Society for History Education

The Dialectical Commons of Western Civilization and Global/World History

Author(s): Nathan Douthit
Source: The History Teacher, Vol. 24, No. 3 (May, 1991), pp. 293-305
Published by: Society for History Education
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The Dialectical Commons of Wester Civilization and
Global/WorldHistory

Nathan Douthit

"All alchemistictalk- the chthonicdescent of the Black Work,the electric

charge of the White - is only a metaphor,a metaphorclear to the initiated
for this age-old auscultation whose final result will be the Red; global
knowledge, brilliant dominion over the planetary system of currents."
Umberto Eco, Foucault's Pendulum(1988), p. 451.

GLOBAL CONSCIOUSNESS HAS BECOME ALL PERVASIVE in

the last quarterof the 20th century.UmbertoEco's recentnovel with its
ironically humoroustreatmentof the pursuitof occult global knowledge
is only one among many documentaryexamples.1Although the debate
between proponentsof westerncivilization or global/worldhistoryseems
stalemated,2the trendtowarda more global perspectivein the historycur-
riculum of schools and colleges seems irreversible.
I teach an introductoryhistory of western civilization course in a
community college, but over the last year I have become increasingly
interestedin exploring the disputedgroundbetween westerncivilization
and global/world history. What at times seems to be a no-man's-land
between the two histories, its arbitraryboundariesestablished by text-
books and tradition, can also be seen as a dialectical commons of
questions, conflicting interpretations,and alternativetheories which can
benefit historianson either side of the two histories debate. In this paper
The History Teacher Volume 24 Number 3 May 1991
294 NathanDouthit

I will examine threequestionswhich representfor me a startin using the

disputed theoretical ground between the two histories as a common
resource. First: What are the origins of global consciousness in western
civilization and what is global/world history? Second: Is global/world
history uniquely western or do other civilizations deserve credit for its
development?Third:Do currenttheories of global processes adequately
take into considerationlocal/nationalprocesses of historicalchange?
Origins of Global Consciousness and Global/WorldHistory
Global consciousness, strictly speaking, should begin with the globe,
what Umberto Eco's characterCasaubon,who together with his occult
obsessed friendspursuedthe secret of the Templarsacross the centuries,
refers to as "the one true Stone that fell in exile from heaven, the Great
MotherEarth."3Although the Babyloniansfirst thoughtof the earthas a
sphere and the Greek philosopherPtolemy in the second century A.D.
produced the first world map, it was Martin Behaim, a Nuremberg
geographer,who in 1492 constructedthe first globe displaying existing
knowledge of the planet earth's geography on the eve of Columbus's
discoveries.4Europeanexplorationsof the 16th centuryled to an explo-
sion of globe and world map-making,the maps and globes of Gerard
Mercatorbeing the best known.5The words "globe"and "global"entered
the English language.
"Global"historyandconsciousness,however,can be tracedbackto the
first expressions of universalor world history. Herodotus'shistoryof the
conflict between the Greek city states and the PersianEmpire,writtenin
the fifth centuryB.C., includedinformationaboutEgyptandotherpeoples
of Asia Minor. It might be consideredthe first "global"history that we
know about. But the second centuryB.C. GreekhistorianPolybius, who
wrote aboutthe rise of Rome to power in the period 264-146 B.C., came
closer to ourmeaningof global historyin his statementof intent:"Now up
to this time the world's history had been, so to speak, a series of
disconnected transactions,as widely separatedin their origin and results
as in theirlocalities. But fromthis time forthHistorybecomes a connected
whole: the affairs of Italy and Libya are involved with those of Asia and
Greece, and the tendencyof all is to unity."6LaterRomanhistoriansalso
wrote in the traditionof universalhistory,7but afterTacitus the vision of
universal humanitydied out in secular historical writing, as in political
life.8 A sense of universalvision survived,but in philosophy andthe new
religion of Christianity.Augustine's City of God, a theological interpre-
tation of history, became the new model of universalhistory for the next
thousandyears.
Whathas been referredto as "theliberationof history from theology"
The Dialectical Commons of WesternCivilization and Global/WorldHistory 295

