8/12/2009

Automated Elections:
For Better or for Worse?

by Roberto Verzola
Secretary-general, Halalang Marangal
0929-856-1930

The official canvassing process

(manual)
Precinct City/muni Precinct returns can be found
counting (ER) Statement of in Election Returns and the
Votes (MSOV) City/muni Statement of Votes

1,628
~260,000
City/muni Provincial
canvass Statement of
(MCOC) Votes (MSOV)

81
Provincial
canvass National
(PCOC) canvass

Precinct City/town Provincial National

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The official canvassing process

(manual)
Precinct City/muni Precinct returns can be found
counting (ER) Statement of in Election Returns and the
Votes (MSOV) City/muni Statement of Votes

1,628
~260,000
City/muni Provincial
canvass Statement of
(MCOC) Votes (MSOV)

81
Provincial
Namfrel canvass National
Citizens' canvass
(PCOC)
Count

Precinct City/town Provincial National

2004 presidential elections: How

GMA 'won' in ARMM

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2004 discrepancies between

Namfrel and Comelec counts
Expressed as percentage (%) of total votes, for valid comparisons
Discrepancy between identical results: 0%
Highest possible discrepancy: 200%
The worse the cheating, the higher the discrepancy

Th e w orst d iscre p a n cie s, b y re g ion

Are a N AM FREL le a d Cong re ss le a d D iscre p a ncy

ARM M FPJ: 1 9 . 2 % GM A: 3 1 . 3 % 50 .5 %
C. M ind a na o FPJ: 2 0 . 5 % FP J: 7 . 0 % 13 .5 %
CAR GMA: 9.3% GMA: 13.4% 4.1%
N . M ind a na o FPJ: 3 . 0 % GM A: 0 . 8 % 3 .9 %
W . M ind a na o GM A: 4 . 9 % GM A: 8 . 6 % 3 .8 %
CARAGA GM A: 2 2 . 7 % GM A: 2 4 . 0 % 1 .3 %
S. M ind a na o FPJ: 1 . 2 % FP J: 0 . 6 % 0 .6 %
S.Tagalog FPJ: 21.2% FPJ: 20.6% 0.5%
Bicol GMA: 4.1% GMA: 4.0% -0.1%
NCR FPJ: 10.0% FPJ: 10.2% -0.2%
C.Valley FPJ: 11.9% FPJ: 12.4% -0.5%
C.Visayas GMA: 56.7% GMA: 56.2% -0.5%
E.Visayas GMA: 2.7% GMA: 2.1% -0.6%
W.Visayas GMA: 33.9% GMA: 33.0% -0.9%
Ilocos FPJ: 6.7% FPJ: 8.0% -1.3%

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Can the discrepancy be due to the

incomplete NAMFREL tally?
We looked at each NAMFREL provincial tally grouped by
completion rate (<50%, 50-59%, 60-69%, 70-79%, 80-89%, and
100%).
We found that most province in each group matched the Congress
tally closely. But one or two provinces showed a big discrepancy
compared to the Congress tally.
No, it is not due to the incomplete tally. These discrepancies are
probably due to cheating.

Discre pa ncie s in GM A m a rgin in province s w he re

t he NAM FREL t a lly w a s < 5 0 % com ple t e
N AM FREL Cong re ss
P rovince D iscre p a ncy
Le a d Le a d
S. Kud a ra t FP J: 2 9 . 1 % GM A: 3 6 . 3 % 6 5 .4%
La na o d e l S. FP J: 1 1 . 1 % GM A: 4 6 . 8 % 5 8 .0%
Sarangani FPJ: 22.6% FPJ: 13.9% 8.7%
Quirino Prov. FPJ: 7.2% FPJ: 5.6% 1.6%
Davao Or. GMA: 7.8% GMA: 8.8% 1.0%
N. Cot abat o FPJ: 10.6% FPJ: 9.9% 0.6%
Caloocan FPJ: 17.9% FPJ: 17.5% 0.4%

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Discre pa ncie s in GM A m a rgin in province s w he re t he

NAM FREL t a lly w a s 5 0 -5 9 % com ple t e
Province N AM FREL Cong re ss D iscre p a ncy
M a g uind a na o GM A: 2 9 . 7 % GM A: 4 8 .3 % 18.7%
Agusan del N. GMA: 26.9% GMA: 29.8% 2.9%
Valenzuela FPJ: 18.1% FPJ: 17.3% 0.8%
Z m b del N. GMA: 31.0% GMA: 28.7% -2.2%

