Board of Medical Education vs.

Alfonso
Facts:
In 1985, the Commission on Medical Education was
authorized by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports
(DECS) and the Board of Medical Education, herein petitioners,
to conduct a study of all medical schools in the Philippines. One
report showed that the Philippine Muslim-Christian College of
Medicine Foundation Inc., the private respondent and herein
referred to as the College, had failed to comply with the
minimum standards set forth for medical schools and the team
of inspectors sent by the Commission recommended its closure.
The College contended that the findings were biased and
discriminatory. Thereafter, the Board of Medical Education sent
another team of inspectors to re-evaluate it which affirmed the
previous report and recommended the closure of the College.
Third and fourth inspections were made and the College was
still found to be inadequate in all aspects of the survey. With
regards to the results of the evaluations, the Board of Medical
Education recommended the closure of the College to the
DECS. Lourdes R. Quisumbing, then Secretary of the
Department, informed the Chairman of the Colleges Board of
Trustees about the decision to close the college who instead
proposed a gradual phase out in order to minimize financial
losses. On 1989, the College appealed the decision to the Office
of the President alleging grave abuse of discretion to the
Secretary of DECS but the Executive Secretary affirmed the
decision. On 1989, the College filed Civil Case No. 1385 in the
court of Judge Daniel P. Alfonso, herein respondent, against the
Secretary of DECS, questioning the evaluation as illegal. The
respondent ruled that there was no evidence supporting the
findings of the report and that the deficiencies mentioned were
non-existent and issued a writ of injunction to restrain the
implementation of the decision of the Secretary.
Issue:
Whether or not the Secretary of Department of Education,
Culture and Sports has acted within the scope of powers
granted by the law and the Constitution?
Whether or not the respondent Judge Alfonso committed
grave abuse of discretion in issuing a writ of preliminary
injunction to restrain the implementation of the decision of the
Secretary of DECS
Held:
It is not the function of any Court to review the decisions
of the Secretary on the issue of whether or not an educational
institution meets the standards required to operate. No court
has the power to substitute its opinion for that of the Secretary.
The only authority the Courts have is to determine whether or
not the Secretary has acted within the scope of powers granted
by law. It is well settled that the courts of justice should not
interfere with purely administrative functions because they are
in better position to render judgment on such matters due to
their special knowledge and expertise. The Supreme Court held
that the respondent judge committed a grave abuse of
discretion in substituting his judgment for that of the Secretary
and for issuing the questioned injunction.



Francisco Chavez vs. Public Estates Authority and Amari
Coastal Bay Development Corporation
Facts:
On the 20
th
day of November 1973, the government signed
a contract with the Construction and Development Corporation
of the Philippines through the Commissioner of Public
Highways to reclaim certain foreshore and offshore areas of
Manila Bay. On the 4
th
day of February 1977, then President
Ferdinand Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1084 creating
Public Estates Authority, herein respondent. Such Decree
assigned the Public Estates Authority to reclaim land, including
foreshore and submerged areas and to develop, improve,
acquire, lease and sell all kinds of lands. The President also
issued Presidential Decree No. 1085 which transfers the lands
reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay to
the Public Estates Authority under the Manila Cavite Coastal
Road and Reclamation Project. On the 19
th
day of January 1988,
then President Corazon Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517
transferring the parcel of lands so reclaimed under the Manila-
Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project. The Public Estates
Authority and the AMARI, a private corporation and one of the
respondents herein, entered into a Joint Venture Agreement
without public bidding. Such agreement also required the
reclamation of an additional 250 hectares of submerged areas.
It was approved by the then President Fidel V. Ramos. Then
Senate President Ernesto Maceda delivered his privilege speech
and alleged that the Joint Venture Agreement as the
grandmother of all scams. This resulted to the investigation of
its legality. Frank Chavez, a taxpayer and herein petitioner filed
a Petition for Mandamus and prays that the Public Estates
Authority publicly disclose the terms of the negotiation of the
Joint Venture Agreement invoking the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern as provided by the
Constitution. The respondent contends that the petitioner
erred in seeking judicial intervention without first asking the
needed information which violates the principle of exhaustion
of administrative remedies.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner merits the dismissal for non
exhaustion of administrative remedies
Held:
The Supreme Court held that the Public Estates Authority
has the duty to disclose all the terms and conditions for the sale
of its islands to the public. The respondent is obliged to make
public disclosure even without demand from petitioner or from
anyone. The respondent failed to make this public because such
agreement was a result of a negotiation not of a public bidding.
The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not
apply if the issue involved is a purely legal question.








Provident Tree Farms Inc. vs. Batario
Facts:
The Provident Tree Farms Inc. , the petitioner herein , is a
Philippine Corporation engaged in industrial tree planting solely
for production of matches. In accordance with the state policy
to encourage qualified persons to engage in industrial tree
plantation, Sec. 36 of the Revised Forestry Code gives
incentives to the petitioner, including the qualified ban against
importation of wood products. On the 5
th
day of April 1989, the
A.J. International Corporation, one of the private respondents
herein, imported four containers of matches from Indonesia,
and two more containers of matches from Singapore. Due to
the request of the petitioner, the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources issued a certification that there are
enough available wood supply in the Philippines for the match
industry. On 5
th
day of May 1989, the petitioner filed a
complaint for injunction and damages with prayer for
temporary restraining order against the Commissioner of
Bureau of Customs, one of the respondents herein, to stop the
latter from allowing importations. One of the private
respondents moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground
that Sec. 1207 of the Tariff and Customs Code provides that the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs has exclusive
jurisdiction to determine the legality of an importation and not
the regular courts. The motion to dismiss was denied. However,
upon motion for reconsideration, the Court reconsidered its
order and dismissed the case on the ground that it had no
jurisdiction to determine whether the importation is legal or
not.
Issue:
Whether or not the determination of the legality the
importation falls under the jurisdiction of the Commissioner of
Customs
Held:
The Supreme Court held that the enforcement of the
importation ban provided by Sec. 36 of the Revised Forestry
Code is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commissioner
Bureau of Customs. Allowing the regular courts to direct the
Commissioner to impound the imported matches is a clear
interference with the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of
Customs over seizure and forfeiture cases. Under the Doctrine
of Primary Jurisdiction, the courts cannot determine a
controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction
of an administrative agency where the question demands the
exercise of purely administrative discretion requiring the use of
special knowledge of such administrative agency.











