Aldaba vs. COMELEC, G.R. No.

188078, January 25, 2010

Facts: This case is an original action for Prohibition to
declareunconstitutional, R.A. 9591 which creates a legislative
district for the City of Malolos, Bulacan. Allegedly, the R.A.
violates the minimum population requirement for the creation of
a legislative district in a city. Before the May 1, 2009, the
province of Bulacan was represented in Congress through 4
legislative districts. Before the passage of the Act through House
Bill 3162 (later converted to House Bill 3693) and Senate Bill
1986, Malolos City had a population of 223, 069 in 2007.

House Bill 3693 cites the undated Certification, as requested to
be issued to Mayor Domingo (then Mayor of Malolos), by
Region III Director Miranda of NSO that the population of
Malolos will be as projected, 254,030 by the year 2010.

Petitioners contended that R.A. 9591 is unconstitutional for
failing to meet the minimum population threshold of 250,000 for
a city to meritrepresentative in Congress.

Issue: Whether or not R.A. 9591, n act creating a legislative
district for the City of Malolos, Bulacan is unconstitutional as
petitioned. And whether the City of Malolos has at least 250,000
actual or projected.

Held: It was declared by the Supreme Court that the R.A. 9591
isunconstitutional for being violative of Section 5 (3), Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended
to the 1987 Constitution on the grounds that, as required by the
1987 Constitution, a city must have at least 250,000 population.
In relation with this, Regional Director Miranda issued a
Certification which is based on the demographic projections, was
declared without legal effect because the Regional Director has
no basis and no authority to issue the Certification based on the
following statements supported by Section 6 of E.O. 135
as signed by President Fidel V. Ramos, which provides:

The certification on demographic projection can be issued only if
such are declared official by the Natl Statistics Coordination
Board. In this case, it was not stated whether the document have
been declared official by the NSCB.

The certification can be issued only by the NSO Administrator or
his designated certifying officer, in which case, the Regional
Director of Central Luzon NSO is unauthorized.

The population projection must be as of the middle of the year,
which in this case, the Certification issued by Director Miranda
was undated.

It was also computed that the correct figures using the growth
rate, even if compounded, the Malolos population of 223,069 as
of August 1, 2007 will grow to only 249,333 as of August 1, 2010.

It was emphasized that the 1935 Constitution, that this Court
ruled that the aim of legislative reappointment is to equalize the
population and voting power among districts.

ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR. vs. THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES
G.R. No. 160261. November 10, 2003.


FACTS:
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a
Resolution, sponsored by Representative Felix William D.
Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice "to
conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of
disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)." On
June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr.
and seven Associate Justices of this Court for "culpable violation
of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high
crimes." The complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex
T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen, and
was referred to the House Committee. The House Committee on
Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment
complaint was "sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss the
same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. To
date, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent
to the House in plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2)
of Article XI of the Constitution. Four months and three weeks
since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on
October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice
voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint was filed
with the Secretary General of the House by Representatives
Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella against
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results
of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House
Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was
accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment"
signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the
House of Representatives.


ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment
complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the
House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided
in the Constitution.

2. Whether the resolution thereof is a political question has
resulted in a political crisis.



HELD:
1. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of
filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the House
Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the
meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an
impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing
manner, another may not be filed against the same official
within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the
Constitution. In fine, considering that the first impeachment
complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices
of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House
Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second
impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C.
Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief
Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional
prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings
against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.

2.From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, it is clear that judicial power is not
only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated
by the mere specter of this creature called the political question
doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify, however,
that Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with
"truly political questions." From this clarification it is gathered
that there are two species of political questions: (1) "truly
political questions" and (2) those which "are not truly political
questions." Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial
review, the reason for respect of the doctrine of separation of
powers to be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of
Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review
questions which are not truly political in nature.