D iscre p a ncie s in GM A m a rg in in p rovince s w he re t he

N AM FREL t a lly w a s 6 0 -6 9 % com p le t e

Province N AM FREL Cong re ss D iscre p a ncy

Ba sila n FPJ: 5 2 . 3 % GM A: 2 2 . 8 % 7 5 .1 %
Benguet GMA: 20.1% GMA: 23.4% 3.4%
Kalinga GMA: 16.6% GMA: 18.7% 2.1%
Bat aan FPJ: 36.6% FPJ: 35.6% 1.0%
Manila FPJ: 11.6% FPJ: 11.8% -0.22%
Tarlac GMA: 10.8% GMA: 9.5% -1.3%
Quezon Cit y FPJ: 2.7% FPJ: 4.4% -1.7%
S. Cot abat o FPJ: 19.4% FPJ: 22.5% -3.1%

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Discr e p an cie s in GMA m ar g in in p r o vin ce s w h e r e th e

NAMFREL tally w as 7 0 -7 9 % co m ple te
P rovince N AM FREL Ta lly Cong re ss Ta lly D iscre p a ncy
La na o d e l N . FP J: 1 8 . 4 % FPJ: 2 . 3 % 16 .2%
Z am bales FPJ: 29.6% FPJ: 25.3% 4.3%
Surigao del S. GMA: 18.5% GMA: 21.4% 2.9%
Pasig Cit y FPJ: 13.8% FPJ: 12.4% 1.4%
Mandaluyong FPJ: 6.8% FPJ: 6.6% 0.15%
Cavit e FPJ: 6.3% FPJ: 6.3% 0.04%
Agusan del S. GMA: 20.2% GMA: 20.1% -0.06%
Negros Occ. GMA: 23.2% GMA: 23.1% -0.13%
Isabela FPJ: 18.4% FPJ: 18.8% -0.40%

Discr e p an cie s in GM A m ar gin in pr o vin ce s w h e r e th e

NAMFREL tally w as 8 0 -8 9 % co m ple t e

P rovince N AM FREL Ta lly Cong re ss Ta lly D iscre p a ncy

Ta w i-Ta w i FP J: 5 4 . 3 % FP J: 1 8 . 5 % 35.9%
Rom blon FPJ: 10.4% FPJ: 4.0% 6.4%
Iloilo GMA: 56.0% GMA: 57.3% 1.2%
Cagayan FPJ: 7.1% FPJ: 6.1% 1.0%
Nueva Ecija FPJ: 40.4% FPJ: 40.9% 0.5%
Malabon/Nav. FPJ: 29.6% FPJ: 30.2% 0.5%
N. Sam ar FPJ: 32.9% FPJ: 33.4% 0.5%
E. Sam ar GMA: 1.0% GMA: 0.5% 0.5%
Bukidnon GMA: 10.2% GMA: 9.8% 0.5%
Mindoro Or. FPJ: 16.2% FPJ: 16.5% 0.4%
Pasay Cit y FPJ: 14.1% FPJ: 14.5% 0.36%
Las Piñas GMA: 1.0% GMA: 1.4% -0.42%
Makat i Cit y FPJ: 6.4% FPJ: 5.8% -0.59%

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Discr e p an cie s in GMA m ar g in in p r o vin ce s w h e r e th e

NAMFREL tally w as 1 0 0 % co m p le te
P rovince N AM FREL Cong re ss D iscre p a ncy
Sulu FP J: 2 9 . 3 % GM A: 1 2 . 0 % 41 .3%
Guim aras GMA: 60.5% GMA: 63.5% 3.0%
Biliran FPJ: 0.1% GMA: 1.2% 1.3%
Aurora FPJ: 34.9% FPJ: 34.9% 0.02%
Bat anes GMA: 27.5% GMA: 27.4% -0.17%
N. Vizcaya FPJ: 10.7% FPJ: 10.9% -0.22%

Discre pa ncie s in a ve ra ge vot e s pe r pre cinct , by re gion

N a m f re l Cong re ss Incre a se Tot a l Incre a se in
Are a
AV P AV P p e r p ct p re cinct s vot e s
ARMM 99.8 153.4 53.6 5,736 307,484
Ilocos 147.0 167.7 20.7 11,402 235,563
C. V isa ya s 136.7 151.0 14.3 16,567 236,985
E. V isa ya s 138.2 146.6 8.3 10,553 88,039
C.Mindanao 132.9 140.7 7.8 9,077 70,930
Bicol 147.3 152.1 4.8 12,295 58,822
CARAGA 146.0 148.1 2.1 5,931 12,562
S.Tagalog 149.8 150.6 0.8 33,080 26,789
NCR 134.2 134.8 0.6 29,370 18,007
N.Mindanao 143.4 143.2 -0.1 10,419 -1,425
W.Visayas 153.4 152.6 -0.8 17,562 -13,333
S.Mindanao 144.4 143.4 -1.0 10,463 -10,835
CAR 148.5 147.2 -1.3 3,861 -4,948
C.Luzon 154.5 152.8 -1.7 24,525 -40,709
W.Mindanao 135.5 133.3 -2.2 8,361 -18,680