Antipolo Realty Corporation vs. National Housing Authority
Facts:
On the 18
th
day of August 1970, Jose Hernando, through a
Contract to Sell, acquired Lot No.15, Block IV of the Ponderosa
Heights Subdivision in Antipolo, Rizal from the Antipolo Realty
Corporation, herein petitioner. Mr. Hernando transferred his
rights through a Deed of Assignment and Substitution of
Obligor with the Consent of the Antipolo Realty Corporation to
Virgilio Yuson, herein private respondent. The private
respondent assumed the performance of all obligations under
the original contract. However, for failure of petitioner to
develop the subdivision project pursuant to Clause 17 of the
contract, the private responded stopped all monthly
installment payments. Such Clause provides that failure by the
seller shall permit the buyer to suspend monthly installments
until such time that improvement have been completed.
On the 14
th
day of October 1976, the President of Antipolo
realty corporation sent a notice to private respondent stating
that the improvements required according to Clause 17 had
already been completed. The notice also requested resumption
of payment of the monthly installments. The private
respondent replied that he would pay as soon as he was able to
verify the truth about it. A second letter was sent repeating the
request of resumption of payment citing the decision rendered
by the National Housing Authority in Case No. 252 declaring
that petitioner had substantially complied with its commitment
to the lot buyers in accordance to the Contract to Sell. The
private respondent refused to pay the monthly installments for
September 1972-October 1976 but agreed to pay post
installments. The petitioner responded by rescinding the
contract. The private respondent brought the dispute before
the National Housing Authority, herein public respondent
through a complaint. The petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss
which was denied. The public respondent rendered a decision
ordering the reinstatement of the Contract to Sell. The
petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on the ground
that the jurisdiction to hear and decide the complaint is with
the regular courts and not the public respondent since it
involves interpretation of the Contract to Sell which was
denied. The petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari to the
Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the National Housing Authority committed
grave abuse of discretion or acted in excess of its jurisdiction
when it ordered the reinstatement of the Contract to Sell.
Held:
Administrative agencies exercise and perform adjudicatory
powers and functions to a limited extent. Quasi judicial
authority had been delegated to administrative agencies
because of the need for special competence and experience.
The extent to which an administrative body may exercise such
powers depend on the provisions of the statute granting the
power to such agency. In the case at bar, the National Housing
Authority has been granted with quasi judicial authority by
Presidential Decree No. 957 which provides that it shall have
exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and
business. The Supreme Court held that the public respondent
did not commit any grave abuse of discretion or act in excess of
its jurisdiction when it ordered the reinstatement of the
Contract to Sel.

Industrial Enterprises Inc vs. CA
Facts:
The industrial enterprises inc., herein petitioner, was
granted a coal operating contract by the Government for the
exploration of two blocks of coal in Eastern Samar through the
Bureau of Energy Development. Thereafter, the petitioner also
applied with the then Ministry of Energy for another coal
operating contract for the exploration of three additional coal
blocks. Subsequently, the petitioner was later on advised that
in line with the objective of making the countrys coal supply
demand balance, the coal operator in the areas should be the
Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corporation which was
already developing the coal deposit in another area. Hence,the
Industrial Enterprises Inc and the Marinduque Mining and
Industrial Corporation executed a Memorandum of Agreement
whereby all the rights and interests in the two coal blocks of
the petitioner was assigned and transferred to MMIC.
However, the petitioner filed an action for rescission of the
Memorandum of Agreement with damages against MMIC and
Minister of Energy before the Regional Trial Court of Makati on
the ground that the MMIC took possession of the subject coal
blocks even before the Memorandum of Agreement was
approved. The petitioner also prayed that the Minister of
Energy be ordered to approve the return of the coal operating
contract to the petitioner. The trial court rendered its decision
ordering the recission of such Memorandum and the reversion
of two coal blocks to the petitioner. However, the Court of
Appeals reversed the trial courts decision and held that the
trial court had no jurisdiction over the action since the BED has
the power to decide controversies relating to exploration and
development of coal blocks as provided by Presidential Decree
No. 1206.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction to hear and
decide the suit for rescission of the Memorandum of
Agreement

Held:
The BED has the power to decide controversies relative to the
exploration, exploitation and development of coal blocks. The
doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies in this case since the
question of what coal areas should be exploited and developed
and which entity should be granted coal operating contracts
involves a technical determination by the BED as the
administrative agency in possession of the specialized expertise
relative to the exploration, exploitation, development and
extraction of mineral resources. These issues preclude an initial
judicial determination. Under the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, it may occur that the Court has jurisdiction to take
cognizance of a particular case, which means that the matter
involved is also judicial in character. However, if the case is such
that its determination requires the expertise, specialized skills
and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because
technical matters or intricate questions of facts are involved,
then relief must first be obtained in an administrative
proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even
though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a court.