Veterans Federation Party v. Comelec [Oct. 6, 2000]
24SEP
FACTS:
There are 4 parameters to determine the winners in a party-list
election under RA 7941:
1. 20% allocation 3. 3-seat limit
2. 2% threshold 4. Proportional representation
The Congress enacted RA 7941 on Mar. 3, 1995 which states that
the State shall promote proportional representation in the
election of representatives to the House of Representatives
through a party-list system of registered national, regional and
sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will
enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who
lack well-defined political constituencies but who could
contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become
members of the House of Representatives. The State shall also
develop the simplest scheme possible to guarantee a full, free
and open party system by enhancing their chances to compete
for and win seats in the legislature.
ISSUES:
1. Is the 20% allocation mandatory? Should the 20% allocation
for party-list be filled up completely all the time?
2. Are the 2% threshold and the 3-seat limit constitutional?
3. How should the additional seats be determined?
HELD/RULING:
(1) NO. Sec. 5(2) Art. 6 merely provides a ceiling for party-list
seats in Congress. The Congress has prerogative to determine
whether to adjust or change this percentage requirement, and
the mechanics by which it is to be filled up.
(2) YES. The 2% threshold and the 3-seat limit are consistent with
the very essence of representation. The 3-seat limit ensures
the entry of various interest-representations into the legislative.
Thus, no single group would dominate.
(3) To determine the additional seats, 3 steps will be followed:
a. rank the highest to lowest. The highest is called the first
party.
b. determine the seats the first party will have. For the first
party, it will have a 6% benchmark. Every succeeding additional
2% of votes from the first 2% requirement will constitute 1
additional seat. If the first party gets 2 additional seats, then
the next in rank will get less.
c. to solve for the additional seats of other qualified parties, the
formula provided below will be used:
additional seats no. of votes no. of
for the = of the party x additional
concerned no. of votes of seats of the
party the first party first party

PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD, INC. (PGBI)
represented by its Secretary General George FGBF George
Duldulao, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
[G.R. No. 190529. April 29, 2010]
FACTS:
Respondent delisted petitioner, a party list organization, from
the roster of registered national, regional or sectoral parties,
organizations or coalitions under the party-list system through
its resolution, denying also the latters motion for
reconsideration, in accordance with Section 6(8) of Republic Act
No. 7941 (RA 7941), otherwise known as the Party-List System
Act, which provides:
Section 6. Removal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The
COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any
interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing,
the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party,
organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:
x x x x
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding
elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the
votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding
elections for the constituency in which it has
registered.[Emphasis supplied.]
Petitioner was delisted because it failed to get 2% of the votes
cast in 2004 and it did not participate in the 2007
elections. Petitioner filed its opposition to the resolution citing
among others the misapplication in the ruling ofMINERO v.
COMELEC, but was denied for lack of merit. Petitioner elevated
the matter to SC showing the excerpts from the records of
Senate Bill No. 1913 before it became the law in question.
ISSUES:
Political Law
(1) Whether or not there is legal basis in the delisting of PGBI.
(2) Whether or not PGBIs right to due process was violated.
Civil Law (Statutory Construction)
(1) Whether or not the doctrine of judicial precedent applies in
this case.
RULINGS:
Political Law
(1) No. The MINERO ruling is an erroneous application of Section
6(8) of RA 7941; hence, it cannot sustain PGBIs delisting from
the roster of registered national, regional or sectoral parties,
organizations or coalitions under the party-list system. First, the
law is in the plain, clear and unmistakable language of the law
which provides for two (2) separate reasons for
delisting. Second, MINERO is diametrically opposed to the
legislative intent of Section 6(8) of RA 7941, as PGBIs cited
congressional deliberations clearly show. MINERO therefore
simply cannot stand.
(2) No. On the due process issue, petitioners right to due
process was not violated for [it] was given an opportunity to
seek, as it did seek, a reconsideration of [COMELEC
resolution]. The essence of due process, consistently held, is
simply the opportunity to be heard; as applied to administrative
proceedings, due process is the opportunity to explain ones side
or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of. A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all
times and in all instances essential. The requirement is satisfied
where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity
to explain their side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned
upon is absolute lack of notice and hearing x x x. [It is] obvious
[that] under the attendant circumstances that PGBI was not
denied due process.
Civil Law (Statutory Construction)
(1) No. This case is an exception to the application of the
principle of stare decisis. The doctrine of stare decisis et non
quieta movere (to adhere to precedents and not to unsettle
things which are established) is embodied in Article 8 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines which provides, thus:
ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of
the Philippines.
The doctrine enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It
requires courts in a country to follow the rule established in a
decision of its Supreme Court. That decision becomes a judicial
precedent to be followed in subsequent cases by all courts in the
land. The doctrine of stare decisis is based on the principle that
once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should
be deemed settled and closed to further argument.
The doctrine though is not cast in stone for upon a showing that
circumstances attendant in a particular case override the great
benefits derived by *SCs+ judicial system from the doctrine
of stare decisis, the Court is justified in setting it
aside. MINERO did unnecessary violence to the language of the
law, the intent of the legislature, and to the rule of law in
general. Clearly, [SC] cannot allow PGBI to be prejudiced by the
continuing validity of an erroneous ruling. Thus, [SC] now
abandons MINERO and strike it out from [the] ruling case law.

