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National Identities in Ukraine and in Euromaidan

Antony Penaud

June 21, 2014
1 Introduction
In this essay, we are going to document and highlight the different identities in
Ukraine.
Much has already been said on language (Russophones in Ukraine), and here
we are going to focus on historical narrative.
We are going to show that the different identities can be seen geographically,
and on the electoral map.
We are going to focus particularly on Western Ukraine (where Ukrainian na-
tionalism is the strongest).
We will also highlight the role of nationalism in Euromaidan, and its represen-
tation in the post Yanukovich government.
The plan for our essay is the following:
2. Political and identical map in short
3. Historical narratives
4. Svaboda
5. Euromaidan
6. What came out of Euromaidan
7. Conclusions
2 Political and identical map in short
Main political parties The two main political parties in recent Ukrainian
history have been
- the Party of Regions: it was led by Yanukovich who is from the Donetsk re-
gion (Donbass, part of Eastern Ukraine), and in short it is seen as the party
protecting Russophones and willing closer ties with Russia.
- Fatherland: Yushchenko was president of Ukraine before 2010 and member
of the Our Ukraine party which was ideollogicaly close to Fatherland. Our
Ukraine is now dissolved. Tymoshchenko is Fatherland’s leader and was PM

antonypenaud@yahoo.fr
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under Yushchenko. Yatseniuk belongs to this party and supported Yushchenko
in the past. In short, Fatherland can be seen as the opposite as the Party of
Regions.
Extremes Because we want to focus national identities, we introduce the far
right and the far left:
- Svaboda (far right nationalist party, electoral base in Western Ukraine - we
have a full section about it later).
- The Communist Party (Soviet identity and anti nationalist in short, strongest
scores in the South and in the East).
Again, to summarise: in a second round of presidential elections between the
Party of Region and Fatherland, Svaboda sympathisers would vote for Father-
land and Communist Party sympathisers would vote for the Party of Regions.
We have included electoral maps of different elections at the end of this essay.
2nd round of the 2010 presidential elections The electoral map of the
2010 presidential elections shows a clear and strong separation: in the South
and the East (where there are more Russophones and people who want closer
ties with Russia), Yanukovich had more votes in every region. In particular, in
the Donbass (Lugansk region and Donetsk region) Yanukovich had more than
80%, and in some parts more than 90%.
On the other hand, Tymoshenko had her best scores (near 90%) in the West of
Ukraine, in particular in the Lviv region.
These patterns can be found in previous presidential elections too (see electoral
maps at the end).
Svaboda and the Communist Party In the first round of the 2010 elec-
tions both parties did not do well:
- Svaboda’s score was 1.43% nationally (its highest score was 5.35% in the Lviv
region, but interestingly it did 34.98% in another Western Ukraine region in the
local elections later that year, which might mean that Svaboda sympathisers
vote for the Fatherland party in presidential elections).
- The Communists Party’s score was 3.5% nationally.
In the 2012 parliamentary elections both parties made much higher scores:
- Svaboda’s national score was 10.44%. In the Lviv region (Lviv is the largest
city in Western Ukraine) it did 38.01%. It made a breakthrough in Kiev with
17.33%. Its lowest scores were in Crimea (1.05%), and in the Donbass (around
1.25%).
- The Communist Party’s national score was 13.2%. It was 25.14% in the
Lugansk region (one of the two regions of the Donbass, Eastern Ukraine) and
29.46% in Sevastopol (home to the Russian naval base in Crimea). Its lowest
score was in one region of West Ukraine (1.78%).
2
Summary To summarise, Western Ukraine and the Donbass region (Eastern
Ukraine) are at the two extremes in terms of Ukrainian politics. The Centre of
Ukraine is closer to Western Ukraine while the remaining of the East and the
South are closer to the Donbass region.
Finally, the extreme South of Western Ukraine is different from Western Ukraine
(it was not part of Poland before 1939), and Crimea was part of Russia until
1954 and the majority of Crimean people identify themselves as Russians.
