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epublic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-44896 July 31, 1936
RODOLFO A. SCHNECKENBURGER, petitioner,
vs.
MANUEL V. MORAN, Judge of First Instance of Manila, respondent.
Cardenas and Casal for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for respondent.
ABAD SANTOS, J .:
The petitioner was duly accredited honorary consul of Uruguay at Manila,
Philippine Islands on June 11, 1934. He was subsequently charged in the
Court of First Instance of Manila with the crime of falsification of a private
document. He objected to the jurisdiction of the court on the ground that both
under the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the
Philippines the court below had no jurisdiction to try him. His objection having
been overruled, he filed this petition for a writ of prohibition with a view to
preventing the Court of First Instance of Manila from taking cognizance of the
criminal action filed against him.
In support of this petition counsel for the petitioner contend (1) That the Court
of First Instance of Manila is without jurisdiction to try the case filed against
the petitioner for the reason that under Article III, section 2, of the
Constitution of the United States, the Supreme Court of the United States
has original jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers, and consuls, and such jurisdiction excludes the courts of the
Philippines; and (2) that even under the Constitution of the Philippines
original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers,
and consuls, is conferred exclusively upon the Supreme Court of the
Philippines.
This case involves no question of diplomatic immunity. It is well settled that a
consul is not entitled to the privileges and immunities of an ambassador or
minister, but is subject to the laws and regulations of the country to which he
is accredited. (Ex parte Baiz, 135 U. S., 403; 34 Law. ed., 222.) A consul is
not exempt from criminal prosecution for violations of the laws of the country
where he resides. (U. S. vs. Ravara, 2 Dall., 297; 1 Law. ed., 388; Wheaton's
International Law [2d ed.], 423.) The substantial question raised in this case
is one of jurisdiction.
1. We find no merit in the contention that Article III, section 2, of the
Constitution of the United States governs this case. We do not deem
it necessary to discuss the question whether the constitutional
provision relied upon by the petitioner extended ex propio
vigore over the Philippines. Suffice it to say that the inauguration of
the Philippine Commonwealth on November 15, 1935, has brought
about a fundamental change in the political and legal status of the
Philippines. On the date mentioned the Constitution of the
Philippines went into full force and effect. This Constitution is the
supreme law of the land. Not only the members of this court but all
other officers, legislative, executive and judicial, of the Government
of the Commonwealth, are bound by oath to support the Constitution.
(Article XIII, section 2.) This court owes its own existence to the great
instrument, and derives all its powers therefrom. In the exercise of its
powers and jurisdiction, this court is bound by the provisions of the
Constitution. The Constitution provides that the original jurisdiction of
this court "shall include all cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers, and consuls." In deciding the instant case this court cannot
go beyond this constitutional provision.
2. It remains to consider whether the original jurisdiction thus
conferred upon this court by the Constitution over cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, is exclusive. The
Constitution does not define the jurisdiction of this court in specific
terms, but merely provides that "the Supreme Court shall have such
original and appellate jurisdiction as may be possessed and
exercised by the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands at the time
of the adoption of this Constitution." It then goes on to provide that
the original jurisdiction of this court "shall include all cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls."
In the light of the constitutional provisions above adverted to, the question
arises whether the original jurisdiction possessed and exercised by the
Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution was exclusive.
The original jurisdiction possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court of
the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of the Constitution was
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derived from section 17 of Act No. 136, which reads as follows: The Supreme
Court shall have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, certiorari,
prohibition, habeas corpus, and quo warranto in the cases and in the manner
prescribed in the Code of Civil Procedure, and to hear and determine the
controversies thus brought before it, and in other cases provided by law."
Jurisdiction to issue writs of quo warranto, certiorari, mandamus, prohibition,
and habeas corpus was also conferred on the Courts of First Instance by the
Code of Civil Procedure. (Act No. 190, secs. 197, 217, 222, 226, and 525.) It
results that the original jurisdiction possessed and exercised by the Supreme
Court of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of the Constitution
was not exclusive of, but concurrent with, that of the Courts of First Instance.
Inasmuch as this is the same original jurisdiction vested in this court by the
Constitution and made to include all cases affecting ambassadors, other
public ministers, and consuls, it follows that the jurisdiction of this court over
such cases is not exclusive.
The conclusion we have reached upon this branch of the case finds support
in the pertinent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States. The
Constitution of the United States provides that the Supreme Court shall have
"original jurisdiction" in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers, and consuls. In construing this constitutional provision, the
Supreme Court of the United States held that the "original jurisdiction thus
conferred upon the Supreme Court by the Constitution was not exclusive
jurisdiction, and that such grant of original jurisdiction did not prevent
Congress from conferring original jurisdiction in cases affecting consuls on
the subordinate courts of the Union. (U. S. vs. Ravara, supra;
Bors vs. Preston, 111 U. S., 252; 28 Law. ed., 419.)
3. The laws in force in the Philippines prior to the inauguration of the
Commonwealth conferred upon the Courts of the First Instance original
jurisdiction in all criminal cases to which a penalty of more than six months'
imprisonment or a fine exceeding one hundred dollars might be imposed.
(Act No. 136, sec. 56.) Such jurisdiction included the trial of criminal actions
brought against consuls for, as we have already indicated, consuls, not being
entitled to the privileges and immunities of ambassadors or ministers, are
subject to the laws and regulations of the country where they reside. By
Article XV, section 2, of the Constitution, all laws of the Philippine Islands in
force at the time of the adoption of the Constitution were to continue in force
until the inauguration of the Commonwealth; thereafter, they were to remain
operative, unless inconsistent with the Constitution until amended, altered,
modified, or repealed by the National Assembly. The original jurisdiction
granted to the Courts of First Instance to try criminal cases was not made
exclusively by any, law in force prior to the inauguration of the
Commonwealth, and having reached the conclusion that the jurisdiction
conferred upon this court by the Constitution over cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, is not an exclusive
jurisdiction, the laws in force at the time of the adoption of the Constitution,
granting the Courts of First Instance jurisdiction in such cases, are not
inconsistent with the Constitution, and must be deemed to remain operative
and in force, subject to the power of the National Assembly to amend alter,
modify, or repeal the same. (Asiatic P. Co. vs. Insular Collector of Customs,
U. S. Supreme Court [Law. ed.], Adv. Ops., vol. 80, No. 12, pp. 620, 623.)
We conclude, therefore, that the Court of First Instance of Manila has
jurisdiction to try the petitioner, an that the petition for a writ of prohibition
must be denied. So ordered.
Avancea, C. J., Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz, and Recto, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-117376 December 8, 1994
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF OSCAR
DE GUZMAN, CHAIRMAN SEDFREY A. ORDOEZ, DIRECTOR
EMMANUEL C. NERI AND THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS, petitioners,
vs.
DIRECTOR VICENTE VINARAO, BUREAU OF
CORRECTIONS, respondent.

ROMERO, J .:
This is an original petition for habeas corpus filed directly before this Court in
behalf of Oscar de Guzman y Enriquez, who was tried and convicted by the
Regional Trial Court of San Jose City Branch 39 in G.R. No. 76742,
"People of the Philippines v. Oscar de Guzman y Enriquez," 188 SCRA 407,
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for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, alleging in particular the
fact that de Guzman wilfully and unlawfully sold two (2) sticks of marijuana.
Upon review by this Court, the trial court's decision sentencing de Guzman to
suffer the penalty of life imprisonment plus payment of P20,000 fine and
costs was affirmed in toto and the appeal was dismissed with costs against
accused-appellant.
Under the provisions of Section 20, Republic Act No. 6425 as last amended
by R.A. 7659, which became effective on December 31, 1993, and as
interpreted by this Court in the case of People v. Simon,
1
if the quantity of
the marijuana involved is less than 250 grams, the imposable penalty, in the
event that the conviction should be affirmed, shall be within the range
of prision correccional (from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years).
Clearly, de Guzman is entitled to benefit from the reduction of penalty
introduced by the new law.
Petitioners allege that since de Guzman has been serving sentence since
July 1984 or for more than ten (10) years now, his continued detention in the
National Penitentiary is a violation of his basic human rights and that,
therefore, he should be released from prison without further delay. In aid of
judicial administration, petitioners further recommend that all prisoners
similarly situated be likewise released from prison.
The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty upon a verified
petition setting forth:
1. that the person in whose behalf the application is made is
imprisoned or restrained of his liberty;
2. the officer or name of the person by whom he is so
imprisoned or restrained;
3. the place where he is imprisoned or restrained of his
liberty; and
4. a copy of the commitment or cause of detention of such
person (Section 3, Rule 102, Revised Rules of Court).
It appearing that all the above requirements have been met and finding merit
in the petition, the same is hereby GRANTED. Let a writ of habeas
corpus issue immediately.
The Director, New Bilibid Prisons, is commanded to forthwith execute the writ
for de Guzman's discharge from confinement unless he is being detained for
some other lawful cause, to make due return of the writ, and to submit a
complete inventory of all other prisoners therein similarly situated within thirty
days, to relieve them from further confinement. With costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo,
Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.
[Syllabus]
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 121424. March 28, 1996]
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF MAURO
MAGTIBAY y PENTINIO, Chairman SEDFREY A. ORDOEZ,
Comm. NARCISO C. MONTEIRO, Comm. MERCEDES V.
CONTRERAS, Comm. NASSER A. MAROHOMSALIC, Comm.
VICENTE P. SIBULO, Director EMMANUEL C. NERI and the
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, petitioners, vs. Director
VICENTE VINARAO, BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS,respondent.
[G.R. No. 104992. March 28, 1996]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MAURO
MAGTIBAY, accused-appellant.
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R E S O L U T I O N
PANGANIBAN, J .:
Before us is a Petition for Habeas Corpus filed by the Commission on
Human Rights, for the immediate release of Mauro P. Magtibay, the
accused-appellant in G.R. No. 104992, entitled People vs. Mauro Magtibay,
pending before this Court. In the latter case (which has been consolidated
with the instant case per Resolution of this Court dated September 4, 1995),
accused-appellant is contesting his conviction by the Regional Trial Court of
Batangas City, Branch III for violation of Sec. 4, Art. II of R.A.
No. 6425, otherwise known as The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as
amended. The accused-appellant was caught in flagrante delicto selling ten
(10) grams of dried marijuana leaves during a buy-bust operation conducted
on August 21, 1989 in Cuenca, Batangas. Sentenced to suffer the penalty of
life imprisonment, accused-appellant has been under preventive detention at
the New Bilibid Prison since August 21, 1989 or for more than six (6) years
as of the date of the Petition.
Petitioners now seek the immediate release of accused-appellant on the
ground that the latter has already served the term of imprisonment applicable
to his offense as provided under R.A.7659, otherwise known as An Act to
Impose Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes.
By way of background: R.A. 7659, which took effect on December 31,
1993, partly amended R.A. No. 6425, by providing, inter alia, that if the
quantity of the prohibited drugs involved is less than 750 grams, the penalty
of imprisonment is reduced to a range of from prision correctional to
reclusion perpetua depending on the quantity of marijuana involved; in
contrast, Sec. 4, Art. II of R.A. 6425 formerly provided for imprisonment
ranging from 12 years and one day to 20 years of prision mayor. Pursuant to
the new legislation, this Court ruled in People vs. Simon, (234 SCRA555,
573 [July 29, 1994]) and in People vs. De Lara, (236 SCRA 291
[September 5, 1994]) that where the quantity of marijuana leaves involved is
below 250 grams. The penalty to be imposed shall be prision correccional.
On November 13, 1995, the First Division of this Court referred these
consolidated cases to the Third. In response to the Resolution of this Court
dated February 14, 1996, the Office of the Solicitor General filed its
Manifestation in Lieu of Comment, averring that it interposes no objection to
the immediate release of accused-appellant as prayed for in the
Petition. The Solicitor General further declared: Considering the report of
Magdalena M. Mogridge, Chief, Documents Section of the Bureau of
Corrections, (Annex I hereof), appellant is now eligible for immediate
release, pursuant to Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, having undergone
preventive imprisonment for a period of more than the possible maximum
imprisonment to which he may be sentenced.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Petition in G.R. No. 121424 is
hereby GRANTED, and the accused-appellant Mauro P. Magtibay is hereby
ORDERED RELEASED IMMEDIATELY, unless he is being detained on
some other legal charge. The Petition in G.R. No. 104992 is DISMISSED for
being moot and academic.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-8919. September 28, 1956.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellees, vs. AGUSTIN
MANGULABNAN alias GUINITA, DIONISIO SARMIENTO, ARCADIO BALMEO,
PATRICIO GONZALES, FLORENTINO FLORES, CRISPIN ESTRELLA, FELIPE CALISON,
PEDRO VILLAREAL, CLAUDIO REYES, PETER DOE and JOHN DOE Defendant,
AGUSTIN MANGULABNAN, Appellant.

D E C I S I O N
FELIX, J.:
At about 11:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary00 oclock in the evening of November 5,
1953, the reports of gunfire awaked the spouses Vicente Pacson and Cipriana
Tadeo, the 4 minor children and Ciprianas mother, Monica del Mundo, in their
house at barrio Tikiw, San Antonio, Nueva Ecija. Whereupon, Vicente Pacson
crossed the room and shouted to one Tata Pisio that persons were going up their
house and then hid himself inside the ceiling.
In the meantime, someone broke the wall of the kitchen at the back of the house,
and a few moments later a person suddenly entered the dining room and shouted
that the door leading to the living room be opened. As no one of the house
members obeyed, the intruder removed 3 board pieces in the wall and through the
opening thus made he entered the living room. The intruder who was armed with a
hunting knife was recognized by Cipriana Tadeo to be Agustin Mangulabnan, who
was previously known to her. Agustin removed the iron bar from the door leading
to the balcony and after opening said door, 2 persons whose identity has not been
ascertained entered. Agustin then approached Cipriana Tadeo and snatched from
her neck one necklace valued P50 and also took from her person P50 in the paper
bills and P20 in silver coins. Meanwhile, one of the two unidentified marauders
searched the person of Monica del Mundo and took from her P200 in cash and in
gold necklace valued at P200. But not contented with the loot, the same individual
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asked from Monica del Mundo to give her diamond ring which the latter could not
produce, and for this reason, he strucked her twice on the face with the butt of his
gun. One of the small children of Vicente Pacson who was terrified called to his
mother and that unidentified person, irked by the boys impudence, made a move to
strike him, but Monica del Mundo warded off the blow with her right arm. At this
juncture, the second unidentified individual put his companion aside the climbing
on the table, fired his gun at the ceiling. Afterwards, Appellant and his two
unidentified companion left the place.
After they were gone, Cipriana Tadeo called to her husband Vicente Pacson, and
receiving no answer she climbed the ceiling and she found him lying face downward
already dead. According to Dr. Vicente P. Llado, who performed the autopsy,
Vicente Pacson sustained the injuries described in his autopsy reports, which reads
as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
November 6, 1953
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Post-mortem findings on cadaver Vicente Pacson, age-37 years, married, of barrio
Tikiw, San Antonio, Nueva Ecija.
Time take:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary 8:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary20 a.m.
1. Entrance fracture of the frontal region of head due to gunshot wound.
Exit wound at left side of the head, about the upper portion of the left ear.
2. Entrance gunshot wound, left lateral side of the left middle arm.
Exit gunshot wound inner side of left arm.
3. Entrance gunshot wound, left lateral of the left forearm.
Exit gunshot wound, left inner side of the left forearm.
4. Entrance gunshot wound around 2 inches more or less above the middle of the
right clavicle.
Exit gunshot would at the back in the region of the spinal cord between the two
scapula.
Cause of death severe hemorrhage due to go gunshot wound of the frontal
region of the forehead.
(Exhibit C).
The incident was reported to the police authorities that same evening and in the
ensuing investigation Cipriana Tadeo informed the Chief of Police that Agustin
Mangulabnan was one of the malefactors who entered their house. When the latter
was investigated, he readily and voluntarily subscribed before the Justice of the
Peace of San Antonio, Nueva Ecija, an affidavit admitting his participation in the
robbery and killing of Vicente Pacson (Exhibit A and B). Much later, however, he
subscribed to another affidavit before the Clerk of Court wherein he exculpated
from any participation Crispin Estrella, one of those he implicated in his previous
affidavit, though admitting the truth of the other allegations contained therein
(Exhibit D).
As the result of the investigation conducted by the authorities a complaint was filed
in the Justice of the Peace Court of San Antonio, Nueva Ecija, against Agustin
Mangulabnan alias Guinita, a surrendered Huk and 10 other unidentified persons.
But the complaint was amended on January 13, 1954, to include Dionisio
Sarmiento, together with Arcadio Balmeo, Patricio Gonzales, Florentino Flores,
Crispin Estrella, Pedro Villareal, Claudio Reyes, Peter Doe and John Doe, who
were still at large, as Defendants. After the preliminary investigation the case was
forwarded to the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija whereDefendants were
accused of robbery with homicide. In that Court, Agustin Mangulabnan was found
guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide and sentenced to reclusion perpetua,
to indemnify Monica del Mundo in the sum of P400; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryCipriana Tadeo in the sum of P132; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryP6,000 to the heirs of Vicente Pacson, and to pay the
costs. Defendant Dionisio Sarmiento was acquitted while the information as against
the other Defendants who continued to be at large was dismissed for lack of
evidence, with the proportionate part of the costs de officio.
Agustin Mangulabnan moved for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered
evidence, but the motion was denied for lack of merit. Hence his appeal which is
now before Us.
The motion for a new trial was based on the affidavits of Dr. Numeriano D. Lustre,
Marino Ventura, Marcosa Mudlong and Patricio Gonzales but they were not really
newly discovered nor could they alter the conclusion arrived at by the trial Court. As
stated by the Solicitor General, it is a settled rule in this jurisdiction that before a
new trial may be granted on the ground of newly discovered evidence, it must be
shown:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary (a) That the evidence was discovered after
trial; chan roblesvirtualawlibrary(b) That such evidence could not have been
discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence
(U. S. vs. Tan Jonjua, 1 Phil. 51; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryU.S. vs. Palanca, 5 Phil.
269; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryU.S. vs. De Leon, 1 Phil. 188; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryU. S. vs. Zamora, 2 Phil. 582; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryU. S.
vs. Torrente, 2 Phil. 1); chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand (c) That is material, not
merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching (U. S. vs. Luzon, 4 Phil. 343), and of
such a weight that it would probably change the judgment if admitted (U. S. vs.
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Zamora, supra; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryU. S. vs. Alvarez, 3 Phil. 24; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryU. S. vs. Luzon, supra.; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryU. S. vs.
Hernandez 5 Phil. 429; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryU. S. vs. Magtibay, 17 Phil.
417; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryU. S. vs. Tongco, 2 Phil. 189; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryPeople vs. Cu- Unjieng, 61 Phil. 906; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryand People vs. Reyes, 71 Phil. 598). The motion for new trial
did not comply with these requisites and was properly denied by the trial Court.
Appellants objection to the admissibility in evidence of post- morten report (Exhibit
C) is evidently untenable. The fact that it is a mere carbon copy is of no amount, for
it has been signed by the physician who executed the same and his signature was
identified by him at the witness stand. Furthermore, Appellant did not offer any
objection to its admission when it was presented in evidence at the hearing. His
objection now comes too late (Hodges vs. Salas et al., 63 Phil. 567; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryU. S. vs. Ong Shiu, 28 Phil. 242).
The lower court did neither err in rejecting Exhibit 1 for the defense. This is an
affidavit purportedly executed by Sgt. Adan Fernando of the Philippine
Constabulary. The main portion of it (quoted in Appellants brief, page 32, and
appearing on page 21 of the record), is as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Chief of Police of San Antonio, Nueva Ecija, who first arrived at the scene of
the crime, have already picked up the empty shells of Cal. 30, Carbine type and
were delivered to Cpl. Lopez, one of the investigators of our unit. Information
revealed that Civilian Commando of barrio Pulo, San Isidro, Nueva Ecija, has
something to do with the crime committed, so I proceeded to barrio Pulo to
confiscate their arms. Among those arms confiscated were those registered under
Pedro Villareal and Claudio Reyes and upon examination of the Ballistic Experts in
Camp Crame, it appeared positive as per Ballistic Report (Exhibit 1).
As may be seen, the latter part of the aforequoted testimony of Sgt. Adan Fernando
is hearsay and, anyway, it is of no moment in the case at bar, because 2 of the 3
persons who entered the dwelling of the spouses Pacson were unidentified.
There is no denial that the crime of robbery with homicides was committed as
described in the information. By Appellants own admission (Exhibit A and B) and
the testimony of Cipriana Tadeo, we cannot have any doubt as to Appellants
participation in the execution thereof. And as pointed out by the Solicitor
General, Appellant and the rest of the malefactors came together to the house of
the offended parties to commit the robbery perpetuated therein and together went
away from the scene of the crime after its perpetration. This shows conspiracy
among the offenders which rendered each of them liable for the acts of the others
(People vs. Delgado, 77 Phil. 11).
Moreover, the record shows that Appellant participated in the criminal design to
commit the robbery with his co-Defendants (People vs. Flores, et al., G. R. No. L-
231, August 21, 1946), and it is settled rule in this jurisdiction that unity of purpose
and action arising from a common design makes all parties thereto jointly liable (U.
S. vs. Matanug, 11 Phil. 188), each being responsible for the result, irrespective of
the character of their individual participation (U. S. vs. Ramos, 2 Phil., 434).
It may be argued that the killing of Vicente Pacson undertaken by one of the 2
unidentified persons who climbed up a table and fired at the ceiling, was an
unpremeditated act that surged on the spur of the amount and possibly without
any idea that Vicente Pacson was hiding therein, and that the English version of
Article 294, No. 1, of the Revised Penal Code, which defines the special, single and
indivisible crime of robbery with homicide only punished any persons guilty of
robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person, with the
penalty of reclusion perpetua when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the
crime of homicide shall have been committed, but this English version of the Code
is a poor translation of the prevailing Spanish text of said paragraph, which reads as
follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1. Con la pena de reclusion perpetua a muerte, cuando con motivo o con ocasion
del robo resultare homicidio.
We see, therefore, that in order to determine the existence of the crime of robbery
with homicide it is enough that a homicide would result by reason of on the
occasion of the robbery (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of November 26,
1892, and January 7, 1878, quoted in 2 Hidalgos Penal Code, p. 267 and 259-260,
respectively). This High Tribunal speaking of the accessory character of the
circumstances leading to the homicide, has also held that it is immaterial that the
death would supervene by mere accident (Decision of September 9, 1886;chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryOctober 22, 1907; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryApril 30, 1910
and July 14, 1917), provided that the homicide be produced by reason or on
occasion of the robbery, inasmuch as it is only the result obtained, without
reference or distinction as to the circumstances, causes, modes or persons
intervening in the commission of the crime, that has to be taken into consideration
(Decision of January 12, 1889 see Cuello Calons Codigo Penal, p. 501-502).
The crime committed in the case at bar, of which Appellant Agustin Mangulabnan is
a co-participant, is the crime of robbery with homicide covered by Article 294, No.
1, of the Revised Penal Code and punished with reclusion perpetua to death. The
commission of the offense was attended by the aggravating circumstances of
nighttime, dwelling, abuse of superior strength and with the aid of armed men, and
in consonance with the provisions of Article 63, No. 1 of the same legal
body, Appellant should be sentenced to the capital punishment, as recommended
by the Solicitor General. However, as the required number of votes for the
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imposition of the capital penalty has not been secured in this case, the penalty to
be imposed upon Agustin Mangulabnan is the next lower in degree or reclusion
perpetua (Section 9, Republic Act No. 296, known as the Judiciary Act of 1948).
Wherefore the decision appealed from being in accordance with law and the
evidence, is hereby affirmed with costs against Appellant. It is SO ORDERED.
Paras, C.J., Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepc
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-13899 September 29, 1961
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PABLO BLAZA and FRANCISCO MANGULABNAN, defendants,
FRANCISCO MANGULABNAN, defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Manansala and Saturnino for defendant-appellant.


