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Supreme Court of the United States.

Lisa R. KIRBY, Neal L. Kirby, Susan N. Kirby, Barbara J. Kirby, Petitioners,
v.
MARVEL CHARACTERS, INCORPORATED, Marvel Worldwide, Incorporated, MVL Rights, LLC, Walt Disney
Company, Marvel Entertainment, Incorporated, Respondents.
No. 13-1178.
June 13, 2014.
On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari To The United States Court Of Appeals For The Second Circuit
Brief of Amici Curiae Mark Evanier, John Morrow and Pen Center USA in Support of Petitioners
Steven W. Smyrski, Smyrski Law Group, A P.C., 3310 Airport Ave., SW, Santa Monica, CA 90405, (310) 397-9118,
steve@smyrski.com, Counsel for Amici Curiae.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................................................................................

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .....................................................................................................................................................

iii

INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE .........................................................................................................................................

1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ................................................................................................................................................

3

ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................................................................................

6

I. Jack Kirbys Business Relationship with Marvel Reflects a Highly Independent Freelance Creative
Artist Selling Work in a Volatile Industry ...........................................................................................................................

6

A. The Comic Book Business Was Unpredictable; Publishers Cut Costs, Providing No Security for
Freelancers ........................................................................................................................................................................................

6

B. The Marvel Method: Using Freelance Artists to Plot and Draw Comic Books to Reduce Costs .........

9

C. Freelancers Understood That Their Work Was Purchased and Assigned Not Owned at Inception as
Work for Hire ..............................................................................................................................................................................

12

II. Kirbys Independently Designed Seminal Creations ..................................................................................................

15

A. The Fantastic Four ...................................................................................................................................................................

15

B. The Mighty Thor ......................................................................................................................................................................

17

C. Spider-Man .................................................................................................................................................................................

18

D. Sgt. Fury and His Howling Commandos ........................................................................................................................

19

III. The 1980s Return of Original Artwork Fiasco .......................................................................................................

20


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CONCLUSION ...............................................................................................................................................................................

23


TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Other Authorities

Adventure Comics #75 (May 1942) .................................................................................................................

17

Alter Ego ....................................................................................................................................................................

2

Amazing Fantasy No. 15 (Aug 1962) ..............................................................................................................

11, 18

Challengers of the Unknown #2 (Aug/Sep 1958) .......................................................................................

16

Collected Jack Kirby Collector, The ...............................................................................................................

2

Comic Book Artist ...................................................................................................................................................

2

Fantastic Four #1 (Nov 1961) ...........................................................................................................................

16

Jack Kirby Collector #25 (Aug 1999) .............................................................................................................

19

Journey into Mystery # 83 (Aug 1962) ...........................................................................................................

17

Kirby Collector, The ..............................................................................................................................................

2

Kirby: King of Comics (2008) ............................................................................................................................

1

Mad Art (2002) ........................................................................................................................................................

2

Origins of Marvel Comics (1974) .....................................................................................................................

16

Seduction of the Innocent (1954) ......................................................................................................................

8

Son of Origins of Marvel Comics (1975) .......................................................................................................

16

Tales of the Unexpected #16 (Aug 1957) ......................................................................................................

17


INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE
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Amici curiae Mark Evanier, John Morrow and PEN Center USA support Petitioners position in this case as the
determination of the important issue presented - whether work for hire is applicable to an independent content creator
under the 1909 Copyright Act - will have a broad and profound impact on nearly all artists, writers, and creators of comic
books and other works, and their families. Amici submit this Brief in an effort to aid the Court by providing historical context
and perspective on the work of Jack Kirby and the custom and practice in the comic book industry during the 1958-1963
period relevant to this case.

Mark Evanier has been involved in the comic book industry for over forty years as a writer, columnist and historian. Mr.
Evanier has extensive knowledge of the work of Jack Kirby and the comic book industry in the time period relevant to this
case. One of Mr. Evaniers earliest jobs in the comic book industry was as an apprentice for Jack Kirby. Mr. Evanier has
since written five books on the history of comic books, including Kirby: King of Comics (2008), the definitive biography of
Jack Kirby and winner of both the prestigious Eisner and Harvey Awards, and Mad Art (2002), a history of Mad Magazine.
As a comic book historian, Mr. Evanier has written about and acted as an advisor to most of the major comic book
publishers, including Marvel, DC Comics, and Dark Horse Comics. Mr. Evanier serves as a moderator or panelist at

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numerous comic book industry events, including the Comic-Con International in San Diego, where he routinely interviews
the comic book greats. For his efforts in recording and preserving the history of the comic book art form, Mr. Evanier
received the esteemed Bob Clampett Humanitarian Award in 2001.

John Morrows experience in the comic book industry spans twenty years as a writer, archivist and publisher, and also has a
great deal of knowledge of the work of Jack Kirby and the comic book industry in the relevant time frame. Mr. Morrows
company, Two-Morrows, is widely recognized as a premier publisher of books and magazines regarding the history of comic
books, including the Eisner Award-winning Comic Book Artist, covering the history of comic book creators, Alter Ego,
focusing on the Golden and Silver Age of comics (1940s to 1960s), and The Kirby Collector and The Collected Jack Kirby
Collector, regarding the work of Jack Kirby. Mr. Morrow has extensively researched Jack Kirby, amassing a wealth of
archival material, and conducted dozens of interviews of leaders in the comic book business from the 1950s and 1960s. Mr.
Morrow has also written several introductions for Marvels reprinting of classic comic book series by Jack Kirby, including
The Fantastic Four, The Mighty Thor, Nick Fury, and Captain America.

PEN Center USA (PEN USA) is an organization of over 700 novelists, poets, essayists, translators, playwrights,
screenwriters, teleplay writers, journalists, and editors. As part of International PEN, PEN USA is chartered to defend free
and open communication within all nations and internationally. Each spring, the PEN World Voices Festival of International
Literature showcases work of writers from around the world in a cross-cultural celebration of the written word. Chaired by
Salman Rushdie, the Festival has featured such luminaries as Nadine Gordimer, Toni Morrison, Orhan Pamuk, Umberto Eco,
Ian McEwan, and Mario Vargas Llosa. PEN USA encourages literacy and writing via diverse programs that defend freedom
of speech, confer literary scholarships and awards, and enrich the writing community by encouraging participation from
underrepresented groups. PEN USA is dedicated to supporting creators of literary culture, and it is in pursuit of this goal that
PEN USA joins this brief as an amicus.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
From its beginnings in the 1930s through the 1960s, the comic book business was very much a fly-by-night industry. Jack
Kirbys career is emblematic of its haphazard, un-businesslike nature during this period. Kirby (born Jacob Kurtzberg in
1917) began his career in the depths of the Great Depression, hauling his art portfolio to various publishers, newspaper
syndicates, and animation companies in and around New York City. Kirby created or co-created many enormously popular
characters and comics, including Captain America, The Fantastic Four, The Mighty Thor, The Incredible Hulk, The
Avengers, X-Men, Spider-Man, Sgt. Fury and His Howling Commandos, and Ant-Man. However, due to the perilous financial
condition of the comic book business in the late 1950s, artists such as Kirby were required to work from their homes as
freelancers. Their material was purchased for publication at what is called the page rate, basically a standard rate for a page
of printed material accepted for publication.

Kirby worked on his own as a freelancer, supervised himself, and did not create under the direction of Stan Lee or anyone
else at Marvel. Kirby worked from his home, first in Long Island and later, in the late 1960s, in Southern California. Kirby
set his own hours and working conditions, and paid his overhead and all expenses associated with his creations. He purchased
his own art supplies, including paper, pencils, ink, pens, brushes, and other materials used to create a comic book story. As
such, Kirby, not Marvel, took on the financial risk of creating Kirbys works.

Beginning in the late 1950s, and during the period in question (1958-1963), Marvel sought to drastically reduce its overhead
and financial commitments. Artists like Kirby were not paid a salary by Marvel. Marvel purchased Kirbys artwork and story
by the page on a piecework basis - again, at the page rate for each page accepted by Marvel for publication. If a page or
story was rejected by Marvel, Kirby was not compensated for his work and personally withstood the financial loss.

Kirby sold his work product to Marvel, not his time or services. The page rate Kirby received was fixed and did not depend
on the amount of time spent writing or illustrating the pages. If Marvel rejected pages and/or the concepts depicted, Kirby
could and would take them to other publishers.

Marvel did not withhold payroll taxes or any other form of taxes from moneys paid to Kirby, nor did Kirby receive any
health benefits, insurance, or any other traditional employment benefit, such as sick pay or vacation pay. As a direct result of

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the arrangement between Marvel and Jack Kirby, it is an understatement to say that Marvel prospered greatly from Jacks
original creations.

It is extremely doubtful that freelancers like Jack Kirby, particularly between 1958 and 1963, had any understanding or intent
that freelance material created at home on their own steam and their own dime, purchased after completion by the page if and
only if such page was accepted for publication, was somehow Marvels work made for hire, authored and owned by the
publisher from the moment the freelancers pencil hit paper.

ARGUMENT
I. Jack Kirbys Business Relationship with Marvel Reflects a Highly Independent Freelance Creative Artist Selling
Work in a Volatile Industry
A. The Comic Book Business Was Unpredictable; Publishers Cut Costs, Providing No Security for Freelancers
In 1939, Martin Goodman, a publisher of mens magazines, founded Marvels predecessor, Timely Comics, to publish
comics. The comic book industry grew out of the Great Depression and was hardly an industry at all, at the time serving
primarily as a conduit to republish newspaper comic strips. When publishers such as Goodman could not acquire enough
newspaper products to reprint, they acquired new product for publication from eager young artists at cut-rate prices. Comic
books were considered the lowliest form of publishing in both cultural and business terms.

Goodmans relative, Stanley Lieber (a.k.a. Stan Lee), started in 1939 as an office boy at Timely Comics. In 1941,
Goodman had Lee, then 18 years old, run his fledgling comic book business. They published comic books in all sorts of
genres, from Westerns and crime to romance, imitating whatever trend was popular at the moment.

In the mid-1940s, Timely moved to large offices on the 14th floor of the Empire State Building. Here, Timely maintained an
in-house bullpen of staff artists creating comic book stories on salary. In late 1949, Goodman discovered a closet full of
unused artwork, and as a result of this huge surplus of art, along with changes in New York employment tax laws, decided
firing the entire bullpen of artists and using up the surplus art would be financially beneficial. Goodman only retained
production assistants and editors as employees. Artists formerly employed in the Timely bullpen, such as Syd Shores, Mike
Sekowsky, Joe Maneely, Dan DeCarlo, and Carl Burgos, suddenly found themselves freelance artists, working from home
studios, creating characters and stories at their own expense.

Between 1935 and 1940, Jack Kirby worked in New York at the Max Fleischer animation studio, the Lincoln Features
Syndicate, Universal Phoenix Syndicate, and Fox Comics, Inc. When he was employed as a staff artist, Kirby attempted to
supplement his income during off-hours by selling freelance comic book work to other companies. While at Fox Comics,
Kirby formed his famous partnership with Joe Simon, and together they created and sold comics material to several different
publishers.