3 Historical narratives
In this section we are going to tell the different historical narratives, with a
focus on Western Ukraine’s historical narrative.
Western Ukraine’s different history in short Western Ukraine only be-
came part of the USSR in 1939 following the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact (it was
occupied by Germany after Operation Barbarossa in June 1941). Before 1939
it was part of Poland, and before WW1 part of the Austro Hungarian Empire.
Unlike the rest of Ukraine, it is not Orthodox.
In other words, Western Ukraine was invaded by the Soviet Union in 1939.
Many people from Western Ukraine fought against the Red Army during the
WW2 (and alongside Nazi Germany), as opposed to other Ukrainians (see
Katchanovski
1
, Ottawa University) .
3.1 Bandera and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army
According to Katchanovski, ”in independent Ukraine, particularly since the
Orange Revolution of 2004, WW2 has become a major political battleground.
There are significant divisions concerning policies, views, definitions, and com-
memoration of this conflict in comtemporary Ukraine”.
3.1.1 Why the revival of national myths in Ukraine should alarm us
Below, we cite extracts of the 19 May 2014 article Why the Revival of National
Myths in Ukraine Should Alarm Us
2
by Amar (Assistant Professor in History
at Columbia University) and Rudling (Associate Professor in History at Lund
University, Sweden):
”Historian Omer Bartov has long pointed out a fundamental problem which
substantial parts of Ukrainian society, in and outside Ukraine, still find hard to
acknowledge: it is not possible to glorify ethnic nationalists as freedom-fighting
heroes and examples for today and, at the same time, to be honest about their
anti-Semitism, ethnic and political mass violence, and collaboration with Nazi
Germany. It is true that this collaboration was less extensive than what it could
1
See The Politics of WW2 in Contemporary Ukraine, available on the internet.
2
See http://hnn.us/article/155618
3
have been, had Nazi Germany accepted the Ukrainian nationalists as allies the
way it did with Slovakian and Croatian ones. Moreover, some Ukrainian nation-
alists also periodically clashed with the Germans and were persecuted by them.
Yet there is no doubt or room for argument about a simple fact: the record of
Ukrainian WW2 nationalism includes massive, politically motivated, and delib-
erate violence against civilians, including participation in the Holocaust and the
mass-murderous ethnic cleansing of tens of thousands of Poles.(...)
Seeking ideological hegemony for this mythical version of history in today’s
Ukraine, it was, in fact, Yushchenko who, ironically, also helped spread a stereo-
type equating Ukrainians with Ukrainian nationalists. In reality, the Organiza-
tion of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA),
controlled by the Bandera wing of the OUN, were within the context of WW2
comparatively small and strongly regional organizations. Their massive, brutal
effects during the war did not reflect popular support throughout Ukraine but
the opportunities offered by the war and the nationalists’ ruthless, premedi-
tated will to capitalize on them. In fact, far more Ukrainians fought against
Nazi Germany as part of Soviet forces than for Ukrainian ethnic nationalism.
By equating ethnic nationalists with the nation Yushchenko not only accepted
the nationalists own unfounded claims at face value. He also contributed to
the polarization of Ukraine. Moreover, for observers at home and abroad, he
burdened the image and substance of pro-western policies with a legacy of au-
thoritarianism and mass murder that is, in fact, irreconcilable with them. In
particular, his policies complicated Ukraine’s relationship with Poland; it was
a Polish initiative, led by Members of the European Parliament from the oth-
erwise pro-Ukrainian ”Platforma Obywatelska” party that finally led to an EU
protest against Yushchenko’s most egregious provocations. Only larger geopo-
litical interests ultimately outweighed these concerns: the glorification of the
violent legacy of ethnic nationalism went largely unchallenged during the nego-
tiations for the EU Association Agreement.(...)
While Yushchenko no longer matters, his legacy of state glorification of eth-
nic nationalists has left Ukraine with one more burden to carry or, perhaps, shed.
