LABSTAND-CANADA.REMOROZA.

YAP 1


Art. 82. Coverage. The provisions of this Title shall
apply to employees in all establishments and
undertakings whether for profit or not, but not to
government employees, managerial employees, field
personnel, members
of the family of the employer who are dependent on
him for support, domestic helpers, persons in the
personal service of another, and workers who are
paid by results as determined by the Secretary of
Labor in
appropriate regulations.

As used herein, "managerial employees" refer to
those whose primary duty consists of the
management of the establishment in which they are
employed or of a department or subdivision thereof,
and to other officers or members of the managerial
staff.

"Field personnel" shall refer to non-agricultural
employees who regularly perform their duties away
from the
principal place of business or branch office of the
employer and whose actual hours of work in the field
cannot be determined with reasonable certainty.

Art. 83. Normal hours of work. The normal hours of
work of any employee shall not exceed eight (8) hours
a
day.

Health personnel in cities and municipalities with a
population of at least one million (1,000,000) or in
hospitals and clinics with a bed capacity of at least
one hundred (100) shall hold regular office hours for
eight (8) hours a day, for five (5) days a week,
exclusive of time for meals, except where the
exigencies of the service require that such personnel
work for six (6) days or forty-eight (48) hours, in which
case, they shall be entitled to an additional
compensation of at least thirty percent (30%) of their
regular wage for work on the sixth day. For
purposes of this Article, "health personnel" shall
include resident physicians, nurses, nutritionists,
dietitians,
pharmacists, social workers, laboratory technicians,
paramedical technicians, psychologists, midwives,
attendants and all other hospital or clinic personnel.
(a) Attendance is outside of the employee's regular
working hours;

(b) Attendance is in fact voluntary; and

(c) The employee does not perform any productive
work during such attendance.

IRR BOOK III RULE 1 SECTION 3-6

SECTION 3. Hours worked. The following shall be
considered as compensable hours worked:

(a) All time during which an
employee is required to be
on duty or to be at the
employer's premises or to be
at a prescribed work place;
and

(b) All time during which an employee is suffered or
permitted to work.

SECTION 4. Principles in determining hours
worked. The following general principles shall
govern in
determining whether the time spent by an employee
is considered hours worked for purposes of this
Rule:
(a) All hours are hours worked which the employee
is required to give his employer, regardless of
whether or not such hours are spent in productive labor
or involve physical or mental exertion.

(b) An employee need not leave the premises of the
work place in order that his rest period shall not be
counted, it being enough that he stops working, may
rest completely and may leave his work place, to go
elsewhere, whether within or outside the premises of his
work place.

(c) If the work performed was necessary, or it
benefited the employer, or the employee could not
abandon his work at the end of his normal working
hours because he had no replacement, all time spent
for such work shall be considered as hours worked,
if the work was with the knowledge of his employer
or immediate supervisor.

(d) The time during which an employee is inactive
by reason of interruptions in his work beyond his
control shall be considered working time either if the
imminence of the resumption of work requires the
employee's presence at the place of work or if the
interval is too brief to be utilized effectively and
gainfully in the employee's own interest.
SECTION 5. Waiting time. (a) Waiting time spent
by an employee shall be considered as working time
if waiting is an integral part of his work or the employee
is required or engaged by the employer to wait.
(b) An employee who is required to remain on call in
the employer's premises or so close thereto that he
cannot use the time effectively and gainfully for his
own purpose shall be considered as working while on
call. An employee who is not required to leave word
at his home or with company officials where he may
be reached is not working while on call.
SECTION 6. Lectures, meetings, training
programs. Attendance at lectures, meetings,
training programs, and other similar activities shall not
be counted as working time if all of the following
conditions are met:
(a) Attendance is outside of the employee's regular
working hours;

(b) Attendance is in fact voluntary; and

(c) The employee does not perform any productive
work during such attendance.

NDC vs. CIR November 30, 1962
Facts: National Development Co., had four shifts of
work. In each shift, there was one hour meal time
period. Workers were used to be paid 8 hours for
each shift but later on were credited only with 6 hours
of work whenever workers in one shift were required
to continue working until the next shift.
Petitioners contended that the two hours
corresponding to the mealtime periods should not be
included in computing compensation. On the other
hand, National Textile Workers Union whose
members are employed at the NDC, maintained the
opposite view and asked the Court of Industrial
Relations to order the payment of additional overtime
pay corresponding to the mealtime periods.
ISSUE: WON the mealtime breaks should be
considered working hours. Yes!
Mealtime in this case should be considered working
hours because working hours in petitioners company
was continuous and therefore the mealtime breaks
should be counted as working time for purposes of
overtime compensation.
The idle time that an employee may spend for resting
and during which he may leave the spot or place of
work though not the premises of his employer, is not
counted as working time only where the work is
broken or is not continuous. The time cards show that
the work was continuous and without any interruption.
There is also the evidence adduced by the petitioner
that the pertinent employees cannot freely leave their
working place nor rest completely.
Pan American World vs. Pan American Employees
February 23, 1961
Facts: Pan American was ordered by the CIR to
permanently adopt the straight 8-hour shift inclusive of
meal period. On appeal, Pan American contended
that the finding that the one-hour meal period should
be considered overtime work (deducting 15 minutes)
as time allotted for eating) is not supported by
substantial evidence. Moreover, the evidence showed
that the complainant could rest completely, and were
not in any manner under the control of the company
during the period.
Issue: WON one-hour meal period should be
considered hours worked. Yes!
Ruling: The court below found that during the so
called meal period, the mechanics were required to
stand by for emergency work; that if they happened
not to be available when called, they were
reprimanded by the leadman; that as in fact it
happened on many occasions, the mechanics had
been called from their meals or told to hurry
Employees Association up eating to perform work
during this period. Such meal period (after deducting
15 minutes) is not rest period but overtime work.
An employee who is required to remain on call on the
employers premises or so close thereto that he
cannot use the time effectively for his own purposes is
working while on call.
C.1 Travel Time
Rule: Time spent travelling to or from the place of
work may or may not be considered working time. It
depends upon the kind of travel involved.
Factors to consider WON travel is to be working
time:
1.) Whether the employee is bound to
travel in a conveyance furnished by the
employer or is free to choose his
conveyance;
2.) Whether or not during the travel, he is
subject to the employers supervision
and control;
3.) Whether or not the travel takes place
under vexing and dangerous conditions.
Kinds of Travel
Travel from home to work- going to or from the
workplace
GR: Not work time
Exception: When an employee receives an
emergency call outside of his regular working hours
and is required to travel to his regular place of
business or some other work site. All time spent in
such travel is work time.
Travel that is all in the days work time spent by
an employee in travel as part of his principal
activity (e.g travel from jobsite to jobsite during
the work day)
GR: Hours Worked (even if beyond the 8-5 working
hours)
Exception: If the employee goes home instead of
returning to employers premises, that would be travel
to work and is not work time.
Travel away from home travel that keeps an
employee away from home overnight
GR: Work time when it cuts across or coincides with
the employees regular work hours.
Note: Away from home not back.
C.2 SECTION 6. Lectures, meetings, training
programs. Attendance at lectures, meetings,
training programs, and other similar activities shall not
be counted as working time if all of the following
conditions are met:
(a) Attendance is outside of the employee's regular
working hours;
(b) Attendance is in fact voluntary; and

(c) The employee does not perform any productive
work during such attendance.

Q: Is time spent in grievance meeting work time?
Yes, provided the time spent in such meeting is
also the time wherein the employees are required
by the employer to be on the premises.

Price Stabilization Corp. (PRISCO) vs. CIR
May 23, 1960
Facts: PRISCO workers union filed a petition praying
that PRISCO be ordered to pay its present
employees, claimants-union members, additional
compensation for overtime work (claimants are
security guards that were made to report for duty and
hour in advance of the usual time work).
Petitioner filed an answer saying that the overtime
work was not authorized because the Chief Security
Officer acted without the authority of Management.
Issue: WON the reporting time of the security
guards, which is one hour in advance may be
considered overtime. Yes!
Ruling: Services rendered outside of the regular
working hours partake the nature of overtime work. In
this case, the guards were directed to report for duty
one hour in advance for briefing purposes, and that
non-compliance is punishable. Services outside the
regular working hours must be voluntary for it to be
taken out of the purview of overtime work.
C.3 Semestral Break
Sibal vs. Notre Dame
February 23, 1990

Facts: Petitioner Delia R. Sibal was employed as
school nurse by private respondent Notre Dame of
Greater Manila. She was not required to report for
work for the entire Christmas and summer vacations.

Even if employed as school nurse, she was asked to
help in the library, was required to report for work
during the summer vacation (which she resisted and
she wasnt paid vacation pay), and was assigned to
teach health subjects. Her 13
th
month pay was also
counted based on 10 month period only instead of 12
months.
For teaching health subjects, she was not given
compensation for teaching notwithstanding the fact
that other teachers were duly compensated for extra
work done.
Notre Dame contended that Sibal was not entitled to
extra compensation for teaching because teaching
was allegedly part of her regular working program as
school nurse.

Failing to receive the compensation demanded,
petitioner filed a complaint for non-payment of the
following:
Vacation pay for 4 months
Compensation for teaching health
subjects
Deficiency in her 13
th
month pay

Issue: WON Sibal is entitled to vacation pay and
compensation for teaching. Yes!

Ruling: Sibal is entitled to compensation for teaching
health subjects. Although the subject taught is Health
and allied to her profession, and is taught during
regular working hours, petitioner's teaching the
subject in the classroom and her administering to the
health needs of students in the clinic involve two
different and distinct jobs. They cannot be equated
with each other for they refer to different functions.
Teaching requires preparation of lesson plans,
examinations and grades, while clinical work entails
preparation of clinical records and treating illnesses of
students in school. There can be no doubt that
teaching health subjects is extra work for petitioner,
and therefore necessitates extra compensation. After
all it has been the practice of the school to pay extra
compensation to teachers who were given extra load
even during regular working hours. The fact that
respondent school failed to produce the records of
those teachers prove that they were paid for extra
work. Hence, petitioner should likewise be paid
compensation.
Significantly, this Court has enunciated in the care
of University of Pangasinan Faculty Union v.
University of Pangasinan that semestral breaks may
be considered as "hours worked" under the Rules
implementing the Labor Code and that regular
professors and teachers are entitled to ECOLA during
the semestral breaks, their "absence" from work not
being of their own will.
C.4 Work Hours of Seamen
Soriano vs. Phil. Rock Products (CA decision)
Ruling: The fact that the tugboat was navigated 4
hours beyond 5 oclock in the afternoon does not
necessarily mean that during those days the appellee
performed service beyond 8 hours. His presence on
board for more than 8 hours a day might have been
required by the nature of his service, but there is no
specific evidence that he has been working all time. It
was not absolutely necessary for him to be
continuously attending to the motor of the tugboat. He
could leave the motor during part of said time and get
rested completely. He had an assistant who could
watch it and inform him of whatever disorder may
develop therein. The fact that he was subject to call in
case some disorder may develop in the motor does
not necessarily mean he was working.
Luzon vs. Luzon April 29, 1957
Facts: Luzon questions the applicability to seamen of
the interpretation given to the phrase hours of work
for the purpose of the Eight-Hour Labor Law.
It has been the consistent stand of petitioner that
while it is true that the workers herein were required to
report for work at 6:00 a.m. and were made to stay up
to 6:00 p.m., their work was not continuous and they
could have left the premises of their working place
were it not for the inherent physical impossibility
peculiar to the nature of their duty which prevented
them from leaving the tugboats. It is the Company's
defense that a literal interpretation of what constitutes
non-working hours would result in absurdity if made to
apply to seamen aboard vessels in bays and rivers.
Issue: Is the definition for "hours of work" as
presently applied to dryland laborers equally
applicable to seamen? Or should a different
criterion be applied by virtue of the fact that the
seaman's employment is completely different in
nature as well as in condition of work from that of
a dryland laborer? No!
Ruling: We do not need to set for seamen a criterion
different from that applied to laborers on land, for
under the provisions of the above quoted section, the
only thing to be done is to determine the meaning and
scope of the term "working place" used therein. As
we understand this term, alaborer need not leave
the premises of the factory shop or boat in order
that his period of rest shall not be counted, it
being enough that he "cease to work", may rest
LABSTAND-CANADA.REMOROZA.YAP 2