From 1940-41, Simon and Kirby worked as editors for Goodman at Timely, where they taught young Stan Lee the editorial
ropes. They soon left, however, accepting what they believed to be a better deal creating material for publication by DC
Comics, while continuing to sell to other publishers. The entry of the United States into the Second World War, and Simons
and Kirbys military service, all but ended the teams collaboration with DC. After the war, Simon and Kirby moved on to
create super-hero, adventure, crime and romance comics which they sold to various publishers, including Hillman
Publications, Crestwood, Headline Publications, and Harvey Publications.

Goodman, meanwhile, was publishing every kind of comic book he could print, including westerns, romance, crime, war
comics, horror stories, books featuring funny animal characters, and superheroes. Some comic book titles lasted a few
years. Others were cancelled after a few issues.

In 1954, Fredric Werthams book Seduction of the Innocent accused comic books of poisoning the minds of Americas youth.
This lead to Senate hearings, and the resulting public backlash brought the comic book business to the brink of ruin.

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Goodman did not cease publishing comic books but wound up losing his distribution channels. This resulted in another
surplus of completed material, so to stay in business, Goodman had Lee inform all the artists (now freelancers) that, once
again, he would not buy any work from them.

Kirby had work at the time, though not a significant amount. He (with some initial input by Simon) had created a successful
new comic published by DC called Challengers of the Unknown, a superhero team many consider to be the predecessor of
The Fantastic Four team. Kirby was also drawing and sometimes writing short mystery and ghost comics for publication by
DC. With another writer, Dave Wood, Kirby created a syndicated newspaper strip called Sky Masters. Kirby had a business
dispute with a DC editor, Jack Schiff, over Sky Masters, and soon discovered he was no longer welcome at DC. This created
a financial crisis in the Kirby household, especially after Sky Masters folded.

In 1958, Timely, which by then was also going by the name Marvel Comics (and briefly Atlas Comics), published a very
small number of titles and started to purchase freelance artwork from artists once the available surplus art was exhausted.
Kirby was one of the first artists Stan Lee contacted. Though Goodmans company bought material for low page rates, Kirby
produced as much as he could. Marvel/Atlas had virtually no staff other than Stan Lee, who acted as both the editor and art
director, and production was limited to a handful of titles per month.

B. The Marvel Method: Using Freelance Artists to Plot and Draw Comic Book Stories to Reduce Costs
During this time period, Stan Lee and the freelance artists developed what became known as the Marvel Method, both to
relieve Lee of his heavy workload and to take advantage of the artists skills as storytellers. Normally at a company like DC
Comics, a detailed, panel-to-panel script would be handed to an artist to literally fill in. The writer of the script would have
little (usually no) contact with the artist. The writer employed by this type of company would create the entire plot and
indicate in his script what happened in each panel and what the artist was to draw.

This was not the case at Marvel. Lee would simply talk to the artists about potential story ideas. Sometimes Lee would come
up with the basic idea, sometimes the artist would come up with the idea, and sometimes the idea would be a collaborative
effort. The artist was then expected to plot a detailed story as well as illustrate the story in panels.

Following these very informal meetings, the artist would return to his own studio, usually at home, and draw out the entire
comic in pencil, deciding what the action should be in each panel and working out the actual storyline. These were decisions
that had traditionally been made by the writer of the comic, not the artist.

As Stan Lee himself noted on many occasions, plotting with Kirby could often be accomplished in a matter of minutes, and
in later years might be done via a brief phone call with Kirby telling Lee what he intended to provide for the next issue. With
Kirby, Lee would frequently offer a just a bare-bones concept, or the name of a character, and sometimes not even that.
Kirby would plot and illustrate a story. As Kirby worked, he would not only draw out the story and invent new characters
where needed, he would write extensive margin notes, including suggested captions and dialogue, so that when Lee
dialogued the balloons, he would know what story points Kirby felt should be made in each panel. Lee would then dialogue
the balloons based on Kirbys illustrated story, notes, suggestions and perhaps a brief conversation.

Even on comic book titles produced primarily by other artists, Kirby made important contributions, such as creating the cover
illustration for Spider-Mans debut in Amazing Fantasy No. 15.

Kirby worked from his home in Long Island late into the night, not at Marvels New York City offices. He went to Marvels
offices two or three times a month to simply drop off material. He was extremely independent; did not work from any written
material supplied by Marvel, nor did he create material under any real direction or supervision by Marvel. In creating
material, Kirby paid all his own expenses and was not reimbursed by Marvel. He periodically bought his own paper, pencils,
pens, brushes, ink and other materials. Marvel did not pay Kirby any sort of salary, nor did Kirby receive any traditional
employment benefits. The transaction was a straightforward purchase of finished material.



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C. Freelancers Understood That Their Work Was Purchased and Assigned Not Owned at Inception as Work for
Hire
Given the chaotic and depressed nature of the comic book industry during the late 1950s, Atlas/Marvel and others also rarely,
if ever, wrote contracts with freelancers. Kirby did not have a written contract regarding the freelance artwork he sold to
Marvel from 1958 through 1970, and certainly not in the 1958-1963 period at issue in this case.

Instead, Marvel at some point began placing legends with legal language on the back of checks provided to freelancers, such
as Kirby, where the freelancer had to sign the back of the check in order to be paid. The language on the back of Marvels
freelance checks as late as 1974 and 1975 still included language of purchase and assignment, not language that the work is
owned at the outset as work made for hire, e.g. By endorsement of this check. I, the payee, acknowledge full payment for
my employment by Magazine Management Company, Inc. and for my assignment to it of any copyright, trademark and any
other rights in or related to the material and including my assignment of any rights to renewal copyright. App.105.

The legends on the back of Marvels checks to freelancers used the foregoing language of assignment or something similar
until 1978, when the 1976 Copyright Act went into effect. Faced with the new copyright laws recitation of work for hire,
Marvel changed the legends on the back of its freelance checks to a work for hire acknowledgement. The 1987 checks
produced by Marvel contain the following language: By acceptance and endorsement of this check, payee acknowledges, a)
full payment for payees employment by Marvel Entertainment Group, Inc., b) that all payees work has been within the
scope of that employment, and c) that all payees works are and shall be considered as works made for hire, the property of
Marvel Entertainment Group, Inc. App.106. Again, artists were required to sign the back of the check in order to be paid.

Marvel had been purchased by Perfect Film and Chemical Corporation in 1968 (renamed Cadence Industries in 1973).
Because of Marvels highly informal, if not haphazard, practices during the late 1950s and early 1960s, Cadence was
concerned with first determining and then shoring up Marvels assets, including Marvels warehouse(s) full of original
artwork. In the 1970s Cadence/Marvel started demanding that artists such as Jack Kirby sign agreements such as the 1972
Agreement assigning to Marvel all previous Kirby work published by Marvel. Ex. 17 at 1.A.(1). Similarly Cadence/Marvel
sought to comply with the new Copyright Acts explicit work-for-hire provisions by having freelancers sign work-for-hire
releases for prior work long after such work had been created. Cadence was seeking to clean up, if not completely rewrite,
Marvels past to protect what had become recognized as valuable intellectual property.

None of the relevant players involved in the comic book industry during this time period - not Goodman, Lee, or freelance
artists such as Jack Kirby - would have considered this material to be work made for hire, owned by Marvel from the
moment the work was created on the freelancers drawing table. In those instances where Marvel rejected the pages,
freelancers like Kirby were not paid anything for their efforts or services. If Kirby redrew rejected material, he was not paid
for the original page; he was paid for only the redrawn page, provided Marvel chose to buy the work. Freelancers like Kirby
were free to take unused concepts they created while working on a Marvel project, or ones that were rejected, and reuse them
for other freelance work for other companies. In fact, Kirby amassed a sizeable collection of pages while working on Marvel
projects at home in the 1960s, keeping them for possible future use. Kirby developed a new version of Captain America that
Marvel rejected, and Kirby later used this artwork to create Captain Glory, published by Topps. Marvel never objected, even
though under Marvels new theory the company would have owned this Kirby creation as work for hire. Additionally, in
1969, an independent company licensed the rights from Marvel to produce merchandise featuring Marvels characters, and
under the name Marvelmania International, paid Kirby separately for the use of several of his rejected pages from Marvel
projects, plus some personal artwork, and published the material in the Jack Kirby Portfolio sold by Marvel to comic book
fans. One of those rejected drawings was reworked later and used as the cover of Kirbys self-published GODS portfolio.

II. Kirbys Independently Designed Seminal Creations
Jack Kirby was unquestionably the dynamic creative force behind what are considered to this day to be Marvels most iconic
superheroes. His work was instrumental in Marvels resurgence in the early 1960s. These successes include The Fantastic
Four, Captain America, the X-Men, The Incredible Hulk, The Mighty Thor the Avengers, Ant-Man, Sgt. Fury and His
Howling Commandos, and many others. These works all contain the markings of his fertile creative mind and fascination
with science, science fiction, astronomy, mythology and religion. Kirby created the iconic look of these characters, which

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have largely remained unchanged to this day, and would often work on his own to both plot and draw the original storylines
of these comics. In addition to the main characters, Kirby created many of the supporting characters (e.g., new villains like
Galactus and Dr. Doom) appearing in such comics. Kirby even played a part in the creation of the Spider-Man character,
with artist Steve Ditko taking over the comic from Kirby.

A. The Fantastic Four
Martin Goodman and Marvel had a reputation for imitating successful comics at other companies. Goodman wanted Lee to
publish a superhero team book to compete with DC Comics Justice League of America. Lee and Kirby met and bounced
ideas off each other. Lee describes the process himself in interviews and in published accounts such as his introductions in
books such as Origins of Marvel Comics (1974) and Son of Origins of Marvel Comics (1975). In all these accounts, new
comics were always created in joint bull sessions with the artist, usually Kirby.

Kirby thereafter drew the first issue of The Fantastic Four, and Lee dialogued the story. Many view The Fantastic Four as a
descendent of Kirbys Challengers of the Unknown due to parallels between the works, particularly in a story that first
appeared in Challengers of the Unknown #2 (Aug./Sept. 1958), several years before the debut of the Fantastic Four in
November 1961. In the Challengers of the Unknown #2 story, following a failed space flight similar to the failed space flight
in the later Fantastic Four #1, one of the Challengers acquires powers similar to those of the Fantastic Four: the ability to
control and shoot flames, superhuman strength, and the power to turn invisible. The members of the Challengers also had
personality traits similar to the Fantastic Four. Pilot Ace Morgan, like the Fantastic Fours Reed Richards, was the decisive
leader of his group. Rocky Ryan, like Benjamin Grimm, aka The Thing, was the groups strongman. Daredevil Red
Ryan was the resident firebrand, much like Johnny Storm. Prof Haley was, like Sue Storm, the bland and nondescript
member of the group. The Challengers team, like the Fantastic Four, confronted science fiction enemies in a wide variety of
fantastic settings.

