f 68

David Lew&' Theory of Passible Worlds

I
I
he develops his theory. Thus Lewis identifies &property with a set of particu-
lars, existing in various possible worlds. (a has F-ness if and only if a belongs
to the set identified with F-ness.) But no particular belongs to two worlds.
So we may associate with any set of particulars the set of worlds to which
those particulars belong. Hence, on ]Lewis' theory, with each property F-ness
there is associated the set of worlds in which F-ness is instantiated. But far
many properties we can show there is no set of possible worlds at which that
properly is instantiated. Consider, for hiance, the property being m di mn.
Our 'above' world construction shows that, given a purported set of all worlds
containing electrons, there is an 'above' world which also contains electronis
but is not a member of that set.
Schoul of History, Politics and Philwophy, Macquarie University.
&prt me~ i of Traditional and Mudern Plhilos~phy,
University of Sydney
Received April 1983
REFERENCES
B r d , C. D, f 1933)- Examimtion of McTaggurt's Phiimophy, Vol. 1, Cambridge University
B r a .
Lewirs, David t 19731, CounZerJ~cfuals, Blackwelt.
BRI AN S KYRMS
POSSIBLE WORLDS, PHYSICS AND METAPHYSICS*
(Received 24 December, 1975)
The idea that many possible worlds may exist, not merely as abstract stmc-
tures but in a concrete and robust a manner as our own, has long been familiar
to fans of science fiction.' Recently, it has acquired proponants from two
distinct areas. David Lewis, in his book, Counferfactuals, argues for just such
a view:
I believe that there are possibIe worlds other than the one we happen to inhabit ... I
emphatically do not identify possible worlds with respectible linguistic entities; I take
them to be respectible entities in their own right. When I profess realism about possibIe
worlds, I mean to be taken literally. Possible worlds are what they zre, and not some
other thing. i f asked what sort of thing they ate, I cannot give the sort of reply my
questioner probably expects: that is, a proposal to reduce possible worlds to something
else.
I can only ask him to admit that he knows what sort of thing actual worfd is, and then
explain that other worlds are more things of that sort, differing not in kind but only
in what goes on at them. Our actual world is only one world among others.'
But it is not only metaphysically-minded modd logicians who support a
many-worlds view. Some physicists have argued that such a view is required
for a correct interpretation of quantum mechanics. IkWitt and Graham, in
their preface to The hny - hr l d s Interpretation of m n m m Mechanics
write:
... Hugh Everett 111, propounded a new inttrprrtation of quantum mechanics that denies
the existence of o *parate clasdcal nal m and asserts that it makes sense to talk about a
state vector for the entire uni ve~e. The state vector n mr cohpws, and henst reafiW
as a whole Is rigaously deterministic, This rtaiity, which t &scribed jointly by the
dynamicol variables and the state vector is not the reailty we customaiiy think of, but
a reality composad of rnarsy worlds. By virtue of the temporal developmnt of t hehe
d~nrtrnicral variabbs the sate vector decornpaseg natur4.b hrs orttacygonal vectors,
reflecting a cantinun1 rglitting of the universe into a multitudc of mutual& ~ n ~ b w ma b k
but equally rcd worlds ..."
In light of such suggestions, the! f~Uowing questions of 'pldosogkcal science-
fiction' take an. a wider significance.
PhiIosophicgI Studief 30 (2976) 323 -332. AZZ Righa Rmc~ed
Copyright 43 1976 by D. Reidel fi b2bhin.g Company, Dodrccht-fiiknd
more than one possible world exists (in the
1. Is the contention that
cr=7fisistenf?
sense our own)
11.
If it is Consistent, how do
r;Ne fmd out the facts of the matter?