G.R. No. 147589 June 26, 2001
ANG BAGONG BAYANI vs. Comelec
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 147613 June 26, 2001
BAYAN MUNA vs. Comelec


Facts
Petitioners challenged the Comelecs Omnibus Resolution No.
3785
,
which approved the participation of 154 organizations and
parties, including those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list
elections. Petitioners sought the disqualification of private
respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system was
intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented; not
the mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or
overrepresented. Unsatisfied with the pace by which Comelec
acted on their petition, petitioners elevated the issue to the
Supreme Court.


Issue:
1. Whether or not petitioners recourse to the Court was proper.
2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party list
elections.
3. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of
discretion in promulgating Omnibus Resolution No. 3785.


Ruling:
1. The Court may take cognizance of an issue notwithstanding the
availability of other remedies "where the issue raised is one
purely of law, where public interest is involved, and in case of
urgency." The facts attendant to the case rendered it justiciable.

2. Political parties even the major ones -- may participate in the
party-list elections subject to the requirements laid down in the
Constitution and RA 7941, which is the statutory law pertinent to
the Party List System.

Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot
be disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on the
ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution provides that members of the House of
Representatives may "be elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations . It is however, incumbent upon the Comelec to
determine proportional representation of the marginalized and
underrepresented, the criteria for participation, in relation to
the cause of the party list applicants so as to avoid desecration of
the noble purpose of the party-list system.

3. The Court acknowledged that to determine the propriety of the
inclusion of respondents in the Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, a
study of the factual allegations was necessary which was beyond
the pale of the Court. The Court not being a trier of facts.

However, seeing that the Comelec failed to appreciate fully the
clear policy of the law and the Constitution, the Court decided to
set some guidelines culled from the law and the Constitution, to
assist the Comelec in its work. The Court ordered that the
petition be remanded in the Comelec to determine compliance
by the party lists.

PEOPLE V JALOSJOS
Feb. 3, 2000
Facts: The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged
member of Congress who is confined at the national penitentiary
while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness
is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking
that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a
Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and
committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the
first instance of a non-bailable offense on the basis of popular
sovereignty and the need for his constituents to be represented
Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to
discharge mandate as member of House of Representatives
Held: Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the
people. However, inspite of its importance, the privileges and
rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or
restricted by law.
The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members
of the House of Representatives arises from a provision of the
Constitution. The privilege has always been granted in a
restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a
special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary
meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment,
implication or equitable considerations.
The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should
be exempted from the operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the
Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent
members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a
legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with
a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is
not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations.
To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and
committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually
make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his
position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-
appellants status to that of a special class, it also would be a
mockery of the purposes of the correction system.

