seem closest to us of all our Allies; they have the
gift of being sympathetic rather than critical and enthusiastic instead of envious."
Operations.
39. The destroyers have been working with zeal and efficiency on convoy
escort, and it is being suggested that some of them should be employed occasionally
where they will have greater opportunities for action.
40. The Garland, since she hoisted the Polish flag in May 1940, has
participated in the protection of forty-eight convoys and steamed 100,000 miles.
41. The two Polish destroyers Krakowiak and Kujawiak took part in the
raid on the Lofoten Islands in J anuary.
42. The Kujawiak, while on convoy escort duty, recently shot down one
enemy plane and probably damaged a second.
RecruitingShips Commissioning and Paying-off.
43. The arrival of the Polish recruits from Russia has been delayed. The
present position in so far as the Navy is concerned is that they hope to receive
about 750 men in J une. On this assumption the Chief of the Polish Navy has
asked the Admiralty to allocate a cruiser of the " Fiji " Class in the Spring of
1943. The matter is under consideration.
44. The Destroyer Burza having been paid-off for a long refit, the Poles
have been offered, and have accepted, a third " Hunt " Class Destroyer, the Bedale,
for which the Polish name Slonjak has been suggested. She is due to commission
in May.
45. The Submarine Wilk is laid-up at Devonport and the question of
refitting her will not be considered until J uly.
Recruiting.
46. Of the sixty recruits from North America, about half have been found
unsuitable and are being sent back to Canada.
47. The assimilation of the personnel who arrived from Russia in J anuary
is proceeding. I t was found that they were much in need of rest and recuperation.
Rest Home.
48. The Royal Sussex Hotel at Brighton has been taken over for use as a
Rest Home for Polish Naval officers and men.
(ii) Army.
Establishment. Officers. Other Ranks.
49. Establishment (including Central
Military Authorities in London) 1,800 22,000
(Approximately)
Strength and Location.
50. In the Field (Fife-Angus Area) ... 3,560 14,008
Armoured Trains ... ... ... 572 105
London 313 124
4,445 14,237
A ccommodation.
51. The Polish Forces are taking up new dispositions in Scotland next
month. Reconnaissances by Advance Parties have been carried out.
Oi 'ganisation.
52. The authorised establishment and present composition of the Polish
Contingent remain the same as detailed in the last Quarterly Report.
Welfare.
29. Satisfactory. Under a newly appointed sports officer there are welcome
signs of organized classes in P.T., boxing and fencing for all ranks. The camp
has managed extremely well through the very cold winter, and there has been
little sickness.
Morale.
30. Good.
(iii) Air Force.
Recruiting.
31. During the period twelve officers and sixty-six other ranks have been
incorporated into the Free French Air Force in the United Kingdom.
Morale.
32. Morale in the United Kingdom is good, but in the Middle East it has
fallen somewhat since the Free French Bomber Squadron were informed, after
being withdrawn from the line, that they could not be re-equipped for some
months.
34 Free Frenchmen entered I nitial Training Wing.
1 Free Frenchman entered Elementary Air Observer School.
3 Free Frenchmen entered Air Gunnery School to complete their
training as Wireless Operator/Air Gunners.
9 Free Frenchmen qualified as Service pilots.
General.
34. No. 340 (Free French) Fighter Squadron has been re-equipped with
Spitfires Mark V, and is about to be moved into a more active theatre of operations.
General de Gaulle visited this Squadron on the 13th February.
35. The Air Ministry have agreed in principle to a proposal made by the
Free French Authorities that they should send a number of pilots to man a
Fighter Squadron on the Russian Front. The Air Ministry have made a condition
governing their acceptance of the proposals that the Royal Air Force is not
committed to train French pilots to replace wastage in Russia, or to provide from
the United Kingdom resources aircraft or maintenance personnel.
36. With reference to the second paragraph of paragraph 22 of the
Nineteenth Report, General Odic has been dismissed from the Free French Air
Force by General de Gaulle.
Communication Aircraft.
37. As a result of a recent request from the United States for the use of
Pointe Noire as an air base, General de Gaulle has demanded eight Lockheed
Lodestars for the defence of his territory and for use on internal air lines
connecting French Equatorial Africa with Syria. I t is unlikely that the Air
Ministry will be able to make any aircraft of this type available for the present.
B.-POLI SH.
38. I t has been said by a British officer who has had Polish and other Allied
ships under his command : " They share our sorrows and rejoice at our victories
in a manner which makes them seem closest to us of all our Allies; they have the
gift of being sympathetic rather than critical and enthusiastic instead of envious."
Operations.
39. The destroyers have been working with zeal and efficiency on convoy
escort, and it is being suggested that some of them should be employed occasionally
where they will have greater opportunities for action.
40. The Garland, since she hoisted the Polish flag in May 1940, has
participated in the protection of forty-eight convoys and steamed 100,000 miles.
41. The two Polish destroyers Krakoiciak and Kujawiak took part in the
raid on the Lofoten Islands in J anuary.
42. The Kujawiak, while on convoy escort duty, recently shot down one
enemy plane and probably damaged a second.
RecruitingShips Commissioning and Paying-off.
43. The arrival of the Polish recruits from Russia has been delayed. The
present position in so far as the Navy is concerned is that they hope to receive
about 750 men in J une. On this assumption the Chief of the Polish Navy has
asked the Admiralty to allocate a cruiser of the " Fiji " Class in the Spring of
1943. The matter is under consideration.
44. The Destroyer Burza having been p aid-off for a long refit, the Poles
have been offered, and have accepted, a third " Hunt " Class Destroyer, theBe dale,
for which the Polish name Slonjak has been suggested. She is due to commission
in May.
45. The Submarine Wilk is laid-up at Devonport and the question of
refitting her will not be considered until J uly.
Recruiting. ,
46. Of the sixty recruits from North America, about half have been found
unsuitable and are being sent back to Canada.
47. The assimilation of the personnel who arrived from Russia in J anuary
is proceeding. I t was found that they were much in need of rest and recuperation.
Rest Home.
48. The Royal Sussex Hotel at Brighton has been taken over for use as a
Rest Home for Polish Naval officers and men.
(ii) Army.
49. Establishment (including Central
Military Authorities in London) 1,800 22,000
(Approximately)
50. I n the Field (Fife-Angus Area) ... 3,560 14,008
Armoured Trains ... ... ... 572 105
London 313 124
4,445 14,237
A ccommodation.
51. The Polish Forces are taking up new dispositions in Scotland next
month. Reconnaissances by Advance Parties have been carried out.
Organisation.
52. The authorised establishment and present composition of the Polish
Contingent remain the same as detailed in the last Quarterly Report.
Equipment.
53.(a) Since the last Report the Field Regiments have been rearmed with
25-pdr. equipments, and the following major items of equipment have also been
issued :
Bren guns ... ... ... ... ... ... 35
T.S.M.G.'s 46
Vickers -303-inch 4
A/Tank Rifles 24
2-inch Mortars 4
3-inch Mortars 3
(o) The present position regarding major items of equipment in possession
of the Polish Forces is as follows :
Guns. Machi ne Guns. Mortars.
Anti Anti --
i
I 2-pdr. i Tanl Tanlss Curri ers Curri ers..

Vi ckers Thorn p-
Tanks Tanks..
1
Mod. , Fi d. I Anti - Bren. 2-in. 3-in. Ri fl es Ri fl es..
-303-in. son.
! Tank.
Establ i shment 10 52 , 36 1,429 48 930 ISO 84 598 253 174 " 1 '
t;inks,
4
crui ser
tanks.
Hol di ng 16 i 53 1 24 763 90 061 86 63 223 169
68(
!
)
(') 32 Val enti ne, 21 Churchi l l , 15 Mark I .
Employment.
Exercises.
54. The Polish Forces have taken part in over a dozen exercises during
the quarter, including the testing of the landward defences of the Forth and the
defences of the aerodromes at Crail, Arbroath, Leuchars and Donibristle.
Demonstrations.
55. A demonstration of infiltration tactics was carried out by a Brigade
Group, supported by the Polish Army Co-operation Squadron, in the Glenfarg
area. This demonstration was attended by a large number of spectators,
including representatives of Scottish Command Headquarters and other British
formations, the Home Guard and the U.S.S.R. Military Attache to the Polish
Government.
56. The battalion of the Training Brigade training in parachute duties
gave a demonstration of preliminary parachute training to War Correspondents.
This consisted of physical training, exercises in the management of a parachute
in the air, and on landing and jumping, from the practice tower. This was
followed by an "Assault Exercise," to demonstrate the methods by which
parachute troops can overcome obstacles during attacks on fortified strong points.
Artillery Practice.
57. Firing practices have been carried out by the Field Regiments and an
anti-Tank shoot with 40-mm. guns by the Light A.A. unit.
A.F.V. Training.
58. One of the Brigade Groups has started instructional centre to train
seven officers and sixty men per regiment. All three regiments of this Brigade
run classes in the employment of armoured formations and tank tactics.
Signals.
59. There are now 270 students undergoing instruction at the Polish Signals
Training Centre. Two classes are in progress for officers going to Russia in
addition to the two normal classes for cadets.
60. The workshops are busy fulfilling Government orders for 50 "Buzzer
Keys."
61. A mine defector invented by Lieutenant Kosacki has been adopted by
the Government and is being manufactured by various firms. This officer is now
engaged in working .out an adaption of his detector for use with Tanks. He has
also invented an " amplifier " for use with Field Telephones.
Courses and A ttachments.
62. I n addition to the large number of courses the Poles run themselves, a
number of officers and N.C.O's. have attended courses at our schools and
completed attachments to British units.
Co-operation with Home Guard.
63. Arrangements were made for a Polish unit to train the Home Guard
at Leven in unarmed combat. A demonstration of tanks and carriers was also
given to the Montrose-Home Guard.
Special Training.
64. A series of courses in ski training have been carried out at a ski-training
school and proved a great success, the snow having been plentiful and the country-
most suitable. Students " lived hard " on the courses and the training was taken
very seriously.
Combined Operations.
65. A skeleton battalion did three weeks' combined training at the Combined
Operations Training Centre in Scotland run by the Royal Navy.
309 (P) Squadron, R.A.F.
66. This squadron has carried out a number of exercises in gas spray with
British units, including Home Guard. The pilots now have considerable
experience in this form, of attack, having done much training with troops of the
Polish Corps, as well as with British units.
Teaching of English.
67. Fifteen Polish Staff Officers attended a course in English at the Polish
Military Bureau, Edinburgh.
68. A total of sixty-one Polish personnel are attending courses to fit them
as instructors in English. The total number of trained instructors is now about
120.
f
Recruits and Drafts.
69. About 230 recruits have joined from South America and Canada and
124 officers have left for Russia.
Yugoslav Unit.,
70. The eleven officers and thirty-seven other ranks who had been attached
to one of the Polish formations left the contingent for service overseas.
M edical.
71. Arrangements have been made for the acquisition by the Polish
authorities of Auchentroig Auxiliary Hospital, Buchlyvie, with a capacity of
forty beds, in order to accommodate chronic service invalids and so release beds
in the Polish Military Hospitals required for recoverable cases.
72. Seventy Polish water duty personnel have been trained by the Polish
Field Hygiene Section since last December.
73. Arrangements are in hand for courses in rehabilitation for Polish
discharged soldiers.
74. Arrangements have been made with the Department of Health for
Scotland for the utilisation of the services of Polish military medical officers
with a special knowledge of Typhus Fever, in case of an outbreak of that disease.
[23709] ' c
Security.
75. Satisfactory.
t
Welfare.
76. Satisfactory.
Morale.
77. Good.
Decorations.
78. On the 24th J anuary the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Scottish
Command, presented O.B.E's to two Polish officers.
79. On the 17th February Lieutenant-General Kukiel, Commanding the
Polish Army Corps, attended Buckingham Palace and was invested by His
Majesty The King with the Insignia of the K.C.B. (Honorary Member).
Visits.
80. During the quarter the Polish Forces were visited by the General Officer
Commanding 3rd A.A. Division, senior officers from Scottish Command, General
Headquarters, Home Forces, and the War Office.
Note by Inspector of A Hied Contingents.
81. Following on several conversations between the C.I.G.S., the Com-
mander-in-Chief, Home Forces, the V.C.I.G.S., and General Sikorski, the
preliminary steps towards a Polish Armoured Division have been taken. I t is
not possible at this stage to issue an establishment for this formation, as it
depends upon available equipment and Polish man-power in this country, and
also upon the most suitable proportion of I nfantry to tanks. Certain Polish
units who will be incorporated in the Armoured Division are being moved south
of the Forth to a better training area, and General Maczek has been nominated
to command. The result of these moves in Scotland is that Angus and Perthshire
will be vacated by the Poles, except for the hospitals at Taymouth Castle and
Dupplin Castle, and that General Kukiel, with his Headquarters and our No. 4
Liaison Headquarters, will move to a more central locality.
82. Throughout the training of the Armoured Division arrangements will
be made to ensure that all the troops will be able to take the field at very short
notice on " action stations." '
(iii) Air Force.
Order of Battle (see also Appendix I I I ).
83. During the quarter under review there has been no change in the
number or equipment of Polish Operational Squadrons. All are fully
operational.
Operations (see also Appendix V).
84. The four Bomber Squadrons have been employed in night-bombing raids
over the Ruhr and Western Germany as well as over the Channel ports.
85. Operations have generally been hampered by adverse weather conditions,
and on the only occasion on which Polish Bombers took part in day operations
two Squadrons took off to attack the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau during the
German fleet's escape through the Channel, but failed to make contact with the
target.
The Bomber Squadrons are showing great keenness and efficiency, are most-
punctual in taking off and are acquiring R.A.F. Signals procedure very satisfac-
torily. A tendency to bomb from too great a height has been noted, but this fault
is being corrected.
111 Poles entered I nitial Training Wing.
37 Poles entered Elementary Air Observer School.
63 Poles entered the Signals School.
22 Poles (Wireless Operator /Air Gunners) 1 entered Air Gunnery
42 Poles (Air Gunners) J School.
28 Poles qualified as Service Pilots.
27 Poles qualified for flying duties.
Station Defence.
87. Arising out of the policy that all personnel on R.A.F. Stations are to
assist in Station Defence should the necessity arise, Polish Land Army Officers
were attached to various R.A.F. Stations on which Polish Units are located in
order to assist in the training of P.A.F. personnel in Station Defence duties.
These Army Officers have now been withdrawn and replaced by P.A.F. Officers,
all of whom have been specially trained as Station Defence Instructors.
Recruiting.
88. Up to the 1st March, 1942, 175 recruits reached this country for training
from North America. About 55 per cent, of these were selected for aircrew
training, and about 14 per cent, have for various reasons been rejected for service
with the Polish Air Force. The majority of these rejects have been or are to be
repatriated to North America.
89. Up to the 31st March, 1942, approximately 60 officers and 290 airmen
of the Polish Air Force have reached the United Kingdom from Russia and have
been accepted for service.- Of these also, about 55 per cent, have been selected for
aircrew duties. I t is expected that a further 2,000 personnel for the Polish Air
Force will be evacuated to this country. Of this figure, it is probable that there
will be many who have never really served in the Polish Air Force, but who as
civilians have received a measure of flying training.
90. During the period under review thirty-two volunteers from the Poles
reaching this country from South America are in process of being transferred
from the Polish Land Army to the Polish Air Force. Most of these will probably
be selected for ground duties.
M or ale.
91. Reports received from Operational Commands indicate that morale is
most satisfactory. Morale is also good amongst Poles under training.
C.DUTCH.
(i) Navy.
92. The situation in the Far East has naturally been uppermost in the
minds of officers and men .of the Netherlands Navy serving in this country. I n
spite of the losses of ships, men and territory, morale has not been affected and is
everywhere excellent.
93. The Captain of the Submarine O. SI, now refitting in this country after
service in the Mediterranean, has been awarded a bar to his D.S.O. The
First Lieutenant received a D.S.C. Two D.S.M.'s and four mentions in despatches,
were also awarded to members of this ship's company.
Ships commissioned and to commission shortly.
94. The Destroyer Jan van Galen (formerly Noble) was commissioned in
February and is now working up. Her sister ship, the Tjerk Hiddes (formerly
Nonpareil), is now due to commission in May.
95. One of four M.T.B.'s has been commissioned and the second one will be
ready shortly. The remaining two have been delayed.
96. Three motor minesweepers are being built for the Dutch and will be
completed during the year.
[23709] c 2
Ships Paid Off.
97. The Torpedo Boats Z. 5 and Z. 5 have been paid off and also the Gun
Boat Gruno and the Trawler Notre-Dame de France.
Personnel.
98. A number of Dutch Naval Officers and ratings from the Dutch East
Indies are expected to reach this country during the next few months, but it is
not yet possible to say how many. I t is, however, almost certain that there will
be enough to man a cruiser, and Admiral Furstner has made tentative enquiries
as to whether the Admiralty would be disposed to make one available. A definite
request on the part of the Netherlands Government may be expected.
99. About 150 Cadets and staff from the Naval College at Sourabaya will
reach this country in due course, and the Netherlands Naval Authorities have
asked if the Admiralty could arrange for the Netherlands Cadets Training
establishment near Falmouth to be enlarged for their reception. This and
alternative proposals are under consideration.
Movements of Ships.
100. The Cruiser Heemskerck and the Submarine Depot Ship Colombia are
now at Colombo. Three Submarines, formerly in the Dutch East Indies, are with
her, and 0. 2 3 , just refitted in the United Kingdom, is on her way to the East.
Two more will follow on completion of their refits.
101. The Destroyer Isaac Sweers, which was in the Mediterranean, has also
proceeded to Colombo. She may have to return here shortly for refit.
102. The Minesweeper Jan van Brakel is to sail for the Dutch West Indies,
where she will be employed on anti-submarine duties.
(ii) Army.
103. Establishment (including Ministry of
Defence, London) ... 150 3,000
(approximately)
104. Wrottesley Park Camp, Wolver-
hampton 72 1,381
London... 42 97
114 1,478
Organisation.