Volodymyr Viatrovych, under Yushchenko director of the archives of the
former KGB, is now the head of Ukraines Institute of National Memory. He has
long been a key proponent of an uncritical and glorifying interpretation of the
OUN and UPA. His publications, often written for a broad audience and little
known in the West but influential in Ukraine have consistently downplayed the
OUN’s anti-Semitism and the UPA’s anti-Polish massacres. Viatrovych has also
publicly belittled the murder of civilians in Belarus by Ukrainian nationalists
serving there as German auxiliaries.”
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3.1.2 Geographical divide
A poll In a 2009 survey from the Kiev Interrnational Institute of Sociol-
ogy (KIIS), in Galicia (the part of Western Ukraine with Lviv, Ternopil and
Ivan–Frankivsk), 63% of Ukrainians had a positive attitude towards Bandera
(of which 37% very positive), 12% had a negative attitude (of which 6% very
negative).
In the Centre of Ukraine, 13% had a positive attitude towards Bandera (of
which 3% was very positive) , and 38% a negative attitude (of which 21% was
very negative).
In Eastern Ukraine (Donetsk, Lugansk but also Kharkov, Dniepropetrovsk and
Zaporizhia), 2% had a positive attitude towards Bandera (of which 1% was very
positive) , and 59% a negative attitude (of which 46% was very negative).
In the South of Ukraine, 1% had a positive attitude towards Bandera, and 45%
a negative attitude (of which 30% was very negative).
The view of a Donbass resident The following 11 April 2014 interview
(in Le Courrier de Russie) of a Donetsk (Donbass, Eastern Ukraine) policeman
summarises it all: ”Here in the Donbass, we have nothing in common with Lviv -
the only thing that still unites us, is the country. It was Vatunin [Soviet general
in WW2] who liberated my city. And six months later, he was assassinated by
the soldiers of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. Over there, in Lviv, their heroes
are the people from the Ukrainian Insurgent Army; but for me, it is Vatunin
the hero. That man who led the Red Army and who freed my city from the
fascists. What do we have in common with Lviv people? We have a different
History and a different culture.”
3.2 Holodomor
3.2.1 Yushchenko
Amar and Rudling wrote:
”During Viatrovych first tenure as head of the SBU, he allied himself publicly
with Yushchenko’s memory politics. The SBU presented an absurdly selective
list of ”the” 19 people responsible for the 1932-33 famine in Ukraine. Two
fifths of the names on it were presented in the classically anti-Semitic fashion
of ”decoding” family names by adding the ”real” Jewish name in parenthesis.
Under his tenure, the SBU also produced an official number of 10,063,000 million
victims of the 1932-33 famine in the Ukrainian SSR, a tripling of the consensus
number by historical demographers. Such manipulation of what are terrible
figures anyhow is not a minor issue but reflects a long-standing tendency to
”compete” with the Holocaust.”.
3.2.2 Solzhenitsyn
A few months before his death in August 2008, Alexander Solzhenitsyn (whose
mother was Ukrainian) wrote:
5
” The great famine of 1921 shook our country, from the Urals, across the Volga,
and deep into European Russia. It cut down millions of our people. But the
word Holodomor [meaning murder by hunger] was not used at that time. The
Communist leadership deemed it sufficient to blame the famine on a natural
drought, while failing to mention at all the grain requisitioning that cruelly
robbed the peasantry.
And in 1932-33, when a similar great famine hit Ukraine and the Kuban
region, the Communist Party bosses (including quite a few Ukrainians) treated
it with the same silence and concealment. And it did not occur to anyone to
suggest to the zealous activists of the Communist Party and Young Communist
League that what was happening was the planned annihilation of precisely the
Ukrainians. The provocative outcry about ”genocide” only began to take shape
decades later – at first quietly, inside spiteful, anti-Russian, chauvinistic minds
– and now it has spun off into the government circles of modern-day Ukraine,
who have thus outdone even the wild inventions of Bolshevik agitprop.
To the parliaments of the world: This vicious defamation is easy to insinuate
into Western minds. They have never understood our history: You can sell them
any old fairy tale, even one as mindless as this.”