De Guzman v. Comelec
G.R. No. 129118 (July 19, 2000)
FACTS: The Comelec reassigned petitioners to other stations
pursuant to Section 44 of the Voters Registration Act. The Act
prohibits election officers from holding office in a particular city
or municipality for more than four years. Petitioners claim that
the act violated the equal protection clause because not all
election officials were covered by the prohibition.

HELD: The law does not violate the equal protection clause. It is
intended to ensure the impartiality of election officials by
preventing them from developing familiarity with the people of
their place of assignment. Large-scale anomalies in the
registration of voters cannot be carried out without the
complicity of election officers, who are the highest
representatives of Comelec in a city or municipality.

SENATOR BENIGNO C. AQUINO III V. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 189793, April 7, 2010
Perez, J.
FACTS:

Republic Act No. 9176 created an additional legislative district
for the province of Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the existing
first and second legislative districts of the province. The said law
originated from House Bill No. 4264 and was signed into law by
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October 2009.

To that effect, the first and second districts of Camarines Sur
were reconfigured in order to create an additional legislative
district for the province. Hence, the first district municipalities of
Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando
were combined with the second district Municipalities of Milaor
and Gainza to form a new second legislative district.

Petitioners claim that the reapportionment introduced by
Republic Act No. 9716 violates the constitutional standards that
requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand (
250,000) for the creation of a legislative district. Thus, the
proposed first district will end up with a population of less than
250,000 or only 176,383.

ISSUE:

Whether a population of 250,000 is an indispensable
constitutional requirement for the creation of a new legislative
district in a province.

HELD:

NO. The second sentence of Section 5 (3), Article VI of the
constitution states that: Each city with a population of at least
two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least
one representative.

There is a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of
a city to a district on one hand, and the entitlement of a province
to a district on the other. For a province is entitled to at least a
representative, there is nothing mentioned about the
population. Meanwhile, a city must first meet a population
minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly entitled.

It should be clearly read that Section 5(3) of the constitution
requires a 250,000 minimum population only for a city to be
entitled to a representative, but not so for a province.

Romulo L. Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of
Public Officers and Investigations, et. al.

G.R. No. 180643 25 March 2008

FACTS:

On April 21, 2007, the DOTC entered into a contract with ZTE for
the supply of equipment and services for the NBN Project in the
amount of nearly Php6B and was to be financed by the Republic
of China. Several Resolutions regarding the investigation and
implications on national security and government-xto-
government contracts regarding the NBN Project were
introduced in Senate. Respondent Committees initiated the
investigation by sending invitations to certain personalities and
cabinet officials involved in the NBN Project. Petitioner was
summoned to appear and he testified to the Committees for
eleven (11) hours, but refused to answer three important
questions, invoking his right to executive privilege. For failing to
appear in the other days that he was summoned, Neri was held
in contempt.

ISSUES:

1. Whether Neri can invoke executive privilege;
2. Whether the invocation of executive privilege violate
Sec. 28, Art. II and Sec. 7, Art. III; and
3. Whether the Committees gravely abused their
discretion by holding Neri in contempt.
RULING:

