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ANAMA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No.187021, January 25, 2012

where it was held that:
Elementary is the rule that every motion must contain the mandatory
requirements of notice and hearing and that there must be proof of service
thereof. The Court has consistently held that a motion that fails to comply with
the above requirements is considered a worthless piece of paper which should
not be acted upon. The rule, however, is not absolute. There are motions that
can be acted upon by the court ex parte if these would not cause prejudice to the
other party. They are not strictly covered by the rigid requirement of the rules on
notice and hearing of motions.

The motion for execution of the Spouses Co is such kind of motion. It cannot be
denied that the judgment sought to be executed in this case had already become
final and executory. As such, the Spouses Co have every right to the issuance of a
writ of execution and the RTC has the ministerial duty to enforce the same. This
right on the part of the Spouses Co and duty on the part of the RTC are based on
Section 1 and Section 2 of Rule 39 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure
provides, as follows:
Section 1. Execution upon judgments or final orders. Execution
shall issue as a matter of right, on motion, upon a judgment or order that
disposes of the action or proceeding upon the expiration of the period to
appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly perfected.
If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, the
execution may forthwith be applied for in the court of origin, on motion of
the judgment obligee, submitting therewith certified true copies of the
judgment or judgments or final order or orders sought to be enforced and
of the entry thereof, with notice to the adverse party.
Xxxxx
As can be gleaned therefrom, under Paragraph 1 of Section 1 of Rule 39 of
the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, the Spouses Co can have their motion
for execution executed as a matter of right without the needed notice and
hearing requirement to petitioner. This is in contrast to the provision of
Paragraph 2 of Section 1 and Section 2 where there must be notice to the adverse
party. In the case of Far Eastern Surety and Insurance Company, Inc. v. Virginia D.
Vda. De Hernandez, it was written:



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It is evident that Section 1 of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court does not
prescribe that a copy of the motion for the execution of a final and executory
judgment be served on the defeated party, like litigated motions such as a motion
to dismiss (Section 3, Rule 16), or motion for new trial (Section 2, Rule 37), or a
motion for execution of judgment pending appeal (Section 2, Rule 39), in all of
which instances a written notice thereof is required to be served by the movant
on the adverse party in order to afford the latter an opportunity to resist the
application.
Based on the quoted decision, it is clear that the mandatory requirement of
notice and hearing involving litigated motions do not apply to a motion for writ
execution of a judgment that has already become final and executory because no
appeal was perfected within the prescribed period. This is because the execution
of such final decision is precisely no longer a litigated matter. Execution of such
judgment is a matter of right.
- See more at: http://philjurislaw.blogspot.com/2013/03/execution-of-
judgment-is-notice-of.html#sthash.fAobbgBy.d


RCBC vs. FEDERICO A. SERRA (G.R. 203241)
Execution of judgment; when allowed to proceed via motion beyond 5 years from
finality. -sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2013/july2013/203241.pdf
"x x x.

The Rules of Court provide that a final and executory judgment may be executed
by motion within five years from the date of its entry or by an
actionafter the lapse of five years and before prescription sets in. This
Court, however, allows exceptions when execution may be made by motion even
after the lapse of five years.
These exceptions have one common
denominator: the delay is caused or occasioned by actions of the judgment
obligor and/or is incurred for his benefit or advantage. In Camacho v. Court of
Appeals, we held that where the delays were occasioned by the judgment
debtors own initiatives and for her advantage as well as beyond the judgment
creditors control, the five-year period allowed for enforcement of the judgment
by motion is deemed to have been effectively interrupted or suspended.

In the present case, there is no dispute that RCBC seeks to enforce the
decision which became final and executory on 15 April 1994. This decision
orders Serra to execute and deliver the proper deed of sale in favor of
RCBC. However, to evade his obligation to RCBC, Serra transferred the
property to his mother Ablao, who then transferred it to Liok.

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Serras action prompted RCBC to file the Annulment case. Clearly, the
delay in the execution of the decision was caused by Serra for his own
advantage.

Thus, the pendency of the Annulment case effectively suspended the five-year
period to enforce through a motion the decision in the Specific Performance
case. Since the decision in the Annulment case attained finality on 3 March
2009 and RCBCs motion for execution was filed on 25 August 2011, RCBCs
motion is deemed filed within the five-year period for enforcement of a
decision through a motion.



Herminia Acbang v. Hon. Jimmy Luczon, Jr., et al.,G.R. No. 164246, January 15,
2014.

