DOCTRINE: In fine, under the new rule on demurrer to evidence the accused has the right to file a demurrer to evidence after the prosecution has rested its case. If the accused obtained prior leave of court before filing his demurrer, he can still present evidence if his demurrer is denied. However, if he demurs without prior leave of court, or after his motion for leave is denied, he waives his right to present evidence and submits the case for decision on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution. This power to grant leave to the accused to file a demurrer is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. The purpose is to determine whether the accused in filing his demurrer is merely stalling the proceedings
FACTS:
1. Paz T. Bernardo was originally charged with four (4) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 until private respondent, Florlita Ronquillo-Concepcion, executed an Affidavit of Desistance which led to the dismissal of the last two cases.
2. After presenting its last witness, the prosecution rested its case and formally offered its exhibits. However, instead of presenting their evidence, the defense requested for a reset to file a demurrer to evidence, on the ground that the prosecution failed to elicit the fact where the checks were issued and where they were actually dishonored.
3. Which led to this:
COURT: Alright, in view of the objections, and in view of the manifestations of the private prosecutor, the defense grounds for demurrer, the same not being well taken is hereby DENIED (underscoring supplied). You will now present your evidence.
ATTY. MIRAVITE: If your honor please, may we just ask for a reconsideration (underscoring supplied)?
COURT: If you will waive your right to present your evidence, the Court will give you a period to file a demurrer to evidence. And, if you dont present your evidence now, you will be considered to have waived your right to present evidence (underscoring supplied). xxxx
ATTY. MIRAVITE: If your honor please, we would like to reiterate our motion to file a demurrer to evidence (underscoring supplied)?
COURT: But you have already orally made that demurrer which has been denied (underscoring supplied).
ATTY. MIRAVITE: In which case your honor, if there is no leave of court, we will be filing our demurrer to evidence, your honor (underscoring supplied).
COURT: That is tantamount to postpone (sic) this case. The Court considers that motion dilatory (underscoring supplied).
ATTY. MIRAVITE: Your honor, I think within the option of the parties to take remedies and at this point, we did prepare for our purposes, that instead of presenting the accused or 2
presenting our witnesses, we would just prefer to move for a demurrer to evidence (underscoring supplied).
COURT: You may include that in your motion for reconsideration. Alright, the prosecution having rested, and the defense having been considered to have waived his right to present his evidence, this case is deemed submitted for decision. Set the promulgation of this case to June 6, 1994 at 8:30 oclock in the morning
4. Petitioner assailed the Order of respondent judge hereinbefore immediately quoted before the Court of Appeals by way of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. Petitioner argued that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in considering her to have waived her right to present evidence after the denial of her motion for leave to file demurrer to evidence.
5. CA: Directed the RTC for trial for reception of evidence for the petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether the trial courts denial of the motion is only a denial of the motion for leave to file demurrer to evidence and not the demurrer to evidence itself
HELD: NO. Petitioner is incorrect and the CA decision cannot be affirmed because it is against the letter and spirit of Sec. 15, Rule 119, of the Rules of Court
Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa, Chairman of the Committee, suggested that - x x x there may be instances where it is very plain that the evidence is insufficient, but there are also instances where the court is in doubt x x x x it is the court that will now determine whether a demurrer should be filed or not after getting the opinion of both sides x x x x If the accused asks for leave of court and the court supports it, it is good; but x x x if it finds the motion dilatory, then it denies it. But x x x there should be no waiver if the demurrer is with leave of court, because there may be a situation where the court itself may want to dismiss the case x x x x If leave is denied, and the accused still files the demurrer, then there is waiver
(underscoring supplied).
The Committee finally approved the following propositions of the Chief Justice: (a) The court on its initiative can dismiss the case after giving prior notice to the prosecution; (b) The accused can file a demurrer only if he is granted prior leave of court; (c) If the motion for leave or the demurrer is denied, the accused can present his evidence, and there is no waiver; and, (d) If the accused files a demurrer without leave, his right to present evidence is waived.
In fine, under the new rule on demurrer to evidence the accused has the right to file a demurrer to evidence after the prosecution has rested its case. If the accused obtained prior leave of court before filing his demurrer, he can still present evidence if his demurrer is denied. However, if he demurs without prior leave of court, or after his motion for leave is denied, he waives his right to present evidence and submits the case for decision on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution. This power to grant leave to the accused to file a demurrer is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. The purpose is to determine whether the accused in filing his demurrer is merely stalling the proceedings.
In the case at bar, petitioner admits that in the hearing of 20 May 1994 the trial court denied her motion for leave to file a demurrer to evidence. In such case, the only right petitioner has under Sec. 15, Rule 119, of the Rules of Court after having been denied leave to submit a demurrer is to adduce evidence in her defense. However, even without express leave of the trial court, nay, after her motion for leave was denied, petitioner insisted on filing a demurrer instead of presenting evidence in her defense.
Judicial action to grant prior leave to file demurrer to evidence is discretionary upon the trial court. But to allow the accused to present evidence after he was denied prior leave to file demurrer is not discretionary. Once prior leave is denied and the accused still files his demurrer to evidence or motion to dismiss, the court no longer has discretion to allow the accused to present evidence. The only recourse left for the court is to decide the case on the basis of the evidence presented by the prosecution. And, unless there is grave abuse thereof amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, which is not present in the instant case, the trial courts denial of prior leave to file 3
demurrer to evidence or motion to dismiss may not be disturbed. However, any judgment of conviction by a trial court may still be elevated by the accused to the appellate court.
WHEREFORE, the Petition to allow petitioner to file a demurrer to evidence is DENIED.
Radiowealth Finance Co., v Del Rosario G.R. No. 138739 July 6, 2000
Doctrine: The rule, however, imposes the condition by the same token that if his demurrer is granted by the trial court, and the order of dismissal is reversed on appeal, the movant losses his right to present evidence in his behalf and he shall have been deemed to have elected to stand on the insufficiency of plaintiffs case and evidence. In such event, the appellate court which reverses the order of dismissal shall proceed to render judgment on the merits on the basis of plaintiffs evidence.
Facts: Vicente and Maria Sumilang del Rosario jointly and severally executed, signed and delivered in favor of Radiowealth Finance Company a Promissory Note for P138,948 without need of notice or demand, in instalments. Upon default, the late payment, 2.5% penalty charge per month shall be added to each unpaid installment from due date thereof until fully paid.
Radiowealth filed a complaint for the collection of a sum of money before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. During the trial, Jasmer Famatico, the credit and collection officer of Radiowealth, presented in evidence the Spouses check payments, the demand letter dated July 12, 1991, Spouses customers ledger card, another demand letter and Metropolitan Bank dishonor slips. Famatico admitted that he did not have personal knowledge of the transaction or the execution of any of these pieces of documentary evidence, which had merely been endorsed to him. TC: issued an Order terminating the presentation of evidence for the petitioner. [9] Thus, the latter formally offered its evidence and exhibits and rested its case on July 5, 1994. Respondents filed Demurrer to Evidence ] for alleged lack of cause of action. DISMISSED. Ground: Failure of petitioner to substantiate its claims, the evidence it had presented being merely hearsay. CA: reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings During the pretrial, through judicial admissions or the spouses admitted the genuineness of thePromissory Note and demand letter dated July 12, 1991. Their only defense was the absence of an agreement on when the installment payments were to begin
ISSUE: W/N the spouses can still present evidence after the appellate courts reversal of the dismissal on demurer of evidence?
HELD: NO The old Rule 35 of the Rules of Court was reworded under Rule 33 of the 1997 Rules, but the consequence on appeal of a demurrer to evidence was not changed. As amended, the pertinent provision of Rule 33 reads as follows: SECTION 1. Demurrer to evidence.After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence, the defendant may move for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If his motion is denied, he shall have the right to present evidence. If the motion is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence. [14]
Explaining the consequence of a demurrer to evidence, the Court in Villanueva Transit v. Javellana pronounced: The rationale behind the rule and doctrine is simple and logical. The defendant is permitted, without waiving his right to offer evidence in the event that his motion is not granted, to move for a dismissal (i.e., demur to the plaintiffs evidence) on the ground that upon the facts as thus established and the applicable law, the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If the trial court denies the dismissal motion, i.e., finds that plaintiffs evidence is sufficient for an award of judgment in the absence of contrary evidence, the case still remains before the trial court which should then proceed to hear and receive the defendants evidence so that all the facts and evidence of the contending parties may be properly placed before it for adjudication as well as before the appellate courts, in case of appeal. Nothing is lost. The doctrine is but in line with the established procedural precepts in the conduct of trials that the trial court liberally receive all proffered evidence at the trial to enable it to render its decision with all possibly relevant proofs in the record, thus assuring that the appellate courts upon appeal have all the material before them 4
necessary to make a correct judgment, and avoiding the need of remanding the case for retrial or reception of improperly excluded evidence, with the possibility thereafter of still another appeal, with all the concomitant delays. The rule, however, imposes the condition by the same token that if his demurrer is granted by the trial court, and the order of dismissal is reversed on appeal, the movant losses his right to present evidence in his behalf and he shall have been deemed to have elected to stand on the insufficiency of plaintiffs case and evidence. In such event, the appellate court which reverses the order of dismissal shall proceed to render judgment on the merits on the basis of plaintiffs evidence. In other words, defendants who present a demurrer to the plaintiffs evidence retain the right to present their own evidence, if the trial court disagrees with them; if the trial court agrees with them, but on appeal, the appellate court disagrees with both of them and reverses the dismissal order, the defendants lose the right to present their own evidence. The appellate court shall, in addition, resolve the case and render judgment on the merits, inasmuch as a demurrer aims to discourage prolonged litigations. In the case at bar, the trial court, acting on respondents demurrer to evidence, dismissed the Complaint on the ground that the plaintiff had adduced mere hearsay evidence. However, on appeal, the appellate court reversed the trial court because the genuineness and the due execution of the disputed pieces of evidence had in fact been admitted by defendants. Applying Rule 33, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Court, the CA should have rendered judgment on the basis of the evidence submitted by the petitioner. While the appellate court correctly ruled that the documentary evidence submitted by the [petitioner] should have been allowed and appreciated xxx, and that the petitioner presented quite a number of documentary exhibits xxx enumerated in the appealed order, we agree with petitioner that the CA had sufficient evidence on record to decide the collection suit. A remand is not only frowned upon by the Rules, it is also logically unnecessary on the basis of the facts on record.
G.R. No. 186001 October 2, 2009 ANTONIO CABADOR, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
NATURE: Petition for review on certiorari
DOCTRINE: A demurrer to evidence can only be made after the prosecution has rested its case.