completely and leave or may leave at his will the
spot where he actually stays while working, to go
somewhere else, whether within or outside the
premises of said factory, shop or boat. If these
requisites are complied with, the period of such
rest shall not be counted.
Note: Seamen are not considered at work all the
time they are on board on ship. If he rests, such is
not considered work time.
National Shipyards and Steel vs CIR
December 30, 1961

Facts: In a complaint for
payment of overtime compensation, the court
examiner interpreted the words "Detail" or "Detailed
on Board" to mean that as long as respondent
Malondras was in his barge for twenty-four hours, he
should be paid overtime for sixteen hours a day or the
time in excess of the legal eight working hours that he
could not leave his barge. Petitioner NASSCO, upon
the other hand, argues that the mere fact that
Malondras was required to be on board his barge all
day so that he could immediately be called to duty
when his services were needed does not imply that he
should be paid overtime for sixteen hours a day, but
that he should receive compensation only for the
actual service in excess of eight hours that he can
prove.

Issue: WON respondent Malondras should be paid
overtime compensation for every hour in excess
of the regular working hours that he was on board
his vessel or barge each day. No!

Ruling:
We can not agree with the Court below that
respondent Malondras should be paid overtime
compensation for every hour in excess of the regular
working hours that he was on board his vessel or
barge each day, irrespective of whether or not he
actually put in work during those hours. Seamen are
required to stay on board their vessels by the very
nature of their duties, and it is for this reason that, in
addition to their regular compensation, they are given
free living quarters and subsistence allowances when
required to be on board. It could not have been the
purpose of our law to require their employers to pay
them overtime even when they are not actually
working; otherwise, every sailor on board a vessel
would be entitled to overtime for sixteen hours each
day, even if he had spent all those hours resting or
sleeping in his bunk, after his regular tour of duty. The
correct criterion in determining whether or not sailors
are entitled to overtime pay is not, therefore, whether
they were on board and can not leave ship beyond
the regular eight working hours a day, but whether
they actually rendered service in excess of said
number of hours.
Stolt-Nielsen Marine Services vs. NLRC July 11,
1996
Facts: Hernandez was hired by petitioner Stolt-
Nielsen marine Services (Phils.) Inc. as radio officer of
board M/T Stolt Condor for a period of ten months. He
was ordered to disembark and was repatriated
allegedly due to insubordination. Hernandez then filed
with the POEA a complaint for asking among others
for payment of overtime pay.
Stolt-Nielsen invoked the Court's pronouncement
in Cagampan v. NLRC, wherein the NLRC ruled on
the disallowance of overtime pay because the
complainant never produced any proof of actual
performance of overtime work.
Issue: WON Hernandez is entitled to overtime pay.
No!
Ruling: The rendition of overtime work and the
submission of sufficient proof that the said work was
actually performed are conditions to be satisfied
before a seaman could be entitled to overtime pay
which would be computed on the basis of 30% of the
basic monthly salary. In short, the contract provision
guarantees the right to overtime pay but the
entitlement to such benefit must first be established.
Realistically speaking, a seaman, by the very nature
of his job, stays on board a ship or vessel beyond the
regular eight-hour work schedule. For the employer to
give him overtime pay for the extra hours when he
might be sleeping or attending to his personal chores
or even just lulling away his time would be extremely
unfair and unreasonable.
A close scrutiny of the computation of the monetary
award shows that the award for overtime was for the
remaining six (6) months and three (3) days of private
respondent's contract at which time he was no longer
rendering services as he had already been
repatriated. Thus, he is not entitled to overtime pay.
D. Meal Periods
Note: Meal periods maybe shorter than one hour
but not lesser than 20 minutes. (1-19 minutes, it
must be compensable)
SECTION 7. Meal and Rest
Periods. Every employer
shall give his employees,
regardless of sex, not less
than one (1) hour time-off for
regular meals, except in the
following cases when a meal
period of not less than
twenty (20) minutes may be
given by the employer
provided that such shorter
meal period is credited as
compensable hours worked of
the employee:

(a) Where the work is non-manual work in nature or
does not involve strenuous physical exertion;

(b) Where the establishment regularly operates not
less than sixteen (16) hours a day;

(c) In case of actual or
impending emergencies or
there is urgent work to be
performed on machineries,
equipment or installations to
avoid serious loss which the
employer would otherwise
suffer; and

(d) Where the work is necessary to prevent serious
loss of perishable goods.

Rest periods or coffee
breaks running from five (5)
to twenty (20) minutes shall
be considered as
compensable working time.

Art. 85. Meal periods. Subject to such regulations as
the Secretary of Labor may prescribe, it shall be the
duty of every employer to give his employees not less
than sixty (60) minutes time-off for their regular meals.


NDC vs. CIR November 30, 1962
Facts: National Development Co., had four shifts of
work. In each shift, there was one hour meal time
period. Workers were used to be paid 8 hours for
each shift but later on were credited only with 6 hours
of work whenever workers in one shift were required
to continue working until the next shift.
Petitioners contended that the two hours
corresponding to the mealtime periods should not be
included in computing compensation. On the other
hand, National Textile Workers Union whose
members are employed at the NDC, maintained the
opposite view and asked the Court of Industrial
Relations to order the payment of additional overtime
pay corresponding to the mealtime periods.
ISSUE: WON the mealtime breaks should be
considered working hours. Yes!
Ruling: Mealtime in this case should be considered
working hours because working hours in petitioners
company was continuous and therefore the mealtime
breaks should be counted as working time for
purposes of overtime compensation.
The idle time that an employee may spend for resting
and during which he may leave the spot or place of
work though not the premises of his employer, is not
counted as working time only where the work is
broken or is not continuous. The time cards show that
the work was continuous and without any interruption.
There is also the evidence adduced by the petitioner
that the pertinent employees cannot freely leave their
working place nor rest completely.
Sime Darby Philippines vs. NLRC
Facts: The work schedule in Sime Darby Pilipinas
was 7:45 am- 3:45 pm, with a 30 minute paid on call
lunch break. Sometime in 1992, the employer
changed the work schedule to 7:45 am- 4:45 pm. The
lunch break from 12:00 noon to 1:00 PM would be
without pay.
ALU-TUCP an association of monthly salaried
employees of Sime Darby in its Marikina factory filed
a complaint with the Labor Arbiter for unfair Labor
practice and discrimination.
The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint on
the ground that the change in the work schedule and
the elimination of the 30-minute paid lunch break of
the factory workers constituted a valid exercise of
management prerogative and that the new work
schedule, break time and one-hour lunch break did
not have the effect of diminishing the benefits granted
to factory workers as the working time did not exceed
eight (8) hours.
NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiters ruling
because it is violative of Article 100 (prohibition on
diminution of benefits).
Issue: WON the new work schedule fully complies
with the daily work period of eight (8) hours
without violating the Labor Code. Yes!
Ruling: In the instant case, Sime Darby cites as
reason for the adjustment the efficient conduct of its
business operations and its improved productions. It
rationalizes that while the old work schedule included
a 30-minute paid lunch break, the employees could be
called upon to do jobs during that period as they were
on call.
With the new work schedule, the employees are now
given a one-hour lunch break without any interruption
from their employer. Since the employees are no
longer required to work during this one-hour lunch
break, there is no more need for them to be
compensated for this period. The Court agrees with
the Labor Arbiter that the new work schedule fully
complies with the daily work period of eight (8) hours
without violating the Labor Code. Besides, the new
schedule applies to all employees in the factory
similarly situated whether they are union members or
not.
Management is free to regulate, according to its own
discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment,
including hiring, work assignments, working methods,
time, place and manner of work, processes to be
followed, supervision of workers, working regulations,
transfer of employees, work supervision, lay off of
workers and discipline, dismissal and recall of
workers. Further, management retains the
prerogative, whenever exigencies of the service so
require, to change the working hours of its
employees. So long as such prerogative is exercised
in good faith for the advancement of the employers
interest and not for the purpose of defeating or
circumventing the rights of the employees under
special laws or under valid agreements, this Court will
uphold such exercise.

Art. 86. Night shift differential. Every employee
shall be paid a night shift differential of not less than
ten
percent (10%) of his regular wage for each hour of
work performed between ten oclock in the evening
and six oclock in the morning.

Note: Night shift differential is 10 %. Time: 10 PM-
6AM
The Shell Company vs. National Labor Union July
26, 1948
Ruling: Night work cannot be regarded as desirable,
either from the point of view of the employer or of the
wage earner. It is uneconomical unless overhead
costs are unusually heavy. Frequently the scale of
wages is higher as an inducement to employees to
accept employment on the night shift, and the rate of
production is generally lower.
The lack of sunlight tends to produce anemia and
tuberculosis and to predispose to other ills. Nightwork
brings increased liability to eyestrain and accident.
Serious moral dangers also are likely to result from
the necessity of traveling the streets alone at night,
and from the interference with normal home life. From
an economic point of view, moreover, the
investigations showed that nightwork was
unprofitable, being inferior to day work both in quality
and in quantity. Wherever it had been abolished, in
the long run the efficiency both of the management
and of the workers was raised. Furthermore, it was
found that nightwork laws are a valuable aid in
enforcing acts fixing the maximum period of
employment.
Naric vs. Naric Workers Union
May 29, 1959
Issue: WON an employee performing his regular 8
hours work during the daytime from 8:00 oclock
in the morning to 12:00 oclock at noon and from
1:00 oclock to 5:00 oclock in the afternoon be
paid for his services from 5:00 oclock to 9:00
oclock in the afternoon as overtime work and at
the same time be paid from 6:00 oclock to 9
oclock in the evening as night work. Yes!
Ruling: Yes. In effect held that "night work" is any
and all work rendered between 6:00 o'clock in the
afternoon and 6:00 o'clock in the morning, and
consequently, if a certain employee performs his
regular eight hours up to 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon
and renders overtime from 5:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m. of
the same day, the said employee is entitled to an
additional compensation for overtime services from
5:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m. and at the same time to
additional compensation for "night work" from 6:00
p.m. to 9:00 p.m. for the very same work.
When the tour of duty of a labourer falls at night time
(between 10 pm and 6 am), the receipt of overtime
pay will not preclude the right to night differential pay.
The latter is payment for work done during the night
while the other is payment for the excess of the
regular 8 hour work.

