Sedekad dasar AS selepas tragedi 11 September

Oleh SHAKILA YACOB

DR. SHAKILA YACOB
Fakulti Sains Sosial dan Sastera
Universiti Malaya
TRAGEDI 11 September 2001 (911) sedekad yang lalu mendorong kita untuk meninjau implikasi
tragedi tersebut ke atas perjalanan politik dan ekonomi negara kuasa besar Amerika Syarikat (AS)
dan yang paling penting impaknya ke atas dunia.
Implikasi utama 911 adalah tindakan polisi pentadbiran George W. Bush (Januari 2001 - Januari
2009). Sepanjang dua penggal pentadbiran Bush, kita lihat tindak balas pentadbiran tersebut
terhadap tragedi itu amat merugikan rakyat dan negara AS serta dunia amnya.
Perang anti-keganasan terhadap Afghanistan yang dilancarkan pada Oktober 2001 dan diikuti
dengan perang ke atas Iraq pada Mac 2003 telah meninggalkan kesan hebat ke atas kedudukan
kewangan AS dan juga reputasi negara tersebut.
Kesan buruk ini adalah hasil dasar Bush dan bukannya akibat tragedi 911. Seandainya Al-Gore
berjaya dalam pilihan raya presiden AS tahun 2000, sudah tentu perjalanan politik AS akan jauh
berbeza dan besar kemungkinan Iraq tidak akan diserang.
Hampir sejuta nyawa manusia hilang dalam perang anti-keganasan global yang dilancarkan oleh
negara kuasa tunggal ini selepas berlaku tragedi 11 September. Mengikut jurnal perubatan The
Lancet, di Iraq sahaja 655,000 orang awam terkorban. Lebih 6,200 askar AS maut sepanjang dekad
lalu.
Sepanjang dua penggal pentadbiran Bush perbelanjaan pertahanan mencapai rekod paling tinggi di
mana kerajaan persekutuan AS dipercayai membelanjakan jumlah wang yang besar melalui pelbagai
polisi yang dilaksanakan demi memastikan AS bebas daripada serangan keganasan.
Sememangnya pasca-911, tiada sebarang insiden serangan berlaku ke atas AS. Tetapi ketaksuban AS
dalam perang terhadap keganasan dan obsesinya dengan Al-Qaeda menyebabkan hutang negara
tersebut meningkat berlipat kali ganda.
Penubuhan Department of Homeland Security dan perbelanjaan keselamatan sepanjang dekad lalu
telah mencapai AS$360 bilion. Ditambah dengan perang di Iraq yang juga dikenali sebagai The Three
Trillion Dollar War maka kos menentang keganasan ini telah mencapai hampir AS$4 trilion
mengikut sumber yang dipercayai. Ini termasuk perbelanjaan di Pentagon, kos faedah hutang
peperangan, kos kesihatan untuk veteran perang dan sebagainya.
Di samping itu, salah urus ekonomi telah memberi kesan buruk kepada kehidupan rakyat AS.
Keadaan diburukkan lagi dengan pengurangan kadar faedah oleh Rizab Persekutuan sehingga
mewujudkan gelembung hartanah yang sehingga kini tidak dapat ditangani.
Kesan kewangan ini terus menghantui penggal kedua pentadbiran Bush dan penggantinya Barack
Obama. Pentadbiran Obama terus terbelenggu dalam krisis ekonomi yang tiada penghujung. Kadar
pengganguran yang enggan berganjak dari 9.1 peratus (%), kadar inflasi yang terus melonjak naik
pada 3.65%, kejatuhan harga rumah kesemuanya menghimpit rakyat AS.
Kegagalan pentadbiran Obama memperbaiki ekonomi AS memburukkan lagi keadaan. Pakej
rangsangan ekonomi Obama jelas gagal mempertingkatkan ekonomi AS mahupun peluang pekerjaan.
Pelan penjagaan kesihatan yang melibatkan perbelanjaan persekutuan yang begitu besar terus
menekan ekonomi AS.