FACTS: 1. June 23, 2000 - the public prosecutor accused petitioner Antonio Cabador before the RTC of Quezon City of murdering, in conspiracy with others, Atty. Jun N. Valerio. a. February 13, 2006 - after presenting only five witnesses over five years of intermittent trial, the RTC declared at an end the prosecutions presentation of evidence and required the prosecution to make a written or formal offer of its documentary evidence within 15 days from notice. b. But the public prosecutor asked for three extensions of time, the last of which was to end on July 28, 2006. Still, the prosecution did not make the required written offer. 2. August 1, 2006 - petitioner Cabador filed a motion to dismiss the case complaining of a turtle-paced proceeding in the case since his arrest and detention in 2001 and invoking his right to a speedy trial. Further, he claimed that in the circumstances, the trial court could not consider any evidence against him that had not been formally offered. He also pointed out that the prosecution witnesses did not have knowledge of his alleged part in the crime charged. 3. Unknown to petitioner Cabador, however, four days earlier or on July 28, 2006 the prosecution asked the RTC for another extension of the period for its formal offer, which offer it eventually made on August 1, 2006, the day Cabador filed his motion to dismiss. 4. RTC: issued an Order treating petitioner Cabadors August 1, 2006 motion to dismiss as a demurrer to evidence. And, since he filed his motion without leave of court, the RTC declared him to have waived his right to present evidence in his defense. The trial court deemed the case submitted for decision insofar as he was concerned. 5. CA: affirmed RTC ruling.
ISSUE: whether or not petitioner Cabadors motion to dismiss before the trial court was in fact a demurrer to evidence filed without leave of court, with the result that he effectively waived his right to present evidence in his defense and submitted the case for decision insofar as he was concerned.
HELD: NO! Petitioner Cabador filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of violation of his right to speedy trial, not a demurrer to evidence. He cannot be declared to have waived his right to present evidence in his defense. Petition GRANTED. RTC is DIRECTED to resolve petitioner Antonio Cabadors motion to dismiss based on the circumstances surrounding the trial in the case. 5
1. The trial proper in a criminal case usually has two stages: first, the prosecutions presentation of evidence against the accused and, second, the accuseds presentation of evidence in his defense. a. If, after the prosecution has presented its evidence, the same appears insufficient to support a conviction, the trial court may at its own initiative or on motion of the accused dispense with the second stage and dismiss the criminal action. There is no point for the trial court to hear the evidence of the accused in such a case since the prosecution bears the burden of proving his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The order of dismissal amounts to an acquittal. 2. But because some have in the past used the demurrer in order to delay the proceedings in the case, the remedy now carries a caveat. When the accused files a demurrer without leave of court, he shall be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence and the case shall be considered submitted for judgment. 3. Enojas, Jr. v. Commission on Elections : To determine whether the pleading filed is a demurer to evidence or a motion to dismiss, the Court must consider (1) the allegations in it made in good faith; (2) the stage of the proceeding at which it is filed; and (3) the primary objective of the party filing it. 4. Reason why it is a MTD and not a Demurrer to Evidence: In criminal cases, a motion to dismiss may be filed on the ground of denial of the accuseds right to speedy trial. This denial is characterized by unreasonable, vexatious, and oppressive delays without fault of the accused, or by unjustified postponements that unreasonably prolonged the trial. This was the main thrust of Cabadors motion to dismiss and he had the right to bring this up for a ruling by the trial court. a. Cabador of course dropped a few lines in his motion to dismiss in paragraphs "11 (sic)" and 12, saying that the trial court "has no evidence to consider," "the charge has no leg to stand on," and that "the witnesses x x x had no knowledge of any connection with or any participation by the accused in the incident." But these were mere conclusions, highlighting what five years of trial had accomplished. b. The fact is that Cabador did not even bother to do what is so fundamental in any demurrer. He did not state what evidence the prosecution had presented against him to show in what respects such evidence failed to meet the elements of the crime charged. His so-called "demurrer" did not touch on any particular testimony of even one witness. He cited no documentary exhibit. Indeed, he could not because, he did not know that the prosecution finally made its formal offer of exhibits on the same date he filed his motion to dismiss. To say that Cabador filed a demurrer to evidence is equivalent to the proverbial blind man, touching the side of an elephant, and exclaiming that he had touched a wall. 5. Besides, a demurrer to evidence assumes that the prosecution has already rested its case. Section 23, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, reads: Demurrer to evidence. After the prosecution rests its case, the court may dismiss the action on the ground of insufficiency of evidence (1) on its own initiative after giving the prosecution the opportunity to be heard or (2) upon demurrer to the evidence filed by the accused with or without leave of court. a. Here, after the prosecution filed its formal offer of exhibits on August 1, 2006, the same day Cabador filed his motion to dismiss, the trial court still needed to give him an opportunity to object to the admission of those exhibits. It also needed to rule on the formal offer. And only after such a ruling could the prosecution be deemed to have rested its case. Since Cabador filed his motion to dismiss before he could object to the prosecutions formal offer, before the trial court could act on the offer, and before the prosecution could rest its case, it could not be said that he had intended his motion to dismiss to serve as a demurrer to evidence. b. a demurrer to evidence shortens the proceedings in criminal cases. Caution must, however, be exercised in view of its pernicious consequence on the right of the accused to present evidence in his defense, the seriousness of the crime charged, and the gravity of the penalty involved.
People vs. Sumingwa G.R. No. 183619 October 13, 2009
DOCTRINE: The order granting appellants demurrer to evidence was a resolution of the case on the merits, and it amounted to an acquittal.
FACTS: 1. In 12 Informations, the prosecution charged Sumingwa with 2 counts of Acts of Lasciviousness, 4 counts of Rape, 3 counts of Unjust Vexation, 1 count of Other Light Threats, 1 count of Maltreatment and 1 count of Attempted Rape committed against his minor daughter AAA. To which Sumingwa pleaded not guilty. 6
a. Such stemmed from several incidents wherein Sumingwa sexually molested his daughter AAA. Particularly, on November 24, 2000, Sumingwa asked AAA to have sex with him, when she refused, Sumingwa forcefully took off her clothes and boxed her right buttock. As she resisted, he took a bolo and poked at her. (Basis of Other Light Threats, Attempted Rape, Unjust Vexation and Maltreatment) 2. AAA decided to report the sexual abuses to her grandmother, who brought her to the NBI where she was physically examined. They found that there were old, healed and incomplete hymenal lacerations. 3. Sumingwa denied all accusations claiming that he was not at home most of the time and was with his mistress. 4. Later on, AAA executed an Affidavit of Recantation claiming that while appellant indeed committed lascivious acts against her, she exaggerated accusations against him. She said that she was not actually raped as there was no penetration. 5. RTC: Found Sumingwa guilty of 6 counts of acts of lasciviousness, 1 count of attempted rape and 1 account of unjust vexation on the basis of the Demurrer to Evidence filed by Sumingwa. a. The trial court gave credence to AAAs testimonies on the alleged lascivious acts committed against her. In view of the withdrawal of her earlier claim of the fact of penetration, the court sustained the innocence of appellant on the rape charges and concluded that the crime committed was only Acts of Lasciviousness. b. In Criminal Case No. 1651, the RTC found that appellant committed all the acts of execution of the crime of Rape, but failed to consummate it because of the arrival of AAAs grandmother. Hence, he was convicted of attempted rape. In embracing and kissing AAA in full view of the latters best friend, appellant was convicted of Unjust Vexation. 6. CA: Affirmed the conviction, except that instead of Acts of Lasciviousness, he was convicted of Qualified Rape. a. Notwithstanding the Affidavit of Recantation, the prosecution sufficiently established the commission of the crime of Rape, as well as the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sumingwa can be held liable for Other Light Threats, Unjust Vexation and Maltreatment as these acts were alleged in the Information for Attempted Rape for which he was convicted?
HELD: NO.
We cannot hold appellant liable for Other Light Threats for threatening AAA with a bolo; for Unjust Vexation for undressing her without her consent, causing disturbance, torment, distress, and vexation; nor for Maltreatment for boxing the right side of AAAs buttocks. Although all of the above acts were alleged in the Information for Attempted Rape in the Order dated September 24, 2004, Criminal Case Nos. 1650, 1652 and 1653 involving the above crimes were dismissed for insufficiency of evidence based on the demurrer to evidence filed by appellant.
The order granting appellants demurrer to evidence was a resolution of the case on the merits, and it amounted to an acquittal. Any further prosecution of the accused after an acquittal would violate the proscription on double jeopardy. 61 Accordingly, appellants conviction of any of the above crimes, even under Criminal Case No. 1651, would trench in his constitutional right against double jeopardy.
The Court Affirms with Modification (Not Guilty of Attempted Rape)
G.R. No. 165496 February 12, 2007 HUN HYUNG PARK, Petitioner, vs. EUNG WON CHOI, Respondent.
FACTS: 1.) Eung Won Choi, was charged for violation of BP 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law, for issuing PNB Check No. 0077133 postdated August 28, 1999 in the amount of P1,875,000 which was dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds. He pleaded not guilty. 2.) After the prosecution rested its case, respondent filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File Demurrer to Evidence to which he attached his Demurrer, asserting that the prosecution failed to prove that he received the notice of dishonor, hence, the presumption of the element of knowledge of insufficiency of funds did not arise. 7
3.) The MeTC of Makati, Branch 65 granted the demurrer and dismissed the case. 4.) The prosecutions motion for reconsideration was denied. Park appealed the civil aspect of the case to the RTC of Makati, contending that the dismissal of the criminal case should not include its civil aspect. 5.) The RTC held that while the evidence presented was insufficient to prove Chois criminal liability, it did not altogether extinguish his civil liability. 6.) It accordingly granted Parks appeal and ordered Choi to pay him P1,875,000 with legal interest. 7.) Upon Chois motion for reconsideration, however, the RTC set aside its decision and ordered the remand of the case to the MeTC for further proceedings, so that Choi may adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case. Parks motion for reconsideration of the remand of the case having been denied, he elevated the case to the CA which dismissed his petition.
Issue: Whether or not the CA was correct in denying the petition?