In order to answer these questions, we must be clear about just what sorts of
possible worlds are at stake. 1f a possible world need only be a mathematical
structure which is a model for a dven language, then the co-existence of
many possible worlds poses no conceptlid problem But it is clear that it is
not that sort of possible world
existence is at issue here. Neither
physicist not science fiction writer is interested in such pale and abstract
possibnities, and Lewis explicitly says that he isn't either; "I cannot believe ...
that our o m world is a purely m a thematical entity. Since X do not believe
that other worlds are different in and from ours, I do not believe that they
are either."4 What I take kwh to be saying, and what makes his claim really
exciting, is the contention that p ~ ~ ~ i b l e worlds are red as Afghanistan
or the emter of the Sun or A- Lewis, DeWitt and the typical science
fiction story all claim that possible worlds exist in just as ~ ~ ~ c r e t e a MY as
Our OI W. f Suggest that we take tm as implying &at more One possible!
world is real in the following sense: A world is real if-and-only if every propo-
sition true-in-that-world is me. 5
Thi s seems a modest requirement, designed only to separate genuine physi-
cal or metaphysical c]-s from met aphofi cafl ~ presented rnode1 theory- But
this innocent requirement imediateJy leads to difficulty. It is plausible t o
adopt the following principle of individuation for possible worlds: A world
w , is identical t o a world w2 if and only if exactly the same propositions are
true-in-wl as are tme-in-w, ~~t n m if two possible worlds are disrinct then
there is a proposition wlrich is tme-&-one and whose denid is tmt-bethe-
other; and if two distinct worl& aarc: m d then there is s propositon such that
both it and its denid arc? tme. me many-worlds hypothesis is prima JPcie
inconsistent !
The situation is reminiscent of ;i?az old metaphysical problem, the problem
of rhge.' Change involves apdmf&ie contradiction - f i t Fa, then -Fa -
with the first a d second &uations being quite red. Some phifosophers have
taken this d i f f i e d ~ as showing change; is impossible. Others have conduded
that contradictions me possible. Neither of these views is now much favored,
POSSIBLE WORLDS, PHYSICS AND METAPHYSI CS 325
Rather, it is generally held that the appearance: of contradiction in the demip-
tion of change arises from an incomplete specification of the statements in-
volved. We do not have 'Fa' and '-Fa' both being true. Rather, we have a true
the relational statements 'Fat,' and '-r;irtz3 where 'tl' and 't3' refer to different
times. 'Socrates is young at t t ' no more contradicts 'Socrates is old at t2' than
'Socrates loves Alcibiades' would contradict 'Socrates cares not for Democritus',
This medicine is such a successful treatment for the paradox of change that it h
hard to resist trying it out on the paradox of many real worlds. We will say that
what we took to be 'Fa' is really 'E;izwlY a d what we took to be '-Fayis really
'-Fav,'. Thus 'Socrates is wise in wodd 1' no more contradicts 'Socrates ia silly
in world 2' than Socrates is young at tl' contradicts 'Socrates is old at t2'.7
But now, we no longer have two distinct possible worlds in the sense laid
down. What has happened is that what looked from an earlier perspective
(the Fa; -Fa perspective) like distinct possible worlds, have from the later
( F w, , -Fmz) perspective been incorporated into a single 'supr-world'.
Thus, the answer t o question 1 is: yes and no. It is strictly inconsistent to
maintain that two distinct possible worlds are real. But is always B consistent
to take what, from a certain perspective are distinct possible worlds; incor-
porate them as indicated into a single 'super-world'; and contend that that
super-world is real.
More precisely, we see that the notion of a possible world is language-
rehtive. Relative to the language in which 'Fa' is a closed sentence we have
two distinct worlds, but relative to the richer language in which ' F i i 3 is a
closed sentence they are but objects; a part of the substance of the world.