At Kirbys peak in the early and mid-1960s, the Fantastic Four comic book introduced dozens of new and imaginative
characters, such as Dr. Doom, Alicia Masters, The Watcher, The Inhumans, The Black Panther, Galactus, The Silver Surfer,
The Frightful Four, The Skrulls and many more. Many of these characters spun off into their own series; others reappeared
time and again, not only in Fantastic Four but in other Marvel comics. Tellingly, after Kirby became disenchanted with
Marvel and contemplated working with DC, the Fantastic Four ceased offering notable new characters.

B. The Mighty Thor
Jack Kirby was known to be very keen on mythology, particularly Norse mythology. In 1942, Kirby created a Thor-like
character in a story he created with Joe Simon - Villain from Valhalla, published in May 1942 in DC Comics Adventure
Comics #75. Kirby thereafter included Thor in DCs Tales of the Unexpected #16, published in August 1957, where Thor
sported a horned helmet and wielded a magic hammer.

In contrast, at no time before or after the appearance in 1962 of Marvels Thor in Journey into Mystery #83 (August 1962)
did Stan Lee, or his brother Larry Lieber, the credited writer, express any interest in Norse mythology, or in using
mythological gods as comic book characters. Kirbys lifelong interest in mythology continued after the creation of Thor
when, working for DC Comics again in the 1970s, he created his own pantheon of mythological deities in his New Gods
comic book and his Fourth World saga.

In a 1998 interview, Stan Lee was asked about the mythology-based Tales of Asgard Thor stories. Lee replied, most of
those were dreamed up by Jack because he did a lot of research on Norse gods more than I did. There is no doubt that
The Mighty Thor was a Jack Kirby creation.

C. Spider-Man

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Jack Kirby was also known to have been involved in the original creation of Spider-Man, based upon a character called The
Fly that Simon and Kirby had created in the late 1950s, which was in turn based on an earlier character called The Silver
Spider. Kirby originally drew the first five pages of the initial Spider-Man story, which like The Fly was about a young
orphan who with the aid of a magic ring transformed himself into a superhero. Lee rejected Kirbys story, and then asked
Steve Ditko to draw the first Spider-Man story instead of Kirby. Interestingly, Lee did not use Ditkos cover; Jack Kirby
produced the cover of the first Spider-Man story published in Amazing Fantasy #15 (August 1962). While Kirby was paid
for this cover, he was not paid for the five Spider-Man pages that Marvel rejected.

D. Sgt. Fury and His Howling Commandos
In an interview conducted for the magazine, Jack Kirby Collector #25 (August 1999), artist John Severin, who had worked
with Timely and Lee, recalled a meeting with Jack Kirby in the late 1950s. Severin related the following, which perfectly
describes the concept of Sgt. Fury:
Jack wanted to know if Id be interested in syndication [of a newspaper comic strip]. He said we could be
partners on a script idea he had. The story would be set in Europe during WWII; the hero would be a
tough, cigar-smoking Sergeant with a squad of oddball G.I.s - sort of an adult Boy Commandos. Like so
many other grand decisions I have made in comics, I peered through the cigar smoke and told him I really
wasnt interested in newspaper strips. We finished cigars and coffee and Jack left, heading towards
Marvel and Stan Lee.


Prior to the debut of The Fantastic Four, Marvel published what are considered within the comics industry to be derivative
comics of little note or originality (with the exception of Captain America, created by Simon and Kirby and published in
1941). The Fantastic Four, The Incredible Hulk, The Mighty Thor, X-Men, Ant-Man, Sgt. Fury and His Howling Commandos
and The Avengers were all created or co-created by Kirby or jointly created by Kirby and Lee. Prior to 1958, Marvel is not
considered, to those familiar with the history of comic books, to have produced any significant original creations, while
during this time period, Kirby developed a continuous string of creative and financial successes including Captain America,
Boy Commandos, Sandman, the Newsboy Legion, and the Fly. Kirby and Joe Simon also pioneered the genre of Romance
comics, which in the late 1940s and 1950s were selling in the millions, sparking imitators throughout the comics field. Those
knowledgeable in the comic book industry recognize that Marvels editor, Lee can boast no notable original comics creations
once Kirby stopped selling to Marvel in 1970, while Kirby went on to create numerous new concepts and characters which
are major titles at DC Comics today, such as the New Gods, Darkseid, Mister Miracle, Kamandi, OMAC, the Demon, and
many others.

III. The 1980s Return of Original Artwork Fiasco
Marvel trailed other comic book publishers, particularly its chief rival DC Comics, in returning original artwork to freelance
artists such as Jack Kirby. The reasons are several, but boil down to primarily two: fear that they would owe New York sales
tax and insecurities about ownership. Marvels new corporate parent, Perfect Film, which became Cadence, had concerns
about Marvels highly informal business practices in the 1950s and 1960s and how these practices affected their ownership
in what had become very valuable properties. Coinciding with the new work-for-hire provisions under the 1976 Copyright
Act, Perfect Film/Cadence rewrote Marvels past in an apparent effort to protect its interests.

As such artwork began to fetch considerable sums in the 1970s, artists began demanding the return of their artwork. DC
Comics capitulated, publicly stating that the company had no legal claim to the artwork. Initially, Marvel refused to return
artwork, but changed course in the mid-1970s and began returning then-current artwork. By the late 1970s Marvel began
returning older artwork from the 1960s, provided the recipients signed releases prepared by Marvel re-characterizing their
artwork as work made for hire. Marvel thus embarked on a campaign to retroactively force purchases and assignments of
rights to older freelance material into its new work for hire mold.

As Jack Kirby was behind most of Marvels most famous characters, he suffered the brunt of these efforts for years. Like

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many other freelancers, Kirby had requested the return of his artwork to provide his family with some form of security.
Whereas other artists had to sign a single-page release to get their artwork back, Marvel provided Kirby with a much more
onerous four-page document. The Kirby release was apparently a result of Marvels heightened concerns with respect to
Kirbys numerous, and now famous, creations. Due to a public outcry in support of Kirby, Marvel backed down somewhat,
but Kirby was still required to sign Marvels work for hire release before Marvel returned any of Kirbys artwork to him in
1987.

****

Marvel is in many ways the house that Jack built. With little or no financial security, the prolific Kirby created a wealth of
material featuring novel storylines and characters, while Marvel alone has reaped the benefits of Jack Kirbys most valuable
creations. Kirby worked from the basement of his own home and set his own hours. He did not receive any of the benefits,
security or guarantees of employment in producing what are considered to be seminal characters and stories. He continually
faced the risk that Marvel, at its sole discretion, could reject his work without payment for his investment of time and money.
The only contemporaneous agreement Marvel had with Kirby consisted of a legend Marvel placed on the back of its checks
with express copyright assignment language, a tactic that forced him to sign his name in order to get paid - at the page rate -
for his creations. A 1972 agreement was their first formal agreement, again expressly assigning to Marvel copyrights to
Kirbys works, published by Marvel ten years earlier.

Decades after the success of the key Kirby characters, Marvel, under its new corporate parents, Perfect Film/Cadence,
attempted to clean up Marvels claims to what had become comic book franchises, effectively by re-writing history. Amici
believe that Marvel is engaging in the same revisionist history today as the Kirby family members seek to avail themselves
of their termination rights pursuant to the Copyright Act.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, as well as for the reasons stated in the petition, the petition for writ of certiorari should be granted.

Footnotes

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Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.6, counsel for amici certify that no counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or part, and
no counsel or party made a monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief. No person other
than amicus made such a monetary contribution. The parties have been given at least ten days notice of amicis intention to file
this brief. Letters of consent are being filed with the Clerk of this Court.



10



Supreme Court of the United States.
Lisa R. KIRBY, Neal L. Kirby, Susan N. Kirby, Barbara J. Kirby, Petitioners,
v.
MARVEL CHARACTERS, INCORPORATED, Marvel Worldwide, Incorporated, MVL Rights, LLC, Walt Disney
Company, Marvel Entertainment, Incorporated, Respondents.
No. 13-1178.
June 13, 2014.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Brief of Amici Curiae Bruce Lehman, Former Asst Secretary of Commerce and Director of the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office; Ralph Oman, Former U.S. Register of Copyrights; The Artists Rights Society, The International
Intellectual Property Institute, and Various Professional Associations, Illustrators and Cartoonists in Support of
Petitioners
Bruce Lehman, Esq., Counsel of Record, 1900 K Street, NW, Suite 725, Washington, DC 20006, (202) 544-6610,
blehman@iipi.org, Counsel for Amici Curiae.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTERESTS OF THE AMICI CURIAE ..................................................................................................

1

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT .......................................................................................................

4

ARGUMENT ....................................................................................................................................................

6

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS INCORRECTLY FOUND THAT THE WORKS IN
QUESTION WERE MADE FOR HIRE UNDER THE 1909 COPYRIGHT ACT,
DIVESTING PETITIONERS OF THEIR STATUTORY TERMINATION RIGHTS .......

6

A. The Second Circuit Disregards the Legislative History and Contemporaneous
Understanding of the Term Employer in the 1909 Act .................................................................

6

1. The Legislative History of the 1909 Act Clearly Shows that the Term Employer
Connotes Traditional Employment ...........................................................................................................

6

2. The Law in 1958-63 When Kirby Sold His Work to Marvel Was that Work for Hire
Applied Only to Traditional Employees Not Freelancers ................................................................

8

B. The Court of Appeals Decision Violates Supreme Court Precedent ......................................

11

1. The Decision Ignores the Supreme Courts Canon of Statutory Interpretation ..................

11

2. The Decision Disregards the Supreme Courts Ruling in CCNV v. Reid ..............................

15

II. MARVELS RELATIONSHIP WITH KIRBY IS SYMPTOMATIC OF THE
PREDATORY PRACTICES OF PUBLISHERS, AND THE VERY IMBALANCE
CONGRESS SOUGHT TO REMEDY BY THE 1976 ACTS TERMINATION
PROVISIONS ...................................................................................................................................................

17

A. The 1976 Acts Termination Provisions Demonstrate Congresss Well-Considered 17

11

Policy to Protect and Benefit Authors ......................................................................................................


B. Marvels Inequitable Treatment of Jack Kirby Is Typical of Amicis Experience and
Will Continue Without This Courts Review ........................................................................................

20

CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................................................

22

APPENDIX

Appendix A Organizations Joining Brief ...............................................................................................

App. 1

Appendix B Illustrators, Cartoonists, and Artistic Professionals Joining Brief .......................

App. 10


TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc., 738 F.2d 548 (2d. Cir. 1984) .......................

121

Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903) ................................

7

Brattleboro Publishing Co. v. Winmill Publishing Corp., 369 F.2d 565 (2d Cir.
1966) ....................................................................................................................................................

12, 13, 17

Brunswick Beacon, Inc. v. Schock-Hopchas Pub. Co., 810 F.2d 410 (4th Cir.
1987) ....................................................................................................................................................

14

Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989) ........................

passim

Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 846 F.2d 1485 (D.C.Cir. 1988) ...