began in 16th centuryItaly.9Secularuniversalhistory re-emergedin the

18th century as a result of two centuries of Europeanexploration and
colonization. Voltaire in his Essay on the Manners and Customs of
Nations (1757) wrotesympatheticallyaboutthe religious andphilosophi-
cal ideas of othercultures.10A few decadeslater,the Germanphilosophers
Kant and Herderboth publishedessays on universalhistory." Hegel fol-
lowed with his idea of universal history as the unfolding of a spiritual
reality through the nation-state.'2Marx and Engels, in the mid-19th
century,contributeda new global historicalperspective in The Commu-
nist Manifesto (1848), with their thesis that "the history of all hitherto
existing society is the historyof class struggles."They also pointedto the
global impact of the latest victor in the history of class struggles, the
Europeanbourgeoisie, whose "needof a constantlyexpandingmarketfor
its productschases the bourgeoisieover the whole surfaceof the globe."13
Recent theories of westernization,such as world system and dependency
theory, which I will discuss later,have built on this basic insight of Marx
and Engels about the global impact of capitalism.
In the 20th century the idea of universal, world, or global history
continued to attract interest, although the trend within the emerging
historical profession was to write monographs or general histories on
nation-state development. Disillusioned by the destructive forces of
westerncivilization in the FirstWorldWar,OswaldSpenglerpopularized
the idea of studyingworld culturesfrom a relativisticpoint of view in The
Decline of the West (1918, 1923).14The Second World War produced
another wave of disillusionment reflected in the writings of Geoffrey
Barracloughin the late 1940s and early 1950s.15He expressed doubts
about the existence of a common Europeantraditionand warned that
emphasis on a classical tradition obscured outside influences on the
development of wester Europeanhistory. In "the new constellation of
world-affairs," Barraclough saw a need for more recognition of the
influence of non-western history on the West. True to his misgivings,
Barracloughhas been a leader amonghistoriansin the effort to develop a
more global frameworkfor the understandingof western civilization in
the post-WorldWar II period.'6
This brief survey of universal, world, or global historical thought in
western civilization suggests that global consciousness has origins in the
classical traditionof western thought, which some scholars have con-
trasted with what they regard as the ahistorical universalism of non-
western Buddhist and Confucian civilizations."7As a practical matter,
however, contemporaryglobal consciousnesscanprobablybe datedto the
crossing of a more recentthresholdof awarenessin the 1960s. In 1962 the
historianHans Kohn, who hadjust turnedseventy years of age, wrote in
296 Nathan Douthit

the preface to his book TheAge of Nationalism: TheFirst Era of Global

History, that "in the middle of the twentiethcenturymankindhas entered
the firststage of globalhistory."18 The historianL. S. Stavrianosandothers
also published their textbook A Global History of Man that same year.19
In 1968 MarshallMcLuhanand QuentinFiore's book War and Peace in
the Global Village popularizedthe global village metaphor.20This book
documented the growing intellectual consciousness of global intercon-
nections stemming from a combinationof political, economic, and elec-
tronic communicationdevelopments.By 1970 a concern with the global
environment intensified to the point that United Nations Secretary-
General U Thant issued a "global alert,"warning that "ours is the first
global civilization which can wrecknot just one nationor society, but the
very earthitself."21Throughthe 1970s and 1980s this new sense of global
awareness originating in communications and environmental studies
broadenedto influence thinkingin all of the humanities,social sciences,
and sciences.22
Despite the rise of global consciousness, historianshave been cautious
in theiruse of the word"global."Among the proponentsof global history
there has been a reluctanceto apply the word "global"to the whole of
human history. Kohn and Barracloughreserved the word for special
application to the recent era, either the 19th or 20th century. Even
Stavrianosandhis collaborators,despitetheiruse of "globalhistory"in the
title of theirtextbook,statedthat"globalhistorybeganin 1500."Thatdate
"ended the age-old separation between Eurasia and the other conti-
nents.'23
There seem to be two currentdefinitions of global history. One treats
global history as synonymous with world history, a history that encom-
passes all the majorcivilizations and their interactions.Let's call this the
general definition of global history. However, if one refers to "theera of
global history," then one means the recent period of intensified global
interconnectionswhich has followed westernexpansionsince 1500. Let's
call this the special definitionof global history. The TimesAtlas of World
History uses the word "global" in a way consistent with the special
definition when it calls the period from 1870 to the present"The Age of
Global Civilisation."24
If one thinks of global consciousness as an historicalinterestin other
cultures or as philosophical and religious ideas which embrace other
peoples regardlessof their race or culture,then the classical traditionof
western thought has incorporatedglobal consciousness to some degree
since the fifth centuryB.C. But if global consciousness is somethingquite
distinct from universalizing principles and perspectives in history, phi-
losophy, and religion, if it is a state of mind peculiarto the age in which
The Dialectical Commons of WesternCivilization and Global/WorldHistory 297