PADILLA, J .:
In an amended information subscribed by the Provincial Fiscal and filed in
the Court of First Instance of Laguna, Pablo Blaza alias Fernandez and
Francisco Mangulabnan alias Ellen were charged with the crime of
kidnapping Dorotea Fernandez, Fe Fernandez and Buenaventura Fernandez
on 23 April 1953, for the purpose of extorting ransom from them, defined and
penalized under the provisions of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 18 (crim. case No. SC-161). Their alleged
confederates are those named defendants in crim. case No. SC-120 of the
same Court, to wit: Lope Cunanan alias Perla, Ruperto
Esquillo aliasesSergio and Alex, Raymundo Abesamis aliases Rading,
Reddy, Mike, Manding, Uto, Ben, Pepe and North.
1
Upon arraignment the
defendants Blaza and Mangulabnan, assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded
not guilty.
On 5 November 1957 the defendant Mangulabnan by counsel de parte,
Attorney Emilia C. Saturnino, filed a motion to quash the information against
him, claiming that he is one of the defendants in crim. case No. 1940 of the
Court of First Instance of Pampanga, People vs. Guillermo Paquinto, et al.,
for "the complex crime of Rebellion with Multiple Murders, Robberies, Arsons
and Kidnapping," on 27 counts of atrocities allegedly committed on different
dates in the provinces of Pampanga, Pangasinan, Bulacan, Nueva Ecija,
Tarlac and Laguna (Exhibits 1 & 1-A); that in criminal case No. 15909 of the
Court of First Instance of Laguna, People vs. Apolinar Oracion, et al.,for
rebellion complexed with multiple murder, robbery, arson, rape and
kidnapping, the kidnapping of Dorotea Fernandez, Fe Fernandez and
Buenaventura Fernandez on 23 April 1957 (for which the defendant
Mangulabnan was separately charged in crim. case No. SC-161) was for the
purpose of raising funds for the HMB organization and a necessary means of
committing the crime of rebellion (Annex B to motion to quash); that on 17
December 1956 the said court, rendering judgment in the latter case, held
that "such act was in furtherance and a mere ingredient of the offense of
rebellion" and "cannot be punished separately from the latter (rebellion) or
complexed with it" (Annex C to motion to quash); and that the Supreme
Court in the cases of People vs. Hernandez, 52 Off. Gaz. 5506; People vs.
Geronimo, G.R. No. L-8936, 23 October 1956 and People vs. Togonon, G.R.
No. L-8926, 29 June 1957, has held that "the crimes of murders, arsons,
kidnappings, etc., when committed as a means to or in furtherance of the
subversive ends, become absorbed in the crime of rebellion, and cannot be
considered as giving rise to a separate crime;" and contending that the
defendant Mangulabnan having been charged with the principal offense of
rebellion in crim. case No. 1940 of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga is
twice put in jeopardy of being punished for the same offense in crim. case
No. SC-161 of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, prayed that the
information in the latter case be quashed. After hearing, during which
counsel de partefor the defendant Mangulabnan and the Provincial Fiscal
appeared and orally argued in support of their motion and objection, on 5
November 1957 the Court denied the motion to quash and set the case for
trial on 29 November 1957 at 9:00 o'clock in the morning. However, the
Court cancelled the trial set for 29 November 1957 and reset it for trial on 12
December 1957 at the same time. On 11 December 1957 the defendant
Mangulabnan filed a motion for reconsideration of the order denying his
motion to quash and on 12 December 1957 the Provincial Fiscal, an
objection thereto. On the same day, 12 December 1957, the Court denied
the motion for reconsideration and set the case for trial on 27 January 1958
at 9:00 o'clock in the morning.
On 16 January 1958 the defendant Mangulabnan by counsel de parte filed a
petition praying that the case be reset for trial on 25 February 1958 on the
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ground that a petition for certiorari testing the legality of the denial of the
defendant's motion to quash would be filed in the Supreme Court after the
needed amount for filing and attorney's fees shall have been raised by the
defendant.
On 22 January 1958 the defendant Blaza filed a motion praying for separate
trial in view of the delay in the trial of the case due to several postponements
at the behest of his co-defendant.
On 23 January 1958 the Court denied Blaza's motion and reset the case for
trial on 25 February 1958.
On the day set for trial, 25 February 1958, the assistant provincial fiscal and
counsel de parte for the defendant Blaza, Attorney Ariston Oblena, appeared
but counsel de parte for the defendant Mangulabnan, Attorney Emilia C.
Saturnino, did not appear despite previous notice. In view thereof the Court
entered an order imposing upon the absent counsel a fine of P25, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, appointing Attorney Tirso
Caballero as counsel de oficio for the defendant Mangulabnan, who prayed
that he be relieved from his appointment because he is related to the
offended parties, setting the case for trial on 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 March 1958 at
9:00 o'clock in the morning, and appointing Attorney Celso Cabalones,
Leandro Rebong, Benjamin Agarao and Enrique Villanueva as counsel de
oficio for the defendant Mangulabnan, should counsel de parte fail to appear
on the first day of the trial.
On 28 February 1958 counsel de parte for the defendant Mangulabnan filed
a petition in the trial court explaining that her failure to attend the trial of the
case on 25 February 1958 was due to a sudden indisposition that she felt of
which there was no material time to notify the Court and prayed that she be
excused for failure to attend the trial of the case on that date, and alleging
that a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction to be filed in the
Supreme Court was being prepared to test the sufficiency and legality of the
information filed against her client in criminal case No. SC-161 and that she
had received subpoenas from the City Attorney of Quezon City, Courts of
First Instance of San Pablo and Cabanatuan Cities and the City Fiscal of
Manila to appear before them as counsel on 3, 4, 5 and 7 March 1958,
prayed that the trial of the case be postponed indefinitely until the Supreme
Court shall have decided her client's petition for certiorari with preliminary
injunction. On 1 March 1958 the same counsel filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order entered by the Court on 25 February 1958
imposing upon her a fine of P25, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, reiterating the same reasons stated in her petition filed on 28
February 1958.
On the date set for trial, 3 March 1958, counsel de parte for the defendant
Mangulabnan did not appear. Whereupon the Court denied her motion for
indefinite postponement of the trial of the case in behalf of her client and
proceeded with the trial of the case, the defendants being assisted by their
respective counsel de oficio.
On the second day of the trial, 4 March 1958, counsel de parte for the
defendant Mangulabnan appeared and prayed for indefinite suspension of
the trial of the case against her client and reconsideration of the order
imposing upon her a fine of P25. The Court denied the first part but granted
the second part of her prayer and proceeded with the trial of the case. After
hearing the testimony of the defendant Blaza and his witness Silverio Lintak,
the Court entered an order setting the continuation of the trial of the case for
10 March 1958 at 9:00 o'clock in the morning.
After trial, on 14 March 1958 the Court rendered judgment, which was
promulgated on 26 March 1958, finding the defendants guilty of the crime
charged and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, the
accessory penalties provided by law, and to pay the costs.
On 26 March 1958 the defendant Mangulabnan filed a notice of appeal.
On 2 April the defendant Blaza filed a motion for reconsideration. On 8 April
the Court denied his motion for reconsideration. On 10 April the defendant
Blaza filed a notice of appeal. On 14 May his counsel de oficio filed a motion
for withdrawal of his appeal. On 16 May 1958 the trial court approved the
withdrawal of his appeal.
This appeal is by the defendant Francisco Mangulabnan only.
Dr. Zosimo Fernandez, his wife Dorotea, daughter Fe and cousin
Buenaventura Fernandez, who was the chauffeur of the family, lived in the
town of Pagsanjan, province of Laguna. At dinner time, about 7:00 o'clock in
the evening of 23 April 1953, the Fernandez spouses heard a commotion
and the barking of dogs in their yard and somebody knocking at the front
door of the house. Dr. Fernandez asked Buenaventura to see what the
commotion and barking of dogs were all about while Mrs. Fernandez peeped
through an opening and saw people in army uniform. Buenaventura told the
spouses that somebody who was trying to gain admission to the house
wanted to see Dr. Fernandez at the behest of Captain Sebastian and that the
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house was surrounded by people in army uniform. Afterwards, they heard
somebody knocking at the back door. Dr. Fernandez stood up, looked
outside the window and asked what the man wanted. The latter answered
that Captain Sebastian was sending for the doctor. The man's answer
aroused Dr. Fernandez's suspicion that the visitor did not mean well because
Captain Sebastian was residing in Cavinti. Dr. Fernandez slipped out of the
house to ask aid and protection from the chief of police, who lived nearby,
leaving behind his wife, daughter, cousin and maids. After Dr. Fernandez had
left, the inmates of the house heard somebody persistently knocking at the
door and trying to force it open. Mrs. Fernandez and her daughter Fe opened
the kitchen door to escape but Lope Cunanan alias Captain Mendoza
grabbed Fe by the hand. Cunanan went up the house and ordered Mrs.
Fernandez, Fe and Buenaventura to go down with him. Downstairs, Mrs.
Fernandez saw the companions of Lope Cunanan who were about 17 in
number, armed with guns and revolvers, at the stairs of the house, in the
backyard and surrounding area. The band forcibly took them along and made
them wade through a knee-deep river and walk through coconut groves until
they reached the outpost of the band in the mountains at about 3:00 o'clock
the following morning. There the three victims were confined for two days
guarded by the appellant, Pablo Blaza and their companions. After two days
in the outpost of the band they were transferred to the inner part of the
mountains where they stayed until they were released on 8 May 1953 after
paying to their kidnappers a ransom of P40,000.
Turning back to the night of the incident, 23 April 1953, when Dr. Fernandez
returned to his house with some soldiers and policemen and found his wife,
daughter and cousin gone, he went to the army headquarters but as he
found nobody there, repaired to the old municipal building, to telephone and
report on the incident to the army authorities in Camp Nazareth, Pila,
Laguna, under the command of Coronel Friedlander. After searching the
house, Dr. Fernandez's uncle found on a table inside the doctor's room a
letter signed by Captain Mendoza stating that his wife, daughter and cousin
were taken for the purpose of asking ransom from him. Days after Dr.
Fernandez received about five or six letters signed by the same person
asking for P100,000 ransom, for the release of the three victims, which
amount was reduced to P80,000, P60,000 and finally to P40,000 through
negotiations with the kidnappers.1awphl.nt
On 8 May 1953, after the ransom was finally reduced to P40,000, Dr.
Fernandez asked Dionisio Almario, his son Dionisio, Jr., Juan Abao,
Conrado Velasco and one Ruperto to proceed to barrio Anibong. There, as
agreed upon, Ceferino Llamas and Eliseo Zafra delivered the money to
Dionisio Almario and his companions which they divided and strapped on
their respective bodies. At that juncture Ruperto, whom Dionisio Almario had
earlier dispatched together with Juan Abao to the place where the kidnap
victims had been confined, arrived and reported to him that he had been
assured by the kidnappers that the victims were in safe hands. Ruperto led
them to where the victims were. About half an hour after arrival in the
mountains, the three victims were produced to Dionisio Almario and his
companions by Lope Cunanan and his band numbering about twenty.
Among those in the band was the appellant. Dionisio gave the money to Mrs.
Fernandez which was counted by some of the members of the band of Lope
Cunanan in his presence. After counting, Cunanan took P10,000, gave
P6,000 each to Pablo Blaza and one Pepe and distributed P1,000 each to
the remaining members of the band. The balance of P4,000 was set aside for
expenses of the band. After waiting for 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon,
Cunanan allowed them to leave. The victims and the rescue party arrived in
town at about 6:30 o'clock in the evening.
The appellant denies complicity in the commission of the crime imputed to
him. He claims that he joined the Huk organization sometime in 1948 and
was with Basilio Balbos alias Commander Maning now dead; that later on he
joined the unit of Tomas Calma as his security guard; that from 1950 to 1951
Calma's unit operated in the Sierra Madre Mountains; that thereafter his unit
was transferred to the mountains of Bulacan and Arayat; that during the
entire year 1953 his unit operated in the vicinity of San Luis, Candaba and
Arayat and never left the jurisdiction of Pampanga; that his unit never
operated in the province of Laguna, particularly in Pagsanjan; that he was a
member of the unit of Tomas Calma until 1954; that he knew Lope
Cunanan alias Commander Perla even before he joined the Huk organization
because they lived in the same barrio but that he was never associated with
him; and that he came to know Apolinar Oracion only in 1956 when he was
brought by the army authorities to Canlubang and confined in the stockade in
connection with the Fernandez kidnapping case.
The appellant's denial of complicity in the commission of the crime of
kidnapping imputed to him and the members of the band of Lope
Cunanan alias Captain Mendoza is ineffective in the face of the clear, direct
and positive testimony of Mrs. Dorotea Fernandez, one of the victims, that he
and his co-defendant Pablo Blaza were among those who stood guard over
her, her daughter and cousin in-law; that she saw him with the band of
kidnappers on the 23rd and 24th days of April 1953; and that he was present
while the ransom money was being counted by the members of the band;
and of Dionisio Almario that he saw the appellant with the band of kidnappers
when the three victims were being led out from the mountains by the band on
8 May 1953 and that he was present when the ransom money was being
counted by the band.
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The appellant assails the act of the trial court in proceeding with the trial of
the case in the absence of his counselde parte after appointing a counsel de
oficio to assist him. Reviewing the various motions filed by his counsel de
parte and the orders entered by the trial court thereon, we find that the
appellant has no valid reason to complain. The motions for indefinite
postponement of the trial of the case filed by his counsel de parte, on the
ground that a petition for certiorari to test the legality of the denial of his
motion to quash would be filed in the Supreme Court, but which was never
filed, were plainly to delay the trial and disposition of the case. Despite
receipt of notice his counsel de parte failed to appear on the first day of the
trial (3 March 1958). On the second day (4 March 1958) she appeared but all
that she did for her client was to reiterate his plea for indefinite suspension of
the trial of the case and state that she "will just corroborate for the defense."
On the third and last day (10 March 1958) she actively took part in the
defense of the appellant, she herself conducting the direct examination of the
appellant. The defendant was under detention and it is his constitutional right
and the duty of the Court to have a speedy trial and disposition of the case.
Moreover, it cannot be said that counsel de oficio who assisted the appellant
in the absence of counsel de parte on the first day of the trial was remiss in
the performance of his duties. As shown in the transcript of stenographic
notes, he had endeavored to safeguard the appellant's rights as a defendant
on trial.
As regards the appellant's complaint that he had no been afforded sufficient
time to present other witnesses in his defense, it appears in the transcript of
stenographic notes that after the appellant had finished testifying in his
behalf, counsel de parte stated that she could not close the evidence for the
defense because she wanted to secure the appearance of Apolinar Oracion
as a witness. Asked by the Court what his testimony would be about, she
answered "that (the) kidnapping for ransom was to secure funds for the
functions of the organization." The Court denied the continuation of the trial
of the case and ordered the trial closed because the testimony of Oracion
would not be of any help to the appellant in view of his denial of complicity in
the kidnapping of the victims. Hence, the appellant cannot validly complain
and the Court did not err in its last mentioned order. Furthermore, the
appellant claims to have known Apolinar Oracion only in 1956 or 1957 when
he was brought to the stockade of the Second Military Area in Canlubang.
The crime imputed to the appellant was committed on 23 April 1953.
Therefore, whatever testimony Apolinar Oracion would give in evidence
would not be of much value to the appellant's defense.
The appellant raises the question of double jeopardy. He points out the fact
that he had been charged with the complex crime of rebellion with multiple
murder, robbery, arson and kidnapping in criminal case No. 1940 of the
Court of First Instance of Pampanga (Annexes A and A-1, motion to quash);
that on 8 January 1959, after pleading guilty to the crime of simple rebellion,
the said Court sentenced him to suffer the penalty of one year and five
months of prision correccional and to pay his proportionate share of the costs
(Annex B to petition to withdraw as counsel); in criminal case No. 15909 of
the Court of First Instance of Laguna, People vs. Apolinar Oracion, et al., for
rebellion complexed with multiple murder, robbery, arson, rape and
kidnapping, the kidnapping of Dorotea Fernandez, Fe Fernandez and
Buenaventura Fernandez on 23 April 1957 was alleged to be for the purpose
of raising funds for the HMB organization and a necessary means of
committing the crime of rebellion (Annex B, motion to quash); and that on 17
December 1956, the said Court held that "such act was in furtherance and a
mere ingredient of the offense of rebellion" and "cannot be punished
separately from the latter (rebellion) or complexed with it" (Annex C, motion
to quash). He now contends that the crime of kidnapping imputed to him
being a necessary means of committing and in furtherance of the crime of
rebellion, the said crime is absorbed by rebellion and that, having been
convicted of simple rebellion, he is now put twice in jeopardy of punishment
for the same offense. The appellant's contention is untenable. A reading of
the information filed in criminal case No. 1940 of the Court of First Instance
of Pampanga (Annexes A and A-1; motion to quash) shows that the
kidnapping of Dorotea Fernandez, Fe Fernandez and Buenaventura
Fernandez had never been mentioned as an overt act of rebellion and a
scrutiny of the information filed in criminal case No. 15909 of the Court of
First Instance of Laguna and the judgment rendered therein discloses no
mention of the appellant as a defendant therein. The appellant, therefore,
had never been put in jeopardy of punishment for the crime of rebellion and
cannot maintain that he is being twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense.
In the instant case, the amended information filed in court against the
appellant and his co-defendant was for "kidnapping with ransom" under the
provisions of article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 18. The information filed in the Court of First Instance of
Laguna against Lope Cunanan, et al. (SC No. 120) was also for the same
offense. On appeal by Raymundo Abesamis, this Court found "that the
kidnapping was made by Huks under the command of Capt. Mendoza, or
Lope Cunanan, and Abesamis admittedly belonged to the Huk detachment
under such command." Nevertheless, this court affirmed the judgment of the
Court of First Instance finding Raymundo Abesamis guilty of the crime of
kidnapping for the purpose of extorting ransom and sentencing him to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The herein appellant cannot be entitled to
a penalty lighter than that imposed upon his confederates.
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The pronouncement of this Court in the case of People vs. Raymundo
Abesamis, et al., G.R. No. L-13007, 23 December 1960, that the head of the
band, Lope Cunanan, having been sentenced only to the penalty ofreclusion
perpetua, the same penalty should be meted out to the appellant therein,
despite the presence of the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, with the
assistance of armed men, and band, is equally applicable to the herein
appellant.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellant.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. Nos. L-32613-14 December 27, 1972
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. SIMEON. FERRER (in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Tarlac, Branch I), FELICIANO CO alias LEONCIO CO alias
"Bob," and NILO S. TAYAG alias Romy Reyes alias "Taba,"respondents.
Solicitor R. Mutuc for respondent Feliciano Co.
Jose W. Diokno for respondent Nilo Tayag.