Held: 8.) Yes. When a demurrer to evidence is filed without leave of court, the whole case is submitted for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution as the accused is deemed to have waived the right to present evidence. 29 At that juncture, the court is called upon to decide the case including its civil aspect, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate civil action has been waived or reserved. 9.) If the filing of a separate civil action has not been reserved or priorly instituted or the enforcement of civil liability is not waived, the trial court should, in case of conviction, state the civil liability or damages caused by the wrongful act or omission to be recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there is any. 10.) For, in case of acquittal, the accused may still be adjudged civilly liable. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action where (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused was acquitted. 11.) The civil action based on delict may, however, be deemed extinguished if there is a finding on the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. 12.) In case of a demurrer to evidence filed with leave of court, the accused may adduce countervailing evidence if the court denies the demurrer. 34 Such denial bears no distinction as to the two aspects of the case because there is a disparity of evidentiary value between the quanta of evidence in such aspects of the case. In other words, a court may not deny the demurrer as to the criminal aspect and at the same time grant the demurrer as to the civil aspect, for if the evidence so far presented is not insufficient to prove the crime beyond reasonable doubt, then the same evidence is likewise not insufficient to establish civil liability by mere preponderance of evidence. 13.) On the other hand, if the evidence so far presented is insufficient as proof beyond reasonable doubt, it does not follow that the same evidence is insufficient to establish a preponderance of evidence. For if the court grants the demurrer, proceedings on the civil aspect of the case generally proceeds. The only recognized instance when an acquittal on demurrer carries with it the dismissal of the civil aspect is when there is a finding that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. Absent such determination, trial as to 8
the civil aspect of the case must perforce continue. Thus this Court, in Salazar v. People, 35 held: If demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the accused has the right to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case unless the court also declares that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. In the instant case, the MeTC granted the demurrer and dismissed the case without any finding that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. 14.) Respondent did not assail the RTC order of remand. He thereby recognized that there is basis for a remand. 15.) Indicatively, respondent stands by his defense that he merely borrowed P1,500,000 with the remainder representing the interest, and that he already made a partial payment of P1,590,000. Petitioner counters, however, that the payments made by respondent pertained to other transactions. 37 Given these conflicting claims which are factual, a remand of the case would afford the fullest opportunity for the parties to ventilate, and for the trial court to resolve the same.
PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS, Petitioner, vs. SPOUSES JOSE C. GO and ELVY T. GO, Respondents. G.R. No. 175514 February 14, 2011
Nature: Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 filed by petitioner Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCom) seeking to set aside the July 28, 2006 Decision, and the November 27, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. CV No. 77714. The CA decision reversed and set aside the January 25, 2002 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 42, Manila (RTC), which granted the motion for summary judgment and rendered judgment on the basis of the pleadings and attached documents.
FACTS: On September 30, 1999, respondent Jose C. Go (Go) obtained two loans from PBCom, evidenced by two promissory notes, embodying his commitment to pay P17,982,222.22 for the first loan, and P80 million for the second loan, within a ten-year period from September 30, 1999 to September 30, 2009. To secure the two loans, Go executed two (2) pledge agreements, both dated September 29, 1999, covering shares of stock in Ever Gotesco Resources and Holdings, Inc. The first pledge, valued at P27,827,122.22, was to secure payment of the first loan, while the second pledge, valued at P70,155,100.00, was to secure the second loan. Two years later, however, the market value of the said shares of stock plunged to less than P0.04 per share. Thus, PBCom, as pledgee, notified Go in writing on June 15, 2001, that it was renouncing the pledge agreements. Later, PBCom filed before the RTC a complaint for sum of money with prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment against Go and his wife, Elvy T. Go (Spouses Go), docketed as Civil Case No. 01-101190. PBCom alleged that Spouses Go defaulted on the two (2) promissory notes, having paid only three (3) installments on interest paymentscovering the months of September, November and December 1999. Consequently, the entire balance of the obligations of Go became immediately due and demandable. PBCom made repeated demands upon Spouses Go for the payment of said obligations, but the couple imposed conditions on the payment, such as the lifting of garnishment effected by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) on Gos accounts. Spouses Go filed their Answer with Counterclaim denying the material allegations in the complaint. On September 28, 2001, PBCom filed a verified motion for summary judgment. PBCom contended that the Answer interposed no specific denials on the material averments in paragraphs 8 to 11 of the complaint such as the fact of default, the entire amount being already due and demandable by reason of default, and the fact that the bank had made repeated demands for the payment of the obligations. Spouses Go opposed the motion for summary judgment arguing that they had tendered genuine factual issues calling for the presentation of evidence. The RTC granted PBComs motion for summary judgment in its Judgment dated January 25, 2002. Spouses Go moved for a reconsideration but the motion was denied in an order dated March 20, 2002. In its Decision dated July 28, 2006, the CA reversed and set aside the assailed judgment of the RTC, denied PBComs motion for summary judgment, and ordered the remand of the records to the court of origin for trial on the merits. The CA could not agree with the conclusion of the RTC that Spouses Go admitted paragraphs 3, 4 and 7 of the complaint. It found the supposed admission to be insufficient to justify a rendition of summary judgment in the case for sum of money, since there were other allegations and 9
defenses put up by Spouses Go in their Answer which raised genuine issues on the material facts in the action. The CA agreed with Spouses Go that paragraphs 3 and 4 of the complaint merely dwelt on the fact that a contract of loan was entered into by the parties, while paragraph 7 simply emphasized the terms of the promissory notes executed by Go in favor of PBCom. The fact of default, the amount of the outstanding obligation, and the existence of a prior demand, which were all material to PBComs claim, were "hardly admitted" by Spouses Go in their Answer and were, in fact, effectively questioned in the other allegations in the Answer. PBComs motion for reconsideration was denied in a resolution dated November 27, 2006. Thus, this petition for review. PBCom anchors its arguments on the alleged implied admission by Spouses Go resulting from their failure to specifically deny the material allegations in the Complaint, citing as precedent Philippine Bank of Communications v. Court of Appeals, and Morales v. Court of Appeals. Spouses Go, on the other hand, argue that although admissions were made in the Answer, the special and affirmative defenses contained therein tendered genuine issues.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED OR ACTED IN GRAVE ABUSE OF JURISDICTION [DISCRETION] IN HOLDING THAT ISSUES WERE RAISED ABOUT THE FACT OF DEFAULT, THE AMOUNT OF THE OBLIGATION, AND THE EXISTENCE OF PRIOR DEMAND.
HELD: No The Court agrees with the CA that "[t]he supposed admission of defendants-appellants on the x x x allegations in the complaint is clearly not sufficient to justify the rendition of summary judgment in the case for sum of money, considering that there are other allegations embodied and defenses raised by the defendants-appellants in their answer which raise a genuine issue as to the material facts in the action." The CA correctly ruled that there exist genuine issues as to three material facts, which have to be addressed during trial: first, the fact of default; second, the amount of the outstanding obligation, and third, the existence of prior demand. Under the Rules, following the filing of pleadings, if, on motion of a party and after hearing, the pleadings, supporting affidavits, depositions and admissions on file show that, "except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law," summary judgment may be rendered. Under Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended, except as to the amount of damages, when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment may be allowed. Summary or accelerated judgment is a procedural technique aimed at weeding out sham claims or defenses at an early stage of litigation thereby avoiding the expense and loss of time involved in a trial. Under the Rules, summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of fact which call for the presentation of evidence in a full-blown trial. Even if on their face the pleadings appear to raise issues, when the affidavits, depositions and admissions show that such issues are not genuine, then summary judgment as prescribed by the Rules must ensue as a matter of law. The determinative factor, therefore, in a motion for summary judgment, is the presence or absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact. A "genuine issue" is an issue of fact which requires the presentation of evidence as distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false claim. When the facts as pleaded appear uncontested or undisputed, then there is no real or genuine issue or question as to the facts, and summary judgment is called for. The party who moves for summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating clearly the absence of any genuine issue of fact, or that the issue posed in the complaint is patently unsubstantial so as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial. Trial courts have limited authority to render summary judgments and may do so only when there is clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact. When the facts as pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested, proceedings for summary judgment cannot take the place of trial. Juxtaposing the Complaint and the Answer discloses that the material facts here are not undisputed so as to call for the rendition of a summary judgment. While the denials of Spouses Go could have been phrased more strongly or more emphatically, and the Answer more coherently and logically structured in order to overthrow any shadow of doubt that such denials were indeed made, the pleadings show that they did in fact raise material issues that have to be addressed and threshed out in a full-blown trial. In this case Spouses Go are not disclaiming knowledge of the transaction or the execution of the promissory notes or the pledge agreements sued upon. The matters in contention are, as the CA stated, whether or not respondents were in default, whether there was prior demand, and the amount of the outstanding loan. These are the matters that the parties disagree on and by which reason they set forth vastly different allegations in their pleadings which each will have to prove by presenting relevant and admissible evidence during trial. Furthermore, in stark contrast to the cited cases where one of the parties disclaimed knowledge of something so patently within his knowledge, in this case, respondents Spouses Go categorically stated in the Answer that there was no prior demand, that they were not in default, and that the 10
amount of the outstanding loan would have to be ascertained based on official records. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.SO ORDERED
MARIO J. MENDEZONA and TERESITA M. MENDEZONA, LUIS J. MENDEZONA and MARICAR L. MENDEZONA and TERESITA ADAD VDA. DE MENDEZONA, petitioners, vs. JULIO H. OZAMIZ, ROBERTO J. MONTALVAN, JOSE MA. OZAMIZ, CARMEN H. OZAMIZ, PAZ O. MONTALVAN, MA. TERESA O.F. ZARRAGA, CARLOS O. FORTICH, JOSE LUIS O. ROS, PAULITA O. RODRIGUEZ, and LOURDES O. LON, respondents. GR NO. 143370. February 6, 2002
TOPIC: Grounds for Motion for New Trial
DOCTRINE: It has been held that a lack of diligence is exhibited where the newly discovered evidence was necessary or proper under the pleadings, and its existence must have occurred to the party in the course of the preparation of the case, but no effort was made to secure it; there is a failure to make inquiry of persons who were likely to know the facts in question, especially where information was not sought from co-parties; there is a failure to seek evidence available through public records; there is a failure to discover evidence that is within the control of the complaining party; there is a failure to follow leads contained in other evidence; and, there is a failure to utilize available discovery procedures.
NATURE: Petition for review on certiorari of the CA decision which reversed and set aside the order of RTC in favor of the petitioners.