MERCURY DRUG CO. INC. VS. DAYAO
FACTS: This is a verified petition dated March 17,
1964 which was subsequently amended on July 31,
1964 filed by Nardo Dayao and 70 others against
Mercury Drug Co., Inc., and/or Mariano Que,
President & General Manager, and Mercury Drug Co.,
Inc. . Employees Association praying, with respect to
respondent corporation and its president and general
manager: 1) payment of their unpaid back wages for
work done on Sundays and legal holidays plus 25c/c
additional compensation from date of their
employment up to June 30, 1962; 2) payment of extra
compensation on work done at night; 3) reinstatement
of Januario Referente and Oscar Echalar to their
former positions with back salaries; and, as against
the respondent union, for its disestablishment and the
refund of the money it had collected from petitioners.
The CIR sustained the claim of the petitioners for
payment of back wages correspoding to the first four
hours work rendered on every other Sunday and first
four hours on legal holidays should be denied for lack
of merit. The motion for reconsideration was denied.
Thus, the instant petition (MERCURY) contending that
private respondents' claims for 25% Sunday and
Legal Holiday premiums are not supported by
substantial evidence, thus infringing upon the cardinal
rights of the petitioner, and that assuming it is, such
premiums are already included in the salary of private
respondents.
ISSUE: Whether or not private respondents are
entitled to the 25% Sunday and Legal Holiday
premiums.
HELD YES. While an employer may compel his
employees to perform service on such days, the law
nevertheless imposes upon him the obligation to pay
his employees at least 25% additional of their basic or
regular salaries. Under Section 4 of C. A. No. 444, no
person, firm or corporation, business establishment or
place of center of labor shall compel an employee or
laborer to work during Sundays and legal holidays
unless he is paid an additional sum of at least twenty-
five per centum of his regular remuneration: Provided,
However, That this prohibition shall not apply to public
utilities performing some public service such as
supplying gas, electricity, power, water, or providing
means of transportation or communication. Although a
service enterprise, respondent company's employees
are within the coverage of C. A. No. 444, as amended
known as the Eight Hour Labor Law, for they do not
fall within the category or class of employees or
labourers excluded from its provisions. In not giving
weight to the evidence of the petitioner company, the
respondent court sustained the private respondents'
evidence to the effect that their 25% additional
compensation for work done on Sundays and Legal
Holidays were not included in their respective monthly
salaries. The private respondents presented evidence
through the testimonies of Nardo, Dayao, Ernesto
Talampas, and Josias Federico who are themselves
among the employees who filed the case for unfair
labor practice in the respondent court and are private
respondents herein. The petitioner- company's
contention that the respondent court's conclusion on
the issue of the 25% additional compensation for work
done on Sundays and legal holidays during the first
four hours that the private respondents had to work
under their respective contracts of employment was
not supported by
substantial evidence is, therefore, unfounded.
***************************************
SEABORNE VS NLRC (Amando Ternida, PR)
FACTS: PR began working for Seaborne on April 8,
1983 as Tug Master with a monthly salary of
P2,475.00. Sep 15, 1987, the tugboat he was
manning met an accident. Half of the cost of repairs
totalling P5,000.00 was shouldered by Seaborne.
Private respondent was required to pay for the other
half, and an initial salary deduction of P250.00 was
made. September 24, 1987, he sought permission to
go on leave of absence to ask from the Department of
Labor and Employment if such deduction was legal,
his request was not granted. Instead, he was asked
by petitioner Gatan, Seaborne's president and
manager, to tender his resignation. When he refused
to resign, as he had not yet received any separation
pay, he was dismissed. Complaint for illegal
dismissal, illegal deduction, and unpaid wages, which
was later amended to include petitioner Gatan as
party-respondent and to embrace claims for overtime
pay, holiday pay, 13th month pay, sick leave pay,
damages, and attorney's fees.
LABSTAND-CANADA.REMOROZA.YAP 3

LA declared the dismissal of the complainant as
illegal. NLRC Modified reinstate complainant to his
former position, plus give the amount illegally
deducted from his salary, and attorney's fees of 10%
ISSUE: (1) WON the PR is entitled to service
incentive leave benefits as well as holiday and 13th
month pay; YES (2) Jerry Ronaldo Gatan personally
liable, with the petitioner corporation. NO
PET CONTENDS: award to PR should not have
included service incentive pay because it was never
sought in the complaint and the private respondent is
already enjoying vacation leave benefits, which bars
the employee from entitlement to the yearly service
incentive leave benefit mandated by Article 95 of the
Labor Code.The award of 13th month pay and holiday
pay, the petitioners allege that the private respondent
failed to prove or establish that he is entitled to the
same, he did not specify which holiday or what year
he was not paid said benefits.
(1) PRs allegation of non-payment of these benefits,
to which he is by law entitled, is a negative allegation
which need not be supported by evidence unless it is
an essential part of the cause of action.

It must be
noted that the main cause of action of the private
respondent is his illegal dismissal, and the claim for
the monetary benefits is but an incident of the protest
against such dismissal. Thus, the burden of proving
that payment of said benefits has been made rests
upon the party who will suffer if no evidence at all is
presented by either party, that is, the petitioners as
private respondent's employer.
(2) There is nothing on record which would prove the
insinuation that Jerry Gatan sanctioned the deduction
of P250.00 from private respondent's salary, as well
as the denial of the latter's request for leave of
absence.
***************************************
NATIONAL SEMI-CONDUCTOR VS NLRC (EDGAR
SANTOS)

FACTS:NSC manufactures and assembles electronic
parts for export with principal office at Mactan, Lapu-
Lapu City. PR was employed by NSC as a
technician in its Special Products Group with a
monthly salary of P5,501.00 assigned to the
graveyard shift starting at ten o clock in the evening
until six o clock in the morning. On 8 January 1993
Santos did not report. He resumed his duties as on 9
January 1993. At the end of his shift the following
morning, he made two (2) entries in his daily time
record (DTR) to make it appear that he worked on
both the 8th and 9
th
. Supervisor, Mr. Joel Limsiaco,
received the report that there was no technician in the
graveyard shift of 8 January 1993. He checked again
in the morning of 9 January 1993 he found the entry
made by Santos for the day before.
Santos was required in a memorandum to explain in
writing within
48 hours from notice why no disciplinary action
should be taken against him for dishonesty, falsifying
daily time record (DTR) and violation of company
rules and regulations 11 January 1993 Santos
submitted his written explanation alleging that he was
ill on the day he was absent. he alleged that it was
merely due to oversight or carelessness on his part.
NSC dismissed him on 14 January 1993 on the
ground of falsification of his DTR, which act was
inimical to the company and constituted dishonesty
and serious misconduct
.
Santos filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal and non-payment of back wages,
premium pay for holidays and rest days, night shift
differential pay, allowances, separation pay, moral
damages and attorneys fees. LA Santos was
dismissed on legal grounds but violated due process
likewise ordered the payment of P19,801.47
representing Santos unpaid night shift differentials.
NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter NSC contends
that the question of non-payment of night shift
differentials was never raised as an issue nor pursued
and proved by Santos in the proceedings before the
Labor Arbiter; that Santos was already paid his night
shift differentials, and any further payment to him
would amount to unjust enrichment;
ISSUES: is the PR entitled to night diff payment? YES
(2)Who has the burden of proving a claim for night
shift differential pay, the worker who claims not to
have been paid night shift differentials, or the
employer in custody of pertinent documents which
would prove the fact of payment of the same? THE
COMPANY
HELD: The fact that Santos neglected to substantiate
his claim for night shift differentials is not prejudicial to
his cause the burden of proving payment rests on
petitioner NSC. Santos allegation of non-payment
of this benefit, to which he is by law entitled, is a
negative allegation which need not be supported by
evidence unless it is an essential part of his cause of
action his main cause of action is his illegal dismissal,
and the claim for night shift differential is but an
incident of the protest against such dismissal. Thus,
the burden of proving that payment of such benefit
has been made rests upon the party who will suffer if
no evidence at all is presented by either party.GR:,
one who pleads payment has the burden of
proving it. Even where the plaintiff must allege non-
payment, the general rule is that the burden rests on
the defendant to prove payment, rather than on the
plaintiff to prove non-payment. The debtor has the
burden of showing with legal certainty that the
obligation has been discharged by payment.For sure,
private respondent cannot adequately prove the fact
of non-payment of night shift differentials since the
pertinent employee files, payrolls, records,
remittances and other similar documents - which will
show that private respondent rendered night shift
work; the time he rendered services; and, the
amounts owed as night shift differentials - are not in
his possession but in the custody and absolute control
of petitioner.
***************************************
NASSCO vs CIR
FACTS: NASSCO, a government-owned and
controlled corporation, is the owner of several barges
and tugboats. Itsbargemen are required to stay in
their respective barges, were given living quarters
therein as well as subsistence allowance of P1.50 per
day during the time they are on board. However, upon
prior authority of their superior officers, they may
leave their barges when said barges are idle.
April 15, 1957, 39 crew members including therein
respondent Dominador Malondras, filed with the
Industrial Court a complaint for the payment of
overtime compensation parties entered into a
stipulation of facts wherein the NASSCO recognized
and admitted 4. That to meet the exigencies of the
service in the performance of the above work,
petitioners have to work when so required in excess
of eight (8) hours a day and/or during Sundays and
legal holidays (actual overtime service is subject to
determination on the basis of the logbook of the
vessels, time sheets and other pertinent records of
the respondent).6. The petitioners are paid by the
respondent their regular salaries and subsistence
allowance, without additional compensation for
overtime work; Industrial Court, issued an order
directing the court examiner to compute the overtime
compensation due the claimants.
Examiner found Malondras, rendered an average
overtime service of five (5) hours each day for the
period aforementioned On April 30, 1958, the court
examiner submitted his second partial report covering
the period from January 1, 1954 to December 31,
1956, again giving each crewman an average of five
(5) overtime hours each day. Malondras was not,
however, included He filed petitions in the same case
asking for the compensation and payment of his
overtime compensation for the period from January 1,
1954 to December 31, 1956, and from January to
April 30, 1957 which, he alleged, was not included in
the first report of the examiner because his time
sheets for these months could not be found at the
time. Malondras' petition was opposed by the
NASSCO upon the argument, among others, that its
records do not indicate the actual number of working
hours rendered by Malondras during the periods in
question.
There appears to be no question that respondent
Malondras actually rendered overtime services during
the periods covered by the examiner's report. This is
admitted in the stipulation of facts of the parties on the
basis of this admission that the Court below, in its
order of November 22, 1957, ordered the payment of
overtime compensation to all the petitioners , the
number of hours of overtime for which Malondras
should be paid for the periods January 1, 1954 to
December 31, 1956, and from January to April 30,
1957. Almost everyday Dominador Malondras was on
"Detail" or "Detailed on Board". According to the
officer in charge of Dominador Malondras, when he
(Dominador Malondras) was on "Detail" or "Detailed
on Board", he was in the boat for twenty-four (24)
hours.
Examiner interpreted the words "Detail" or "Detailed
on Board" to mean that as long as respondent
Malondras was in his barge for twenty-four hours, he
should be paid overtime for sixteen hours a day or the
time in excess of the legal eight working hours that he
could not leave his barge. Petitioner NASSCO, upon
the other hand, argues that the mere fact that
Malondras was required to be on board his barge all
day so that he could immediately be called to duty
when his services were needed does not imply that he
should be paid overtime for sixteen hours a day, but
that he should receive compensation only for the
actual service in excess of eight hours that he can
prove.
ISSUE: WON Malondras is entitled to overtime pay
as to the 16 hours? NO HOW MANY HOURS?
HELD:We can not agree with the Court below that
respondent Malondras should be paid overtime
compensation for every hour in excess of the regular
working hours that he was on board his vessel or
barge each day, irrespective of whether or not he
actually put in work during those hours. Seamen are
required to stay on board their vessels by the very
nature of their duties, and it is for this reason that, in
addition to their regular compensation, they are given
free living quarters and subsistence allowances when
required to be on board. It could not have been the
purpose of our law to require their employers to pay
them overtime even when they are not actually
working; otherwise, every sailor on board a vessel
would be entitled to overtime for sixteen hours each
day, even if he had spent all those hours resting or
sleeping in his bunk, after his regular tour of duty. The
correct criterion in determining whether or not sailors
are entitled to overtime pay is not, therefore, whether
they were on board and can not leave ship beyond
the regular eight working hours a day, but whether
they actually rendered service in excess of said
number of hours. Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No.
444, known as the Eight-Hour Labor Law,
provides:"SEC. 1. The legal working day for any
person employed by another shall be of not more than
eight hours daily. When the work is not continuous,
the time during which the laborer is not working AND
CAN LEAVE HIS WORKING PLACE and can rest
completely, shall not be counted."
As we understand this term, alaborer need not leave
the premises of the factory shop or boat in order that
his period of rest shall not be counted, it being enough
that he "cease to work", may rest completely and
leave or may leave at his will the spot where he
actually stays while working, to go somewhere else,
whether within or outside the premises of said factory,
shop or boat. If these requisites are complied with, the
period of such rest shall not be counted. Overtime
service he put in whenever he was required to be
aboard his barge all day from 1954 to 1957 would be
more or less consistent. In truth, the other claimants
who served with Malondras under the same
conditions and period have been finally paid for an
overtime of 5 hours a day, and no substantial
difference exists between their case and the present
one, which was not covered by the same award only
because Malondras' time records not found until later.