Europeansbegan to explore and colonize other continents,then it has to

be treatedas discontinuouswith the classical traditionof westem thought.
As history teachers we can choose either one or the other of these two
definitions of global history. But perhapswe should look upon them as
opposing cases in a debatethathas yet to be concluded.In my opinion,the
more we explore the boundariesbetweencivilizations andcontactsacross
those boundaries,the more we are likely to discover the importantrole
played by interactionsbetween civilizations which the generaldefinition
of global historyhighlights,in short,the morewe arelikely to discoverthe
beginnings of global consciousness before 1500 in various civilizations.
Contributionsof Non-WesternCivilizations to Global/WorldHistory
The second question is related to the first. Is global/world history
uniquely western or do other civilizations deserve credit for its develop-
ment?The classical traditionof westen civilization identifies a streamof
universalisticideas that point to the eventual unifying embraceof Euro-
pean colonization, industrialization,and imperialism.Similarly,the spe-
cial definition of global history gives credit to westerization for the
globalization of recent human history. The general definition of global
history emphasizes the contributions of all civilizations, but it also
incorporatesthe special definition when it comes to the modem era.
Let me draw upon one of the leading global/world history college
textbooks, A History of the Human Community(3rd edition, 1990) to
illustrate the general definition of global history. William H. McNeill
stresses the importanceof tradeand conquest in the global expansion of
empires. However, he shows that the spreadof new religious ideas was
associatedwith the expansionof the Chineseand Indianas well as Greco-
Roman and Roman-Christianempires in the period 200 B.C.-600 A.D.
Writing about the impact of Buddhismon Japan,for example, McNeill
states that "conversionto Buddhism was a very importantstep toward
civilization."25Throughoutthis period the major centers of civilization
experienced cycles of "advance, retreat,and partial recovery."26When
Islam burst onto the global historical stage in the seventh century, it
expanded quickly over the next several centuries from North Africa to
India. McNeill notes that "in many ways it was unique, built around
religion and the fresh revelationof God's will."27
On the whole it is difficult to single out uniquecontributionsof major
civilizations and empires to the developmentof global consciousness in
McNeill's survey text. Global consciousness seems to arise in a general
way throughtradeandthe spreadof culturalideas. In discussing the basis
of European expansion after 1450, McNeill stresses three factors: a
flexible economy; a warlike spirit; and the "techniques"of printing,
298 NathanDouthit