CASTRO, J .:p
I. Statement of the Case
Posed in issue in these two cases is the constitutionality of the Anti-
Subversion
Act,
1
which outlaws the Communist Party of the Philippines and other
"subversive associations," and punishes any person who "knowingly, willfully
and by overt acts affiliates himself with, becomes or remains a member" of
the Party or of any other similar "subversive" organization.
On March 5, 1970 a criminal complaint for violation of section 4 of the Anti-
Subversion Act was filed against the respondent Feliciano Co in the Court of
First Instance of Tarlac. On March 10 Judge Jose C. de Guzman conducted
a preliminary investigation and, finding a prima facie case against Co,
directed the Government prosecutors to file the corresponding information.
The twice-amended information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 27, recites:
That on or about May 1969 to December 5, 1969, in the
Municipality of Capas, Province of Tarlac, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
abovenamed accused, feloniously became an officer and/or
ranking leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines, an
outlawed and illegal organization aimed to overthrow the
Government of the Philippines by means of force, violence,
deceit, subversion, or any other illegal means for the
purpose of establishing in the Philippines a totalitarian
regime and placing the government under the control and
domination of an alien power, by being an instructor in the
Mao Tse Tung University, the training school of recruits of
the New People's Army, the military arm of the said
Communist Party of the Philippines.
That in the commission of the above offense, the following
aggravating circumstances are present, to wit:
(a) That the crime has been committed in contempt of or with
insult to public authorities;
(b) That the crime was committed by a band; and afford
impunity.
(c) With the aid of armed men or persons who insure or
afford impunity.
Co moved to quash on the ground that the Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of
attainder.
Meanwhile, on May 25, 1970, another criminal complaint was filed with the
same court, sharing the respondent Nilo Tayag and five others with
subversion. After preliminary investigation was had, an information was filed,
which, as amended, reads:
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The undersigned provincial Fiscal of Tarlac and State
Prosecutors duly designated by the Secretary of Justice to
collaborate with the Provincial Fiscal of Tarlac, pursuant to
the Order dated June 5, above entitled case, hereby accuse
Nilo S. Tayag, alias Romy Reyes alias TABA, ARTHUR
GARCIA, RENATO (REY) CASIPE, ABELARDO GARCIA,
MANUEL ALAVADO, BENJAMIN BIE alias COMMANDER
MELODY and several JOHN DOES, whose identities are still
unknown, for violation of REPUBLIC ACT No. 1700,
otherwise known as the Anti-Subversion Law, committed as
follows:
That in or about March 1969 and for sometime prior thereto
and thereafter, in the Province of Tarlac, within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, and elsewhere in the
Philippines, the above-named accused knowingly, willfully
and by overt acts organized, joined and/or remained as
offices and/or ranking leaders, of the KABATAANG
MAKABAYAN, a subversive organization as defined in
Republic Act No. 1700; that BENJAMIN BIE and
COMMANDER MELODY, in addition thereto, knowingly,
willfully and by over acts joined and/or remained as a
member and became an officer and/or ranking leader not
only of the Communist Party of the Philippines but also of
the New People's Army, the military arm of the Communist
Party of the Philippines; and that all the above-named
accused, as such officers and/or ranking leaders of the
aforestated subversive organizations, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, did then
and there knowingly, willfully and feloniously commit
subversive and/or seditious acts, by inciting, instigating and
stirring the people to unite and rise publicly and tumultuously
and take up arms against the government, and/or engage in
rebellious conspiracies and riots to overthrow the
government of the Republic of the Philippines by force,
violence, deceit, subversion and/or other illegal means
among which are the following:
1. On several occasions within the province of Tarlac, the
accused conducted meetings and/or seminars wherein the
said accused delivered speeches instigating and inciting the
people to unite, rise in arms and overthrow the Government
of the Republic of the Philippines, by force, violence, deceit,
subversion and/or other illegal means; and toward this end,
the said accused organized, among others a chapter of the
KABATAANG MAKABAYAN in barrio Motrico, La Paz,
Tarlac for the avowed purpose of undertaking or promoting
an armed revolution, subversive and/or seditious
propaganda, conspiracies, and/or riots and/or other illegal
means to discredit and overthrow the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines and to established in the
Philippines a Communist regime.
2. The accused NILO TAYAG alias ROMY REYES alias
TABA, together with FRANCISCO PORTEM alias KIKO
Gonzales and others, pursued the above subversive and/or
seditious activities in San Pablo City by recruiting members
for the New People's Army, and/or by instigating and inciting
the people to organize and unite for the purpose of
overthrowing the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines through armed revolution, deceit, subversion
and/or other illegal means, and establishing in the
Philippines a Communist Government.
That the following aggravating circumstances attended the
commission of the offense: (a) aid of armed men or persons
to insure or afford impunity; and (b) craft, fraud, or disguise
was employed.
On July 21, 1970 Tayag moved to quash, impugning the validity of the
statute on the grounds that (1) it is a bill of attainder; (2) it is vague; (3) it
embraces more than one subject not expressed in the title thereof; and (4) it
denied him the equal protection of the laws.
Resolving the constitutional issues raised, the trial court, in its resolution of
September 15, 1970, declared the statute void on the grounds that it is a bill
of attainder and that it is vague and overboard, and dismissed the
informations against the two accused. The Government appealed. We
resolved to treat its appeal as a special civil action for certiorari.
II. Is the Act a Bill of Attainder?
Article III, section 1 (11) of the Constitution states that "No bill of attainder
or ex port facto law shall be enacted."
2
A bill of attainder is a legislative act
which inflicts punishment without trial.
3
Its essence is the substitution of a
legislative for a judicial determination of guilt.
4
The constitutional ban against
bills of attainder serves to implement the principle of separation of
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powers
5
by confining legislatures to
rule-making
6
and thereby forestalling legislative usurpation of the judicial
function.
7
History in perspective, bills of attainder were employed to
suppress unpopular causes and political minorities,
8
and it is against this evil
that the constitutional prohibition is directed. The singling out of a definite
class, the imposition of a burden on it, and a legislative intent, suffice to
stigmatizea statute as a bill of attainder.
9

In the case at bar, the Anti-Subversion Act was condemned by the court a
quo as a bill of attainder because it "tars and feathers" the Communist Party
of the Philippines as a "continuing menace to the freedom and security of the
country; its existence, a 'clear, present and grave danger to the security of
the Philippines.'" By means of the Act, the trial court said, Congress usurped
"the powers of the judge," and assumed "judicial magistracy by pronouncing
the guilt of the CCP without any of the forms or safeguards of judicial trial."
Finally, according to the trial court, "if the only issue [to be determined] is
whether or not the accused is a knowing and voluntary member, the law is
still a bill of attainder because it has expressly created a presumption of
organizational guilt which the accused can never hope to overthrow."
1. When the Act is viewed in its actual operation, it will be seen that it does
not specify the Communist Party of the Philippines or the members thereof
for the purpose of punishment. What it does is simply to declare the Party to
be an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government for the
purposes of the prohibition, stated in section 4, against membership in the
outlawed organization. The term "Communist Party of the Philippines" issued
solely for definitional purposes. In fact the Act applies not only to the
Communist Party of the Philippines but also to "any other organization
having the same purpose and their successors." Its focus is not on
individuals but on conduct.
10

This feature of the Act distinguishes it from section 504 of the U.S. Federal
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959
11
which, in U.S.
vs. Brown,
12
was held to be a bill of attainder and therefore unconstitutional.
Section 504 provided in its pertinent parts as follows:
(a) No person who is or has been a member of the
Communist
Party ... shall serve
(1) as an officer, director, trustee, member of any executive
board or similar governing body, business agent, manager,
organizer, or other employee (other than as an employee
performing exclusively clerical or custodial duties) of any
labor organization.
during or for five years after the termination of his
membership in the Communist Party....
(b) Any person who willfully violates this section shall be
fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than
one year, or both.
This statute specified the Communist Party, and imposes disability and
penalties on its members. Membership in the Party, without more, ipso
facto disqualifies a person from becoming an officer or a member of the
governing body of any labor organization. As the Supreme Court of the
United States pointed out:
Under the line of cases just outlined, sec. 504 of the Labor
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act plainly
constitutes a bill of attainder. Congress undoubtedly
possesses power under the Commerce Clause to enact
legislation designed to keep from positions affecting
interstate commerce persons who may use of such positions
to bring about political strikes. In section 504, however,
Congress has exceeded the authority granted it by the
Constitution. The statute does not set forth a generally
applicable rule decreeing that any person who commits
certain acts or possesses certain characteristics (acts and
characteristics which, in Congress' view, make them likely to
initiate political strikes) shall not hold union office, and leaves
to courts and juries the job of deciding what persons have
committed the specified acts or possessed the specified
characteristics. Instead, it designates in no uncertain terms
the persons who possess the feared characteristics and
therefore cannot hold union office without incurring criminal
liability members of the Communist Party.
Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367
US 1, 6 L ed 2d 625, 81 S CT 1357, lend a support to our
conclusion. That case involved an appeal from an order by
the Control Board ordering the Communist Party to register
as a "Communist-action organization," under the Subversive
Activities Control Act of 1950, 64 Stat 987, 50 USC sec.
781 et seq. (1958 ed). The definition of "Communist-action
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organization" which the Board is to apply is set forth in sec. 3
of the Act:
[A]ny organization in the United States ... which (i)is
substantially directed, dominated, or controlled by the foreign
government or foreign organization controlling the world
Communist movement referred to in section 2 of this title,
and(ii) operates primarily to advance the objectives of such
world Communist movement... 64 Stat 989, 50 USC sec.
782 (1958 ed.)
A majority of the Court rejected the argument that the Act
was a bill of attainder, reasoning that sec. 3 does not specify
the persons or groups upon which the deprivations setforth
in the Act are to be imposed, but instead sets forth a general
definition. Although the Board has determined in 1953 that
the Communist Party was a "Communist-action
organization," the Court found the statutory definition not to
be so narrow as to insure that the Party would always come
within it:
In this proceeding the Board had found, and the Court of
Appeals has sustained its conclusion, that the Communist
Party, by virtud of the activities in which it now engages,
comes within the terms of the Act. If the Party should at
anytime choose to abandon these activities, after it is once
registered pursuant to sec. 7, the Act provides adequate
means of relief. (367 US, at 87, 6 L ed 2d at 683)
Indeed, were the Anti-Subversion Act a bill of attainder, it would be totally
unnecessary to charge Communists in court, as the law alone, without more,
would suffice to secure their punishment. But the undeniable fact is that their
guilt still has to be judicially established. The Government has yet to prove at
the trial that the accused joined the Party knowingly, willfully and by overt
acts, and that they joined the Party, knowing its subversive character and
with specific intent to further its basic objective, i.e., to overthrow the existing
Government by force deceit, and other illegal means and place the country
under the control and domination of a foreign power.
As to the claim that under the statute organizationl guilt is nonetheless
imputed despite the requirement of proof of knowing membership in the
Party, suffice it to say that is precisely the nature of conspiracy, which has
been referred to as a "dragneet device" whereby all who participate in the
criminal covenant are liable. The contention would be correct if the statute
were construed as punishing mere membership devoid of any specific intent
to further the unlawful goals of the Party.
13
But the statute specifically
required that membership must be knowing or active, with specific intent to
further the illegal objectives of the Party. That is what section 4 means when
it requires that membership, to be unlawful, must be shown to have been
acquired "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts."
14
The ingredient of specific
intent to pursue the unlawful goals of the Party must be shown by "overt
acts."
15
This constitutes an element of "membership" distinct from the
ingredient of guilty knowledge. The former requires proof of direct
participation in the organization's unlawful activities, while the latter requires
proof of mere adherence to the organization's illegal objectives.
2. Even assuming, however, that the Act specifies individuals and not
activities, this feature is not enough to render it a bill of attainder. A statute
prohibiting partners or employees of securities underwriting firms from
serving as officers or employees of national banks on the basis of a
legislative finding that the persons mentioned would be subject to the
temptation to commit acts deemed inimical to the national economy, has
been declared not to be a bill of attainder.
16
Similarly, a statute requiring
every secret, oath-bound society having a membership of at least twenty to
register, and punishing any person who becomes a member of such society
which fails to register or remains a member thereof, was declared valid even
if in its operation it was shown to apply only to the members of the Ku Klux
Klan.
17

In the Philippines the validity of section 23 (b) of the Industrial Peace
Act,
18
requiring labor unions to file with the Department of Labor affidavits of
union officers "to the effect that they are not members of the Communist
Party and that they are not members of any organization which teaches the
overthrow of the Government by force or by any illegal or unconstitutional
method," was upheld by this Court.
19

Indeed, it is only when a statute applies either to named individuals or to
easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict
punishment on them without a judicial trial does it become a bill of
attainder.
20
It is upon this ground that statutes which disqualified those who
had taken part in the rebellion against the Government of the United States
during the Civil War from holding office,
21
or from exercising their
profession,
22
or which prohibited the payment of further compensation to
individuals named in the Act on the basis of a finding that they had engages
in subversive activities,
23
or which made it a crime for a member of the
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Communist Party to serve as an officer or employee of a labor union,
24
have
been invalidated as bills of attainder.
But when the judgment expressed in legislation is so universally
acknowledged to be certain as to be "judicially noticeable," the legislature
may apply its own rules, and judicial hearing is not needed fairly to make
such determination.
25

In New York ex rel. Bryant vs. Zimmerman,
26
the New York legislature
passed a law requiring every secret, oath-bound society with a membership
of at least twenty to register, and punishing any person who joined or
remained a member of such a society failing to register. While the statute did
not specify the Ku Klux Klan, in its operation the law applied to the KKK
exclusively. In sustaining the statute against the claim that it discriminated
against the Ku Klux Klan while exempting other secret, oath-bound
organizations like masonic societies and the Knights of Columbus, the United
States Supreme Court relied on common knowledge of the nature and
activities of the Ku Klux Klan. The Court said:
The courts below recognized the principle shown in the
cases just cited and reached the conclusion that the
classification was justified by a difference between the two
classes of associations shown by experience, and that the
difference consisted (a) in a manifest tendency on the part of
one class to make the secrecy surrounding its purpose and
membership a cloak for acts and conduct inimical to
personal rights and public welfare, and (b) in the absence of
such a tendency on the part of the other class. In pointing
out this difference one of the courts said of the Ku Klux Klan,
the principal association in the included class: "It is a matter
of common knowledge that this organization functions
largely at night, its members disguised by hoods and gowns
and doing things calculated to strike terror into the minds of
the people;" and later said of the other class: "These
organizations and their purposes are well known, many of
them having been in existence for many years. Many of
them are oath-bound and secret. But we hear no complaint
against them regarding violation of the peace or interfering
with the rights of others." Another of the courts said: "It is a
matter of common knowledge that the association or
organization of which the relator is concededly a member
exercises activities tending to the prejudice and intimidation
of sundry classes of our citizens. But the legislation is not
confined to this society;" and later said of the other class:
"Labor unions have a recognized lawful purpose. The
benevolent orders mentioned in the Benevolent Orders Law
have already received legislative scrutiny and have been
granted special privileges so that the legislature may well
consider them beneficial rather than harmful agencies." The
third court, after recognizing "the potentialities of evil in
secret societies," and observing that "the danger of certain
organizations has been judicially demonstrated," meaning
in that state, said: "Benevolent orders, labor unions and
college fraternities have existed for many years, and, while
not immune from hostile criticism, have on the whole justified
their existence."
We assume that the legislature had before it such
information as was readily available including the published
report of a hearing, before a committee of the House of
Representatives of the 57th Congress relating to the
formation, purposes and activities of the Klu Klux Klan. If so
it was advised putting aside controverted evidence that
the order was a revival of the Ku Klux Klan of an earlier time
with additional features borrowed from the Know Nothing
and the A. P. A. orders of other periods; that its
memberships was limited to native-born, gentile, protestant
whites; that in part of its constitution and printed creed it
proclaimed the widest freedom for all and full adherence to
the Constitution of the United States; in another exacted of
its member an oath to shield and preserve "white
supremacy;" and in still another declared any person actively
opposing its principles to be "a dangerous ingredient in the
body politic of our country and an enemy to the weal of our
national commonwealth;" that it was conducting a crusade
against Catholics, Jews, and Negroes, and stimulating
hurtful religious and race prejudices; that it was striving for
political power and assuming a sort of guardianship over the
administration of local, state and national affairs; and that at
times it was taking into its own hands the punishment of
what some of its members conceived to be crimes.
27

In the Philippines the character of the Communist Party has been the object
of continuing scrutiny by this Court. In 1932 we found the Communist Party
of the Philippines to be an illegal association.
28
In 1969 we again found that
the objective of the Party was the "overthrow of the Philippine Government
by armed struggle and to establish in the Philippines a communist form of
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government similar to that of Soviet Russia and Red China."
29
More
recently, in Lansang vs. Garcia,
30
we noted the growth of the Communist
Party of the Philippines and the organization of Communist fronts among
youth organizations such as the Kabataang Makabayan (KM) and the
emergence of the New People's Army. After meticulously reviewing the
evidence, we said: "We entertain, therefore, no doubts about the existence of
a sizeable group of men who have publicly risen in arms to overthrow the
government and have thus been and still are engaged in rebellion against the
Government of the Philippines.
3. Nor is it enough that the statute specify persons or groups in order that it
may fall within the ambit of the prohibition against bills of attainder. It is also
necessary that it must apply retroactively and reach past conduct. This
requirement follows from the nature of a bill of attainder as a legislative
adjudication of guilt. As Justice Frankfurter observed, "frequently a bill of
attainder was ... doubly objectionable because of its ex post factofeatures.
This is the historic explanation for uniting the two mischiefs in one
clause 'No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed.' ...
Therefore, if [a statute] is a bill of attainder it is also an ex post facto law. But
if it is not an ex post facto law, the reasons that establish that it is not are
persuasive that it cannot be a bill of attainder."
31

Thus in Gardner vs. Board of Public Works,
32
the U.S. Supreme Court
upheld the validity of the Charter of the City of Los Angeles which provided:
... [N]o person shall hold or retain or be eligible for any public
office or employment in the service of the City of Los
Angeles, in any office or department thereof, either elective
or appointive, who has within five (5) years prior to the
effective date of this section advised, advocated, or taught,
or who may, after this section becomes effective, become a
member of or affiliated with any group, society, association,
organization or party which advises, advocates or teaches or
has within said period of five (5) years advised, advocated,
or taught the overthrow by force or violence of the
Government of the United States of America or of the State
of California.
In upholding the statute, the Court stressed the prospective application of the
Act to the petitioner therein, thus:
... Immaterial here is any opinion we might have as to the
charter provision insofar as it purported to apply
restrospectively for a five-year period to its effective date.
We assume that under the Federal Constitution the Charter
Amendment is valid to the extent that it bars from the city's
public service persons who, subsequently to its adoption in
1941, advise, advocate, or reach the violent overthrow of the
Government or who are or become affiliated with any group
doing so. The provisions operating thus prospectively were a
reasonable regulation to protect the municipal service by
establishing an employment qualification of loyalty to the
State and the United States.
... Unlike the provisions of the charter and ordinance under
which petitioners were removed, the statute in the Lovett
case did not declare general and prospectively operative
standards of qualification and eligibility for public
employment. Rather, by its terms it prohibited any further
payment of compensationto named individuals or
employees. Under these circumstances, viewed against the
legislative background, the statutewas held to have imposed
penalties without judicial trial.
Indeed, if one objection to the bill of attainder is thatCongress thereby
assumed judicial magistracy, them it mustbe demonstrated that the statute
claimed to be a bill of attainderreaches past conduct and that the penalties it
imposesare inescapable. As the U.S. Supreme Court observedwith respect
to the U.S. Federal Subversive Activities ControlAct of 1950:
Nor is the statute made an act of "outlawry" or of attainderby
the fact that the conduct which it regulates is describedwith
such particularity that, in probability, few organizationswill
come within the statutory terms. Legislatures may act tocurb
behaviour which they regard as harmful to the public
welfare,whether that conduct is found to be engaged in by
manypersons or by one. So long as the incidence of
legislation issuch that the persons who engage in the
regulated conduct, bethey many or few, can escape
regulation merely by altering thecourse of their own present
activities, there can be no complaintof an attainder.
33