105. The establishment and present composition of the Dutch Contingent
remain as detailed in the last Report.
Equipment.
106.(a) The following major items of equipment have been issued since the
last report :
Bren guns ... ... ... ... ... ... 33
T.SM.G.'s ... 10
A/Tank rifles 10
(b) The present position regarding the major items of equipment in
possession of the Dutch Forces is as follows :
Ma c h i n e Gu n s . Mor t ar s .
A/ A/ TT
Carri ers Carri ers..
Ri f l es Ri f l es ..
Br e n . Th o mp s o n . 2- i n. 3- i n.
20 Es t a b l i s h me n t 128 107 50 24 12
20
Ho l d i n g s
120 113 2 4 7 12
Employment. .
107. Although normal training has continued and the Dutch Forces have
taken part in a few exercises, there was a certain unsettling effect in the Brigade
due to arrangements to send further reinforcements to the Netherlands East
Indies. The decision to send these reinforcements was, however, cancelled early
in March.
Recruits.
108. Five officers and about 130 other ranks have joined the Contingent
from Canada and South Africa.
Drafts.
109. Over 100 other ranks have left the Brigade for training as gunners in
the Merchant Navy.
Home Guard.
110. Two Home Guard officers have been appointed as Liaison Officers
between the Dutch Brigade and the Home Guard.
Security.
111. There were breaches of security in connexion with the move of the
detachment to the Netherlands East Indies, but steps have been taken to prevent
a recurrence and security arrangements are now satisfactory, a sense of security-
mindedness increasing throughout the Brigade.
Welfare.
112. Satisfactory. Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Thomas Cook, M.P., visited the
camp in February and discussed welfare in general with the "Dutch Welfare
Officers. '
Morale.
113. Satisfactory, though there is, however, a very general feeling of
boredom in the camp over the continuing '' waiting on '' for active service and the
constant taking of drafts for the other services.
Visits.
114. The Brigade has been visited by officers from Headquarters, Western
Command, General Headquarters, Home Forces, and the War Office, including
the Inspector of Allied Contingents.
Death of Dutch Inspector-General.
115. Lieutenant-General G. B. Noothoven van Goor, C.B., Inspector-
General of the Dutch Forces, died in hospital at Wolverhampton on the
12th March, a few days after an operation for appendicitis. He was buried at
Wolverhampton on the 16th. A representative gathering of British officers
attended the funeral, the Inspector of Allied Contingents representing the British
Army and the Commander-General, Midland District, representing the General
Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Western Command. The Commanders and detach-
ments from the Czechoslovak and Belgian Contingents were also present.
Note by Inspector of Allied Contingents.
116. The Dutch Contingent is at the moment in a rather unsettled condition
owing to their having earmarked reinforcements for the Dutch East Indies
(which were in the end cancelled), to the death of General Noothoven, not yet
replaced, and to heavy calls on them for other services. This matter has been
represented to the Dutch authorities in London, and it is hoped that the situation
may be tidied up, and that this fine body of men may get into their stride again.
All they require is that the strength of the Contingent shall be stabilized by their
Government deciding on the proportion of available men to be allotted to each
Service, by filling the two vacancies in Command, and by deciding how far in the
circumstances they can proceed with their present organization. They are
expecting more recruits.
I n the meanwhile, special training is being given to as many as can be taken
at our schools of that nature, and they have been given sixteen places in the
present course at the Sandhurst O.C.T.U.
(hi) Air Force.
Royal Dutch Naval Air Service.
Order of Battle (see also Appendix I I I ). .
117. No. 320 Squadron, which, prior to its temporary withdrawal from
operations on the 20th December, 1941, had been working on a one-flight basis,
has now been re-established as a full Squadron, and will shortly return to
operations as such.
Royal Dutch Army Air Force.
(Incorporated in the R.A.F.V.R.)
Training.
3 Dutchmen entered I nitial Training Wing.
21 Dutchmen qualified as Service Pilots.
General.
Recruiting.
119. The Air Ministry has agreed to accept for pilot training 10 Dutchmen
a month.
120. The Dutch Navy and Army have agreed to pool all candidates for
aircrew training. These will be incorporated in the R.A.F.V.R., but pilots and
other aircrew eventually selected for service with No. 320 Squadron will, when
trained, be transferred from the R.A.F.V.R. to the Royal Dutch Naval Air
Service.
Morale.
121. The morale in both Services is good.
D.CZECHOSLOVAK.
(i) Army.
121. Establishment (including
of National Defence)
Ministry
280 4,400
(approximately)
122. Leamington Area 604 2,558
Ministry of National Defence, London 76 48
680 2,606
Organization.
123. There has been no change in the approved establishment and present
composition of the Czechoslovak Forces since the last Report.
Equipment.
124.(a) The 2 field batteries are now equipped with 25-pdr. guns. The
following major items of equipment have also been issued since the last report:
A/Tank rifles 15
T.S.M.Gs 15
(b) The present position of major items of equipment in possession of the
Czechoslovak Forces is as follows :
Guns . Ma c h i n e Gu n s . Mor t ar s .
A/ T A/ T..
Carri ers Carri ers ..
Ri f l es Ri f l es ..
A/ T.
Fi e l d. Br e n . Vi c ke r s . Tho mps o n. 2- i n. 3- i n.
2 -
B
d r .
Es t a b l i s h me n t . . . 10 12 167 14 133 85 31 15 30
Ho l d i n g s 16 8 1 2 4 14 141 43 15 15 33
Employment.
125. I n addition to normal training, the Czechoslovak Brigade have taken
part in a number of exercises, including a large Home Defence Exercise.
126. Field Battery firing and calibration with 25-pdr. guns have been carried
out at Trawsfynydd Practice Camp, where, also, the Anti-Tank Battery practised
with their 2-pounders.
Security.
127. Satisfactory.
Welfare.
128. Satisfactory.
Morale.
129. Good.
Visits.
130. Units of the Brigade have been inspected by Senior British officers of
the Western Command and a visit was paid by the Inspector of Allied Contingents
with Mr. Nicholls, the British Minister to the Czechoslovak Government.
Note by the Inspector of Allied Contingents.
131. The Czechs are still feeling the lack of recruits, and are unlikely to
reach their full establishment in this country. The units that are formed are
well equipped and well trained and together make a mixed Brigade of high
fighting value. Of all the Allied Contingents, they have been the readiest to
co-operate with us in every possible way and made the fewest demands. I t is
a pity that they cannot be amongst our best troops for a time, and exercised with
and against them, for value to both sides would result. The Ceramander-in-Chief,
Home Forces, and the Army Commander are considering the possibility of moving
their fighting units to some other part of the country for the summer months.
132. The Army Commander rates them as a very useful mobile fighting force',
(ii) Air Force,
Operations (see also Appendix V).
133. No. 311 Squadron was employed in night bombing raids over the
Ruhr, Western Germany and the Channel ports.
134. During the first month the squadron was able to operate on six nights,
two aircraft failing to return. I n the second month the squadron operated on
seven nights and one day, one aircraft failing to return. I n the third month
the squadron took part in the recent successful attack on the Renault Works
near Paris.
135. Bad weather conditions generally made difficult the location of primary
targets and the observation of results. Although the squadron took off to
intercept theScharnhorst, Gneisenau and Prinz Eugen when they escaped through
the Channel, it was unable to intercept. Nevertheless, an improvement in night
photography has been noticed.
136. Bad weather also having impeded the work of the operational training
flight, the number of crews available for operations has recently dropped.
Recruiting. - -
137. Four Officers (selected for Observer Training) and forty-one privates
have been transferred from the Czech army; eleven recruits have arrived from
Canada.
13 Czechoslovaks entered Initial Training Wing;
12 Czechoslovaks entered Elementary Air Observer School;
6 Czechoslovaks entered Air Gunnery School;
15 Czechoslovaks qualified as Service Pilots.
139. The operational training of Czech Bomber crews has for a considerable
time been carried out within No. 311 Squadron. I n the middle of December 1941,
however, a small Operational Training Unit equipped with 10 +2 Wellington and
2 +1 Oxford aircraft was established at East Wretham as No. 1420 Flight.
Station Defence.
140. Five Czechoslovak Army Officers have successfully completed a Ground
Defence Course and will be commissioned in the R.A.F.V.R. prior to attachment
to units.
Morale.
141. Morale in all Czech Squadrons is good.
E.-NORWEGI AN.
(i) Navy.
142. General Ffansteen has been appointed Supreme Commander-in-Chief
of the Norwegian Naval and Military Forces. The immediate control of the
Navy remains in the hands of the Navai Staff as heretofore and up to now the
new appointment has not made any material difference.
143. The Captain of the destroyer Bath has been awarded the D.S.C. In
addition the Norwegian Navy received three D.S.M.'s and seven mentions in
despatches, during the quarter. This has given over much satisfaction in the
Norwegian fleet.
Ships commissioned and to commission shortly.
144. Another M.T.B. has been added to the Flotilla, which now numbers
five.
' 145. The destroyer Mansfield has been paid off, as she was due for a long
refit, and the Lincoln, of the same class, has been commissioned in her place.
146. The Potentilla was commissioned in J anuary and there are now five
Norwegian-manned corvettes.
147. The destroyer Glaisdale is due to complete in April and great interest
is being taken by the Norwegians in commissioning this new ship.
148. The submarine Uredd completed her working up at the end of last
year and has been carrying out patrol duties. She has been favourably reported
on.
149. The Norwegian naval authorities agreed to the Admiralty's request
that the torpedo boat Draug should be used for Submarine Escort Duties for a
short period and it is now under consideration to employ her as a training ship,
keeping her fully manned and ready for sea.
150. The destroyer Sleipner has been taken in hand for a six weeks' refit
and alterations in armament to bring her more up to date.
Training.
151. .A number of officers and ratings have undergone training, particularly
with a view to manning the new destroyer and to provide a certain proportion of
spare ratings for their two submarines.
Recruiting.
152. Recruiting for the navy has been almost at a standstill, as no suitable
men have been getting over from Norway. I t is, however, reported that about
five thousand men, most of whom are of the seaman or fisherman classes, are now
in Sweden and anxious to come to this country.
153. About three hundred men are being trained in Canada as D.E.M.S.
gunners.
(ii) Army.
154. Establishment (Field units and forma-
tions) ... 100 2,500
(approximately)
156. The approved establishment and present composition of the Norwegian
Strength
155.
and Location.
Aberdeen area ....
Dumfries area, &c... ... ... ... .
92
83
1,175
638
Organisation.
175 1,813
Forces are as detailed in the last Report.
Equipment.
157.(a) The following major items of equipment have been issued to the
Norwegian Forces since the last Report:
Bren guns ... ... ... ... ... ... 12
A/Tank rifles ... ... ... 7
2-inch mortars ... ... ... ... ... 6
(b) The present position regarding major items of equipment in possession
of the Norwegian Forces is as follows :
Ma c h i n e Gu n s . Mor t ar s .
'' Fi e l Fi e l dd Ant i - Ta n Ant i - Ta nkk
Gu n s Gu n s .. Ri f l es Ri f l es ..
Br e n. Vi c ke r s . Th o mp s o n . 2- i n. 3-i n.
Es t a b l i s h me n t 4 124 12 99 6 1 24 12 20
1
Ho l d i n g s ; 4 88 12 9 3 3 0 18 8 20
Employment.
158. I n addition to normal training the Norwegians have taken part in
exercises with the 51st (H) Division.
159. Working parties have been provided for beach scaffolding on the coasts.
160. A number of artillery personnel have been attached to one of our
RA. Training Regiments, and Scottish Command sent a special squad of W/T
instructors to run a short course at the Norwegian Depot.
161. Security.
Satisfactory.
162. Welfare.
Satisfactory.
163. Morale.
Good.
[23709] D
Visits.
164.
165. At the end of February the late Commander-in-Chief of the Norwegian
Army (Major-General Fleischer) visited the Contingent to bid them farewell on
his retirement.
166. The Inspector of Allied Contingents visited the Brigade and visits
were also made by ordnance and catering representatives from Scottish Command.
Notes by Inspector of A Hied Contingents.
167. The Norwegians have recently adopted a new system of Command, and
Major-General ELansteen has been brought in to be Commander-in-Chief of their
Navy, Army and Air Force. Major-General Beichmann has been appointed
Commander-in-Chief
v
of the Norwegian Army, and Major-General Karl Fleischer,
K.C.B., has retired after notable service both with the troops and with the
Ministry in London.
168. Following on these changes, the principles of the present use and future
character of the Norwegian defence services have been examined in two notes,
copies of which have been sent to the War Office, Home Forces and Scottish
Command, and concrete proposals for certain changes in the organisation of the
Norwegian Contingent are gradually emerging.
169. The Norwegians are being concentrated in Ross-shire so that the
disadvantages of the 250 miles separation of the training from the fighting units
will disappear.
170. This Contingent is in good heart and making real progress.
(iii) Air Force.
Training.
171. During the period unde^review, two Norwegians entered Signals
School for training as Wireless Operator/Air Gunners. The bulk of Norwegian
training is still carried out in Canada.
Recruiting.
172. Recruits are still reaching this country from Norway and Sweden,
but there is a falling off in the recruiting of Norwegian Air personnel in Canada
and the United States.
Morale.
173. Morale remains high.
General.
174. No. 330 Squadron is expected to move during the summer from Iceland
to the United Kingdom, where it will be re-equipped with Hudson I I I aircraft
and be incorporated in No. 18 Group.
F.BELGI AN,
(i) Navy. )
Ships Commissioned and to Corhmfssion Shortly.
175. The corvette Godetia was commissioned in February. The First Lord
sent a signal to the ship conveying his good wishes, which was much appreciated.
The entire ship's company, with the exception of the Commanding Officer and
three ratings, are Belgian. She is now working up.
have been under training, particularly in Signals and Wireless. They have made
176.
April.
The completion of the corvette Buttercup has been delayed until early
Training.
177. H.M.S. Royal Arthur reports very favourably on the Belgians, who
good progress in the English language and also in Physical Training.
178. One of the Belgian Cadets at Dartmouth has passed out top of all
the Special Entry Cadets, which, in view of having to learn technical subjects
in a foreign language, may be considered a most meritorious performance. The
other three Cadets also passed out very satisfactorily.
Recruiting.
179. The number of Belgian ratings has only increased by twenty during
the quarter, as recruiting has been almost at a standstill owing to continued
delay in drawing up regulations for the conscription by the Allied Governments
of their nationals in British territory.
National Flag.
180. The Admiralty have given their approval to a request from the
Belgian Government to fly the Belgian Flag side by side with the White Ensign,
and this is known to have given great satisfaction in Belgian quarters. I t has
also been approved that the Belgian officers, although holding commissions in the
R.N.R. or R.N.V.R., may wear a badge indicative of their nationality.
(ii) Army.
181. Establishment (including Ministry of
Defence, London) 150 2,450
(approximately)
182. Malvern
78 951
Hereford (1 Battalion and Filed
Artillery Battery) 55 969
London 53 145
186 2,065
A ccommodation.
183. The Belgian Contingent will move shortly to the Carmarthen-Llanelly
area; preliminary reconnaissances have been undertaken.
Organisation.
184. The establishment and present composition of the Belgian Contingent
remain as detailed in the last Report.
Equipment.
185.(a) The Armoured Car Squadron have now been issued with
14 Humbers, Mark-1, in lieu of the 14 Guys.
Twelve Trucks, 8-cwt. Fords, have been issued to the Belgians at the request
of their Minister of Defence for elementary A.F.V. training, with the hope that
at some future date the Belgians may be equipped with Tanks.
The following major items of equipment have also been issued since the last
Report:
Bren guns ... ... ... ... ... ... 6
A/Tank rifles ... 3
(b) The present position regarding major items of equipment in possession
of the Belgian Contingent is as follows :
Ma c h i n e Guns .
Ant i Ant i --
Mor t ar s .
Fi e l Fi e l dd
Ta n Ta n kk
Guns Guns ..
Ri f l e s Ri f l e s ..
Br e n . Th o mp s o n . 2- i n. 3- i n.
Es t a b l i s h me n t 8 126 103 5 3 24 12 20
Ho l d i n g s 8 7 6 99 2 6 10 1 2 13
[23709] D 2
Employment.
186. I n addition to normal training, the Belgian Brigade have taken part
in a number of important exercises. In one of these exercises a British battalion
was placed under the command of the Belgian Commander. The Headquarter
staff took part in a large Home Defence Exercise; this was most successful and
the headquarters worked efficiently.
arrange for Belgian troops on leave to be taken by families in the Birmingham
187. The Field Battery carried out practice firing at Trawsfynydd.
Security.
188. Satisfactory.
Welfare.
189. Satisfactory. Birmingham Hospitality Committee have offered to
area. Accommodation and feeding will be free.
Morale.
190. Satisfactory.
Visits.
191. During the quarter the Belgian units have been inspected by the
Commander-in-Chief, Home Forces, and the Inspector of Allied Contingents.
Note by Inspector of Allied Contingents.
192. The Belgian troops are to be moved back into Wales in about a month's
time. Their old Guy armoured cars have been replaced by Humbers; they have
also received quite a lot of miscellaneous equipment and are pretty well off in that
respect. Transport, being in short supply, is their principal demand.
193. There has been a recrudescence of somewhat bitter discussion amongst
them on the subject of the political future of Belgium, and certain senior officers
are supposed to be in favour of a Fcoyal Dictatorship, and to be in some sense
planning to that end. This is being watched as closely as may be, lest it go so
far as to affect the discipline of the Contingent. I t is perhaps unfortunate that
the temperament and strong personality of the Commander are such as to make
him, with or without his volition or consent, likely to be regarded as a protagonist.
I t is certain that more active conditions of service would cure all this, and I am
asking that some Belgians may be taken on one of our raids.
(iii) Air Force.
Recruiting.
194. 50 Belgians have been enlisted for ground duties and these have
been posted or are awaiting posting.to Technical Training Schools. A further
16 are being considered for enlistment.