Miriam College Foundation Inc. vs CA
Facts:
The members of the Miriam College Community
allegedly describes the contents of the September-October
1994 issue of Miriam Colleges School Paper and Magazine as
obscene, indecent, and sexually explicit. After the publication
of the schools paper and magazine, the members of the
editorial Board received a letter signed by the Chair of the
Miriam College Discipline Committee. It provides that the
students committed major and minor offenses in the student
handbook. The students were required to submit their answer.
However, they requested the chair to transfer the case to the
Regional Office of the DECS which, under Rule XII Order No. 94,
had jurisdiction over the case. On the 21
st
day of November
1994, the Chair, again, requested the students to file their
answers. The lawyer for the students submitted a letter to the
Discipline Committee reiterating that it had no jurisdiction over
them. Subsequently, the Discipline Committee continued its
investigation without the other party. After such investigation,
the Discipline Committee imposed disciplinary sanctions upon
the students involved. The students filed a petition for
prohibition and certiorari with preliminary restraining order
before the regional trial court of Quezon City questioning the
jurisdiction of the Discipline Board of Miriam College over
them. The court ruled that there is nothing in the DECS Order
No. 94 that excludes school administrators from exercising
jurisdiction over cases like the present case. The said order
never mentioned that it has exclusive jurisdiction over cases
falling under RA 7079. The court granted the writ of preliminary
Injunction. Both parties moved for reconsideration.
Subsequently, the court dismissed the petition ruling that since
both parties do not want the court to assume jurisdiction, the
case is dismissed without prejudice to the parties going to
another forum. The Court referred the case to the Court of
Appeals. On the 26
th
day of September, the court of appeals,
herein respondent, granted the students petition. Miriam
College filed a petition with the supreme court.
Issue:
Whether or not Miriam College has the jurisdiction over the
complaints against the students.
Held:
YES,Section 7 of the Campus Journalism Act should be read in a
manner as not to infringe upon the school's right to discipline
its students. At the same time, however, we should not
construe said provision as to unduly restrict the right of the
students to free speech. Consistent with jurisprudence, we read
Section 7 of the Campus Journalism Act to mean that the school
cannot suspend or expel a student solely on the basis of the
articles he or she has written, except when such articles
materially disrupt class work or involve substantial disorder or
invasion of the rights of others The power of the school to
investigate is an adjunct of its power to suspend or expel. It is a
necessary corollary to the enforcement of rules and regulations
and the maintenance of a safe and orderly educational
environment conducive to learning. That power, like the power
to suspend or expel, is an inherent part of the academic
freedom of institutions of higher learning guaranteed by the
Constitution.SC rule that Miriam College has the authority to
hear and decide the cases filed against students.


PAAT vs. CA
Facts:
On the 19
th
day of May 1989, the truck of Victoria de
Guzman, herein private respondent, was seized by a personnel
of the Department of Environment and Natural resources
because the driver of the said truck could not produce the
necessary documents for the forest products found in the truck.
Jovito Layugan, a Community Environment and Natural
Resources Officer and one of the petitioners herein issued an
order of confiscation of the truck and gave the owner fifteen 15
days to submit an explanation why the truck should not be
forfeited. However, the owner failed to submit the required
explanation. Rogelio Bagayan, the Regional Executive Director
of Department of environment and natural resources and one
of the petitioners herein, ordered the forfeiture of truck
pursuant to Section 68-A of Presidential Decree No. 705.
Private respondents filed a letter of reconsideration of the
Order, however, it was denied. Subsequently, the case was
brought to the Secretary of Department of environment and
Natural Resources by the petitioners. Meanwhile, the private
respondents filed a civil case with the Regional Trial Court
against the petitioner. The court issued a writ ordering the
return of the truck forfeited. The petitioners filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground that the private respondents failed to
exhaust all administrative remedies which was however denied.
A motion for reconsideration was filed but it was also denied.
The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals which however, sustained the trial courts decision.
The petitioners filed a petition with the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Held:
The Supreme Court held that a party is allowed to
seek court intervention on the condition that all administrative
remedies should have been exhausted first. If a remedy within
the administrative agency can still be resorted to by giving the
administrative officer concerned the opportunity to decide a
matter within his jurisdiction, then such remedy must be
resorted first before resorting to the courts. However, this
principle is subject to certain exceptions. In the case at bar, the
controversy was still pending before the Secretary of
Department of Environment and Natural Resources when the
private respondents resorted to the court. This is a clear
violation of the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies. Furthermore, the enforcement of forestry laws fall
within the responsibilities of the Department of.. It must be
given the opportunity to decide a controversy within its
jurisdiction.












Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corp vs. Factoran
Facts:
On the 9
th
day of February 1972, the Atlas
Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation registered
the location of its mining claim with the Mining recorder of
Toledo City. On the 10
th
day of September 1973, Asterio
Buqueron, herein private respondent, registered the location of
his mining claims with the same Mining Recorder. Atlas
registered the declarations of locations of its other mining
claims to the same Mining recorder.
Buquerons claims were surveyed and the surveys
thereof were duly approved by the Director of Mines and Geo
Sciences. Such notice of Buquerons lease application was
published. During the said publication, herein petitioner filed a
claim against Buquerins mining claims on the ground that they
overlapped its own mining claims. On the 17
th
day of April 1978,
the Director of Mines decided that Buqueron is given the
preferential rights to possess and operate the areas covered
by his mining claims except the area covered which is in conflict
with the claims of petitioner. The petitioner appealed to the
Minister of Natural Resources who decided on the 10
th
day of
November 1978, that the mining claims of Buqueron are null
and void while the mining claims of Atlas Consolidated Mining
Development Corporation are valid. On further appeal, the
Deputy Executive Secretary and the Office of the President
reversed the decision of the Minister and reinstated decision of
the Director of Mines and Geo Sciences.
Issue:
Whether or not the private respondents appeal to the Office of
the President was time barred
Held:
Under Presidential Decree No. 463, the decision of
the Minister is appealable to the Office of the President within
five (5) days from receipt thereof. In the case at bar, the private
respondent received the copy of the decision of the Minister of
Natural Resources on the 27
th
day of November 1978. It
appears that the 5-day period expired on the 2
nd
day of
December 1978, a Saturday. The private respondent filed his
appeal on the 4
th
day of December 1978, a Monday. The
Petitioner contends that the appeal was filed out of time,
hence, when it was filed before the Office of the President, it
should have been dismissed. However, at the time of filing of
the appeal in question, Saturday, was observed as a legal
holiday. Section 31 of the Administrative Code provides that
where the last day for doing any act required by law falls on a
holiday, the act may be done on the next succeeding business
day, In the case at bar, Monday was the next succeeding
business day, thus, the appeal was filed on time.