FACTS: 1. September 25, 1991- Civil Case suit for quieting of title filed petitioner spouses Mendezona as initial plaintiffs and later joined by others as co-plaintiffs in the amended complaints and in the amended complaint. a. Petitioner spouses owned a parcel land, which they purchased from Carmen Ozamis. b. Initiated the suit to remove a cloud on their said respective titles caused by the inscription thereon of a notice of lis pendens, which came about as a result of an incident in Special Proceeding of guardianship over the lands of Ozamis inititiated by respondents. c. It appears that on January 15, 1991, the respondents instituted the petition for guardianship alleging therein that Carmen Ozamiz, then 86 years old, after an illness in July 1987, had become disoriented and could not recognize most of her friends; that she could no longer take care of herself nor manage her properties by reason of her failing health, weak mind and absent-mindedness. d. Agreed that Ozamis needed a guardians, guardians filed their inventories and accounts listing Ozamis assets including the subject property which transferred to the petitioner spouses by virtue of the Deed of Sale. Respondents caused the inscription on the titles of petitioners a notice of lis penden thus giving rise to the suit for quieting of title filed by herein petitioners. 2. Respondents answer: opposed the petitioners claim of ownership of the Lahug property and alleged that the titles issued in the petitioners names are defective and illegal, and the ownership of the said property was acquired in bad faith and without value inasmuch as the consideration for the sale is grossly inadequate and unconscionable. Respondents further alleged that at the time of the sale on April 28, 1989 Carmen Ozamiz was already ailing and not in full possession of her mental faculties; and that her properties having been placed in administration, she was in effect incapacitated to contract with petitioners. 3. RTC- in favor of the petitioners a. The property described in the complaint was sold, with reservation of usufructuary rights by Carmen Ozamiz to the plaintiffs under a valid contract, voluntarily and deliberately entered into while she was of sound mind, for sufficient and good consideration, and without fraud, force, undue influence or intimidation having been exercised upon her, and consequently, the Court orders the defendants herein to acknowledge and recognize the plaintiffs title to the aforecited property and to refrain from further clouding the same b. The Notice of Lis Pendens affecting the property should be eliminated from the record and the Register of Deeds of Cebu City is ordered to expunge the same. 4. CA-reversed- sale null and void and cancellation of certification 11
of title issued to petitioners a. Sale was simulated failed to prove that the consideration was actually paid, and, furthermore, that at the time of the execution of the contract the mental faculties of Carmen Ozamiz were already seriously impaired. 5. Petitioners filed a MR then filed a motion for a new trial and/or for reception of evidence. a. They contended, among other things, that the appellate court totally ignored the testimony of Judge Teodorico Durias regarding the mental condition of Carmen Ozamiz a month before the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale in question. The said testimony was taken in the Special Proceeding. However, Judge Durias was not presented as a witness in Civil Case.Petitioners alleged that Judge Duriass testimony is a newly-discovered evidence which could not have been discovered prior to the trial in the court below by the exercise of due diligence. b. CA- denied both motions
ISSUE: Whether the testimony of J udge Durias be considered as newly discovered evidence as ground for the motion for new trial
HELD: NO. We find that the requirement of reasonable diligence has not been met by the petitioners. A motion for new trial upon the ground of newly discovered evidence is properly granted only where there is concurrence of the following requisites, namely: o (a) the evidence had been discovered after trial; o (b) the evidence could not have been discovered and produced during trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; and o (c) the evidence is material and not merely corroborative, cumulative or impeaching and is of such weight that if admitted, would probably alter the result. All three (3) requisites must characterize the evidence sought to be introduced at the new trial. We find that the requirement of reasonable diligence has not been met by the petitioners. o As early as the pre-trial of the case at bar, the name of Judge Durias has already cropped up as a possible witness for the defendants, herein respondents. That the respondents chose not to present him is not an indicia per se of suppression of evidence, since a party in a civil case is free to choose who to present as his witness. Neither can Judge Durias testimony in another case be considered as newly discovered evidence since the facts to be testified to by Judge Durias which were existing before and during the trial, could have been presented by the petitioners at the trial below. The testimony of Judge Durias has been in existence waiting only to be elicited from him by questioning. o It has been held that a lack of diligence is exhibited where the newly discovered evidence was necessary or proper under the pleadings, and its existence must have occurred to the party in the course of the preparation of the case, but no effort was made to secure it; there is a failure to make inquiry of persons who were likely to know the facts in question, especially where information was not sought from co-parties; there is a failure to seek evidence available through public records; there is a failure to discover evidence that is within the control of the complaining party; there is a failure to follow leads contained in other evidence; and, there is a failure to utilize available discovery procedures. o Thus, the testimony of Judge Durias cannot be considered as newly discovered evidence to warrant a new trial.
ROWENA PADILLA-RUMBAUA, v. EDWARD RUMBAUA, G.R. No. 166738 August 14, 2009
DOCTRINE: A remand of the case to the RTC for further proceedings amounts to the grant of a new trial that is not procedurally proper at this stage. Section 1 of Rule 37 provides that an aggrieved party may move the trial court to set aside a judgment or final order already rendered and to grant a new trial within the period for taking an appeal. In addition, a motion for new trial may be filed only on the grounds of (1) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence that could not have been guarded against by ordinary prudence, and by reason of which the aggrieved partys rights have probably been impaired; or (2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, the aggrieved party could not have discovered and produced at the trial, and that would probably alter the result if presented. Granting arguendo that the petitioners counsel had been negligent, the negligence that would justify a new trial must be excusable, i.e. one that ordinary diligence and prudence could not have guarded against.
NATURE: Petition for Review on Certiorari 12
FACTS: 1. The petitioner alleged that the respondent was psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of marriage as shown by the following circumstances: the respondent reneged on his promise to live with her under one roof after finding work; he failed to extend financial support to her; he blamed her for his mothers death; he represented himself as single in his transactions; and he pretended to be working in Davao, although he was cohabiting with another woman. a. She and the respondent were childhood neighbors and became sweethearts but the respondents family did not approve of their relationship. After graduation from college, the respondent promised to marry the petitioner as soon as he found a job. The job came in 1993, when the Philippine Air Lines (PAL) accepted the respondent as a computer engineer. The respondent proposed to the petitioner that they first have a secret marriage in order not to antagonize his parents. The petitioner agreed; they were married in 1993. The petitioner and the respondent, however, never lived together. b. For the first 6 months, they saw each other every da but respondent refused to live with her for fear that his application for a PAL scholarship would be affected if known to public. Seven months into their marriage, the couples daily meetings became occasional and they would have sexual trysts in motels. Later that year, the respondent lost his employment with PAL. c. Their respective families discovered their marriage. The respondents mother tried to convince him to go to the United States, but he refused. To appease his mother, he continued living separately from the petitioner. The respondent forgot to greet the petitioner during her birthday in 1992 and likewise failed to send her greeting cards on special occasions. The respondent indicated as well in his visa application that he was single. d. In April 1995, the respondents mother died to which he blamed petitioner, associating his mothers death to the pain that the discovery of his secret marriage brought. e. In 1997, respondent informed the petitioner that he had found a job in Davao. A year later, the petitioner and her mother went to the respondents house in Novaliches and found him cohabiting with another woman. Their communication ceased thereafter. 2. Summons was served on the respondent through substituted service, as personal service proved futile. 3. The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the petition. 4. Aside from her oral testimony, the petitioner also presented a certified true copy of their marriage contract; and the testimony, curriculum vitae, and psychological report of clinical psychologist Dr. Nedy Lorenzo Tayag. 5. The RTC nullified the parties marriage in its decision of April 19, 2002. The trial court saw merit in the testimonies of the petitioner and Dr. Tayag a. Respondent in this case, is revealed to operate in a very self-centered manner as he believes that the world revolves around him. His egocentrism made it so easy for him to deceitfully use others for his own advancement with an extreme air of confidence and dominance. He would do actions without any remorse or guilt feelings towards others especially to that of petitioner. b. It would appear that the foregoing narration are the attendant facts in this case which show the psychological incapacity of respondent, at the time of the celebration of the marriage of the parties, to enter into lawful marriage and to discharge his marital responsibilities (See Articles 68 to 71, Family Code). This incapacity is declared grave, severe and incurable. 6. The Republic, through the OSG, appealed the RTC decision to the CA. The CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision, and denied the nullification of the parties marriage a. the evidence presented must show that the incapacitated party was mentally or physically ill so that he or she could not have known the marital obligations assumed, knowing them, could not have assumed them. 7. The petitioner moved to reconsider the decision, but the CA denied her motion in its resolution. Petitioner prays that the RTCs and the CAs decisions be reversed and set aside, and the case be remanded to the RTC for further proceedings; in the event or, that the CAs decision be set aside and the RTCs decision be reinstated. 8. The Republic maintained in its comment that: (a) A.M. No. 02-11-10- SC (removed the necessity for a certification stating the reasons of the Republics agreement or opposition the petition to annul) was applicable although it took effect after the promulgation of Molina; (b) invalidating the trial courts decision and remanding the case for further proceedings were not proper; and (c) the petitioner failed to establish respondents psychological incapacity
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ISSUE: WON the lower courts decisions and the remand of the case to the RTC for further reception of evidence are procedurally permissible
HELD: NO. A remand of the case to the RTC for further proceedings amounts to the grant of a new trial that is not procedurally proper at this stage. Section 1 of Rule 37 provides that an aggrieved party may move the trial court to set aside a judgment or final order already rendered and to grant a new trial within the period for taking an appeal. In addition, a motion for new trial may be filed only on the grounds of (1) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence that could not have been guarded against by ordinary prudence, and by reason of which the aggrieved partys rights have probably been impaired; or (2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, the aggrieved party could not have discovered and produced at the trial, and that would probably alter the result if presented.
In the present case, the petitioner cites the inadequacy of the evidence presented by her former counsel as basis for a remand. She did not, however, specify the inadequacy. That the RTC granted the petition for declaration of nullity prima facie shows that the petitioners counsel had not been negligent in handling the case. Granting arguendo that the petitioners counsel had been negligent, the negligence that would justify a new trial must be excusable, i.e. one that ordinary diligence and prudence could not have guarded against.
Blunders and mistakes in the conduct of the proceedings in the trial court as a result of the ignorance, inexperience or incompetence of counsel do not qualify as a ground for new trial. If such were to be admitted as valid reasons for re-opening cases, there would never be an end to litigation so long as a new counsel could be employed to allege and show that the prior counsel had not been sufficiently diligent, experienced or learned. This will put a premium on the willful and intentional commission of errors by counsel, with a view to securing new trials in the event of conviction, or an adverse decision, as in the instant case.
We do not blame the petitioner for the move to secure a remand of this case to the trial courts for the introduction of additional evidence; the petitioners evidence in its present state is woefully insufficient to support the conclusion that the petitioners marriage to the respondent should be nullified on the ground of the respondents psychological incapacity.
As we ruled in Molina, however, it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological illness. The psychological illness that must afflict a party at the inception of the marriage should be a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive the party of his or her awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she was then about to assume.
WHEREFORE, in view of these considerations, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals dated June 25, 2004 and January 18, 2005, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 75095. SO ORDERED.
SPOUSES MICHAELANGELO and GRACE MESINA, petitioners, vs. HUMBERTO D. MEER, respondent.
G.R. No. 146845 July 2, 2002 Puno, J .
Doctrine: Relief from judgment is an equitable remedy and is allowed only under exceptional circumstances and only if fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence is present. Where the defendant has other available or adequate remedy such as a motion for new trial or appeal from the adverse decision, he cannot avail himself of this remedy.
Facts:
1. Respondent Humberto Meer is a registered owner of a parcel of land (with TCT) located at Lot 15, Block 5, Pandacan, Manila.
2. Sometime in June 1993, he applied for a loan to construct a house thereon. However, he discovered that his certificate of title has been cancelled and a new one was issued in the name of spouses Sergio and Lerma Bunquin.
3. The Spouses Bunquin acquired said property by virtue of a deed of sale dated June 3, 1985 purportedly executed by respondent (Meer) in their favor.
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4. On January 12, 1994, respondent sought the cancellation of this second TCT with the MTC of Manila.