This statement, mutatis mutandis, may be said of theAnti-Subversion Act.
Section 4 thereof expressly statesthat the prohibition therein applies only to
acts committed"After the approval of this Act." Only those who
"knowingly,willfully and by overt acts affiliate themselves with,become or
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remain members of the Communist Party of thePhilippines and/or its
successors or of any subversive association"after June 20, 1957, are
punished. Those whowere members of the Party or of any other subversive
associationat the time of the enactment of the law, weregiven the opportunity
of purging themselves of liability byrenouncing in writing and under oath their
membershipin the Party. The law expressly provides that such
renunciationshall operate to exempt such persons from penalliability.
34
The
penalties prescribed by the Act are thereforenot inescapable.
III. The Act and the Requirements of Due Process
1. As already stated, the legislative declaration in section 2 of the Act that the
Communist Party of the Philippinesis an organized conspiracy for the
overthrow of theGovernment is inteded not to provide the basis for a
legislativefinding of guilt of the members of the Party butrather to justify the
proscription spelled out in section 4. Freedom of expression and freedom of
association are sofundamental that they are thought by some to occupy
a"preferred position" in the hierarchy of constitutional values.
35
Accordingly,
any limitation on their exercise mustbe justified by the existence of a
substantive evil. This isthe reason why before enacting the statute in
question Congressconducted careful investigations and then stated
itsfindings in the preamble, thus:
... [T]he Communist Party of the Philippines
althoughpurportedly a political party, is in fact an organized
conspiracyto overthrow the Government of the Republic of
the Philippinesnot only by force and violence but also by
deceit, subversionand other illegal means, for the purpose of
establishing in thePhilippines a totalitarian regime subject to
alien dominationand control;
... [T]he continued existence and activities of the
CommunistParty of the Philippines constitutes a clear,
present andgrave danger to the security of the Philippines;
... [I]n the face of the organized, systematice and
persistentsubversion, national in scope but international in
direction,posed by the Communist Party of the Philippines
and its activities,there is urgent need for special legislation to
cope withthis continuing menace to the freedom and security
of the country.
In truth, the constitutionality of the Act would be opento question if, instead of
making these findings in enactingthe statute, Congress omitted to do so.
In saying that by means of the Act Congress has assumed judicial
magistracy, the trial courd failed to takeproper account of the distinction
between legislative fact and adjudicative fact. Professor Paul Freund
elucidatesthe crucial distinction, thus:
... A law forbidding the sale of beverages containingmore
than 3.2 per cent of alcohol would raise a question of
legislativefact, i.e., whether this standard has a reasonable
relationto public health, morals, and the enforcement
problem. Alaw forbidding the sale of intoxicating beverages
(assuming itis not so vague as to require supplementation by
rule-making)would raise a question of adjudicative fact, i.e.,
whether thisor that beverage is intoxicating within the
meaning of the statuteand the limits on governmental action
imposed by the Constitution. Of course what we mean by
fact in each case is itselfan ultimate conclusion founded on
underlying facts and oncriteria of judgment for weighing
them.
A conventional formulation is that legislative facts those
facts which are relevant to the legislative judgment will not
be canvassed save to determine whether there is a
rationalbasis for believing that they exist, while
adjudicativefacts those which tie the legislative enactment
to the litigant are to be demonstrated and found according
to the ordinarystandards prevailing for judicial trials.
36

The test formulated in Nebbia vs. new York,
37
andadopted by this Court
in Lansang vs. Garcia,
38
is that 'if laws are seen to have a reasonable
relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor
discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied, and judicial
determination to that effect renders a court functus officio." The recital of
legislative findings implements this test.
With respect to a similar statement of legislative findingsin the U.S. Federal
Subversive Activities Control Actof 1950 (that "Communist-action
organizations" are controlledby the foreign government controlling the
worldCommunist movement and that they operate primarily to"advance the
objectives of such world Communist movement"),the U.S. Supreme Court
said:
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It is not for the courts to reexamine the validity of
theselegislative findings and reject them....They are the
productof extensive investigation by Committes of Congress
over morethan a decade and a half. Cf. Nebbia v. New York,
291 U.S.502, 516, 530. We certainly cannot dismiss them as
unfoundedirrational imaginings. ... And if we accept them, as
we mustas a not unentertainable appraisal by Congress of
the threatwhich Communist organizations pose not only to
existing governmentin the United States, but to the United
States as asovereign, independent Nation. ...we must
recognize that thepower of Congress to regulate Communist
organizations of thisnature is
extensive.
39

This statement, mutatis mutandis, may be said of thelegislative findings
articulated in the Anti-Subversion Act.
That the Government has a right to protect itself againstsubversion is a
proposition too plain to require elaboration.Self-preservation is the "ultimate
value" of society. It surpasses and transcendes every other value, "forif a
society cannot protect its very structure from armedinternal attack, ...no
subordinate value can be protected"
40
As Chief Justice Vinson so aptly said
in Dennis vs. United States:
41

Whatever theoretical merit there may be to the argumentthat
there is a 'right' to rebellion against dictatorial governmentsis
without force where the existing structure of government
provides for peaceful and orderly change. We rejectany
principle of governmental helplessness in the face of
preparationfor revolution, which principle, carried to its
logical conclusion,must lead to anarchy. No one could
conceive that it isnot within the power of Congress to prohibit
acts intended tooverthrow the government by force and
violence.
2. By carefully delimiting the reach of the Act to conduct (as explicitly
described in sectin 4 thereof), Congressreaffirmed its respect for the rule that
"even throughthe governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial,that
purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stiflefundamental
personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved."
42
The
requirement of knowing membership,as distinguished
from nominalmembership, hasbeen held as a sufficient basis for penalizing
membershipin a subversive organization.
43
For, as has been stated:
Membership in an organization renders aid and
encouragement to the organization; and when membership
is acceptedor retained with knowledge that the organization
is engaged inan unlawful purpose, the one accepting or
retaining membershipwith such knowledge makes himself a
party to the unlawfulenterprise in which it is engaged.
44

3. The argument that the Act is unconstitutionallyoverbroad because section
2 merely speaks of "overthrow"of the Government and overthrow may be
achieved by peaceful means, misconceives the function of the
phrase"knowingly, willfully and by overt acts" in section 4. Section 2 is merely
a legislative declaration; the definitionsof and the penalties prescribed for the
different acts prescribedare stated in section 4 which requires that
membershipin the Communist Party of the Philippines, to be unlawful, must
be acquired "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts." Indeed, the first
"whereas" clause makes clear thatthe overthrow contemplated is "overthrow
not only by forceand violence but also be deceit, subversion and other
illegalmeans." The absence of this qualificatio in section 2 appearsto be due
more to an oversight rather than to deliberateomission.
Moreover, the word "overthrow' sufficiently connotesthe use of violent and
other illegal means. Only in a metaphoricalsense may one speak of peaceful
overthrow ofgovernments, and certainly the law does not speak in
metaphors.In the case of the Anti-Subversion Act, the use ofthe word
"overthrow" in a metaphorical sense is hardlyconsistent with the clearly
delineated objective of the "overthrow,"namely, "establishing in the
Philippines a totalitarianregime and place [sic] the Government under
thecontrol and domination of an alien power." What thisCourt once said in a
prosecution for sedition is appropos: "The language used by the appellant
clearly imported anoverthrow of the Government by violence, and it should
beinterpreted in the plain and obvious sense in which it wasevidently
intended to be understood. The word 'overthrow'could not have been
intended as referring to an ordinarychange by the exercise of the elective
franchise. The useof the whip [which the accused exhorted his audience to
useagainst the Constabulary], an instrument designed toleave marks on the
sides of adversaries, is inconsistentwith the mild interpretation which the
appellant wouldhave us impute to the language."
45

IV. The Act and the Guaranty of Free Expression
As already pointed out, the Act is aimed against conspiracies to overthrow
the Government by force, violence orother illegal means. Whatever interest
in freedom of speechand freedom of association is infringed by the
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prohibitionagainst knowing membership in the Communist Party ofthe
Philippines, is so indirect and so insubstantial as to beclearly and heavily
outweighed by the overriding considerationsof national security and the
preservartion of democraticinstitutions in his country.
The membership clause of the U.S. Federal Smith Actis similar in many
respects to the membership provision ofthe Anti-Subversion Act. The former
provides:
Whoever organizes or helps or attempts to organize
anysociety, group, or assembly of persons who teach,
advocate, orencourage the overthrow or destruction of any
such governmentby force or violence; or becomes or is a
member of, or affiliatedwith, any such society, group or
assembly of persons, knowingthe purpose thereof
Shall be fined not more than $20,000 or imprisoned notmore
than twenty years, or both, and shall be ineligible for
emplymentby the United States or any department or
agencythereof, for the five years next following his
conviction....
46

In sustaining the validity of this provision, the "Court said in Scales vs. United
States:
47

It was settled in Dennis that advocacy with which we arehere
concerned is not constitutionally protected speech, and itwas
further established that a combination to promote
suchadvocacy, albeit under the aegis of what purports to be
a politicalparty, is not such association as is protected by the
firstAmendment. We can discern no reason why
membership, whenit constitutes a purposeful form of
complicity in a group engagingin this same forbidden
advocacy, should receive anygreater degree of protection
from the guarantees of that Amendment.
Moreover, as was held in another case, where the problemsof
accommodating the exigencies of self-preservationand the values of liberty
are as complex and intricate as inthe situation described in the legislative
findings stated inthe U.S. Federal Subversive Activities Control Act of
1950,the legislative judgment as to how that threat may best bemet
consistently with the safeguards of personal freedomsis not to be set aside
merely because the judgment of judgeswould, in the first instance, have
chosen other methods.
48
For in truth, legislation, "whether it restrains
freedom tohire or freedom to speak, is itself an effort at compromisebetween
the claims of the social order and individual freedom,and when the legislative
compromise in either case isbrought to the judicial test the court stands one
step removedfrom the conflict and its resolution through law."
49

V. The Act and its Title
The respondent Tayag invokes the constitutional commandthat "no bill which
may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be
expressed in the title of the bill."
50

What is assailed as not germane to or embraced in thetitle of the Act is the
last proviso of section 4 which reads:
And provided, finally, That one who conspires with anyother
person to overthrow the Government of the Republic ofthe
Philippines, or the government of any of its political
subdivisionsby force, violence, deceit, subversion or illegal
means,for the purpose of placing such Government or
political subdivisionunder the control and domination of any
lien power, shallbe punished by prision
correccional to prision mayor with allthe accessory penalties
provided therefor in the same code.
It is argued that the said proviso, in reality, punishes notonly membership in
the Communist Party of the Philippinesor similar associations, but as well
"any conspiracyby two persons to overthrow the national or any local
governmentby illegal means, even if their intent is not to establisha
totalitarian regime, burt a democratic regime, evenif their purpose is not to
place the nation under an aliencommunist power, but under an alien
democratic power likethe United States or England or Malaysia or even an
anti-communistpower like Spain, Japan, Thailand or Taiwanor Indonesia."
The Act, in addition to its main title ("An Act to Outlawthe Communist Party of
the Philippines and SimilarAssociations, Penalizing Membership Therein,
and forOther Purposes"), has a short title. Section 1 providesthat "This Act
shall be known as the
Anti-Subversion Act."Together with the main title, the short title of the
statuteunequivocally indicates that the subject matter is subversionin general
which has for its fundamental purpose the substitutionof a foreign totalitarian
regime in place of theexisting Government and not merely subversion by
Communistconspiracies..
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The title of a bill need not be a catalogue or an indexof its contents, and need
not recite the details of the Act.
51
It is a valid title if it indicates in broad but
clear termsthe nature, scope, and consequences of the proposed lawand its
operation.
52
A narrow or technical construction isto be avoided, and the
statute will be read fairly and reasonablyin order not to thwart the legislative
intent. We holdthat the Anti-Subversion Act fully satisfies these requirements.
VI. Conclusion and Guidelines
In conclusion, even as we uphold the validity of theAnti-Subversion Act, we
cannot overemphasize the needfor prudence and circumspection in its
enforcement, operatingas it does in the sensitive area of freedom of
expressionand belief. Accordingly, we set the following basic guidelines to be
observed in any prosecution under the Act.The Government, in addition to
proving such circumstancesas may affect liability, must establish the
following elementsof the crime of joining the Communist Party of the
Philippinesor any other subversive association:
(1) In the case of subversive organizations other thanthe Communist Party of
the Philippines, (a) that thepurpose of the organization is to overthrow the
presentGovernment of the Philippines and to establish in thiscountry a
totalitarian regime under the domination of aforeign power; (b) that the
accused joined such organization;and (c) that he did so knowingly, willfully
and byovert acts; and
(2) In the case of the Communist Party of the Philippines,(a) that the CPP
continues to pursue the objectiveswhich led Congress in 1957 to declare it to
be an organizedconspiracy for the overthrow of the Government by
illegalmeans for the purpose of placing the country under thecontrol of a
foreign power; (b) that the accused joined theCPP; and (c) that he did so
willfully, knowingly and byovert acts.
We refrain from making any pronouncement as to thecrime or remaining a
member of the Communist Party ofthe Philippines or of any other subversive
association: weleave this matter to future determination.
ACCORDINGLY, the questioned resolution of September15, 1970 is set
aside, and these two cases are herebyremanded to the court a quo for trial
on the merits. Costs de oficio.
Makalintal, Zaldivar, Teehankee, Barredo and Esguerra, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J., concurs in the result.
Makasiar and Antonio, JJ., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5887 December 16, 1910
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LOOK CHAW (alias LUK CHIU), defendant-appellant.
Thos. D. Aitken for appellant.
Attorney-General Villamor for appellee.