A language, L , can always be replaced by a richer language, L', in this manner
so that the worlds relative t o L, are objects relatiye to L'. Consequently, tha
claim that more than one po~rible world sxistJ must be taken ss s~serting that
tome language, L, is not adequate to des ri h mality, but that a richer L'
which requires many worlds-nlative-to-l m n g its objecb ir .&qua&.
kt us examine the reasons adduced by both mtaphysicim a d physicia, in
support of hais claim. Lewis writes:
If an argument is wanted, it is this. 10 is uneontrovody true that things nt@t ha=
ken oth~mi m t han they am, I &We , md xr 13o you, that thin@ caW hare hem
We s nt in countlea ways. But what dues this arm? Or dhw
pellmits; the
p m p w : these many ways that things mdd haw hen, b e a s the sully t h y
are. On tfre face of it, this sentenm is mi exkbntid q ~ ~ c s t i o n . ft says &at
326 BRI AN SKYRMS
there exist many entities of a certain description, to wit 'ways things could have been',
I believe things could have. been different in countless ways; I believe permissible para*
phrases of what I believe; taking the paraphrase at its face value, I therefore believe in
the existence of entities that might be called 'ways things could have been'. I prefer to
call them 'possible world^'.^
Taken at face value, this argument seems rather cavalier. Are there then 'ways
in which things could not have been" (e.g. triangles having 4 sides) which are
impossible worlds? Etc. But, Lewis redly has a more sophiticated argument
in mind. Thus:
I do not make it an inviolable principle to take seeming existential quantifications of
ordinary language at their face value. But I do recognize a presumption in favor of taking
sentences at their face value, unless (I) taking them at face value is known 5 0 lead to
trouble and (2) taking them some other way is known not to ... 1 do not no any success-
ful argument that my realism about possible worlds ieads to trouble ... All the alter-
natives I know, on the other hand, do lead to t r o ~bl e . ~
Ma t this argument comes to, I think, is the contention that the most viable
sernanticd theory for our ordinary counterfactual and modal discourse is
one which assumes the co-existence of many actual possible worlds,
Even if this contention were correct, it would constitute a weak argument.
If I were convinced that the smoothest sernantical theory that could make
sense of o r d i n q talk about the Easter rabbit; goblins; angels; and Pegasus
was one which assumed that such things really existed, I would not thereby
be convinced of their existence. Rather, I would hold such ordinary talk
suspect. I have no reason to believe that emantical theory for ordinary
discourse is a reliable guide in these matters. What J require here are physical
reasons (rabbit track, etc,). What about possible worlds? If possible worlds
are supposed t o be the wme sorts of things as our actual world; if they are
supposed t o edst in as concrete and robust a sense as our own ; if they are
s uppe d to-be as real as Afghanistan, or the center of the sun or Cygnus A,
then they require the same sort of midence for their a&istence es other
consti&mbs. ufphysicaI rmZity. What is required t o show &at thr: sort of
possible wodds Lewis wants exist, is their presumption in the best phyrsiml
theory.
Furthemore, the contenticin that this sort of robust realistic theory of
possible worlds provides f;he most viable foundation for re =mantical theory
for rnodiils and counkditctuds seems t o me quite clearly false. The reason
is that abstract mathematical structures (Lewis c& them "Ersatz possible
worlds") w# do just as weZI as the 'pasible-worlds' in 'possible-world-
wmn t i ~ ' for modal and counterfactud logic. f n fact, this is just the cwtom-
POSSIBLE WORLDS, PHYSICS AND METAPHYSICS 327
ary way of doing 'possible-world-semmtics'. One must admit, on this approach,
that the real world is not a 'possible-world'. But to insist that it must be is
perhaps to take a metaphor too literally. Lewis' robust realistic theory of
possible worlds is not required by possible-world-semantics; it is rather an
intellectual adventure su&gested by possible-world-semantics. Finally, it is
not at aU clear why Lewis' truism, "things could have been otherwise" should
not apply also t o the enriched language which numbers among its 'things' the
possible worlds relative t o the initial language; and thus gnerate a runaway
ontology.'0
This metaphysical-semantical line of argument, then, fails both internally,
and because it is an inappropriate kind of argument for deciding what is
essentially a physical question. A compelling argument for a reality com-
posed of many worlds would have take the form of a demonstration that the
best physical theory available required such an expanded reality. (If, for
example, a new physical theory required a 5-dimensional reality, we could
regard it as a reality composed of many 4-dimensional worlds, with the
appropriate topological and causal relations holding between them.) Such
news from physicists would be important and exciting, but would not, I
think, satisfy Lewis. For Lewis assumes that the initial language is the I anguage
of physics, whatever it is, and that his worlds are worlds relative to t ht Ian-
guage. He thus forecloses access to the only sort of evidence that could
support his robust realism.