14

Easter Seal Socy v. Playboy Enters., 815 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1987) ..........................

14

Estate of Burne Hogarth v. Edgar Rice Burroughs, Inc., 342 F.3d 149 (2d Cir.
2003) ....................................................................................................................................................

16

Forward v. Thorogood, 985 F.2d 604 (1st Cir. 1993) ......................................................

14

Grant v. Kellogg Co., 58 F. Supp. 48 (S.D.N.Y. 1944), affd, 154 F.2d 59 (2d
Cir. 1946) ...........................................................................................................................................

9

M.G.B. Homes, Inc. v. Ameron Homes, Inc., 903 F.2d 1486 (11th Cir. 1990) ........

14

Martha Graham Sch. and Dance Found., Inc. v. Martha Graham Ctr. of
Contemporary Dance, Inc., 380 F.3d 624 (2d Cir. 2004) ...............................................

16

McKay v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 324 F.2d 762 (2d Cir. 1963) .......

9

Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153 (1985) ...............................................................

9, 19

Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989) ....................

13, 14

Molzof v. United States, 502 U.S. 301 (1992) ......................................................................

13


12

Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952) ..............................................................

13

Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992) .............................................

13

Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999) ............................................................................

14

Official Aviation Guide Co. v. American Aviation Associates, Inc., 150 F.2d
173 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 776 (1945) ...............................................................

9

Picture Music, Inc. v. Bourne, Inc., 457 F.2d 1213 (2d Cir. 1972) .............................

17

Real Estate Data, Inc. v. Sidwell, 907 F.2d 770 (7th Cir. 1990) ...................................

14

Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1(1911) .......................................................

13

*v Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Entertainment Distributing, 429 F.3d
869 (9th Cir. 2005) .........................................................................................................................

14

Yardley v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 108 F. 2d 28 (2d Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 309
U.S. 686 (1940) ................................................................................................................................

8, 9, 16

STATUTES

17 U.S.C. 24 ..................................................................................................................................

6, 7, 14

17 U.S.C. 26 (1970) (Repealed 1976) .................................................................................

passim

17 U.S.C. 26 (1976 ed.) ............................................................................................................

passim

17 U.S.C. 101 ................................................................................................................................

18

17 U.S.C. 203(a) ..........................................................................................................................

18

17 U.S.C. 304 ................................................................................................................................

passim

RULE

Sup. Ct. R. 10 ...................................................................................................................................

11

OTHER AUTHORITIES

1 H. Abrams, The Law of Copyright (2005) ........................................................................

12, 17

Copyright Law Revision, Part 3, Preliminary Draft for the Revised U.S.
Copyright Law and Discussions and Comments on the Draft, 88th Cong., 2d
Sess. 15 (Comm. Print 1964) ......................................................................................................

10, 17

Copyright Law Revision, Part 4, Further Discussions and Comments on
Preliminary Draft for Revised U.S. Copyright Law, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 250
(Comm. Print 1964) .......................................................................................................................

11, 18

*vi H.R. Rep. No. 105-452, 105th Congress, 2d Sess. (1998) ......................................

19

Jessica Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 Cornell L.
Rev. 857 (1987) ...............................................................................................................................
19


13


3 M. & D. Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright (2005) ............................................................

17

William F. Patry, The Copyright Law, 120 n.28 (2d ed. 1986) .....................................

11

Report of the Register of Copyrights on the General Revision of the U.S.
Copyright Law, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (Comm. Print 1961) ...........................................

9, 10

Stenographic Report of the Proceedings of the Librarians Conf., 2d Sess. 65
(Nov 1-4, 1905) ...............................................................................................................................

7

B. Varmer, Works Made For Hire And On Commission, Copyright Office
Study No. 13, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 130 (Comm. Print 1960) .......................................

9, 10


INTERESTS OF THE AMICI CURIAE
1

Bruce Lehman, as Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Director of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office from 1993
through 1998, served as the chief advisor to the President for intellectual property matters, including copyright. He
supervised and coordinated development of the Administrations position in support of the Copyright Term Extension Act of
1998 (CTEA), including the provisions permitting authors to recapture for the extended term copyrights they had
transferred to others during the first 75 years of the term of copyright in works created by them. From 1974 through 1983 he
served as counsel to the Committee on the Judiciary of the U.S. House of Representatives and during that time was the
principal legal counsel to the Committee on copyright matters. In that capacity, he advised the Committee in the 93rd
Congress and the 94th Congress during the process of consideration and final passage of the 1976 Copyright Act which
extended the 56-year term of protection for works created under the 1909 Act for an additional 19 years, and gave the authors
of those works the right to recapture for the extended term their ownership of copyrights previously transferred to others.
These experiences afforded Mr. Lehman a thorough understanding of the intent and objective of Congress in defining works-
made-for-hire and in establishing the authors right to terminate previous transfers of copyright ownership.

Ralph Oman served as U.S. Register of Copyrights from 1985 to 1993. As Register, he filed with the Acting Solicitor
General an amicus curiae brief with the Supreme Court in a case that dealt with the application of the work-made-for-hire
doctrine -- Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989), and the Courts opinion did not conflict with
the briefs conclusions. For the past 22 years, Mr. Oman has taught copyright law at George Washington University Law
School, but it is his wealth of first-hand experience that has made him a true expert. He served as Chief Counsel of the
Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary and as chief minority
counsel of the Senate Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights during the final two years of Senate
consideration of the landmark 1976 Copyright Act. As the former Register of Copyrights, Mr. Oman recognizes that this case
raises issues of national importance and implicates wide-ranging and recurring policy concerns of constitutional dimension.
Mr. Oman cautions not to draw conclusions from the Copyright Offices failure to intervene at this point in the proceeding
because during his tenure as Register of Copyrights it was the Offices policy not to weigh in at the cert stage, absent an
express request from the Court or the Solicitor General that it do so. At this preliminary stage, the Court has yet to make such
request.

The International Intellectual Property Institute is a nonprofit think tank and development organization that promotes the
effective use of intellectual property rights throughout the world.

The Artists Rights Society (ARS) is the preeminent copyright, licensing, and monitoring organization for fine artists in the
United States. Founded in 1987, ARS represents the intellectual property rights interests of over 60,000 visual artists and the
estates of visual artists from around the world (painters, sculptors, architects, photographers and others). Among its American
members are Jackson Pollock, Alexander Calder, Georgia OKeeffe, Frank Lloyd Wright, Willem de Kooning, Mark Rothko,
Robert Indiana, Sam Francis, Bruce Nauman, Frank Stella, Arshile Gorky, Richard Serra, Sol LeWitt, Lee Krasner, Barnett
Newman, Milton Avery, Susan Rothenberg, and many others. Foreign members include Henri Matisse, Pablo Picasso, Rene
Magritte, Marc Chagall, Marcel Duchamp, Joan Mir, Man Ray, Edvard Munch, Joseph Beuys, Pierre Bonnard, Fernand
Lger, Alberto Giacometti, Georges Braque, Constantin Brancusi, Jean Dubuffet, Max Ernst, Le Corbusier, Vassily
Kandinsky, and many others. A large percentage of the artists represented by ARS created works prior to enactment of the

14

1976 Copyright Act and have a strong interest in being able to assert the termination rights in such works granted to them
under 17 U.S.C. 304.

Joining as amici are 12 professional associations and societies that provide standards, education and advocacy services for
illustrators, as set forth in Appendix A at App. 1; and 221 nationally celebrated illustrators and cartoonists, several of whom
have received the Pulitzer Prize, and artistic professionals as set forth in Appendix B at App. 10.

All of the amici represent self-employed, working freelance artists whose livelihood depends on the ability to retain and
exercise effective control of their copyrights in an environment in which the clients served are more often than not publishers
or institutional and corporate purchasers who regularly use their greater market power to provide the minimum compensation
possible in return for transfer of the greatest possible copyright control in works commissioned by them. The ability to make
effective use of the termination rights at issue in this case is essential if these artists are to retain meaningful benefit from the
use of their copyrights, as Congress intended, in the face of the disproportionately greater negotiating power of their clients.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Amici urge this Court to grant the petitioners request to review the decision of the court of appeals, which denied them their
statutory rights to recapture the copyright interests of their father, Jack Kirby - a world famous creator and illustrator of
comic book characters and stories - in works that were sold for $18-20 per page and have subsequently generated billions for
respondents. It is undisputed that Kirby was an independent contractor who assigned to Marvel rights in the works Marvel
chose to purchase for publication.

When the petitioners exercised their right to terminate those assignments under 17 U.S.C. 304(c) respondents sought a
declaratory judgment; arguing that under a judicial instance and expense test all of Kirbys creations published by Marvel
in 1958-63 were exempt as work for hire under the 1909 Copyright Act. The district court granted Marvel summary
judgment pursuant to this highly presumptive test, and the Second Circuit affirmed. It essentially held that because Marvel
was Kirbys primary client, he created his works at the publishers instance and at its expense, even though Marvel only
paid Kirby for those submissions it wished to publish.

Amici vehemently disagree with the court of appealss retroactive re-characterization of Kirbys freelance work as made-for-
hire under the 1909 Act. The Second Circuits controversial instance and expense test unfairly imposes an almost
irrebuttable presumption that commissioned works were for hire under the 1909 Act, effectively gutting the termination
rights provided by the curative 1976 Copyright Act.

Kirbys creations in 1958-63 were not works for hire according to the interpretation of the 1909 Act by this Court, Congress,
and under the common law. Per Section 26 of that statute only a traditional employer is considered an author in the
case of works made for hire. In drafting that provision, Congress clearly contemplated regular, salaried employment and
Congresss exhaustive research leading up to the 1976 Act shows that certainly no one in 1958-63 construed work for hire to
include the copyrighted material of freelancers like Kirby. This Courts articulation in Community for Creative Non-Violence
et al v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989) of well-established norms of statutory construction; work for hire doctrine under the 1909
Act, and the 20-year legislative history of the 1976 Act - all lead to the natural conclusion that Kirbys creations in 1958-63
were not Marvels works for hire.

Petitioners were thus clearly entitled to exercise the termination rights vested in them by the 1976 Act. Congress intended
the termination provisions to give authors and their heirs the opportunity to share in the proven value of their works. Yet, the
Second Circuit has gone out of its way to thwart congressional intent, ignore the text and legislative history of the 1909 Act,
and disregard this Courts teaching in CCNV - all to deny creators, like Kirby, their termination rights and to bestow on
publishers an unjustified windfall.

Amici encourage this court to grant the Kirby familys petition for certiorari.

ARGUMENT

15

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS INCORRECTLY FOUND THAT THE WORKS IN QUESTION WERE MADE FOR
HIRE UNDER THE 1909 COPYRIGHT ACT, DIVESTING PETITIONERS OF THEIR STATUTORY
TERMINATION RIGHTS
A. The Second Circuit Disregards the Legislative History and Contemporaneous Understanding of the Term
Employer in the 1909 Act
1. The Legislative History of the 1909 Act Clearly Shows that the Term Employer Connotes Traditional Employment
Section 26 of the 1909 Copyright Act provides that the word author shall include an employer in the case of works made
for hire 17 U.S. C 26. This language is echoed in 17 U.S.C. 24 with no further explanation. There are no other uses of
the term for hire in the 1909 Act. Section 24 makes clear that, where a work is not created for hire, the renewal term vests
in the author or certain heirs. 17 U.S.C. 24.

