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They did so only because they fundamentally

misread what the collapse of the Soviet Union meant: the ideological
triumph of liberal capitalist democracy over communism, not the
obsolescence of hard power.
For Hegel, it was the Battle of Jena, in 1806, that
rang the curtain down on the war of ideas. . Adapted to the postCold War
world, this argument was taken to
mean that in the future, states would have to adopt the principles of
liberal capitalism to keep up. no social form
other than liberal democracy provided enough freedom and dignity
for a contemporary society to remain stable.
With history over, the focus shifted
from geopolitics to development economics and nonproliferation,
and the bulk of foreign policy came to center on questions such as
climate change and trade.
Para Obama: the United States most important
priorities involved promoting the liberal world order, not playing
classical geopolitics.
the world is looking less
post-historical by the day.
China, Iran, and Russia are all pushing back against the
political settlement of the Cold War.
Iran wishes to replace the current order in the
Middle Eastled by Saudi Arabia and dominated by Sunni Arab
stateswith one centered on Tehran.
Across the region, the Arab Spring has weakened Sunni
regimes, further tilting the balance in Irans favor.
these states have undermined the Eurasian geopolitical
order in ways that complicate U.S. and European efforts to construct a
posthistorical, win-win world.
the win-win outcomes that Americans so eagerly seek will sometimes
be held hostage to Russian geopolitical interests.
the public shares the elite consensus that in a postCold War world, the
United States ought to be able to pay less into the system and get more
out

outro lado:
Order building is not premised on the end of geopolitics; it is about how to
answer the big questions of geopolitics.
The military capabilities aggregated in this U.S.-led
alliance system outweigh anything China or Russia might generate
for decades to come.
Allies in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East have sought to draw the United
States into playing a greater role in their regions. The result is what the
historian Geir Lundestad has called an empire by invitation.
World War II made the answer clear: the countrys prosperity
and security depended on access to every region.
In the mid-1980s, India and Japan were the only Asian democracies, but since
then, Indonesia, Mongolia, the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand
have joined the club.
Democratization has put China and Russia in a geopolitical box.

Near Eastern Promises
as the problems of one society spread to its neighbors and spark new
conflicts
Syria: a steady influx of Russian arms, Iranian funds, and Hezbollah
troops,
For much of its existence, Saudi Arabia has drawn legitimacy from its
official support for orthodox clerics.
just as previous administrations have learned, the region has a tendency
to pull the United States back in, even when it wants out.

Far Eastern Promises
But bilateral ties are developing in such a way that any
disagreements produced by the pivot will be addressed in the broader
context of a more stable and cooperative U.S.-Chinese relationship
Asia consumes some 30 million barrels of oil every day,
more than twice the amount that the EU does.
Chinas attempts to change the territorial status quo in the East China
and South China seasfor example, by establishing an air defense
identification zone in the East China Sea over islands administered by
Japanpresent an immediate challenge.