Ang Tibay vs. CIR
Facts:
Ang Tibay, a manufacturer of rubber slippers, is a
company owned and controlled by Toribio Teodoro. The
company has two major labor unions namely, the National
Labor Union Inc., which is dominated mostly of laborers of Ang
Tibay and the National Workers Brotherhood, which is
allegedly dominated by Toribio Teodoro. Ang Tibay had a
contract with the Philippine Army secured by a bond. The
contract was breached by Ang Tibay because of an alleged
delay of supply of leather soles from the United States. Since
there was shortage of leather shoes, Teodoro felt that it was
necessary to temporarily dismiss some employees, particularly,
the members of the National Labor Union Inc. However,
according to the National Labor Union, it was merely a scheme
made by the owner, Teodoro Toribio, to systematically
terminate the employees from work because the alleged
shortage of soles is unsupported. This resulted to a case
between ANg Tibay and the aggrieved labor union, wherein Ang
Tibay won. A motion for reconsideration was filed with the
Court of Industrial Relations by the National Labor Union on the
grounds that 1). Teodoros claim of shortage of leather soles is
entirely false and unsupported by the records of the Bureau of
Customs and Book of accounts of native dealers; 2). The
supposed lack of leather materials was just a scheme to
prevent the forfeiture of the bond despite breach of contract
with the Philippine Army; 3) The National Workers
Brotherhood of Ang Tibay is an employer union dominated by
Teodoro therefore, its existence is illegal; 4). The employer
Teodoro was guilty of Unfair Labor Practices for discriminating
against the members of the National Labor Union Inc, and
unjustly favoring the members of the National Workers
Brotherhood.
Issue: Whether or not there is violation of procedural due
process of law.
Held:
The Supreme Court held that the Court of Industrial
Relations cannot ignore or disregard the fundamental and
essential requirements of due process in trial and investigations
of an administrative character which are 1). The right to
hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or
affected to present his own case and submit evidence in
support thereof; 2). Tribunal must condsider the evidence
presented; 3). The decision must have something to support
itself; 4). The Evidence must be substantial; 5). The decision
must be rendered on th evidence presented at the hearing; 6).
The court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges must act on
its own or his independent judgment; 7). The Court of Industrial
Relations should render its decision in such a manner that the
parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved
and the reasons for the decisions rendered.








Macailing vs. Andrada
Facts:
A dispute arose between plaintiffs and the defendant
heirs of Salvador Andrada over four (4) parcels of land located
in Lobak, Cotabato, because the plaintiffs were settling and
occupying four hectares of each parcel of land. The District
Land Officer of Cotabato decided in favor of the plaintiffs and
excluded the four parcels of land claimed by the plaintiffs.
However, the Director of Lands reversed the decision of the
District Land Officer and declared that the portion of land shall
be restored to the heirs of Salvador Andrada, herein
defendants.
An appeal was made by the plaintiffs with the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and on the 27
th

day of October 1956, the decision of the Director of Lands was
reversed and the lands claimed were awarded to the plaintiffs.
The defendants moved for reconsideration, however, it was
denied on the 30
th
day of May 1957. The defendants, again,
filed a second motion for reconsideration but on the 14
th
day of
October 1957, they received a copy that the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources rejected it on and ruled that
his judgment on the case had long become final and executory
therefore, he had no more jurisdictions to entertain the second
motion. Subsequently, the defendants appealed to the Office of
the President. On the 20
th
day of August 1959, the Assistant
Executive Secretary Enrique Quema, by authority of the
President, reversed the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources and declared that the lands involved
should be restored to the hairs of Andrada. The plaintiffs filed a
case in the Cotabato Court on the 23
rd
day of December 1959
raising the issue of finality of the decision of the Secretary. The
court declared the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources as valid, final and executory. The defendants
appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the decision of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources is final and executory
Held:
Yes, the decision of the Secretary is final and
executory. It is provided in Section 12 of Administrative Order
No. 6 tat decisions of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
resources shall of an appealed case shall become final after the
lapse of thirty 30 days from the date of its receipt by the
interested parties. Section 13 of the same Administrative Order
provides that after a decision of the Secretary has become final,
no motion or petition for reconsideration of such decision shall
be entertained by the Secretary. In the case at bar, defendants
did not comment on the plaintiffs issue that there motion for
reconsideration lapsed the reglementary period of thirty 30
days. They merely contended that their appeal to the Office of
the President was made 9 days after receiving the ruling of the
Secretary. The Supreme Court held that the decision of the
Assistant Executive Secretary by the authority of the President
reversing the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources in this case is null and void and of no force
and effect.