3.3 Memory politics (memory wars?)
3.3.1 Bandera
Hero of Ukraine Shortly before the 2010 presidential elections, Yushchenko
awarded to Bandera the title of Hero of Ukraine. Later that year, under
Yanukovich, a Donetsk court declared unlawful that decree
3
(they argued Ban-
dera only lived in the USSR, not in the Ukrainian independent state).
Monuments In 2010 and 2011, many Western Ukrainian cities named Ban-
dera honorary citizen of their city.
As far as we know, there are 25 Bandera statues, 5 Bandera museums, and 14
Bandera streets in Ukraine: all are recent, and all are in Western Ukraine.
The first monument for the victims of the UIA and nationalists was erected
in Simferopol (Crimea) in 2007. In May 2010 in Lugansk (Eastern Ukraine),
another monument for the victims of the UIA and nationalists was erected
4
.
There is another monument in Kharkiv (Eastern Ukraine).
Outside Ukraine, there are monuments to the victims of the UIA in Poland
(tens of thousands of thousands of Poles were ethnicaly cleansed by the UIA).
In Canada and the US, there are monuments honouring the UIA in cemeteries.
3
See http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/donetsk-court-deprives-shukhevych-of-
ukrainian-her-64630.html
4
See http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/luhansk-unveils-monument-to-victims-
of-oun-upa-66171.html
6
9 May On 9 May 2011, for the celebration of the end of WW2 (because of
the time difference it is not celebrated on 8 May in post Soviet countries), a
group of people including WW2 veterans was attacked in Lviv by nationalists
5
.
That day Svaboda members stormed the office of the regional administration
(Mikhailo Tsymbaliouk) and forced him to sign a resignation letter.
3.3.2 Holodomor
Yushchenko Since 2006, Ukraine have a Holomodor memorial day (on 25
November). In 2007, there was a 3-day commemoration in Kiev, and in 2008 a
memorial was erected in Kiev.
In 2009, Ukrainian schoolchildren took a more extensive course on the History
of the Holodomor, as well as on the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists and
Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UIA)
6
.
Yanukovich In 2010, the new president Yanukovich visited the Holodomor
memorial.
Earlier that year he had stated in Strasbourg: ”The Holodomor was in Ukraine,
Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. It was the result of Stalin’s totalitarian regime.
But it would be wrong and unfair to recognize the Holodomor as an act of
genocide against one nation”.
The Fatherland party reacted by stating ”By his statement, Yanukovych directly
violated the norms of the Ukrainian law of November 28, 2006 on the Holodomor
of 1932-1933 in Ukraine, the first article of which clearly states: ’The Holodomor
of 1932-1933 in Ukraine is genocide against the Ukrainian people.’”
7
.
Summary While both main parties want to remember the Holodomor, they
disagree on how to remember it. Fatherland have exaggerated the number of
victims and see it as a genocide directed by Russians against Ukrainians, while
the Party of Regions insist the famine happened in other parts of the Soviet
Union too.
3.4 Comments
Causality? One should note that Bandera and the UIA were essentially from
the West of Ukraine, and that in 1932-33 what we now call Western Ukraine
was in Poland, and there was therefore no famine there. Therefore, the UIA
was not a consequence of the famine, there was no causal relationship - they
were unrelated. The East and Centre of Ukraine were the most affected part of
Ukraine.
5
See for example https://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/lviv-nationalists-clash-with-
police-103942.html
6
See http://zik.ua/en/news/2009/06/11/184328
7
See http://www.kyivpost.com/content/politics/our-ukraine-party-yanukovych-violated-
law-on-holod.html
7
Ukraine unity Beyond the fact that the glorification of Bandera is morally
questionable, many Ukrainians in the South and the East of Ukraine do not see
Bandera as a hero, and on the contrary see him as a nazi collaborator. It seems
logical that such a choice for a national hero would not unify Ukrainians, but on
the contrary divide them. Bandera is quite simply a divisive figure in Ukraine.