shipbuilding/navigation,and gunpower/militaryorganization.28
Fromthe perspectiveof the generaldefinitionof global history, as it is
representedby McNeill's text, global historyderivesmore or less equally
from different civilization centers. Prior to the 18th and 19th centuries
thereis little to distinguishthe world's civilizationsin termsof theirglobal
unifying influence. A historyof the non-westernworldin the period 1500-
1850 reinforcesthis point by statingthat "nowherein Africa or Asia did
Europeanpower reach more than a few miles inlanduntil the eighteenth
century."29Hans Kohn stresses that what emerged in Europe in the 17th
and 18th centuries was "a new and revolutionarycivilization."30But
paradoxicallyit may have been anothercivilizationthatprovidedthe push
into this new historical dimension. The Islamic scholar Hichem Djait
emphasizes Islam's influence on Europe:"Islam was at once a military
force threateningEuropeand an economic sphere sharingits dynamism,
just as later it would be an ideological enemy and a philosophicalmodel.
In a word,Europe'semergenceintohistorytook place- andcouldnot have
taken place otherwise- throughthe mediationof Islam:in the beginning
by means of a defensive recoil, afterwardby an offensive explosion."31
The answerto the second questionthereforedependsuponwhetherone
works within the general or special definition of global history. Global/
world historiansemphasizethe contributionsof non-westernandwestern
civilizations to the development of global consciousness prior to about
1500. After 1500 they highlight the West's role in shaping a new era of
global history. However, if Djait's thesis is correct,the West took on this
role in response initially to the challenge of Islam.
Global Versus Local Influences in History
If we approachthe eraof globalhistorysince 1500 fromthe perspective
of non-western civilizations, then the process of local adaptationsto
westernization becomes a key focus of study. This leads to the third
question: Do currenttheories of global/world historical processes ade-
quately take into considerationlocalnational adaptationsto westerniza-
tion? Here again it seems to me thatthe generaland special definitionsof
global historylead in differentdirections.The special definitionof global
history has emphasized,as Marx and Engels did, the hegemonic force of
capitalism as it spread around the world. But do we run the risk of
overlooking the influence of local factors by imposing world system or
dependencytheory on local, regional, or nationalhistory?
In the writing of history textbooks there are a handful of leading
historianswho over the last threedecades have pushed historical studies
in the global direction- T. WalterWallbank,AlastaireM. Taylor,Edward
McNall Bums, William H. McNeill, and L. S. Stavrianos figure most
The Dialectical Commons of WesternCivilization and Global/WorldHistory 299

prominently.32But no one has exerted a more forceful theoreticalinflu-

ence on global historical study than ImmanualWallerstein,a sociologist
of social change, whose "world-systemtheory"has providedthe leading
paradigm for historians writing about the relationshipof Third World
countriesto the West in the modem era.33Accordingto Wallersteinthere
emerged in Europeduringthe period 1450-1620 a "world-system"based
on capitalistprinciples.This system spreadits influence over the rest of
the world during the course of the next four centuries, establishing
relations of domination by the European"core" nation-states over the
"periphery"of non-Westem societies. Wallerstein'sworld-systemtheory
drawsupon the FrenchhistorianFemand Braudel'swritings aboutworld
economy andon "dependency"theorywhich explains the underdevelop-
ment of the Third World in terms of capitalisteconomic hegemony.
Wallerstein's world-system theory has been sharply criticized, espe-
cially for its empirical weaknesses.34Wallerstein's more severe critics
reject the idea that an integratedcapitalistworld-systememerged before
the 19th century. The major thrustof their argumentsare that Waller-
stein's methodological insistence on the study of a world-systemdirects
attentionaway fromlocal conditions(e.g. domesticproductionratherthan
internationaltrade) that contradict his global thesis.35 In addition to
Marxist critics who strongly reject Wallerstein's redefinition of class
relationsand de-emphasisof class conflict in the developmentof capital-
ism andEuropeanworldhegemony,historiansandanthropologistsstudy-
ing the ThirdWorldalso have difficultywith global developmenttheories.
The critique of world system and dependency theory from a Third
World perspective can be illustrated by William B. Taylor's article,
"Between Global Process and Local Knowledge: An Inquiryinto Early
Latin American Social History, 1500-1900."36Taylor raises five major
criticismsof dependencytheory(andby extensionof Wallerstein'sworld-
system theory): 1) Viewing "capitalismas a single system of meaning,"
dependencystudiespay too "littleattentionto the differentialeffects of the
capitalisms [mercantileand industrial]on social relationshipsin various
places and times"; 2) Economic determinism ignores "pre-Conquest
social forms and relationshipsof productionin different localities"; 3)
Emphasis on "capitalistrelationshipsof exchange" de-emphasizes the
role of the state in Latin America; 4) Economic change is viewed as
imposed from the outside therebyneglecting "the role of local modes of
thought and practiceand local arrangementsof power [i.e. local elites]";
and5) By emphasizing"thesweeping influenceof capitalismdependency
studies overlook regional variations"(e.g. Argentinaand Mexico "in the
first half-century after Independence, [which] do not seem to fit the
dependencymodels").37Carol A. Smith reinforcesTaylor's critiquein a
300 NathanDouthit