Quintos Jr. vs. National Stud Farm
Facts:
Eduardo Quintos Jr., the plaintiff herein, was the
owner or a race horse named Kings Toss. On the 17
th
day of
February 1970, he duly and officially registered the horse with
the National Stud Farm, herein respondent. The defendant
issued Certificate of Registration No. 002426 for the said horse
which acknowledged it to participate in horse races and
sweepstakes draws held in legally authorized racing tracks. On
the 15
th
day of March 1970, the race horse Kings Toss, by
virtue of the official registration started participating in horse
races. On the 13
th
day of June 1972, the plaintiff submitted the
name of his race horse Kings Toss to the Philippine Racing
Club, Inc. and applied for the races programmed for June 17 or
18, 1972. Kings Toss was declared eligible to participate and
take part in the actual race and such application was accepted
and was approved by the Philippine Racing Club, Inc. On the
17
th
day of June, the day when plaintiffs horse, Kings Toss
was scheduled to participate at the race tracks, an
announcement was made through the public address system
that Kings Toss had been excluded from taking part in the
race where it was supposed to run that day. The plaintiff
alleged that said withdrawal of the certificate of registration of
the plaintiffs horse was oppressive and was done without due
process because of the absence of a formal investigation and
inquiry. On the 9
th
day of October 1972, the lower court
dismissed herein plaintiffs complaint on the ground of violation
of the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies. The
lower court ruled that the complaint was filed prematurely. The
plaintiff should have asked the Board of Trustees of National
Stud Farm to reconsider its resolution and in case such
reconsideration is denied, an appeal to the Games and
Amusements Board or to the Office of the Philippines may be
done.
Issue:
Whether or not the lower court erred in dismissing
appellants complaint for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies
Held:
No. Quintos instant complaint was prematurely
instituted. The failure to apply the basic concept of exhaustion
of administrative remedies is what further lends support to the
order of dismissal. The question could have been resolved in a
manner satisfactory to the parties if the Board of Trustees of
National Stud Farm and subsequently, the Games and
Amusements Board, which certainly had the necessary
qualifications to view its manifold aspects, were appealed to, or
an appeal to the Office of the President of the Philippines in
case reconsideration is denied.










Gordon vs. Veridiano
Facts:
On the 21
st
day of March 1980, a team composed of
agents from the Food and Drug Administration and narcotic
agents from the Philippine Constabulary conducted a test buy
at San Sebastian Drug Store where they were sold 200 tablets
of Valium without a doctors prescription. A report of the said
operation was submitted to Hon. Richard Gordon, then Mayor
of Olongapo City and the petitioner herein. On the 17
th
day of
April 1980, he issued a letter for the revocation of Mayors
Permit No. 1954 for violation of Republic Act 6425, also known
as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Subsequently, the vice
mayor of the city ordered the posting of a sign board at the San
Sebastian Drug Store announcing its permanent closure.
Meanwhile, the Administrator of the Food and Drug
Administration, after the fearing about the case, directed the
closure of the drug store for three (3) days and the payment of
a fine of P100 for the violation of Republic Act No. 3720. Three
days later, the order of closure was lifted and the drug store
was allowed to resume operations. Rosalinda Yambao, the
owner of the drug store and herein private respondent, wrote a
letter to the Mayor, seeking for reconsideration of the
revocation of Permit No. 1954 which merit no reply. Thereafter,
she filed a complaint against the Mayor and Vice Mayor with
the Regional Trial Court. The petitioner wrote to the Food and
Drug Administration requesting reconsideration of its order
allowing the resumption of operations of the drug store which
was denied. He filed a motion for reconsideration which was
also denied and the revocation of Mayors Permit was declared
null and void.
Issue:
Whether the Food and Drug Administration or the
Mayor of Olongapo City has the power to grant and revoke the
license for operation of the drug store.
Held:
The Supreme Court held that the authorization to
operate issued by the Food and Drug Administration is a
condition precedent to the grant of a Mayors Permit to
operate to the drug store. Therefore, if the FDA grants license
upon its finding that the applicant drug store has complied with
the requirements of the general laws and the implementing
administrative rules and regulations, it is only for their violation
that the FDA may revoke the said license. At the same time,
having granted the permit upon his ascertainment that the
conditions thereof as applied particularly to Olongapo City have
been complied with, it is only for the violation of such
conditions that the mayor may revoke the said permit. Factual
findings of administrative authorities are accorded great
respect because of their acknowledged expertise in the fields of
specialization to which they are assigned. The petitioner cannot
claim he has superior knowledge than the FDA in the
enforcement of the pharmacy and drug addiction laws.








San Miguel Corporation vs. Secretary of Labor
Facts:
Gregorio Yanglay Jr. was an operator in the crown
cork department of the Metal Closure and Lithography Plant of
the San Miguel Corporation. He was dismissed by the plant
manager therein. On the 22
nd
day of April, after leaving the
plant, Yanglay was apprehended by a Patrolman of the Manila
Police Department outside the company compound while
carrying a bagful of drugs worth P267. The bag of drugs was
turned over to the nurse in charge of the companys clinic. In
his written statement, Yanglay admitted that he was caught in
possession of the said drugs which he had bought from his co-
workers and which had been given to him free of charge. At the
investigation, Yanglay denied that he was trafficking, illegally,
the drugs of the company. He said that he bought the drugs
from his co-workers and contended that he had not violated
any rule of the company. After the investigation, he was
dismissed. At the meeting of the management and the union,
the union representative contended that there was no
company rule against trafficking drugs, which were no longer
owned by the company after having been issued to the
workers. The management said that Yanglays didmissal was
not due to union activities but due to the fact that the sale of
drugs was a subversion of the companys efforts to give medical
benefits to its workers. Yanglay filed a complaint with the NLRC
alleging that his dismissal was not justified and that he was
dismissed because of union activities. The mediator fact finder
recommended yanglays reinstatement with back wages which
the NLRC applied. The petitioner moved for reconsideration of
the decision on the ground that the mediators fact finding
report was not passed upon an arbitrator pursuant to the
NLRCs Rules. The Secretary of Labor denied it. The company
instituted a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review
the decisions of the NLRC and the Secretary of Labor under the
principle of Separation of Powers
2. Whether or not the San Miguel Corporation was denied due
process because the NLRC did not strictly conform to the
procedure for arbitration
Held:
1. Yes, it is understood that as to administrative agencies
exercising quasi judicial powers, there is an underlying
power in the courts to scrutinize the acts of such agencies
on questions of law and jurisdiction. The purpose of
judicial review is to keep the administrative agency within
its jurisdiction. It is proper in case of lack of jurisdiction,
grave abuse o discretion, error of law, fraud and collusion.
It is part of the system of check and balances.