Although the word employer is undefined, it is clear from its common meaning and legislative history that the drafters of
the 1909 Act intended work for hire to only apply to regular hierarchical employment. The drafters discussed that payment of
a salary, entitle[d] an employer to all rights to obtain a copyright in any work performed during the hours for which such
salary [was] paid. Stenographic Report of the Proceedings of the Librarians Conf., 2d Sess. 65 (Nov 1-4, 1905). More
strikingly, the drafters discussed that the artist who is employed for the purpose of making a work of art so many hours a
day and the independent artist should have different rights. Id.

The 1909 Act codified then existing case law governing employed authors. In 1903, this Court for the first time considered
the question of whether an employer could be considered the author of a work created by an employee. Bleistein v.
Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903). The Court found that copyrights in advertising lithographs belonged to
the employers of the designers of those works because the designers were persons employed and paid by the plaintiffs in
their establishments to make those very things. Id. at 248 (citations omitted). These employees fit the traditional model of
full time salaried or hourly workers performing their tasks using the equipment and workspaces of the employer and under
the direct supervision of the employer. Congress codified this principle in the 1909 Act by defining author to include the
employer in the case of works made for hire. 17 U.S.C. 26 (1970) (Repealed 1976).

2. The Law in 1958-63 When Kirby Sold His Work to Marvel Was that Work for Hire Applied Only to Traditional
Employees Not Freelancers
Given that the Second Circuit applies the instance and expense test as a means of establishing the presumptive intent of
contracting parties, Pet. App. 33-46, it is critical that during the 1958-63 period when Kirby created the works at issue that
work for hire applied solely to work created within a traditional employment relationship, not to commissioned works of an
independent contractor like Kirby.

When Congress initiated the process of revising the 1909 statute it was commonly understood that work-for-hire
encompassed only works by salaried employees. At the time of the copyright revision the courts had not applied Section 26
or the work-made-for-hire doctrine to commissioned works. Instead, the courts applied a common law presumption that a
commissioned party effected an implied assignment. The leading case was the Second Circuits decision in Yardley v.
Houghton Mifflin Co., 108 F.2d 28 (1939), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 686 (1940). After the City of New York commissioned an
artist to paint a mural on a wall in a public high school, the court of appeals held that the city was assigned the copyright and
artwork. Yardley, 108 F.2d at 30-31. Not once did Yardley cite the work for hire provision in the 1909 Act, and the court
went on to state that the artists executor, not the city, held the renewal right. Id.
2


In Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder this Court found that the Copyright Office held the primary responsibility to develop the 1976
Act, including authorizing a series of 34 studies on major issues of copyright law; conduct[ing] numerous meetings with
representatives of the many parties that the copyright law affected; issu[ing] a preliminary draft revision bill;
submitt[ing] [a] 1965 draft revision bill; and prepar[ing] a supplementary report to accompany the 1965 draft revision
bill. 469 U.S. 153, 159-160 (1985). See also Report of the Register of Copyrights on the General Revision of the U.S.

16

Copyright Law, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (Comm. Print 1961) (Registers Report). All of its findings were that employer in
the 1909 Act meant a formal, salaried employee.

This was acknowledged in an analysis by Borge Varmer, who, at the request of the Register of Copyrights authored one of its
thirty-four monographs. Varmer stated [I]t may be concluded that section 26 [of the 1909 Act] refers only to works made by
salaried employees in the regular course of their employment. B. Varmer, Works Made For Hire And On Commission,
Copyright Office Study No. 13, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 130 (Comm. Print 1960) (Varmer Works for Hire).

Varmer posed the question of whether revision of the 1909 Act should alter this presumption and treat commissioned works
as works-for-hire. Varmer Works for Hire, at 143. The Registers Report concluded that the answer to this question was no.
The Report observed that [t]he courts have not generally regarded commissioned works as made for hire and
recommended that any revision should make this clear by defining works-for-hire as works created by an employee within
the regular scope of his employment. Registers Report at 87.

The 1961 Registers Report was followed two years later by a Preliminary Draft Bill that embodied the conclusions of the
1961 report, explicitly stating, [i]n the case of a work made for hire, the employer shall, for purposes of this title, be
considered the author and shall have all the rights comprised in the copyright unless the parties have expressly agreed
otherwise. Copyright Law Revision, Part 3, Preliminary Draft for the Revised U.S. Copyright Law and Discussions and
Comments on the Draft, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (Comm. Print 1964) (quoting section 14) (Preliminary Draft). A footnote
stated that [a] work made for hire would be defined elsewhere in the statute as a work prepared by an employee within the
scope of the duties of his employment, but not including a work made on special order or commission. Id. At 15 n. 11.

A contemporaneous statement of the American Book Publishers Council and the American Textbook Publishers Institute
acknowledged that [w]orks for hire - in which copyright is by law owned by the employer - would be redefined to include
only work done by a salaried employee in the scope of his regular duties, and would exclude works made on special order or
commission. William F. Patry, The Copyright Law, 120 n.28 (2d ed. 1986), quoting Copyright Law Revision, Part 4, Further
Discussions and Comments on Preliminary Draft for Revised U.S. Copyright Law, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 250 (Comm. Print
1964) (Further Discussions on Draft).

B. The Court of Appealss Decision Violates Supreme Court Precedent
1. The Decision Ignores the Supreme Courts Canon of Statutory Interpretation
In the decision below and the cases preceding it, the Second Circuit has decided an important federal question in a way that
conflicts with relevant decisions of this Court. S. Ct. R. 10. In Community for Creative Non-Violence et Al. v. Reid 490 U.S.
730 (1989) (CCNV) this court clearly rejected the Second Circuits instance and expense test as applied to works created
after January 1, 1978, the effective date of the 1976 Copyright Act. The Court held that the test could not apply to define
employee under the 1976 Act for the universal reason that undefined terms in statutes must be read in accordance with their
common law definition. Id. at 741.

The issue in CCNV was whether a commissioned work of sculptural art could be a work-made-for-hire prepared by an
employee within the scope of his or her employment where the party commissioning the work actually designed part of
the final sculpture, developed the concept for the sculpture and closely supervised its creation. Id. at 737. Justice Marshal
discussed the prior analyses used by four different circuits, including the approach formulated by the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit in Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc. 738 F. 2d 548 (5th Cir. 1984), cert denied, 469 U.S. 982
(1984). Id. at 739. He viewed the Aldon Accessories approach as turning on whether the hiring party has actually wielded
control with respect to the creation of a particular work. Id. This is the basis for the interest prong of the interest and
expense test. However, Justice Marshall rejected the Second Circuits instance and expense test and endorsed the D.C.
Circuits approach, concluding that the term employee should be understood in light of the general common law of
agency. Id. at 741.

If the word employee in the 1976 Act provides an adequate basis for the Supreme Court to interpret the statutory provision
in light of the general common law of agency, then there seems no good reason why the use of the word employer in the

17

1909 Act should not do the same. 1 H. Abrams, The Law of Copyright (Abrams) (2005) 4:11, at 4-44 to 4-45.
Moreover, CCNV defined employer in addition to employee. Id. at 732. Ignoring this part of CCNV to theorize about a
putative distinction between employee in the 1976 Act and employer in the 1909 Act misses the point. There is no
reasonable explanation of how employer could have a broad scope in the 1909 Act when as CCNV held it has a narrow
scope in the 1976 Act bound by the common law of agency and traditional employment.

It was not until 1966 that the Second Circuit, in a line of cases beginning with Brattleboro Publishing Co. v. Winmill
Publishing Corp., 369 F.2d 565 (2d Cir. 1966), began to read commissioned works of an independent contractor within the
term employer in the 1909 Act, contrary to the well-settled principle that where words are employed in a statute which
had at the time a well-known meaning at common law or in the law of this country they are presumed to have been used in
that sense unless the context compels to the contrary. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59 (1911). This
principle was well understood when Brattleboro ignored it, and it remains a cardinal rule of statutory construction. Molzof
v. United States, 502 U.S. 301, 307 (1992), citing Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952). Under this canon it
is clear that Congress means an agency law definition for employee unless it clearly indicates otherwise. Nationwide Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 325 (1992). Thus, employee means the conventional master-servant relationship as
understood by commonlaw agency doctrine. CCNV, 490 U.S. at 739-40. The correlative term employer has the same
obvious meaning. Id., at 740-41 (When we have concluded that Congress intended terms such as employee, employer,
and scope of employment to be understood in light of agency law, we have relied on the general common law of agency,
rather than on the law of any particular State, to give meaning to these terms)(citations omitted).

The mandatory practice of examining the common law to interpret undefined statutory terms did not come into existence by
accident: federal statutes are generally intended to have uniform nationwide application, and this is especially true for
statutes using the terms employer or employee. CCNV, 490 U.S. at 740 (quoting Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v.
Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 43 (1989)). The subject at issue in the statute in CCNV was work for hire, but the decision explicated
this broader holding. The Court emphasized the importance of giving the same common law meaning to undefined terms in
statutes that are commonly understood. CCNV, 490 U.S. at 740. This copyright legislation is only one statute amidst many.
The Second Circuits expansive unsupported construction of employer in Section 24 to include independent contractors not
only contorts copyright law but is contrary to the goal of consistency across federal statutes.

All courts of appeals which have addressed work for hire under the 1909 Act now follow the infirm instance and expense
test.
3
The circuits total disregard for this Courts holding and reasoning in CCNV is matched only by their lack of concern.
Indeed, since the creation of this test, not one circuit interpreting the 1909 Acts work for hire doctrine has even attempted to
reconcile its holding with this Courts well-established rule of [statutory] construction, Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1,
21 (1999), or to square the instance and expense tests expansive construction of employer with this Courts narrow one.

2. The Decision Disregards the Supreme Courts Ruling in CCNV v. Reid
The Second Circuit apparently felt free to disregard this Courts teaching in CCNV because Jack Kirby created the works at
issue under the 1909 Act. However, the law as understood in 1958-63 that time does not support the interest and expense
test it retroactively applied. To understand the contours of that law the court of appeals had to look no further than Justice
Marshals opinion in CCNV.

Justice Marshal discussed the evolution of the law under the 1909 Act as follows:
In 1955, when Congress decided to overhaul the copyright law, the existing work for hire provision was 62 of the 1909
Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. 26 (1976 ed.) (1909 Act). It provided that the word author shall include an employer in the
case of works made for hire. Because the 1909 Act did not define employer or works made for hire, the task of shaping
these terms fell to the courts. They concluded that the work for hire doctrine codified in 62 referred only to works made by
employees in the regular course of their employment (emphasis added). As for commissioned works, the courts generally
presumed that the commissioned party had impliedly agreed to convey the copyright, along with the work itself, to the hiring
party. See, e.g., Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 221 F. 2d 569, 570, revd, 223 F. 2d 252 (CA2 1955);
Yardley v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 108 F. 2d 28, 31 (CA2 1939), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 686 (1940).