> On the same day, a notice of lis pendens was annotated at the back of TCT No. 166074.
5. On June 15, 1994, while the case was pending, the TCT of the Spouses Bunquin was cancelled and replaced by another issued in the name of the petitioners, spouses Michaelangelo and Grace Mesina.
6. It appears that the subject property has been conveyed to the petitioners on September 28, 1993, even prior to the annotation of lis pendens.
> The Absolute Deed of Sale evidencing the conveyance was notarized on the same day, including the payment of taxes appurtenant thereto.
> The transfer of the title from Lerma Bunquin to petitioners was effected only on June 15, 1994 because of some requirements imposed by the National Housing Authority.
7. Due to the foregoing developments, Meer impleaded petitioners as additional party defendants.
8. Defendant-spouses Bunquin never appeared during the hearings, leading the court to declare them in default.
> Petitioners, however, participated actively in defense of their position.
9. In its Decision dated February 16, 1998, the trial court ruled that the alleged sale between Meer and Banquin was fraudulent.
> However, petitioners were adjudged buyers in good faith and thus were entitled to the possession of the subject property.
> While the Defendant spouses Sergio and Lerma Bunquin were ordered: a. To pay plaintiff the value of the subject property based on the prevailing price on the date of the decision; b. To pay the plaintiff exemplary damages in the amount of P20, 0000.00; c. To pay attorneys fees in the amount of P30, 000.00.
10. Respondent Meer filed an MR against the said Decision but the trial court denied the same.
11. Respondent thereafter filed an Appeal with the RTC.
> the RTC reversed the decision of the MeTC and ruled that petitioners were not purchasers in good faith, reasoning that it is the registration of the Deed of Sale, and not the date of its consummation that will confer title to the property. Since the Deed of Sale was registered subsequent to the annotation of the lis pendens, petitioners were bound by the outcome of the case
12. Petitioners appealed to the CA, which affirmed the ruling of the RTC.
13. On July 17, 2000 and after reglementary period for appeal had lapsed, petitioners filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment and prayed that the CA set aside its resolution for the following reasons: (a) extrinsic fraud was committed which prevented petitioners from presenting his case to the court and/or was used to procure the judgment without fair submission of the controversy; (b) mistake and excusable negligence has prevented the petitioner from taking an appeal within the prescribed period; and (c) petitioner has good and substantial defense in his action.
> On the first ground, petitioners argued that there has been collusion between the respondent and the Bunquins during the trial of the case at the Metropolitan Trial Court. Had the Bunquins testified in court as to the validity of the Deed of Sale as well as the authenticity of the respondents signature, petitioners argued that the result would have been in their favor.
> Anent the second ground, petitioners averred that their failure to file the requisite appeal on time was largely due to the delay of counsel of record to produce the requested documents of the case.
> Finally, petitioners claim that they have good and substantial defense.
> CA: "As aptly pointed out by the respondent, the first ground raised by the petitioner spouses should have been filed before the court of origin, the Metropolitan Court of Manila, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 38 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure as amended. As to the second ground, the petitioner spouses who were the prevailing party before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, did not mention the alleged extrinsic fraud when the case was on appeal before the Regional Trial Court. Petitioners cannot now challenge the decision of this Court for the fraud allegedly perpetrated in the court of origin. Besides, it is extremely doubtful that the remedy of a petition for relief under Rule 38 may be availed of from a judgment of the CA in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
14. Petitioners MR was denied, hence, this Petition for Review.
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Issue:
Is a Petition for Relief under Rule 38 available as a remedy against the judgment of the CA promulgated in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction? No!!!
If so, whether or not the grounds relied on by the petitioners are sufficient to give due course to the petition? No.
Held: After careful examination of the case, we resolve to deny the petition.
Relief from judgment is an equitable remedy and is allowed only under exceptional circumstances and only if fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence is present. Where the defendant has other available or adequate remedy such as a motion for new trial or appeal from the adverse decision, he cannot avail himself of this remedy.
Under the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition for relief must be filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, final order or other proceeding to be set aside and must be accompanied with affidavits showing the fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence relied upon, and the facts constituting the petitioners good and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be. Most importantly, it should be filed with the same court which rendered the decision, viz:
"Section 1. Petition for relief from judgment, order, or other proceedings.- When a judgment or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter taken against a party in any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a petition in such court and in the same case praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be set aside. As revised, Rule 38 radically departs from the previous rule as it now allows the Metropolitan or
Municipal Trial Court which decided the case or issued the order to hear the petition for relief. Under the old rule, petition for relief from the judgment or final order of municipal trial courts should be filed with the regional trial court, viz:
"Section 1. Petition to Court of First Instance for Relief from Judgment of inferior court.- When a judgment is rendered by an inferior court on a case, and a party thereto by fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, has been unjustly deprived of a hearing therein, or has been prevented from taking an appeal, he may file a petition in the Court of First Instance of the province in which the original judgment was rendered, praying that such judgment be set aside and the case tried upon its merits.
Section 2. Petition to Court of First Instance for relief from the judgment or other proceeding thereof.- When a judgment order is entered, or any other proceeding is taken against a party in a Court of First Instance through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a petition in such court and in the same cause praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be set aside."
Petitioners argue that apart from this change, the present Rule extends the remedy of relief to include judgments or orders of the Court of Appeals since the Rule uses the phrase "any court". We disagree.
The procedural change in Rule 38 is in line with Rule 5, prescribing uniform procedure for municipal and regional trial courts and designation of municipal/metropolitan trial courts as courts of record. While Rule 38 uses the phrase "any court", it refers only to municipal/metropolitan and regional trial courts.
The procedure in the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court are governed by separate provisions of the Rules of Court and may, from time to time, be supplemented by additional rules promulgated by the Supreme Court through resolutions or circulars. As it stands, neither the Rules of Court nor the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals allow the remedy of petition for relief in the Court of Appeals.
Petitioners beg this Court, on equitable grounds, not to strictly construe the Rules, arguing that their "only earthly possession" is at stake. Indeed, in certain occasions, this Court has, in the interest of substantial justice and in exercise of its equity jurisdiction, construed the Rules of Court with liberality.
Nevertheless, the circumstances obtaining in the present case do not convince this Court to take exception.
As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, the petitioners allegation of extrinsic fraud should have been brought at issue in the Metropolitan Trial Court. If they truly believe that the default of the spouses Mesina prejudiced their rights, they should have questioned this from the beginning. Yet, they chose to participate in the proceedings and actively presented their defense. And their efforts were rewarded as the Metropolitan Trial Court ruled in their favor.
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When the respondent appealed the case to the Regional Trial Court, they never raised this issue. Even after the Regional Trial Court reversed the finding of the MeTC, and the Court of Appeals sustained this reversal, petitioners made no effort to bring this issue for consideration. This Court will not allow petitioners, in guise of equity, to benefit from their own negligence.
The same is true with regard to the defenses forwarded by the petitioners in support of their petition. These contentions should have been raised in the MeTC, as they have been available to them since the beginning.
Finally, it is a settled rule that relief will not be granted to a party who seeks to be relieved from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence, or a mistaken mode of procedure; otherwise, the petition for relief will be tantamount to reviving the right of appeal which has already been lost either because of inexcusable negligence or due to mistaken mode of procedure by counsel. Petitioners, however, place the blame on their counsel and invoke honest mistake of law. They contend that they lack legal education, hence, were not aware of the required period for filing an appeal.
In exceptional cases, when the mistake of counsel is so palpable that it amounts to gross negligence, this Court affords a party a second opportunity to vindicate his right. But this opportunity is unavailing in the instant case, especially since petitioners have squandered the various opportunities available to them at the different stages of this case. Public interest demands an end to every litigation and a belated effort to reopen a case that has already attained finality will serve no purpose other than to delay the administration of justice.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, this petition is DENIED for lack of merit and the assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
MA. PATRICIA GARCIA, BELEN G. GUTIERREZ, NICANOR GUTIERREZ, GRACE M.B. GUTIERREZ, CAROLYN M.B. GUTIERREZ, GERWIN GARCIA, GERSON GARCIA, and GILMER GARCIA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. PEDRO M. ICAMINA, Judge of the Regional Trial Court, 6th Judicial Region, Branch 9, Kalibo, Aklan; RURAL BANK OF SARA, INC., RAFAEL C. DINGLASAN, JR., MARIA ELENA I. DINGLASAN, ANTHONY CABUGSO and LEDA SUELLO [G.R. No. 117032. July 27, 2000]
Nature of Action: Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul and set aside the CA decision dated August 31, 1994, in CA-G.R. SP. No. 31231, sustaining the RTC Orderdenying petitioners' motion for summary judgment.
Doctrine: (On Motion for Summary Judgment) A summary judgment is one granted upon motion by a party for an expeditious settlement of the case, there appearing from the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits that there are no important questions or issues of fact posed (except as to the amount of damages) and therefore, the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. But this rule does not vest in the trial court jurisdiction to summarily try the issues on depositions and affidavits but gives it limited authority to render summary judgment only when there is no genuine issue of material fact at bar. In the case under consideration, the pleadings and exhibits on record reveal that there exist genuine issues on material or pertinent facts sufficient to preclude a rendition of summary judgment
FACTS: 1. On October 5, 1987, Florencio Junior Garcia, representing himself as attorney in fact of the petitioners, brought in the name of the latter, an action for collection of sum of money, against the private respondents, docketed as Civil Case No. 3777 before Branch 9, Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan. 2. The said complaint: a) That on Feb. 11, 1986, plaintiffs through their then Attorney in fact, (Florencio Junior Garcia) went to defendant Rural Bank, for the purpose of surrendering said Time Deposit Certificates, and to receive the payment from defendants of the amounts therein stated totaling P283,788, plus interest thereon at 17% per annum for 731 days or two years, the interest then amounting to P96,487.92 as of Feb. 11, 1986, for a total of P380,275.92 as of Feb. 11, 1986; b) That defendants acting through Anthony Casugbo and Leda Suello, Manager and Cashier respectively of defendant Rural Bank, refused to pay, and told plaintiffs' attorney in fact, to return after one month, which said attorney in fact did, not only one month thereafter, but on several other occasions thereafter either by himself (attorney in fact), or through other authorized representatives; on all of these occasions the promises to pay the time deposits and interest thereon were not fulfilled; c) That impatient at waiting, plaintiffs, on August 27, 1987, through counsel, sent a letter of demand to defendants, giving to defendants 30 days from receipt within which to pay the Time Deposit plus the interest increments thereof, which letter (Annex I) was received by them on Sept. 4, 1987 (Annex I-1); d) However, until the date of the filing of this complaint, which is more than 30 days from Sept. 4, 1987 defendants have not even 17
bothered to reply or to make any arrangements acceptable to plaintiffs;x x x" 3. Respondent Rural Bank of Sara, Inc., Anthony Cabugso, and Leda Suello, (manager and cashier, respectively, of respondent bank), filed their answer contending by way of special and affirmative defenses that: a) The Complaint states no cause of action against the defendants as the attorney-in-fact, Florencio Junior Garcia is neither empowered nor authorized to transact with the defendant bank as regards the time deposit certificationsthere was no reason at all to allow alleged attorney-in-fact, Florencio Junior Garcia, who never was properly authorized, to transact for and in behalf of said depositors; b) The herein attorney-in-fact, Florencio Junior Garcia, has no capacity to sue and be sued, being not the real party interest 4. The respondent spouses, DINGLASAN, likewise filed their answer contending by way of special and affirmative defenses, that: a) The complaint states no cause of action against defendants; b) There is no privity of contract between plaintiffs and defendants; c) Attorney-in-Fact Florencio Junior Garcia has no apparent authority from plaintiffs to file the instant complaint." 5. What the petitioners did was to present a Motion for Summary Judgment, asseverating that they are entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, since the pleadings and supporting affidavits submitted are barren of any genuine issue which may be controverted. 6. TRIAL COURT: denied the motion for summary judgment. 7. Dissatisfied, petitioners went to the Court of Appeals, theorizing that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in denying their subject motion. COURT OF APPEALS: upheld the lower court decision. Hence this present petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners' motion for summary judgment should have been granted?