***************************************
PNB VS PEMA
NATURE
Appeal from decision of the Court of Industrial
Relations (CIR)
FACTS
PNB and PNB Employees Association (PEMA) had a
dispute regarding the proper computation of overtime
pay. PEMA wanted the cost of living allowance
(granted in 1958) and longevity pay (granted in 1961)
to be included in the computation. PNB disagreed and
the 2 parties later went before the CIR to resolve the
dispute. CIR decided in favor of PEMA and held that
PNB should compute the overtime pay of its
employees on the basis of the sum total of the
employees basic salary or wage plus cost of living
allowance and longevity pay. The CIR relied on the
ruling in NAWASA v NAWASA Consolidated Unions,
which held that for purposes of computing overtime
compensation, regular wage includes all payments
which the parties have agreed shall be received
during the work week, including differentiated
payments for working at undesirable times, such as at
night and the board and lodging customarily furnished
the employee. This prompted PNB to appeal, hence
this case.
ISSUE: WON the cost of living allowance and
longevity pay should be included in the
computation of overtime pay as held by the CIR.
NO

HELD Overtime pay is for extra effort beyond that
contemplated in the employment contract; additional
pay given for any other purpose cannot be included in
the basis for the computation of overtime pay. Absent
a specific provision in the CBA, the bases for the
computation of overtime pay are 2 computations,
namely:
1. WON the additional pay is for extra work done or
service rendered
2. WON the same is intended to be permanent and
regular, not contingent nor temporary as a given only
to remedy a situation which can change any time.
Reasoning
- Longevity pay cannot be included in the computation
of overtime pay for the very simple reason that the
contrary is expressly stipulated in the CBA, which
constitutes the law between the parties.
- As regards cost of living allowance, there is nothing
in Commonwealth Act 444 [or the 8-hour Labor Law,
now Art. 87 Labor Code] that could justify PEMAs
posture that it should be added to the regular wage in
computing overtime pay. C.A. 444 prescribes that
overtime work shall be paid at the same rate as their
regular wages or salary, plus at least 25% additional.
The law did not define what is a regular wage or
salary. What the law emphasized is that in addition to
regular wage, there must be paid an additional 25%
of that regular wage to constitute overtime rate of
pay. Parties were thus allowed to agree on what shall
be mutually considered regular pay from or upon
which a 25% premium shall be based and added to
makeup overtime compensation.
- No rule of universal application to other cases may
be justifiably extracted from the NAWASA case. CIR
relies on the part of the NAWASA decision where the
SC cited American decisions whose legislation on
overtime is at variance with the law in this jurisdiction.
The US legislation considers work in excess of forty
hours a week as overtime; whereas, what is
generally considered overtime in the Philippines is
work in
excess of the regular 8 hours a day. It is
understandably
material to refer to precedents in the US for purposes
of computing weekly wages under a 40-hour week
rule, since the particular issue involved in NAWASA is
the conversion of prior weekly regular earnings into
daily rates without allowing diminution or addition.
- To apply the NAWASA computation would require a
different formula for each and every employee. It
would require reference to and continued use of
individual earnings in the past, thus multiplying the
administrative difficulties of the Company. It would be
cumbersome and tedious a process to compute
overtime pay and this may again cause delays in
payments, which in turn could lead to serious
disputes. To apply this mode of computation would
retard and stifle the growth of unions themselves as
Companies would be irresistibly drawn into denying,
new and additional fringe benefits, if not those already
existing, for fear of bloating their overhead expenses
through overtime which, by reason of being unfixed,
becomes instead a veritable source of irritant in labor
relations.
**Overtime Pay Rationale Why is a laborer or
employee who works beyond the regular hours of
work entitled to extra compensation called, in this
enlightened time, overtime pay?
Verily, there can be no other reason than that he is
made to work longer than what is commensurate with
his agreed compensation for the statutorily fixed or
voluntarily agreed hours of labor he is supposed to
do. When he thus spends additional time to his work,
the effect upon him is multi- faceted; he puts in more
effort, physical and/or mental; he is delayed in going
home to his family to enjoy the comforts thereof; he
might have no time for relaxation, amusement or
sports; he might miss important pre-arranged
engagements; etc. It is thus the additional work, labor
or service employed and the adverse effects just
mentioned of his longer stay in his place of work that
justify and are the real reasons for the extra
compensation that is called overtime pay.
**Overtime Pay Definition The additional pay for
service or work rendered or performed in excess of 8
hours a day by employees or laborers in employment
covered by the 8 hour Labor Law [C.A. 444, now Art.
87 Labor Code] and not exempt from its requirements.
It is computed by multiplying the overtime hourly rate
by the number of hours worked in excess of eight.
Disposition decision appealed from is REVERSED
*************************************************************
CALTEX vs CIR
Ruling: If the Sunday, Holiday, and night differential
pay and other fringe benefits are not continuously and
regularly received by the employees, and considering
that CA No. 444 (8 Hour Labor Law) makes the
regular pay the basis of computing the overtime pay,
which term should be sensibly interpreted and given
its ordinary meaning, it should not include premiums
for work done on rest days, night differentials, cost of
living allowance, payments for sick leave etc., which
items constitute extra pay or additions to the regular
or basic pay.

*************************************************************
BISIG vs PRC

FACTS: Bisig ng Manggagawa ng Philippine Refining
Company, Inc. filed with the Court of First Instance of
Manila a petition for declaratory relief seeking, among
others, the judgement that their Christmas bonus be
included as part of their basic pay for the computation
of overtime pay. Petitioner based its contention
primarily on the ruling of the Supreme Court in
NAWASA vs. NAWASA Consolidated Unions, et all
G.R. No. L-18938, August 31, 1964, 11 SCRA 766
where it was declared that the 'regular rate' is also
deemed to include other incentives and bonuses
which employers may receive as part of their regular
pay.
Respondent Philippine Refining Company, Inc. on
the other hand contended that in their collective
bargaining agreement (CBA), the parties never
intended to include the employees' Christmas bonus
in the computation of the overtime pay, and that it did
agree to raise the overtime rate to 50% instead of
25% of the regular base pay precisely on the
consideration that it be based only on the regular
base pay and should not include Christmas bonus.

Issue: WON, in the interpretation of the provision of
the CBA of the parties on overtime pay, the term
"regular base pay" should include Christmas bonus,
and that in case it should not, whether such
interpretation would contravene the principle
established in the Nawasa vs Nawasa case.

HELD: SC held that the term "regular base pay" is
clear, unequivocal and requires no interpretation. It
held that the term means regular basic pay which
necessarily EXCLUDES money received in different
concepts such as Christmas bonus and other fringe
benefits. The Court observed that in framing up their
CBA escpecially on the provision regarding overtime
pay, it was only the regular base pay that was
considered, and the same fact was undeniably known
to the petitioner - the very reason, according to the
court, why it attempted to have a different provision
pertaining to overtime pay which would include
Christmas bonus and other benefits. This factual
information by itself constrains the petitioner to
question the intention of that particular phrase in their
CBA pertaining to overtime pay but could only claim
that it violated the Nawasa doctrine and insist that it
be reformed to conform to said doctrine.