ARELLANO, C. J .:
The first complaint filed against the defendant, in the Court of First Instance
of Cebu, stated that he "carried, kept, possessed and had in his possession
and control, 96 kilogrammes of opium," and that "he had been surprised in
the act of selling 1,000 pesos worth prepared opium."
The defense presented a demurrer based on two grounds, the second of
which was the more than one crime was charged in the complaint. The
demurrer was sustained, as the court found that the complaint contained two
charges, one, for the unlawful possession of opium, and the other, for the
unlawful sale of opium, and, consequence of that ruling, it ordered that the
fiscal should separated one charge from the other and file a complaint for
each violation; this, the fiscal did, and this cause concerns only the unlawful
possession of opium. It is registered as No. 375, in the Court of First Instance
of Cebu, and as No. 5887 on the general docket of this court.
The facts of the case are contained in the following finding of the trial court:
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The evidence, it says, shows that between 11 and 12 o'clock a. m.
on the present month (stated as August 19, 1909), several persons,
among them Messrs. Jacks and Milliron, chief of the department of
the port of Cebu and internal-revenue agent of Cebu, respectively,
went abroad the steamship Erroll to inspect and search its cargo,
and found, first in a cabin near the saloon, one sack (Exhibit A) and
afterwards in the hold, another sack (Exhibit B). The sack referred to
as Exhibit A contained 49 cans of opium, and the other, Exhibit B,
the larger sack, also contained several cans of the same substance.
The hold, in which the sack mentioned in Exhibit B was found, was
under the defendant's control, who moreover, freely and of his own
will and accord admitted that this sack, as well as the other referred
to in Exhibit B and found in the cabin, belonged to him. The said
defendant also stated, freely and voluntarily, that he had bought
these sacks of opium, in Hongkong with the intention of selling them
as contraband in Mexico or Vera Cruz, and that, as his hold had
already been searched several times for opium, he ordered two other
Chinamen to keep the sack. Exhibit A.
It is to be taken into account that the two sacks of opium, designated as
Exhibits A and B, properly constitute thecorpus delicti. Moreover, another lot
of four cans of opium, marked, as Exhibit C, was the subject matter of
investigation at the trial, and with respect to which the chief of the department
of the port of Cebu testified that they were found in the part of the ship where
the firemen habitually sleep, and that they were delivered to the first officer of
the ship to be returned to the said firemen after the vessel should have left
the Philippines, because the firemen and crew of foreign vessels, pursuant to
the instructions he had from the Manila custom-house, were permitted to
retain certain amounts of opium, always provided it should not be taken
shore.
And, finally, another can of opium, marked "Exhibit D," is also corpus
delicti and important as evidence in this cause. With regard to this the
internal-revenue agent testified as follows:itc-alf
FISCAL. What is it?
WITNESS. It is a can opium which was bought from the defendant
by a secret-service agent and taken to the office of the governor to
prove that the accused had opium in his possession to sell.
On motion by the defense, the court ruled that this answer might be stricken
out "because it refers to a sale." But, with respect to this answer, the chief of
the department of customs had already given this testimony, to wit:
FISCAL. Who asked you to search the vessel?
WITNESS. The internal-revenue agent came to my office and said
that a party brought him a sample of opium and that the same party
knew that there was more opium on board the steamer, and the
agent asked that the vessel be searched.
The defense moved that this testimony be rejected, on the ground of its
being hearsay evidence, and the court only ordered that the part thereof "that
there was more opium, on board the vessel" be stricken out.
The defense, to abbreviate proceedings, admitted that the receptacles
mentioned as Exhibits A, B, and C, contained opium and were found on
board the steamship Erroll, a vessel of English nationality, and that it was
true that the defendant stated that these sacks of opium were his and that he
had them in his possession.
According to the testimony of the internal-revenue agent, the defendant
stated to him, in the presence of the provincial fiscal, of a Chinese interpreter
(who afterwards was not needed, because the defendant spoke English), the
warden of the jail, and four guards, that the opium seized in the vessel had
been bought by him in Hongkong, at three pesos for each round can and five
pesos for each one of the others, for the purpose of selling it, as contraband,
in Mexico and Puerto de Vera Cruz; that on the 15th the vessel arrived at
Cebu, and on the same day he sold opium; that he had tried to sell opium for
P16 a can; that he had a contract to sell an amount of the value of about
P500; that the opium found in the room of the other two Chinamen
prosecuted in another cause, was his, and that he had left it in their
stateroom to avoid its being found in his room, which had already been
searched many times; and that, according to the defendant, the contents of
the large sack was 80 cans of opium, and of the small one, 49, and the total
number, 129.
It was established that the steamship Erroll was of English nationality, that it
came from Hongkong, and that it was bound for Mexico, via the call ports of
Manila and Cebu.
The defense moved for a dismissal of the case, on the grounds that the court
had no jurisdiction to try the same and the facts concerned therein did not
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constitute a crime. The fiscal, at the conclusion of his argument, asked that
the maximum penalty of the law be imposed upon the defendant, in view of
the considerable amount of opium seized. The court ruled that it did not lack
jurisdiction, inasmuch as the crime had been committed within its district, on
the wharf of Cebu.
The court sentenced the defendant to five years' imprisonment, to pay a fine
of P10,000, with additional subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency,
though not to exceed one third of the principal penalty, and to the payment of
the costs. It further ordered the confiscation, in favor of the Insular
Government, of the exhibits presented in the case, and that, in the event of
an appeal being taken or a bond given, or when the sentenced should have
been served, the defendant be not released from custody, but turned over to
the customs authorities for the purpose of the fulfillment of the existing laws
on immigration.
From this judgment, the defendant appealed to this court.lawphi1.net
The appeal having been heard, together with the allegations made therein by
the parties, it is found: That, although the mere possession of a thing of
prohibited use in these Islands, aboard a foreign vessel in transit, in any of
their ports, does not, as a general rule, constitute a crime triable by the
courts of this country, on account of such vessel being considered as an
extension of its own nationality, the same rule does not apply when the
article, whose use is prohibited within the Philippine Islands, in the present
case a can of opium, is landed from the vessel upon Philippine soil, thus
committing an open violation of the laws of the land, with respect to which, as
it is a violation of the penal law in force at the place of the commission of the
crime, only the court established in that said place itself had competent
jurisdiction, in the absence of an agreement under an international treaty.
It is also found: That, even admitting that the quantity of the drug seized, the
subject matter of the present case, was considerable, it does not appear that,
on such account, the two penalties fixed by the law on the subject, should be
imposed in the maximum degree.
Therefore, reducing the imprisonment and the fine imposed to six months
and P1,000, respectively, we affirm in all other respects the judgment
appealed from, with the costs of this instance against the appellant. So
ordered.
Torres, Mapa, Johnson, Carson, Moreland and Trent, JJ., concur.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5272 March 19, 1910
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AH CHONG, defendant-appellant.
Gibb & Gale, for appellant.
Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.
CARSON, J .:
The evidence as to many of the essential and vital facts in this case is limited
to the testimony of the accused himself, because from the very nature of
these facts and from the circumstances surrounding the incident upon which
these proceedings rest, no other evidence as to these facts was available
either to the prosecution or to the defense. We think, however, that, giving
the accused the benefit of the doubt as to the weight of the evidence
touching those details of the incident as to which there can be said to be any
doubt, the following statement of the material facts disclose by the record
may be taken to be substantially correct:
The defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook at "Officers' quarters,
No. 27," Fort Mc Kinley, Rizal Province, and at the same place Pascual
Gualberto, deceased, was employed as a house boy or muchacho. "Officers'
quarters No. 27" as a detached house situates some 40 meters from the
nearest building, and in August, 19087, was occupied solely as an officers'
mess or club. No one slept in the house except the two servants, who jointly
occupied a small room toward the rear of the building, the door of which
opened upon a narrow porch running along the side of the building, by which
communication was had with the other part of the house. This porch was
covered by a heavy growth of vines for its entire length and height. The door
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of the room was not furnished with a permanent bolt or lock, and occupants,
as a measure of security, had attached a small hook or catch on the inside of
the door, and were in the habit of reinforcing this somewhat insecure means
of fastening the door by placing against it a chair. In the room there was but
one small window, which, like the door, opened on the porch. Aside from the
door and window, there were no other openings of any kind in the room.
On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10 o'clock, the defendant, who had
received for the night, was suddenly awakened by some trying to force open
the door of the room. He sat up in bed and called out twice, "Who is there?"
He heard no answer and was convinced by the noise at the door that it was
being pushed open by someone bent upon forcing his way into the room.
Due to the heavy growth of vines along the front of the porch, the room was
very dark, and the defendant, fearing that the intruder was a robber or a thief,
leaped to his feet and called out. "If you enter the room, I will kill you." At that
moment he was struck just above the knee by the edge of the chair which
had been placed against the door. In the darkness and confusion the
defendant thought that the blow had been inflicted by the person who had
forced the door open, whom he supposed to be a burglar, though in the light
of after events, it is probable that the chair was merely thrown back into the
room by the sudden opening of the door against which it rested. Seizing a
common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, the defendant struck
out wildly at the intruder who, it afterwards turned out, was his roommate,
Pascual. Pascual ran out upon the porch and fell down on the steps in a
desperately wounded condition, followed by the defendant, who immediately
recognized him in the moonlight. Seeing that Pascual was wounded, he
called to his employers who slept in the next house, No. 28, and ran back to
his room to secure bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds.
There had been several robberies in Fort McKinley not long prior to the date
of the incident just described, one of which took place in a house in which the
defendant was employed as cook; and as defendant alleges, it was because
of these repeated robberies he kept a knife under his pillow for his personal
protection.
The deceased and the accused, who roomed together and who appear to
have on friendly and amicable terms prior to the fatal incident, had an
understanding that when either returned at night, he should knock at the door
and acquiant his companion with his identity. Pascual had left the house
early in the evening and gone for a walk with his friends, Celestino Quiambao
and Mariano Ibaez, servants employed at officers' quarters No. 28, the
nearest house to the mess hall. The three returned from their walk at about
10 o'clock, and Celestino and Mariano stopped at their room at No. 28,
Pascual going on to his room at No. 27. A few moments after the party
separated, Celestino and Mariano heard cries for assistance and upon
returning to No. 27 found Pascual sitting on the back steps fatally wounded in
the stomach, whereupon one of them ran back to No. 28 and called
Liuetenants Jacobs and Healy, who immediately went to the aid of the
wounded man.
The defendant then and there admitted that he had stabbed his roommate,
but said that he did it under the impression that Pascual was "a ladron"
because he forced open the door of their sleeping room, despite defendant's
warnings.
No reasonable explanation of the remarkable conduct on the part of
Pascuals suggests itself, unless it be that the boy in a spirit of mischief was
playing a trick on his Chinese roommate, and sought to frightened him by
forcing his way into the room, refusing to give his name or say who he was,
in order to make Ah Chong believe that he was being attacked by a robber.
Defendant was placed under arrest forthwith, and Pascual was conveyed to
the military hospital, where he died from the effects of the wound on the
following day.
The defendant was charged with the crime of assassination, tried, and found
guilty by the trial court of simple homicide, with extenuating circumstances,
and sentenced to six years and one day presidio mayor, the minimum
penalty prescribed by law.
At the trial in the court below the defendant admitted that he killed his
roommate, Pascual Gualberto, but insisted that he struck the fatal blow
without any intent to do a wrongful act, in the exercise of his lawful right of
self-defense.
Article 8 of the Penal Code provides that
The following are not delinquent and are therefore exempt from
criminal liability:
xxx xxx xxx
4 He who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided there are
the following attendant circumstances:
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(1) Illegal aggression.
(2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel
it.
(3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself.
Under these provisions we think that there can be no doubt that defendant
would be entitle to complete exception from criminal liability for the death of
the victim of his fatal blow, if the intruder who forced open the door of his
room had been in fact a dangerous thief or "ladron," as the defendant
believed him to be. No one, under such circumstances, would doubt the right
of the defendant to resist and repel such an intrusion, and the thief having
forced open the door notwithstanding defendant's thrice-repeated warning to
desist, and his threat that he would kill the intruder if he persisted in his
attempt, it will not be questioned that in the darkness of the night, in a small
room, with no means of escape, with the thief advancing upon him despite
his warnings defendant would have been wholly justified in using any
available weapon to defend himself from such an assault, and in striking
promptly, without waiting for the thief to discover his whereabouts and deliver
the first blow.
But the evidence clearly discloses that the intruder was not a thief or a
"ladron." That neither the defendant nor his property nor any of the property
under his charge was in real danger at the time when he struck the fatal
blow. That there was no such "unlawful aggression" on the part of a thief or
"ladron" as defendant believed he was repelling and resisting, and that there
was no real "necessity" for the use of the knife to defend his person or his
property or the property under his charge.
The question then squarely presents it self, whether in this jurisdiction one
can be held criminally responsible who, by reason of a mistake as to the
facts, does an act for which he would be exempt from criminal liability if the
facts were as he supposed them to be, but which would constitute the crime
of homicide or assassination if the actor had known the true state of the facts
at the time when he committed the act. To this question we think there can
be but one answer, and we hold that under such circumstances there is no
criminal liability, provided always that the alleged ignorance or mistake or fact
was not due to negligence or bad faith.
In broader terms, ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or mistake
of fact is sufficient to negative a particular intent which under the law is a
necessary ingredient of the offense charged (e.g., in larcerny, animus
furendi; in murder, malice; in crimes intent) "cancels the presumption of
intent," and works an acquittal; except in those cases where the
circumstances demand a conviction under the penal provisions touching
criminal negligence; and in cases where, under the provisions of article 1 of
the Penal Code one voluntarily committing a crime or misdeamor incurs
criminal liability for any wrongful act committed by him, even though it be
different from that which he intended to commit. (Wharton's Criminal Law,
sec. 87 and cases cited; McClain's Crim. Law, sec. 133 and cases cited;
Pettit vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 240; Commonwealth vs. Power, 7 Met., 596;
Yates vs. People, 32 N.Y., 509; Isham vs. State, 38 Ala., 213;
Commonwealth vs. Rogers, 7 Met., 500.)
The general proposition thus stated hardly admits of discussion, and the only
question worthy of consideration is whether malice or criminal intent is an
essential element or ingredient of the crimes of homicide and assassination
as defined and penalized in the Penal Code. It has been said that since the
definitions there given of these as well as most other crimes and offense
therein defined, do not specifically and expressly declare that the acts
constituting the crime or offense must be committed with malice or with
criminal intent in order that the actor may be held criminally liable, the
commission of the acts set out in the various definitions subjects the actor to
the penalties described therein, unless it appears that he is exempted from
liability under one or other of the express provisions of article 8 of the code,
which treats of exemption. But while it is true that contrary to the general rule
of legislative enactment in the United States, the definitions of crimes and
offenses as set out in the Penal Code rarely contain provisions expressly
declaring that malice or criminal intent is an essential ingredient of the crime,
nevertheless, the general provisions of article 1 of the code clearly indicate
that malice, or criminal intent in some form, is an essential requisite of all
crimes and offense therein defined, in the absence of express provisions
modifying the general rule, such as are those touching liability resulting from
acts negligently or imprudently committed, and acts done by one voluntarily
committing a crime or misdemeanor, where the act committed is different
from that which he intended to commit. And it is to be observed that even
these exceptions are more apparent than real, for "There is little distinction,
except in degree, between a will to do a wrongful thing and indifference
whether it is done or not. Therefore carelessness is criminal, and within limits
supplies the place of the affirmative criminal intent" (Bishop's New Criminal
Law, vol. 1, s. 313); and, again, "There is so little difference between a
disposition to do a great harm and a disposition to do harm that one of them
may very well be looked upon as the measure of the other. Since, therefore,
the guilt of a crime consists in the disposition to do harm, which the criminal
shows by committing it, and since this disposition is greater or less in
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proportion to the harm which is done by the crime, the consequence is that
the guilt of the crime follows the same proportion; it is greater or less
according as the crime in its own nature does greater or less harm" (Ruth.
Ints. C. 18, p. 11); or, as it has been otherwise stated, the thing done, having
proceeded from a corrupt mid, is to be viewed the same whether the
corruption was of one particular form or another.
Article 1 of the Penal Code is as follows:
Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and ommissions
punished by law.
Acts and omissions punished by law are always presumed to be
voluntarily unless the contrary shall appear.
An person voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor shall incur
criminal liability, even though the wrongful act committed be different
from that which he had intended to commit.
The celebrated Spanish jurist Pacheco, discussing the meaning of the word
"voluntary" as used in this article, say that a voluntary act is a free, intelligent,
and intentional act, and roundly asserts that without intention (intention to do
wrong or criminal intention) there can be no crime; and that the word
"voluntary" implies and includes the words "con malicia," which were
expressly set out in the definition of the word "crime" in the code of 1822, but
omitted from the code of 1870, because, as Pacheco insists, their use in the
former code was redundant, being implied and included in the word
"voluntary." (Pacheco, Codigo Penal, vol. 1, p. 74.)
Viada, while insisting that the absence of intention to commit the crime can
only be said to exempt from criminal responsibility when the act which was
actually intended to be done was in itself a lawful one, and in the absence of
negligence or imprudence, nevertheless admits and recognizes in his
discussion of the provisions of this article of the code that in general without
intention there can be no crime. (Viada, vol. 1, p. 16.) And, as we have
shown above, the exceptions insisted upon by Viada are more apparent than
real.
Silvela, in discussing the doctrine herein laid down, says:
In fact, it is sufficient to remember the first article, which declared
that where there is no intention there is no crime . . . in order to
affirm, without fear of mistake, that under our code there can be no
crime if there is no act, an act which must fall within the sphere of
ethics if there is no moral injury. (Vol. 2, the Criminal Law, folio 169.)
And to the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain,
as, for example in its sentence of May 31, 1882, in which it made use of the
following language:
It is necessary that this act, in order to constitute a crime, involve all
the malice which is supposed from the operation of the will and an
intent to cause the injury which may be the object of the crime.
And again in its sentence of March 16, 1892, wherein it held that
"considering that, whatever may be the civil effects of the inscription of his
three sons, made by the appellant in the civil registry and in the parochial
church, there can be no crime because of the lack of the necessary element
or criminal intention, which characterizes every action or ommission
punished by law; nor is he guilty of criminal negligence."
And to the same effect in its sentence of December 30, 1896, it made use of
the following language:
. . . Considering that the moral element of the crime, that is, intent or
malice or their absence in the commission of an act defined and
punished by law as criminal, is not a necessary question of fact
submitted to the exclusive judgment and decision of the trial court.
That the author of the Penal Code deemed criminal intent or malice to be an
essential element of the various crimes and misdemeanors therein defined
becomes clear also from an examination of the provisions of article 568,
which are as follows:
He who shall execute through reckless negligence an act that, if
done with malice, would constitute a grave crime, shall be punished
with the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum degree, to prision
correccional in its minimum degrees if it shall constitute a less grave
crime.
He who in violation of the regulations shall commit a crime through
simple imprudence or negligence shall incur the penalty of arresto
mayor in its medium and maximum degrees.
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In the application of these penalties the courts shall proceed
according to their discretion, without being subject to the rules
prescribed in article 81.
The provisions of this article shall not be applicable if the penalty
prescribed for the crime is equal to or less than those contained in
the first paragraph thereof, in which case the courts shall apply the
next one thereto in the degree which they may consider proper.
The word "malice" in this article is manifestly substantially equivalent to the
words "criminal intent," and the direct inference from its provisions is that the
commission of the acts contemplated therein, in the absence of malice
(criminal intent), negligence, and imprudence, does not impose any criminal
liability on the actor.
The word "voluntary" as used in article 1 of the Penal Code would seem to
approximate in meaning the word "willful" as used in English and American
statute to designate a form of criminal intent. It has been said that while the
word "willful" sometimes means little more than intentionally or designedly,
yet it is more frequently understood to extent a little further and approximate
the idea of the milder kind of legal malice; that is, it signifies an evil intent
without justifiable excuse. In one case it was said to mean, as employed in a
statute in contemplation, "wantonly" or "causelessly;" in another, "without
reasonable grounds to believe the thing lawful." And Shaw, C. J., once said
that ordinarily in a statute it means "not merely `voluntarily' but with a bad
purpose; in other words, corruptly." In English and the American statutes
defining crimes "malice," "malicious," "maliciously," and "malice aforethought"
are words indicating intent, more purely technical than "willful" or willfully,"
but "the difference between them is not great;" the word "malice" not often
being understood to require general malevolence toward a particular
individual, and signifying rather the intent from our legal justification.
(Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs. 428 and 429, and cases cited.)
But even in the absence of express words in a statute, setting out a condition
in the definition of a crime that it be committed "voluntarily," willfully,"
"maliciously" "with malice aforethought," or in one of the various modes
generally construed to imply a criminal intent, we think that reasoning from
general principles it will always be found that with the rare exceptions
hereinafter mentioned, to constitute a crime evil intent must combine with an
act. Mr. Bishop, who supports his position with numerous citations from the
decided cases, thus forcely present this doctrine:
In no one thing does criminal jurisprudence differ more from civil than
in the rule as to the intent. In controversies between private parties
the quo animo with which a thing was done is sometimes important,
not always; but crime proceeds only from a criminal mind. So that
There can be no crime, large or small, without an evil mind. In other
words, punishment is the sentence of wickedness, without which it
can not be. And neither in philosophical speculation nor in religious
or mortal sentiment would any people in any age allow that a man
should be deemed guilty unless his mind was so. It is therefore a
principle of our legal system, as probably it is of every other, that the
essence of an offense is the wrongful intent, without which it can not
exists. We find this doctrine confirmed by
Legal maxims. The ancient wisdom of the law, equally with the
modern, is distinct on this subject. It consequently has supplied to us
such maxims as Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea, "the act itself
does not make man guilty unless his intention were so;" Actus me
incito factus non est meus actus, "an act done by me against my will
is not my act;" and others of the like sort. In this, as just said, criminal
jurisprudence differs from civil. So also
Moral science and moral sentiment teach the same thing. "By
reference to the intention, we inculpate or exculpate others or
ourselves without any respect to the happiness or misery actually
produced. Let the result of an action be what it may, we hold a man
guilty simply on the ground of intention; or, on the dame ground, we
hold him innocent." The calm judgment of mankind keeps this
doctrine among its jewels. In times of excitement, when vengeance
takes the place of justice, every guard around the innocent is cast
down. But with the return of reason comes the public voice that
where the mind is pure, he who differs in act from his neighbors does
not offend. And
In the spontaneous judgment which springs from the nature given by
God to man, no one deems another to deserve punishment for what
he did from an upright mind, destitute of every form of evil. And
whenever a person is made to suffer a punishment which the
community deems not his due, so far from its placing an evil mark
upon him, it elevates him to the seat of the martyr. Even infancy itself
spontaneously pleads the want of bad intent in justification of what
has the appearance of wrong, with the utmost confidence that the
plea, if its truth is credited, will be accepted as good. Now these facts
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are only the voice of nature uttering one of her immutable truths. It is,
then, the doctrine of the law, superior to all other doctrines, because
first in nature from which the law itself proceeds, that no man is to be
punished as a criminal unless his intent is wrong. (Bishop's New
Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs. 286 to 290.)
Compelled by necessity, "the great master of all things," an apparent
departure from this doctrine of abstract justice result from the adoption of the
arbitrary rule that Ignorantia juris non excusat ("Ignorance of the law excuses
no man"), without which justice could not be administered in our tribunals;
and compelled also by the same doctrine of necessity, the courts have
recognized the power of the legislature to forbid, in a limited class of cases,
the doing of certain acts, and to make their commission criminal without
regard to the intent of the doer. Without discussing these exceptional cases
at length, it is sufficient here to say that the courts have always held that
unless the intention of the lawmaker to make the commission of certain acts
criminal without regard to the intent of the doer is clear and beyond question
the statute will not be so construed (cases cited in Cyc., vol. 12, p. 158, notes
76 and 77); and the rule that ignorance of the law excuses no man has been
said not to be a real departure from the law's fundamental principle that
crime exists only where the mind is at fault, because "the evil purpose need
not be to break the law, and if suffices if it is simply to do the thing which the
law in fact forbids." (Bishop's New Criminal Law, sec. 300, and cases cited.)
But, however this may be, there is no technical rule, and no pressing
necessity therefore, requiring mistake in fact to be dealt with otherwise that in
strict accord with the principles of abstract justice. On the contrary, the
maxim here is Ignorantia facti excusat ("Ignorance or mistake in point of fact
is, in all cases of supposed offense, a sufficient excuse"). (Brown's Leg.
Max., 2d ed., 190.)
Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any
such mistake of fact as shows the act committed to have proceeded from no
sort of evil in the mind necessarily relieves the actor from criminal liability
provided always there is no fault or negligence on his part; and as laid down
by Baron Parke, "The guilt of the accused must depend on the
circumstances as they appear to him." (Reg. vs. Thurborn, 1 Den. C., 387;
P. vs.Anderson, 44 Cal.., 65; P. vs. Lamb, 54 Barb., 342; Yates vs. P., 32 N.
Y., 509; Patterson vs. P., 46 Barb., 625; Reg. vs. Cohen, 8 Cox C. C., 41;
P. vs. Miles, 55 Cal., 207, 209; Nalley vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 387.) That is to
say, the question as to whether he honestly, in good faith, and without fault
or negligence fell into the mistake is to be determined by the circumstances
as they appeared to him at the time when the mistake was made, and the
effect which the surrounding circumstances might reasonably be expected to
have on his mind, in forming the intent, criminal or other wise, upon which he
acted.
If, in language not uncommon in the cases, one has reasonable
cause to believe the existence of facts which will justify a killing or,
in terms more nicely in accord with the principles on which the rule is
founded, if without fault or carelessness he does believe them he
is legally guiltless of the homicide; though he mistook the facts, and
so the life of an innocent person is unfortunately extinguished. In
other words, and with reference to the right of self-defense and the
not quite harmonious authorities, it is the doctrine of reason and
sufficiently sustained in adjudication, that notwithstanding some
decisions apparently adverse, whenever a man undertakes self-
defense, he is justified in acting on the facts as they appear to him.
If, without fault or carelessness, he is misled concerning them, and
defends himself correctly according to what he thus supposes the
facts to be the law will not punish him though they are in truth
otherwise, and he was really no occassion for the extreme
measures. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, sec. 305, and large array of
cases there cited.)
The common illustration in the American and English textbooks of the
application of this rule is the case where a man, masked and disguised as a
footpad, at night and on a lonely road, "holds up" his friends in a spirit of
mischief, and with leveled pistol demands his money or his life, but is killed
by his friend under the mistaken belief that the attack is a real one, that the
pistol leveled at his head is loaded, and that his life and property are in
imminent danger at the hands of the aggressor. No one will doubt that if the
facts were such as the slayer believed them to be he would be innocent of
the commission of any crime and wholly exempt from criminal liability,
although if he knew the real state of the facts when he took the life of his
friend he would undoubtedly be guilty of the crime of homicide or
assassination. Under such circumstances, proof of his innocent mistake of
the facts overcomes the presumption of malice or criminal intent, and (since
malice or criminal intent is a necessary ingredient of the "act punished by
law" in cases of homicide or assassination) overcomes at the same time the
presumption established in article 1 of the code, that the "act punished by
law" was committed "voluntarily."
Parson, C.J., in the Massachusetts court, once said:
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If the party killing had reasonable grounds for believing that the
person slain had a felonious design against him, and under that
supposition killed him, although it should afterwards appear that
there was no such design, it will not be murder, but it will be either
manslaughter or excusable homicide, according to the degree of
caution used and the probable grounds of such belief. (Charge to the
grand jury in Selfridge's case, Whart, Hom., 417, 418, Lloyd's report
of the case, p.7.)
In this case, Parker, J., charging the petit jury, enforced the doctrine as
follows:
A, in the peaceable pursuit of his affairs, sees B rushing rapidly
toward him, with an outstretched arms and a pistol in his hand, and
using violent menaces against his life as he advances. Having
approached near enough in the same attitude, A, who has a club in
his hand, strikes B over the head before or at the instant the pistol is
discharged; and of the wound B dies. It turns out the pistol was
loaded with powder only, and that the real design of B was only
to terrify A. Will any reasonable man say that A is more criminal that
he would have been if there had been a bullet in the pistol? Those
who hold such doctrine must require that a man so attacked must,
before he strikes the assailant, stop and ascertain how the pistol is
loaded a doctrine which would entirely take away the essential
right of self-defense. And when it is considered that the jury who try
the cause, and not the party killing, are to judge of the reasonable
grounds of his apprehension, no danger can be supposed to flow
from this principle. (Lloyd's Rep., p. 160.)
To the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, cited
by Viada, a few of which are here set out in full because the facts are
somewhat analogous to those in the case at bar.
QUESTION III. When it is shown that the accused was sitting at his
hearth, at night, in company only of his wife, without other light than
reflected from the fire, and that the man with his back to the door
was attending to the fire, there suddenly entered a person whom he
did not see or know, who struck him one or two blows, producing a
contusion on the shoulder, because of which he turned, seized the
person and took from his the stick with which he had undoubtedly
been struck, and gave the unknown person a blow, knocking him to
the floor, and afterwards striking him another blow on the head,
leaving the unknown lying on the floor, and left the house. It turned
out the unknown person was his father-in-law, to whom he rendered
assistance as soon as he learned his identity, and who died in about
six days in consequence of cerebral congestion resulting from the
blow. The accused, who confessed the facts, had always sustained
pleasant relations with his father-in-law, whom he visited during his
sickness, demonstrating great grief over the occurrence. Shall he be
considered free from criminal responsibility, as having acted in self-
defense, with all the circumstances related in paragraph 4, article 8,
of the Penal Code? The criminal branch of the Audiencia of
Valladolid found that he was an illegal aggressor, without sufficient
provocation, and that there did not exists rational necessity for the
employment of the force used, and in accordance with articles 419
and 87 of the Penal Code condemned him to twenty months of
imprisonment, with accessory penalty and costs. Upon appeal by the
accused, he was acquitted by the supreme court, under the following
sentence: "Considering, from the facts found by the sentence to have
been proven, that the accused was surprised from behind, at night,
in his house beside his wife who was nursing her child, was
attacked, struck, and beaten, without being able to distinguish with
which they might have executed their criminal intent, because of the
there was no other than fire light in the room, and considering that in
such a situation and when the acts executed demonstrated that they
might endanger his existence, and possibly that of his wife and child,
more especially because his assailant was unknown, he should have
defended himself, and in doing so with the same stick with which he
was attacked, he did not exceed the limits of self-defense, nor did he
use means which were not rationally necessary, particularly because
the instrument with which he killed was the one which he took from
his assailant, and was capable of producing death, and in the
darkness of the house and the consteration which naturally resulted
from such strong aggression, it was not given him to known or
distinguish whether there was one or more assailants, nor the arms
which they might bear, not that which they might accomplish, and
considering that the lower court did not find from the accepted facts
that there existed rational necessity for the means employed, and
that it did not apply paragraph 4 of article 8 of the Penal Code, it
erred, etc." (Sentence of supreme court of Spain, February 28,
1876.) (Viada, Vol. I, p. 266.) .
QUESTION XIX. A person returning, at night, to his house, which
was situated in a retired part of the city, upon arriving at a point
where there was no light, heard the voice of a man, at a distance of
some 8 paces, saying: "Face down, hand over you money!" because
of which, and almost at the same money, he fired two shots from his
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pistol, distinguishing immediately the voice of one of his friends (who
had before simulated a different voice) saying, "Oh! they have killed
me," and hastening to his assistance, finding the body lying upon the
ground, he cried, "Miguel, Miguel, speak, for God's sake, or I am
ruined," realizing that he had been the victim of a joke, and not
receiving a reply, and observing that his friend was a corpse, he
retired from the place. Shall he be declared exempt in toto from
responsibility as the author of this homicide, as having acted in just
self-defense under the circumstances defined in paragraph 4, article
8, Penal Code? The criminal branch of the Audiencia of Malaga did
not so find, but only found in favor of the accused two of the
requisites of said article, but not that of the reasonableness of the
means employed to repel the attack, and, therefore, condemned the
accused to eight years and one day of prison mayor, etc. The
supreme court acquitted the accused on his appeal from this
sentence, holding that the accused was acting under a justifiable and
excusable mistake of fact as to the identity of the person calling to
him, and that under the circumstances, the darkness and
remoteness, etc., the means employed were rational and the
shooting justifiable. (Sentence supreme court, March 17, 1885.)
(Viada, Vol. I, p. 136.)
QUESTION VI. The owner of a mill, situated in a remote spot, is
awakened, at night, by a large stone thrown against his window at
this, he puts his head out of the window and inquires what is wanted,
and is answered "the delivery of all of his money, otherwise his
house would be burned" because of which, and observing in an
alley adjacent to the mill four individuals, one of whom addressed
him with blasphemy, he fired his pistol at one the men, who, on the
next morning was found dead on the same spot. Shall this man be
declared exempt from criminal responsibility as having acted in just
self-defense with all of the requisites of law? The criminal branch of
the requisites of law? The criminal branch of the Audiencia of
Zaragoza finds that there existed in favor of the accused a majority
of the requisites to exempt him from criminal responsibility, but not
that of reasonable necessity for the means, employed, and
condemned the accused to twelve months of prision correctional for
the homicide committed. Upon appeal, the supreme court acquitted
the condemned, finding that the accused, in firing at the malefactors,
who attack his mill at night in a remote spot by threatening robbery
and incendiarism, was acting in just self-defense of his person,
property, and family. (Sentence of May 23, 1877). (I Viada, p. 128.)
A careful examination of the facts as disclosed in the case at bar convinces
us that the defendant Chinaman struck the fatal blow alleged in the
information in the firm belief that the intruder who forced open the door of his
sleeping room was a thief, from whose assault he was in imminent peril, both
of his life and of his property and of the property committed to his charge;
that in view of all the circumstances, as they must have presented
themselves to the defendant at the time, he acted in good faith, without
malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that he was doing no more than
exercising his legitimate right of self-defense; that had the facts been as he
believed them to be he would have been wholly exempt from criminal liability
on account of his act; and that he can not be said to have been guilty of
negligence or recklessness or even carelessness in falling into his mistake
as to the facts, or in the means adopted by him to defend himself from the
imminent danger which he believe threatened his person and his property
and the property under his charge.
The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court
should be reversed, and the defendant acquitted of the crime with which he
is charged and his bail bond exonerated, with the costs of both instance de
oficio. So ordered.
Johnson Moreland and Elliott, JJ., concur.
Arellano, C.J., and Mapa, J., dissent.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-18924 October 19, 1922
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
WONG CHENG (alias WONG CHUN), defendant-appellee.
Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellant.
Eduardo Gutierrez Repide for appellee.
ROMUALDEZ, J .:
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In this appeal the Attorney-General urges the revocation of the order of the
Court of First Instance of Manila, sustaining the demurrer presented by the
defendant to the information that initiated this case and in which the appellee
is accused of having illegally smoked opium, aboard the merchant
vessel Changsa of English nationality while said vessel was anchored in
Manila Bay two and a half miles from the shores of the city.
The demurrer alleged lack of jurisdiction on the part of the lower court, which
so held and dismissed the case.
The question that presents itself for our consideration is whether such ruling
is erroneous or not; and it will or will not be erroneous according as said
court has or has no jurisdiction over said offense.
The point at issue is whether the courts of the Philippines have jurisdiction
over crime, like the one herein involved, committed aboard merchant vessels
anchored in our jurisdiction waters. 1awph!l.net
There are two fundamental rules on this particular matter in connection with
International Law; to wit, the French rule, according to which crimes
committed aboard a foreign merchant vessels should not be prosecuted in
the courts of the country within whose territorial jurisdiction they were
committed, unless their commission affects the peace and security of the
territory; and the English rule, based on the territorial principle and followed
in the United States, according to which, crimes perpetrated under such
circumstances are in general triable in the courts of the country within
territory they were committed. Of this two rules, it is the last one that obtains
in this jurisdiction, because at present the theories and jurisprudence
prevailing in the United States on this matter are authority in the Philippines
which is now a territory of the United States.
In the cases of The Schooner Exchange vs. M'Faddon and Others (7 Cranch
[U. S.], 116), Chief Justice Marshall said:
. . . When merchant vessels enter for the purposes of trade, it would
be obviously inconvenient and dangerous to society, and would
subject the laws to continual infraction, and the government to
degradation, if such individuals or merchants did not owe temporary
and local allegiance, and were not amenable to the jurisdiction of the
country. . . .
In United States vs. Bull (15 Phil., 7), this court held:
. . . No court of the Philippine Islands had jurisdiction over an offense
or crime committed on the high seas or within the territorial waters of
any other country, but when she came within three miles of a line
drawn from the headlands, which embrace the entrance to Manila
Bay, she was within territorial waters, and a new set of principles
became applicable. (Wheaton, International Law [Dana ed.], p. 255,
note 105; Bonfils, Le Droit Int., secs. 490 et seq.; Latour, La Mer
Ter., ch. 1.) The ship and her crew were then subject to the
jurisdiction of the territorial sovereign subject to such limitations as
have been conceded by that sovereignty through the proper political
agency. . . .
It is true that in certain cases the comity of nations is observed, as in Mali
and Wildenhus vs. Keeper of the Common Jail (120 U.., 1), wherein it was
said that:
. . . The principle which governs the whole matter is this: Disorder
which disturb only the peace of the ship or those on board are to be
dealt with exclusively by the sovereignty of the home of the ship, but
those which disturb the public peace may be suppressed, and, if
need be, the offenders punished by the proper authorities of the local
jurisdiction. It may not be easy at all times to determine which of the
two jurisdictions a particular act of disorder belongs. Much will
undoubtedly depend on the attending circumstances of the particular
case, but all must concede that felonious homicide is a subject for
the local jurisdiction, and that if the proper authorities are proceeding
with the case in the regular way the consul has no right to interfere to
prevent it.
Hence in United States vs. Look Chaw (18 Phil., 573), this court held that:
Although the mere possession of an article of prohibited use in the
Philippine Islands, aboard a foreign vessel in transit in any local port,
does not, as a general rule, constitute a crime triable by the courts of
the Islands, such vessels being considered as an extension of its
own nationality, the same rule does not apply when the article, the
use of which is prohibited in the Islands, is landed from the vessels
upon Philippine soil; in such a case an open violation of the laws of
the land is committed with respect to which, as it is a violation of the
penal law in force at the place of the commission of the crime, no
court other than that established in the said place has jurisdiction of
the offense, in the absence of an agreement under an international
treaty.
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As to whether the United States has ever consented by treaty or otherwise to
renouncing such jurisdiction or a part thereof, we find nothing to this effect so
far as England is concerned, to which nation the ship where the crime in
question was committed belongs. Besides, in his work "Treaties,
Conventions, etc.," volume 1, page 625, Malloy says the following:
There shall be between the territories of the United States of
America, and all the territories of His Britanic Majesty in Europe, a
reciprocal liberty of commerce. The inhabitants of the two countries,
respectively, shall have liberty freely and securely to come with their
ships and cargoes to all such places, ports and rivers, in the
territories aforesaid, to which other foreigners are permitted to come,
to enter into the same, and to remain and reside in any parts of the
said territories, respectively; also to hire and occupy houses and
warehouses for the purposes of their commerce; and, generally, the
merchants and traders of each nation respectively shall enjoy the
most complete protection and security for their commerce, but
subject always to the laws and statutes of the two countries,
respectively. (Art. 1, Commerce and Navigation Convention.)
We have seen that the mere possession of opium aboard a foreign vessel in
transit was held by this court not triable by or courts, because it being the
primary object of our Opium Law to protect the inhabitants of the Philippines
against the disastrous effects entailed by the use of this drug, its mere
possession in such a ship, without being used in our territory, does not being
about in the said territory those effects that our statute contemplates
avoiding. Hence such a mere possession is not considered a disturbance of
the public order.
But to smoke opium within our territorial limits, even though aboard a foreign
merchant ship, is certainly a breach of the public order here established,
because it causes such drug to produce its pernicious effects within our
territory. It seriously contravenes the purpose that our Legislature has in
mind in enacting the aforesaid repressive statute. Moreover, as the Attorney-
General aptly observes:
. . . The idea of a person smoking opium securely on board a foreign
vessel at anchor in the port of Manila in open defiance of the local
authorities, who are impotent to lay hands on him, is simply
subversive of public order. It requires no unusual stretch of the
imagination to conceive that a foreign ship may come into the port of
Manila and allow or solicit Chinese residents to smoke opium on
board.
The order appealed from is revoked and the cause ordered remanded to the
court of origin for further proceedings in accordance with law, without special
findings as to costs. So ordered.
Araullo, C.J., Street, Malcolm, Avancea, Villamor, Ostrand and Johns, JJ.,
concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
Adm. Case No. 3086 February 23, 1988
ALEXANDER PADILLA, complainant,
vs.
THE HON. BALTAZAR R. DIZON, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasay City Branch 113,respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N