EJECTMENT immediate execution of judgment; requisites for stay. The ruling in
Chua v. Court of Appeals (286 SCRA 437, 444-445 [1998]) is instructive on the
means of staying the immediate execution of a judgment in an ejectment case, to
wit:

As a general rule, a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an ejectment suit is
immediately executory, in order to prevent further damage to him arising from
the loss of possession of the property in question. To stay the immediate
execution of the said judgment while the appeal is pending the foregoing
provision requires that the following requisites must concur: (1) the defendant
perfects his appeal; (2) he files a supersedeas bond; and (3) he periodically
deposits the rentals which become due during the pendency of the appeal. The
failure of the defendant to comply with any of these conditions is a ground for the
outright execution of the judgment, the duty of the court in this respect being
ministerial and imperative. Hence, if the defendant-appellant perfected the
appeal but failed to file a supersedeas bond, the immediate execution of the
judgment would automatically follow. Conversely, the filing of
a supersedeas bond will not stay the execution of the judgment if the appeal is
not perfected. Necessarily then, the supersedeas bond should be filed within the
period for the perfection of the appeal.

In short, a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an ejectment suit is
immediately executory, but the defendant, to stay its immediate execution, must:
(1) perfect an appeal; (2) file a supersedeas bond; and (3) periodically deposit the
rentals becoming due during the pendency of the appeal. Herminia Acbang v.
Hon. Jimmy Luczon, Jr., et al.,G.R. No. 164246, January 15, 2014.



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Execution; Terceria; when proper. The right of a third-party claimant to file a
terceria is founded on his title or right of possession. Corollary thereto, before the
court can exercise its supervisory power to direct the release of the property
mistakenly levied and the restoration thereof to its rightful owner, the claimant
must first unmistakably establish his ownership or right of possession thereon.
In Spouses Sy v. Hon. Discaya (260 Phil. 401 [1990]) we declared that for a third-
party claim or a terceria to prosper, the claimant must first sufficiently establish
his right on the property:

[A] third person whose property was seized by a sheriff to answer for the
obligation of the judgment debtor may invoke the supervisory power of he court
which authorized such execution. Upon due application by the third person and
after summary hearing, the court may command that the property be released
from the mistaken levy and restored to the rightful owner or possessor. What said
court can do in these instances, however, is limited to a determination of whether
the sheriff has acted rightly or wrongly in the performance of his duties in the
execution of judgment, more specifically, if he has indeed taken hold of property
not belonging to the judgment debtor. The court does not and cannot pass upon
the question of title to the property, with any character of finality. It can treat of
the matter only insofar as may be necessary to decide if the sheriff has acted
correctly or not. It can require the sheriff to restore the property to the claimants
possession if warranted by the evidence. However, if the claimants proofs do not
persuade the court of the validity of his title or right of possession thereto, the
claim will be denied.
Magdalena T. Villasi v. Filomena Garcia, substituted by his heirs, namely,
Ermelinda H. Garcia, et al.,G.R. No. 190106, January 15, 2014.

Execution of judgments; Immediate execution in Small Claims cases. Section 23 of
the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases states that the decision shall
immediately be entered by the Clerk of Court in the court docket for civil cases
and a copy thereof forthwith served on the parties. A.L. Ang Network, Inc. v.
Emma Mondejar, accompanied by her husband, Efren Mondejar,G.R. No. 200804.
January 22, 2014.

Execution of judgments; rationale. It is almost trite to say that execution is the
fruit and end of the suit. Hailing it as the life of the law, ratio legis est anima,
this Court has zealously guarded against any attempt to thwart the rigid rule and
deny the prevailing litigant his right to savour the fruit of his victory. A judgment,
if left unexecuted, would be nothing but an empty triumph for the prevailing
party. Magdalena T. Villasi v. Filomena Garcia, substituted by his heirs, namely,
Ermelinda H. Garcia, et al.,G.R. No. 190106, January 15, 2014.



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ERNESTO VILLEZA vs. GERMAN MANAGEMENT AND SERVICES,
INC., et.al ( GR G.R. No. 182937)



An action for revival of judgment is governed by Article 1144 (3), Article
1152 of the Civil Code and Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Thus,

Art. 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten
years from the time the right of action accrues:

x x x x

(3) Upon a judgment

Article 1152 of the Civil Code states:


Art. 1152. The period for prescription of actions to demand the
fulfillment of obligations declared by a judgment commences from
the time the judgment became final.



In PLDT Employees Union v. PLDT Free Telephone Workers Union (97 Phil. 424)
An order or judgment is deemed final when it finally disposes of the pending
action so that nothing more can be done with it in the trial court. In other words,
a final order is that which gives an end to the litigation when the order or
judgment does not dispose of the case completely but leaves something to be
done upon the merits, it is merely interlocutory.

Antonio v. Samonte, (1 SCRA 1072)
A final order of judgment finally disposes of, adjudicates, or determines the rights,
or some right or rights of the parties, either on the entire controversy or on some
definite and separate branch thereof, and concludes them until it is reversed or
set aside. Where no issue is left for future consideration, except the fact of
compliance or non-compliance with the terms of the judgment or order, such
judgment or order is final and appealable.