Anti Russian There is however a common factor between the UIA and the
Holodomor. In both cases, the ennemy (from contemporary Ukrainian nation-
alists’ point of view) is the Russians. This is in fact historically not that simple:
the UIA hated more the Poles than the Russians (”they have an almost religious
worship of their nation and distrust anything foreign: first and foremost, Polish,
then Russian; then German”
8
), and Stalin was Georgian.
The role of the EU (and the US)? Also, we think it worth pondering
on the following sentence in the Amar and Rudling article: the glorification
of the violent legacy of ethnic nationalism went largely unchallenged during the
negotiations for the EU Association Agreement. Indeed, it is possible that the
EU (and the US) judged that it was in their interest to encourage (or at least
tolerate) strong nationalistic anti Russian sentiment in Ukrainian politics.
3.5 The CIA’s assessment on Bandera
Just after the end of WW2, the US made a bond with Ukrainian nationalists:
a CIA declassified (under the Nazi war crimes disclosure act) document reads
9
:
”As relations between the US and the Soviet Unions deteriorated, the CIA
expanded its ties with these emigres(...).
many Ukrainians despised Poles and Jews as well as Soviet Communists. Ukraini-
ans served in the German army and had been linked to Nazy atrocities on the
Eastern Front(...)
Bandera led the largest faction of the OUN (which split when the war broke out),
and Melnik led the smaller one. Both factions participated in terrorist activities
against Polish officials before the war, and Ukrainian nationalists allied them-
selves with their Nazi ”liberators” during the first days of Operation Barbarossa
in 1941. Even though OUN’s enthusiasm diminished after the Nazis failed to
support Ukrainian statehood, many Ukrainians continued to fight alongside the
Germans until the end of the war.(...)
The Soviet Union’s demand for repatriating all its citizens suspected of war
crimes and collaboration with the Nazis complicated Aradi’s and Holtman’s
work with the Ukrainians while they established initial contacts with OUN and
ZPUHVR. American acquiescence with Soviet demand would damage relations
with the Ukrainians. At the same time, Nazis rounded up OUN members and
8
See Cold War Allies: the origins of CIA’s relationship with Ukrainian Nationalists, CIA
declassified document.
9
See Cold War Allies: the origins of CIA’s relationship with Ukrainian Nationalists, CIA
declassified document.
8
placed them in concentration camps(...)
The Soviets wanted Stefan Bandera. American intelligence officials recognised
that his arrest would have quick and adverse effects of US operations with the
Ukrainians.(...)
The CIA recognised that Bandera’s extradition would be a blow to the un-
derground movement, but noted that his organisation ’is, as the field agrees,
primarily [original emphasis] a terrorist irgnisation”.
Note that the original CIA document reads ”primarily [original emphasis] ”.
4 Svaboda
In this section we focus on the Ukrainian nationalist party, with its electoral
base in Western Ukraine.
4.1 Party history
Social National Party Svaboda was founded in 1991 in Lviv (Western Ukraine)
as the Social-National Party of Ukraine. According to Olszanski
10
, its symbol
was ”the letters I+N (Idea of the Nation), that is graphically identical with the
Wolfsangel rune one of the symbols of European neo-Nazi organisations”.
It established in 1999 in Lviv a paramilitary organisation called Patriot of
Ukraine.
Svaboda The Social-National Party changed name to Svaboda in February
2004 and dropped the Wolfsangel logo when Oleh Tyahnibok became its leader.
According to Olszansk, ”The radical neo-Nazi and racist groups were pushed
out from the party. However, Tyahnybok never concealed that these changes
were made primarily for image purposes. The party remains associated with
the wide social nationalist movement comprised of numerous organisations (and
websites) and gathered around the Social- Nationalist Assembly which was set
up in 2008”.
Tyahnibok Tyahnibok (who was born in Lviv, West Ukraine) became mem-
ber of the Social-National Party in 1991 and became an MP in 1998. In 2002 he
was reelected as part of the coalition led by Yushchenko (Yushchenko became
president in 2005). He was expelled from that coalition after a speech in the
summer of 2004 in which he talked of: ”the Moscow-Jewish mafia rulling our
Ukraine” and celebrated the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists for having
fought ” Moscovites, Germans, Jews and other scum who wanted to take away
our Ukrainian state”.