18

CCNV, 490 U.S. at 743-74.

The court of appeals analysis conflicts with Justice Marshals analysis of the work for hire doctrine under the 1909 Act. Jack
Kirbys works at issue fell into the category of commissioned works which Justice Marshall concluded were convey[ed],
i.e., assigned. Furthermore, all of the evidence available to the lower courts supported that Kirby convey[ed] the copyright
to Marvel, not that Marvel owned Kirbys work at creation. That is precisely the circumstance 17 U.S.C. 304 is intended to
address by giving authors or their statutory heirs the opportunity to terminate such copyright transfers.

Justice Marshall gave only a brief description of the pre-1978 law of work-made-for-hire. A closer look provides no support
whatsoever for the court of appeals bold assertion that the law in effect when the works were created .... requires us to apply
what is known as the instance and expense test. Pet. App. 33-34.

The court of appeals departs from uniform statutory interpretation and Supreme Court precedent without justification. It
applied the instance and expense test despite acknowledging that it had erred in using Yardleys implied assignment factors
to find that an independent contractors work was for hire. Pet. App. 34-36; see also Estate of Burne Hogarth v. Edgar Rice
Burroughs, Inc., 342 F.3d 149, 159-160 (2d Cir. 2003). The Second Circuit further admits that the sweeping instance and
expense test was adopted without explanation or citation of authority. Martha Graham Sch. and Dance Found., Inc. v.
Martha Graham Ctr. of Contemporary Dance, Inc., 380 F.3d 624, 635 (2d Cir. 2004). In particular, Hogarth could not
reconcile its expansive reading of employer in Section 26 of the 1909 Act with this Courts express reasoning in CCNV.
Leading commenters have noted that the use of the instance and expense test transform freelance material into work for
hire is wrong both on principle and under the rule of the early cases. 3 M. & D. Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright
(Nimmer)(2005) 9.03[D], at 9-28.2 to 9-28.3. The court of appeals view is untenable under CCNV, which explains that
copyright vests in a commissioned author rather than vesting automatically in the hiring party. 3 Nimmer, id., 9.03[D], at
9-28.4. See also 1 Abrams, supra, 4:9, at 4-12 to 415 (criticizing the Second Circuits reasoning in cases, including
Brattleboro Pub. Co. and Picture Music, Inc. v. Bourne, Inc., 457 F.2d 1213 (2d Cir. 1972)).

II. MARVELS RELATIONSHIP WITH KIRBY IS SYMPTOMATIC OF THE PREDATORY PRACTICES OF
PUBLISHERS, AND THE VERY IMBALANCE CONGRESS SOUGHT TO REMEDY BY THE 1976 ACTS
TERMINATION PROVISIONS
A. The 1976 Acts Termination Provisions Demonstrate Congresss Well-Considered Policy to Protect and Benefit
Authors
The termination right first appeared in the 1963 Preliminary Draft bill prepared for Congress by the Copyright Office.
Copyright Law Revision, Part 3, Preliminary draft for Revised U.S. Copyright Law and Discussions and Comments on the
Draft, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (Comm. Print 1964).

Publishers reactions to the termination provisions in the 1963 Preliminary Draft bill were negative. To limit their impact
they proposed that the definition of work-for-hire be retained insofar as it referred to employees, but that it be expanded to
incorporate commissioned works, without regard to subject matter, if the parties so agree in writing. Further Discussions on
Draft at 274.

Representatives of authors strongly objected to the publishers proposal. The legendary Irwin Karp, long-time counsel for the
Authors League of America, argued that publishers would use their superior bargaining position to force authors to sign
work for hire acknowledgements, thereby relinquishing all of their copyrights if they wanted to get their works published.
[A]n author could easily be induced to sign a form contract stating that his work is made for hire, and that ordinary book
publication contracts, signed before the author has completed the work and calling for an advance against royalties, could be
converted into employment agreements as a matter of course. Copyright Law Revision, Part 6, at 67. He urged that
language in the 1963 Preliminary Draft bill be retained - that works made on special order or commission be excluded from
the definition of work for hire. Id. at 239, 245.

Ultimately, after introduction of the termination right in an earlier draft bill, a compromise was reached in 1965 providing
authors the termination right as to both pre-1978 and post-1978 grants, 17 U.S.C. 203(a), 304 (c), while publishers gained

19

the right to commission works for hire under limited circumstances. 17 U.S.C. 101. The subsequent judicial decisions
that unjustifiably expanded work for hire in the last years the 1909 Act were never examined by the legislature in enacting
the 1976 Acts termination provisions. See Mills Music, 469 U.S. at 160-161 (Although additional hearings were held in
subsequent sessions, and revision bills were submitted to Congress in each term for the next 10 years, discussion over the
termination provisions was essentially completed at this time. Congress enacted the termination provisions in the 1976
Act in virtually the same form as they appeared in the 1965 draft revision bill.) There is no indication that anyone involved
in copyright revision later became aware of the line of cases expanding the work made for hire doctrine. Jessica Litman,
Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 Cornell L. Rev. 857, 901 (1987).

The termination right applies only to the period of copyright protection extended by the 1976 Act, and further extended by
the 1998 CTEA. 17 U.S.C. 304. In enacting this right, Congress honored the fact that the parties to a pre-1978 copyright
grant had bargained for a maximum term of 56 years per the 1909 Act. Congress gave authors and their families the
opportunity to benefit from its extensions by recovering copyrights for the extended term. See H.R. Rep. No. 105-452, 105th
Congress, 2d Sess., at 8 (1998) (the intention is for original authors of works and their beneficiaries to benefit from the
extended copyright protection). If the court of appeals decision is allowed to stand the benefits Congress expressly intended
to bestow on authors and their families will be rendered meaningless.

The amici represented in this brief can attest through personal experience that Mr. Karps concerns, articulated 51 years ago,
remain as valid today as then. Not only because many of them created material before 1978, but because they cannot rely
upon the legislative compromises that their representatives reached in Congress. The Second Circuits misinterpretation of
work for hire under the 1909 Act unfairly strips freelance artists of their termination rights and provides an unintended and
unwarranted windfall to publishers.

B. The Inequitable Treatment of Artists Like Jack Kirby Is Typical of the Amicis Experience and Will Continue
Without This Courts Much Needed Review
It is undisputed that Jack Kirby was not an employee of Marvel at the time he created the works in question. Kirby was
typical of the professional illustrators and cartoonists comprising the amici. He was a freelancer who, as sole proprietor of his
own business, paid his own income and social security taxes, worked out of his own home, purchased all his own materials
and paid all of his expenses. Pet. App 44. Marvel paid none of these costs and bore no responsibility for Kirbys authorship
of comic book characters, storylines, text and illustrations. Kirby pitched and discussed concepts with Marvels editor and
submitted completed material to Marvel which it thereafter purchased for publication or rejected. Pet. App. 44-46. While
Marvel may have been Kirbys biggest client in 1958-63, Kirby had no engagement agreement, was non-exclusive, and
retained the right to submit his original work to other publishers, even material originally conceived for a sale to Marvel.

The only contemporaneous agreement between the parties consisted of legends inserted by Marvels attorneys on the back of
its checks to Kirby with assignment, instead of work-for-hire, language. Pet. App. 47. Those very assignments are subject
to the 1976 Acts termination provisions. 17 U.S.C. 304. However, Kirbys children had no opportunity to present evidence
to the trier of fact because they were thrown out of court on summary judgment based on the Second Circuits instance and
expense test which ignores the text and legislative history of the 1909 Act, this Courts precedent and Congresss clear
objectives in enacting the termination provisions. Pet. App. 2.

Like most freelance commercial artists Jack Kirby had little choice if he wished to continue to sell his work to his biggest
client. The working artists among the amici are intimately familiar with this kind of pressure. They face it each time they
attempt to sell a work to a publisher with vastly greater market power than they possess.

Amici strongly urge this Court to review this important case. The instance and expense test for retroactively characterizing
independent work as employment for hire establishes a game of gotcha designed to block freelance artists from
exercising their rights under the Copyright Act. If the court of appeals unsupportable decision is allowed to stand, Congresss
twice expressed intent to give authors and their families the benefit of its copyright term extensions, will be nullified.

CONCLUSION

20

The almost irrebuttable presumption established by the Second Circuit - which disregards the definition of employer as it
was universally understood at the time Jack Kirby created the works in question - renders meaningless the termination right
established for the benefit of freelance authors and artists under the 1976 Act and should be rejected by this court consistent
with its decision in CCNV.

Footnotes

1


No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no counsel or party made a monetary contribution to fund the
preparation or submission of this brief. No person other than the amici made such a monetary contribution. The parties have been
given at least ten days notice of amicis intention to file this brief and have given amici consent to file. Copies of the letters of
consent will be filed with the Clerk of the Court.

2


Cases following Yardley also used assignment language. See, e.g., Official Aviation Guide Co. v. American Aviation Associates,
Inc., 150 F.2d 173, 178 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 776 (1945); McKay v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 324 F.2d 762,
763 (2d Cir. 1963); Grant v. Kellogg Co., 58 F. Supp. 48, 51 (S.D.N.Y. 1944), affd, 154 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1946). See also Varmer
Works for Hire, at 130. None of these cases equated an employee and a commissioned creator under Section 26.

3


See Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Entertainment Distributing, 429 F.3d 869 (9th Cir. 2005), Brunswick Beacon, Inc. v.
Schock-Hopchas Pub. Co., 810 F.2d 410, 412 (4th Cir. 1987); M.G.B. Homes, Inc. v. Ameron Homes, Inc., 903 F.2d 1486, 1490
(11th Cir. 1990); Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 846 F.2d 1485, 1489, 1493 (D.C.Cir. 1988), affd on other
grounds, 490 U.S. at 736; Forward v. Thorogood, 985 F.2d 604, 606 (1st Cir. 1993); Easter Seal Socy v. Playboy Enters., 815
F.2d 323, 327 (5th Cir. 1987); Real Estate Data, Inc. v. Sidwell, 907 F.2d 770, 771 (7th Cir. 1990).




21



Supreme Court of the United States.
Lisa R. KIRBY, Neal L. Kirby, Susan N. Kirby, Barbara J. Kirby, Petitioners,
v.
MARVEL CHARACTERS, INCORPORATED, Marvel Worldwide, Incorporated, MVL Rights, LLC, Walt Disney
Company, Marvel Entertainment, Incorporated, Respondents.
No. 13-1178.
June 13, 2014.
On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari To The United States Court Of Appeals For The Second Circuit
Brief of Amicus Curiae the California Society of Entertainment Lawyers in Support of Petitioners
Steven T. Lowe, Counsel of Record, Daniel B. Lifschitz, Lowe & Associates, 11400 Olympic Blvd., Suite 640, Los Angeles,
CA 90064, (310) 477-5811, steven@lowelaw.com, Counsel for Amicus Curiae.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS .....................................................................................................................................................................