Ma t news h e n , do we h m from physicha concerning the existence of
many worlds? Quantum mechanics, under the Everett-Wheeler interpretation,
has the initial appearance of being just n theory of many worlds. In fact,
hwi t t md Graham have chwen to cntide their coflaction of afticlex of the
EversttWheeler interpretation '?Re Many-Worldr Inferpretntion of QzLantum
~'cknics.' In languags reminescent of Lewis, DeWitt dtscribes the many
worlds :
Our univttxse mwt be viewed aai constantly splitting into a stupndous number of
bnhches, all resulting from the m ~ u r t n r t n ~ ~ interntion between its my&& of
COragponcn.ts, Because there exists neither a mchanism within the f-w~rk of *
foraamm nor, by definition, an entity outride of tfit universe that de-h whhh
branch of the gmad superposition is the 'real' world, PU bmcfies must be remded as
q w y real.1=
328 BRIAN SKYRMS
Why then, do we not observe such splits? Everett expliiins:
In reply to a preprint of this article, some correspondents have raised the question of
the rfrm$ition7 from possible to actual,' arguing that in 'reality' there is - as our ex-
prience testifxes - no such splitting of observer states, so that only one branch can ever
actually exist. Sincc this point may occur to other readers the following is offered in
expbt i on.
The whole issue of the transition from 'possible' to 'actual' is taken care of in the theory
in a very simple way-there is no such transition, nor is such a transition necemry for
the theory to be in accord with our experience. From the viewpoint of the theory a&
elements of a superposition (all 'branches') are 'actual', none any more 'red' than the
rest. It is m e e e s w to suppose that aU but one are somehow destroyed, since an the
separate elements of a superposition individually obey the wave equation with complete
indiffercnae to the prepence or absence ('actuality' or not) of any other elements. This
total lack of effect of one branch on another also implies that no observer wig ever be
a wm of any 'spjlitting' prmm. lZ
But if the Everett theory is only one interpretaiiun of quantum mechanics;
if other interpretations require only one world; and if the Everett interpreta-
tion is observationally indistinguishable from other interpreations ; shouldn't
the Everett interpretation simply be eliminated by Ockham's Razor? The
matter is not quite so straightforward. In a standard formulation of quantum
mechanics, the state function, J, may change either (1) continuously, accord-
ing to the Schrodinger wave equation or (2) discontinuously, as a result of
a measurement, according to the projection postulate. In the Everett theory,
only proms 1 is allowed; the projection postulate is denied. The entire
universe may be treated quantum mechanically in the Everett theory, but not
on t he standard theory. Thus it is strictly incorrect to speak here of two dif-
ferent interprsalions of the same theory. What we redly have are two dis-
tinct, incompatible theories. The Everett theory cannot then, simply be
dismissed as quantum mechanics plus metaphysical puffery. It must be ration-
ally evaluated a s a genuine alternative theory.
I do not want to pursue that evaluation here, but only to ask what sort of
'many-world$ pictun the Everett theory docs give us. Everett propat s to
regard wave mechanics as a complete theory, Thus, measurement must be
reg;lr&d ;ts an interaction between two subsystems of a composite system,
whicfi must itrdf be regarded from the standpoint of wave mechanics. Thus:
I"?& k s Eht conqaaeaa tjuit if the sets {tf $1 1 and fT@S2 ) ~ - ~ m~ l e t @ ~ f i o ~ o ~
sets of states fos $, ruid S, respectively, then the g3~nera.l state of S can b~ written as P
superporzitim:
$8 = xfj y hS. nisz
POSSIBLE WORLDS, PHYSICS AND METAPHYSICS 329
... although S is in st definite state 9 '8, the subsystems S, and S, do not posses mything
like defiite states independently of one another ...