10
Svoboda party - the new phenomenon on the Ukrainian right-wing scene by Tadeusz
Olszanski in issue 56 of the Centre for Eastern Studies (04 July 2011).
9
Paramilitary The relationship between Patriot of Ukraine and Svaboda was
officially ended in 2007. At the end of 2013, Patriot of Ukraine joined forces with
other nationalist groups to form the Right Sector (Pravi Sector). University of
Ottawa’s Ostriitchouk
11
wrote that Svaboda ”retains close links with far right
paramilitary organisations trained to fighting, that we will see on the front at
the Maidan.”
4.2 Policies
Policies In terms of policies, Svaboda opposes abortion and gay rights (the
Kievpost dated 11 December 2011 reads ”The ultra-nationalist Svoboda Party
has admitted that their activists attacked gay community and human rights ac-
tivists who were holding a protest in central Kyiv on 8 December to commem-
orate international Human Rights Day)
12
, keeping and bearing arms should be
allowed, Ukrainian children should not be adopted by non-Ukrainians, ethnic
origins should be specified on passports.
Historical narrative Svaboda has organised commemorations of Stepan Ban-
dera and of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UIA). They have organised marches
(in Lviv) to celebrate the Waffen SS Galicia division.
According to Ostriitchouk, ”most of the UPA momunents have been erected by
Svaboda’s inititiative or by Svaboda funding”, and ”often organise the removal
of Soviet monuments” (Lenin statues in particular are the object of another
memorial war: Svaboda sympathisers try to topple them and Communist Party
sympathisers get organised to guard them).
4.3 Views on Svaboda
4.3.1 Jewish organisations and Israel MPs
Wiesenthal Centre In 2012, the Simon Wiesenthal Centre ranked Svaboda
number 5 in its top 10 anti-semitic list, just ahead of Greece’s Golden Dawn
Party.
World Jewish Congress In 2013 the World Jewish Congress labelled the
party as ”neo-nazi”.
11
”Dr Ostriitchouk is originally from Ternopil, [Western] Ukraine and worked ans
studied in Kiev. Dr Ostriitchouk is now at the University of Ottawa with the
Chair of Ukrainian Studies. Her main area of research focuses on identities issues in
Ukraine.” (from http://ukrainiangenealogygroup-ncr.org/feb14news.pdf). Ostriitchouk’s ar-
ticle D’une contestation civique a une guerre identitaire is in French and available on
http://www.cairn.info/revue-le-debat-2014-3-page-3.htm
12
see http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/sabbath-of-perverts-svoboda-boasts-of-
attacking-gay-demonstration-317463.html
10
Kneesset In 2013 too, thirty MPs of the Israeli Knesset (there are 120 MPs
in total) sent the following letter to the president of the EU parliament:
”Dear Mr. President!
First of all, let us thank you for your activities to strengthen the values of
justice and democracy in Europe and the whole world. We want to note that
Europe is a more welcoming and tolerant place now, thanks to your initiatives
and to the spirit you bring to the continent.
However, it has been more than half a year we receive alarming reports
on the new nationalistic trend in Ukraine stirred up by the Neo-Nazi Svoboda
Party, which won more than ten percent of votes in the last parliamentary elec-
tions. We are aware of the threats and slander hurled by members of that party
against the Jews, the Russians, and others. These are the people who draw
their inspiration from the Nazis and openly glorify the mass murderers of the
SS Ukrainian Divisions.
We were also shocked by the fact, that this party is not isolated at all but
enjoys full cooperation of the two main opposition parties in Ukraine. Unfor-
tunately, these parties did not protest at all against the actions and statements
of their extreme partner, but even have compromised themselves by their own
public glorification of Ukrainian Nazi war criminals.