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..............................................................................................................................................................

ii

INTERESTS OF AMICUS CURIAE ...............................................................................................................................................

1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .........................................................................................................................................................

3

ARGUMENT ...........................................................................................................................................................................................

5

A. The Second Circuit Employed Law Unsupported By Its Own Precedent, the Text of the Copyright Act,
or the Language of This Court. ..........................................................................................................................................................

5

B. The Court of Appeals Ability to Engage In Outcome-Oriented Jurisprudence Stems Directly From Its
Curation Of Nebulous and Inconsistent Case Law ....................................................................................................................

8

C. The Second Circuits Use Of The Instance and Expense Test Creates Unnecessary Uncertainty In
Copyright Law, Chilling Authors Rights .....................................................................................................................................

12

CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................................................................................

15


TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980) ..............................................................................................

5

Brattleboro Publishing Co. v. Winmill Publishing Corp., 369 F.2d 565 (2d Cir.
1966) .........................................................................................................................................................

6, 10

Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440 (2003) ..................

5

Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989) ............................. passim

22


Consumer Product Safety Commn v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102 (1980) .......

5

Estate of Burne Hogarth v. Edgar Rice Burroughs, Inc., 342 F.3d 149 (2d Cir.
2003) .........................................................................................................................................................

7, 10, 14

Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) .............................

12

Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994) .........................................................................

13, 14

Greyhound Corp. v. Mt. Hood Stages, Inc., 437 U.S. 322 (1978) ....................................

5

Hallford v. Fox Entmt Group, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19625, 9-10
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) ....................................................................................................................................

14

Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106 (1940) ................................................................................

8

Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1980) ..........................

9

INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) ........................................................................

5

Lin-Brook Builders Hardware v. Gertler, 352 F.2d 298 (9th Cir. 1965) .......................

6

Martha Graham School & Dance Foundation, Inc. v. Martha Graham Center of
Contemporary Dance, Inc., 380 F.3d 624 (2d Cir. 2004) ....................................................

11

Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publg Co., 240 F.3d 116 (2d Cir. 2001) ....................

13

Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153 (1985) ....................................................................

5

Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992) ..................................................

10

Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991) ..................................................................................

8

Petrella v. MGM, 188 L. Ed. 2d 979 (2014) ..............................................................................

4

Picture Music, Inc. v. Bourne, Inc., 457 F.2d 1213 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 997 (1972) ............................................................................................................................

6

Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Dumas, 53 F.3d 549 (2d Cir. 1995) ......................................

6

Tufenkian Import/Export Ventures, Inc. v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 338 F.3d 127
(2d Cir. 2003) ........................................................................................................................................

12

Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Entertainment Distribution, 429 F.3d 869,
881 (9th Cir. 2005) ..............................................................................................................................

10

United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704 (1947) .................................................................................

10

Yardley v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 108 F.2d 28 (1939), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 686
(1940) .......................................................................................................................................................

6

Statutes

17 U.S.C. 26 (1976 ed.) ................................................................................................................. passim

23


Other Authorities

1 P. Goldstein, Goldstein On Copyright (2005) 4.3 ............................................................

13

3 Melville Nimmer and David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright .......................................

7, 11

Arthur L. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the Litigation Explosion,
Liability Crisis, and Efficiency Cliches Eroding Our Day In Court And Jury
Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. Law Rev. 982 (2003) ........................................................

9

Hon. W.G. Young, Vanishing Trials - Vanishing Juries 5 Vanishing Constitution,
40 Suffolk U. Law Rev. 67 (2006) ................................................................................................

9

Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 Cornell L. Rev. 857
(1987) .......................................................................................................................................................

6

R. Stern et al., Supreme Court Practice 232 (8th ed. 2002) .................................................

12

Robert P. Burns, The Death of the American Trial (2009) ..................................................

9

Steven T. Lowe & Daniel Lifschitz, Death of Copyright, the Sequel, The
Computer & Internet Lawyer, Sept. 2012 ..................................................................................

2

Steven T. Lowe, Death of Copyright, L.A. Lawyer, Nov. 2010 ........................................

2


INTERESTS OF AMICUS CURIAE
1

Amicus curiae the California Society of Entertainment Lawyers (CSEL) is a recently formed non-profit, non-partisan,
professional organization of attorneys representing authors, screenwriters, songwriters, and other creators of intellectual
property in the entertainment industry, including television, film, and music. CSEL seeks to balance the influence of the
international conglomerates within the television, film, and music industries through education, public-policy advocacy,
legislation, and litigation, in this case as amicus curiae.

Due to their limited resources and relative ignorance of the law, individual creators in the entertainment industry are at a great
disadvantage relative to corporate entities (such as studios and publishers) when attempting to protect or exploit their
intellectual property. When creative professionals and studios face one another in court over alleged violations of intellectual
property rights, these limitations most often result in decisive victories for studio and network defendants.
2
CSEL seeks to
level the playing field by providing informative counseling and advice to creator-litigants as to best practices for protecting
and enforcing their rights, as well as advocating their interests to those in a position to correct perceived deficiencies in their
legal protections.

The federal work for hire doctrine is of profound significance to freelance authors, including many clients of CSEL members.
In their petition for certiorari, Petitioners have demonstrated in detail the inconsistencies of the Second Circuits ruling
pertaining to the instance and expense test used to characterize work for hire, as well as the erroneous legal conclusions
justifying this Courts intervention. CSEL agrees with Petitioner that the controversial use of the instance and expense test
to recharacterize the copyrightable works created by independent contractors under the Copyright Act of 1909 as works made
for hire is ripe for resolution by the court, as it directly affects the uniform application of a federal body of law. This case
provides a clean vehicle for resolving the conflict, as the issue of whether or not the subject matter of the lawsuit constituted
works for hire under the 1909 Act was dispositive of Petitioners copyright claim.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

24

The decision rendered by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in this case (the Opinion) is symptomatic of the inconsistent
(and often incoherent) state of modern copyright jurisprudence. Despite the clear legal doctrines laid out by Congress and this
Court pertaining to the adjudication of copyright claims, district and appellate courts frequently subvert those doctrines with
contrary and outcome-oriented rulings, destabilizing the copyright ecosystem in the process. The instant case is yet another
example of this worrisome trend in action.

As detailed in Petitioners brief (the Cert Petition), the problematic structure of the instance and expense test allowed the
analysis of this case to be engineered in a wholly lopsided manner, inuring to the benefit of Respondents. The court of
appeals acknowledged the fundamental gaps in the Second Circuits case law - the errant development of a test for labeling
commissioned work as made for hire under the 1909 Copyright Act, based upon a misreading of decisions concerning
implied licenses - only to brush those observations aside in favor of blind adherence to admittedly incorrect law. Going
further, the court compacted the deluge of factors relevant to exercising the test into a base-level hurdle that nearly any
defendant can satisfy. Finally, the court brushed aside contrary facts (including contractual language indicating that Marvel
simply purchased the material in question and received copyright assignments) by acting as fact-finder instead of allowing
the issue to be considered by a jury.

The results-driven approach engaged in by the court of appeals is endemic in modern litigation, whereby federal judges have
used contradictory case law to upend numerous core tenets of copyright law, from statutory limitations on work for hire to
the protection of an authors work against infringement. For instance, until May of this year, judges had been abusing the
equitable doctrine of laches to cut short the statute of limitations on copyright claims mandated by Congress in the Copyright
Act. Thankfully, this Court stepped in to end that practice; Justice Ginsburg writing that courts are not at liberty to jettison
Congress judgment on such matters. Petrella v. MGM, 188 L. Ed. 2d 979, 986 (2014).

Now, as then, this Court should uphold Congresss clear intent and prevent its circumvention through errant judicial
extrapolations regarding work for hire. It should abolish the Second Circuits overbroad and unprincipled instance and
expense test and replace it with a proper test for employment under the common law of agency, one rooted in the language
of the 1909 Copyright Act and this Courts prior decisions. Doing so would be a very significant step towards returning
federal copyright law to one of balance, measure, and predictability.

ARGUMENT
A. The Second Circuit Employed Law Unsupported By Its Own Precedent, the Text of the Copyright Act, or the
Language of This Court.
In copyright cases, as elsewhere, it is appropriate to assume that the ordinary meaning of the language that Congress
employed accurately expresses the legislative purpose. Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153, 164 (1985) (footnote
omitted). Accord INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432 n.12 (1987); Consumer Product Safety Commn v. GTE
Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980); Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 695 (1980); Greyhound Corp. v. Mt. Hood Stages,
Inc., 437 U.S. 322, 330 (1978). The work for hire provision of the 1909 Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. 26 (1976 ed.) (Section
26), provides simply that the word author shall include an employer in the case of works made for hire. Although the
statute did not define employer or work made for hire, it is well established that, under common law, employer refers
to the conventional master-servant relationship as understood by common-law agency doctrine (Community for Creative
Non-Violence v. Reid (CCNV), 490 U.S. 730, 739-40 (1989)), which excludes commissioning relationships. See, e.g.,
Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 445 n.5 (2003). Indeed, case law applied Section 26 solely
to factual scenarios involving regular, salaried employees until 1965, by which point the text of the 1976 Copyright Acts
work for hire provision had been fully developed. See Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 Cornell
L. Rev. 857, 890 n.215 (1987).

The Second Circuit complemented this plain reading of Section 26 with a common law presumption that, when dealing with
a commissioned work, the author impliedly agrees to assign the copyright, along with the work itself, to the hiring party. See
Yardley v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 108 F.2d 28 (1939), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 686 (1940). Unfortunately, this presumption was
warped by a line of cases beginning with Brattleboro Publishing Co. v. Winmill Publishing Corp., 369 F.2d 565 (2d Cir.
1966) (Brattleboro), in which the courts found that, contrary to the plain language of the 1909 Copyright Act, Section 26

25

could apply to creations by an independent contractor made at the requesting partys instance and expense.
3
Accord Picture
Music, Inc. v. Bourne, Inc., 457 F.2d 1213, 1216 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 997 (1972) (Picture Music)
(misinterpreting implied assignment cases as work for hire decisions); Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Dumas, 53 F.3d 549, 554
(2d Cir. 1995) (Playboy) ( an independent contractor is an employee and a hiring party an employer for purposes of
[Section 26] if the work is made at the hiring partys instance and expense )

The conclusion reached by these cases rested entirely on a misreading of prior decisions finding an implied assignment of
copyright, which the Second Circuit all but admitted in Estate of Burne Hogarth v. Edgar Rice Burroughs, Inc., 342 F.3d
149, 160 n.14 (2d Cir. 2003) (Hogarth). Hogarth further noted that this Courts decision in CCNV reinforced the
distinction that commissioned works under Section 26 were presumed to have been assigned to, not authored by, the
commissioning party. Hogarth at 162 (citing CCNV, 490 U.S. at 744). Yet Hogarth brushed aside these concerns, finding
itself compelled to follow the line of unsubstantiated instance and expense case law and discarding this Courts
confirmation in CCNV of the Second Circuits error as mere dicta. Id. at 161-63.