HELD: No! Petition is devoid of merit. A summary judgment is one granted upon motion by a party for an expeditious settlement of the case, there appearing from the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits that there are no important questions or issues of fact posed (except as to the amount of damages) and therefore, the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. But this rule does not vest in the trial court jurisdiction to summarily try the issues on depositions and affidavits but gives it limited authority to render summary judgment only when there is NO genuine issue of material fact at bar. In the case under consideration, the pleadings and exhibits on record reveal that THERE EXIST genuine issues on material or pertinent facts sufficient to preclude a rendition of summary judgment
Sections 1 and 3, Rule 34, of the Rules of Court provide: "SECTION 1. Summary judgment for claimant. - A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time after the pleading in answer thereto has been served, move with supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof." "SEC. 3. Motion and proceedings thereon. - The motion shall be served at least ten (10) days before the time specified for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. After the hearing, the judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleading, depositions, and admissions on file together with the affidavits, show that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, the pleadings submitted below by the parties raise the following issues: "1. Whether or not Florencio Junior Garcia is properly authorized to file the complaint for the plaintiffs named in the title of the complaint. xxx....xxx....xxx 2. Whether or not defendants (private respondents) spouses Dinglasan may be held jointly and severally liable with their co-defendant (co-private respondent) rural bank."
GENUINE ISSUES ON PERTINENT FACTS SUFFICIENT TO PRECLUDE RENDITION OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT: (A) There is a need to find out whether Florencio Junior Garcia was duly authorized by the plaintiffs named in Civil Case No. 3777 to file the complaint against the private respondents. It is worthy to note that while the complaint states that the plaintiffs therein mentioned empowered Florencio Junior Garcia to collect the sums due them from the respondent bank, the records on hand show that only four of the eight plaintiffs executed a special power of attorney authorizing Florencio Junior Garcia to deal with respondent bank. But the undeniable fact, however, is that not one of the plaintiffs verified the contents of the complaint; and neither was there in the records a special power of attorney authorizing Florencio Junior Garcia to institute the present case against private respondents. Thus the issue of whether or not the plaintiffs named in Civil Case No. 3777, constituted Florencio Junior Garcia as their attorney in fact with authority to bring subject suit for collection of sum of 18
money against the private respondents. (B) Then too, the issue of whether or not petitioners have a cause of action against the spouses, Rafael Dinglasan and Maria Elena Dinglasan, calls for a trial on the merits. While the said respondent spouses insist that there is no privity of contract between them and the petitioners, the latter claim that the former "prevailed upon them" to time deposit their money with the respondent bank. Indeed, it is only upon presentation of evidence during the trial can it be determined whether the respondent spouses may be held jointly and severally liable with respondent bank.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. LI KA KIM alias ED, appellant. [G.R. No. 148586. May 25, 2004 VITUG, J .:]
TOPIC: New Trial DOCTRINE: Not one of the requisites of newly discovered evidence in order to justify a new trial are attendant in the present case: a. the evidence is discovered after trial; b. such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; and c. the evidence is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching, and of such weight that, if admitted, would likely change the judgment. FACTS: 1. Li Ka Kim alias Ed was charged with violation of Section 15, Article III, of Republic Act No. 6425, as so amended by Republic Act 7659 (Anti-Drugs Law) 2. Ed did not enter any plea during his arraignment so the court entered a plea of not guilty in his behalf. 3. RTC found Ed guilty with the following reasons: a. it hard to believe that Ed would be singled out by the police officers from scores of people at the mall where he was arrested and later indicted for selling shabu. b. a certain Tan Eng Hong, did not appear in court to corroborate his testimony. c. the car, as well as the license plate, used by Ed had been stolen, and that Ed was an undocumented alien as so shown by the letter, dated 13 October 2000, [6] of then Commissioner on Immigration and Deportation Rufus B. Rodriguez, to State Prosecutor Reynaldo J. Lugtu. 4. RTC convicted appellant and decreed the penalty of death considering the use of a motor vehicle to be an aggravating circumstance 5. 04 October 2002: Fernandez, Pacheco & Dizon Law Offices filed its entry of appearance as being the new counsel for appellant only to be substituted later by Guzman, Tanedo, &Acain Law Offices. 6. 01 September 2003: Ed filed a motion to remand the case for new trial. a. He attempted to overturn his conviction or, at the very least, to be given a chance for a new trial, citing Section 14, Rule 121, of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, because of newly discovered evidence i. NEW EVIDENCE: his passport which would establish his true identity as Huang Xiao Wei, a Chinese National, and as having entered the Philippines as a tourist. ii. Ed also invoked his constitutional right to an effective counsel, appellant chides his former counsel for having failed to secure and present his travel documents.
ISSUE: Whether his passport can be treated as new discovered evidence to grant the Motion for New Trial.
HELD: No. Judgment of conviction against appellant Li Ka Kim, a.k.a. Ed, is AFFIRMED with modification in that the penalty of DEATH imposed by the trial court is hereby reduced to RECLUSION PERPETUA. 2. The requisites of newly discovered evidence in order to justify a new trial are that a. the evidence is discovered after trial; b. such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; and c. the evidence is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching, and of such weight that, if admitted, would likely change the judgment. 3. Not one of the requisites mentioned is attendant. a. Eds passport could have easily been presented and produced during the trial. i. the presentation of Eds passport, would hardly be material to the outcome of the case since he was positively identified by the prosecution witnesses as being the perpetrator of the crime. ii. Ed even identified himself as Li Ka Kim at the trial and not as Huang Xiao Wei, that bolsters the 19
conclusion that appellant deliberately concealed his true identity in the nefarious enterprise. 4. On the issue of Death Penalty: The quantity of the drugs seized from appellant, which is 994.773 grams of shabu, warrants the application of the penalty under Section 16, in relation to Section 17, of Republic Act No. 7659, otherwise also known as An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes, of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos. Applying the provisions of Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, the lesser penalty should be imposed, there being neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances that can be considered, for the commission of the offense
MERCURY DRUG CORPORATION, petitioner vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and the SPOUSES EDUARDO AND CARMEN YEE, respondents. G.R. No. 138571 July 13, 2000
TOPIC: Relief from Judgment
DOCTRINE: A petition for relief from judgment (Rule 38) is an equitable remedy that is allowed only in exceptional cases when there is no other available or adequate remedy. When a party has another remedy available to him, which may be either a motion for new trial or appeal from an adverse decision of the trial court, and he was not prevented by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence from filing such motion or taking such appeal, he cannot avail himself of this petition.
FACTS: 1. Private Respondents (Yees) filed a complaint in the RTC against petitioner (Mercury Drug) for annulment and/or reformation of contract of lease covering (5) twos-storey units of a commercial building owned by Yees. 2. The complaint prayed that the contract be either annulled or the rentals be increased. 3. Yees demand for increase of rentals had been refused Petitioner lessee Mercury Drug Corporation on the ground that there was no official devaluation of the peso thus no basis for a rental increase. 4. On 28 February 1995, the lower court rendered in favour of petitioner Mercury Drug dismissing the complaint for annulment and/or reformation of contract was not supported by law and jurisprudence. 5. The former counsel for the Respondent (Yees) Atty. Willkom received a copy of the decision on 3 March 1995 but did not inform petitioners nor take any step to protect the interests of his clients by presenting a motion for reconsideration or taking an appeal. 6. Petitioners learned of the judgment only on 24 March 1995 when they visited his office. The 15-day period within which to appeal lapsed. On 15 May 1995 petitioners filed thru their present counsel a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 RTC - The lower court denied the petition. It ruled that considering the rule of notice to counsel as notice to client it becomes evidently clear that the requirements fixed by law and jurisprudence on petitioner for relief from judgment have not been met by the respondent Yees, ergo the petition must fail. 7. Respondents MR was denied. Hence, they appealed to the CA. CA - granted the petition and set aside the riling of the RTC. It held inapplicable the general rule that notice to counsel is notice to client. The Court of Appeals considered that it was precisely the inaction of the counsel of the YEES in not informing them of the decision which resulted in the lapse of the period to appeal forcing them to file their petition for relief through another lawyer. 8. MR was likewise denied. Hence, Petitioner filed petition for review on certiorari. Petitioners Contention: it contended that the respondents petition for relief from judgment failed to comply with the requirements of the Rules inasmuch as the petition was filed more than sixty days from the receipt by their lawyer of the decision of the RTC. Petitioner argues that it is long established by jurisprudence that notice to the counsel is binding upon the client and that the client is bound by the mistakes of his lawyer. The failure of the YEES lawyer to inform them of the decision resulting in the failure to appeal therefrom is not the accident, mistake or excusable negligence referred to in the Rules that would warrant the granting of the petition for relief.
ISSUE: WON Private respondents (Yees) timely filed their petition for relief under Rule 38.
HELD: NO. A petition for relief from judgment (Rule 38) is an equitable remedy that is allowed only in exceptional cases when there is no other available or adequate remedy. When a party has another remedy available to him, which may be either a motion for new trial or appeal from an adverse 20
decision of the trial court, and he was not prevented by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence from filing such motion or taking such appeal, he cannot avail himself of this petition.