1. The communications elicited by the three questions are
covered by executive privilege. Despite the revocation
of E.O. 464, there is a recognized claim of executive
privilege. The privilege is said to be a necessary
guarantee of presidential advisors to provide the
President and those who assist him with freedom to
explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies
and making decisions and to do so in a way many would
be unwilling to express except privately. Furthermore,
the claim was properly invoked by the letter provided
by Executive Secretary Ermita stating the precise and
certain reason that the said information may impair the
countrys diplomatic as well as economic relations with
the Republic of China.
2. The petitioner was able to appear in at least one of the
days where he was summoned and expressly
manifested his willingness to answer more questions
from the Senators, with the exception only of those
covered by his claim of executive privilege. The right to
public information and full public disclosure of
transactions, like any other right, is subject to
limitation. These include those that are classified by
the body of jurisprudence as highly confidential. The
information subject to this case belongs to such kind.
3. The Committees violated Sec. 21, Art. VI of the
Constitution for having failed to publish its Rules of
Procedure. Inquiries are required to be in accordance
with the duly published rules of procedure. Without
these, the aid of legislation are procedurally infirm.
Reghis M. Romero II, Edmond Q. Sese, Leopoldo T. Sanchez,
Reghis M. Romero III, Michael L. Romero, Nathaniel L. Romero
and Jerome R. Canals vs. Sen. Jinggoy E. Estrada and Senate
Committee on Labor, Employment and Human Resources
Development, G.R. No. 174105, April 2, 2009.
Inquiry in aid of legislation. A legislative investigation in aid of
legislation and court proceedings has different purposes. On one
hand, courts conduct hearings or like adjudicative procedures to
settle, through the application of a law, actual controversies
arising between adverse litigants and involving demandable
rights. On the other hand, inquiries in aid of legislation are, inter
alia, undertaken as tools to enable the legislative body to gather
information and, thus, legislate wisely and effectively; and to
determine whether there is a need to improve existing laws or
enact new or remedial legislation, albeit the inquiry need not
result in any potential legislation. On-going judicial proceedings
do not preclude congressional hearings in aid of legislation.
While Sabio and Standard Chartered Bank advert only to pending
criminal and administrative cases before lower courts as not
posing a bar to the continuation of a legislative inquiry, there is
no rhyme or reason that these cases doctrinal pronouncement
and their rationale cannot be extended to appealed cases and
special civil actions awaiting final disposition before this Court. . .
When the Committee issued invitations and subpoenas to
petitioners to appear before it in connection with its
investigation of the aforementioned investments, it did so
pursuant to its authority to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.
This is clearly provided in Art. VI, Sec. 21 of the Constitution,
which was quoted at the outset. And the Court has no authority
to prohibit a Senate committee from requiring persons to appear
and testify before it in connection with an inquiry in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure. Sabio emphasizes the importance of the duty of
those subpoenaed to appear before the legislature, even if
incidentally incriminating questions are expected to be asked.

PS Resolution Nos. 537 and 543 were passed in 2006 and the
letter-invitations and subpoenas directing the petitioners to
appear and testify in connection with the twin resolutions were
sent out in the month of August 2006 or in the past Congress. On
the postulate that the Senate of each Congress acts separately
and independently of the Senate before and after it, the
aforesaid invitations and subpoenas are considered functos
oficio and the related legislative inquiry conducted is, for all
intents and purposes, terminated.


BANAT vs. COMELEC , GR 17927 [ April 21, 2009 ]
Post under case digests, Political Law at Thursday, February 23,
2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind
Facts: Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency (BANAT) filed before the
Commission on Elections(COMELEC) a petition to proclaim the
full number of party list representatives provided by
the Constitution. However, the recommendation of the head of
the legal group of COMELECsnational board of canvassers to
declare the petition moot and academic was approved by the
COMELEC en banc, and declared further in a resolution that the
winning party list will be resolved using the Veterans
ruling. BANAT then filed a petition before the SC assailing
said resolution of the COMELEC.
Issues:
(1) Is the 20% allocation for party-list representatives provided
in Sec 5 (2), Art VI of the Constitution mandatory or is it merely a
ceiling?
(2) Is the 2% threshold and qualifier votes prescribed by the
same Sec 11 (b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
(3) Does the Constitution prohibit major political parties from
participating in the party-list elections? If not, can major political
parties participate in the party-list elections?
Held:
(1) Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 mandates the filling
up of the entire 20% allocation of party-list representatives
found in theConstitution. The Constitution, in paragraph 1, Sec 5
of Art VI, left the determination of the number of the members
of the House of Representatives to Congress. The
20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling;
party-list representatives cannot be more then 20% of the
members of the House of Representatives.
(2) No. We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional
seats, the continued operation of the two percent threshold for
the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second
clause of Sec 11(b) of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court
finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically
impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party-
list seats when the available party-list seat exceeds 50. The
continued operation of the two percent threshold in the
distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of
the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of
Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.We
therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation
to the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second
clause of Sec 11 (b) of RA 7941. The two percent threshold
presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of
Sec 5 (2), Art VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment
of the-broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or
group interests in the House of Representatives.
(3) No. Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 prohibits major
political parties from participating in the party-list system. On
the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the
major political parties to participate in party-
list elections through their sectoral wings. However, by vote of 8-
7, the Court decided tocontinue the ruling in Veterans
disallowing major political parties from participating in the party-
list elections, directly or indirectly.

