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6/18/2014 The Complex China-South Korea Relationship | The Diplomat

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Image Credit: REUTERS/Wang Zhao/ Pool
The Complex China-South
Korea Relationship
An upcoming visit by Xi Jinping to
South Korea will likely leave much
unsaid.
Chinas new premier, Xi Jinping, is scheduled
to visit South Korea in the next few weeks.
Given the tame, bland statism of both
countrys media, few of the interesting
debates and important disagreements will be
aired. Instead, the national prestige obsession of both will dominate the coverage. There will
be a lot of self-congratulation and vanity: how important each country is now, how they are
resetting world politics, how the West, and the United States especially, needs to pay more
attention to them, and so on. And finally, as both countries bureaucracies are reflexively
anti-Japanese, there will be a lot of the standard conspiratorial Japan is remilitarizing and
plotting to take over Asia again boilerplate. All-in-all, the local media coverage will be weak
and recycled, so instead, here are the large, unspoken issues lurking in the background:
South Korea is increasingly caught between its economic dependence on
Chinese export markets and military dependence on the United States.
This dilemma has been intensifying in South Korean foreign policy for more than a decade
now. As China has risen to regional and global prominence, South Korean exporters have
increasingly linked themselves to its 8 trillion dollar economy. South Korea, like many Asian
states, is deeply committed to the mercantilist goal of a running trade surpluses. As such, the
search for export markets plays an extraordinarily important role in South Korean politics.
(It need not; a stronger won would help heavily indebted Korean consumers a lot. But
corporate behemoths [the chaebol] play an outsized role in Korean politics and have
convinced the Korean voter that their export profits and Koreas national interest are
identical. They are not.) Because of its high growth, China would clearly play a role in South
Korean economic nationalism; that China is right next door and offers good complementarity
as a lower middle income state only tightens the fit. In two decades China has risen to be the
number one export market for South Korea.
Simultaneously, South Korea continues to significantly underspend on defense, given the
By Robert E. Kelly
June 18, 2014
6/18/2014 The Complex China-South Korea Relationship | The Diplomat
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challenges of both engaging in conflict with North Korea as well as occupying and
reconstructing it. Despite decades of prodding from the U.S., Korean defense spending is still
only at 2.5-3 percent of its GDP. It is woefully unprepared to fight North Korea alone, much
less take on an insurgency during any subsequent occupation. South Korea desperately
needs the U.S. for its external security, which in turn creates obvious tension with China.
There is no obvious answer to this dilemma that would not involve significant internal pain.
The chaebol have little interest in rocking the export boat with China, while there is little will
for higher defense spending, and indeed strong opposition from the South Korean left.
South Korea increasingly needs China to get any measure of good behavior,
much less unification, out of North Korea.
In the early post-Cold War years, there was much fluidity among North Koreas neighbors.
China had not yet risen dramatically. It was one player among many, while the U.S., Japan,
and South Korea had not yet moved toward a unified position on the North. Russias near
total collapse in the region was not yet clear.
Today, the lines have hardened. Russia plays little role on North Korea. Putin may enjoy
flirting with it to poke the U.S. in the eye, but he is a mild spoiler at best out here. The U.S.,
Japan, and South Korea have broadly hewed to a moderately hawkish line since the collapse
of the Sunshine Policy. As such, North Korea, which used to happily bounce back and forth
among possible patrons, playing them off against each other, is now stuck. Its only exit from
the (more or less) unified democratic front is China. North Korea must placate China in order
to evade the punishing UN sanctions regime it faces. China is now North Koreas primary
pipeline to the rest of the world. Smuggled goods come through inbound flights (it is very
easy to see when you fly into Pyongyang from Beijing) and over the Yalu and Tumen Rivers.
Chinese banks help launder North Korean illegal monies from its drug-running and insurance
fraud. The cushy lifestyle of the Pyongyang elite HDTVs, luxury cars, modern appliances,
top-shelf liquor, and so on would not be possible without massive Chinese flouting of the
sanctions.
This has thrust China into newfound prominence on North Korea. It hosted the (failed) Six
Party Talks, and there is a growing consensus among North Korea watchers that if China
were to cease its economic and diplomatic support, North Korea would suffer a major
systemic crisis. South Korean President Park Geun-Hye must now dote on Beijing to bring
about any kind of movement on North Korea, and in the longer term, any hope for unification
now depends on Beijings willingness to one day cut off North Korea. So long as Beijing pays
Pyongyangs bills, provides it diplomatic cover at the UN where it recently blocked a
reference of North Korea to the International Criminal Court and provides it with an
unstated defense guarantee against the United States, North Korea will continue to stumble
on. The road to Pyongyang now runs through Beijing.
South Korea may not worry about Chinas rise as the United States and Japan
do, but it will not compromise on nearby maritime territorial issues with
China.
6/18/2014 The Complex China-South Korea Relationship | The Diplomat
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It is now widely recognized outside of South Korea that China manipulates South Korean
anti-Japanese feeling in order to drive a wedge between the Americans main allies in the
region. Indeed, were the U.S. not in the region and allied to South Korea and Japan, it is
unclear whether South Korea would align with Japan or China. Japan would be the natural
political choice; like South Korea, it is an open, liberal democratic state with an exemplary
record since the war. But Japanophobia runs very deep in South Korea. Koreans fear and
dislike the Japanese far more than they do the Chinese. Post-colonial resentment of Japan is
shared by both and is often projected back through history. That the Chinese Ming dynasty
helped Korea against a Japanese invasion in the 1590s is well-known by every Korean
schoolchild. Korea has little interest in aligning with the U.S. and Japan against China.
But this does not mean that Seoul will agree to Chinas increasingly capacious territorial
claims in the East China Sea. Chinas expansion of its air defense identification zone last year
was greeted with hostility in Seoul as well as Tokyo. While the Japanese and South Koreans
did not cooperate, both rejected the expansion, and South Korea counter-expanded its own
ADIZ in response.
South Korea has taken a similarly hard line with Chinese fishermen who regularly wander
into South Korean waters in the Yellow Sea. China does not recognize the inter-Korean sea
border called the Northern Line Limit and it has rented out some of these waters from
North Korea. South Korea has rejected this and regularly detains Chinese vessels that enter.
These three areas of tension will belie the smiles and self-congratulatory rhetoric coming
later this month. South Korea is in the weaker position. It is smaller and desperately needs
Chinas help with North Korea. But it also has the looming threat of the U.S. pivot in the
background. China cannot play too tough, or it risks pushing South Korea into the emerging
U.S.-Japanese anti-China camp. Good relations with South Korea is Chinas best chance of
fracturing the emerging ring of hostile states on its periphery, particularly in the South China
Sea. Regional hostility to China means Xi will not be able to bully Park as China has with the
Philippines and Vietnam recently.
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Taro-nechan 13 hours ago
A lot of Chinese posters in The Diplomat like reminding the rest that Koreans have
historically been vassals of China and that even contemporary Koreans have no
problems remaining subservient to China, versus allying with co-liberal
democratic, co-US allied Japan.
This theme of Korean vassalage to China is sure to be one "topic" Xi Jinping will be
quiet about during this visit.


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