We can however for any choice of a state in one subsystem wigueiy assign a car-
responding rektive state in the other subsystem ...
For any choice of basis in S, , {gi) it is always possible to r e p ~ m t the statc of S as a
single superposition of pairs of states each consisting of a stab from fie bwb { t i ) in
S, and its relative state in S, .I3
Given an ideal measuring interaction between a measured 'object' subsystem
and a measuring 'apparatus7 subsystem, for each state of the apparatw sysbm
its relative state is the corresponding eigenstate of the apparatus system. For
the composite system there is then;
... a representation in terms of a superposition, each element of whkh contains a &finit%
observer st at e and a corresponding system state. Thus, with each sucob~di i observation
(or interaction) the observer state 'bmchw' into a number of different Jhtcr. f i ch
b mc h represents a different outcome of the measurement avrd tho c o r r e ~n d h g ~ k n -
state for the object system state. bmches exist simultaneously in the superposition
after my given sequence of obs@;rvations.'*
For purposes of illustration, consider the Schrodinger Cat paradox. The cat-
geigercounter subsystem measures the radioactive source subsystem. Tney
are coorelated 30 that the relative state of 'cat dead' is 'radioactire decay
~ ~ ~ u r r e d ' and the relative stale of 'cat alive' is 'radioactive &my didn't
occur'. The state of the composite system is a superposition containing these
pairs of states. Thus we are led t o talk of a reality containing one world with
radioactive decay and dead cat, and another with no radioactive decay and
five cat,
Here then, are the many worlds of the 'many-wotids interpntation of
quantum mechanics'. What kind of worlds me t hq? An unauphis.kicated
reader might jump, from the example of Schrodinger7s c ~ t , t o fhc ~ o o c ~ w i ~ ~ ~
that they an classical worlds. But, of course, the uncertainty principk h-
mediately show that this cannot be so. A world cannot haw g g l . ~ ~dt f e~
for both a position md a momentum of a partide at a tim. Each world it
quite th~mughly quantum mechanical, md may be thought of a ~ ~ f t ~ ' '
in Hnbrt rpaos. Ks uni~m of mpny wad& m y llwr be %o@t of s?r a
vwttw in Hilbsrk space. Now then, do the worlds and fhefr nlttiw constitute
a larger reality? AU we can wy in the unhr e ~ of wad& h mch that it erm be
r ~ p e mt E d as a m p p m of the compi&mf. w* with m f i ~ mf-
ma n. One may wonder at this point whether this b a theory of r n&ty
composd of many ~oddn in tbe sews t forth at the bcgi.dag of W prpr.
330 BRIAN SKYRMS
POSSIBLE WORLDS, PHYSICS AND METAPHYSICS 33 2
I think that it is not. The argument that I will ofler is an old one, and in no
way orignal; but I think that for the concerns of this paper it should be
underlined once more.
It is evident, that if a universe of worlds U1 contains at least one world,
W, which is not contained in a univeme Ll; , then U1 and U2 are distinct. For
instance, if we tried taking numbers as worlds, and the 'universe' containing
several 'worlds' as just their sum, it would not wash for then the Zlniverse"
containhg just 2 and 3 would be identical to the one containing just 1 and 4.
The same point applies generally to taking vectors as 'worlds'and their vector
sum, or a superposition of them with various coefficients as 'universe'. Now
in quantum mechanics, the decomposition of the state vector is likewise not
unique. The state vector might be written in terms of position eigenvectors or
momentum eigenvectors (or in t e r n of some other basis). The idea of
Everett-Wheeler is to disambiguate by using eigenvectors of the measurement
actually performed, The performance of a perfectly sharp position measure-
ment then splits one world into non-i nt erfe~g branches, each of which regs-
ten a sharp position. What is important for us here, however, is that a perfect-
ly sharp position measurement is an idealization - it never really happens.