2. The petitioner contends that the NLRC gravely abused its
discretion and denied them due process of law when it
decided the case without giving the employer a chance to
submit the case for arbitration pursuant to Section 14 of
the NLRCs Rules and Regulations. The Supreme Court held
that company was given the chance to be heard. If the
case will be referred to an arbitrator, it would only cause
undue delay to its final disposition. Also, Yanglays
dismissal was a severe punishment and that he should be
reinstated but without back wages because the company
acted in good faith in dismissing him.























Collector of Internal Revenue vs. Aznar
Facts:
On the 28
th
day of November 1952, the Collector of
Internal Revenue demanded the payment of P732,032.66 from
Matias H. Aznar, herein defendant. The payment was for the
latters alleged income tax deficiencies for the years 1945 to
1951. The Collector of Internal Revenue also instructed the City
Treasurer of Cebu to place the properties of the defendant
under constructive distraint to guarantee the payment of taxes
assessed. This instruction was complied with by the City
Treasurer by virtue of a warrant of distraint and levy and issuing
it to the defendant. An exchange of communications between
the Internal Revenue Office and the taxpayer took place and as
result of which, a reinvestigation of the income tax assessment
was made and it was reduced to P380,999.70. When the
defendant received the corrected assessment, he filed a
petition with the Court of Tax Appeals to review it and filed an
urgent petition was also filed to restrain the Collector of
Internal Revenue from proceeding with the collection of the
alleged tax deficiencies by means of the summary methods of
distraint and levy on the ground that the right of the Collector
had already prescribed and the employment of these means
would cause injustice and injury. The lower court issued the
injunction for enjoining the means of summary methods of
distraint and levy after finding that the warrant issued by the
City Treasurer was not actually served on the petitioner and
that the placing of the properties of the taxpayer under
distraint and levy was made beyond the prescriptive period of
three years as provided by the National Internal Revenue Code.
Thereafter, the Collector of Internal Revenue filed a petition to
review by certiorari alleging that the collection of taxes cannot
be restrained by injunction and that even if the court could
have lawfully issued the same, it acted with grave abuse of
discretion when it did not require the payment of the taxpayer
of his taxes.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Tax Appeals erred in issuing
the injunction restraining said official from employing the same

Held:
The Supreme Court held that the requirement of issuing a
bond before a writ of injunction could be issued by the Tax
Court applies only to cases where the means sought to be
employed are legal and not where it is declared null and void.
The Collector of Internal Revenue placed the properties of the
taxpayer under distraint and levy to secure payment of alleged
tax deficiencies, and as with respect to the taxes demanded,
the warrant was issued beyond the 3year period of limitations
as prescribed by the Tax Code. Following the ruling adopted by
this Court as regards with the issuance by the Tax Courts of
writs of injunction, the respondent court did not err in
enjoining the Collector from using summary administrative
methods without requiring posting of bond to make a deposit.








Chua Hiong vs. Deportation Board
Facts:
On the 26
th
day of February 1952, proceedings were
instituted before the Deportation Board, the defendant herein,
against Federico Chua Hiong, herein petitioner. Allegedly, the
petitioner secured the cancellation of his alien certificate of
registration with the Bureau if Immigration through fraud and
misrepresentation and to have exercised illegally, the privileges
and rights belonging only to citizens of the Philippines. On
February 1952, a warrant of arrest was issued upon institution
of proceedings. The petitioner filed a petition for the dismissal
of such proceedings on the grounds that the jurisdiction to
deport aliens exists only with regard to aliens and that his
Filipino citizenship has already been declared by the Secretary
of Labor, by the authority of the President which is binding on
the other executive branches including the Deportation Board.
Such motion was denied by the defendant on the grounds that
mere plea of citizenship does not deprive it the power over
deportation proceedings and that it is not barred from
determining the claim of respondents citizenship
notwithstanding previous findings of other executive officials.
Also according to the Board of Deportation, it may only be
prohibited from continuing the proceeding if it is convinced
that the evidence submitted by the respondent shows that he
is a Filipino Citizen. The petitioners claim had the following
legal foundations. 1). only an alien is subject to deportation or
repatriation and that when a resident denies that he is an alien
and claims to be a citizen of the Philippines, he challenges a
jurisdictional fact; 2) that the evidence which he submitted to
the Deportation Board to prove his Filipino Citizenship is
substantial because as matter of fact, officials of executive
department recognized his citizenship.
Issue:
Whether or not the evidence submitted by petitioner as
regards to his Filipino citizenship is substantial
Held:
The contention of the petitioner appears to be justified by
the documents attached to the record such as the letter of the
Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, the letter of the Secretary of
Labor and the Decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila.
However, these documents contradicted the findings of the
Bureau of Immigration. The Secretary of Justice also found the
citizenship of the petitioner not proved satisfactorily. There is
no question that the power to deport is limited only to aliens
and the alienage of the petitioner is the basic fact upon which
the jurisdiction of the Deportation Board rests. The Supreme
Court held that the evidence of which petitioner and the State
may avail is of substantial nature as to afford belief that only an
impartial judicial investigation can evaluate it with fairness to
the petitioner and with justice to all concerned.