PER CURIAM:
This is an administrative complaint, dated August 6, 1987, filed by the then
Commissioner of Customs, Alexander Padilla, against respondent Baltazar
R. Dizon, RTC Judge, Branch 115, Pasay City, for rendering a manifestly
erroneous decision due, at the very least, to gross incompetence and gross
ignorance of the law, in Criminal Case No. 86- 10126-P, entitled "People of
the Philippines vs. Lo Chi Fai", acquitting said accused of the offense
charged, i.e., smuggling of foreign currency out of the country.
Required by the Court to answer the complaint, the respondent judge filed an
Answer, dated October 6, 1987, reciting his "commendable record as a
fearless prosecutor" since his appointment as Assistant City Fiscal of Manila
on December 4, 1962, until his appointment eventually as RTC Judge on
February 18, 1983; that at in the reorganization of the judiciary after the
February 26, 1986 revolution, he was reappointed to his present position;
that his length of service as prosecutor and judge is "tangible proof that
would negate the allegations of the petitioner" (should be complainant),
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whereas the latter did not last long in the service for reasons only known to
him; that the decision involved in the complaint was promulgated by
respondent on September 29, 1986, but the complaint against him was filed
only on August 6, 1987, a clear indication of malice and ill-will of the
complainant to subject respondent to harassment, humiliation and
vindictiveness; that his decision, of which he submits a copy (Annex A) as
part of his Answer, is based on "fundamental principles and the foundation of
rights and justice" and that if there are mistakes or errors in the questioned
decision, they are committed in good faith. Accordingly, respondent prays for
the dismissal of the petition (should be complaint).
The issue before the Court is whether or not the respondent judge is guilty of
gross incompetence or gross ignorance of the law in rendering the decision
in question. A judge can not be held to account or answer, criminally, civilly
or administratively, for an erroneous decision rendered by him in good faith.
The case in which the respondent rendered a decision of acquittal involved a
tourist, Lo Chi Fai, who was caught by a Customs guard at the Manila
International Airport while attempting to smuggle foreign currency and foreign
exchange instruments out of the country. Lo Chi Fai, was apprehended by a
customs guard and two PAFSECOM officers on July 9, 1986, while on board
Flight PR 300 of the Philippine Air Lines bound for Hongkong. At the time of
his apprehension, he was found carrying with him foreign currency and
foreign exchange instruments (380 pieces) amounting to US$ 355,349.57, in
various currency denominations, to wit: Japanese Yen, Swiss Franc,
Australian Dollar, Singapore Dollar, HFL Guilder, French Franc, U.S. Dollar,
English Pound, Malaysian Dollar, Deutsche Mark, Canadian Dollar and
Hongkong Dollar, without any authority as provided by law. At the time the
accused was apprehended, he was able to exhibit two currency declarations
which he was supposed to have accomplished upon his arrival in Manila in
previous trips, namely, CB Currency Declaration No. 05048, dated May 4,
1986 for US$39,600.00 and Japanese Yen 4,000,000.00, and CB Currency
Declaration No. 06346, dated June 29, 1986 for Japanese Yen 6,600,000.00.
An information was filed against Lo Chi Fai, with the RTC of Pasay City for
violation of Sec. 6, Central Bank Circular No. 960, as follows:
That on or about the 9th day of July, 1986, in the City of
Pasay, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Mr. LO
CHI FAI, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attempt to take out of the Philippines through the
Manila International Airport the following foreign currencies
in cash and in checks:
Japanese Yen Y 32,800,000.00
Swiss Franc SW. FR 6,9000.00
Australian Dollar A$ 17,425.00
Singapore Dollar S$ 9,945.00
Deutsche Marck DM 18,595.00
Canadian Dollar CS 13,330.00
Hongkong Dollar HK$ 15,630.00
HFL Guilder HFL 430.00
French Franc F/6,860.00
US Dollar US$ 73,950.00
English Pound 5,318.00
Malaysian Dollar M$. 14,760.00
(in checks)
Australian Dollar A$ 7,750.00
British Pound 700.00
US Dollar US$ 17,630.00
Canadian Dollar C$ 990.00
without authority from the Central Bank.
Contrary to Law.
The case, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 86-10126-P, was
subsequently raffled to Branch 113, presided by herein respondent Judge
Baltazar A. Dizon.
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Section 6 of Circular No. 960 of the Central Bank provides as follows:
Sec. 6. Export, import of foreign exchange; exceptions.
No person shall take out or transmit or attempt to take out or
transmit foreign exchange in any form, out of the Philippines
directly, through other persons, through the mails or through
international carriers except when specifically authorized by
the Central Bank or allowed under existing international
agreements or Central Bank regulations.
Tourists and non-resident visitors may take out or send out
from the Philippine foreign exchange in amounts not
exceeding such amounts of foreign exchange brought in by
them. For purposes of establishing the amount of foreign
exchange brought in or out of the Philippines, tourists and
non-resident temporary visitors bringing with them more than
US$3,000.00 or its equivalent in other foreign currencies
shall declare their foreign exchange in the form prescribed
by the Central Bank at points of entries upon arrival in the
Philippines.
The penal sanction is provided by Section 1, P.D. No. 1883, which reads as
follows:
Section 1. Blackmarketing of Foreign Exchange . That any
person who shall engage in the trading or purchase and sale
of foreign currency in violation of existing laws or rules and
regulations of the Central Bank shall be guilty of the crime of
blackmarketing of foreign exchange and shall suffer the
penalty of reclusion temporal, (minimum of 12 years and I
day and maximum of 20 years) and a fine of no less than
fifty thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos.
At the trial, the accused tried to establish that he was a businessman from
Kowloon, Hongkong, engaged in the garment business, in which he had
invested 4 to 5 million Hongkong Dollars; that he had come to the Philippines
9 to 1 0 times, although the only dates he could remember were April 2,
1986, May 4, 1986, June 28,1986, and July 8, 1986; that the reason for his
coming to the Philippines was to invest in business in the Philippines and
also to play in the casino; that he had a group of business associates who
decided to invest in business with him, namely: Wakita Noboyuki, Kobayashi
Nabuo, Lee Shiang Pin, Lee Chin and Cze Kai Kwan, who had their own
businesses in Japan and Hongkong; that when he came to the Philippines on
April 2,1986, he brought US$50,000.00 and 8,500,000.00 Japanese Yen
which he tried to declare but the Central Bank representative refused to
accept his declaration, until he could get a confirmation as to the source of
the money, for which reason he contacted his bank in Hongkong and a telex
was sent to him on April 3,1986 (Exh. 4). He also brought in with him
US$39,000.00 and 4,000,000.00 Japanese Yen when he arrived on May
4,1986 which he declared (Exh. 1). Again, he declared 8,600,000.00
Japanese Yen when he arrived on June 28, 1986 (Exh. 2). He also testified
that his business associates, as per their agreement to invest in some
business with him in the Philippines, started putting their money for this
purpose in a common fund, hence, every time anyone of them came to the
Philippines, they would declare the money they were bringing in, and all
declarations were handed to and kept by him; these currency declarations
were presented at the trial as exhibits for the defense. When asked by the
court why he did not present all of these declarations when he was
apprehended at the airport, his answer was that he was not asked to present
the declaration papers of his associates, and besides, he does not
understand English and he was not told to do so. He also testified on cross-
examination that the reason he was going back to Hongkong bringing with
him all the money intended to be invested in the Philippines was because of
the fear of his group that the "revolution" taking place in Manila might
become widespread. It was because of this fear that he was urged by his
associates to come to Manila on July 8, 1986 to bring the money out of the
Philippines.
The respondent judge, in his decision acquitting the accused, stated:
The factual issue for this Court to determine is whether or
not the accused wilfully violated Section 6 of Circular No.
960. The fact that the accused had in his possession the
foreign currencies when he was about to depart from the
Philippines did not by that act alone make him liable for
Violation of Section 6.
What is imperative is the purpose for which the act of
bringing foreign currencies out of the country was done the
very intention. It is that which qualifies the act as criminal or
not. There must be that clear intention to violate and benefit
from the act done. Intent is a mental state, the existence of
which is shown by overt acts of a person.
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The respondent proceeded to analyze the evidence which, according to him,
tended to show that the accused had no wilfull intention to violate the law.
According to the respondent in his decision:
... this Court is persuaded to accept the explanation of the
defense that the currencies confiscated and/or seized from
the accused belong to him and his business associates
abovenamed. And from the unwavering and unequivocal
testimonies of Mr. Templo and all of currencies in question
came from abroad and not from the local source which is
what is being prohibited by the government. Yes, simply
reading the provisions of said circular will, readily show that
the currency declaration is required for the purpose of
establishing the amount of currency being brought by tourist
or temporary non-resident visitors into the country. The
currency declarations, therefore, is already (sic) intended to
serve as a guideline for the Customs authorities to determine
the amounts actually brought in by them to correspond to the
amounts that could be allowed to be taken out. Indeed, this
Court is amazed and really has its misgivings in the manner
currency declarations were made as testified to by the
Central Bank employees. Why the Bureau of Customs
representative never took part in all these declarations
testified to by no less than five (5) Central Bank employees?
Seemingly, these employees are the favorites of these
travellers. It is the hope of this Court that the authorities must
do something to remedy the evident flaw in the system for
effective implementation of the questioned Central Bank
Circular No. 960.
But even with a doubtful mind this Court would not be able to
pin criminal responsibility on the accused. This is due to its
steadfast adherence and devotion to the rule of law-a factor
in restoring the almost lost faith and erosion of confidence of
the people in the administration of justice. Courts of Justice
are guided only by the rule of evidence.
The respondent-judge has shown gross incompetence or gross ignorance of
the law in holding that to convict the accused for violation of Central Bank
Circular No. 960, the prosecution must establish that the accused had the
criminal intent to violate the law. The respondent ought to know that proof of
malice or deliberate intent (mens rea) is not essential in offenses punished
by special laws, which are mala prohibita. In requiring proof of malice, the
respondent has by his gross ignorance allowed the accused to go scot free.
The accused at the time of his apprehension at the Manila International
Airport had in his possession the amount of US$355,349.57 in assorted
foreign currencies and foreign exchange instruments (380 pieces), without
any specific authority from the Central Bank as required by law. At the time of
his apprehension, he was able to exhibit only two foreign currency
declarations in his possession. These were old declarations made by him on
the occasion of his previous trips to the Philippines.
Although lack of malice or wilfull intent is not a valid defense in a case for
violation of Central Bank Circular No. 960, the respondent nonetheless chose
to exonerate the accused based on his defense that the foreign currency he
was bringing out of the country at the time he was apprehended by the
customs authorities were brought into the Philippines by him and his alleged
business associates on several previous occasions when they came to the
Philippines, supposedly to be used for the purpose of investing in some
unspecified or undetermined business ventures; that this money was kept in
the Philippines and he precisely came to the Philippines to take the money
out as he and his alleged business associates were afraid that the
"attempted revolution" which occurred on July 6,1986 might spread. Such
fantastic tale, although totally irrelevant to the matter of the criminal liability of
the accused under the information, was swallowed by the respondent-judge
"hook, line and sinker." It did not matter to the respondent that the foreign
currency and foreign currency instruments found in the possession of the
accused when he was apprehended at the airport-380 pieces in all-and the
amounts of such foreign exchange did not correspond to the foreign currency
declarations presented by the accused at the trial. It did not matter to the
respondent that the accused by his own story admitted, in effect, that he was
a carrier" of foreign currency for other people. The respondent closed his
eyes to the fact that the very substantial amounts of foreign exchange found
in the possession of the accused at the time of his apprehension consisted of
personal checks of other people, as well as cash in various currency
denominations (12 kinds of currency in all), which clearly belied the claim of
the accused that they were part of the funds which he and his supposed
associates had brought in and kept in the Philippines for the purpose of
investing in some business ventures. The respondent ignored the fact that
most of the CB Currency declarations presented by the defense at the trial
were declarations belonging to other people which could not be utilized by
the accused to justify his having the foreign exchange in his possession.
Although contrary to ordinary human experience and behavior, the
respondent judge chose to give credence to the fantastic tale of the accused
that he and his alleged business associates had brought in from time to time
and accumulated and kept in the Philippines foreign exchange (of very
substantial amounts in cash and checks in various foreign currency
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denominations) for the purpose of investing in business even before they
knew and had come to an agreement as to the specific business venture in
which they were going to invest. These and other circumstances which make
the story concocted by the accused so palpably unbelievable as to render the
findings of the respondent judge obviously contrived to favor the acquittal of
the accused, thereby clearly negating his claim that he rendered the decision
"in good faith." His actuations in this case amount to grave misconduct
prejudicial to the interest of sound and fair administration of justice.
He not only acquitted the accused Lo Chi Fai, but directed in his decision the
release to the accused of at least the amount of US$3,000.00, allowed,
according to respondent, under Central Bank Circular No. 960. This, in spite
of the fact that forfeiture proceedings had already been instituted by the
Bureau of Customs over the currency listed in the information, which
according to the respondent should be respected since the Bureau of
Customs "has the exclusive jurisdiction in the matter of seizure and forfeiture
of the property involved in the alleged infringements of the aforesaid Central
Bank Circular." In invoking the provisions of CB Circular No. 960 to justify the
release of US$ 3,000.00 to the accused, the respondent judge again
displayed gross incompetence and gross ignorance of the law. There is
nothing in the said CB Circular which could be taken as authority for the trial
court to release the said amount of U.S. Currency to the accused. According
to the above-cited CB Circular, tourists may take out or send out from the
Philippines foreign exchange in amounts not exceeding such amounts of
foreign exchange brought in by them; for the purpose of establishing such
amount, tourists or non-resident temporary visitors bringing with them more
than US$3,000.00 or its equivalent in other foreign currencies must declare
their foreign exchange at points of entries upon arrival in the Philippines. In
other words, CB Circular No. 960 merely provides that for the purpose of
establishing the amount of foreign currency brought in or out of the
Philippines, a tourist upon arrival is required to declare any foreign exchange
he is bringing in at the time of his arrival, if the same exceeds the amount of
US$3,000.00 or its equivalent in other foreign currencies. There is nothing in
said circular that would justify returning to him the amount of at least
US$3,000.00, if he is caught attempting to bring out foreign exchange in
excess of said amount without specific authority from the Central Bank.
Accordingly, the Court finds the respondent Regional Trial Court Judge,
Baltazar R. Dizon, guilty of gross incompetence, gross ignorance of the law
and grave and serious misconduct affecting his integrity and efficiency, and
consistent with the responsibility of this Court for the just and proper
administration of justice and for the attainment of the objective of maintaining
the people's faith in the judiciary (People vs. Valenzuela, 135 SCRA 712), it
is hereby ordered that the Respondent Judge be DISMISSED from the
service. All leave and retirement benefits and privileges to which he may be
entitled are hereby forfeited with prejudice to his being reinstated in any
branch of government service, including government-owned and/or
controlled agencies or corporations.
This resolution is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras,
Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Sarmiento Cortes, and Grio-Aquino, JJ.,
concur.
Padilla, Narvasa, JJ., took no part.
SECOND DIVISION