Krisis had hutang AS dan perbezaan pendapat antara pihak Demokrat dan Republikan di Kongres
menyebabkan pasaran saham dunia jatuh merudum. Ini ditambah lagi dengan agensi penarafan yang
menurunkan peringkat kredit negara itu. Kedua-dua peristiwa ini meninggalkan kesan besar ke atas
pasaran kewangan global.
Jelas AS dan sekutunya telah melakukan kesilapan besar apabila menyerang Afghanistan dan Iraq.
Sehingga kini keadaan di Iraq masih porak peranda dengan pelbagai masalah. Senario yang sama
bakal menanti di Afghanistan apabila tentera AS dan Nato dijangka berundur sepenuhnya pada tahun
2014. Sebagaimana di Iraq keganasan puak-puak akan berterusan di Afghanistan.
Jelas polisi luar AS terhadap kedua-dua negara itu gagal mencapai matlamat pendemokrasian tetapi
mewujudkan keadaan yang semakin meruncing yang telah membuka ruang kepada aktiviti keganasan
di negara Asia Barat dan juga Pakistan contohnya.
Maka apabila kita berbicara mengenai satu dekad selepas 911 kita harus menilai tindak balas polisi
pentadbiran Bush dan Obama. Oleh sebab permasalahan ekonomi yang gagal diatasi, justeru rakyat
AS mula menukar haluan dan menyokong pihak konservatif atau sayap kanan yang ekstrem.
Ini jelas terbukti apabila pilihan raya Kongres 2010 memperlihatkan kejayaan wakil Republikan
memenangi kerusi majoriti di Dewan Perwakilan sehingga menyukarkan Obama untuk
memperkenalkan sebarang polisi kerana harus berhadapan dengan tentangan pihak Republikan.
Pelampau politik dan agama ini pasti akan terus mendapat sokongan sesetengah rakyat AS yang tidak
mampu berfikir dengan rasional akibat tekanan ekonomi. Tambahan lagi, penerimaan terhadap
golongan kanan yang ekstrem dan juga golongan fundamentalis Kristian ini begitu jelas di Eropah
dan di negara sekutu AS seperti Perancis dan Britain. Maka trend ini akan berterusan dan menjadi
semakin ketara di AS. Semangat Islamofobia di Eropah jelas bersemarak di AS juga.
Dari segi politik, strategi mendampingi dunia Islam yang juga merupakan sebahagian daripada
diplomasi 'lembut' Obama gagal merentasi batasan Timur-Barat yang wujud selama ini.
Dalam hal ini apa yang nyata adalah Islamofobia atau Arabfobia yang semakin menyemarak kesan
daripada tragedi 911 telah menyukarkan kehidupan masyarakat muslim di AS khususnya dan dunia
amnya.
Bagaimanapun dalam senario politik antarabangsa yang lebih luas, 911 bukanlah suatu peristiwa yang
besar sepanjang dekad yang telah berlalu ini.
Apa yang telah mentransformasi dunia adalah pertumbuhan pesat yang dialami oleh negara China,
India dan Brazil terutamanya. Pertumbuhan pesat negara-negara inilah yang telah mengubah senario
politik dunia.
Dengan terhakisnya kuasa hegemoni AS dan perselisihan antara pihak Barat dengan sesetengah
negara Islam hanyalah side show dalam senario politik yang lebih besar ini. Negara maju dan kaya di
Barat dan dunia Islam terutamanya akan menghadapi risiko peminggiran politik dan ekonomi yang
serius dalam orde baru dunia ini.
Dalam order baru dunia ini, Israel juga akan bangkit sebagai satu kuasa unggul di rantau Asia Barat
yang dilanda pergolakan politik. Bermula dari sini kuasa Israel akan mengukuhkan kedudukannya di
dunia sebagaimana kita lihat sebelum ini Israel telah pun secara senyap membina kekuatan
militernya. Keunggulan Israel menjadi semakin ketara apabila AS dan kuasa-kuasa Eropah seperti
Sepanyol, Portugal dan Itali mula goyah kedudukan ekonominya akibat krisis kewangan.