CO VS. HRET
G.R. No. 92191-92, July 30, 1991
FACTS:
On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the
second districtof Northern Samar was held. Among the
candidates who vied for the position of representative in the
second legislative district of Northern Samar are the petitioners,
Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose
Ong, Jr. Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly
elected representative of the second district of Northern Samar.
The petitioners filed election protests against
the private respondentalleging that Jose Ong, Jr. is not a
natural born citizen of the Philippines and not a resident of the
second district of Northern Samar.
The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET) declaredrespondent Ong is a natural born Filipino citizen
and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not respondent is a natural born Filipino and a
resident of Laoang, Northern Samar.
2. Whether or not the HRET committed grave abuse of authority
in the exercise of its powers.
HELD:
1. The Court affirmed the decision of HRET that respondent is a
natural born Filipino and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar.
Therespondent traces his natural born citizenship through
his mother, not through the citizenship of his father. The
citizenship of the father is relevant only to determine whether or
not the respondent"chose" to be a Filipino when he came of age.
At that time and up to the present, both mother and father were
Filipinos. RespondentOng could not have elected any other
citizenship unless he first formally renounced Philippine
citizenship in favor of a foreignnationality. Unlike other persons
faced with a problem of election, there was no
foreign nationality of his father which he could possibly have
chosen.

2. The Court declared that HRET did not commit any grave abuse
of discretion. The same issue of natural-born citizenship has
already been decided by the Constitutional Convention of 1971
and by the Batasang Pambansa convened by authority of
the Constitutiondrafted by that Convention. Emil Ong, full blood
brother of therespondent, was declared and accepted as a
natural born citizen by both bodies.
Representative Danila Ramon S. Fernandez vs. House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal and Jesus L. Vicente, G.R. No.
187478, December 21, 2009.