What we have instead are imperfect approximations t o this model, where the
world docs not split c l e dy into non-interfering branches. But now, there is
no ma9011 not to decarnpose in terns of momentum mther than position,
and by our previous argument, we have one quantum mechanical world rather
&an many (just as we did before the imperfect measurement). From this
standpoint, d l the 'garden of the forking paths' talk is an appealing metaphor
which provides some insight into the theory of measurement, rather than an
accurate description of the reality posited by the theory. I am not suggesting
that the physic&@ who are propanan& of the Everett-Wkedcr interpretation
are deceived They know this all very well.' But we would be deceived if
we took the reladve4tate formuIotion of qwt um. mchmicrr to be a theory
of may polasible wonlds Iln Pht mnse at issue in thb paper.
In smw, &ens lis a sense jn which the con ten ti or^ &at many pmibte
teat. MebphysicaI md moammnti d a m c n e
fd to &d& the 43taXiCXi. b t is required to %Upp~t*% the =y-wsfi&
con&ntion is n demonstnrtion h t the be~t physical theory requires a richer
reality, w&& from the starsdgmkt of our cumnt penpctcti~e, is a =&ey af
many worlds. I t k quite pcssible &at them might be such a physid theory.
But Everett's "bEa&cf State' fum~latjolz of qmtu~lrm me~hmicdi & not meh
a theory. To the best of our present knowledge, the hypothesis that more
than one possible world is actual fails.
Llniy. of Illi~~is at Chicago Circle
NOTES
* This paper grew out of a talk entitled 'Parakl Worlds and the Principle of Planitatatas"
given at Various times at University of Wisconsin; University of Chicago; fhlgblry Uni-
versity; U.C.L.A. and U.C. Berkeley, in which I presented, md then criticized a position
much Like that of David Lewis. That paper, more than thls, exhibited my ambivlrlsma
to a many-worlds view of reality which 1 find aesthetically attractive but, in final
analysis, philosophically indefensible. Thank?; for hefpful comments am due t6 the
audiences at each of these talks and also to Jim de Jong; Terry Patsons; Bas van F m n ;
David Kapfan; David Lewis; Arthur Fine; Neal Grossman; Abner Shimony; Paul Teller;
Ernest Adams; Phil Quinn; Gail Stein; Nancy CarWright and ladie Tharp (none of
whom are to be taken as ensorsing the following). This paper is not an attack on modal
logic. This paper is not an attack on the Everett-Wheeler interpretation of qwmm
mechanics,
Recent examples: Asimov, The Theml ves, various episodes of DY. W h , BBC-
TV.
David Lewis, Counrerfactuals (Harvatd University Press: Cambridge, 1973), pp. 84-85.
Bryce I)eWitt and Neill Graham (eda.), l%t! Many-Worilds inteqmtarion of Quantum
Mechanics (Princeton University Press: Princeton, 13731, p. v.
' Lewis, Countmfacnurb, p. 84.
"ibis definition, and the following argument are due to a suggestion of Terry Ms o~.
stated, the clefitions and the argument depend on a rather platonistic vkw of propa-
sitions. Otherwise, there wouldn't be enough of them to fully characterize a world.
Those who feel more comfortable with sentences might modify the argument as follows:
ffa world is real then every sentence true-in-hit-world is true. Two worlds are di rmf bl y
distinct if and only if there is a sntence true&-one but not the other. A theow of m31Iy
discernibly di shct worlds then falls into the same difficulties; while a theory of ma~Iy
distinct but indiscernible worlds is not too interesting.
' The Bnalogy between possible worlds and moments of time has Men pointed out by
Prior, Montague, Kaplan, and Lewis, among others.
' NO@ that we cannot yet out of thcr general difficulties n h d with Just some buaincu
about sountsrparrt. Consider the cuc where ' ( 3 ~ ) hr' is trusinu, and its denirl is trus
f " z *
David hw&, Cosurt~~~facmbr, p. 84.
' David b w h , Cb~lntrtfocttdaik, p, 90.