Dalam konteks orde baru dunia ini, amat penting bagi Malaysia untuk mempelbagaikan hubungan
luarnya dalam usaha mengelak kebergantungan kepada sesuatu negara.
Malaysia harus terus mengambil kesempatan daripada hubungan bersejarahnya dengan
mengukuhkan hubungan dengan negara China serta juga negara India dibawah pergerakan negara-
negara berkecuali (NAM) dan Komanwel. Pada masa yang sama terus mengekalkan hubungan baik
dengan AS sebagaimana wujud dalam pentadbiran Najib-Obama setakat ini bagi mengimbangi kuasa
China di Asia Tenggara.
Kepimpinan Malaysia masa kini telah melaksanakan strategi yang tepat dengan mempelbagaikan
hubungan luarnya di samping meneruskan kerjasama selatan-selatan lanjutan dari inisiatif yang
dimulakan oleh pentadbiran Tun Dr. Mahathir Mohamad.

















Targeting Terror:U.S. Policy toward Middle Eastern State Sponsors and Terrorist Organizations, Post-September
11
Matthew Levitt
October 2002
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INTRODUCTION
In the first year of the U.S.-led war on terror, a proliferation of reports and studies have analyzed al-Qaeda and
Osama bin Laden from every conceivable angle -- and with good reason. On September 11, 2001, nineteen al-
Qaeda operatives stunned the world with four synchronized suicide hijackings, a terrorist operation the scale of
which had never before been seen. A year into the war on terror, however, other Middle Eastern terrorist groups
and their state sponsors are the subjects of inconsistent focus at official levels. In the first few months after
September 2001, Hamas and Hizballah were placed on new U.S. government terrorism lists, and the primary
Hamas front organization in the United States was shut down. Since then, however, these groups have captured
decisionmakers' attention only for brief periods, usually in the wake of increasingly heinous terrorist attacks.
September 11 did produce a new political will for taking concrete action to counter and disrupt the terrorist
threat to America and its allies. Indeed, in the wake of the al-Qaeda attacks, U.S. leaders came to realize that
ideologically driven religious zealots, in this case radical Islamic fundamentalists, are not deterred by the threat
of the use of force -- certainly not by limited actions like bombing an evacuated training camp. Unfortunately,
this lesson appears to have been learned only so far as al-Qaeda is concerned. While operations targeting bin
Laden and his associates are concerted and continuous, similar efforts against other Middle Eastbased
international terrorists and terrorist groups of "global reach,"(1) as well as their state sponsors, are markedly less
exhaustive.
Among the terrorists subsequently linked to the September 11 plot are a disturbing number of individuals in an
alarming number of countries who, while previously known to the authorities as Islamic extremists (and in
some cases the subjects of surveillance), were not assigned the intelligence priority they deserved because they
were merely "terrorist supporters," not actual "terrorist operatives." One of the key lessons so painfully learned
on September 11 is that counterterrorism efforts must target operational and logistical cells with equal vigor.
The attacks in New York, Virginia, and Pennsylvania could never have been carried out without the tremendous
logistical assistance of a sophisticated and well-entrenched support network. Indeed, the nineteen al-Qaeda
hijackers were funded and facilitated by dozens of individuals, cells, front organizations, and affiliated groups
that provided a variety of logistical support activities essential to carrying out an operation of this magnitude.