195. A number of trained or partly trained Belgian Air Force pilots have
escaped to this country, of whom 13 have been commissioned and 4 enlisted in
the R.A.F.V.R.
196. During the period under review-
31 Belgians have entered I nitial Training Wing.
1 Belgian has qualified Service Pilot.
197. The Air Ministry have tagreed to accept every three months up to
50 Belgians for training as pilots or, if already trained, for service.
Morale.
198. Morale is high.
G.GREEK.
(i) Navy.
Destroyer Crews.
199. One hundred and forty Greek Naval personnel who represent half crews
for two destroyers arrived in this country early in March. With the exception
of a few engineroom personnel who are standing by the Bolebroke and Border,
on the Tyne, the Greeks have been accommodated at the R.N. Barracks, Chatham,
and Training in all branches is proceeding. The first impressions of the men
are that they are well disciplined and keen to learn, but the language difficulty
is retarding progress. Very few amongst them speak enough English to act
as interpreters. A number of Greeks in this country are being specially entered
in the Greek Navy for duty as interpreters.
200. Two more crews are already on their way from Alexandria and.
Bombay and it is, therefore, expected that the Bolebroke and Border will
commission in May and J une. A fourth crew will be ready to leave Alexandria
at the end of April and it should be possible to commission the third and fourth
Destroyers in, August and September.
201. About 100 Naval reservists who were employed in the Greek merchant
service in this country are being recruited and, after general disciplinary
training at Chatham, will be used to bring the four crews to full strength.
202. The question of manning two submarines is in abeyance for the present.
(ii) Air Force.
Operations.
203. I n Middle East Command the Greek G.R. Flight remains active and
the Greek Fighter Squadron is now operational.
Morale.
204. Reports from Middle East state that morale is good.
General.
205. An agreement between His Majesty's Government and the Greek
Government relating to the organisation and employment of the Greek Armed
Forces has been signed. I t provides for the entry of R.H.A.F. personnel into
the R.A.F.V.R.
(i) Air Force. H. YUGOSLAV.
Operations.
206. No. 2 Yugoslav Squadron has been operating under Middle East
Command mainly on anti-submarine patrol. The Squadron has, however, only
five aircraft (Do. 22) left, of which only one is reported as serviceable. The
question of the re-equipment of this Squadron is under consideration by Middle
East Command.
Morale.
207. Morale in No. 2 Yugoslav Squadron is reported to be good. Elsewhere
morale has been gravely undermined by a crisis over the Yugoslav High Command.
Training,
208. All, or almost all, personnel have been removed from Amman and are
now in Egypt. I t was intended that all Yugoslavs in the Middle East, excepting
fully trained personnel, should proceed for training to Southern Rhodesia. This
movement has had to be deferred owing to the crisis in Cairo referred to above.
In the meantime, three officers and twenty-two other ranks have left the United
Kingdom for Southern Rhodesia.
April 22, 1942.
REMARKS ON WELFARE OF ALLIED NAVIES.
The Allies have opened a number more clubs, canteens and hostels in the
Ports which are visited by their ships.
Arrangements which have been made for private hospitality continue to be
much appreciated. Many Allied officers have been invited to join London Clubs
as honorary members.
A scheme is being drawn up to meet the needs of officers and men of the
United States Navy and Merchant Service in United Kingdom and Northern
Ireland Ports. The American Red Cross is co-operating.
Duty-free stores have been made available to certain categories of Allied
ships which were not previously eligible.
Special attention has been paid to the welfare of Allied fishermen.
A PPE NDI X I I .
GENERAL STATE OF ALLIED NAVIES.
The following Table shows the strength of the Allied Navies, excluding Dutch East Indies Fleet, Greek and Yugoslav Navies as at the
end of March 1942, and the losses they have so far suffered:
Cl ass of Shi p. F. N. F. L.
Royal Norwegi an
Navy.
Royal Ne t he r l ands
Navy, At l ant i c.
Pol i s h Navy.
R. N. Sect i on,
Bei ge.
Tot al s.
Crui ser Crui serss . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. 1
1
Des t royer Des t royerss an andd Torped Torpedoo Bo a t Bo a t ss 3 5 1 6
15
Submari ne Submari ness . . . . .. 3 2 6 3
14
Gunboat s Gunboat s ,, Sl oop Sl oopss an andd Corvet t e Corvet t ess . . . . .. 13 5 2
20
Mi ne s we e pe r s Mi ne s we e pe r s ,, Pat ro Pat roll an andd Smal Smal ll Convo Convoyy Ve s s e l Ve s s e l ss 4 35 23 4 66
Smal l e Smal l err Fi ght i n Fi ght i ngg Ve s s e l Ve s s e l ss . . . . .. 12 13 4 3
32
Harbou Harbourr Servi c Servi cee Ves s el Ves s el ss . . . . .. 12 3 3
18
Totals Totals.. 47 63 40 12 4 166
200/ 1, 420 34 / 280 1, 314/ 12, 280
Pe r s onne l : Offi cers/ Men . . . 460*/ 5, 120 3 7 0 t / 8 , 1 6 0 $ 2508/ 2, 8008
Los s e s t o Da t e 2 Submari nes 1 Des t royer . . . . . . 2 Submar i ne s 1 Des t royer
1 Corvet t e 1 Pat rol Ves s el 2 Mi ne s we e pe r s 1 Submari ne
1 Pat rol Ves s el 1 M. T. B. 1 A/ S Trawl er
3 Mi ne s we e pe r s 1 Es c or t Ves s el
*
ALLIED PERSONNEL IN R.N. AND R.N.P.S.
French : 25 Officers, 850 Men. Belgians: 20. Norwegians: 140 Officers, 280 Men.
* I nc l ude s 70 Mi ds hi pme n. f I nc l ude s 50 Mi ds hi pme n. %I nc l ude s 600 D. E. M. S. Gunners . g Approxi mat el y, owi ng t o s hi ps havi ng l ef t
A P P E N DI X I I I .
ORDER OF BATTLE OF ALLIED AIR FORCES, MARCH 20, 1942.
Na t i o na l i t y .
No. of
Squa dr o n
Fl i ght .
or
Ty p e of
Squadr on.
Ai r c r af t
Lo c a t i o n by
Co mma n d .
Tr e nc h 340 Fi g h t e r . . .
B o mb e r . . .
Fi g h t e r
Ar my Co- op.
Spi t f i re . . .
Bl e n h e i m
I n f o r ma t i o n
( pr obabl y Mo -
ha wk)
Ly s a n d e r
Fi g ht e r Co mma nd.
Mi ddl e Ea s t .
) J J J
F r e n c h E q u a t o r i a l
Af ri ca.
Po l e s 300
301
304
305
302
303
306
307
308
315
316
317
309
B o mb e r . . .
,, . . .
,j . . .
,, . . .
Fi g h t e r
Ni g ht Fi g ht e r
Fi g h t e r . . .
, . . . . .
ti "**
,, . . .
Ar my Co- op.
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
We l l i n g t o n
**
Spi t f i re . . .
11 . . .
?s .. ' *:*; - '
Be a uf i g ht e r
Spi t f i re . . .
,,
Ly s a n d e r
"'***.
. . .
.-***
. . .
Bo mb e r Co mma nd.
) *
it it
Fi g ht e r Co mma nd.
' y tt
it j)
it tt
it j)
)i tt
it it
ii it
Ar my Co- operat i on
Co mma n d .
Du t c h 320 Hu d s o n I I . Coas t al Co mma nd.
G. R
Cz e c hs . . .
No r we g i a ns
. . . 310
311
312
313
330
331
332
Fi g h t e r
Bo mb e r . . .
Fi g h t e r
)t * * *
G. R. and Ar my
Co- op.
Fi g ht e r
Spi t f i re . . .
We l l i n g t o n
Spi t f i re . . .
,, . . . . . .
No r t hr o p Fl o a t
Pl a n e s
Spi t f i re . . .
Fi g ht e r
Bo mb e r
Fi g ht e r
a
Coas t al
Fi g ht e r
. tt
Co mma nd.
Co mma nd.
Co mma nd.
-i
Co mma nd.
Co mma n d .
.. tt
Be l g i a n s . . . 350
11 * * * * * * j j * - ' * * * ii it
Gr e e ks 335
Fl i g ht ( i n
No . 201 Group)
,,
G. R.
. . . . . . Hu r r i c a n e
Ar s o n , Do . 22
Fa i r e y I I I F.
. . .
Mi ddl e
ii
Ea s t .
it
Yugos l av . . . Fl i g ht ( No. 2
Yug o s l a v
Squa dr o n)
G. R Do . 22 . . .
tt . it
A P P E NDI X I V.
STRENGTHS OF ALLIED AIR FORCES, MARCH 20, 1942.
:
Fr e e Fr e e
Fr e e Royal Dut c h
l! rench i n Fr e nc h i n Royal Dut c h
Ar my Ai r Fr e nc h i n
Yugos l avs . Tot al s .
Fr e nc h Mi ddl e Pol e s . Naval Air Czechs. Norwegi ans . Bel gi ans . Greeks.
Uni t e d For c e .
Equat ori al Ea s t and Servi ce.
Ki ngdom. ( R. A. F. V. R. )
Afri ca. Syri a.
Officers Officers,, fl yi n fl yi ngg
Ai rmen Ai rmen,, Hyi n Hyi ngg . . . . ..
8 4 ]
KA)
186 J
19
49
38
69
1, 120]
KB)
1, 605 J
5 9 ]
KG)
98 J
3 0 ]
KD)
54 J
1 6 7 ]
K
E
)
378 J
9 9 ]
KG)
159 J
1 0 0 ]
104 J
1 2 1 ]
S- (
J
)
172 J
107
96
1, 944
2, 970
Officers Officers,, non- f l yi n non- f l yi ngg 50 15 48 590 12 ' 1 80 ( F) 147 7 SO 12 992
Ai rmen Ai rmen,, non- f l yi n non- f l yi ngg 210 220 1, 275 5, 272 179 665 1, 324 132 977 99 10, 353
1, 729 343 1, 300 314 16, 259
Tot a Tot al l 530 803 1, 430 8, 587 348 85 1, 290
( A) I nc l ude s 32"pi l ots servi ng i n t he Fr e e Fr e nc h Fi ght er Squadron, 57 pi l ot s s ervi ng i n R. A. F. operat i onal squadrons and 9 pi l ot s s ervi ng in R. A. F. non-
operat i onal uni t s ( i ncl udi ng I ns t ruct ors and Staff Pi l ot s i n School s ) .
( B) I nc l ude s 28 pi l ot s servi ng i n R. A. F. operat i onal squadrons and 465 pi l ot s servi ng i n non- operat i onal uni t s ( i ncl udi ng I ns t ruct ors and Staff Pi l ot s i n School s ) .
(C) I nc l ude s 92 pi l ot s and ai rcrew servi ng i n R. A. F. operat i onal squadrons and 65 pi l ot s and ai rcrew servi ng i n R. A. F. non- operat i onal uni t s ( i ncl udi ng
t hos e under t rai ni ng) .
( D) I nc l ude s 13 pi l ot s s ervi ng i n R. A. F. operat i onal squadrons and 58 pi l ot s s ervi ng i n R. A. F. non- operat i onal uni t s ( i ncl udi ng t hos e under t rai ni ng) .
( E) I nc l ude s 61 pi l ot s and ot her ai rcrew servi ng i n R. A. F. operat i onal squadrons and 86 pi l ot s and ot her ai rcrew servi ng i n non- operat i onal uni t s ( i ncl udi ng
I ns t r uc t or s and Staff Pi l ot s i n School s ) .
( F) Ex c l ude s 23 officers t ransf erred f rom t he Czechos l ovak Ar my who wi l l be c ommi s s i one d i n t he R. A. F. V. R. on c ompl e t i on of ai rcrew t rai ni ng.
( G) I nc l ude s 127 pi l ot s and ai rcrew servi ng i n R. A. F. operat i onal s quadrons and 50 pi l ot s and ai rcrew s ervi ng i n R. A. F. non- operat i onal uni t s ( i ncl udi ng t hos e
under t rai ni ng) .
( H) I nc l ude s 96 pi l ot s s ervi ng i n R. A. F. operat i onal s quadrons and 108 pi l ot s s ervi ng i n R. A. F. non- operat i onal uni t s ( i ncl udi ng I ns t ruct ors , Staff Pi l ot s and
pers onnel under t rai ni ng) .
( J) I nc l ude s 35 Officer Cadet s and 84 N. C. O. Cadet s under trai ni ng. -
SCALE OF OPERATIONS BY ALLIED AIR FORCES.
December 21, 1941, to March 20, 1942,
Free French
1 Fighter Squadron carried out 13 sorties.
Poles-
4 Bomber Squadrons carried out 591 sorties.
8 Fighter Squadrons carried out 903 sorties.
Czechs
1 Bomber Squadron carried out 172 sorties.
3 Fighter Squadrons carried out 1,009 sorties.
Norwegians
1 Fighter Squadron carried out 323 sorties.
1 Coastal Squadron (figures not available).
Belgians
1 Fighter Squadron carried out 107 sorties (non-operational for the last
month of the quarter).
Yugoslavs
1 G.R. Squadron carried out 66 sorties during J anuary. ^
NOTE.No. 320 Dutch Squadron and No. 332 Norwegian Squadron have been
non-operational during the period under review.
A P P E 1ST OJ L X " V I .
Enemy Aircraft Destroyed by Allied Air Forces.
DECEMBER 21ST, 1941 TO MARCH 20TH, 1942.
B y Fr e e Fr e nc h
By Czech Pi l ot s B y Be l gi an Pi l ot s
B y Pol i s h B y Czech
Pi l ot s servi ng i n
s ervi ng i n Bri t i s h servi ng i n Bri t i s h Tot al s. .
Squadrons. Squadrons.
Bri t i s h Squadrons. Squadrons^ Squadrons.
De s t r oye De s t r oye dd
Probabl Probabl yy de s t r oye d. . de s t r oye d. . ..
Da ma g e Da ma g e dd . . . . . . ..
Tot a Tot al l
- '
2
1
3
10
4
14
"i
i
1
2
3
3
3
16
5 ,
3
24
APPENDIX VII.
Fr e e
Casualties
Fr e nc h.
(lulled, injured or wounded and missing) suffered by Allied
DECEMBER 21ST, 1941 TO MARCH 20TH, 1942.
Pol e s . Dut c h. Czechs . Norwegi ans . Bel gi ans .
Air Forces.
Greeks. Yugos l avs . Tot al s.
K. I. M. K. I. M. K. I. M. K. I. M. K. I. M. K. I. M. K. I. M. K. I. M. K. I. M.
Du Du ee t t oo e ne m e ne myy act i o act i onn o onn
Operat i ona Operat i onall Fl i ght Fl i ght ss
Du Du ee t t oo ac c i de nt ac c i de nt ss o onn Opera Opera--
t i ona t i onall Fl i ght Fl i ght ss
Du Du ee t t oo flying flying acci dent acci dent ss o onn
Trai ni n Trai ni ngg o orr Non- Opera Non- Opera--
t i ona t i onall Fl i ght Fl i ght ss
3
6
. . . 13( a)
1 ...
7
21
28
5
13
19
43
. . .
3
1
1
. . . . . . 1
6
3
3
8
10
39
. . .
. . .
. . .
%
1
. . . 2
2. ...
: , 1
2
...
. . .
1
2 . . . 3 . . . 1
2 . . . . . . -
13
29
41
8
21
35
98
. . .
5
Tot a Tot all 9 1 13 56 37 46 2 10 21 39 1 2 2 3 . . . 3 . . . 3 . . . 2 83 64 103
(a) I nc l udi ng. one pri soner
C D
C D
NOTE ON THE TRANSFER OF CERTAIN TRAINING TO CANADA.
Consequent upon the decision to transfer to R.A.F. transferred schools i ni
Canada the work of all but one R.A.F. Service Flying Training School (College) 1
and the Polish School (No. 16 (P) S.F.T.S:), it has been necessary, in agreement I
with the various national authorities to arrange for all Free French, Czechoslovak, 1
Dutch, Belgian, and some Polish pupil pilots to be sent to Canada to complete 1
their Flying Training. For the present the Polish Elementary and Service j
Flying Training Schools will remain in England.
Although arrangements have been made to complete the training of a few I
more Allied Air Observers in the United Kingdom, the rule in future will be that I
Air Observers, as well as pupil pilots, must complete their training in Canada. 1
During the period under review the following Allied pupil pilots and
observers have left the United Kingdom for Canada :
Free French ... ... ... 10 pupil pilots.
Poles ... ... ... ... -28 pupil pilots.
21 pupil observers.
Czechs ... ... ... 13 pupil pilots.
Belgians ... ... ... 1 pupil pilot.
THI S DOCUMENT I S THE PROPERTY OP KI3f BRI TANNI C MAJ ESTY' S
GOVERNMEN
T0
B SECRET E KEPT UNOEf i
L0CK & m
P
f
tsd
tha t 3peoi al
W.P.C42) 162 6l r .
m y b e t a k e
" - W A R CABI NET T ' * ensure * ^
15t h Apr i l 1942 " "' cy of this document Copy No, ^y.
secr e 6
Evacuat i on of I ndi an Ref ugees f r omBur ma. "
Memor andumf r y t he Secr et ar y of St at e f or Bur ma.
Wi t h r ef er ence to- rny Memor andumNo. W. P. ( 42) 160, I
at t ach a. copy of a t el egr am whi ch has been r ecei ved f r om
t he Gover nor - Gener al r el at i ng t o t hi s subj ect . The Uni t ed
St at es mi l i t ar y aut hor i t i es i n I ndi a pr opose t o make a
gr adual l y i ncr easi ng number of ai r cr af t avai l abl e f or
ser vi ce bet ween Di nj an i n Assam and Myi t kyi na i n Bur ma on
t he r et ur n j our neys of whi ch some space may be avai l abl e
f or r ef ugees af t er wounded mi l i t ar y per sonnel have been
pr ovi ded f or . Thi s wi l l be i n addi t i on t o ar r angement s f or
evacuat i on by t he Chi nese and I ndi an ci vi l ai r ser vi ces
whi ch appar ent l y ar e i n oper at i on al r eady.