Marvel v. Kirby continues this unfortunate tradition of the Second Circuit uncovering past errors and then swiftly burying
them. The court of appeals comes to the same conclusions as Hogarth, acknowledging that both this Court and the nations
leading copyright treatise have criticized the Second Circuits approach to Section 26. Opinion at 37, n.8 (citing CCNV, 490
U.S. at 744 and 3 Melville Nimmer and David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright 9.03[D]). Yet the court goes on to apply this
very same erroneous approach to unfairly deprive the Kirby family of valuable statutory rights, apparently resigning itself to
perpetuate bad law and inequitable decisions unless and until this Court requires it to stop doing so.

The Section 26 cases that currently control the Second Circuits analyses amount to a policy preference disguised as
adherence to precedent. Yet while stare decisis may promote judicial predictability and consistency, [it] is not an inexorable
command; rather, it is a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision. Payne v.
Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991) (quoting Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940)). The circuits are acutely
aware that their current application of Section 26 to non-employee cases is an unprincipled legal aberration, and despite
multiple opportunities to self-correct, have deferred to compounding legal error. In doing so, the circuits contort copyright
law in favor of the publishers and media conglomerates, who are the primary beneficiaries of the uncertainty created by their
decisions.

B. The Court of Appeals Ability to Engage In Outcome-Oriented Jurisprudence Stems Directly From Its Curation Of
Nebulous and Inconsistent Case Law.
The approach to copyright cases retained by the court of appeals in spite of its lack of doctrinal support persists, in large part,
because it affords judges unparalleled discretion by which to conduct their analyses. Copyright litigation often hinges upon
close questions of fact, making summary judgment in its context traditionally frowned upon. Hoehling v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 977 (2d Cir. 1980). Yet the vast majority of copyright claims filed against major studios or
publishers are now dismissed in short order on summary judgment or earlier, depriving litigants of due process and their right
to trial by jury.
4
In short, judicial economy has been prioritized over constitutional mandates, and the route taken to
accomplish this has resulted in a breakdown of coherent law.

As plainly illustrated by the Opinion, the Second Circuit has been unable to afford any measure of predictability to its
analyses under the instance and expense test. When the court of appeals surveyed its not so tidy case law for a set of
principles applicable to determining work for hire under Section 26 (Opinion at 37), those it derived cut in every
conceivable direction and often conflicted. See, e.g., Opinion at 37-39 (creative contributions to work strongly suggesting
work for hire in some cases, but not in others), 39 (finding CCNV factors such as the provision of tools controlling in some
cases, having no bearing in others). The subsequent application of these factors to the facts of the case was no less
contradictory. See, e.g., Opinion at 50-51, 53-54 (claiming Kirby did not have to speculate that Marvel would use his work,
yet also noting Marvel had and exercised the right to reject Kirbys work).

The latitude with which the court was thus able to conduct its examination, and the seemingly low work for hire threshold it
enunciated, calls back to an unpredictable style of jurisprudence in which courts interpret defined language in the light of the
mischief to be corrected and the end to be attained. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 325 (1992) (quoting

26

United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 713 (1947)). The court was able to mix and match components of various factors to
marshal what it believed to be a preponderance of evidence in the Respondents favor, ignoring clear legal impediments
along the way - such as that Respondents payment of a sum certain should have only satisfied the expense prong if paid
pursuant to a financial commitment to Kirby at the time he created his works, and that Marvel had none. See Hogarth, 342
F.3d at 163 (publisher was contractually obligated to pay a guaranteed fixed sum); Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v.
Entertainment Distribution, 429 F.3d 869, 881 (9th Cir. 2005) (Twentieth Century) (publisher was contractually obligated
to pay a nonrefundable cash advance); Brattleboro, 369 F.2d at 568 (hiring party was obligated to bear expense of creating
work whether or not accepted or used).

As noted by Petitioner, the standard for determining instance and expense utilized by the Second Circuit broadly
encapsulates publishing arrangements so diverse that copyright vesting in the actual creator is the exception rather than the
rule.
5
Cert Petition at 24-26. Even though the question of whether a work is made for hire under Section 26 turns on the
mutual intent of the parties (Martha Graham, 380 F.3d at 634 n. 17), and such questions as to the parties intent are
generally for the trier of fact (Nimmer on Copyright 12.10[A]), the court of appeals saw fit to operate as fact-finder and
negate contrary evidence based on its own beliefs and speculation. See, e.g., Opinion at 47-48 (dismissing the evidentiary
value of assignment agreements between the parties due to the likelihood that they were redundancies desired by
Marvel). That the court could claim it viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to Petitioners, yet explicitly and
repeatedly construe said evidence against them, merely illustrates how far removed copyright litigation has become from any
pretense of adhering to principles of due process.

The federal courts curating of inconsistent case law has been key to their ability to conduct copyright analyses in this nearly
ad hoc fashion. Much as the Second Circuit has ignored CCNV, other seminal copyright cases by this Court have gone
unheeded in the lower courts as well. Compare Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361-62 (1991)
(articulating a selection and arrangement test for copyright protection) and Tufenkian Import/Export Ventures, Inc. v.
Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 338 F.3d 127, 135-136 (2d Cir. 2003) (replacing the selection and arrangement test with a contrary
filtration test). This pattern of practice substantially undermines the predicable and uniform adjudication of copyright law
and presents compelling grounds for this Court to intervene. See R. Stern et al., Supreme Court Practice 232 (8th ed. 2002)
(A direct conflict between the decision of the court of appeals of which review is being sought and a decision of the
Supreme Court is one of the strongest possible grounds for securing the issuance of a writ of certiorari).

C. The Second Circuits Use Of The Instance and Expense Test Creates Unnecessary Uncertainty In Copyright
Law, Chilling Authors Rights.
The Second Circuits use of Section 26 to reclassify the commissioned work of independent contractors as the work-for-hire
of an employee is not only problematic from a textual and doctrinal standpoint, but from a policy standpoint as well. The
instance and expense test injects pronounced uncertainty into the status of countless copyright transactions conducted
under the 1909 Copyright Act, many of which will require complex post hoc determinations as to their ownership status. See
1 P. Goldstein, Goldstein On Copyright (2005) 4.3, at 4:38 (Many works now protected under the 1976 Act were created
at a time when the 1909 Act was in effect, and [i]t is the 1909 Act and not the 1976 Act that governs the determination
whether these works are works made for hire).

In Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994), this Court noted that it is peculiarly important that the boundaries of
copyright law be demarcated as clearly as possible. Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 526-27; accord Matthew Bender & Co. v. West
Publg Co., 240 F.3d 116, 122 (2d Cir. 2001). The same is true of ensuring that the word employer is understood the same
way from statute to statute in order to enhanc[e] predictability and certainty of copyright ownership. CCNV, 490 U.S. at
740, 749. The decisions of the Second Circuit, at issue, have served only to obscure and complicate these issues rather than to
clarify them.

Because of the substantial ambiguity in the current body of federal case law, modern copyright litigation has become
unjustifiably unpredictable, with the determination of each case resting almost entirely on the unfettered discretion of the
judiciary. Judge William H. Pauley III of the Southern District of New York admitted in a recent copyright decision that [i]t
is hard to discern the difference between the legal analysis a district judge undertakes at the motion to dismiss stage when the
works in question are attached, and the factual analysis the same judge undertakes during a bench trial. Hallford v. Fox

27

Entmt Group, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19625, 9-10 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) The uncertainty of this distinction, he wrote, has
the potential to remove questions of fact from a jury, authorize district judges to resolve such questions, and empower
appellate judges to review what are essentially factual determinations de novo. Id.

With district judges so tasked to resolve copyright claims de novo through the filter of incoherent law, creators simply cannot
know what method of analysis will be employed or factors accorded the greatest (or any) weight in adjudicating their claims,
chilling the filing of copyright suits to enforce their rights. This results not only in haphazard doctrinal development, but also
in the fundamental destabilization of copyright law, as judicially-constructed tests prove capable of eclipsing the plain text
and meaning of statutes and ultimately swallowing them whole. The legal confusion that inevitably follows is contrary to
both the language and spirit of this Courts rulings in CCNV and Fogerty, and the Second Circuits exacerbation of these
problems warrants reversal here.

To the extent that the Second Circuits decision in Hogarth and this case is predicated on purported gaps, ambiguities, or
dicta in this Courts prior decisions, the Court should reassert the observations regarding work for hire contained in CCNV
with the full vigor of a binding, on-point decision that eliminates any potential for further wiggle room in circuit case law.
The current climate of hostility towards true authors and copyright plaintiffs can only be tempered by bringing the legal
standards that govern the litigation of their claims back towards a sensible equilibrium, and that begins by returning a
semblance of reasoned objectivity to the judiciarys toolkit.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, as well as for the reasons stated in the Cert Petition, the petition for writ of certiorari should be
granted.

Footnotes

1


Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.6, counsel for amicus certify that no counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part,
and no counsel or party made a monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief. No person other
than amicus made such a monetary contribution. The parties have been given at least ten days notice of amicus curiaes intention
to file this brief and both parties have consented to the filing.

2


See Steven T. Lowe, Death of Copyright, L.A. Lawyer, Nov. 2010, at 32, 34-35, available at http://
www.loweandassociatespc.com/press/publications/death-of-copyright (identifying 18 cases within the Second Circuit decided
between 1991 and 2010 in which the studio or network defendants prevailed); Steven T. Lowe & Daniel Lifschitz, Death of
Copyright, the Sequel, The Computer & Internet Lawyer, Sept. 2012, at 1, 7 nn.15, 18, available at http://
www.loweandassociatespc.com/press/publications/death-of-copyright-the-sequel (identifying 3 more cases decided within the
Second Circuit in 2010 and 2011 in which the studio or network defendants prevailed).

3


The Second Circuit presumably took inspiration from Lin-Brook Builders Hardware v. Gertler, 352 R2d 298, 300 (9th Cir. 1965),
the first case to coin the term instance and expense and which cited no authority for its promulgation.

4


See fn. 2, supra; see also, Hon. W.G. Young, Vanishing Trials - Vanishing Juries - Vanishing Constitution, 40 Suffolk U. Law
Rev. 67, 78 (2006); Arthur L. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the Litigation Explosion, Liability Crisis, and
Efficiency Cliches Eroding Our Day In Court And Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. Law Rev. 982, 1064; 1066; 1071-1072;
1133-1134 (2003); Robert P. Burns, The Death of the American Trial (2009).

5


Yet the standard is also malleable enough to swing in the complete opposite direction. See, e.g., Martha Graham School & Dance
Foundation, Inc. v. Martha Graham Center of Contemporary Dance, Inc., 380 F.3d 624, 635 (2d Cir. 2004) (Martha Graham)
(holding that a work created by a traditional employee as a special job assignment, outside [his] regular duties is not work
for hire, even though the employer pays for (i.e., expense) and has a right to supervise the work (i.e., instance).