An individual, group, or state that provides the funds, travel documents, training, or other support for terrorist
activity is no less associated with terror than the operative who completes the attack by detonating the bomb,
pulling the trigger, or crashing the airplane. As President Bush stated, "The allies of terror are equally guilty of
murder and equally accountable to justice."(2)
It is long past time to apply this lesson to the Middle East. Yet, such statements by senior officials have not
been followed by a fully broadened counterterrorism policy or requisite action. Syria and Iran sponsor terrorism
at a more frenetic pace than ever before; the Palestinian Authority, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Lebanon publicly
support a variety of terrorist groups without sanction; organizations like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and
the Islamic Action Front (IAF) in Jordan articulate support for terrorism vocally and actively; and groups such
as Hizballah, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad continue to raise funds, smuggle weapons, recruit
operatives, and carry out horrendous attacks.
Webs of Terror
Al-Qaeda, an umbrella organization encompassing a variety of like-minded groups, provides a current
microcosm of international terrorism. International terrorist groups do not operate in isolation, and the linkage
among these essentially disparate organizations highlights a matrix of illicit activity. Individual terrorists often
work with more than one group in their "careers," spreading knowledge and methodology as they migrate.
Terrorist leaders meet and cooperate with one another to plan and execute terrorist attacks. And funds
designated for individual groups are often intermingled in a single financial conduit.
Vociferously targeting only some groups or networks within a much larger domain will fail to stem the growing
tide of international terrorism. The attacks of September 11, like the bombings of the USS Cole and the U.S.
embassies in East Africa, were the product of long-term operational planning on the part of al-Qaeda.
September 11 teaches that terrorist groups must be denied the kind of permissive operating environment that
enables them to plan and execute terrorist attacks. The West's uninterest in the groups of mujahedin warriors in
the years following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan enabled the rise of men like Osama bin Laden and
the formation of groups like al-Qaeda and its affiliated members. Indeed, Western apathy facilitated the growth
of forward-based, entrenched logistical and financial support networks capable of backing terrorist operations
on the scale of September 11.
Mistakes of Tolerance
It is painfully ironic that the United States and its Western allies are repeating the same mistakes now with
respect to other Middle Eastern terrorist groups that they made during the two previous decades of dealing with
al-Qaeda and its precursors. For example, in July 2002, Ambassador Christopher Ross, a senior State
Department official responible for spearheading the Bush administration's public diplomacy campaign toward
the Middle East, requested a meeting with the Islamic Action Front in Jordan, an Islamist party affiliated with
the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas. The IAF agreed to hold the meeting -- but only at the group's Amman
offices, not at the U.S. embassy in Amman as Ross had requested. At the ninety-minute parley, Ambassador
Ross and other U.S. officials sat with IAF leaders, including Hamza Mansour, the group's secretary-general. At
a press conference a few days later, Mansour said that he told Ambassador Ross, "Arabs and Muslims view the
U.S. as an enemy because it places Arabs under siege, as is the case with Iraq; provides the Zionist entity
[Israel] with weapons; and protects Israel's actions against Palestinians in front of the UN Security Council."(3)
He further asserted that the United States "promotes hatred in the Western world against Arabs and Muslims in
the name of the war against terrorism."
On July 31, 2002, just two weeks after the Ross-IAF encounter, a Hamas bombing at Jerusalem's Hebrew
University killed seven civilians, including five Americans, and wounded eighty-six others. The next day, the
IAF sponsored a mass rally in the Suwaylih neighborhood of Amman originally in support of Hamas and the
"Jenin martyrs"; there, IAF leaders proudly lauded the university bombing as a "bold, heroic operation."(4)
Addressing the rally, Mansour highlighted the IAF's commitment to supporting Hamas and asserted that the
Hebrew University attack cost $50,000. "This necessitates giving large financial aid to the Palestinian people to
carry out more operations of this kind," Mansour said. He further urged Jordanians and the larger Arab nation
"to contribute generously to the Palestinian people so that they could buy the weapons and necessary equipment
for confronting the Israeli arrogance."
Although engaging in a concerted public diplomacy campaign is critical, America's "zero tolerance" for
terrorism is severely undermined when senior U.S. officials engage in dialogue with groups and individuals
directly linked to terrorist groups. It remains to be seen whether the administration will now freeze the funds of
the IAF and bar its leaders from entering the United States under powers recently granted by postSeptember 11
legislation.