The Supreme Court held that the Nawasa ruling did
not limit that the computation of overtime pay to be
LABSTAND-CANADA.REMOROZA.YAP 4

based solely on the employees' regular wage or
salary, which according to law includes bonuses and
other benefits. What is important is that the product
resulting from the computation must always be equal
or higher than the statutory requirement of 25% more
than the regular wage. In the case at bar, the formula
adopted by the CBA is 50% more than the regular
basi pay, which when computer is much higher than
what can be arrived at using the statutory formula.
Thus, the Court declared that the provisions of the
CBA as to the computation of overtime pay has amply
complied with what is required by law, and therefore is
valid and not in contravention to the Nawasa doctrine.
***************************************
PALEA vs PAL
February 14, 1963 (PALEA) Philippine Air Lines
Supervisors' Association (PALSA) commenced an
action against the Philippine Air Lines (PAL) praying
that PAL be ordered to revise its method of computing
the basic daily and hourly rate of its monthly salaried
employees, pay them their accrued sala
differentials.Sought to be revised is PAL's formula in
computing wages of its employees:
Monthly salary x 12 365 (No. of calendar = x (Basic
dailr rate) days in a year) x 8 = Basic hourly rate
The unions would like PAL to modify the above
formula in this wise:
Monthly salary x 12 No. of actual working = x (Basic
daily rate) days x 8 = Basic hourly rate
CIR, issued an order denying the unions' prayer for a
modified wage formula. PALSA and PALEA seek to
change the long standing method in PAL of computing
the basic daily and hourly rate of monthly salaried
employees for the purpose of determining overtime
pay, Sunday and legal holiday premium pay, night
differential pay, vacation and sick leave pay, to wit,
the monthly salary multiplied by 12 and dividing the
product thereof by 365 and then the quotient by 8.
PALEA and PALSA claim that the method of
computing the basic daily and hourly rate of monthly
salaried employees of PAL prior to the implementation
of the 40-hour week schedule in PAL should be by
dividing the monthly salary by 26 working days, and
after the 40-hour week schedule, by dividing the
monthly salary by 20 working days, and then dividing
the quotient thereof in each case by 8. it appears that
for may years since 1952, PAL has been consistently
and regularly determining the basic and hourly rates
of monthly salaried employees by multiplying the
monthly salary by 12 momths and dividing the product
by 365 days to arive at the basic daily rate, and
dividing the quotient by 8 to compute the basic hourly
rate. No attempt to revise this formula notwithstanding
the various negotiations This, however, was a mere
proposal by PALSA for the adoption of a new formula;
it was not a demand for the application of a formula
claimed to be correct under the law. PALSA and
PALEA are estopped from questioning the
correctness and propriety of PAL's method of
determining the basic hourly and daily rate of pay of
its monthly salaried personnel, and considering the
long Unions attributed error to PAL's wage
formula, particularly in the use of 365 days as divisor.
The unions contended that the use of 365 days as
divisor would necessarily include off-days which,
under the terms of the collective bargaining
agreements entered into between the parties,
were not paid days. This is so since for work done on
an off-day, an employee was paid 100% plus 25%, or
100% plus 37- of his regular working hour rate.
ISSUES: WON DAYS, 11 AS SATURDAYS,
SUNDAYS, COMPANY OBSERVED HOLIDAYS OR
ANY OTHER DESIGNATED HOLIDAYS ARE PAID
DAYS.
(2) WON CIR ERED AND ACTED IN EXCESS OF
ITS JURISDICTION IN SENTENCING PAL TO PAY
DIFFERENTIALS FOR OVERTIME WORK,
NIGHTWORK, HOLIDAY AND SUNDAY PAY FROM
JULY 1, 1957 CONSIDERING THAT UNDER THE
THREE-YEAR PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD PROVIDED
IN SECTION 7-a OF COMMONWEALTH ACT NO.
444, AS AMENDED, THE EIGHT-HOUR LABOR
LAW, RESPONDENT UNIONS, ASSUMING THEY
HAD ANY CAUSE OF ACTION, COULD RECOVER
ONLY FROM FEBRUARY 14, 1960 UP TO THE
PRESENT, SINCE RESPONDENT UNIONS FILED
THEIR ACTION ONLY ON FEBRUARY 14, 1963.
PAL's maiden argument has a strong tendency to
mislead. off-days are paid and therefore should be
reckoned with in determing the divisor for computing
daily and hourly rate, PAL leans heavily on what it
considers as additional payment of 125% or 137 %,
as the case may be, of an employee's basic hourly
rate, given to a worker who worked on his off-days.
industrial court noted that before September 4,
1961, a monthly salaried employee of PAL had to
work 304 days only in a year,a nd after said date, he
had to work only 258 days in ayear, to be entitled to
his equivalent yearly salary. When he worked on his
off-day, he was paid accordingly (125% or 137%),
indicating that his off-days were not with pay. It seems
illogical for said employe to be paid 125% or 137 %
of his basic daily rate, if such off-days are already wtih
pay, as indicated by the company WE agree.There
should hardly be any doubt that off-days are not paid
days, Precisely, off-days are rest days for the worker.
He is not required to work on such days. This finds
support not only in the basic principle in labor that the
basis of remuneration or compensation is actual
service rendered, but in the ever pervading labor spirit
aimed at humanizing the conditions of hie working
man.
Since during his off-days an employee is not
compelled to work he cannot, conversely, demand for
his corresponding pay. If, however, a worker works on
his off-day, our welfare laws duly reward him with a
premium higher than what he would receive when he
works on his regular working day.Such being the
case, the divisor in computing an employee's
basic daily rate should be the actual working days
in a yar The number of off-days are not to be
counted precisely because on such off-days, an
employee is not required to work.
Simple common sense dictates that should an
employee opt not to work which he can legally do
on an off-day, and for such he gets no pay, he
would be unduly robbed of a portion of his legitimate
pay if and when in computing his basic daily and
hourly rate, such off-day is deemed subsumed by the
divisor. For it is elementary in the fundamental
process of division that with a constant dividend, the
bigger your divisor is, the smaller our quotient will be.
PAL maintains that the NAWASA doctrine should
not apply to a public utility like PAL which, from the
nature of its operations, requires a whole-year-round,
uninterrupted work by personnel. What PAL
apparently forgets is that just like it, NAWASA is also
a public utility which likewise requires its workers to
work the whole year round. Moreover, the NAWASA
is a government-owned corporation to which PAL
is akin, it being a government-controlled corporation.
And in the collective bargaining agreement entered
into between the NAWASA and respondent unions it
was agreed that all existing benefits enjoyed by the
employees and laborers prior to its effectivity shall
remain in force and shall form part of the agreement,
among which certainly is the 25% additional
compensation for work on Sundays and legal holidays
theretofore enjoyed by said laborers and employees.
The settled NAWASA doctrine should not be
disturbed.
The principle of estoppel and laches cannot well be
invoked agains the Association. In the first place, it
would be contrary to the spirit of the Eight-Hour Labor
Law, under which, as already seen, the laborers
cannot waive their right to extra compensation. In the
second place, the law principally obligates the
employer to observe it, as much so that it punishes
the employer for its employer for its violation and
leaves the employee or laborer is in such a
disadvantageous position as to be naturally reluctant
or even apprehensive in asserting any claim which
may cause the employher to devise a way for
exercising his right to terminate the employment.
If the principle of estoppel and laches is to be applied,
it may bring about a situation, whereby theemployee
or laborer, who cannot expressly renounce their right
to extra compensation under the Eight-Hour Labor
Law, may be compelled to accomplish the same thing
by mere silence or lapse of time, thereby frustrating
the purpose of the law by indirection
***************************************
MANILA RAILROAD VS CIR
FACTS: The heirs of an employee of the Manila
Railroad Company who died in 1945 were awarded
the money equivalent of his unused vacation and sick
leave although the law then in force provided for the
forfeiture thereof upon the employee's separation from
the service, for the reason, it is alleged, that Republic
Act 611, effective only on May 5, 1951, which
suppressed that part of the law relating to forfeiture,
was applied. But a careful reading of the decision will
show that the ruling was specifically based on a
circular issued by the manager of the railroad
company relative to the "grant of monetary aid to
former employees and/or to the latter's dependents,
who could not be reinstated on account of illness or
death" and also on the "long-standing policy of the
railroad company to pay vacation and sick leave duly
acquired by its employees and laborers effective upon
separation from the service."
ISSUE: WON the overtime worked rendered by the
employee without the approval of the Department
Head should be paid. YES
HELD: If the work performed was necessary, or that it
benefited the company or that the employee could not
abandon his work at the end of his eight hour work
because there was no substitute ready to take his
place and he performed overtime services upon the
order of his immediate superior, notwithstanding the
fact that there was a standing circular to the effect that
before overtime work may be performed with pay, the
approval of the corresponding department head
should be secured, such overtime services are
compensable inspite of the fact that said overtime
services were rendered without the prior approval of
the Department Head.
**************************************************
REOTAN VS NATIONAL RICE AND CORN
CORPORATION
Plaintiffs Fermin Reotan, Silvestre Reotan and
Praxedes Balane were guards-watchmen in the
agencies or branches of the NARIC in Naga,
Camarines Sur,. Inasmuch as these agencies had
each only two (2) guards-watchmen, the latter had
been required by their immediate superiors to work in
two (2) shifts of 12 hours daily each, except when
they were on vacation or sick leave of absence.
Having made demands of payment of the
corresponding overtime compensation which were not
heeded by the NARIC, on July 15, 1954, plaintiffs filed
their respective claims for overtime with the Wage
Administration Service, which, on February 16, 1955,
rendered decision in their favor. NARIC persisted in
its refusal to pay said compensation, plaintiffs
instituted the present separate actions, which were
jointly heard and disposed of in one decision, as
above stated.
Plaintiffs had rendered the overtime services
aforementioned has been fully established, not only
by their testimony and that of the corresponding
officers-in-charge . also, by their respective time-
records, most of which duly certified and found
correct as to the prescribed office hours, and bearing
the signatures of the officers-in-charge were
introduced in evidence. It was, also, proven
satisfactorily that, some time-records had been
destroyed by anay, and consequently, could not be
produced in court, and that said overtime services
were rendered by order of the aforementioned
officers-in-charge,
NARIC maintains: (1) that "except in special cases of
overtime work specifically approved by the
management to be with pay, no payment of overtime
work will be approved", for pursuant to Resolution No.
479 of its Board of Directors, "no overtime nor meal
allowance shall be allowed unless previously
approved by the General Manager and only in cases
of absolute necessity"; (2) that this case should be
dismissed because, upon petition filed by the NARIC
Workers union at the CIR, the same extended to the
NARIC workers in the provinces, the benefits of a
partial decision, rendered in said case, on February
16, 1953, granting differential pay to NARIC workers
in Manila who had rendered night work, overtime and
work on Sundays and legal holidays, for which reason
an examiner of the Court of Industrial Relations
reported thereto, inter alia, that plaintiffs herein,
namely, Fermin Reotan, Silvestre Reotan and
Praxedes Balane were entitled for such work, during
the period from February 1945 to January 1953, to the
sum of P5.82, P193.30 and P151.23, respectively; (3)
that the Eight-Hour Labor Law is inapplicable to the
NARIC; and (4) that the period during which said
plaintiffs were on leave of absence should not have
been included in the computation of the amounts due
them by way of overtime according to the decision
appealed from.
Section 6 of Commonwealth Act No. 444
specifically provides that 'any agreement or contract
between the employer and the laborer or employee
contrary to the provision of this Act shall be null and
void ab initio'. Even in cases of disaster or calamity, to
prevent loss of life and property, Section 3 of said
Commonwealth Act No. 444 provides that 'in all such
cases the laborers and employees shall be entitled to
receive compensation for the overtime work
performed at the same rate as the regular wages or
salary, plus at least 25 per centum additional'.
Section 4 of the same Act provides that 'no person,
firm, or corporation ... shall compel an employee or
laborer to work during Sundays and legal holidays,
unless he is paid an additional sum of at least 25 per
centum of his regular remuneration." .ISSUE:WON
REOTAN were entitled to the overtime pay? YES
HELD: We are fully in accord with this view, which is
in line with our decision in Manila Railroad Co:
(REFER TO HELD OF MANILA RAILROAD)
HENCE. It appearing that Fermin Reotan had been on
leave of absence for 36 days and that Silvestre
Reotan and Praxedes Balane had been absent for
one (1) day and four (4) days, respectively, and that
these absences had not been considered in
computing the overtime compensation due said
plaintiffs, it is clear that the corresponding deductions
should be made therefrom.
GLOBAL VS ATIENZA
FACTS: Rosal, herein private respondent,
commenced her employment with petitioner Global
Incorporated in February, 1970, as a Sales Clerk.
In November 1976 Global Inc. filed with the
Department of Labor Regional Office, an application
for clearance to terminate the services of Clarita
Rosal, for having violated company rules and
regulations by incurring repeated absences and
tardiness. The subject employee was placed under
preventive suspension on November 16, 1976
pending resolution of the application for clearance.c

Clarita Rosal filed her opposition to the clearance
application as well as a counter-complaint against
Global Inc., for illegal dismissal, overtime pay and
premium pay.