discussion of Western Guatemala.38Smith evaluates world-system ap-

proaches to the history of Guatemala against ethnographicdata. She
concludes that "to understandany particularlocal system, such as thatin
Guatemala,one must look at the interactionof global and local forces"
instead of global capitalismalone.39
The terms "local" and "global"representpolaritiesin terms of which
we can think abouthistorical change. In discussing "paradigmsof inter-
national relations,"for example, Erie Keenes writes about the need to
link thinking about internationalrelationsto local politics - "theprocess
by which groups of people decide for themselves what the good life is in
their particularcomer of the world, and how to get it."40Politics, a sense
of history, as well as the writingof novels, poems, and plays begin at the
local level. Clifford Geertz in his collection of essays entitled Local
Knowledge emphasizes the foundationalnatureof the "local" when he
says "the shapes of knowledge are always ineluctably local."41In their
differentways andseparatefields of research,Taylor,Smith, Keenes, and
Geertz are warning against neglect of local influences on global/world
history.
Despite its critics,however, Wallerstein'sworld-systemtheorycontin-
ues to influence historianslooking for a more global perspective.42That
influence has recently shown up in writing about the history of the
AmericanWest. In the November, 1989, issue of the WesternHistorical
Quarterly,threearticlesconvergeon the global dimensionsof the Ameri-
can West. WalterNugent discusses the interrelatednessof global frontier
and imperialimpulses in the period 1870-1914, and a common featureof
frontiersand empires- exploitationof indigenous peoples.43Michael P.
Malone urges historians of the American West to cease relying upon
Frederick Jackson Turner's frontier thesis as a unifying interpretive
framework and to seek a new model for identifying the West as a
distinctiveregion.44Malone creditsthe historiansWilliam H. McNeill, L.
S. Stavrianos, and Theodore Von Laue, as well as Wallerstein, with
providing a useful global view of Western capitalist expansion and its
harmfuleffects, andhe suggests thatthe word"frontier"be replacedwith
the term"globalization- the ongoing integrationof thislong-remoteplace
into the human community."45In a third article, William G. Robbins
argues that historians of the American West have neglected "politics,
power, class relations,and otherexpressionsof capitalism"which would
link the historyof the AmericanWest with westerncivilization history.46
Robbins, too, draws upon the global perspectives of FernandBraudel,
Wallerstein,KarlMarx,anddependencytheoristsfor an understandingof
the "evolvingdialecticbetweenchangesin worldcapitalismandlocal eco-
nomics."47
The Dialectical Commons of WesternCivilization and Global/WorldHistory 301