The preceding case offers a snapshot of the past year's trend of actively targeting al-Qaeda while passively
tolerating other terrorist groups and state sponsors in the Middle East. The following sections constitute an
album of other snapshots illustrating U.S. policy as pursued in the first year of the war on terror.
Part one highlights the effect this war has had on counterterrorism documents produced since September 11,
focusing on U.S. terrorism lists, the latest Patterns of Global Terrorism report (the premier annual publication
on international terrorism produced by the U.S. government), two recent U.S. reports on Palestinian compliance
with peace treaty commitments, and the European Union's terrorism list.
Part two addresses the escalating roles played by Syria and Iran, the two most active sponsors of international
terrorism on the world scene, focusing on the intimate bond that these countries share with Hizballah.
Part three examines the facilitation of terrorism by Saudi Arabia, the Palestinian Authority, Yemen, and
Lebanon -- entities not included on the State Department's state sponsors of terrorism list even as they fund,
shelter, and otherwise support a variety of terrorist organizations while turning a blind eye to the activities of
others.
Finally, part four focuses on the activities of Palestinian terrorist groups since September 11, highlighting the
birth of a new group, Fatah's al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades; the increased activity of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic
Jihad; the resurgence of Palestinian secular groups; and the prospect that Palestinian terrorists could begin
actively targeting U.S. interests. The conclusion is inescapable: to be effective, neither the United States nor its
allies can satisfy themselves with targeting al-Qaeda alone, or any other specific terrorist network. The war on
terror must target terrorism broadly defined and all organizations that employ it or facilitate its use as a means
of expression.
Notes:
1. The Federal Bureau of Investigation defines acts of international terrorism as those that "occur outside the
United States or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the
persons they appear to coerce or intimidate, or the locale in which the perpetrators operate or seek asylum"
(Counterterrorism Threat Assessment and Warning Unit, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Terrorism in the
United States, 1999: 30 Years of Terrorism, A Special Retrospective Edition, FBI Publication #0308, n.d.). By
extension, international terrorist groups are those that transcend national boundaries in terms of their targeting,
or in terms of their operational, logistical, or financial support activities.
Terrorist groups of "global reach" not only transcend national boundaries, but also satisfy an implicit threshold
of threat or activity. Such groups extend their reach across the globe, either by actively targeting international
interests in their home or primary arena of operations, actively targeting international interests in other
geographic locations, or actively engaging in logistical or financial support of terrorist operations.
The term "global reach," however, has not been officially defined. The concept of global reach first appeared in
Executive Order 13224, issued on September 24, 2001, which lists terrorist entities as "specially designated
global terrorists" (See Executive Order 13224 -- Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions with Persons
Who Commit, Threaten To Commit, or Support Terrorism, available online at
www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/sanctions/terrorism.html). Two weeks later, in his November 6
remarks at a NATO conference on combating terrorism, President George W. Bush used the term itself: "We
will not rest until terrorist groups of 'global reach' have been found, have been stopped, and have been defeated.
And this goal will not be achieved until all the world's nations stop harboring and supporting such terrorists
within their borders" (remarks available online at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011106-
2.html). On December 5, 2001, the White House Coalition Information Center's "Daily Summary of News,
Message, and Facts about the War on Terror" (distributed via email) stated, "No group or nation should mistake
America's intentions: where terrorist groups of 'global reach' exist, the United States and our friends and allies
will seek [them] out and destroy them."
2. From the president's remarks to the United Nations General Assembly on November 10, 2001. Available
online (www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011110-3.html).
3. Alia Shukri Hamzeh, "IAF Delivered 'Clear' Message to U.S. on Regional Policy -- Mansour," Jordan Times
(Amman), July 26, 2002.
4. "Al-Rantisi: University Operation One of 60 Operations That Hamas Has Planned To Carry Out against
Israel," al-Sharq al-Awsat (London), August 2, 2002, p. 2.