The t el egr am shows t hat t he aut hor i t i es i n I ndi a
al r eady have t he cooper at i on of Gener al Br er et on t hrough
-
whomt hey wi l l be abl e t o br i ng t o not i ce t he i mpor t ance ; f
t hi s pr obl em f r omt he poi nt of vi ew of I ndi an pol i t i cal
opi ni on. I n t hose ci r cumst ances i t i s per haps undesi r at - ^
t o t ake t he mat t er up al so t hr ough Hi s Maj est y' s Ambassador
at Washi ngt on as pr evi ousl y suggest ed.
L. S * A.
BURMA OFFI CE.
15t h Apr i l 1' 942.
I NWARD TELEGRAM f r om Gover nor - Gener al
t o Secr et ar y of St at e f or I ndi a
dat ed 11. 25 hour s, l ot h Apr i l 1942,
1019- S. . ^
Addr essed- t o Gover nor of "Bur ma, r epeat ed t o Secr et ar y
of St at e end Ambassador at Washi ngt on. Ref er ence Washi ngt on
t el egr amNo. 14 dat ed Apr i l 6t h. Fol l owi ng i nf or mat i on
- r ecei ved f r omU. S. . Ar my Cor ps i n I ndi a. Begi ns They pr opose
t o st ar t ver y soon a f er r y ser vi ce bet ween Di nj an and
Myi t kyi na. Thi s wi l l however consi st of onl y 5 or 6 machi nes
unt i l end of Oct ober by whi ch t i me t hey hope t o have 75 ai r -
cr af t avai l abl e, Those ai r cr af t wi l l be C47
!
s wi t h a dead
l oad of about 3 t ons, i . o. t hey wi l l be abl e t o t ake about
25 men each.
St ar t i ng f r omabout Apr i l 16t h t her e wi l l pr obabl y be
some sur pl us space i n t hese r et ur ni ng ai r cr af t . I t i s
suggest ed t hat Bur ma ar my shoul d al l ot pr i or i t i es i n t hese
- ai r cr af t f i l l i ng up sur pl us space wi t h r ef ugees who must not
r epeat not t ake pr ecedence, over wounded.
I n addi t i on ar r angemcnt sHoy "CTN. A. C. and I . N. A. f r om
about Apr i l 11t h wi l l r esul t i n a f l ow of evacuees f r om
Myi t kyi na t o Di nj an at t he r at e of 150 per di em. Ends.
J,
: B
pOOUMENT l a TI LE PROPERTY OP HI S BRI TANNI C MAJ ESTY' S GOVERNMENT) .
it s requested that special care may beta- \
It
i
is reque3t ea i aai spe
R E G R E T .
ensure the secrecy
0 /
w^P. / 42 ) 165.
ogth Apr i l , 1943.
COPY NO,
l /
WAR^J l ; ABI NET
e
ENEMY OI L QUESTI ONS,
Not e by t he. Secr et ar y of t he War Cabi net ,
The f ol l owi ng r evi sed, ar r angement s have been
appr oved by t he Pr i me Mi ni st er f or deal i ng wi t h Enemy Oi l
quest i ons: -
( 1) I t wi l l be t he dut y of t he J oi nt I nt el l i gence
Sub- Commi t t ee t o dr aw up Per i odi c Repor t s on
t he Enemy Oi l posi t i on. . These Repor t s wi l l he
based on t echni cal est i mat es of t he enemy' s
oi l consumpt i on and r esour ces, t oget her wi t h
i nf or mat i on f r om such ot her sour ces as i s
avai l abl e t o t he J oi nt I nt el l i gence Sub- Commi t t ee
0
( 2) The t echni cal i nf or mat i on as t o t he enemy' s oi l
consumpt i on and r esour ces wi l l cont i nue t o he
col l at ed by a speci al i st body under t he Chai r man-
shi p of Si r Har ol d Har t l ey, Thi s body wi l l he
known as
, ;
The Techni cal Sub- Commi t t ee on Axi s Oi l " .
( 3) The Per i odi c Repor t s f r om t he J oi nt I nt el l i gence
Sub- Commi t t ee wi l l he ci r cul at ed t o t he Chi ef s of
St af f s But
;
i n vi ew of t he i mpor t ance of t he
enemy oi l posi t i on? and of t he f act t hat act i on
t o r educe or dest r oy enemy oi l st ocks may t ake many
f or ms, t hese Repor t s wi l l be submi t t ed t o t he
Secr et ar y of St at e f or Domi ni on Af f ai r s, as Deput y
Ghai r man of -the Def ence Commi t t ee
?
who may di r ect
t hat t hey shal l be br ought bef or e t he Def ence
Commi t t ee or t he War Cabi net o
( 4) The Secr et ar y of St at e f or Domi ni on Af f ai r s, as
Deput y Ghai r man of t he Def ence Commi t t ee, wi l l
under t ake, t he co- or di nat i ng dut i es hi t her t o
per f or med by Lor d Hankey i n r egar d t o measur es
t o deny t o t he enemy oi l i n t er r i t or i es t hr eat ened
by t he enemy, , The Secr et ar y f or Pet r ol eumwi l l
of cour se r emai n r esponsi bl e f or t he pr epar at i on
of pr act i cal measur es t o deny t o t he enemy oi l
suppl i es i n t er r i t or i es t hr eat ened by t he enemy.
The Mi ni st er of Economi c War f ar e wi l l be r esponsi bl e
f or gi vi ng advi ce on quest i ons of pol i cy af f ect i ng
t he deni al of oi l t o t he enemy,
*
The above ar r angement s make i t possi bl e to di scont i nue
t he Hankey Commi t t ee on Pr event i ng Oi l f r omReachi ng Ger many,
and t he Ll oyd Commi t t ee on t he Ger man Oi l Posi t i on,
( Sgd, ) E. E. BRI DGES,
Gr eat Geor ge St r eet , ScWol.
v
THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTVS GOVERNMENT
SECRET Copy No.
W . P . ( 4 2 ) 1 6 4
(Also C.O.S. (42) 227)
April 16, 1942
TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AjffD KEY.
It is requested that special care ma^fe taken to
WAR CABINET
WEEKLY RESUME
(No. 137)
of the
from 0700 April 9th, to
0700 April 16th,
1942
Cabinet War Room
NAYAL SI TUATI ON.
General Review.
., 1. Our main forces have withdrawn from the vicinity of Ceylon.
Two U-boats have been sunk.
, Shipping losses, principally due to U-boat attacks in the West Atlantic, have
been heavy.
Home Waters.
2. In an engagement with E-boats off Lowestoft during the early morning
of the 12th, ELM. Destroyers Walpole, Mendip and Cattistock sank one and
damaged two, without casualties or damage to themselves.
H.M.S. Anson, a new battleship of the "Ki ng George V " class, was
commissioned in the Tyne on the 14th.
Northern Waters.
3. The Russian submarine U21 was mined and badly damaged off the North
Cape. The crew sank her in order to avoid capture, and were later rescued by
another Russian submarine.
Escorts for our convoys to North Russia have been reinforced by additional
destroyers, with heavy ships of the Home Fleet acting as cover. One of these
convoys, consisting of 24 ships, ran into ice during the night of 10th/11th about
150 miles to the north-eastward of Iceland (C). H.M. Destroyer Wilton and
a number of H.M. Auxiliary Vessels acting as escort were damaged and, together
with a number of ships in the convoy, have returned to Iceland (C).
Mediterranean.
4. H.M. Submarine Una sank a 7,000-ton transport south of Messina on
the 5th.
ELM. Cruiser Penelope, which had been damaged in recent air raids at Malta,
arrived at Gibraltar on the 10th. She was repeatedly attacked by aircraft
whilst on passage, but only suffered slight damage.
I n air raids on Malta during the week H.M. Destroyer Kingston was sunk
in dock and H.M. Destroyer Lance was further damaged. An immense amount of
damage has been done on the island, and among familiar landmarks which have
been destroyed or seriously damaged are both Admiralty Houses (at Valetta and
Vittoriosa), St. Angelo, the Customs House, the Castille, St. Paul's Cathedral,
the Opera House and the great dome of the church at Musta. The Rinella
wireless station and the Naval Canteen were also hit, and minor damage was
caused in H.M. Dockyard.
I n an air raid on Alexandria during the night of 7th/8th sheds containing
torpedo and electrical workshops and naval and victualling stores were damaged.
During the week 28,733 tons of French shipping eastbound and 14,325 tons
westbound have passed through the Straits of Gibraltar under escort.
East Indies.
5. On the 1st April, H.M. Submarine Truant sank two ships, probably
empty troop transports, of about 6,000-7,000 tons, at the northern end of the
Malacca Straits.
H.M. I ndian Sloop Indus was sunk by enemy aircraft off Fakir Point, Burma,
on the 6th. There were about 15 casualties.
On the 12th, 40 ships, estimated to average 5,000 tons, were sighted by our
aircraft in the Rangoon area.
Our two main forces, which had been operating in company in the vicinity
-of Ceylon, have arrived at Mombasa and Bombay respectively.
Pacific.
6. American submarines operating in Far Eastern Waters are reported
to have sunk a destroyer, a transport, a 7,000-ton merchant ship and a submarine
chaser, in addition to the vessels reported sunk last week in the vicinity of the
Carolines.
I n an attack by American aircraft on a J apanese force at Rabaul, on the 11th,
a hit and two near misses were claimed on an aircraft-carrier. The carrier was
observed at sea on the 12th proceeding to the north-westward at high speed.
7. On the 14th the American Destroyer Roper sank a U-boat 50 miles
N.N.E. of Cape Hatteras. 29 bodies were picked up. On the 15th a U-boat was
sunk 450 miles N.W. of Cape Finisterre by H.M. Sloop Stork and H.M. Corvette
Vetch, which were escorting an outward-bound convoy to Gibraltar. H.M. Sub-
marine P. 37 possibly torpedoed a U-boat N.N.E. of the ShetLands on the 14th.
Two other attacks were made during the week by surface craft off Halifax and
Iceland (C) and six were made by aircraft, two of which were in the "West
Atlantic and four to the west and south-west of Ireland, but in no case was there
evidence of destruction.
Enemy Intelligence.
German.
8. There is no change in the position of main units.
There are indications that a raider is now in the South Atlantic.
U-boats.
9. The main concentration has continued to be in the West Atlantic. Two
U-boats, probably I talian, have operated off the north coast of Brazil and one or
two in the Freetown area. A number have also been operating in Northern Waters
on our convoy route to North Russia.
is believed to be about 20.
The total number based in Northern Norway
*
Japanese.
10. A J apanese force, including heavy ships, was seen in position 100 miles
south of Ceylon on a westerly course on the 15th. Otherwise there has been no
evidence of enemy forces in the I ndian Ocean other than U-boats.
11. During the week ending the 15th April, 913 ships, including 238 Allied
and 22 neutral, have been convoyed. Three cruisers, three anti-aircraft ships,
92 destroyers (including 13 American and two Russian) and 105 sloops, corvettes
and minesweepers were employed on escort duties.
During March, 450 ships have arrived in the United Kingdom in 19 ocean
convoys without loss from enemy action.
Imports into the United Kingdom by ships in convoy during the week ending
11th April totalled 424,000 tons compared with 606,000 tons during the previous
seven days and an average of 629,000 tons for the past ten weeks. Of the week's
imports 160,000 tons were oil of various grades. There was, in addition, one
shipload of special Government cargo.
12. According to the information at present available 25 ships, including
13 tankers, have been attacked by U-boats during the week, 18 in the West
Atlantic and West Indies, four off the north coast of Brazil, two, in convoy from
Murmansk, in the Barents Sea and one off the Liberian coast: of these 15 are
known to have been sunk. Three ships have been sunk by J apanese aircraft off
Ceylon, one ship in the home-bound convoy from Murmansk was bombed and
sunk off the North Cape and two ships at Malta and one off Port Said have been
seriously damaged by bombs. One ship in a coastal convoy was sunk by- a mine
off Yarmouth.
In addition information has now
:
been received that ten ships were sunk by
enemy action and a number of others attacked in the Bay of Bengal during the
preceding week.
Shipping losses from enemy action in March, so far reported, were 136 ships
totalling 642,014 tons, details of which are given in Appendix I. This includes
the loss of 42 tankers totalling 289,000 tons, of which 12 were British,
13 American, 11 Dutch, four Norwegian and two Panamanian. This is the
highest monthly figure since the beginning of the war and delayed reports are
likely to increase it. The previous highest figure was 624,000 tons in April 1941*
which included the losses incurred during the evacuation from Greece and Crete-
88 ships, totalling 525,851 tons, were sunk by U-boats, mainly off the West
Atlantic seaboard and in the Caribbean Sea. Only five ships were sunk by mines
and eight by aircraft attack. The losses shown under other causes include ships
believed to have been sunk or captured by the J apanese during the evacuation
from the Dutch East Indies. During the month approximately 124,000 tons of
shipping has been seriously damaged by enemy action, of which 74,000 tons were
British and 50,000 Allied.
British Minelaying.
13. During the week mines were laid by surface craft in the East Coast
Barrier, off the Flemish coast, in the Bay of Biscay, and off the southern
Norwegian coast. There has also been considerable minelaying by aircraft in the
Heligoland Bight area.
14. Minelaying by enemy aircraft on a considerable scale has taken place
on five nights during the week. On some occasions between 30 and 40 aircraft
have been employed. Mines were laid off the coast between Cromer and Dover,
particularly off Harwich, and may have also been laid off Flamborough Head.
-boats were probably minelaying when they were attacked off Lowestoft, as
previously reported, on the night of the llth/12th.
Mines were also laid in the harbour of Murmansk during a recent air raid.
* 22 magnetic and two acoustic mines have been destroyed during the week.
The mine totals are 1,088 magnetic, 1,260 acoustic, and 1,116 moored.
MI LI TARY SITUATION.
(An outline map showing operations in Russia is included in this Resume as
an inset.)
15. That part of the German 16th Army which is beleaguered in the area
around Staraya Russa continues to receive supplies by air.
Central Sector.
16. Local Russian attacks and German counter-attacks continue without
resulting in any noteworthy territorial change.
Ukraine,
17. North and south of Kursk the front remains quiet, but east of Kharkov
there has been a small German advance. Elsewhere the situation is unchanged.
Crimea.
18. Russian attacks on the Kerch Peninsula have not effected any change.
Summary.
19. Operations, which are local in character, are probably being impeded by
the thaw. The Russians are attacking wherever possible in an effort to prevent
the Germans from disengaging for rest and refitting. In the Crimea there are
signs of greater activity.
Libya.
20. On the 8th April our forward columns attacked parties from the enemy
columns who had advanced and were digging opposite the centre of the front.
We captured 165 Italians, including five Officers, and four enemy tanks were
burned out.
21. By next day enemy activity had become more pronounced on our
southern flank, but on the 10th activity decreased. Since then the enemy has
maintained his positions in the centre, in the areas of Sidi Breghisc and Segnali
(39 miles south-east of Mekili), but has withdrawn a little between Bir Temrad
and the coast and also on the southern flank. Patrol activity on our side has
increased.
On the 13th, three of our columns were in action in the area south-west of"
our defensive positions. We raided an Italian strong point in the Segnali area,
inflicting casualties without loss to ourselves.
The following day an enemy force including tanks and self-propelled guns
attacked one of our forward columns six miles east of Eluet el Aggara. We
knocked out two enemy tanks and damaged five others but one of our " I " tanks
was knocked out and five further tanks and three anti-tank guns are missing.
The main enemy M.T. concentration is now in the area seven miles north of
Segnali.
Burma.
Irrawaddy Front.
22. On the 9th our forces withdrew northwards, covering the line of the
road Magwe-Taungwingyi-Satthwa.
On the 10th two enemy columns moved up from Prome towards Satthwa and
the village of Migyaungye. Contact was made next day and heavy fighting
ensued. Further south a third column was reported at Sinbaungwe.
Early on the 13th the enemy captured Migyaungye with strong pressure along
a wide front, which caused a wide gap between this front and our forces at
Taungwingyi who maintained their positions to protect the Chinese right flank.
On the 14th enemy infiltration threatened to outflank our I rrawaddy position
through this gap but by the 16th we had established a position astride the
Yinchaung.
Sittang Front.
23. After a lull on this front on the 11th and 12th, the J apanese strongly
attacked the Chinese at Swa. The latter suffered about 1,200 casualties and were
forced to withdraw some five miles up the main road to Thagaya. On the 14th
severe fighting took place at Thagaya and the Chinese estimate casualties at
three to one in their favour.
To the east, an enemy column reached Mawchi on the 9th, and on the 14th
fighting was reported further east between Kemapyu and Pazang with heavy
casualties on both sides. The Chinese are now in a position further north six miles
south of Bawlake. A small enemy party approaching from the west got astride
the Bawlake-Loikaw Road on the evening of the 13th, but was wiped out.
Netherlands East Indies.
24. Dutch refugees from Celebes report that on 17th March the J apanese
were holding Macassar, Pare Pare, Palopa and Kendari, but not in any great
force.
New Guinea Area.
25. J apanese forces (estimated at 300-500) landed at Lorungau (Manus
Island) on 7th April.
One of our patrols reports that the J apanese have not penetrated more than
two miles up the Markham Valley (Lae).
Solomon Islands.
26. On 13th April it was reported that there were 100 J apanese on Faisi
and Lofang Islands (Bougainville Straits).
Australia,
27. - President Roosevelt stated on 8th April that there were 63,000 American
troops in Australia.
Intelligence.
France and the Low Countries.
28. There are signs that, since the raid on St. Nazaire, the Germans have
become increasingly preoccupied with coastal defences, particularly in south-west
France whence a number of defensive precautions have been reported. A further
division is believed to have been transferred from France to Russia. The
estimated total of divisions is now 25 in France and three m the Low Countries.
Norway and Denmark.