Jaime Hernandez vs. Albano
Facts:
A complaint was filed by Delfin Albano, the
respondent herein, with the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila
against Jaime Hernandez, herein petitioner and then Secretary
of Finance and Presiding Officer of the Monetary Board of the
Central Bank. The complaint was about the alleged
shareholdings of the petitioner in different corporations. At the
joint investigation of the charges before the investigating fiscal,
the complainant, Delfin Albano and the respondent herein,
moved to exclude the alleged violation of Article 216 of the
Revised Penal Code because during that time, the applicability
of this statue was in question. The petitioner sought dismissal
of the remaining charges on the grounds that a). the violation
of Article VII, Section 11, subsection 2 of the Constitution,
should be prosecuted at the domicile of the private enterprises
affected thereby; and b). that the violation of Section 13 of
Republic Act 265 is not criminal in nature. The dismissal was
denied. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,
however, it was also denied. Thus, to restrain the respondent
Fiscals from continuing the investigation, herein petitioner
went to the Court of First Instance of Manila and filed a petition
for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for preliminary
injunction. On the 13
th
day of October 1961, the decision
reached upon a stipulation of facts and dismissed the petition.
Hence, the petitioner appealed.
Issue:
W/n the prosecuting arm of the City of Manila should
be restrained from proceeding with the investigation of the
charges against petitioner
Held:
Ordinarily criminal prosecution may not be blocked
by a court prohibition or injunction. Extreme cases may exist
where relief in equity may be availed of to stop a purported
enforcement of a criminal law where it is necessary (a) for the
orderly administration of justice; (b) to prevent the use of the
strong arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive manner;
(c) to avoid multiplicity of actions; (d) to afford adequate
protection to constitutional rights; and (e) in proper cases,
because the statute relied upon is unconstitutional, or was held
invalid.














Azajar vs. Bureau of Lands
Facts:
The plaintiff, Maria De Azajar filed a complaint in the
Court of First Instance of Albay seeking a declaratory judgment
or relief pleading that she applied for the purchase of a parcel
of land belonging to the public domain located in the Province
of Albay and that an opposition to such application was filed by
Francisco Ardales, one of the respondents herein. The
respondent contended that the applicant cannot be entitled to
acquire said lands being a Chinese Citizen. Such opposition,
according to the plaintiff, raises uncertainty and insecurity to
her citizenship which is prejudicial to her. She contended that
unless such question of citizenship be judicially determined, the
Bureau of Lands should not deny her application. Moreover,
she contended that her father is a Filipino Citizen. The
petitioner prayed that after due hearing, judgment be rendered
declaring her to be a Filipino Citizen and as such, entitled her to
acquire lands of the public domain and that she possessed all
the rights and privileges accorded to the Filipino Citizens. After
hearing, the court rendered a decision stating that the plaintiff
is a Chinese Citizen and being such, she is not entitled to
acquire lands of the public domain. The petitioner moved for
reconsideration but it was denied. The appeal was forwarded to
the Court of Appeals. While it was pending, the First Assistant
Solicitor General filed a motion praying that the appeal be
dismissed on the grounds that an action for declaratory relief is
not the proper proceedings for the purpose of securing a
judicial declaration of Filipino Citizenship and that the action
brought by the plaintiff was not the proper remedy because the
trial court had no authority or jurisdiction to decide on the
merits but to dismiss it. The appellant objected to this motion
and moved that the appeal be forwarded to the Supreme Court
because it involves pre questions of law. However, the First
Assistant Solicitor General objected and appealed for the case
to be dismissed on the ground that the case involved not only
questions of law but also questions of fact being such the court
lacked jurisdiction to hear and render judgment therein.
Issue:
Whether or not the plaintiffs citizenship can be determined in
a complaint for declaratory judgment or relief.
Held:
From a decision of the Director of Lands, an appeal lies to the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Until all the
administrative remedies had been exhausted, no court may
compel the Director of Lands or the Secretary of Agriculture to
decide any sales application as such is exclusively vested upon
them. The Supreme Court held that the appellants citizenship
cannot be determined in the complaint for declaratory
judgment/relief as such is not proper remedy for determination
of citizenship. The appellant may resort to the courts if the
exercise of her rights as citizens be prevented or denied.
However, such was not the action brought in the case at bar
and the lower court should have dismissed it.







The Collector of Internal Revenue vs. Reyes
Facts:
On the 13
th
day of October 1954, the Collector of
Internal Revenue, herein petitioner, demanded the payment of
alleged deficiencies of income taxes, surcharges, interests and
penalties from Aurelio P. Reyes, one of the respondents herein,
through a letter. Together with the letter, the respondent also
received a warrant of distraint and levy on his properties in
case he should fail to pay the alleged deficiency. The
respondent filed a petition for review of the collectors
assessment with the Court of Tax Appeals. The petitioner also
filed an urgent petition to restrain the Collector of Internal
revenue from executing the warrant of distraint and levy on his
properties on the grounds that the right of the respondent to
collect the alleged deficiencies by summary proceedings had
already prescribed as provided by Section 51 of the National
Internal Revenue Code, that a distraint and levy on his
properties would cause him irreparable damage and injury and
that the requisite of Section 11 of RA No. 1125 for the filing of a
bond before a writ of distraint may be suspended was not
applicable in this case. The Collector of Internal Revenue
opposed said petition on the grounds that the Court of Tax
Appeals had no authority to restrain him from executing the
warrant of distraint and levy and that Section 51 does not
preclude distraint and levy. The Court of Tax Appeals ruled in
favor of the petitioner and ordered the Collector of Internal
Revenue to desist from collecting the taxes allegedly due by
administrative method.
Issue:
1. Whether the Court of Tax Appeals could restrain the
Collector of Internal Revenue from enforcing collection of
income tax deficiency by summary proceedings after the
expiration of the three-year period provided for in section
51 (d) of the National Internal Revenue Code
2. Whether the Court of Tax Appeals had any power to grant
an injunction without requiring the filing of a bond or
making a deposit as prescribed by section 11 of Republic
Act No. 1125.