These examples of theoreticalapproachesto researchon the historiesof

CentralAmericaandthe AmericanWest illustratedivergentemphaseson
global and local processes. CentralAmericanscholars suggest that local
processes are being neglected, while historians of the American West
arguethatglobal processes arebeing neglected.This leads me to conclude
thatwheretherehas been neglect of global connections,global theoretical
perspectives may be useful. But they may also distort our view of
historical processes if not tested by "micro-studies"of the dynamics of
local cultures.
HansKohn in TheAge of Nationalism:TheFirst Era of Global History
highlighted the fact that the era of global history began in national
competition. He envisioned that the "age of pan-nationalism"would
merge into "theage of pan-humanism."48 In ourteachingof contemporary
history, there is a dangerthat we may be swept along by enthusiasmfor
global integrationand cooperation. While some internationalrelations
specialistshave embracedthe concept of a global political environment,49
others are not persuadedthat the world is ready for a paradigmshift in
internationalrelationstheoryor worldpolitics. The nation-statecontinues
to exert a strong force in global politics. No "global community"has
emergedto replacethe nation-state.As Yale H. FergusonandRichardW.
Mansbach observe, "the intensification of local and sublocal 'national-
ism' produces resistance to rising interdependence,repeatedly forcing
local elites to act contraryto the logic of 'national' or 'global' interests
producedby that interdependence."50 The same point is made by A. D.
Smith, who writes that "manystates today are linked in a series of near-
global transactionsanddependencies,"but the internationalsystem actu-
ally encourages nationalism. As a result, "nationalism's diffusion has
simply globalised the traditionalEuropean'balance of power' concepts
and relationships,and these in turnare now reinforcingnationalisms.""5
Recent events in EasternEuropeand the Soviet Union also speak to the
revival of local ethnic and national aspirations.52
As a teacher of history I believe we should be wary of abandoning
concepts framed in a context of national rivalries and national history.
Global history has to take note of trendstowardinternationalcommunity
and conflict resolution,but it must also pay attentionto the conservative
force of nationalismandotherforms of local culturalinfluence on human
history. Significantly, all recentdiscussions of the futureof Europeboth
east andwest focus on regionalintegration.It is this fact thathas led Silviu
Brucanto suggest thatwe live in a transitionalperiodof time.53In the short
term- how long one can only guess - the evolution towardgreaterworld
integrationwill pass througha stage of regionalintegration.If this is the
continuing reality of our time, as it has been for the past forty years of
302 NathanDouthit

militaryalliances (since the creationof NATO in 1949), then the teaching

of contemporaryglobal historymust incorporatean evolutionaryperspec-
tive which leaves room for the older paradigmof political realism and
balanceof powerpolitics as the worldmoves towarda newerparadigmof
universally recognized global political principles and institutions.
Conclusion
If the theoretical disagreements between western civilization and
global/world history are truly a dialectical commons, ratherthan a no-
man's land, as I have suggested, then a readeroughtto leave this dialogue
with a new sense of direction for teaching. Let me indicate what its
teaching implications are for me.
First, I want to work towardbreakingdown the separationof the two
histories. As McNeill's writing aboutthe interactionsof civilizations on
theirboundariesshows, boundarylines are artificial.They exist at police
checkpoints and dissolve in the hills beyond. One importantimplication
for my teaching is that the influence of the wester on the non-western
world is a propositionto be debatedand not to be accepted a priori.
Second, I want to continue to question the distinction between the
general and special definitions of global/world history. The distinction
highlights for me the fact that interactionsbetween civilizations vary in
scope and intensity in differenttime periods. But the essential duality of
"global"history (i.e. pre- and post-1500 periods), which the general and
special definitions express, makes me want to look for evidence of
interaction,mutual influence, diffusion of culturalelements, and other
"global"effects throughouthuman history.
Third,the generaland special definitionsof global historytend toward
simplification:one as the idea of the globalizationof the West, the other
as the idea of the westemization of the globe. I look to the analytical
concept of global/local processes as a way to avoid these simplifications.
I believe that we will find local and more global processes at work
throughoutmost of humanhistory,if we look for them. I find the concept
of global/local processes to be an especially useful check on the impulse
to westemize the recent"eraof global history."

Notes
1. Umberto Eco, Foucault's Pendulum (San Diego and London:HarcourtBrace
Jovanovich, 1988).
The Dialectical Commons of WesternCivilization and Global/WorldHistory 303