29. Fresh evidence has been received of a movement of troops and stores
from Germany to Norway. There is nothing to indicate, however, that the rein-
forcements are for other than defensive purposes and the estimated total of
German divisions in Norway remains at eight, with two more in Denmark.
AIR SITUATION.
General Review.
30. Heavy raids were carried out by our bombers on the Essen and
Dortmund areas. A small force attacked targets in Northern Italy.
Fighter Command operated on a large scale over Northern France.
The Grand Harbour and aerodromes in Malta were heavily bombed.
United Kingdom.
31. Fighter Command flew 4,022 sorties by day and 428 by night.
32. Enemy activity against this country was again on a small scale and
consisted mainly of coastal operations. Thirty enemy aircraft flew overland by
day and 29 by night.
Day.
33. Fighter and Bomber Commands despatched 1,713 and 37 offensive
sorties respectively.
34. Bostons of Bomber Command attacked targets in Northern France. At
Hazebrouck railway centre, several fires were started among the sheds. A hit
was claimed on Mondeville Power Station, near Caen, and numerous bursts were
also seen on railway lines and factories. Bombs were dropped at Cherbourg
docks and on a railway line nearby. Hurricane bombers attacked Desvres aero-
drome and the railway between Marck and Gravelines.
35. In support of these operations and in large-scale sweeps a total of
148 Fighter Squadron sorties were flown. Enemy re-action varied. Some opera-
tions were vigorously opposed by large numbers of fighters. During others,
opposition was not of a determined nature, and in some instances no hostile air-
craft appeared. Eighteen enemy fighters were destroyed, 13 probably destroyed,
and 36 damaged. We lost 27 Spitfires (four pilots safe) and one Boston.
Night.
36. Bomber Command despatched 1,020 sorties against land targets,
compared with 834 last week. Sea mining is reported under " Coastal
Operations." A total of 620 tons of H.E. bombs (including 60 4,000 lbs.)
and 161.184 incendiaries were dropped. The principal objectives were Essen and
Dortmund, both of which were attacked on two nights, in cloudy weather which
obscured ground detail and made precise observation difficult.
37. The aircraft detailed to attack Essen dropped a total of 418 tons of
HE . and incendiaries. There were several reports of a particularly large
explosion in the centre of the target and a hit w,as claimed on Krupp's Works
and adjacent sheds. A t Dortmund, over 290 tons of H.E. and incendiaries were
released and numerous fires, some of which appeared to be of considerable size,
were reported.
33. Havre was bombed on four nights, and sticks of bombs were seen to
straddle the docks. A successful attack was also carried out on St. Nazaire.
39. A small scale raid by home-based Whitleys was made against Genoa on
one night. The target was obscured by heavy cloud but seven aircraft dropped
bombs on the estimated position and others located and bombed Turin.
40. Forty-one of our bombers failed to return from the above operations.
Two enemy aircraft were. destroyed, a third probably destroyed and another
damaged.
41. Fighter Command despatched 37 sorties to patrol and attack aerodromes
in France and Holland.
Coastal Operations.
42. Coastal Command flew 503 sorties, of which 64 sorties were on convoy
escort. Shipping protection provided by Fighter Command involved 1,248 sorties.
43. Bomber Command despatched a total of 84 aircraft on sea-mining
operations off the Frisian Islands, Heligoland, Horns Eeef and St. Nazaire, and
118 mines were successfully laid.
44. Aircraft of Coastal Command continued to attack enemy shipping,
and carried out routine and special patrols. Hudsons claim four hits on a
medium-sized vessel off the coast of Norway, and two hits are believed to have
been made on a large tanker beached off Ameland.
45. Spitfires of Fighter Command damaged a motor barge off Dunkirk and a
vessel off Gravelines.
46. Enemy minelaying was suspected off the East Coast on several nights.
Anti-shipping operations took place on one night, when a convoy was unsuccess
fully attacked off Yarmouth.
Mediterranean.
Libya and Egypt.
47. Our fighters maintained their offensive activities in the forward area
of Cyrenaica and provided protection for shipping off the eoast. Twenty enemy
dive-bombers escorted by fighters, were intercepted off Tobruk by seven
Tomahawks and forced to jettison their bombs. Three enemy aircraft were
destroyed and another was damaged. Five Tomahawks were lost, but two pilots
are safe.
48. The quays and shipping at Benghazi were attacked by Wellingtons on
three nights of the week, and mines were laid in the harbour.
49. Five enemy fighters attacked the landing ground at El Adem, and
destroyed a Kittyhawk on the ground. One enemy fighter was destroyed and
another was probably destroyed by our fighters.
50. Two J u. 88s on reconnaissance off Alexandria were shot down by our
fighters and two others were damaged.
Malta.
51. Enemy attacks on Malta were again on a heavy scale, involving more
than 850 sorties. The aerodromes and Grand Harbour were the main objectives.:
52. The damage caused at Grand Harbour is reported in the Naval Section.
The aerodromes were hit on several occasions, and Hal Far and Takali
were rendered temporarily unserviceable. Fifteen of our aircraft were destroyed
on the ground and eight others were damaged. Service buildings and M.T.
vehicles were also damaged. There was considerable damage to civilian property.
53. Our fighters destroyed seven aircraft, probably destroyed another, and
damaged 14. Anti-aircraft guns destroyed 22, probably destroyed three, and
damaged 12. We lost four Hurricanes, the pilots of which are safe.
Italy and Sicily.
54. Aircraft from Malta carried out reconnaissances of aerodromes and
harbours in Sicily and Southern Italy and of the Tunisian coast.
Crete.
55. "Wellingtons and Blenheims from Egypt attacked aerodromes in Crete
on three nights.
Sea Communications.
56. On the 14th, eight Beauforts with fighter escort attacked with torpedoes
a southbound enemy convoy of four merchant vessels and four destroyers 100 miles
south-east of Malta. Results were not observed, but explosions were heard among
the ships. Two Me. 110s were shot down over the convoy by our fighters.
Five Beauforts and a shadowing Blenheim were lost whilst proceeding to
Malta after this attack.
Russia.
57. The German Air Force is becoming increasingly active in the Crimea.
Ceylon.
58. Later reports of the operations on the 9th (reported in last week's
Resume), indicate that the attack on Trincomalee was carried out by 54 bombers,
escorted by 40 fighters. Enemy casualties during this raid and during the attack
on the J apanese naval force are now given as 18 aircraft destroyed, 12 more
probably destroyed and two damaged.
Andaman Islands.
59. Two Hudsons attacked 13 flying boats in Port Blair Harbour; one was
left sinking, two were set on fire and the rest were damaged.
Burma.
60. In support of our troops on the Irrawaddy Front, our bombers raided
enemy concentrations at Nyaungbintha (20 miles north of Allanmyo) and
Singbaungwe (15 miles further north). Three enemy aircraft were destroyed on
Toungoo aerodrome during an attack by P. 40s of the A.V.G.
61. Loiwing aerodrome was machine-gunned by J apanese fighters and one
transport aircraft was damaged on the ground; P. 40s destroyed 11 of the 20
raiders. Two days later, in a surprise attack, five P. 40s were damaged on the
aerodrome, but, when the attack was renewed, P. 40s and Hurricanes (of which
two are missing) brought down seven enemy aircraft.
Enemy bombers carried out numerous raids over the forward area. Mawkmai
suffered severely. Damage was also caused at Thazi, Pyinmana, Ywadaw,
Taunggyi and Kentung, where civilian casualties were heavy. The bazaar area at
Pyawbwe was extensively damaged. Meiktila town and landing ground were
attacked daily.
Pacific Zone.
62. Allied aircraft attacked shipping in Rabaul Harbour; a merchant
vessel was hit and the wharf and buildings are believed to have been damaged.
Two enemy fighters were shot down. At least eight bombers and a fighter were
claimed as destroyed on Vunakanau aerodrome, where several large fires among
buildings were started. Three J apanese fighters were damaged on Lae aerodrome
and fires resulted from an attack on the aerodrome and barracks at Koepang.
63. Seven J apanese bombers escorted by six fighters caused slight damage
at Seven Miles aerodrome, Port Moresby. One enemy bomber and one enemy
fighter were probably destroyed by P. 40s.' Five enemy flying-boats raided Tulagi
and Gavatu (Solomon Islands) and some buildings were damaged.
Philippines.
64. Headquarters, Melbourne, issued the following report to the Press :
On the 13th and 14th, Allied aircraft attacked targets in the Philippines. At
Davoa (S. Mindanao) two transports were hit (one of which probably sank) and
docks and warehouses were destroyed. At Cebu, three transports were sunk, two
others were hit. and considerable damage was caused to a dock. At Batangas
(Luzon) a cargo ship was sunk. I n these operations 4 J apanese aircraft were
shot down and 2 damaged, another was destroyed and several damaged on the
ground. One Allied bomber was lost (crew safe).
Australia.
65. No reports of enemy air activity have been received during the week.
HOME SECURITY SI TUATI ON.
General.
By Day.
66. There were two minor incidents. On the 9th April Worthing was
bombed. Some damage was caused to a hospital and a gasometer was set on fire.
Two people were killed. On the 13th slight damage was done to a few houses at
Portland and Weymouth.
By Night.
67. Grimsby was bombed on the night of the 13th/ 14th. Thirteen people
were killed and 28 seriously injured and a number of houses were destroyed. Some
houses were also wrecked at Hull and four people were killed and a few injured.
There were other incidents of a minor nature mostly in the Humber area.
On the' 15th/16th 25 people were killed and 52 seriously injured at Middles-
brough. Public utility services were affected, some roads were blocked and houses
damaged, and there were a few small fires. Damage was also caused at Saltburn
and Skelton in the North Riding, but there were no casualties.
Casualties.
68. Estimated civilian casualties for the week ending 0600 the 15th April
are 20 killed and 33 seriously injured. '
Merchant Vessels (excluding Commissioned Merchant Vessels) of all tonnages
lest by enemy action during the month of March 1942.
Table I showing the division of losses into cause and nationality.
Ot he r Ca us e s
Surf ace
Submar i ne . Mi ne . Ai rcraf t . and Ca us e
Total.,
Craft.
Un k n o wn .
Fl ag.
No .
Gros s
Tons .
No.
Gr os s
To ns .
No .
Gr os s
To ns .
No .
Gr os s
Tons .
No .
Gr os s
To ns .
No.
Gross
Tonal
British 26 ! 169, 683 . 4 12, 328 9 5 1 21, 106 11 5, 196
46 ] 209,261;
Al l i e d -
Belgian ... 9 1 1
Du t c h . . . 4, 534 19 ! 59, 513 25
31, 476 i 1
95,523
Greek ... 2 170 3
10,995
10, 825
Nor we gi an 11 793 3, 060 13 62,392
58, 539
Pa na ma ni a n 4 4, 815 5
26, 417
31,232
Uni t e d St a t e s 33
196, 974
5 2 2 34 197,496
Ot her Al l i es 6 2, 815 30,224.
27, 409
Sub- Tot al of Al l i ed l os s e s 6 1 1351, 640 4, 534 2, 815 5, 699 22 ! 63, 265 427,953
Neut ral c ount r i e s * 4, 528 269 4,797
1
Tot al 8 8 ; 525, 851
;
5 : 16, 862 3, 766 136 642, 011
27, 074 I 33 ! 68, 461
l
Table II showing the division of losses into cause and area.
Ot her Ca us e s
Sur f ac e
Subma r i ne . Mi ne . Ai rcraf t . and Caus e Tot al .
Craft.
Un k n o wn .
Area.
No .
Gr os s
Tons .
No .
Gr os s
Tons .
No .
Gros s
Tons .
No.
Gros s
Tons .
No .
Gr os s
Tons .
No.
Gr os s
To ns .
Atlantic . . . 8 3 500, 208 85 502, 234
2 I 2, 026
Far Ea s t and Pac i f i c
( excl udi ng I ndi a n
Ocean We s t of 1 0 0
o
East ) 2 17, 473 30 63, 658 3 2 81, 131
Indian Oc e a n ( We s t of
100
o
Ea s t ) 2 1, 749 2 4, 633 4 6, 382
Medi terranean 1 7. 255 1 170 2 7, 425
United Ki ng do m Coas t al
Wat ers . . . 12, 328 9 5 1 7 14, 163
2 884 J
El sewhere 6, 421 4, 534 2, 815 6 30, 679
3 I 16, 909
Tot al 8 8 525, 851 16, 862 3, 766 8 ! 27, 074 33 68, 461 136 642, 014
I ndi an Oc e an, for t he pur pos e of t hi s t abl e, i s t a ke n t o be t he s ea area We s t f rom 1 0 0
Q
Ea s t ; l o s s e s i n t he
rest of t he I ndi a n Oc e a n t o Ea s t of 1 0 0
o
Ea s t are i nc l ude d i n Par Ea s t and Paci f i c.
Table 3 showing the losses inflicted on ocean and coastal convoys during March.
Nu mb e r Lo s t . Pe r c e nt a g e Los t .
Nu mb e Nu mb e rr
Con Con--
v o y e d. v o y e d. '' - Sub- Sur f ac e Ai r- Sub- Sur f ac e Ai r-
Mi ne . Tot al . Mi ne . Tot al .
mar i ne . Craft. craf t . mar i ne . Craf t . craf t .
Ocean c o nv o y s 9 3 9 1
".'\
1 - 11 - 1 1
Coastal c o nv o y s 3, 253
3
1 1 - 09 - 03 - 0 3 - 15 5
' '
4, 192 1 3 1 1 6 - 02 - 07 - 0 2 - 0 2
- 13
Total Losses by Enemy Action and Marine Causes of Merchant Ships, including Tankers
other than Merchant Ships commissioned for Naval Service.
(Including vessels of all tonnages for losses by enemy action and vessels of 100 gross tons
and over for losses by marine causes.)
A.British, Allied and Neutral Losses.
Tot al .
Br i t i s h. Al l i ed. Ne ut r al .
Mo nt hs .
Tho us a nds Tho us a nds Tho us a nds
Thousands
No . of Gros s No. of Gros s No . of Gros s No.
of Gross
Tons . Tons . Tons .
Tons.
1 9 3 9 -
S e p t e mb e r - De c e mb e r 317 929 158 498 9 0 142
341
(4 mo nt hs )
1 9 4 0 -
J a nua r y - Ma r c h 297 800 111 352 13 36 412
( 3 mo nt hs )
Apr i l - J une . . . 313 1, 038 153 469 66 326 9 4 243
( 3 mo nt hs )
J u l y - S e p t e mb e r . . . 348 1, 332 211 925 56 211 8 1 196
( 3 mo nt hs )
Oc t o be r - De c e mbe r
365 1, 337 255 981 60 2 3 4 50 122
( 3 mo nt hs )
1 9 4 1 -
Januar y
92 388 54 222 29 153 9 13
Fe br ua r y 137 461 9S 3 5 9 24 75 15 27
Mar c h 154 568 101 3 7 4 37 147 16 If 47
Apri l 167 662 84 3 6 4 69 248 14 50
Ma y 138 536 96 392 24 106 18 38
J une . . . 122 451 65 2 8 0
35 143 2 2 28
Jul y 58 144 43 108
6 2 4
9 12
Au g u s t 65 158 43
110
10 3 4
12 14
Se pt e mbe r . . . 110 338 76
254
14 46
20 I 38
Oct ober 67 233 41
160
17 58
9
15
No v e mbe r . . . 62 183 38
117
10 33
1 4
33
De c e mb e r . . . 166 459
100 247
54 181
12
31
1 9 4 2 -
J a nua r y
123 480 60 2 1 2 56 253 7
15
Fe br ua r y 130 656 56 307 72 332 2
17
Mar c h
151 682 55 231 9 4 4 4 6 2
5
3, 382 11, 835 1, 898 6, 962 763 3, 176 721
1,697
9
f* l
i *)
h
B.Losses analysed by cause.
( I n Th o u s a n d s of Gr os s Tons . )
00
Mo nt hs Mo nt hs ..
1939 1939
S e p t e mb e r - De c e mb e S e p t e mb e r - De c e mb e rr
((44 mo nt hs mo nt hs ))
1940 1940
Januar y- Mar c Januar y- Mar c hh . . . . ..
Apr i l - Jun Apr i l - Junee
J u l y - S e p t e mb e J u l y - S e p t e mb e rr
Oc t o be r - De c e mbe Oc t o be r - De c e mbe rr
. . . . ..
Tot al Tot al ..
929
800
1, 038
1, 332
1, 337
Tot al .
743
524
935
1, 246
1, 151
i , S u b -
! mar i ne .
i -
421
291
346
770
690
E n e my
Mi ne .
2 5 8
169
154
54
133
Ac t i o n.
Sur -
r
f ac e
,,
craf t .
57
74
231
2 1 9
j
. .
Ai r-
,,
craf t ,
! .
1
:
."''V' '
:
" %* 1;
3
33
250
179
89
Ot he r
Ca us e s
or
Ca us e
Un -
kno wn.
4
3 1
111
12
2 0
Mar i ne Ri s k.
Tot al
Over-
due
pre-
s u me d
l os t . *
Ot he r
Caus e s -
t
1
j 186
276
103
86
186
j 12
!*.
44
8]
20
19
174
2 3 2
95
6 6
167
1 9 4 1 1 9 4 1 --
Januar Januaryy . . . . ..
'. - '
388
313 125 17 94 77 75 67
Februar Februaryy . . . . ..
461
372 184 16 8 2 90 .. . S9 " 3 1 58
Marc Marchh . . . . .. . . . . ..
568
535 234 23 163 113 2 33 10 23
Apri Aprill
662
624 240 25 4 8 294 17 38
. 10 28
Ma Mayy
536
501 331 23
15 132 . . . 35 . . . 35
JJun unee
Jul Jul yy
.. .. ..
. . . . ..
. . . . ..
451
144
418
119
292
92
14
9
-t O
i o
6
66
9
2 8
3
33
25
18
2
15
2 3
Augus Augus tt
158
130 80 1
25
24 28 1 27
Se pt e mbe Se pt e mbe rr
' 338
278 205 15
15
41 2 60 1 5 9
Oct obe Oct oberr
233
205 152 14
3
35 1 28 8 2 0
No v e mbe r . . No v e mbe r . . ..