In order for a petition for relief to be entertained by the court, the petitioner must satisfactorily show that he has faithfully and strictly complied with the provisions of Rule 38. It is also incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the said petition was filed within the reglementary period specified in Section 3, Rule 38 (within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or other proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six (6) months after such judgment or final order was entered, or such proceeding was taken). And the rule is that the reglementary period is reckoned from the time the partys counsel receives notice of the decision for notice to counsel of the decision is notice to the party for purposes of Section 3 of Rule 38. In the present case, the YEES were served a copy of the judgment of the lower court through their counsel, Attorney Ralph Lou I. Willkom on March 3, 1995. Thus, the YEES are considered to have received notice on March 3, 1995 when their counsel was served notice and not on March 24, 1995 when they actually learned of the adverse decision. Consequently, their petition for relief, which was filed on May 15, 1995 or over sixty days from notice of their counsel, was filed out of time. The SC has consistently held that the failure of a partys counsel to notify him on time of the adverse judgment to enable him to appeal therefrom is negligence, which is not excusable. However, notice sent to counsel of record is binding upon the client and the neglect or failure of counsel to inform him of an adverse judgment resulting in the loss of his right to appeal is not a ground for setting aside a judgment valid and regular on its face. Petition is GRANTED. RTC decision reinstated.
G.R. No. 141973 June 28, 2005 PHILIPPINE PHOSPHATE FERTILIZER CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondent.
Doctrine: The "mistake" that is allowable in Rule 37 is one which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against. Negligence to be "excusable" must also be one which ordinary diligence and prudence could not have guarded against and by reason of which the rights of an aggrieved party have probably been impaired.53 The test of excusable negligence is whether a party has acted with ordinary prudence while transacting important business.
FACTS: 1. Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Corporation (Philphos) is a domestic corporation registered with the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA). 2. It manufactures fertilizers for domestic and international distribution and as such, utilizes fuel, oil and other petroleum products which it procures locally from Petron Philippines Corporation (Petron). 3. Petron initially pays the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs the taxes and duties imposed upon the petroleum products. Petron is then reimbursed by petitioner when Petron sells such petroleum products to the petitioner. 4. In a letter dated August 28, 1995, petitioner sought a refund of specific taxes paid on the purchases of petroleum products from Petron for the period of September 1993 to December 1994 in the total amount of P602,349.00 which claim is pursuant to the incentives it enjoyed by virtue of its EPZA registration. 5. Since the two-year period within which petitioner could file a case for tax refund before the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) was about to expire and no action had been taken by the BIR, petitioner instituted a petition for review before the CTA against the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR). 6. During the trial, to prove that the duties imposed upon the petroleum products had been duly paid for by petitioner, petitioner presented: a. a Certification from Petron dated August 17, 1995; b. a schedule of petroleum products sold and delivered to petitioner detailing the volume of sales and the excise taxes paid thereon; c. photocopies of Authority to Accept Payment for Excise Taxes issued by the CIR pertaining to petroleum products purchased; d. as well as the testimony of Sylvia Osorio, officer of Petron, to attest to the summary and certification presented. 7. The CIR did not present any evidence to controvert the ones presented by petitioner, nor did it file an opposition to petitioners formal offer of evidence. 8. On August 11, 1998, the CTA promulgated its Decision finding that while petitioner is exempt from the payment of excise taxes because petitioner is a EPZA registered entity, it failed to sufficiently prove that it is entitled to refund in this particular case since it did not submit invoices to support the summary of petroleum products sold and delivered to it by Petron. 21
a. (Petitioner is entitled to refund from certain local taxes as an EPZA entity as a general rule. Its just that petitioner did not submit invoices to prove the amount of refund, if any. Thats why the CTA ruled against petitioner, because of lack of proof to the refund.) 9. On August 31, 1998, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that it failed to submit invoices because it thought that the presentation of said invoices was not necessary to prove the claim for refund, since petitioners previous claims, in CTA Case Nos. 4654, 4993 and 4994, involving similar facts, were granted by the CTA even without the presentation of invoices. a. It then prayed that the CTA decision be reconsidered and its claim for refund be allowed, or in the alternative, allow petitioner to present and offer the invoices in evidence to present its claim. 10. The CTA denied the motion for reconsideration on January 6, 1999, explaining that: a. CTA Circular No. 1-95, beginning January 25, 1995, was not yet in effect at the time of the previous CTA cases; b. In the instant case, the Petition for Review was filed on September 1, 1995; c. The said CTA Circular No. 1-95 stated that for voluminous documents to be presented in the CTA, (a) a Summary containing the total amount/s of the tax account or tax paid for the period involved and a chronological or numerical list of the numbers, dates and amounts covered by the invoices or receipts; and (b) a Certification of an independent Certified Public Accountant attesting to the correctness of the contents of the summary after making an examination and evaluation of the voluminous receipts and invoices; d. No such summary or Accountants certificate was presented before the CTA; and that e. The prayer to present additional evidence partakes of the nature of a motion for new trial under Section 1 Rule 37 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It has already been emphasized in several cases that failure to present evidence already existing at the time of trial does not warrant the grant of a new trial because said evidence can no longer be considered newly discovered but is more in the nature of forgotten evidence. Neither can such inadvertence on the part of the counsel to present said evidence qualify as excusable negligence. 11. CTA Presiding Judge Ernesto D. Acosta dissented with the view that in the interest of justice, petitioner should be given a chance to prove its case by allowing it to present the invoices of its purchases, stating that the ground stated by petitioner in his motion for reconsideration could easily fall under the phrase "mistake or excusable negligence" as a ground for new trial under Sec. 1(a) of Rule 37 and not under the phrase "newly discovered evidence" as stated in our said resolution. 12. On January 25, 1999, petitioner filed another motion for reconsideration with motion for new trial praying that it be allowed to present an additional witness and to have invoices and receipts pre- marked in accordance with CTA Circular No. 1-95.13, which the CTA denied for the reason that it found no convincing reason to reverse its earlier decision and the motion for new trial was filed beyond the period prescribed by Sec. 1, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court as well as for appeals as provided under Sec. 4, Rule 43. 13. Petitioner then went to the Court of Appeals (CA) which dismissed the appeal because the affidavit of non-forum shopping was not signed by the petitioner but by counsel. 14. MR was denied.
ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals should have given due course to the Petition for Review? Yes!
2. Whether or not the Court of Tax Appeals should have granted petitioners claim for refund? REMANDED FOR ACCEPTANCE OF INVOICE EVIDENCES.
HELD: Issue #1 1. The primary question that has to be resolved is whether an Affidavit of Non-Forum Shopping, erroneously signed by counsel, may be cured by subsequent compliance. 2. Generally, subsequent compliance with the requirement of affidavit of non-forum shopping does not excuse a party from failure to comply in the first instance. 3. There are instances, however, when we treated compliance with the rule with relative liberality, especially when there are circumstances or compelling reasons making the strict application of the rule clearly unjustified. a. (Lots of cases cited but basically, relaxing of the rules depends on substantial justice and special circumstance) 4. Here, the affidavit of non-forum shopping was signed by petitioners counsel. Upon receipt of the resolution of the CA, however, which dismissed its petition for non-compliance with the rules on affidavit of non-forum shopping, petitioner submitted, together with its motion for reconsideration, an affidavit signed by petitioners president in compliance with the said rule. 5. We deem this to be sufficient especially in view of the merits of the case, which may be considered as a special circumstance or a 22
compelling reason that would justify tempering the hard consequence of the procedural requirement on non-forum shopping.
Issue #2: 1. If the State expects its taxpayers to observe fairness and honesty in paying their taxes, so must it apply the same standards against itself in refunding excessive payments. When it is undisputed that a taxpayer is entitled to a refund, the State should not invoke technicalities to keep money not belonging to it. No one, not even the State, should enrich oneself at the expense of another. 2. The general rule is that claimants of tax refunds bear the burden of proving the factual basis of their claims. a. This is because tax refunds are in the nature of tax exemptions, the statutes of which are construed strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority. 3. In this case, there is no dispute that petitioner is entitled to exemption from the payment of excise taxes by virtue of its being an EPZA registered enterprise. 4. As stated by the CTA, the only thing left to be determined is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the amount claimed for refund. 5. Petitioners entire claim for refund, however, was denied for petitioners failure to present invoices allegedly in violation of CTA Circular No. 1-95 a. Nowhere in said Circular is it stated that invoices are required to be presented in claiming refunds. What is says is: b. 1. The party who desires to introduce as evidence such voluminous documents must present: (a) Summary containing the total amount/s of the tax account or tax paid for the period involved and a chronological or numerical list of the numbers, dates and amounts covered by the invoices or receipts; and (b) a Certification of an independent Certified Public Accountant attesting to the correctness of the contents of the summary after making an examination and evaluation of the voluminous receipts and invoices. Such summary and certification must properly be identified by a competent witness from the accounting firm. (Emphasis supplied) 6. The CTA in denying petitioners motion for reconsideration, also mentioned for the first time that petitioners failure to present "a certification of an independent CPA" is another ground that justified the denial of its claim for refund. a. The certification of an independent CPA is not another mandatory requirement under the Circular which petitioner failed to comply with. b. It is rather a requirement that must accompany the invoices should one decide to present invoices under the Circular. 7. Since CTA Circular No. 1-95 did not make it mandatory to present invoices, coupled with the previous cases of petitioner where the certifications issued by Petron sufficed, it is understandable that petitioner did not think it necessary to present invoices and the accompanying certifications when it filed the present case for refund before the CTA. 8. Even then, petitioner, in its motion for reconsideration, asked the CTA for an opportunity to present invoices to substantiate its claims. But this was denied by the CTA explaining that its prayer to present additional evidence partakes of the nature of a motion for new trial under Section 1, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court. a. The CTA held that under such rule, failure to present evidence already existing at the time of trial does not warrant the grant of a new trial because such evidence is not newly discovered but is more in the nature of forgotten evidence which is not excusable. 9. On this point, we agree with the dissenting opinion of CTA Presiding Judge Ernesto D. Acosta who stated that the reason could easily fall under the phrase "mistake or excusable negligence" as a ground for new trial under Sec. 1(a) of Rule 37 and not under the phrase "newly discovered evidence" as stated in our said resolution. 10. Sec. 1, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court provides as follows:
SECTION 1. Grounds of and period for filing motion for new trial or reconsideration.--- Within the period for taking an appeal, the aggrieved party may move the trial court to set aside the judgment or final order and grant a new trial for one or more of the following causes materially affecting the substantial rights of said party:
(a) Fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against and by reason of which such aggrieved party has probably been impaired in his rights; or
(b) Newly discovered evidence, which could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial, and which if presented would probably alter the result. 23
11. It is true that petitioner could not move for new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence because in order to have a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence, it must be proved that: a. (a) the evidence was discovered after the trial; b. (b) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial with reasonable diligence; c. (c) it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching; and d. (d) it is of such weight that, if admitted, will probably change the judgment. 12. This does not mean however, that petitioner is altogether barred from having a new trial. a. As pointed out by Judge Acosta, the reasons put forth by petitioner could fall under mistake or excusable negligence. b. The "mistake" that is allowable in Rule 37 is one which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against. c. Negligence to be "excusable" must also be one which ordinary diligence and prudence could not have guarded against and by reason of which the rights of an aggrieved party have probably been impaired. d. The test of excusable negligence is whether a party has acted with ordinary prudence while transacting important business. 13. Respondent also argues that petitioners motion for new trial was filed out of time and should therefore be dismissed in view of Sec. 1, Rule 37 and Sec. 4, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. a. Sec 1, Rule 37: Within the period for taking an appeal, the aggrieved party may move the trial court to set aside the judgment or final order and grant a new trial b. Sec. 4, Rule 43: 15 days from time of judgement to appeal, extendible for another 15 days upon proper motion and the payment of the full amount of the docket fee before the expiration of the reglementary period, but only in the most meritorious cases. 14. It is borne by the records however that in its first motion for reconsideration duly filed on time, petitioner had already prayed that it be allowed to present and offer the pieces of evidence deemed lacking by the CTA in its Decision dated August 11, 1998. a. Thus, while it named its pleading as a Motion for New Trial only in its motion dated January 25, 1999, petitioner should not be deemed to have moved for new trial only at such time. 15. In cases before tax courts, Rules of Court applies only by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient shall be liberally construed in order to promote its objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. a. Since it is not disputed that petitioner is entitled to tax exemption, it should not be precluded from presenting evidence to substantiate the amount of refund it is claiming on mere technicality especially in this case, where the failure to present invoices at the first instance was adequately explained by petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed resolution is SET ASIDE and the case REMANDED to the Court of Tax Appeals for the reception of evidence, particularly invoices supporting the schedules of petroleum products sold and delivered to petitioner by Petron and the corresponding certification of an independent Certified Public Accountant, for the proper and immediate determination of the amount to be refunded to petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 115813. October 16, 2000] EDUARDO FERNANDEZ, TERESITA FERNANDEZ-CAVA, LETICIA FERNANDEZ-TORREA, ADOLFO FERNANDEZ, GLORIA FERNANDEZ- HUGONIN, ZENAIDA FERNANDEZ-ILEDAN, and ESMERNA FERNANDEZ- LEGASPI, AS HEIRS OF PRUDENCIO FERNANDEZ, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER ELEVENTH DIVISION), JESUS CIOCON, CIRILO CIOCON, VICENTE URBANOZO, ALFONSO JARDENIL and ANUNCIACION JOVER, LEVITA LLERA (ACCOMPANIED BY HER HUSBAND ANTONIO BERLIZO), JOEL LLERA, FEBE LLERA (ACCOMPANIED BY HER HUSBAND LUCIANO LIM), SALVACION N. VDA. DE LLERA, HOSPICIO PEDRINA, RUFO CALVEZ, and MONSERRAT VILLABA, respondents
NATURE: Petition for Review
FACTS: 1. This petition involves Lot 435 of the Bacolod cadastre originally titled to petitioners predecessor-in-interest, Prudencio Fernandez.