CIRSE FRANCISCO CHOY
TORRALBA,
P e t i t i o n e r,



- versus




PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
R e s p o n d e n t.
G. R. No. 153699

Present:

PUNO,
Chairman,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR.,
TINGA, and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.

Promulgated:

August 22, 2005
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

D E C I S I O N


CHICO-NAZARIO, J .:

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This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision
[1]
promulgated on 22
May 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 24818 which affirmed, with
modification, the trial courts
[2]
decision finding petitioner Cirse Francisco Choy
Torralba guilty of the crime of libel in Criminal Case No. 9107.

Culled from the records are the following facts:

Petitioner Torralba was the host of a radio program called Tug-Ani ang
Lungsod which was aired over the radio station DYFX in Cebu City. On 12
September 1994, an information for libel was filed before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Tagbilaran City against petitioner Torralba. The information states:


The undersigned, City Prosecutor II, City of Tagbilaran,
Philippines, hereby accuses CIRSE FRANCISCO CHOY
TORRALBA for the crime of Libel, committed as follows:

That, on or about the 11
th
day of April, 1994, in the City of
Tagbilaran, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with deliberate and
malicious intent of maligning, impeaching and discrediting the
honesty, integrity, reputation, prestige and honor of late CFI Judge
Agapito Y. Hontanosas, who was during his [lifetime] a CFI Judge
of Cebu and a man of good reputation and social standing in the
community and for the purpose of exposing him to public hatred,
contempt, disrespect and ridicule, in his radio program TUG-ANI
AND LUNGSOD (TELL THE PEOPLE) over radio station
DYFX, openly, publicly and repeatedly announce[d] the
following: KINING MGA HONTANOSAS, AGAPITO
HONTANOSAS UG CASTOR HONTANOSAS, MGA
COLLABORATOR SA PANAHON SA GUERRA. SA ATO PA,
TRAYDOR SA YUTANG NATAWHAN. X X X. DUNAY DUGO
NGA PAGKATRAYDOR ANG AMAHAN NI MANOLING
HONTANOSAS, which in English means: THESE
HONTANOSAS, AGAPITO HONTANOSAS AND CASTOR
HONTANOSAS, ARE COLLABORATORS DURING THE
WAR. IN OTHER WORDS, THEY ARE TRAITORS TO THE
LAND OF THEIR BIRTH. X X X. THE FATHER OF
MANOLING HONTANOSAS HAD TREACHEROUS BLOOD,
and other words of similar import, thereby maliciously exposing
the family of the late Judge Agapito Hontanosas including Atty.
Manuel L. Hontanosas,
[3]
one of the legitimate children of [the]
late CFI Judge Agapito Y. Hontanosas to public hatred, dishonor,
discredit, contempt and ridicule causing the latter to suffer social
humiliation, embarrassment, wounded feelings and mental
anguish, to the damage and prejudice of said Atty. Manuel L.
Hontanosas in the amount to be proved during the trial of the case.

Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Article 353 of
the Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 355 of the same
Code.

City of Tagbilaran, Philippines, September 8, 1994.


(SGD.) ADRIANO P. MONTES
City Prosecutor II

APPROVED:

(SGD) MARIANO CAPAYAS
City Prosecutor
[4]




Upon arraignment on 12 March 1996, petitioner Torralba pleaded not guilty to
the crime he was charged with.
[5]


On 14 May 1998, petitioner Torralba filed before the RTC, Branch 1,
Tagbilaran City, where Crim. Case No. 9107 was raffled off, a motion for
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consolidation
[6]
alleging therein that private complainant Atty. Manuel Hontanosas
(Atty. Hontanosas) filed a total of four (4) criminal cases for libel against petitioner
Torralba, three of which Crim. Cases No. 8956, No. 8957, and No. 8958 were
then pending with the RTC, Branch III, Tagbilaran City. As the evidence for the
prosecution as well as the defense were substantially the same, petitioner Torralba
moved that Crim. Case No. 9107 be consolidated with the three other cases so as to
save time, effort, and to facilitate the early disposition of these cases.

In its order dated 25 May 1998,
[7]
the motion for consolidation filed by
petitioner Torralba was granted by the RTC, Branch 1, Tagbilaran City.

During the trial on the merits of the consolidated cases, the prosecution
presented as witnesses Segundo Lim, private complainant Atty. Hontanosas, and
Gabriel Sarmiento.

Lim testified that he was one of the incorporators of the Tagbilaran Maritime
Services, Inc. (TMSI) and was at that time the assigned manager of the port in
Tagbilaran City. According to him, sometime during the Marcos administration,
petitioner Torralba sought TMSIs sponsorship of his radio program. This request
was approved by private complainant Atty. Hontanosas who was then the president
of TMSI. During the existence of said sponsorship agreement, the management of
TMSI noticed that petitioner Torralba was persistently attacking former Bureau of
Internal Revenue Deputy Director Tomas Toledo and his brother Boy Toledo who
was a customs collector. Fearing that the Toledos would think that TMSI was
behind the incessant criticisms hurled at them, the management of TMSI decided to
cease sponsoring petitioner Torralbas radio show. In effect, the TMSI
sponsored Tug-Ani ang Lungsod for only a month at the cost of P500.00.

Soon thereafter, petitioner Torralba took on the management of TMSI. Lim
testified that petitioner Torralba accused TMSI of not observing the minimum wage
law and that said corporation was charging higher handling rates than what it was
supposed to collect.

On 17 December 1993, private complainant Atty. Hontanosas went on-air
in petitioner Torralbas radio program to explain the side of TMSI. The day after
said incident, however, petitioner Torralba resumed his assault on TMSI and its
management. It was petitioner Torralbas relentless badgering of TMSI which
allegedly prompted Lim to tape record petitioner Torralbas radio broadcasts. Three
of the tape recordings were introduced in evidence by the prosecution, to wit:


Exhibit B - tape recording of 19 January 1994
[8]

Exhibit C - tape recording of 25 January 1994
[9]

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Exhibit D - tape recording of 11 April 1994
[10]




During his testimony, Lim admitted that he did not know how to operate a
tape recorder and that he asked either his adopted daughter, Shirly Lim, or his
housemaid to record petitioner Torralbas radio program. He maintained, however,
that he was near the radio whenever the recording took place and had actually heard
petitioner Torralbas radio program while it was being taped. This prompted
petitioner Torralba to pose a continuing objection to the admission of the said tape
recordings for lack of proper authentication by the person who actually made the
recordings. In the case of the subject tape recordings, Lim admitted that they were
recorded by Shirly Lim. The trial court provisionally admitted the tape recordings
subject to the presentation by the prosecution of Shirly Lim for the proper
authentication of said pieces of evidence. Despite petitioner Torralbas objection to
the formal offer of these pieces of evidence, the court a quo eventually admitted the
three tape recordings into evidence.
[11]


It was revealed during Lims cross-examination
[12]
that petitioner Torralba
previously instituted a criminal action for libel
[13]
against the former arising from an
article published in the Sunday Post, a newspaper of general circulation in the
provinces of Cebu and Bohol. In said case, Lim was found guilty as charged by the
trial court
[14]
and this decision was subsequently affirmed, with modification, by the
Court of Appeals in its decision promulgated on 29 July 1996 in CA-G.R. CR No.
16413 entitled, People of the Philippines v. Segundo Lim and Boy
Guingguing.
[15]
In our resolution of 04 December 1996, we denied Lims petition
for review on certiorari.
[16]


For his part, private complainant Atty. Hontanosas testified that he was at
that time the chairman and manager of TMSI; that on 20 January 1994, Lim
presented to him a tape recording of petitioner Torralbas radio program aired on 18
January 1994 during which petitioner Torralba allegedly criticized him and stated
that he was a person who could not be trusted; that in his radio show on 25 January
1994, petitioner Torralba mentioned that he was now [wary] to interview any one
because he had a sad experience with someone who betrayed him and this someone
was like his father who was a collaborator; that on 12 April 1994, Lim brought to
his office a tape recording of petitioner Torralbas radio program of 11 April 1994
during which petitioner Torralba averred that the Hontanosas were traitors to the
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land of their birth; that Judge Agapito Hontanosas and Castor Hontanosas were
collaborators during the Japanese occupation; and that after he informed his siblings
regarding this, they asked him to institute a case against petitioner Torralba.
[17]


When he was cross-examined by petitioner Torralbas counsel, private
complainant Atty. Hontanosas disclosed that he did not actually hear petitioner
Torralbas radio broadcasts and he merely relied on the tape recordings presented to
him by Lim as he believed them to be genuine.
[18]


Sarmiento testified that he was the former court stenographer and interpreter
of RTC, Branch 3, Tagbilaran City, and that he translated the contents of the tape
recordings in 1994 upon the request of private complainant Atty. Hontanosas.

The defense presented, as its sole witness, petitioner Torralba himself.
Petitioner Torralba maintained that he was a member of the Kapisanan ng mga
Brodkaster ng Pilipinas and other civic organizations in Cebu. In the course of his
profession as a radio broadcaster, he allegedly received complaints regarding the
services of TMSI particularly with respect to the laborers low pay and exhorbitant
rates being charged for the arrastre services. As he was in favor of balanced
programming, petitioner Torralba requested TMSI to send a representative to his
radio show in order to give the corporation an opportunity to address the issues
leveled against it; thus, the radio interview of private complainant Atty. Hontanosas
on
17 December 1993.

When petitioner Torralba was cross-examined by private complainant Atty.
Hontanosas,
[19]
he denied having called former CFI Judge Hontanosas a traitor
during his 11 April 1994 radio broadcast. Petitioner Torralba admitted, though, that
during the 17 December 1993 appearance of private complainant Atty. Hontanosas
in his radio program, he did ask the latter if he was in any way related to the late CFI
Judge Hontanosas. Petitioner Torralba averred that he posed said question as mere
backgrounder on his interviewee.

On 24 August 2000, the trial court rendered an omnibus
decision
[20]
acquitting petitioner Torralba in Crim. Cases No. 8956, No. 8957, and
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No. 8958 but holding him guilty of the crime of libel in Crim. Case No. 9107. The
dispositive portion of the trial courts decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court
hereby ACQUITS from criminal liability herein accused Cirse
Francisco Choy Torralba of the charges alluded in Criminal Cases
Nos. 8956, 8957, and 8958 being an exercise of legitimate self-
defense, as afore-discussed. Consequently, the corresponding cash
bonds of the accused in said cases as shown by OR No. 5301156,
No. 5301157, and No. 5301158, all dated February 23, 2000,
issued by the Clerk of Court of Multiple Salas in the amount of
P4,200.00 each representing cash deposits therefore are hereby
cancelled and released.

However, the Court finds the same accused GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt in Crim. Case No. 9107 for his
unwarranted blackening of the memory of the late Hon. CFI Judge
Agapito Y. Hontanosas through the air lanes in his radio program
resulting to the dishonor and wounded feelings of his children,
grandchildren, relatives, friends, and close associates. For this, the
Court hereby sentences the accused to imprisonment for an
indeterminate period of FOUR MONTHS of Arresto Mayor to
THREE YEARS of Prision Correccional medium period pursuant
to Art. 353 in relation to Art. 354 and Art. 355 of the Revised
Penal Code under which the instant case falls. Furthermore, he is
ordered to indemnify the heirs of the late Judge Agapito Y.
Hontanosas for moral damages suffered in the amount of ONE
MILLION PESOS (P1,000,000.00), as prayed for, considering
their good reputation and high social standing in the community
and the gravity of the dishonor and public humiliation caused.
[21]



Petitioner Torralba seasonably filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals
which, in the challenged decision before us, affirmed, with modification, the findings
of the courta quo, thus:

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the court a
quo is AFFIRMED with the modification that accused-appellant
is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of four (4) months of
arresto mayor to two (2) years, eleven (11) months and ten (10)
days of prision correccional and to pay moral damages in the
amount of P100,000.00.
[22]



Hence, the present recourse where petitioner Torralba raises the following
issues:

I

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SPEAKING
THROUGH ITS SPECIAL FIFTEENTH DIVISION GRAVELY
ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE LOWER
COURT A QUO (WITH MODIFICATION), CONVICTING
PETITIONER-APPELLANT [TORRALBA] FOR THE CRIME
OF LIBEL AS DEFINED AND PENALIZED UNDER
ARTICLES 353 AND 355 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE
BASED SOLELY ON THE ALLEGED TESTIMONY OF
SEGUNDO LIM . . . AS BORNE OUT BY THE
STENOGRAPHIC NOTES WOULD NOT SUPPORT THE
FINDING THAT HE TESTIFIED ON THE MALICIOUS
IMPUTATIONS PURPORTEDLY MADE BY PETITIONER-
APPELLANT [TORRALBA] IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 9107.