183
104 62 2
17
23 79 32 47
De c e mb e r . . De c e mb e r . . ..
459
410 105 64
6
31 2 0 4 49 11 3 8
1 9 4 2 1 9 4 2 --
Januar Januaryy
Februar Februaryy
Marc Marchh
.. .. ..
. . . . ..
TT
; ;
. . . . ..
480
656
682
11, 835
355
594
642
10, 199
293
416
526
5, 855
-
10
19
17
1, 037
-
3
12
4
1, 092
35
113
27
1, 664
1*1Cl
14
3 4
6 8
551
125
62
40
1, 636
27
22
1
285
9 8
40
39
1, 351
* S o me of t h e s e l o s s e s ma y e v e nt ua l l y be he l d t o be d u e t o e n e my ac t i on,
f I nc l udi ng l os s e s d u e to v e s s e l s r unni ng o n Br i t i s h mi n e s .
Appendix III (1) will be inserted in a subsequent R6sume\
(2) Merchant Ships (100 gross tons and over) under construction in the United
Kingdom as at 31st March, 1942.
Tankers . Ot hers .
No. Gross t ons . No. Gr os s t ons .
Coas t i n Coas t i ngg s hi p s hi pss an andd col l i er col l i erss . . . . .. 8 5, 000 12 19, 000
Ot he Ot herr s hi p s hi pss
39 332, 000 168* 860, 000
Tot a Tot all 47 337, 000 180 879, 000
* I nc l udi ng 10 s hi ps ( 6, 000 gros s t ons ) of Me r c ha nt t y pe i nt e nde d for Na v a l us e.
I n addition the following merchant ships are on order in the United
Kingdom and abroad :
Tanke r s . Ot hers .
No. Gros s t ons . No. Gr os s t ons .
Uni t e Uni t e dd Ki ng do Ki ng do mm 19 125, 000 9 9 f 425, 000
Canad Canadaa an andd Uni t e Uni t e dd St a t e St a t e ss . . . . .. 67$ 483, 000
Tot a Tot all 19 125, 000 166 903, 000
f I nc l udi ng- 7 ve s s e l s ( 3, 000 gros s t ons ) bui l di ng for t he Na v y .
$ So me of t he s e ve s s e l s are al ready under c ons t r uc t i on but de t ai l s are not avai l abl e.
APPENDIX IY.
This will be inserted in a subsequent Resume.
APPENDIX Y.
The following casualties to H.M. Auxiliary Vessels have been reported :
April 10.H.M. Trawler Jade and H.M. Drifter Ploughboy damaged
in an air attack at Malta.
April 10/11.--H.M. Minesweepers Hebe and Speedy, A/S Trawlers
Northern Pride, Northern Wave and Duncton and the Armed Boarding
Vessel Lord Austin damaged in ice to the N.E. of Iceland (C).
April 11.H.M. Trawler St. Cathan sunk in collision off South
Carolina.
April 13.H.M. Trawler Lord Snowden sunk in collision off Fowey.
April 14.H.M. Minesweeping Trawler Remeso slightly damaged by
bombs off Grimsby.
The following casualties to naval personnel have been reported : -
Officers : Killed 22; wounded 4; missing 2.
Ratings: Killed 142; wounded 13; missing 35.
Provisional operational aircraft battle casualties compiled from reports received
between dawn, Thursday, 9th April, 1942, and dawn, Thursday, 16th April,
1942.
Metropolitan Area.
Bo mbe r s . . . 49
Fi ght e r s . . . 29
Coas t al . . . 6
Ar my Co- Ope r at i on
Tot al 84
Fi v e pi l ot s s af e.
Enemy.
Bo mbe r s
Fi ght e r s
Destroyed.
18
3
Probably
Destroyed.
13
1
Damaged.
4
3 5 .
To t a l 21 14 3 9
British.
Bo mbe r s . .
Fi ght e r s ..
Ot hers . .
11
18
1
11
4
1
.
Tot al . . . 30 16
Twe l v e pi l ot s and t wo c r e ws are s af e.
Probably
Enemy. Destroyed. Destroyed. Damaged.
Bo mb e r s . . . 3 0 3 2 1
Fi ght e r s . . . 1 4 2 1 3
Tot al 4 4 3 4
Of t he a b o v e t ot al s , t we nt y- f i ve we r e de s t r oye d, t hr e e pr obabl y de s t r oye d,
and f o ur t e e n d a ma g e d by A. A. fire.
Far East.
Bo mb e r s . . . 7
Fi ght ers . . . . 9
Mi s c e l l a ne o us 4
Total 20
Fo ur pi l ot s a nd one c r e w are s af e .
Enemy.
Bo mb e r s . . .
Fi ght e r s
Destroyed.
' V
29
1 4
Probably
Destroyed
14
Damaged.
9
2
Tot al 45 24 1 1
NOTES. ( a) No a c c o unt i s t a ke n of e n e my ai rcraf t de s t r o y e d on t he gr ound in a ny t he at r e
(b) No a c c o u n t i s t ake n of Br i t i s h Na v a l ai rcraf t c as ual t i e s .
i
Germany.
Lubeck.-Photographs taken on 12th April, 1942, reveal that approximately
45 per cent, to 50 per cent, of the city has been totally destroyed (this does not
include the suburbs). The following constitute the chief points of major
damage :
Most of the damage appears to have been done by fire, although there is
evidence of a number of direct hits by H.E., including probable 4,000-lb.
incidents.
Among the important buildings seen destroyed or very severely damaged
are the Cathedral, the Cathedral Museum, the Reichsbank, the Central Electric
Station, the Stadt Halle and a number of churches. The Main Railway Station
(at Lorenz) has suffered some damage from fire.
I n the residential suburb of Lorenz, in the neighbourhood of the Main
Railway Station, there has been a very large amount of total destruction by fire
to houses in a fully built-up area.
Severe damage has occurred to warehouses in the harbour and railway station
to the north-west.
A transport firm who usually routed their goods through Lubeck have been
informed by their agents that they are unable to handle any further goods
despatched and these should be diverted to Bremen or Hamburg.
Cologne.The raid on 5th/6th April was more severe than that of 13th/14th
March. The greater part of the Rhine harbour was destroyed together with the
railway approaches thereto. I t is said that the debris in this district will take
these works have been seriously damaged both by fire and H.E. The damage is
some weeks to clear.
damage.
In addition over 400 buildings suffered varying degrees of
Occupied France.
Poissy: Matford Works.Photographs taken on 10th April, 1942, show that
confined almost entirely to the target and factories immediately to the south and
south-west, although there are a few incidents of damage to residential property
in the district. The outstanding points of damage are as follows:-
Parts of the assembly, presses, spraying, enamelling, bodywork and upholstery
shops have been severely damaged by fire and blast.
The offices have been hit at the south-west end, and discolouration by fire or
blast is evident over the whole length.
A heavy bomb, possibly 4,000 lb., has fallen on the machine-tool workshops,
the roof having been destroyed over an area about 160 ft. square. Very serious
damage to the interior of the workshops has undoubtedly been caused by blast
The store for raw materials and half-finished parts has been hit at the south-
west end.
A near miss has destroyed approximately 55 ft. of the wall bordering the
transformers on the north-east side.
Though damage to the transformers cannot be confirmed from the photo-
graphs, it is almost certain that they will have sustained damage from blast or
flying debris.
Two blocks of workmen's dwellings have been totally destroyed.
Shed-type buildings to the north-east of the main building have been
damaged.
There is little doubt that the Matford Works has been very seriously
damaged, although it is not possible at this stage to say definitely that the works
will be permanently out. of commission. A number of factories near the main
works have been hit, but as they have not yet been identified it is not possible to
assess the effect of the damage caused.
i
Germany.
Lubeck.-Photographs taken on 12th April, 1942, reveal that approximately
45 per cent, to 50 per cent, of the city has been totally destroyed (this does not
include the suburbs). The following constitute the chief points of major
damage :
Most of the damage appears to have been done by fire, although there is
evidence of a number of direct hits by H.E., including probable 4,000-lb.
incidents.
Among the important buildings seen destroyed or very severely damaged
are the Cathedral, the Cathedral Museum, the Reichsbank, the Central Electric
Station, the Stadt Halle and a number of churches. The Main Railway Station
(at Lorenz) has suffered some damage from fire.
I n the residential suburb of Lorenz, in the neighbourhood of the Main
Railway Station, there has been a very large amount of total destruction by fire
to houses in a fully built-up area.
Severe damage has occurred to warehouses in the harbour and railway station
to the north-west.
A transport firm who usually routed their goods through Lubeck have been
informed by their agents that they are unable to handle any further goods
despatched and these should be diverted to Bremen or Hamburg.
Cologne.The raid on 5th/6th April was more severe than that of 13th/14th
March. The greater part of the Rhine harbour was destroyed together with the
railway approaches thereto. I t is said that the debris in this district will take
these works have been seriously damaged both by fire and H.E. The damage is
some weeks to clear.
damage.
In addition over 400 buildings suffered varying degrees of
Occupied France.
Poissy: Mat ford Works.Photographs taken on 10th April, 1942, show that
confined almost entirely to the target and factories immediately to the south and
south-west, although there are a few incidents of damage to residential property
in the district. The outstanding points of damage are as follows:-
Parts of the assembly, presses, spraying, enamelling, bodywork and upholstery
shops have been severely damaged by fire and blast.
The offices have been hit at the south-west end, and discolouration by fire or
blast is evident over the whole length.
A heavy bomb, possibly 4,000 lb., has fallen on the machine-tool workshops,
tJhe roof having been destroyed over an area about 160 ft. square. Very serious
damage to the interior of the workshops has undoubtedly been caused by blast.
The store for raw materials and half-finished parts has been hit at the south-
west end.
A near miss has destroyed approximately 55 ft. of the wall bordering the
transformers on the north-east side.
Though damage to the transformers cannot be confirmed from the photo-
graphs, it is almost certain that they will have sustained damage from blast or
flying debris.
Two blocks of workmen's dwellings have been totally destroyed.
Shed-type buildings to the north-east of the main building have been
damaged.
There is little doubt that the Matford Works has been very seriously
damaged, although it is not possible at this stage to say definitely that the works
will be permanently out. of commission. A number of factories near the main
works have been hit, but as they have not yet been identified it is not possible to
assess the effect of the damage caused.
- " ' -"" W-
.-TS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OP HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT)
S E C R E T ,
i-7. P. (42) 165c COPY NO..
( -BOTH APRIL, 1942c
WAR CABINET. .
POST- V/AR COMMODITY POLICY AND RELIEF.
Note by the Secretary off the War Cabinet.
The annexed Statement describing the organisation
for dealing with Post-war Commodity Policy and Relief, as
recently re-constituted, has "been approved by the Official
Committee on Export Surpluses, and is circulated for
information.
(Signed) E.E. BRIDGES *
Great George Street, S.W.I.,
20th April, 1942.
ANNEX,
As has "been announced in connexion with the recent
Ministerial changes, the Prime Minister has approved an
arrangement whereby the general responsibility in regard to
Export Surpluses .and Allied Post-war Relief, hitherto
entrusted to the Minister without Portfolio, will in future
be exercised by the president of the Board of Trade.
Sir Frederick Leith-Ross, Chief Economic Adviser to
the Government, will continue to direct the organisation
concerned with these questions, which will now be attached
to the Board of Trade instead of to the Ministry of Economic
Warfare.
The functions of the organisation will be, in conjunction
with the other Departments concerned, to keep in review the
world commodity position, with special reference to post-war
aspects; to devise measures for dealing with commodity
surpluses (whether by purchase or otherwise) and for the
orderly disposal of any stocks arising from such purchases;
t o co- or di nat e act i on i n r egar d t o schemes f or t he r egul at i on
of pr oduct i on and mar ket i ng of f oodst uf f s and ot her pr i mar y
commodi t i es whi ch have been or ar e l i kel y t o be i n sur pl us
suppl y; and t o f or mul at e pl ans f or or gani si ng Post - war
Rel i ef and t he di st r i but i on of avai l abl e suppl i es t o Eur ope,
i n conj unct i on wi t h t he I nt er - Al l i ed Commi t t ee and Bur eau.
The I nt er - Depar t ment al Commi t t ee of Of f i ci al s wi l l
cont i nue under t he Chai r manshi p of Si r Fr eder i ck Lei t h- Ross,
and wi l l i n f ut ur e r epor t to, t he pr esi dent of t he Boar d of
Tr ade and t hr ough ai mt o t he Mi ni st er i al Commi t t ee on
Reconst r uct i on pr obl ems. When t he Of f i ci al Commi t t . ee has
r el i ef quest i ons bef or e i t , t he War Of f i ce, Mi ni st r y of Heal t h
and Mi ni st r y of Labour woul d be r epr esent ed.
I n vi ew of t he changes whi ch have t aken pl ace i n t he
commodi t i es si t uat i on, t he t er m"Expor t Sur pl uses" i s no
l onger appr opr i at e and i t has been deci ded t hat t he Depar t ment
and Commi t t ee shoul d i n f ut ur e be descr i bed as deal i ng wi t h
Post - war Commodi t y Pol i cy and Rel i ef .
Al l Depar t ment s are r equest ed t o keep Si r Fr eder i ck
Lei t h- Ross or hi s st af f i nf or med of any act i on cont empl at ed
by t hemwhi ch may have a bear i ng on t he wor k as def i ned above.
/
2
..1&.TTT
( THI S DOCUMENT 13 THE PROPERTY OF HI S BRI TANNI C
1 TY'
GOVERNMENT)
SECRET
W. P. , ( 42)^6
17t h Apr i l 1942 WAR CABI NET
Copy. No. ^j ^L
At t i t ude of I ndi an Nat i onal Congr ess
Memor andum by t he Secr et ar y of St at e, f or J t adi a -
The f ol l owi ng passage f r oma r ecent l et t er f r omNehr u
t o Raj agopal achar i , f or war ded by t he Vi cer oy i n a l et t er of
Febr uar y i 8t h, t hr ows an i nt er est i ng l i ght on t he at t i t ude
of Congr ess l eader s. Af t er expr essi ng hi s di st r ess at some
of Raj agopal achar i ' s speeches suggest i ng a wi l l i ngness t o
cooper at e, t he l et t er cont i nues:
"I shoul d l i ke t o make i t cl ear
t hat
I amnot chal l eng
i ng your r i ght t o say what you have so i d. But a cont i nuous
appr oach t o t he Br i t i sh Gover nment , even t hough t hi s mi ght be
subj ect t o t he condi t i ons l ai d down by t he Congr ess, makes
peopl e t hi nk t hat behi nd al l our r esol ut i ons t her e i s a mor e -
def i ni t e i nvi t at i on to t he Br i t i sh Gover nment and t hat
somet hi ng i n t he nat ur e of a compr omi se i s bei ng wor ked out .
Thi s
appr oach agai n l eads ; opl e t o t he concl usi on t hat some
ar r angement wi l l be an i ved s/t. They do not t her ef or e wor r y
t hemsel ves about
t he or gi
ani sat i onal or t he const r uct i ve
pr ogr amme of t he
ongj
r ess nor do t hey t hi nk much
about
devel opi ng t hei r own st r engt h t o l ead t he cr i si s
ahead. A
f eel i ng of doubt and uncer t ai nt y f i l l s t he mi nds
of peopl e
maki ng. t hem i ncap bl e of ef f ect i ve act i on.
vou t ol d me t hat what ever your wi shes wer e i n t he matter,
yOU Daw ' no chance what ever of any cornpromi " e bet ween t he
Br i t i sh Gover nment and I ndi an nat i onal i sm.
I f t hat i s so
and I
agr ee wi t h you ent i r el y t hat i t i s so, t hen t her e :
no
po i nt
i n emphasi si ng t he desi r abi l i t y of such compr omi se
whi ch
can onl y l ead peopl e
1
s mi nds
ast r ay. i ' or my par t ,
I
t hi nk
i t i s much coo l at e f or any r eal compr omi se t o t ake
pl ace,
f or t he v ry mi ni mum condi t i ons on our par t ar e f a
beyond what t he Br i t i sh Gover nment mi ght do, I t hi nk t her e
can be not hi ng mor e danger ous t han our bei ng saddl ed wi t h
r esponsi bi l i t y wi t hout compl et e power . Compl et e power i s
i nconcei vabl e i n t he pr esent and par t i al power wi l l make our
posi t i on wor se.
"Your r ef er ences t o t he Musl i mLeague mor e r l ess on
same t er ms as t he Congr ess al so seemt o me t o be unhappy,
Th:
f i l l i p t o the dwi ndl i ng f or t unes of t he League
i r r i t at es
: l ar ge numb of Congr essmen and ot her s,
er
"I have vent ur ed t o wr i t e t o you f r ankl y because , 1' know
you wi l l appr eci at e f r ankness on my par t , I have al so of
cour se onl y hi nt ed at what I had i n my mi nd but you wi l l
under st and. "
- The r ef er ence t o "l eadi ng t he cr i si s anGact" ana t o
"onl y hi nt i ng at what I had i n my mi nd" ar e obscur e, but
woul d seem t o suggest some sor t of act i on i ndependent of , i f
not di r ect ed agai nst , t he Gover nment ,
I NDI A OFFI CE, L . i D . A.
17t h Apr i l
1 PA
1
")
Printed for the War Cabinet, Afiril, 1942
MOST SECRET
COPY No.
W. P. (42) 167
18th April, 1942.
TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY
It is requested that special care may be taken to ensure the
secrecy of this document.
WAR CABINET
RELEASE OF* EX- MINERS FROM THE ARMY
MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR
1. At the meeting of the War Cabinet on 10th April, 1942 (Minute 1
Conclusion (v)) I was asked to "furnish particulars of the units of the Field
Force at Home in which ex-miners, whose release was sought, are now serving,
distinguishing in particular between fighting units and ancillary services".