2. After Fernandez acquired ownership of the lot, he tried to eject private respondent Jesus Ciocon and some other occupants off the property.
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3. Allegedly, Ciocon asked Fernandez that he be given a last chance to repurchase the lot. Fernandez refused.
4. After this rejection, Ciocon instituted against Fernandez Civil Case No. 7687 before the RTC of Negros Occidental for reconveyance of the land or what remains of it after deducting portions already sold to others.
5. Ciocon claimed he had paid for the full reconveyance price to Fernandez on for which Fernandez signed a receipt. Fernandez through his guardian ad litem denied receiving any money from Ciocon and averred that Ciocons receipt was a forgery.
6. There are several intervenors in said suit who claimed that they had purchased portions of Lot 435 from Ciocon. Those civil case were eventually consolidated.
7. RTC: ordered private respondent Ciocon and the intervenors to deliver immediate possession of Lot No. 435 to the heirs of Fernandez
8. RTC issued an Order requiring the parties to state in writing within 15 days whether or not they agree to have the records transmitted to the CA with incomplete transcripts of stenographic notes, and if they should fail to reply after 15 days from receipt of the order, the court would consider the parties silence as conformity and order the transmittal of the extant records to the CA.
9. CA noted the incompleteness of the records and ordered the re-taking and completion of missing testimonies. CA granted the Motion to have Above- Entitled Cases Decided Anew by Ciocon on the ground that since the cases were decided on the basis of the records taken by his predecessor, and without the testimony of Roberto Tolentino, the handwriting expert who testified on the alleged forgery of Fernandez signature, granting the motion was in the best interest of justice.
10. RTC rendered a second decision setting aside the judgment because CA, after receiving the notices of appeal and the incomplete records, remanded the case and ordered the re-taking of the testimonies of witnesses Ciocon and Tolentino.
11. Ciocon moved for execution pending appeal which was granted canceeling the TCT in the name of Fernandez and a new TCT was issued in the name of respondent Ciocon.
12. Ciocon filed a motion asking that the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City be directed to cancel entries in TCT. Entry No. 178073, the notice of lis pendens involved in Civil Case No. 7687 and 7723, was not among the entries listed in the motion.
13. It was only on April 20, 1992, at 3:45 P.M., that Entry No. 178073 was annotated on TCT T-164785. RTC ordered the cancellation of the entries of the notices of lis pendens listed in the aforementioned motion.
14. Ciocon then sold the subject property to one Eduardo Gargar, resulting in the issuance of TCT Gargars name. Entry No. 178073 was one of the entries carried over in TCT No. T-165298. Gargar immediately mortgaged the property to the Rizal Commercial and Banking Corporation to secure a loan for P2,000,000.00. 15. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for preliminary injunction under Rule 65 to annul and set aside the Order, of the RTC cancelling the lis pendens notations in the TCT, and its original decision for having been issued without jurisdiction.
16. CA dismissed the petition and ordered the judge-designate to desist from further proceeding with Civil Cases No. 7687 and No. 7723, and to elevate the records for consideration on appeal.
ISSUE: WON The cancellation of said notice of lis pendens is a patent nullity because no motion for the cancellation of the notice (Entry No. 178073) was filed.
HELD: YES
RATIO:
Petitioners contention: Petitioners contend that in promulgating its assailed decision, and denying the corrective writ of certiorari against the RTC, the Court of Appeals refused to recognize that, at the very least, the cancellation 25
by the RTC of the notice of lis pendens, particularly Entry No. 178073,upon a mere ex parte motion is already grave abuse of discretion, and even graver abuse since Entry No. 178073 was not even subject of the motion at all. Petitioners stress that respondent Ciocon prayed for cancellation only of certain entries appearing on the TCT but not Entry No. 178073.Petitioners point out that at the time Ciocon asked for cancellation of the other entries, there was no Entry No. 178073 yet. This entry was made more than a month after Ciocon filed his motion for cancellation of certain entries. Petitioners contend that without a motion for cancellation of Entry No. 178073, no hearing on it could be conducted. Without notice and hearing, there was manifest denial of petitioners right to due process.
Respondents contention: In their opposition and comment to the petition, private respondents claim, with respect to the cited notice of lis pendens, that the order cancelling the annotation of the notice was within the discretion of the RTC and that there was no abuse of discretion on its part because the RTC could determine on its own if a notice was for the purpose of molesting the adverse party or was not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused its annotation. They contend that since the determination of the basis for cancellation of the notice is factual, the Supreme Court is already bound by such determination by the RTC.
While the trial court has inherent power to cancel a notice of lis pendens, such power is exercised under express provisions of law. A notice of lis pendens is an announcement to the whole world that a particular real property is in litigation. Such announcement is founded upon public policy and necessity, the purpose of which is to keep the properties in litigation within the power of the court until the litigation is terminated and to prevent the defeat of the judgment or decree by subsequent alienation. Under Sec. 24, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, now Sec. 14 of Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a notice of lis pendens may be canceled only after proper showing that the purpose of its annotation is for molesting the adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be annotated.
We have scrutinized the records but found no showing that the annotation was caused by petitioners merely to molest private respondents, nor that it was not needed to protect petitioners rights. The peculiar and exceptional circumstances of the case, as in the rendering of two conflicting decisions by the same judge, indubitably manifest that the annotation was not merely to molest the other party but was needed to protect petitioners interest from any hasty transfer of the property to another, making recovery of the property extremely complicated. This is exactly what happened in this case when the notice of lis pendens was cancelled.
Further, the trial courts inherent power to cancel a notice of lis pendens is exercised only under exceptional circumstances, such as: where such circumstances are imputable to the party who caused the annotation; where the litigation was unduly prolonged to the prejudice of the other party because of several continuances procured by petitioner; where the case which is the basis for the lis pendens notation was dismissed for non-prosequitur on the part of the plaintiff; or where judgment was rendered against the party who caused such a notation. In such instances, said notice is deemed ipso facto cancelled. [27] These exceptional circumstances are not present in this case. It will be noted that although the case took long to resolve, it was not due to petitioners. Petitioners had in fact been adjudged owners of the lot in the first decision and it was private respondents who filed a motion that the case be decided anew, despite a timely notice of appeal from the first decision. Furthermore, it was the Court of Appeals which ordered the re-taking of the lost testimonies, which the trial court erroneously took as a remand of the case, resulting in a second decision which was also timely appealed. The records mentioned no such order to remand by the Court of Appeals. The cancellation of the lis pendens notations should not have been ordered since there had been no final judgment yet, the decisions having been timely appealed.
More significantly, a notice of lis pendens cannot be ordered cancelled on an ex parte motion, much less without any motion at all. There should be notice to the party who caused the annotation so that he may be heard to object to the cancellation of his notice and show to the court that the notice of lis pendens is necessary to protect his rights and is not merely to molest the other party.
As the records of this case reflect, private respondent Ciocons motion dated March 17, 1992, to cancel certain notices of lis pendens did not include a request to cancel Entry No. 178073 in particular, and it certainly could not have been included since the entry was annotated in the TCT only a month after the filing of the motion, on April 20, 1992.However, Judge Jocsons order of cancellation included Entry No. 178073. [29]
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Neither can a notice of lis pendens be ordered cancelled upon the mere filing of a bond by the party on whose title the notice is annotated. The ultimate purpose of the annotation which is to keep the properties in litigation within the power of the court and to prevent the defeat of the judgment by subsequent alienation will be rendered meaningless if private respondents are allowed to file a bond, regardless of the amount, in substitution of said notice. [30] As it happened in this case, Ciocon sold the property to Gargar who encumbered the property as security for a loan. We are, therefore, constrained to conclude that, contrary to private respondents stand, the Court could not be bound by the trial courts determination of the bases of the cancellation of the cited notice. Further, we find the trial courts order injudicious and erroneous.
The cancellation order of the notice of lis pendens in this case, Entry No. 178073, should be set aside for three reasons. First, it was granted ex parte. Petitioners were deprived of their right to be heard on notice. Second, there was no showing that the annotation of the notice was for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, nor that it was not necessary to protect the rights of those who sought the annotation. And third, at the time of the order of cancellation of the notice, the trial court no longer had jurisdiction.