2. See, for example, GilbertAllardyce,"The Rise and Fall of the Wester Civili-
zation Course,"AmericanHistorical Review,87 (June 1982), 695-743; William A. Percy
andPedroJ. Suarez,"Today'sWesternandWorldCivilizationCollege Texts: A Review,"
The History Teacher, 17 (August 1984), 567-590; Carolyn J. Mooney, "Sweeping
CurricularChange Is Under Way at Stanford as University Phases Out Its 'Western
Culture'Program,"Chronicle of Higher Education,35 (December 15, 1988), 11-13.
3. Eco, Foucault's Pendulum,p. 451.
4. R. V. Tooley, Maps and Map-Makers(New York:Dorset Press, 1987 [1949]),
pp. 3-7, 24-25.
5. Ibid., pp. 31-32.
6. Walter Emil Kaegi, Jr., and Peter White, eds. Rome: Late Republic and
Principate, Vol. 2, Universityof Chicago Readingsin WesternCivilization (Chicago and
London:University of Chicago Press, 1986), p. 11.
7. M. I. Finley, The Ancient Greeks: An Introductionto their Life and Thought
(New York: Viking Press, 1964), p. 94.
8. AndrewLintott,"RomanHistorians,"pp.226-242, inJohnBoardman,etal., eds.
The RomanWorld(Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1988).
9 Hans Meyerhoff, ed. The Philosophy of History in Our Time: An Anthology
(GardenCity, NY: Doubleday Anchor, 1959), p. 4.
10. PeterGay, TheEnlightenment:An Interpretation/TheScience of Freedom(New
York and London:W. W. Norton, 1977 [1969]), p. 392.
11. Ronald H. Nash, ed. Ideas of History (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1969), p. 68.
12. PatrickGardner,ed.TheoriesofHistory(Glencoe:The FreePress, 1959), pp. 58-
73.
13. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The CommunistManifesto, trans. Samuel
Moore (New York: Socialist LaborParty, 1888), pp. 7-21, 28, in Edgar E. Knoebel, ed.
Classics of WesternThought:TheModernWorld,Vol. 3, 4th ed. (San Diego andToronto:
HarcourtBrace Jovanovich, 1988), p. 372.
14. Oswald Spengler,TheDecline of the West,2 vols. (New York:AlfredA. Knopf,
1926, 1928.
15. Geoffrey Barraclough,History inA ChangingWorld(Oxford:Basil Blackwell,
1957).
16. See, for example,Geoffrey Barraclough,Introductionto ContemporaryHistory
(Middlesex: PenguinBooks, 1967) andThe TimesAtlas of WorldHistory,editor in 1978,
Geoffrey Barraclough,3rd ed. edited by Norman Stone (Maplewood, NJ: Hammond,
1989).
17. See, for example, Eric Voegelin's worksThe Worldof the Polis (Baton Rouge:
LouisianaState University Press, 1957) andThe EcumenicAge (Baton Rouge: Louisiana
State University Press, 1974).
18. HansKohn,TheAgeofNationalism:TheFirst Era ofGlobal History(New York
and Evanston:HarperTorchbooks, 1968), p. x.
19. Leften S. Stavrianos,et al. A Global Historyof Man (Boston andSan Francisco:
Allyn and Bacon, 1962). This was a geographicalhistory. The authorsused the word
"global"in the title, but switched to "world"in the text.
20. Marshall McLuhan and Quentin Fiore, War and Peace in the Global Village
(New York: Bantam, 1968).
21. HenryJ. Kellerman,"Ecology:AWorld Concern,"pp. 17-39, inThe GreatIdeas
Today, 1971 (Chicago: EncyclopediaBritannica,1971).
22. See Silviu Brucan, "The Global Crisis," InternationalStudies Quarterly, 18
(March1984), 97-109; GaryK. Bertsch,ed. GlobalPolicy Studies (Beverly Hills andNew
304 NathanDouthit

Delhi: Sage Publications,1982); David E. Vocke, "ThoseVaryingPerspectiveson Global