2. I append a table showing, by arms, the numbers of ex-miners serving
in the Field Force at Home on 4th April, 1942, and I have sub-divided these
numbers into the arms commonly regarded as fighting arms and those which
may be termed ancillary arms of the service. I have no information to show
how many of these are face-workers, nor could this be obtained without con-
siderable effort and delay.
I have classified these numbers of ex-miners by arms of the service, and
not by units; there are 3,800 separate units in the Field Force, and in the great
majority of these units the number of ex-miners is under 10, though compara-
tively few have no ex-miners at all.
I am not in a position to relate the figures in the appended table to those in
the lists which my department have so far received from the Mines Department,
and totalling up to nth April, 16,690. These lists classify men by name from
individual collieries, and our experience shows that they are so out-of-date that
the tracing of the men takes a considerable time; in many cases the names are
duplicated, and an appreciable portion are found to have been discharged
from the army during a period stretching back as far as 1928.
P-J .G.
THE WAR OFFICE,
18th April, 1942.
This document is the property of His Britannic Majesty's Government
Printed for the War Cabinet, April, 1942
W. P. (42) 167
iSth April, 1942.
TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY
It is requested that special care may be taken to ensure the
secrecy of this document.
WA R C A B I N E T
RELEASE OF EX-MINERS FROM THE ARMY
ME MOR A N D U M B Y T H E S E C R E T A R Y OF S T A T E F OR WA R
1. At t he me e t i ng of t he Wa r Cabi ne t o n 10th Apri l , 1942 ( Mi nut e 1
Conc l us i on ( v) ) I wa s as ke d to " f urni s h part i cul ars of the uni t s of t he Fi e l d
Fo r c e at Ho me i n whi c h e x- mi ne r s , who s e rel eas e wa s s ought , are n o w s ervi ng,
di s t i ngui s hi ng i n part i cul ar be t we e n f i ght i ng uni t s a nd anc i l l ar y s ervi ces ".
2. I a ppe nd a t abl e s howi ng, by arms , t he numbe r s of e x- mi ne r s s e r vi ng
i n t he Fi e l d Fo r c e at Fl ome o n 4th Apri l , 1942, and I h a v e s ub- di vi de d t hes e
numbe r s i nt o t he ar ms c o mmo n l y regarded as fighting a r ms a nd t hos e whi c h
ma y be t e r me d anci l l ary a r ms of t he s ervi ce. I ha v e n o i nf or mat i on to s ho w
h o w ma n y of t hes e are f ace- workers , nor c oul d thi s be obt ai ne d wi t hout c o n-
s i derabl e effort a n d del ay.
I h a v e cl assi f i ed t hes e numbe r s of e x- mi ne r s b y ar ms of t he s ervi ce, a nd
not b y uni t s ; t here are 3,800 s eparat e uni t s i n t he Fi e l d For c e , a nd i n t he great
maj or i t y of t hes e uni t s t he n u mb e r of e x- mi ne r s is unde r 10, t hough c o mpa r a -
t i ve l y f e w h a v e no e x- mi ne r s at al l .
I a m not i n a pos i t i on to rel at e the figures i n t he a p p e n d e d t abl e t o t hos e i n
t he l i sts whi c h my de par t me nt ha v e so f ar r e c e i ve d f r om the Mi ne s De pa r t me nt ,
a nd t ot al l i ng u p t o n t h Apri l , 16,690. The s e l i st s cl as s i f y me n b y n a me f r om
i ndi vi dual col l i eri es, a nd our e xpe r i e nc e s hows t hat t he y are s o out - of - dat e t hat
t he t raci ng of t he me n t akes a cons i derabl e t i me ; i n ma n y c as e s t he n a me s are
dupl i cat ed, a nd a n appr e c i abl e port i on are f o und t o h a v e be e n di s c har ge d
f r om the a r my dur i ng a pe r i o d st ret chi ng bac k as f ar as 1928.
P. J. G.
THE WAR OFFI CE,
18th April, 1942.
MOST SECRET
COAL MI NERS
NUMBERS SERVI NG I N FI ELD FORCE UNI TS AT HOME ON 4 T H APRI L, 1942
Summary by Arms
Arm
Househol Househol Househol Househol Householddddd Cavalr Cavalr Cavalr Cavalr Cavalryyyyy
Cavalr Cavalr Cavalr Cavalr Cavalryyyyy an an an an anddddd Roya Roya Roya Roya Royalllll Armoure Armoure Armoure Armoure Armoureddddd Corp Corp Corp Corp Corpsssss .. .. .. .. ....... .. .. .. .. .......
Roya Roya Roya Roya Royal llll ArtilleryField.. ArtilleryField.. ArtilleryField.. ArtilleryField.. ArtilleryField.......
,,,,,,,,,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, Heav Heav Heav Heav Heavyyyyy Anti-Aircraf Anti-Aircraf Anti-Aircraf Anti-Aircraf Anti-Aircrafttttt
,, ,, ,, ,, ,, Ligh Ligh Ligh Ligh Lighttttt Anti-Aircraf Anti-Aircraf Anti-Aircraf Anti-Aircraf Anti-Aircrafttttt .. .. .. .. .......
,, ,, ,, ,, ,, Searchligh Searchligh Searchligh Searchligh Searchlighttttt .. .. .. .. .......
,, ,, ,, ,, ,, Coas Coas Coas Coas Coasttttt Defenc Defenc Defenc Defenc Defenceeeee
Roya Roya Roya Roya Royal llll Engineer Engineer Engineer Engineer Engineersssss
Roya Roya Roya Roya Royal llll Corp Corp Corp Corp Corpsssss o oooofffff Signals.. Signals.. Signals.. Signals.. Signals.......
Foo Foo Foo Foo Foottttt Guard Guard Guard Guard Guardsssss
I nfantry.. I nfantry.. I nfantry.. I nfantry.. I nfantry....... .. .. .. .. ....... .. .. .. .. .......
Reconnaissanc Reconnaissanc Reconnaissanc Reconnaissanc Reconnaissanceeeee Corp Corp Corp Corp Corpsssss .. .. .. .. .......
Arm Arm Arm Arm Armyyyyy Ai Ai Ai Ai Airrrrr Corp Corp Corp Corp Corpsssss
Parachut Parachut Parachut Parachut Parachuteeeee Battalion Battalion Battalion Battalion Battalionsssss .. .. .. .. .......
.. .. .. .. ....... .. .. .. .. ....... .. .. .. .. .......
Corp Corp Corp Corp Corpsssss o oooofffff Militar Militar Militar Militar Militaryyyyy Polic Polic Polic Polic Policeeeee (incl (incl (incl (incl (incl..... Traffic Traffic Traffic Traffic Traffic Contro Contro Contro Contro Controlllll Companies Companies Companies Companies Companies))))) .. .. .. .. .......
Roya Roya Roya Roya Royal llll Arm Arm Arm Arm Armyyyyy Servic Servic Servic Servic Service eeee Corp Corp Corp Corp Corpsssss
Roya Roya Roya Roya Royal llll Arm Arm Arm Arm Armyyyyy Medica Medica Medica Medica Medicalllll Corp Corp Corp Corp Corpsssss
Roya Roya Roya Roya Royal llll Arm Arm Arm Arm Armyyyyy Ordnanc Ordnanc Ordnanc Ordnanc Ordnanceeeee Corp Corp Corp Corp Corpsssss .. .. .. .. .......
Roya Roya Roya Roya Royalllll Arm Arm Arm Arm Armyyyyy Veterinar Veterinar Veterinar Veterinar Veterinaryyyyy Corp Corp Corp Corp Corpsssss
Pionee Pionee Pionee Pionee Pioneerrrrr Corp Corp Corp Corp Corpsssss
Tota Tota Tota Tota Totalllll
No. of coal miners
Strength of other
included in
ranks
previous column
883
4
613
106,825 2,932
30,335
560
50,57
6
583
31.484
3.324 9
2,355 19
77,060 1,641
32,383
167
15,918
608
215,256
5,514
13,017
386
310
8
1.973 63
5S1.699 13,107
7.958
194
61,859 567
16,875 242
5,464
5i
328
4
105,201
2,614
197,685 3.672
16,779
779.384
(B42/ 127) S o 4/42 W. O. P. 10606
TO BE KEPT U N DE R T OOK ANV -fiV,
It fa requested that special cars may be taken tP ? O
SRstKti) tha saas-sfly at' ihia dooutrwnt. /
DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY
1
S GOVERNMENT,
RET . C gPY N(
(42)168.
Apri l , 1942. WAR CABINET.
COMMUNIST PARTY.
Memorandum by the Home Secretary.
I n conti nuati on of my memorandum of the J rd Apri l
(W.P.(42)142) I ci r cul ate f or i nf ormati on a pol i ce report
of a recent meeti ng hel d by the I ndustr i al Bureau of the
Communist Party.
H.M.
riome Of f i ce
s
24th A pri l , 1942.
SPECI AL 3R.AKCU REPORT.
The I ndust r i al Bureau of the Communi st P ar t y of
Gr eat B r i t ai n hel d a secr et meeti ng of P ar t y members who
ar e T rade Uni on o f f i c i al s , at t he Essex Hal l , St r and, W.C.
dur i ng the eveni ng of 10t h A pr i l . '- About' 45 per sons at t ended.
P et er KERRIGAN pr esi ded and' the speaker was. Harry
POLL I TT'. - '- ' - '." - ':''"
: -------
:
- - -
;
- '',- ;- : - ' -
-"The l at t er opened by decl ar i ng t hat hi s., l i s t ener s
were f or t unat e t o be t he, f i r s t per sons to hear t he
deci si ons of ----recent meeti ng of the- c ent r al Commi ttee,
whi ch had" l ast ed two days and had bean at t ended by f ul l -
ti me P ar t y or gani ser s f rom al l par t s of the count r y. He
then announced t hat the " Uni ty f or V i ctor y'
1
campai gn,
whi ch ended on 51at March, 1942, had been the most
successf ul ever under taken by t he P ar t y; membershi p had
reached- a t ot al of 47, 900 and the sum of 40, 800 had been
rai sed. "'. - I t had been deci ded to depar t t hi s year f rom t he
usual pr ac t i c e of hol di ng t he May Day demonst r at i on i n
Hyde Park, and, i nstead. , ther e- woul d be a mass meeti ng at
Montagu P l ace, W.C.1 commenci ng at 7 p. m. He added t hat
the necessar y i nst r uc t i ons had been sent to the May Day
Demonstr ati on Commi ttee.
. . . . . . . .
";. "POLLI TT ' then pr oceeded to expound, the P ar t y ' s
. at t i t ude towar ds var i ous t opi c al mat t er s. I n connecti on
wi th' - the- demand " expressed by a number of L i ber al and
' l ef t - wi ng
1
per sonal i t i es f or a change of Government, he
sai d t hat the "Party coul d f or ce i t s pol i cy
:
upon the
Government and consequentl y t her e was, at the moment, no
need to c al l f or changes i n i t s per sonnel . Mass pr essur e
had secured^- the di smi ssal ; of- Captai n MARGESSON. and Col onel
-M00RE-BRABAZ0N, but t he P ar t y di d not desi r e to embar r ass
t he P r i me" M i ni st er , i f , by so doi ng, i t woul d r educe the
count r y' s war ef f or t . -" The speaker sai d he was gl ad to
not i ce
1
t hat demor al i sat i on had become appar ent wi t hi n t he
r anks of the r ul i ng c l as s , and i t was up to the Communi st
P ar t y to guard agai nst t hi s di sease spr eadi ng, t o. t he
worki ng c l ass.
. .
:
.;. -" POLLI TT omi tted to st at e upon what dat a he based hi s
- obser vat i ons concer ni ng t he r ul i ng c l ass, but i mmedi atel y
af t er war ds spoke about the removal of L ord BSAVERBRQOK
:
-f rom the War Cabi net. The l at t er was. a br ave and.
ef f i c i ent man, and, wi t h t he excepti on of." Si r St af f or d
CRI PPS, / the most pr o- Sovi et member of the. Gover nment. "He
was sacked" , POLLI TT decl ar ed, " because the bi g c api t al i s t s
hated hi m; because the T r ades Uni on Congr ess wanted bo
get r i d -of hi m, and because he stood up to the r eact i onar y
o i v i l ser vant s. Hi s- r emoval f rom of f i ce i s a def eat f or
t he pr ogr essi ve f or ces" . ' POLLI TT- concl uded hi s eul ogy of
L ord BEAVERBR00K bySpayi ng t r i but e to . the pr o- Sovi et
pol i cy, of the l at t er ' s newspaper s, ' ment i oni ng par t i c ul ar l y
t he " Eveni ng St andar d" . ' ,
-r: T ur ni ng to the pr osecut i on
J
. of the war , POLLI TT sai d
t hat Party"members- shoul d not under est i mat e the i mpor tance
:of the- - R. A . F. r ai ds- on f act or i es. i n Germany and F r ance,
or the. - st r at egi c al - v al ue of the Commando r ai ds on the
enemy ts' "coasts". The at t ac k upon St.. Nazai r e was
;
a-
" magni f i cent pi ece of
;
work" , The war si t uat i on, however,
-was ver y gr ave. B r i t ai n had suf f er ed st agger i ng l osses
i n the Far E ast and H i t l er was about to st r i k e at Egypt
and pr obabl y el sewher e.
T here woul d be more B r i t i sh setbacks and def eat i sm
mi ght assume danger ous pr opor t i ons. The P ar ty bel i eved
. t hat the- i nnodi at e openi ng of a second f r ont i n Europe
was B r i t ai n' s best pol i cy. T here were gener al s i n the
B r i t i s h A my who st at ed they were pr epar ed to est abl i sh
and hol d a br i dgehead i n F r ance f or the pur pose of
st ar t i ng an of f ensi ve. Government spokesmen were t el l i ng
l i es when they al l eged ther e- was not enough mat er i al f or
a second f r ont i n Europe-; producti on! . was qui t e suf f i ci ent
and such a pr oj ect woul d be a wonderf ul , t oni c f or f act or y
wor ker s and ser vi ce nen. '
/ T he B r i t i sh peopl e must be made to r eal i se t hat they
were s t i l l net " f eel i ng, the pi nch" as some of the A l l i es
were - thousands of wor ker s en j oyed., bet t er meal s today i n
communal r est aur ant s than they had
:
ever. eat en i n the past
and t hat vi ct or y woul d not be possi bl e unt i l they were
pr epar ed' to wage t ot al war.
POLLI TT -had l i t t l e to; say about I ndi a. He was
sur pr i sed t hat Si r St af f or d CRI PPS had under taken the
I ndi an mi ssi on i n vi ew of some of the terms of t he
Gover nment' s pr oposal s, whi ch were har dl y i n keepi ng wi t h
the Vi ews expr essed by CRI PPS i n the past . N ever t hel ess,
the Comruni st P ar t y. hoped t hat a set t l ement woul d be
r eached, so as te secur e the ef f ect i ve cooper at i on of
I ndi a i n the war agai nst f asci sm.
Comrades f rom Car di f f had asked the P ar t y Centr e
what t hei r at t i t ude to the, by- el ect i on t her e shoul d be,
and they had been tol d most emphat i cal l y. t o suppor t
Si r J ames GRIGG and to do. ever yt hi ng possi bl e to secur e
t he def ect of F enner Brockway, the I . L . P
V
candi dat e.
BROCKWAY was a mo.st danger ous man and mi ght wel l p o l l
a consi der abl e number -pf votes because he was a seasoned
and;
5
.wi l y campai gner. ' -
Now t hat the membershi p was swel l i ng so r api dl y , the
C ent r al Commi ttee thought t hat the P ar t y deser ved to have
more then one r epr esent at i ve i n P ar l i ament and had t her e-
f or e deci ded to c ont est ; f ut ur e by- el ect i ons, i n sui t abl e
Ceases. The P ol i t i c al Bureau had been i nf ormed of t hi s
new pol i cy, - whi ch, of cour se, woul d not af f ect the P ar t y ' s
suppor t of the. ' Government. ;
The speaker- then deal t wi th, the ban on t he ' Dai l y
Worker ' - and the P ar t y
!
s at t i t ude tdw-a -as Mr. Her ber t
MORRISON. -He sai d " Per sonal abuse
1
ha.., been our st ock-
i n t r ade f or twenty year s and has got us nowher e. I t
has got to st op" . As an exampl e of the harm whi ch
r esul t ed f rom t hi s pol i cy, POLLI TT r ef er r ed to the speech
made by S.O. DAVI ES, M.P. at the "Dai l y Worker" Conf er ence
hel d at the C ent r al Hal l ,. Westmi nster , on - 21st March, 1942
Mr. DAVI ES made a bi t t er ' per s onal at t ack on Mr. MORRISON,
and t he f ol l owi ng day the Home Secr et ar y wrote to the
Mi ners F eder ati on of Gr eat B r i t ai n, aski ng i f Mr. DAVI ES
had voi ced the pol i cy of t he Uni on at the ' Dai l y Worker'
Conf er ence. A bal l ot was hel d by the Uni on E xecuti ve
and i t was deci ded by el even votes to ni ne to r epl y i n
t he negat i ve. The outcone of t hi s was t hat at a subsequent
Gener al Counci l meeti ng of the T r ades Uni on Congr ess, the
M. F. G. B. votes were cast agai nst a r esol ut i on demandi ng the
l i f t i ng of the "Dai l y Worker' ban.
POLLI TT sai d he di d not bel i eve t hat Mr. MORRISON
( to whom he occasi onal l y r ef er r ed as. " Her ber t " ) was the
chi ef stumbl i ng bl ock to secur i ng the r e- appear ance of the
1
Dai l y Wor ker ' . I n hi s opi ni on, the Pri me M i ni st er was
the c ul pr i t . - I f the Home Secr et ar y were to r ai se the
quest i on of removi ng the pan, he woul d have onl y one
suppor t er i n the Cabi net, namel y, Si r Staf f or d C r i pps,
The Government hel d the trump care so l ong as the T. U. C.
r ef used to suppor t the demand f or the l i f t i ng of the ban.