The officer-in-charge of Regional Office, Ministry of
labor Leogardo, Jr. lifted the preventive suspension
of Clarita Rosal, finding her suspension not
warranted, and reinstated her to her former position
without loss of rights and with full backwages from
the time of preventive suspension up to the date of
her actual reinstatement.

The Labor Arbiter rendered his decision dismissing
the complaint for illegal dismissal, overtime
compensation and premium pay, and the clearance
for the complainants termination is granted.

Rosal appealed the aforesaid decision to the
NLRC.Respondents Commissioners Atienza and
Quadra modified the appealed decision, whereby:

(a) respondent is ordered to pay complainant
overtime pay for the period Nov. 1, 1974 to Nov. 16,
1976 when she was suspended;

(b) respondent is likewise ordered to pay
complainant backwages from Dec. 2, 1976 to May
31, 1978;

(c) the decision of the Labor Arbiter granting
clearance to terminate the services of the
complainant is affirmed.

Respondent Commissioner Villatuya voted to affirm
the Labor Arbiters decision. Hence, the instant
petition.

ISSUE: WON
Rosal is entitled to overtime pay
Rosal is entitled to backwages

HELD: The assailed decision of the NLRC is
modified, where the order to pay overtime pay to
Rosal is set aside, the order to pay Rosal
backwages affirmed, and the decision granting
clearance to terminate the services of Rosal
likewise affirmed

1. NO. We agree with the conclusion of the Labor
Arbiter that the same should be denied for want of
sufficient factual and legal basis. No employee is
authorized to work after office hours, during
Sundays and Holidays unless required by a written
memorandum from the General Manager. During
the period from Nov. 1, 1974 to Nov. 16, 1976, no
employee of the company was never required to
work after 5:00 in the afternoon. There is nothing in
the record except her bare allegations which would
show that she truly and actually rendered said
overtime work

2. YES. the NLRC ordered petitioner to pay Rosal
backwages from Dec. 2, 1976 to May 31, 1978,
the date when Asst. Secretary Leogardo, Jr.,
rendered his decision lifting the preventive
suspension of Rosal and ordering petitioner to
reinstate her to her former position without loss of
rights and with full backwages from the time of
preventive suspension up to the date of her actual
reinstatement.c

We agree. We note that this decision of the Labor
Arbiter ordering reinstatement had not been
complied with. Neither was it appealed by petitioner,
therefore, the decision had become final and
executory. To exempt petitioner from the payment
of backwages would be to give premium to the blant
disregard of orders of the Ministry of Labor.
Moreover, it would be in consonance with
compassionate justice that Rosal be paid
backwages during the period that she was
supposed to be reinstated

Note that the only ground for the imposition of
preventive suspension is provided for under Sec. 4,
Rule XIV of the Implementing Regulations of the
Ministry of Labor which reads-

SEC. 4. Preventive suspension. The employer may
place the employee concerned under preventive
suspension only if the continued employment of the
employee poses a serious and imminent threat to
the life or property of the employer or of the co-
employees. Any preventive suspension before the
filing of the application shall be considered worked
days, and shall be duly paid as such if the
continued presence of the employee concerned
does not pose a serious threat to the life and
property of the employer or of the co-employees.

LABSTAND-CANADA.REMOROZA.YAP 5

As aptly held by Asst. Secretary Leogardo Jr., the
continued presence of Clarita Rosal never posed a
serious and imminent threat to the life or property of
the employer or co-employees as would warrant her
preventive suspension

DURABUILT V NLRC

FACTS: On July 11, 1983, a complaint for illegal
dismissal was filed by respondent Reynaldo Bodegas,
against petitioner Durabuilt, a tire recapping company.
Labor Arbiter: private respondent was ordered
reinstated to his former position with full backwages,
from the time he was terminated up to the time he is
actually reinstated, without loss of seniority rights and
benefits accruing to him.

Acting Chief of Research and Information and the
Corporation Auditing Examiner of the then Ministry of
Labor and Employment submitted a computation of
backwages, ECOLA, 13th month pay, sick and
vacation leave benefits in favor of Reynaldo Bodegas
in the total amount of P24,316.38.

The petitioner filed its opposition to the computation
on the ground that it contemplated a straight
computation of twenty six (26) working days in one
month when the period covered by the computation
was intermittently interrupted due to frequent
brownouts and machine trouble and that respondent
Bodegas had only a total of 250.75 days of
attendance in 1982 due to absences. According to the
petitioner, Bodegas is entitled only to the amount of
P3,834.05 broken down as follows: salaries
P1,993.00; ECOLA P1,433.50, and 13th month pay
P407.55.

On October 23, 1985, the Labor Arbiter denied the
opposition to the computation. The petitioner
appealed to the NLRC which, in an order dated May
16, 1986, affirmed the order of the Labor Arbiter and
dismissed the appeal.

Claiming grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
public respondents, Durabuilt filed the instant petition.

ISSUE: WON Bodegas is entitled to backwages

HELD: Backwages, in general, are granted on
grounds of equity for earnings which a worker or
employee has lost due to his dismissal from work
(New Manila Candy Workers Union (NACONWA-
PAFLU v. CIR, 86 SCRA 37).

The general principle is that an employee is entitled to
receive as backwages all the amounts he may have
lost starting from the date of his dismissal up to the
time of his reinstatement

The age-old rule governing the relation between
labor and capital, or management and employee
of a "fair day's wage for a fair day's labor" remains
as the basic factor in determining employees' wages,
and for that matter backwages. If there is no work
performed by the employee there can be no wage or
pay unless, of course, the laborer was able, willing
and ready to work but was illegally locked out, or
suspended (SSS v. SSS Supervisors Union-CUGCO,
117 SCRA 746).

The illegal dismissal of the private respondent is
conceded by the petitioner. It is willing to pay
backwages. However, the petitioner argues that for
days where no work was required and could be done
by its employees, no wages could have been earned
and, thereafter, lost by said employees to justify an
award of backwages.

The petitioner is ordered to pay private respondent his
backwages from the time he was terminated up to the
time he was actually reinstated computed on the basis
of the number of days when petitioner's business was
in actual operation. The number of days where no
work was required and could be done by petitioner's
employees on account of shutdowns due to electrical
power interruptions, machine repair, and lack of raw
materials are not considered hours worked for
purposes of computing the petitioner's obligation to
respondent employee. In no case shall the award
exceed three year's backpay as above computed.

WILLIAM LINES V LOPEZ

FACTS: Lopez wsa storekeeper of Severa vessels.
His services was terminated and approximately 1yr 5
mos and 4 days after his services were terminated
filed a petitio with the CIR claiming salary differentials,
premium pay for services rendered on Sundays and
holidays, as well as daily overtime compensatrion,
with a request for reinstatement.

William lines maintained that Lopez was not entitled to
premium pay bec WL was public utility corp; that the
various claims had already prescribed; and that the
claiman-respondent never redered overtime service
bec the nature of his work was w/o fixed time and did
not require him to work for more than 8hrs a day.

ISSUE: WOM Lopes was entitled to premium pay
H: since sec 7-A of the 8
th
-hour Labor Law allows the
enforcement of an action w/n 3 yrs after the cause of
action accrued, otherwise such action shall be forever
barred, claimant can collect only the overtime
compensation for the 2 hours in excess of the regualr
8 hrs a day which accrued w/n 3 yrs immed before
filing of the petition.

Similar claims w/c accrued prior to the 3yr period or
bfore March 17, 1961 have already prescribed and
can no longer be enforced in this action. However,
since claimant-respndents services were terminated
on 10/13/62, the computation of the 2hr-daily overtime
will cover the period from March17/61 to Oct13/62, or
a period of 1yr, 6mos and 26 days, from which shall
be excluded Sundays and legal holidays based on the
principle that being on board the vessel on these days
were part and parcel of and inherent in his work.

PESALA V NLRC

FACTS 1. Private respondent Angel Esquejo started
working with petitioner PAL Employees Savings and
Loan Association (PESALA) as a company guard and
was receiving a monthly basic salary of P 1,900 plus
an emergency allowance in the amount of P 510.
2. He was required to work 12 hours a day. That
during his entire period of employment with petitioner,
herein private respondent was required to perform
overtime work without any additional compensation
from the latter.
3. Sometime later, private respondent was
administratively charged with serious misconduct or
disobedience of the lawful orders of petitioner or its
officers. As a result, private respondent filed a
detailed and itemized computation of his money
claims.
4. Thereafter, the labor Arbiter rendered a decision
granting private respondent overtime pay.
5. Aggrieved by the decision, petitioner appealed to
the NLRC only to be rejected later. 6. In the
meantime, petitioner filed the instant special civil
action for certiorari citing as reason that quite recently,
the employee payroll sheets which contained the
salaries and overtime pay received by private
respondent were located in the bodega of the
petitioner and based on the payroll sheets, it appears
that substantial overtime pay
have been paid to private respondent.
ISSUE Whether or not an employee is entitled to
overtime pay for work rendered in excess of the
regular eight hour day given the fact that he entered
into a contract of labor specifying a work-day of
twelve hours at a fixed monthly rate above the
legislated minimum wage.
HELD YES. The Supreme Court held that based on
petitioners own computation, it appears that the
basic salary plus emergency allowance given to
private respondent did not actually include the
overtime pay claimed by private respondent.
Moreover, there was no meeting of the minds
between petitioner and private respondent as to what
is covered by the salary stipulated. The said contract
was definite only as to the number of hours to be
rendered.
Furthermore, the subsequent act of private
respondent in filing the money claims negates the
theory that there was a clear agreement as to the
inclusion of his overtime pay in the contracted salary
rate.
MERALCO VS MERALCO