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2004 presidential elections: How

GMA 'won'
the NAMFREL count

Num be r of pre cinct s not t a llie d by NAM FREL

P ct s P ct s
Re g ions w he re not Re g ions w he re not
GM A w on (lead) t a llie d Ra nk FP J w on (lead) t a llie d
C. V isa ya s (1.3M) 0* 1 S. Ta g a log (924T) 3,048
W . V isa ya s (757T) 2,757 2 N CR (290T) 7,892
CARAGA (144T) 1,590 3 C. M ind a (129T) 4,334
Bicol (71T) 599* 4 C. V a lle y (112T) 1,329
CAR (42T) 814 5 Ilocos (98T) 1,887
E. V isa ya s (42T) 396 6 C. Luz on (70T) 4,648
W . M ind a (31T) 1,417 7 ARM M (67T) 1,727
8 N . M ind a (39T) 1,336
9 S. M ind a (16T) 1,456
Precinct s not t allied Precinct s not t allied
7,573 27,657
in GMA areas in FPJ areas

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2007 senatorial elections:

how Maguinanao
made Zubiri senator

l
ga
A ng ng n sa
M ag uinda - tu b a ua
n ga pi an s
D a d t im l a t
p at a lu n t hU S u lt o n g i l
g g u r ta
nao 2 0 0 7 Mi Pa Am Pa So Ba To
Vot er t urnout 98.84% 96.71% 97.13% 70.55% 77.09% 98.82% 93.48%
Vot ers who voted 5,212 4,528 10,308 2,392 9,461 8,530 198,912
Aquino (GO) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cayetano (GO) 0 0 0 0 0 0
Coseteng (GO) 0 0 0 0 0 0
Kiram (TU) 1,740 1,356 5,977 1,587 1,998 2,025 86,122
Lacson (GO) 0 0 0 0 0 0
Osmena (GO) 0 0 0 0 0 0
Pimentel (GO) 4,732 768 1,240 2,196 8,504 1,671 67,111
Roco (GO) 0 0 0 0 0 0
Trillanes (GO) 0 0 0 0 0 2,147
Zubiri (TU) 4,991 4,401 10,205 2,316 9,305 8,412 195,823
Tot al vot es 72,342 54,380 123,928 29,802 115,139 113,553 2,260,848
Tot al vot ers x 12 62,544 54,336 123,696 28,704 113,532 102,360 2,386,944
% of Theor. Max. 115.7% 100.1% 100.2% 103.8% 101.4% 110.9% 94.7%
Z ubiri vot es 95.8% 97.2% 99.0% 96.8% 98.4% 98.6% 98.4%
Z ubiri m argin 128,712
over Pim ent el 259 3,633 8,965 120 801 6,741 20,519

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Will electronic voting machines

make elections more honest?

Background

6-week research fellowship awarded by

University of Oxford's Internet Institute to
HALAL secretary-general Roberto Verzola
Research conducted Apr 20-May 30, 2008
Research outputs submitted to the COMELEC
June 2008

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Research Outputs

Costs of automated elections

Automated elections: electronic voting
machines have made mistakes too
Double-entry accounting can improve both
automated and manual tabulations
Catching machine problems through post-
election audits of sample precincts

Costs of automated elections

$3,000 - $7,000 per machine
Unexpected costs
− additional hardware; memory; batteries
− software upgrades; configuration
− training; public education
− maintenance, storage, insurance
DRE (touch screen) much more expensive than
OMR (optical scanners)
Abalos OMRs: $15,000 (2003 prices)

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DRE (touch screen)

problems insoluble
No software-independent permanent paper
record of voter intent
Voters cannot check the electronic record
Trivial programming to put one thing on the
screen, another thing on the printer, and still
another on a memory card/stick
DREs have been phased out in several states
of the U.S.
DREs should be considered OBSOLETE!