I t was up to the P ar t y, " ther ef or e, to desi st f rom
per sonal at t ack s upon L abour P ar t y of f i c i al s ,
At t hi s poi nt , A.W. MacLAREN i nt er posed wi t h the
comment t hat per sonal abuse had been used wi th good ef f ect
agai nst Col onel MOORE-BRABAZON and Captai n MARGSSSON.
POLLI TT poi nted out t hat nei t her of t hese gentl emen was
a member of the L abour Movement.
Bef ore concl udi ng, POLLI TT gave the f ol l owi ng
addi t i on i nf or mati on about Communi st P ar t y mat t er s.
C ent r al Books L td. had publ i shed 125 di f f er ent pamphl et s,
book l et s, et c . dur i ng 1941, many of whi ch had r eached a
c i r c ul at i on of 3,500,000 copi es. Bef or e the end of 1942, .
the P ar ty ai med at secur i ng a t o t al membershi p of
100,000, I n the L ondon ar ea al one, the P ar t y now
had 50 f ul l - t i me, pai d r ev ol ut i onar i es ( i . e. members
empl oyed sol el y on P ar t y work, i ncl udi ng or gani sat i on,
pr opaganda, agi t at i on, et c . , but not r out i ne of f i ce
wor k) . POLLI TT al so announced t hat the nat i onal congr ess
of the P ar t y, whi ch was to take pl a.ee i n L ondon on 23rd and
24th May, 1942, woul d more or l ess coi nci de wi t h the annual
conf er ence of the L abour P ar t y and i t was hoped t hat i t
woul d be possi bl e to ar r ange f or the exchange of f r at er nal
gr eet i ngs between the two gat her i ngs.
TO BE K EPT UNDER L OCK AND KEY.
(3- fff )
it is requested that special care may be taken to
228
THI 3 DOCUMENT I S THE PROPERTY OV HI 3 BRI TANNI C MAJ ESTY ' 3 GOVERNMENT).
S E C R E T ,
W.P. (k2)l 69*
COPY NO.
20TK APRI L , -I 9h2.
WAR CABI NET,
VI CHY MI NI STERS I N THE DOMI NI ONS.
Memorandum by the Secr et ar y of St at e f or
Domi ni on A f f ai r s,
I have r ecei ved thr ough the Uni on Hi gh Commi ssi oner i n
L ondon a message f rom Gener al Smuts i n t he f ol l owi ng t er ms : -
"Uni on Government woul d wel come advi ce f rom Hi s
M aj est y' s Government i n the Uni ted K i ngdom whether i n
vi ew of r adi c al change i n V i chy or i ent at i on ti me has
not come f or Uni on and Canada to r upt ur e r el at i ons wi t h
V i chy. T hi s woul d al so r egul ar i se posi t i on i n ot her
r espect s whi ch may become i mpor tant" i
2. T hi s poi nt was l as t r ai sed by Gener al Smuts a month
ago when, af t er c i nsul t i ng t he Pri me M i ni st er and F or ei gn
Secr et ar y, I asked our Hi gh Commi ssi oner i n t he Uni on to i nf orm
Gener al Smuts t hat our vi ew was t hat " i t woul d be bet t er i n
pr esent condi t i ons not t o take act i on f or two months, but ,
subj ect to t hat del ay, we f or our par t woul d see no obj ect i on
i f General Smuts were to deci de to di smi ss the V i chy M i ni st er
at such ti me as mi ght seem most conveni ent to hi m" ,
3. I t i s cl ear t hat Gener al Smuts f eel s t hat t he pr esent
change i n t he si t uat i on at V i chy gi ves hi m a sui t abl e occasi on
f or doi ng what he has f or some ti me been anxi ous t o do,
namel y, get r i d of the V i chy M i ni st er .
k. T here i s al so a V i chy M i ni st er i n Canada, and some
months ago Mr, Mackenzi e K i ng was anxi ous to di smi ss hi m.
We then di scour aged Mr. Mackenzi e K i ng f rom t ak i ng t hi s act i on
on t he ground t hat t her e was some advantage i n s t i l l
mai nt ai ni ng touch wi th V i chy. I now at t ac h a t el egr am f rom
Mr. Mackenzi e K i ng whi ch shows t hat he i s anxi ous f or our
vi ews i n pr esent condi t i ons, havi ng r egar d to t he Uni ted St at es
at t i t ude as di scl osed i n t hat t el egr am.
C.R.
DOMI NI ONS OFFI CE,
20t h A pr i l , 19h2.
I N WA R D T E L E GR A M
TYPEX
gROMj CANADA (GGVT. )
TO: D..O.
I n 19th Apr,,,. 1942, 9*25 p m
E. 20th " " 4. 25 a
E
u
m.
r
Ii.;MEDIATK..
Mo. 115 SKCHBT.
Fol l owi ng from the Pri me Mi ni ster f or your Pri me
Mi ni ster,, Begi ns.
I n conversati ons i n Washi ngton from whi ch I have
j ust returned the Acti ng Secretary of State of ^he Uni ted
States i n advi si ng me of hi s Government *B deci si on to
r ecal l Admi ral L eahy from Vi chy expressed the hope that
we woul d not talce any i mmedi ate step, to al t er the status
of French representati on, i n Canada. I had tol d hire that
we took a seri ous vi ew of the possi bl e consequences of
L aval
T
s return to power and were prepared,, i f you were
of the same opi ni on, to "bri ng about the i mmedi ate wi thdrawal
of Vi chy di pl omati c and consul ar r epr esentati ves from
CanadaO He f el t however that pendi ng f ur ther cl ar i f i cat i on
of the si tuati on, i t, woul d be hel pf ul i f we eoul d conti nue
to recei ve the French Mi ni ster.;. He added that he woul d
gi ve us a weefc's noti ce of eventual Uni ted States deci si on
to break of f r el ati ons wi th Vi chy so that we coul d-
synchroni se our acti ons i n thi s matter. I shoul d be very
gl ad to have your vi ews on recent devel opments in French
posi ti on and i n par ti cul ar to know whether you f eel that a
usef ul purpose i s st i l l bei ng served by our mai ntai ni ng
Dupuy as Charge d' A f f ai res to Vi chy and conti nui ng to recei ve
a French Mi ni ster her e. ' Ends.-..
THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OP HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT
MOST SECRET. Copy No.
W.P. (42) 170.
April 22, 1942.
T O B E K E P T U N D E R L O C K A N D K E Y
I t is request ed t hat s peci al care may be t aken to
ensure t he secrecy of t hi s document .
WAR CABINET.
SPECI A L OPERA TI ONS EX ECUT I V E.
NOTE BY THE SECRETARY OF THE WAR CABI NET.
T HE annexed Report by the Mi ni ster of Economic Warf are is ci rcul ated,
by the di recti on of the Pri me Mi ni ster, for the i nformati on of the War Cabi net.
(Signed) E. E. BRI DGES.
April 22, 1942.
A NNEX .
PRI ME MI NI STER,
S.O.E.
SI NCE taki ng office I have made as thorough an i nspecti on of S.O.E.its
personnel, i ts offices and i ts schoolsas ti me has permi tted. I have discussed i ts
work wi th every Mi ni ster, Government official or organi sati on that has had
deal i ngs wi th S.O.E. I have also endeavoured to trace to thei r sources vari ous
rumours whi ch I have heard.
S.O.E. was reorgani sed in the l ate summer of 1940 and the present establish-
ment can be said to have started functi oni ng i n October 1940. I am greatl y
i mpressed both by the standard of personnel and the resul ts achi eved in such a
short time.
The team presi ded over by Mr. J ebb and Si r Frank Nel son is remarkabl e
for i ts abi l i ty and i ni ti ati ve, and in Si r Charl es Hambro, Colonel Tayl or,
Bri gadi er Gubbi ns, Ai r Commodore Boyle, Colonel Davi es, Wi ng Commander
Venner, Colonel Cl arke, Colonel Sporborg, L ord Gl enconner, Colonel Barry and
others you have a first-class team worki ng thei r hardest at a most difficult job.
Rumours.
have i nvesti gated vari ous rumours whi ch alleged inefficiency and
extravagance, &c. I have no hesi tati on i n reporti ng that these are baseless
cal umni es, emanati ng general l y from members of the staff who have been
di scharged for inefficiency. I t may well be that in an organi sati on that was
i mprovi sed i n the mi ddl e of a great war and whi ch has expanded wi th the
greatest rapi di ty whi l e it operated, moving forward from bottleneck to bottl e-
[23731]
I
neck, there have been temporary dislocations of organi sati on in certai n depart-
menl s wi th consequent local surpl uses of staff. The admi ni strati on has been
fighting agai nst time in establ i shi ng an organi sati on whi ch ought to have been
prepared years ago, and steps have had to be taken hurri edl y. Such teethi ng
troubl es do not j usti fy the rumours to whi ch I refer.
Finance.
Thi s is under the charge of a l eadi ng chartered accountant and no
expendi ture has been i ncurred whi ch has not been approved by the Treasury.
The offices are controlled by experi enced and well-known business men and I have
no doubt that they are conducted efficiently.
Expendi ture is runni ng at the rate of about 2,500,000 per annum. The
val ue of the shi ps and cargoes now in Allied hands as a di rect result of the
acti vi ti es of S.O.E alone exceeds the total of l ast year's expendi ture, to say
nothi ng of very great damage inflicted on the enemy, the amount of whi ch i s
incalculable. But the real j usti fi cati on for the expendi ture is to be found in the
organi sati on that has been bui l t up, most of which will not come i nto operati on
unti l the moment when it is called upon to function by the General Staff.
Results achieved.
Some 1,000 men have been trai ned in all the arts of sabotage and subversion,
and W/Tgetti ng in and out of enemy terri tory, &c. I have been greatl y
impressed by the high standard of technical efficiency reached by the schools that
I have visited. There are forty schools. Thi s figure is not necessarily excessive
because it is impossible to mix different nati onal i ti es, or different stages of
i nstructi on.
Of the above trai nees, over 200 men are at work i n enemy-occupied countri es
wi th consi derabl e stores of explosives, &c, whi l e another 100 are operati ng i n
different parts of the world. Some 900 are servi ng wi th the Al l i ed armi es, whi l e
350 are awai ti ng transport abroad. The mai n task of all agents operati ng i n
enemy-occupied terri tory is to form the nucleus of l arge i ndi genous groups and
to promote a revol uti onary si tuati on.
Moreover, though such expl oi ts are not the most i mportant part of i ts
work, S.O.E. has taken an acti ve or l eadi ng part in a number of dari ng
episodes, i ncl udi ng the escape on two occasions from Sweden of Bri ti sh-
chartered shi ps, the seizure of Axi s shi ps at Fei mando Po, the si nki ng of two
l arge I tal i an shi ps in Tuni s and other enemy shi ps i n Greece, the i ntercepti on
of a l arge Vi chy convoy, the capture of a l arge Vi chy shi p, the destructi on of
the power-stati on at Pessac, the temporary blocking of the Danube, the coup
d'Etat in Y ugosl avi a, the Y ugosl av revolt, collaboration in the Lofoten, the
St. Nazai re and other rai ds, &c. I n addi ti on to the above, it has i nsti gated
thousands of small acts of sabotage on the Conti nent, from rai l way accidents to
the i nserti on of abrasi ves in machi ne tools.
Fi nal l y, the design and manufacture of a l arge quanti ty of special l ethal
weapons, wi rel ess sets and secret devices of great moment has been undertaken
and is proceedi ng on an i mportant scale. No bad record for ei ghteen months.
Failures.
S.O.E. fai l ed to provi de an efficient organi sati on i n the Far East. I n
Si am and Mal aya they were not allowed to operate effectively, but there was
fai l ure in other di recti ons as well.
There was also a fai l ure in the Mi ddl e East unti l Si r Frank Nelson went
out in August 1941 and placed the organi sati on on i ts present satisfactory,
basis.
The fai r and true comment on the above is that, if you attempt to create
a worl d-wi de organi sati on under war condi ti ons i n a hurry, some appoi ntments
and arrangements are likely to be less successful than others. The significant
fact is that the fai l ures have been very much fewer than the achievements.
Relations with Other Departments.
The rel ati ons between S.O.E. and the Services, C.C.O. and M. 1 . 5 are
cordial, but unfortunate fri cti on has prevai l ed i n the past wi th the Forei gn
Office, mai nl y i n connection wi th neutral countri es. For i nstance, S.O.E. was
prevented fi'om maki ng any effective preparati ons i n Si am by the confidence
of our Mi ni s t e r t hat the Si ame s e Government wo ul d not s i de wi t h the enemy.
Si mi l arl y, t he For e i gn Office ha s c ompl ai ne d of S. O. E. ac t i vi t i e s i n Turkey,
Por t ugal and ot her count ri es.
I t has no w been set t l ed t hat the For e i gn Secret ary s houl d as s ume f ul l
res pons i bi l i t y for al l S. O. E. ac t i vi t i e s i n neut ral count ri es a nd t hat S. O. E.
s houl d t ake hi s di rect i ons about t hem. I am sure t hat t hi s i s t he best arrange-
ment . The pr i mar y res pons i bi l i t y for preparat i on in s uch areas i s, thereby,
pl aced upon t he For e i gn Office.
I regret t o report I have al s o f ound consi derabl e f r i c t i on bet ween S. O. E.
and C. Th e act i vi t i es of t hese or gani s at i ons necessari l y overl ap i n many part s
of t he worl d. I n my vi ew i t i s es s ent i al t hat the poi nt s of mut ual i nt erest t hat
ari s e bet ween t hem shoul d be s et t l ed i n a t eam s pi r i t de die in diem. For
t hi s purpos e I recommend t he e s t abl i s hme nt of a l i ai s on c ommi t t e e whi ch shoul d
meet at l east weekl y, cons i s t i ng of t he he ads of t he t wo or gani s at i ons pres i ded
over by a Conci l i at or of experi ence and s t andi ng. Wi t h s uch a machi nery i t
s houl d be possi bl e t o settl e di s put e s i n t he i r earl y s t ages . I f t he Conc i l i at or y
s ol ut i on were unaccept abl e t o ei t her par t y t he mat t e r woul d have t o be ref erred
to Mi ni s t e r i al l evel s, but I bel i eve t hat t hi s -would sel dom be neces s ary.
Di s c us s i ons have t ake n pl ace bet ween the S. O. E. and t he Mi ni s t r y of
I nf or mat i on on t he subj ect of s ubvers i ve pr opaganda. I am gl ad to say t hat
agreement has now pract i cal l y been reached.
S. O. E. has had some difficulty i n fitting i n wi t h ot her De par t me nt s , and no
doubt mi s t akes have been made on bot h s i des , but S. O. E. mus t and wi l l pl ay f or
t he team.
Development.
S. O. E. has reached a s t age whe r e i t i s capabl e of very i mpor t ant e xpans i on.
The pri nci pal bot t l eneck t o- day i s t he provi s i on of t rans port . Ma ny more
" a g e n t s ' ' have been t rai ned t han i t ha s been f ound possi bl e to t rans port t o
enemy- occupi ed t erri t ori es. To drop an age nt f rom a pl ane i n a s af e s pot requi res
al most a f ul l moon and fine weat her. Fe w ni ght s are t heref ore avai l abl e. Un t i l
December t rans port f aci l i t i es we r e very i nadequat e, but s i nce t hen the Ai r
Mi ni s t r y has pl aced at t he di s pos al of S. O. E. five Ha l i f a x e s and e i ght Whi t l e ys ,
whi l e t hree Lys ande r s are s hared wi t h C. The Admi r a l t y have gi ve n wha t he l p
t hey can i n f as t mot or boat s for coas t al l andi ngs . I f t hese f ac i l i t i e s coul d be
doubl ed f ul l use woul d be made of t hem. The r e i s part i cul ar need of more l ong-
range f as t pl anes as access t o Po l a n d a nd Czechos l ovaki a i s i mpos s i bl e dur i ng
t he summer wi t h present machi nes .
A devi ce t o enabl e pi npoi nt s to be l ocat ed f rom t he ai r has been evol ved i n
the f or m of a wi rel es s beacon. The i mpor t anc e of t hi s t o S. O. E. wi l l be i mmense,
as i t wi l l enabl e age nt s and stores t o be dr oppe d on e xac t poi nt s wi t ho ut moonl i ght .
I t i s of the ut mos t i mport ance t hat t he manuf ac t ur e of t hes e s houl d be e xpe di t e d
by al l possi bl e means .
The Future.
I n e i ght e e n mont hs and by sheer har d work, under gr e at di ffi cul ti es, very fine
resul t s have been accompl i s hed by t he pers onnel of S. O. E. , who i ncl ude i n t hei r
number men of hi g h di s t i nct i on i n bus i nes s , t he La w a n d t he Servi ces . They ar e
nat ur al l y i ndi gnant at the rumours al l ude d t o above, whi c h have or i gi nat e d f rom
i nt eres t ed part i es , a nd at t he l evi t y wi t h whi c h t hey have been gi ve n currency
by responsi bl e pers ons who appe ar t o have l i t t l e i de a of t he di ffi cul ti es i nherent
i n t hei r task. The y t hemsel ves are precl uded f rom any f orm of repl y a nd t hei r
prof es s i onal r e put at i ons are a t st ake.
I f S. O. E. i s to f unct i on, i t mus t recei ve f ai r pl ay as we l l as gi ve i t . Thes e
rumours have got to cease, a nd I t heref ore propose to i nvi t e an i mpar t i al person
of sufficient aut hor i t y and experi ence t o r e vi e w the or gani s at i on of S. O. E. and t he
condi t i ons unde r whi c h i t has t o operat e, and to advi s e me whet her any
i mprovement i s possi bl e.
Me anwhi l e , I hope my col l eagues wi l l accept my as s urance t hat much good
work ha s been perf ormed' by zeal ous and pat r i ot i c men, a nd f or t hi s purpose
I s houl d be gr at e f ul i f you coul d see your wa y to ci rcul at e t hi s Re por t to t he
W a r C a b i Q e t
- SEL BOENE.
April 10, 1942.

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