The 1987 Constitution explicitly provides under Article VI,
Section 17 thereof that the HRET and the Senate Electoral
Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judges of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective
members. The authority conferred upon the Electoral Tribunal is
full, clear and complete. The use of the word sole emphasizes
the exclusivity of the jurisdiction of these Tribunals, which is
conferred upon the HRET and the SET after elections and the
proclamation of the winning candidates. A candidate who has
not been proclaimed and who has not taken his oath of office
cannot be said to be a member of the House of Representatives.
Thus, private respondent correctly pointed out that a petition for
quo warranto is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HRET, and
cannot be considered forum shopping even if, as in this case, the
COMELEC had already passed upon in administrative or quasi-
judicial proceedings the issue of the qualification of the Member
of the House of Representatives while the latter was still a
candidate.
The qualifications of a member of the House of Representatives
are found in Article VI, Section 6 of the Constitution.
The evidence presented by private respondent before the HRET
hardly suffices to prove that petitioner failed to comply with the
one-year residency requirement under the Constitution. Private
respondents documentary evidence to disqualify petitioner
mainly consisted of (a) petitioners certificates of candidacy
(COCs) for various positions in 1998, 2001 and 2004, which all
indicated his residence as Pagsanjan, Laguna within the Fourth
District of said province; (b) his application for a drivers license
in August 2005 that indicated Pagsanjan, Laguna as his
residence; and (c) the statement in his COCs including his 2007
COC for Congressman for the First District of Laguna that his
place of birth was Pagsanjan, Laguna.
The HRET puts undue emphasis on the fact that petitioner is only
leasing a townhouse in Sta. Rosa while he owns houses in
Pagsanjan and Cabuyao. His ownership of properties in other
places has been taken to mean that petitioner did not intend to
make Sta. Rosa his permanent residence or that he had not
abandoned his domicile of origin.
Although it is true that the latest acquired abode is not
necessarily the domicile of choice of a candidate, there is
nothing in the Constitution or our election laws which require a
congressional candidate to sell a previously acquired home in
one district and buy a new one in the place where he seeks to
run in order to qualify for a congressional seat in that other
district. Neither do we see the fact that petitioner was only
leasing a residence in Sta. Rosa at the time of his candidacy as a
barrier for him to run in that district. Certainly, the Constitution
does not require a congressional candidate to be a property
owner in the district where he seeks to run but only that he
resides in that district for at least a year prior to election day. To
use ownership of property in the district as the determinative
indicium of permanence of domicile or residence implies that
only the landed can establish compliance with the residency
requirement. This Court would be, in effect, imposing a property
requirement to the right to hold public office, which property
requirement would be unconstitutional.
This case must be distinguished from Aquino v. COMELEC and
Domino v. COMELEC, where the disqualified candidate was
shown to be merely leasing a residence in the place where he
sought to run for office. In Aquino and Domino, there appeared
to be no other material reason for the candidate to lease
residential property in the place where he filed his COC, except
to fulfill the residency requirement under election laws.
In the case at bar, there are real and substantial reasons for
petitioner to establish Sta. Rosa as his domicile of choice and
abandon his domicile of origin and/or any other previous
domicile.