F:Some laborers of the petitioning union chose to
work in the motor pool of the company and to be paid
under Plan A wherein they were being paid monthly
rate rquivalent to 30times their daily wage, in addition
to additional sick leave, vacation leave, and other
privileges of a regular employee. They also had the
privilege of taking 4 days off with pay every month,
plus time off with pay on such days when the
executive or official using the car dies not need their
service of more than 8hrs a day in lieu of overtime.
I: is such waiver of OT pay valid in exchange of
certain benefits?
H: Petitioner cant just assume that the waiver of OT
compensation by the drivers who preferred to work in
the motor pool is against the law, it appearing that
such waiver was to bein consideration for certain
privileges they were to enjoy, among them that of
being given tips when doing OT work, and there being
no proof that the value sod those privileges did not
compensate for such work.
ENGINEERING EQUIPMENT V MOLE
F: Miguel Asperas contract w/ petitioner stipulates
that his working day consists of 10hrs a day. He now
claims that his monthly salary should correspond to
8hrs of daily work and that for the additional 2hrs
daily, he was entitled to overtime pay.
Pet. Contends that Aspera is a managerial employee
and under sec82, is not entitled to OT pay.
The Director of Employment Servces,and NLRC
sustained Asperas claim and awarded him that amt
as OT pay but declared void the stipulation for a 10hr
working day bec it was contrary to sec83 of
LaborCode.
I: WON 10hr working day is valid
H: Acting Minister of Labor (MOLE) and Dir De la
Cruz committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction in awarding OT pay and in
disregarding a contract that De la Cruz himself, who is
supposed to know the 8hr labor law, had previously
sealed with his imprimatur. Because of that approval,
the petitioner acted in good faith on enforcing the
contract.
Furthermore, Aspera had not denied that he was
aamanagerial employee w/n the meaning of sec 82.
As such he was not entitled to OT pay.

MERCURY DRUG V DAYAO
FACTS 1. This is a verified petition dated March
17, 1964 which was subsequently amended on
July 31, 1964 filed by Nardo Dayao and 70 others
against Mercury Drug Co., Inc.,
and/or Mariano Que, President & General Manager,
and Mercury Drug Co., Inc. 2. Employees
Association praying, with respect to respondent
corporation and its
president and general manager: 1) payment of their
unpaid back wages for work done on Sundays and
legal holidays plus 25c/c additional compensation
from date of their employment up to June 30, 1962; 2)
payment of extra compensation on work done at
night; 3) reinstatement of Januario Referente and
Oscar Echalar to their former positions with back
salaries; and, as against the respondent union, for its
disestablishment and the refund of the money it had
collected from petitioners.
3. The CIR sustained the claim of the
petitioners for payment of back wages correspoding to
the first four hours work rendered on every other
Sunday and first four hours on legal holidays should
be denied for lack of merit. The motion for
reconsideration was denied.
4. Thus, the instant petition contending
that private respondents' claims for 25% Sunday and
Legal Holiday premiums are not supported by
substantial evidence, thus infringing upon the cardinal
rights of the petitioner, and that assuming it is, such
premiums are already included in the salary of private
respondents.
ISSUE
Whether or not private respondents are entitled to the
25% Sunday and Legal Holiday premiums.
HELD The contention is without merit. While an
employer may compel his employees to perform
service on such days, the law nevertheless imposes
upon him the obligation to pay his employees at least
25% additional of their basic or regular salaries.
Under Section 4 of C. A. No. 444, no person, firm or
corporation, business establishment or place of center
of labor shall compel an employee or laborer to work
during Sundays and legal holidays unless he is paid
an additional sum of at least twenty-five per centum of
his regular remuneration: Provided, However, That
this prohibition shall not apply to public utilities
performing some public service such as supplying
gas, electricity, power, water, or providing means of
transportation or communication. Although a service
enterprise, respondent company's employees are
within the coverage of C. A. No. 444, as amended
known as the Eight Hour Labor Law, for they do not
fall within the category or class of employees or
laborers excluded from its provisions. In not giving
weight to the evidence of the petitioner company, the
respondent court sustained the private respondents'
evidence to the effect that their 25% additional
compensation for work done on Sundays and Legal
Holidays were not included in their respective monthly
salaries. The private respondents presented evidence
through the testimonies of Nardo, Dayao, Ernesto
Talampas, and Josias Federico who are themselves
among the employees who filed the case for unfair
labor practice in the respondent court and are private
respondents herein. The petitioner- company's
contention that the respondent court's conclusion on
the issue of the 25% additional compensation for work
done on Sundays and legal holidays during the first
four hours that the private respondents had to work
under their respective contracts of employment was
not supported by substantial evidence is, therefore,
unfounded.

NWSA V NWSA CONSOLIDATED UNIONS
F: Petitioner is a government-owned and controlled
corp created under RA 1383 while respondent NWSA
Consol.Unions are various labor organizations
composed of laborers and employees of NAWASA.
Acting on the certification of the president of Phil.
Court of Industrial Rel. conducted a hearing on
12/5/57 on the controversy existing bet pet, and
respon unions w/c the latter embodied in a
Manifesto namely:
a. implementation of the 40-hr week law
b. alleged violations of the collecve
bargaining agreement concerning
distress pay
c. min. wage of P5.25
d. promotional appts and filing of
vacancies of newly created positions;
e. addtl compensation for night work;
f. wage increases to some laborers and
employees; and
g. strike duraition pay
in addition, responn unions raised the issue of
whether 25% addtl compensation for Sunday work
should be included in computing the daily wage and
whether, in determining the daily wage of a monthly-
salaried employee, the salary should be divided by 30
days.
Issue: WON the undertime should set-off the time
worked in excess of 8hrs
HELD: the method used by NWSA in offsetting the OT
with undertime and at the same time charging said
undertime to the accrued leave of the employee is
UNFAIR, for under such method the employee is
made to pay twice for his undertime bec his leave is
reduced, to that extent while he was made to pay for it
with work beyond the regukar working hours.

The proper method should be to deduct the undertime
from the accrued leave but pay the employee the
overtime to w/c he is entitled. This method also
obviated the irregular schedule that would result if the
OT should be set off against the undertime for that
would place the schedule for working hrs dependent
on the employee.

STO DOMINGO V PHIL.ROCK (?)

Art. 89.(memo) Emergency overtime work. Any
employee may be required by the employer to
perform overtime work in any of the following
cases:
When the country is at war or when any other
national or local emergency has been declared by
the National Assembly or the Chief Executive;

When it is necessary to prevent loss of life or
property or in case of imminent danger to public
safety due to an actual or impending emergency
in the locality caused by serious accidents, fire,
flood, typhoon, earthquake, epidemic, or other
disaster or calamity;

When there is urgent work to be performed on
machines, installations, or equipment, in order to
avoid serious loss or damage to the employer or
some other cause of similar nature;

When the work is necessary to prevent loss or
damage to perishable goods; and

Where the completion or continuation of the work
started before the eighth hour is necessary to
prevent serious obstruction or prejudice to the
business or operations of the employer.

Any employee required to render overtime work
under this Article shall be paid the additional
compensation required in this Chapter.

Art. 90. Computation of additional compensation.
For purposes of computing overtime and other
additional remuneration as required by this
Chapter, the "regular wage" of an employee shall
include the cash wage only, without deduction on
account of facilities provided by the employer.

CALTEZ V CIR

MERALCO V MERALCO
F: Employees workweek was 45hrs consisting of 8hrs
daily, from Mon-Fri and 5hrs on Sunday. Realizing
certain advantages in compressing the workdays to
only Mon through Fri at 9hrs per day w/o OT, the
employees and the mgt sought the approval of DOLE.
DOLE took the ff position-
GR: Right to OT pay cannot be waived however if
there is a compressed workweek propsed, the same
shall be valid if it meets the ff conditions:
a. the employees voluntarily agree to work
9 hrs a day from Mon-Fri
b. that there will not be any diminution
whatsoever in the weekly of monthly
take home pay and fringe benefits of
the employees.
c. The value of the benefits that will
accrue to the employees under the
proposed work schedule is more than
or at least commensurate with or equal
to the 1 hr OT pay that is due them
during the weekdays based on the
employees quantification
d. The 1hr OT pay of the employees will
become due and demandable if ever
they are permitted or made to work on
any Sat during the effectivity of the new
working time arrangement, since the
agreement betwn the employees and
mgt is that there will be no Saturday
work in exchange for a longer workday
during weekdays
e. The work of the employees does not
involve strenuous physical exertion and
they are provided with adequate rest
periods or coffee breaks in the
morning and afternoon; and
f. The effectivity of the proposed working
time arrangement shall be of temporary
duration as determined by DOLE.



Art. 88. Undertime not offset by
overtime. Undertime work on any
particular day shall not be offset by
overtime work on any other day.
Permission given to the employee
to go on leave on some other day of
the week shall not exempt the
employer from paying the
additional compensation required
in this Chapter.

LABSTAND-CANADA.REMOROZA.YAP 6

IRR on HOURS OF WORK IN GENERAL WHO ARE
INCLUDED/EXCLUDED

Art. 82. Coverage. The provisions of this Title shall
apply to employees in all establishments and
undertakings whether for profit or not, but not to
government employees, managerial employees, field
personnel, members
of the family of the employer who are dependent on
him for support, domestic helpers, persons in the
personal service of another, and workers who are
paid by results as determined by the Secretary of
Labor in
appropriate regulations.

As used herein, "managerial employees" refer to
those whose primary duty consists of the
management of the establishment in which they are
employed or of a department or subdivision thereof,
and to other officers or members of the managerial
staff.

"Field personnel" shall refer to non-agricultural
employees who regularly perform their duties away
from the
principal place of business or branch office of the
employer and whose actual hours of work in the field
cannot be determined with reasonable certainty.
SECTION 1. General statement on coverage.
The provisions of this Rule shall apply to all
employees in all establishments and undertakings,
whether operated for profit or not, except to those
specifically exempted under Section 2 hereof.cralaw
SECTION 2. Exemption. The provisions of this
Rule shall not apply to the following persons if they
qualify for exemption under the conditions set forth
herein:
(a) Government employees whether employed by the
National Government or any of its political subdivision,
including those employed in government-owned
and/or controlled corporations;
(b) Managerial employees, if they meet all of the
following conditions:
(1) Their primary duty consists of the management of
the establishment in which they are employed or of a
department or sub-division thereof.cralaw
(2) They customarily and regularly direct the work of
two or more employees therein.cralaw
(3) They have the authority to hire or fire employees
of lower rank; or their suggestions and
recommendations as to hiring and firing and as to the
promotion or any other change of status of other
employees, are given particular weight.cralaw
(c) Officers or members of a managerial staff if they
perform the following duties and responsibilities:
(1) The primary duty consists of the performance of
work directly related to management policies of their
employer;
(2) Customarily and regularly exercise discretion and
independent judgment; and
(3) (i) Regularly and directly assist a proprietor or a
managerial employee whose primary duty consists of
the management of the establishment in which he is
employed or subdivision thereof; or (ii) execute under
general supervision work along specialized or
technical lines requiring special training, experience,
or knowledge; or (iii) execute, under general
supervision, special assignments and tasks; and
(4) Who do not devote more than 20 percent of their
hours worked in a work week to activities which are
not directly and closely related to the performance of
the work described in paragraphs (1), (2) and (3)
above.cralaw
(d) Domestic servants and persons in the personal
service of another if they perform such services in the
employer's home which are usually necessary or
desirable for the maintenance and enjoyment thereof,
or minister to the personal comfort, convenience, or
safety of the employer as well as the members of his
employer's household.cralaw
(e) Workers who are paid by results, including those
who are paid on piece-work, "takay," "pakiao" or task
basis, and other non-time work if their output rates are
in accordance with the standards prescribed under
Section 8, Rule VII, Book Three of these regulations,
or where such rates have been fixed by the Secretary
of Labor and Employment in accordance with the
aforesaid Section.cralaw
(f) Non-agricultural field personnel if they regularly
perform their duties away from the principal or branch
office or place of business of the employer and whose
actual hours of work in the field cannot be determined
with reasonable certainty.cralaw

ART. 83. Normal hours of work. - The normal hours
of work of any employee shall not exceed eight (8)
hours a day.