II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY
COMMITTED AN ERROR IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE AN
UNAUTHENTICATED AND SPURIOUS TAPE RECORD OF A
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RADIO BROADCAST (EXHIBIT D) ALLEGEDLY BY
HEREIN PETITIONER-APPELLANT [TORRALBA] ON THE
BASIS OF WHICH THE LATTER WAS CONVICTED FOR
THE CRIME OF LIBEL.

III

ASSUMING WITHOUT ADMITTING THAT PETITIONER-
APPELLANT [TORRALBA] MADE UTTERANCES
CONTAINED IN THE TAPE RECORD MARKED AS EXHIBIT
D, THE HONORABLE COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT
CONSIDERING THE PRIVILEGE[D] NATURE OF HIS
ALLEGED STATEMENTS IN FEALTY ADHERRENCE TO
THE LANDMARK DECISION OF THE HONORABLE
SUPREME COURT IN BORJAL VS. CA, 301 SCRA 01 (JAN.
14, 1999).

IV

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN
ERROR IN AWARDING DAMAGES AGAINST THE
PETITIONER ABSENT ANY SHOWING OF EVIDENT BAD
FAITH ON THE PART OF THE PETITIONER-APPELLANT
[TORRALBA] WHO ACTED WITH UBERIMA
FIDES (OVERWHELMING GOOD FAITH) IN EXERCISING
THE CONSTITUTIONALLY ENSHRINED FREEDOM OF THE
PRESS (ARTICLE 2220, NEW CIVIL CODE).
[23]



This Court deems it proper to first resolve the issue of the propriety of the
lower courts admission in evidence of the 11 April 1994 tape recording.
Oddly, this matter was not addressed head-on by the Office of the Solicitor General
in its comment.

Petitioner Torralba vigorously argues that the court a quo should not have
given considerable weight on the tape recording in question as it was not duly
authenticated by Lims adopted daughter, Shirly Lim. Without said authentication,
petitioner Torralba continues, the tape recording is incompetent and inadmissible
evidence. We agree.

It is generally held that sound recording is not inadmissible because of its
form
[24]
where a proper foundation has been laid to guarantee the genuineness of the
recording.
[25]
In our jurisdiction, it is a rudimentary rule of evidence that before a
tape recording is admissible in evidence and given probative value, the following
requisites must first be established, to wit:


(1) a showing that the recording device was capable of
taking testimony;
(2) a showing that the operator of the device was
competent;
(3) establishment of the authenticity and correctness of the
recording;
(4) a showing that changes, additions, or deletions have not
been made;
(5) a showing of the manner of the preservation of the
recording;
(6) identification of the speakers; and
(7) a showing that the testimony elicited was voluntarily
made without any kind of inducement.
[26]


In one case, it was held that the testimony of the operator of the recording
device as regards its operation, his method of operating it, the accuracy of the
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recordings, and the identities of the persons speaking laid a sufficient foundation for
the admission of the recordings.
[27]
Likewise, a witness declaration that the sound
recording represents a true portrayal of the voices contained therein satisfies the
requirement of authentication.
[28]
The party seeking the introduction in evidence of a
tape recording bears the burden of going forth with sufficient evidence to show that
the recording is an accurate reproduction of the conversation recorded.
[29]


These requisites were laid down precisely to address the criticism of
susceptibility to tampering of tape recordings. Thus, it was held that the
establishment of a proper foundation for the admission of a recording provided
adequate assurance that proper safeguards were observed for the preservation of the
recording and for its protection against tampering.
[30]


In the case at bar, one can easily discern that the proper foundation for the
admissibility of the tape recording was not adhered to. It bears stressing that Lim
categorically admitted in the witness stand that he was not familiar at all with the
process of tape recording
[31]
and that he had to instruct his adopted daughter to record
petitioner Torralbas radio broadcasts, thus:

ATTY. HONTANOSAS:

q Was this radio program of the accused recorded on April
11, 1994?

a Yes, sir.

q Who recorded the same radio program of April 11, 1994?

a It was my adopted daughter whom I ordered to tape
recorded the radio program of Choy Torralba.
[32]




Clearly, Shirly Lim, the person who actually recorded petitioner Torralbas
radio show on 11 April 1994, should have been presented by the prosecution in order
to lay the proper foundation for the admission of the purported tape recording for
said date. Without the requisite authentication, there was no basis for the trial court
to admit the tape recording Exhibit D in evidence.

In view of our disallowance of the 11 April 1994 tape recording, we are
constrained to examine the records of this case in order to determine the sufficiency
of evidence stacked against petitioner Torralba, bearing in mind that in criminal
cases, the guilt of the accused can only be sustained upon proof beyond reasonable
doubt.

In his comprehensive book on evidence, our former colleague, Justice Ricardo
Francisco, wrote that [e]vidence of a message or a speech by means of radio
broadcast is admissible as evidence when the identity of the speaker is established
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either by the testimony of a witness who saw him broadcast his message or speech,
or by the witness recognition of the voice of the speaker.
[33]


The records of this case are bereft of any proof that a witness saw petitioner
Torralba broadcast the alleged libelous remarks on 11 April 1994. Lim, however,
stated that while petitioner Torralbas radio program on that date was being tape
recorded by his adopted daughter, he was so near the radio that he could even touch
the same.
[34]
In effect, Lim was implying that he was listening to Tug-Ani ang
Lungsod at that time. In our view, such bare assertion on the part of Lim,
uncorroborated as it was by any other evidence, fails to meet the standard that a
witness must be able to recognize the voice of the speaker. Being near the radio is
one thing; actually listening to the radio broadcast and recognizing the voice of the
speaker is another. Indeed, a person may be in close proximity to said device without
necessarily listening to the contents of a radio broadcast or to what a radio
commentator is saying over the airwaves.

What further undermines the credibility of Lims testimony is the fact that he
had an ax to grind against petitioner Torralba as he was previously accused by the
latter with the crime of libel and for which he was found guilty as charged by the
court. Surely then, Lim could not present himself as an uninterested witness whose
testimony merits significance from this Court.

Nor is this Court inclined to confer probative value on the testimony of private
complainant Atty. Hontanosas particularly in the light of his declaration that he did
not listen to petitioner Torralbas radio show subject of this petition. He simply
relied on the tape recording handed over to him by Lim.

Time and again, this Court has faithfully observed and given effect to the
constitutional presumption of innocence which can only be overcome by contrary
proof beyond reasonable doubt -- one which requires moral certainty, a certainty that
convinces and satisfies the reason and conscience of those who are to act upon it.
[35]

As we have so stated in the past

Accusation is not, according to the fundamental law,
synonymous with guilt, the prosecution must overthrow the
presumption of innocence with proof of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. To meet this standard, there is need for the most careful
scrutiny of the testimony of the State, both oral and documentary,
independently of whatever defense is offered by the accused. Only
if the judge below and the appellate tribunal could arrive at a
conclusion that the crime had been committed precisely by the
person on trial under such an exacting test should the sentence be
one of conviction. It is thus required that every circumstance
favoring innocence be duly taken into account. The proof against
him must survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must
not be permitted to sway judgment.
[36]



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Confronted with what the State was able to present as evidence against
petitioner Torralba, this Court is compelled to overturn the decision of the Court of
Appeals due to insufficiency of evidence meriting a finding of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision promulgated on
22 May 2002 of the Court of Appeals, affirming the omnibus decision dated 24
August 2000 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, Tagbilaran City, is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Instead, a new one is
entered ACQUITTING petitioner Cirse Francisco Choy Torralba of the crime of
libel. The cash bond posted by said petitioner is ordered released to him subject to
the usual auditing and accounting procedures. No costs.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-47722 July 27, 1943
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO Z. OANIS and ALBERTO GALANTA, defendants-appellants.
Antonio Z. Oanis in his own behalf.
Maximo L. Valenzuela for appellant Galanta.
Acting Solicitor-General Ibaez and Assistant Attorney Torres for appellee.
MORAN, J .:
Charged with the crime of murder of one Serapio Tecson, the accused
Antonio Z. Oanis and Alberto Galanta, chief of police of Cabanatuan and
corporal of the Philippine Constabulary, respectively, were, after due trial,
found guilty by the lower court of homicide through reckless imprudence and
were sentenced each to an indeterminate penalty of from one year and six
months to two years and two months of prison correccional and to indemnify
jointly and severally the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P1,000.
Defendants appealed separately from this judgment.
In the afternoon of December 24, 1938. Captain Godofredo Monsod,
Constabulary Provincial Inspector at Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, received
from Major Guido a telegram of the following tenor: "Information received
escaped convict Anselmo Balagtas with bailarina and Irene in Cabanatuan
get him dead or alive." Captain Monsod accordingly called for his first
sergeant and asked that he be given four men. Defendant corporal Alberto
Galanta, and privates Nicomedes Oralo, Venancio Serna and D. Fernandez,
upon order of their sergeant, reported at the office of the Provincial Inspector
where they were shown a copy of the above-quoted telegram and a
newspaper clipping containing a picture of Balagtas. They were instructed to
arrest Balagtas and, if overpowered, to follow the instruction contained in the
telegram. The same instruction was given to the chief of police Oanis who
was likewise called by the Provincial Inspector. When the chief of police was
asked whether he knew one Irene, a bailarina, he answered that he knew
one of loose morals of the same name. Upon request of the Provincial
Inspector, the chief of police tried to locate some of his men to guide the
constabulary soldiers in ascertaining Balagtas' whereabouts, and failing to
see anyone of them he volunteered to go with the party. The Provincial
Inspector divided the party into two groups with defendants Oanis and
Galanta, and private Fernandez taking the route to Rizal street leading to the
house where Irene was supposedly living. When this group arrived at Irene's
house, Oanis approached one Brigida Mallare, who was then stripping
banana stalks, and asked her where Irene's room was. Brigida indicated the
place and upon further inquiry also said that Irene was sleeping with her
paramour. Brigida trembling, immediately returned to her own room which
was very near that occupied by Irene and her paramour. Defendants Oanis
and Galanta then went to the room of Irene, and an seeing a man sleeping
with his back towards the door where they were, simultaneously or
successively fired at him with their .32 and .45 caliber revolvers. Awakened
by the gunshots, Irene saw her paramour already wounded, and looking at
the door where the shots came, she saw the defendants still firing at him.
Shocked by the entire scene. Irene fainted; it turned out later that the person
shot and killed was not the notorious criminal Anselmo Balagtas but a
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peaceful and innocent citizen named Serapio Tecson, Irene's paramour. The
Provincial Inspector, informed of the killing, repaired to the scene and when
he asked as to who killed the deceased. Galanta, referring to himself and to
Oanis, answered: "We two, sir." The corpse was thereafter brought to the
provincial hospital and upon autopsy by Dr. Ricardo de Castro, multiple
gunshot wounds inflicted by a .32 and a .45 caliber revolvers were found on
Tecson's body which caused his death.
These are the facts as found by the trial court and fully supported by the
evidence, particularly by the testimony of Irene Requinea. Appellants gave,
however, a different version of the tragedy. According to Appellant Galanta,
when he and chief of police Oanis arrived at the house, the latter asked
Brigida where Irene's room was. Brigida indicated the place, and upon further
inquiry as to the whereabouts of Anselmo Balagtas, she said that he too was
sleeping in the same room. Oanis went to the room thus indicated and upon
opening the curtain covering the door, he said: "If you are Balagtas, stand
up." Tecson, the supposed Balagtas, and Irene woke up and as the former
was about to sit up in bed. Oanis fired at him. Wounded, Tecson leaned
towards the door, and Oanis receded and shouted: "That is Balagtas."
Galanta then fired at Tecson.
On the other hand, Oanis testified that after he had opened the curtain
covering the door and after having said, "if you are Balagtas stand up."
Galanta at once fired at Tecson, the supposed Balagtas, while the latter was
still lying on bed, and continued firing until he had exhausted his bullets: that
it was only thereafter that he, Oanis, entered the door and upon seeing the
supposed Balagtas, who was then apparently watching and picking up
something from the floor, he fired at him.
The trial court refused to believe the appellants. Their testimonies are
certainly incredible not only because they are vitiated by a natural urge to
exculpate themselves of the crime, but also because they are materially
contradictory. Oasis averred that be fired at Tecson when the latter was
apparently watching somebody in an attitudes of picking up something from
the floor; on the other hand, Galanta testified that Oasis shot Tecson while
the latter was about to sit up in bed immediately after he was awakened by a
noise. Galanta testified that he fired at Tecson, the supposed Balagtas, when
the latter was rushing at him. But Oanis assured that when Galanta shot
Tecson, the latter was still lying on bed. It is apparent from these
contradictions that when each of the appellants tries to exculpate himself of
the crime charged, he is at once belied by the other; but their mutual
incriminating averments dovetail with and corroborate substantially, the
testimony of Irene Requinea. It should be recalled that, according to
Requinea, Tecson was still sleeping in bed when he was shot to death by
appellants. And this, to a certain extent, is confirmed by both appellants
themselves in their mutual recriminations. According, to Galanta, Oanis shot
Tecson when the latter was still in bed about to sit up just after he was
awakened by a noise. And Oanis assured that when Galanta shot Tecson,
the latter was still lying in bed. Thus corroborated, and considering that the
trial court had the opportunity to observe her demeanor on the stand, we
believe and so hold that no error was committed in accepting her testimony
and in rejecting the exculpatory pretensions of the two appellants.
Furthermore, a careful examination of Irene's testimony will show not only
that her version of the tragedy is not concocted but that it contains all indicia
of veracity. In her cross-examination, even misleading questions had been
put which were unsuccessful, the witness having stuck to the truth in every
detail of the occurrence. Under these circumstances, we do not feel
ourselves justified in disturbing the findings of fact made by the trial court.
The true fact, therefore, of the case is that, while Tecson was sleeping in his
room with his back towards the door, Oanis and Galanta, on sight, fired at
him simultaneously or successively, believing him to be Anselmo Balagtas
but without having made previously any reasonable inquiry as to his identity.
And the question is whether or not they may, upon such fact, be held
responsible for the death thus caused to Tecson. It is contended that, as
appellants acted in innocent mistake of fact in the honest performance of
their official duties, both of them believing that Tecson was Balagtas, they
incur no criminal liability. Sustaining this theory in part, the lower court held
and so declared them guilty of the crime of homicide through reckless
imprudence. We are of the opinion, however, that, under the circumstances
of the case, the crime committed by appellants is murder through specially
mitigated by circumstances to be mentioned below.
In support of the theory of non-liability by reasons of honest mistake of fact,
appellants rely on the case of U.S. v. Ah Chong, 15 Phil., 488. The maxim
is ignorantia facti excusat, but this applies only when the mistake is
committed without fault or carelessness. In the Ah Chong case, defendant
therein after having gone to bed was awakened by someone trying to open
the door. He called out twice, "who is there," but received no answer. Fearing
that the intruder was a robber, he leaped from his bed and called out again.,
"If you enter the room I will kill you." But at that precise moment, he was
struck by a chair which had been placed against the door and believing that
he was then being attacked, he seized a kitchen knife and struck and fatally
wounded the intruder who turned out to be his room-mate. A common
illustration of innocent mistake of fact is the case of a man who was marked
as a footpad at night and in a lonely road held up a friend in a spirit of
mischief, and with leveled, pistol demanded his money or life. He was killed
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by his friend under the mistaken belief that the attack was real, that the pistol
leveled at his head was loaded and that his life and property were in
imminent danger at the hands of the aggressor. In these instances, there is
an innocent mistake of fact committed without any fault or carelessness
because the accused, having no time or opportunity to make a further
inquiry, and being pressed by circumstances to act immediately, had no
alternative but to take the facts as they then appeared to him, and such facts
justified his act of killing. In the instant case, appellants, unlike the accused in
the instances cited, found no circumstances whatsoever which would press
them to immediate action. The person in the room being then asleep,
appellants had ample time and opportunity to ascertain his identity without
hazard to themselves, and could even effect a bloodless arrest if any
reasonable effort to that end had been made, as the victim was unarmed,
according to Irene Requinea. This, indeed, is the only legitimate course of
action for appellants to follow even if the victim was really Balagtas, as they
were instructed not to kill Balagtas at sight but to arrest him, and to get him
dead or alive only if resistance or aggression is offered by him.
Although an officer in making a lawful arrest is justified in using such force as
is reasonably necessary to secure and detain the offender, overcome his
resistance, prevent his escape, recapture him if he escapes, and protect
himself from bodily harm (People vs. Delima, 46 Phil, 738), yet he is never
justified in using unnecessary force or in treating him with wanton violence,
or in resorting to dangerous means when the arrest could be effected
otherwise (6 C.J.S., par. 13, p. 612). The doctrine is restated in the new
Rules of Court thus: "No unnecessary or unreasonable force shall be used in
making an arrest, and the person arrested shall not be subject to any greater
restraint than is necessary for his detention." (Rule 109, sec. 2, par. 2). And a
peace officer cannot claim exemption from criminal liability if he uses
unnecessary force or violence in making an arrest (5 C.J., p. 753;
U.S.vs. Mendoza, 2 Phil., 109). It may be true that Anselmo Balagtas was a
notorious criminal, a life-termer, a fugitive from justice and a menace to the
peace of the community, but these facts alone constitute no justification for
killing him when in effecting his arrest, he offers no resistance or in fact no
resistance can be offered, as when he is asleep. This, in effect, is the
principle laid down, although upon different facts, in U.S. vs. Donoso (3 Phil.,
234, 242).
It is, however, suggested that a notorious criminal "must be taken by storm"
without regard to his right to life which he has by such notoriety already
forfeited. We may approve of this standard of official conduct where the
criminal offers resistance or does something which places his captors in
danger of imminent attack. Otherwise we cannot see how, as in the present
case, the mere fact of notoriety can make the life of a criminal a mere trifle in
the hands of the officers of the law. Notoriety rightly supplies a basis for
redoubled official alertness and vigilance; it never can justify precipitate
action at the cost of human life. Where, as here, the precipitate action of the
appellants has cost an innocent life and there exist no circumstances
whatsoever to warrant action of such character in the mind of a reasonably
prudent man, condemnation not condonation should be the rule;
otherwise we should offer a premium to crime in the shelter of official
actuation.
The crime committed by appellants is not merely criminal negligence, the
killing being intentional and not accidental. In criminal negligence, the injury
caused to another should be unintentional, it being simply the incident of
another act performed without malice. (People vs. Sara, 55 Phil., 939). In the
words of Viada, "para que se celifique un hecho de imprudencia es preciso
que no haya mediado en el malicia ni intencion alguna de daar; existiendo
esa intencion, debera calificarse el hecho del delito que ha producido, por
mas que no haya sido la intencion del agente el causar un mal de tanta
gravedad como el que se produjo." (Tomo 7, Viada Codigo Penal
Comentado, 5.a ed. pag. 7). And, as once held by this Court, a deliberate
intent to do an unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with the idea of
reckless imprudence (People vs. Nanquil, 43 Phil., 232; People vs. Bindor,
56 Phil., 16), and where such unlawful act is wilfully done, a mistake in the
identity of the intended victim cannot be considered as reckless imprudence
(People vs. Gona, 54 Phil., 605) to support a plea of mitigated liability.
As the deceased was killed while asleep, the crime committed is murder with
the qualifying circumstance ofalevosia. There is, however, a mitigating
circumstance of weight consisting in the incomplete justifying circumstance
defined in article 11, No. 5, of the Revised Penal Code. According to such
legal provision, a person incurs no criminal liability when he acts in the
fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office. There are two
requisites in order that the circumstance may be taken as a justifying one: (a)
that the offender acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise
of a right; and (b) that the injury or offense committed be the necessary
consequence of the due performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of
such right or office. In the instance case, only the first requisite is present
appellants have acted in the performance of a duty. The second requisite is
wanting for the crime by them committed is not the necessary consequence
of a due performance of their duty. Their duty was to arrest Balagtas or to get
him dead or alive if resistance is offered by him and they are overpowered.
But through impatience or over-anxiety or in their desire to take no chances,
they have exceeded in the fulfillment of such duty by killing the person whom
they believed to be Balagtas without any resistance from him and without
making any previous inquiry as to his identity. According to article 69 of the
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Revised Penal Code, the penalty lower by one or two degrees than that
prescribed by law shall, in such case, be imposed.
For all the foregoing, the judgment is modified and appellants are hereby
declared guilty of murder with the mitigating circumstance above mentioned,
and accordingly sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from five (5) years
of prision correctional to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal, with the
accessories of the law, and to pay the heirs of the deceased Serapio Tecson
jointly and severally an indemnity of P2,000, with costs.
Yulo, C.J., Bocobo, Generoso and Lopez Vito, A., concur.


Separate Opinions