Education,"TheSocial Studies (January/February 1988), 18-20; 'The Age of GlobalCiv-
ilisation,"pp. 254-295, The TimesAtlas of WorldHistory;CraigLambert,"GlobalSpin,"
HarvardMagazine (January/February 1990), 17-30 on global thinkingat HarvardUniver-
sity.
23. Stavrianos,et al. A Global History of Man, p. 48.
24. The TimesAtlas of WorldHistory, pp. 254-295.
25. William H. McNeill, A History of the Human Community3rd ed. (Englewood
Cliffs, NJ: PrenticeHall, 1990), p. 195.
26. Ibid., p. 214.
27. Ibid., p. 217.
28. Ibid., p. 334.
29. JohannaM. Meskill, JohnMeskill, and Ainslie T. Embree,TheNon-European
World1500/1850 (Glenview and London:Scott, Foresman,1971), p. 139.
30. Kohn, The Age of Nationalism, p. 31.
31. Hichem Djait, Europe and Islam: Cultures and Modernity (Berkeley and
London:University of CaliforniaPress, 1985), p. 109.
32. Percy and Suarez, "Today's Westernand World Civilization College Texts."
33. ImmanuelWallerstein,The ModernWorld-System:CapitalistAgricultureand
the Origins of the European World-Economyin the Sixteenth Century (New York:
Academic Press, 1974) andTheModernWorld-SystemII. Merchantilismand the Consoli-
dation of the EuropeanWorld-Economy,1600-1750 (New York:Academic Press, 1980).
34. See Robert S. DuPlessis, "Wallerstein,World Systems Analysis, and Early
Moder EuropeanHistory,"The History Teacher, 21 (February1988), 221-232.
35. See GerryKeams, "History,Geographyand World-SystemsTheory,"Journal
of Historical Geography, 14:3 (1988), 281-292.
36. In OlivierZunz,ed. RelivingthePast: The WorldsofSocialHistory (ChapelHill
andLondon:The Universityof NorthCarolinaPress, 1985), pp. 115-181. On dependency
theorysee also ChrisBrown, "DevelopmentandDependency,"pp. 62-68, in MargotLight
andA. J. R. Groom,eds.InternationalRelations:AHandbookofCurrentTheory(Boulder,
CO: Lynne RiennerPublications,1985).
37. Ibid., pp. 125-127.
38. Carol A. Smith, "Local History in Global Context: Social and Economic
Transitionsin WesternGuatemala,"ComparativeStudiesin SocietyandHistory,26 (April
1984), 193-228.
39. Ibid., p. 224.
40. ErieKeenes, "Paradigmsof InternationalRelations:BringingPoliticsBackIn,"
InternationalJournal, 44 (Winter 1988-89), 41-67.
41. CliffordGeertz,Local Knowledge:FurtherEssays inInterpretiveAnthropology
(New York:Basic Books, 1983), p. 4.
42. See, forexample, PeterJ. Taylor,Political Geography:WorldEconomy,Nation-
State andLocality (New York:Longman,1985);BerniceCohen,GlobalPerspectives:The
Total CultureSystem in the Modern World(London:Codek Publications,1988); George
Modelski, Long Cycles in WorldPolitics (Seattle andLondon:Universityof Washington
Press, 1987).
43. WalterNugent, "Frontiersand Empiresin the LateNineteenthCentury,"West-
ern Historical Quarterly,20 (November 1989), 393-408.
44. Michael P. Malone, "Beyond the Last Frontier:Toward A New Approachto
WesternAmerican History,"ibid., pp. 409-427.
45. Ibid., p. 424.
The Dialectical Commons of WesternCivilization and Global/WorldHistory 305

46. William G. Robbins,"WesternHistory:A Dialectic on the Moder Condition,"

ibid., pp. 429-449.
47. Robbins,ibid., p. 442. A global perspectiveon the historyof the AmericanWest
can also be found in DonaldWorster,Riversof Empire:Water,Aridity,and the Growthof
the AmericanWest (New York:Pantheon,1985), in which Worsterapplies the hydraulic
society concept of Karl Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism: A ComparativeStudy of Total
Power (New Haven and London:Yale University Press, 1957).
48. Kohn, The Age ofNationalism, p. 166.
49. For a survey of internationalrelations textbooks, see Dennis J. D. Sandole,
"Textbooks," pp. 214-228, in Margot Light and A. J. R. Groom, eds. International
Relations: A Handbookof CurrentTheory.
50. Yale H. Ferguson and RichardW. Mansbach,The Elusive Quest: Theory and
InternationalPolitics (Columbia:Universityof SouthCarolinaPress, 1988), pp. 105-107.
51. A. D. Smith,"Internationalism," pp. 66-77, in MarcWilliams, ed. International
Relations in the TwentiethCentury:A Reader (New York: New York University Press,
1989).
52. Zbigniew Bzezinski, "Post-CommunistNationalism," Foreign Affairs, 68
(Winter 1989/90), 1-25.
53. Silviu Brucan,"The Global Crisis."