U.S.: voting machine troubles

Search: “electronic voting machines”
2000, 2004 “stolen” U.S. Presidency
42,000 “incidents” in 2004-05 (U.S.)
− Uninitialized voting machines
− Votes not counted or reversed
− Wrong winner comes out
− Multiple voting
− More votes than voters; negative votes
− Unauthorized software replacement

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U.S.: types of election problems

Election problem reported Count % of total

Registration-related 15,404 36.0%

Polling place inquiry 7,404 17.3%
Absentee ballot related 4,122 9.6%
Others 3,896 9.1%
Machine problem 2,293 5.4%
Other polling place problem 2,248 5.2%
Voter intimidation 1,763 4.1%
Provisional ballot 1,181 2.8%
Identification related 1,075 2.5%
Long lines 1,072 2.5%
Other ballot-related 794 1.9%
Disability access 539 1.3%
Criminal status related 354 0.8%
Late opening 208 0.5%
Insufficient number of ballots 129 0.3%
Early closing 121 0.3%
Language assistance 111 0.3%
Student status 74 0.2%
Unable to read ballot 51 0.1%

Total 42,839 100.0%

France: EVMs had greater

discrepancies than paper ballots
By Ryan Paul | Published: July 09, 2008 - 08:32PM CT

A study conducted by a researcher in France has uncovered that polling locations which
use electronic voting machines exhibit a higher number of discrepancies than those using
conventional paper ballots. Unsurprising to those who have followed the problems
plaguing e-voting since its introduction, the revelation has fueled renewed calls for greater
scrutiny of electronic voting technology in France.

The study was conducted at over 21,000 polling stations by comparing electoral registers,
which voters sign after voting, with the total vote counts from machines and paper ballots
in several elections. Discrepancies were found at almost 30 percent of polling stations
that use electronic machines and only at about 5 percent of those using paper ballots.
Based on the results, the researcher believes that broader studies are needed to
determine the scope of the pattern and the reasons for the discrepancies. The root cause
is thought to be technical rather than a result of widespread operator error because the
margin of discrepancies increased in later elections when voters were already familiar
with the systems.

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Ireland: Electronic voting system to

be scrapped
23 April 2009--The electronic voting system is to be scrapped, having
cost at least €51m to date. Minister Gormley said the figure of €51m
does not include the cost of storing the machines.

Environment Minister John Gormley said a task force is being set up to

oversee the disposal of the voting and counting equipment and the end
of storage arrangements.

He said it was clear from the Report of the Commission on Electronic

Voting that 'significant additional costs' would arise if electronic voting
was proceeded with.

Mr Gormley said the public appeared to be satisfied with the present

paper-based system. It was of paramount importance to ensure public
confidence in the democratic system, he added.

Finland: Gov't Rejects

Defective E-Voting Results
June 9, 2009--Back in February, we found it disturbing that Finland
was allowing the results of an election to stand, despite the fact
that at least 2% of the votes had gone missing due to e-voting
glitches.

However, it looks like some sense of sanity has been restored as a

higher court has now rejected the election results and ordered a
new election. One hopes that the new election won't involve
similarly screwed up e-voting machines.

In a separate article, we find yet another story of e-voting

machines that were "mis-calibrated" in such a way that made it
difficult to impossible for people to vote for candidates of their
choice.

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Germany: e-voting unconstitutional

Newsweek, May 23, 2009--After almost two years of deliberations,

Germany's Supreme Court ruled in March that e-voting was
unconstitutional because the average citizen could not be
expected to understand the exact steps involved in the recording
and tallying of votes.

Political scientist Joachim Wiesner and his son Ulrich, a physicist,

filed the initial lawsuit and have been instrumental in raising public
awareness of the insecurity of electronic voting.

The younger Wiesner said, with some justification, that the voting
machines used in Germany are even less secure than mobile
phones.

Netherlands: hacked in 5 mins.

Newsweek, May 23, 2009--The Dutch public-

interest group Wij Vertrouwen Stemcomputers
Niet (We Do Not Trust Voting Machines) produced
a video showing how quickly the Nedap machines
could be hacked without voters or election officials
being aware (the answer: five minutes).

After the clip was broadcast on national television

in October 2006, the Netherlands banned all
electronic voting machines.

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Scotland: serious
technical failures
May 4, 2007--A major and urgent investigation was launched today into
the electronic voting failures which disrupted the Scottish Parliament
elections.

10 Downing Street said the problems raised serious question marks

about the future development of the technology not just North of the
Border but across the UK. The inquiry was announced by the Scotland
Office who said "serious technical failures" had delayed the
announcement of results in several areas. More than 100,000 votes
across the country may have to be discounted and problems with the
new electronic counting system, being used for the first time in Scotland,
also meant several counts were suspended until much later in the day.

A spokesman said: "We share the public's concern about the high
number of rejected ballot papers."