Gutierrez vs. HR
Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez vs. The House Of Representatives
Committee On Justice, et.al.
G.R. No. 193459, February 15, 2011
Carpio, Morales, J.:
Doctrine: x x x We ought to be guided by the doctrine of stare
decisis et non quieta movere. As pointed out in Francisco, the
impeachment proceeding is not initiated when the House
deliberates on the resolution passed on to it by the Committee,
because something prior to that has already been done. The
action of the House is already a further step in the proceeding,
not its initiation or beginning. Rather, the proceeding is initiated
or begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the
Committee on Justice for action. This is the initiating step which
triggers the series of steps that follow.
Facts: On July 22, 2010, private respondents Risa Hontiveros-
Baraquel, et.al. (Baraquel group) filed an impeachment
complaint against petitioner. On August 3, 2010, private
respondents Renato Reyes et.al. (Reyes group) filed another
impeachment complaint. Both impeachment complaints were
endorsed by different Party-List Representatives.
On August 10, 2010, House Majority Leader Neptali Gonzales II,
as chairperson of the Committee on Rules, instructed the Deputy
Secretary General for Operations to include the two complaints
in the Order of Business, which was complied with by their
inclusion in the Order of Business for the following day.
On August 11, 2010 at 4:47 p.m., during its plenary session, the
House of Representatives simultaneously referred both
complaints to public respondent.
After hearing, public respondent, by Resolution of September 1,
2010, found both complaints sufficient in form, which complaints
it considered to have been referred to it at exactly the same
time.
Meanwhile, the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings
of the 15th Congress was published on September 2, 2010.
On September 6, 2010, petitioner tried to file a motion to
reconsider the September 1, 2010 Resolution of public
respondent. Public respondent refused to accept the motion,
however, for prematurity; instead, it advised petitioner to await
the notice for her to file an answer to the complaints, drawing
petitioner to furnish copies of her motion to each of the 55
members of public respondent.
After hearing, public respondent, by Resolution of September 7,
2010, found the two complaints, which both allege culpable
violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust,
sufficient in substance. The determination of the sufficiency of
substance of the complaints by public respondent, which
assumed hypothetically the truth of their allegations, hinged on
the issue of whether valid judgment to impeach could be
rendered thereon. Petitioner was served also on September 7,
2010 a notice directing her to file an answer to the complaints
within 10 days.
Issue: When is impeachment deemed initiated? (Does the
present impeachment complaint violate the one-year bar rule
under the Constitution?)
Held: The one-year bar rule. Article XI, Section 3, paragraph (5)
of the Constitution reads: No impeachment proceedings shall
be initiated against the same official more than once within a
period of one year.
Petitioner reckons the start of the one-year bar from the filing of
the first impeachment complaint against her on July 22, 2010 or
four days before the opening on July 26, 2010 of the 15th
Congress. She posits that within one year from July 22, 2010, no
second impeachment complaint may be accepted and referred
to public respondent.
Following petitioners line of reasoning, the verification of the
complaint or the endorsement by a member of the House
steps done prior to the filing would already initiate the
impeachment proceedings.
Contrary to petitioners emphasis on impeachment complaint,
what the Constitution mentions is impeachment proceedings.
Her reliance on the singular tense of the word complaint to
denote the limit prescribed by the Constitution goes against the
basic rule of statutory construction that a word covers its
enlarged and plural sense.
The Court, of course, does not downplay the importance of an
impeachment complaint, for it is the matchstick that kindles the
candle of impeachment proceedings. The filing of an
impeachment complaint is like the lighting of a matchstick.
Lighting the matchstick alone, however, cannot light up the
candle, unless the lighted matchstick reaches or torches the
candle wick. Referring the complaint to the proper committee
ignites the impeachment proceeding. With a simultaneous
referral of multiple complaints filed, more than one lighted
matchsticks light the candle at the same time. What is important
is that there should only be ONE CANDLE that is kindled in a
year, such that once the candle starts burning, subsequent
matchsticks can no longer rekindle the candle.
Under the Rules of the House, a motion to refer is not among
those motions that shall be decided without debate, but any
debate thereon is only made subject to the five-minute rule.
Moreover, it is common parliamentary practice that a motion to
refer a matter or question to a committee may be debated upon,
not as to the merits thereof, but only as to the propriety of the
referral. With respect to complaints for impeachment, the House
has the discretion not to refer a subsequent impeachment
complaint to the Committee on Justice where official records
and further debate show that an impeachment complaint filed
against the same impeachable officer has already been referred
to the said committee and the one year period has not yet
expired, lest it becomes instrumental in perpetrating a
constitutionally prohibited second impeachment proceeding. Far
from being mechanical, before the referral stage, a period of
deliberation is afforded the House, as the Constitution, in fact,
grants a maximum of three session days within which to make
the proper referral.
As mentioned, one limitation imposed on the House in initiating
an impeachment proceeding deals with deadlines. The
Constitution states that *a+ verified complaint for impeachment
may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or
by any citizen upon a resolution or endorsement by any Member
thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within
ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within
three session days thereafter.
x x x We ought to be guided by the doctrine of stare decisis et
non quieta movere. As pointed out in Francisco, the
impeachment proceeding is not initiated when the House
deliberates on the resolution passed on to it by the Committee,
because something prior to that has already been done. The
action of the House is already a further step in the proceeding,
not its initiation or beginning. Rather, the proceeding is initiated
or begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the
Committee on Justice for action. This is the initiating step which
triggers the series of steps that follow.
Allowing an expansive construction of the term initiate beyond
the act of referral allows the unmitigated influx of successive
complaints, each having their own respective 60-session-day
period of disposition from referral. Worse, the Committee shall
conduct overlapping hearings until and unless the disposition of
one of the complaints ends with the affirmance of a resolution
for impeachment or the overriding[ of a contrary resolution (as
espoused by public respondent), or the House transmits the
Articles of Impeachment (as advocated by the Reyes group), or
the Committee on Justice concludes its first report to the House
plenary regardless of the recommendation (as posited by
respondent-intervenor). Each of these scenarios runs roughshod
the very purpose behind the constitutionally imposed one-year
bar. Opening the floodgates too loosely would disrupt the series
of steps operating in unison under one proceeding.