Held:
1. The court construed the provision of Section 51 of the
National Internal Revenue Code that the three year
prescriptive period constituted a limitation to the right of
the Government to enforce the collection of income taxes
by the summary proceedings of distraint and levy though it
could proceed to recover the taxes due by the institution
of the corresponding civil action.
2. Sec 305 of the NIRC provides that no court shall have
authority to grant an injunction to restrain the collection
of any internal revenue tax, fee, or charge. But there may
be instances when the Collector of Internal Revenue could
be restrained from proceeding with the collection, levy,
distraint and/or sale of any property of the taxpayer. The
requirement of the bond as a condition precedent to the
issuance of the writ of injunction applies only in cases
where the processes by which the collection sought to be
made by means thereof are carried out in consonance
with the law for such cases provided and not when said
processes are obviously in violation of the law to the
extreme that they have to be SUSPENDED for jeopardizing
the interest of the taxpayer.

Soriano vs. Sandiganbayan
Facts:
A complaint was filed with the City Fiscal of Quezon
City charging Thomas Tan of qualified theft. Lauro G. bnmm ,
herein petitioner and Assistant City Fiscal then, was assigned
for the investigation of the aforementioned case. During the
investigation, the petitioner allegedly demanded P4,000 from
Thomas Tan in return for dismissing the case. Tan reported the
incident and the demand to the National Bureau of
Investigation which set up an entrapment. The entrapment
succeeded and an information was filed with the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 7393 which provides
accusation to Lauro G. Soriano for violation of Section 3 of
Republic Act 3019 also known as the Anti Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act in taking advantage of his position with grave
abuse of authority by his demand and request from Thomas
Tan of an amount of P4,000 in consideration for a favorable
resolution of dismissing the the Qualified Theft Case. After the
trial in Sandiganbayan, the petitioner was found to be guilty of
Section3 of Republic Act No. 3019 beyond reasonable doubt
and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment from six years and
one month to nine years and one day; to suffer disqualification
from public office; and to suffer loss of retirement benefits; and
to pay costs. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,
however, it was denied by the Sandiganbayan. This resulted to
the filing by the petitioner an instant petition in the Supreme
Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the preliminary investigation of a
criminal complaint conducted by a Fiscal is a contract or
transaction so as to bring it within the ambit of RA No. 3019
Held:
The investigation conducted by the petitioner was not
a contract. Neither was it a transaction because this term must
be construed as analogous to the term which precedes it. A
transaction, like a contract, is one which involves some
consideration as in credit transactions and this element is
absent in the investigation conducted by the petitioner. The
Supreme Court agreed that the Sandiganbayan committed an
error for convicting him for violation of Section 3 of Republic
Act No. 3019. The Supreme Court modified the judgment of the
Sandiganbayan in deciding that the petitioner is guilty of
bribery.














Ignacio vs. CA
Facts:
In 1953, Anterio Ignacio, herein petitioner filed a
protest with the Bureau of Lands representing the heirs of
Fernandez Uguiz. His protest alleged that the homestead
application of Mariano Bautista and the sales of application of
Anazaria Bautista overlapped portions B and C of the
homestead of Uguiz. After investigation of the case, the
Regional Land Officer for Davao decided in favor of Bautista,
excluding Portions B and C from the homestead of Uguiz. The
Director of Lands affirmed sunch decision. The petitioner
appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
which modified the previous decision in deciding that Portion B
must be excluded from the homestead application of Bautista.
Both parties moved for reconsideration of the decision of the
Secretary but he awarded Portion C to them and denied the
motion for reconsideration of Bautista for being filed out of
time. Bautista moved for reconsideration and the Secretary
rendered its third decision stating the Portion C should be
retained as part of sales application of Bautista while Portion B
shall be part of homestead of Uguiz because the first decision
pertaining to Portion B already became final and executory. The
heirs of Bautista appealed to the Office of the President which
modified the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture by
including both Portions B and C in the homestead application of
Uguiz. Bautista moved for reconsideration but it was denied.
Subsequently, Bautista filed a petition for certiorari with the
Court of First Instance on the ground that the Executive
Secretary decided abuse of discretion and in excess of
jurisdiction. The court dismissed the petition and assailed that
the petition is defective as it does not allege any specific error
committed by the Executive Secretary nor does it contain any
allegation of facts which constituted the alleged grave abuse of
discretion. The court further stated that the alleged error of
grave abuse of discretion is not annullable by certiorari. Upon
denial of Motion for Reconsideration, an appeal was made to
the Court of Appeals. The Exective Secretary alleged that the
issues involved questions of law hence; it should have been
filed with the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition for certiorari of Bautista is
sufficient in form and substance which is a pure question of law
and beyond the competence of the Court of Appeals
Held:
The Supreme Court agreed that only questions of law were
involved in the appeal. No evidence was presented before the
trial court. The only issue is the correctness of the legal
conclusions made by the trial judge. It is well established that a
question of law must not involve an examination of the
probative value of evidence presented by the litigants. There is
a question of law when the doubt or difference of opinion
arises . in the case at bar, it is evident that the primary issued
have become moot and academic. The Supreme Court ruled
that the court did not commit any error in dismissing the
petition. The petition failed to allege an error committed by the
Executive Secretary which would shoe grave abuse of
discretion. The alleged error of the respondent official is merely
an error of judgment which does not constitute grave abuse of
discretion, thus it is not annullable by certiorari. In the case at
bar, the petitioner failed to state enough facts to constitute a
prima facie cause of action against respondent Secretary.