Health personnel in cities and municipalities with a
population of at least one million (1,000,000) or in
hospitals and clinics with a bed capacity of at least
one hundred (100) shall hold regular office hours for
eight (8) hours a day, for five (5) days a week,
exclusive of time for meals, except where the
exigencies of the service require that such personnel
work for six (6) days or forty-eight (48) hours, in which
case, they shall be entitled to an additional
compensation of at least thirty percent (30%) of their
regular wage for work on the sixth day. For purposes
of this Article, "health personnel" shall include resident
physicians, nurses, nutritionists, dietitians,
pharmacists, social workers, laboratory technicians,
paramedical technicians, psychologists, midwives,
attendants and all other hospital or clinic personnel.

ART. 84. Hours worked. - Hours worked shall
include (a) all time during which an employee is
required to be on duty or to be at a prescribed
workplace; and (b) all time during which an employee
is suffered or permitted to work. Rest periods of short
duration during working hours shall be counted as
hours worked.

**IRR BK III Rule 1 sec 3-6
SECTION 3. Hours worked. The following shall be
considered as compensable hours worked:
(a) All time during which an employee is required to
be on duty or to be at the employer's premises or to
be at a prescribed work place; and
(b) All time during which an employee is suffered or
permitted to work.cralaw
SECTION 4. Principles in determining hours
worked. The following general principles shall
govern in determining whether the time spent by an
employee is considered hours worked for purposes of
this Rule:
(a) All hours are hours worked which the employee is
required to give his employer, regardless of whether
or not such hours are spent in productive labor or
involve physical or mental exertion.cralaw
(b) An employee need not leave the premises of the
work place in order that his rest period shall not be
counted, it being enough that he stops working, may
rest completely and may leave his work place, to go
elsewhere, whether within or outside the premises of
his work place.cralaw
(c) If the work performed was necessary, or it
benefited the employer, or the employee could not
abandon his work at the end of his normal working
hours because he had no replacement, all time spent
for such work shall be considered as hours worked, if
the work was with the knowledge of his employer or
immediate supervisor.cralaw
(d) The time during which an employee is inactive by
reason of interruptions in his work beyond his control
shall be considered working time either if the
imminence of the resumption of work requires the
employee's presence at the place of work or if the
interval is too brief to be utilized effectively and
gainfully in the employee's own interest.cralaw
SECTION 5. Waiting time. (a) Waiting time spent
by an employee shall be considered as working time if
waiting is an integral part of his work or the employee
is required or engaged by the employer to wait.cralaw
(b) An employee who is required to remain on call in
the employer's premises or so close thereto that he
cannot use the time effectively and gainfully for his
own purpose shall be considered as working while on
call. An employee who is not required to leave word at
his home or with company officials where he may be
reached is not working while on call.cralaw
SECTION 6. Lectures, meetings, training
programs. Attendance at lectures, meetings,
training programs, and other similar activities shall not
be counted as working time if all of the following
conditions are met:
(a) Attendance is outside of the employee's regular
working hours;
(b) Attendance is in fact voluntary; and
(c) The employee does not perform any productive
work during such attendance.

TRAVEL TIME:
3 kinds:
Travel From Home to Work- Normal travel from
home to work which is not work time. GR: not
Compensable Work time because it is a normal
incident of employment Exceptions:
1. where employee made to work on an emergency
call and travel is necessary in proceeding to the
workplace
2. travel is done through a conveyance provided by
the employer
3. travel is done under the supervision and control of
the employer
4. travel is done under vexing and dangerous
circumstances


Travel that is all in a days work- Time spent by an
employee in travel as part of his principal activity, like
travel from jobsite to jobsite during the workday.
COMPENSABLE AND COUNTED AS HOURS
WORKED

Travel Away from Home- Travel that keeps an
employee away from home overnight. WORKTIME
when it cuts across an employees workday because
it substitutes for the hours the employee should have
been in the office

SEMESTRAL BREAK: Regular full-time monthly paid
teachers in a private school are entitled to salary and
emergency cost-of-living allowance during semestral
breaks.

WORK HOURS OF SEAMEN: The rule is that a
laborer need not leave the premises of the factory,
ship or boat in order that his period of rest shall not be
counted, it being enough the he ceases to work may
rest completely and leave or may leave at his will the
spot where he actually stays while working.


MEAL PERIODS:
ART. 85. Meal periods. - Subject to such regulations
as the Secretary of Labor may prescribe, it shall be
the duty of every employer to give his employees not
less than sixty (60) minutes time-off for their regular
meals.

IRR BK III Rule 1SECTION 7. Meal and Rest
Periods. Every employer shall give his employees,
regardless of sex, not less than one (1) hour time-off
for regular meals, except in the following cases when
a meal period of not less than twenty (20) minutes
may be given by the employer provided that such
shorter meal period is credited as compensable hours
worked of the employee:
(a) Where the work is non-manual work in nature or
does not involve strenuous physical exertion;
(b) Where the establishment regularly operates not
less than sixteen (16) hours a day;
(c) In case of actual or impending emergencies or
there is urgent work to be performed on machineries,
equipment or installations to avoid serious loss which
the employer would otherwise suffer; and
(d) Where the work is necessary to prevent serious
loss of perishable goods.cralaw
Rest periods or coffee breaks running from five (5) to
twenty (20) minutes shall be considered as
compensable working time.cralaw

NIGHT SHIFT DIFFERENTIAL
ART. 86. Night shift differential. - Every employee
shall be paid a night shift differential of not less than
ten percent (10%) of his regular wage for each hour of
work performed between ten oclock in the evening
and six oclock in the morning.

OVERTIME WORK
ART. 87. Overtime work. - Work may be performed
beyond eight (8) hours a day provided that the
employee is paid for the overtime work, an additional
compensation equivalent to his regular wage plus at
least twenty-five percent (25%) thereof. Work
performed beyond eight hours on a holiday or rest day
shall be paid an additional compensation equivalent to
the rate of the first eight hours on a holiday or rest day
plus at least thirty percent (30%) thereof.

ART. 88. Undertime not offset by overtime. -
Undertime work on any particular day shall not be
offset by overtime work on any other day. Permission
given to the employee to go on leave on some other
day of the week shall not exempt the employer from
paying the additional compensation required in this
Chapter.

ART. 89. Emergency overtime work. - Any
employee may be required by the employer to
perform overtime work in any of the following
cases:chan robles virtual law library

(a) When the country is at war or when any other
national or local emergency has been declared by the
National Assembly or the Chief Executive;

(b) When it is necessary to prevent loss of life or
property or in case of imminent danger to public
safety due to an actual or impending emergency in
the locality caused by serious accidents, fire, flood,
typhoon, earthquake, epidemic, or other disaster or
calamity;

(c) When there is urgent work to be performed on
machines, installations, or equipment, in order to
avoid serious loss or damage to the employer or
some other cause of similar nature;

(d) When the work is necessary to prevent loss or
damage to perishable goods; and

(e) Where the completion or continuation of the work
started before the eighth hour is necessary to prevent
serious obstruction or prejudice to the business or
operations of the employer.

Any employee required to render overtime work under
this Article shall be paid the additional compensation
required in this Chapter.

ART. 90. Computation of additional compensation.
- For purposes of computing overtime and other
additional remuneration as required by this Chapter,
the "regular wage" of an employee shall include the
cash wage only, without deduction on account of
facilities provided by the employer.

IRR ON OVERTIME
SECTION 8. Overtime pay. Any employee
covered by this Rule who is permitted or required to
work beyond eight (8) hours on ordinary working days
shall be paid an additional compensation for the
overtime work in the amount equivalent to his regular
wage plus at least twenty-five percent (25%)
thereof.cralaw
SECTION 9. Premium and overtime pay for holiday
and rest day work. (a) Except employees referred
to under Section 2 of this Rule, an employee who is
permitted or suffered to work on special holidays or on
his designated rest days not falling on regular
holidays, shall be paid with an additional
compensation as premium pay of not less than thirty
percent (30%) of his regular wage. For work
performed in excess of eight (8) hours on special
holidays and rest days not falling on regular holidays,
an employee shall be paid an additional
compensation for the overtime work equivalent to his
rate for the first eight hours on a special holiday or
rest day plus at least thirty percent (30%)
thereof.cralaw
(b) Employees of public utility enterprises as well as
those employed in non-profit institutions and
organizations shall be entitled to the premium and
overtime pay provided herein, unless they are
specifically excluded from the coverage of this Rule
as provided in Section 2 hereof.cralaw
(c) The payment of additional compensation for work
performed on regular holidays shall be governed by
Rule IV, Book Three, of these Rules.cralaw
SECTION 10. Compulsory overtime work. In any
of the following cases, an employer may require any
of his employees to work beyond eight (8) hours a
day, provided that the employee required to render
overtime work is paid the additional compensation
required by these regulations:
(a) When the country is at war or when any other
national or local emergency has been declared by
Congress or the Chief Executive;
(b) When overtime work is necessary to prevent loss
of life or property, or in case of imminent danger to
public safety due to actual or impending emergency in
the locality caused by serious accident, fire, floods,
typhoons, earthquake, epidemic or other disaster or
calamities;
(c) When there is urgent work to be performed on
machines, installations, or equipment, in order to
avoid serious loss or damage to the employer or
some other causes of similar nature;
(d) When the work is necessary to prevent loss or
damage to perishable goods;
(e) When the completion or continuation of work
started before the 8th hour is necessary to prevent
serious obstruction or prejudice to the business or
operations of the employer; or
(f) When overtime work is necessary to avail of
favorable weather or environmental conditions where
performance or quality of work is dependent
thereon.cralaw
In cases not falling within any of these enumerated in
this Section, no employee may be made to work
beyond eight hours a day against his will.