" We slw that in order to wnsistcrntly rnrintnln that many paajibfrr worlds rrc
we musf incoq3~rat.a them into a sfnOQ xwfity; a sir@@ hprworbl'. M& q e
now mppaar at the lava1 of surparworw. Lewis blicvhs that o w mdty k a stppemrld
hccapgorat;ing many g d b h world. A mom convcntianrrl vbw hoMs h t OBK d t y
incogorates only one pmdbla? worM. Ff, as I howwed,this iai ultj'saak& a &f3-ath@nt
pk~siePl quastion, we would want to s y that it is p-bb that b w i ~ is Mt and W
that h~ is wrong. That Fs t o my, in polpplik-world-a, that thcn k mem thsn
A consistent d t must then hold tAat m y supe,~ar& are real, sad
hmQ~mt t them into an even richer reality, a augm-super w0tI.d. ft L c h that thir
PFoccor ~ GY WT stop. NO naattt:rhow rick lp Wgy thc rdkt portktkter, ( m a if ba
332 BRI AN S KYRMS
goes to the trouble of postulating supenvorlds of transfinite order), we can always ask
the modal question "Is it possible that reality is different from that postulated by the
realist". And given that the reasonable answer is 'yes', the realist must postulate an even
richer reaEty. The point is, that this regress is embarrassing to a realist in a way that it is
not to a theorist who views possible worlds simply as mathematical structures. The latter
needs only to be able to find appropriate mathematical structures given any reasonable
modal language. The former must have a reality rich enough t o accomodate all modal
h g ~ ~ g e s . But by the foregoing argument, whatever reality the realist postulates cannot
be r i ch enouah.
-
One might remark that the ontological situation here is no worse than that for set
theory. Indeed! But it is one thing to take a conceptualistic attitude towards sets, and
another to trike such an attitude towards physical reality.
For proof that no language rich enough t o contain arithmetic can express its own
Concept of necesdty, sea Montague, LSyntactical Treatments of Modality, with Corollor-
ies on Reflection Principles and Finite Axiornatizability', in ftoceedings of a CoZZoquium
0" and Many- Valued Logics: Aero Filosofiur Fennieo (Helsinki, August 19621,
pp. 153-167.
i i Bryce DeWitt, The Many-Universes Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics', in DeWitt
and Graham, p. 178.
" Hugh ~ver et t III ' "Relative State" Formulation of Quantum Mechanics', Reviews of
Modem Physics 29,454-462, reprinted in DeWitt and Graham, pp. 146-147.
Is Everett, ' "Relative State" Formulation of Quantum Mechanics', p. 143.
l4 Everett, ' "Relative State" Fo~rnulation of Quantum Mechanics', p. 146.
I S ?dore correctly, the vector represents the state of the world at a time, but this does
not affect the armmenf
18
w - -------
See DeWitt's discussion of imperfect measurements in The Many-Universes Inter-
pretation of Quantum Mechanics', in DeWitt and Graham, pp. 210-215.
Propositional
Objects
A declarative sentence is mu-
any true or false. But your typical declarative sentence is not
&edly true or false. It is true on one occasio~l and false on an-
other, because of the tenses of its verbs and the varying refer-
ences of its pronouns or demonstrative adverbs or other in-
dicator words. By incorporating additional information into
the sentence, such as dates and the names of persom and
places, we can obtain an eternal sentence: one that is fixedly
true or fake. has an eternal sentence need not be a law of
mathematics or of nature; it can also be a report of a passing
event,
Now a p~posftion is the meaning of a sentence. Mom pre-
cisely, since pmpu~itions are supposed to be true or false ofice
and for all, a proposition is the meaning of an eternal sentence.
I 4 . o ~ precisely sm, tt is the cognitive me d n g of an etemd
sentence; &at is, just so much of the m e h g es affects the
b t h value of sentence and not its poetic q d t y its
Et f f ' y~~: tofie,
Not that thZp & precise The word l i n e d g " d v - in my
~~pfmafiOrZ1 and it men a md~ude of sM. Whc;n I g:qb