Causes inherent to
complex technologies

Software bugs
Hardware problems (e.g., alignment, calibration
issues)
Environmental stresses
Poor or flawed design
Human error (election officials, technicians,
operators, voters)
Malicious tampering (esp. “inside jobs”)

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R.P. choice: Smartmatic

Venezuelan-owned: 82.5% by Antonio Mujica,

Roger Pinate, and Jorge Massa
Separate company in the Netherlands, but
registered in Barbados
Election experience: Venezuela, Curacao,
ARMM (but not the SAES 1800)
Single largest contract: Venezuela elections
Owner died 2008 in a mysterious plane crash

Plane crash: both engines fail

May 3, 2008--A small plane, carrying the co-founder of Venezuelan

voting machine company Smartmatic, crashed earlier this week shortly
after take-off from the Caracas airport, killing two employees of the
company, and several others on board and on the ground.

The initial reports indicated that the cause of the crash may have been
the unusual failure of both engines on the small plane.

Smartmatic has been named as a subject in several recent, exclusive,

investigative reports here at The BRAD BLOG, surrounding questions of
the Venezuelan firm's apparent continuing control over the American e-
voting company, Sequoia Voting Systems.

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The machine: SAES 1800

SAES 1800 for the 2010 is a new machine (Google
“SAES 1800” Smartmatic: 15 hits)
13 hits are recent Philippine stories; the other 2 hits are
both company brochures by Smartmatic
Machine licensed from Dominion Voting Company of
Canada, to be manufactured by Kenmec of Taiwan
Joint venture company to be formed with Total
Information Mgt Corp. (TIM) upon contract approval.

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Our ARMM experience

Most candidates unopposed
Smartmatic used a different machine, different
technology (voting pad)
Problems swept under the rug
− One person entering votes for many voters
− Transmission problems
− Security issues (results uploaded into a machine)
Election law says: test first in Luzon, Visayas and
Mindanao

Controlling election cheating

Cleansing the voters' list

Two-column balanced accounting for election
tallies
Transparency in count, canvass
Post-election statistical audits to ensure the
integrity of results
Punish the cheats!

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Two-column balanced accounting

for election tallies

Universally-recognized superiority over

single-column systems
Minimizes clerical errors, delays
Facilitates detection of fraud
Local pool of expertise (accountants and
bookkeepers) already exist
Low-cost, no special hardware

Recording a P500 expense:

two methods
Single entry: Double entry:
Item A 100 Cash 500
Item B 150 Item A 100
Item C 250 Item B 150
-------- Item C 250
Total 500 ------ ------
Total 500 500

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Sample ballot report

Ta b le 1 . Ele ct ion Re t urn, Ba llot St a t us

Ballot Type Dr Cr
Received 200
Excess 0
Unused 45
Cast 150
Missing 5

Sample vote report

Ta b le 2 . Ele ct ion Re t urn, P re sid e nt

No. of slot s: 1 Ballot s cast : 150
Vot es Dr Cr Cr in words
Available 150
Invalid/Blank 5 five
Candidat e 1 80 eight y
Candidat e 2 50 fift y
Candidat e 3 15 fift een

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Sample multi-slot vote report

Ta b le 3 . Ele ct ion Re t urn, Se na t or
No. of slot s: 12 Ballot s cast : 150
Vot es Dr Cr Cr in words
Available 1800
Invalid/Blank 225 t wo hund. t went y-five
Candidat e 1 140 one hund. fort y
Candidat e 2 135 one hund. t hirt y-five
Candidat e 3 130 one hund. t hirt y
Candidat e 4 125 one hund. t went y-five
Candidat e 5 120 one hund. t went y
Candidat e 6 115 one hund. fift een
Candidat e 7 110 one hund. t en
Candidat e 8 105 one hund. five
Candidat e 9 100 one hund.
Candidat e 10 95 ninet y-five
Candidat e 11 90 ninet y
Candidat e 12 85 eight y-five
Candidat e 13 80 eight y

Post-election audits using

statistical sampling
Persistence of machine troubles requires
independent audits
Science and mathematics of election audits
emerging
Random sampling of precincts can confirm at a
95% or higher confidence level the integrity of
machine results
Has been tried in the U.S., now recommended in
California

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Remember:

Moral problems cannot be solved by

technological fixes
A magician's trick can happen “faster than
the eye can see”
A basic principle of democracy is to “vote in
secret, count in public”
Law of “unintended consequences”

Halalang Marangal convenors

Wigberto Tañada, former senator
Mehol Sadain, former Comelec Comm.
Gen. Francisco Gudani, retired
Sr. Mary John Mananzan, former St. Scholastica's College
president
Isagani Serrano, PRRM senior VP
Ma. Paz Luna, TOYM awardee
Roberto Verzola, HALAL sec.-general

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