We can not stand idly by the phenomenon of neo Nazism in any part of
the world. Our duty is to speak out and to contact our colleagues around
the world to join the efforts and to eliminate the symptoms which take us to
the darkest times of humanity. We appreciate the strong position which the
European Parliament expressed on this issue in December last year. We also
want to thank you for the refusal of the EP to have any working relations with
the Svoboda party and for the clarification to all forces operating in Ukraine,
that no attempt of Nazism glorification will be tolerated by Europe. We hope to
work together for the better and safer future of Europe and the whole world.”
4.3.2 The EU U-turn
”Racist, anti-semite and xenophobic” On 13 December 2012 the Euro-
pean Parliament adopted a text in which one paragraph read
”Parliament goes on to express concern about the rising nationalistic sentiment
in Ukraine, expressed in support for the Svoboda Party, which, as a result, is
one of the two new parties to enter the Verkhovna Rada [The Ukrainian parlia-
ment]. It recalls that racist, anti-Semitic and xenophobic views go against the
EU’s fundamental values and principles and therefore appeals to pro-democratic
parties in the Verkhovna Rada not to associate with, endorse or form coalitions
with this party.”.
11
U-turn Just over a year later, the EU associated with Svaboda in the toppling
of the democraticaly elected government, and then backed the new coalition, of
which Svaboda was the second most important political party. When the EU
signed the trade agreement with Ukraine, Svaboda was part of the Ukrainian
government.
4.4 Introducing some Svaboda MPs
Igor Miroshnichenko Svaboda MP Igor Miroshnichenko is Deputy Head
of the Parliamentary Committee on Freedom of Speech and Information. He
had made news in the West in 2012 by calling Ukrainian actress Mila Kunis a
”dirty jewess”.
On 19 March 2014 he made news again by storming with four others the
office of the head of National TV, Oleksandr Panteleymonov
13
. They assaulted
Panteleymonov, forced him to sign a resignation letter, and abducted him for
several hours. Astonishingly, Miroshenko then posted online the video of the
assault. The message he wanted to send was clear. We do not know what
happened after this assault. On Panteleymonov wikipedia page, it says ”Acting
CEO of National Television Company of Ukraine from 20 February 2013 to 25
March 2014).”
14
.
Olha Ostriitchouk reported Tyanhibok’s reaction: ”If yesterday such meth-
ods were justified (for example the take over of regional administrations and
people’s pressure on high officials to sign resignation letters), today we don’t
need them (other methods, legal, can be used).”
Oleg Pankevich From the Nation and Foreign Policy in Focus: ”Svoboda
has always had a soft spot for the [Waffen SS] Galicia Division, and one of
its parliament members, Oleg Pankevich, took part in a ceremony last April
honoring the unit. Pankevich joined with a priest of the Ukrainian Orthodox
Church near Lviv to celebrate the units seventieth anniversary and rebury some
of the divisions dead.”
15
.
Yuriy Mykhalchyshyn He was number one of the Svaboda list for the 2010
Lviv’s municipal elections. In 2005 he established a ”Joseph Goebbels Political
Research Centre” (he changed the name in 2008). The url was http://nachtigall88.livejournal.com
13
Apparently, following a mistake by a releasing editor, the Crimea Red Square concert had
been broadcasted during 5 minutes, see http://euromaidanpr.com/tag/panteleymonov/
14
On 28 April 2014, the mayor of Kharkov Gennady Kernes was shot while cycling. The
Guardian’s Luke Harding wrote ”Kharkiv journalist Zurab Alasania blamed Russia for Mon-
day’s shooting. He noted in a Facebook post that the mayor had not changed his routine of
going for a morning lake swim, despite the deteriorating security situation in the East. ’The
Russian Federation is identifying and liquidating key centres of resistance,’ Alasania said.”.
The reader was led to think that Zurab Alasania was an independent local journalist. In fact
he was the pro-Maiden journalist who replaced Panteleymonov as head of National Television.
15
See http://www.thenation.com/blog/178716/dark-side-ukraine-revolt
12
(see Olszanski’s article). The number 88 refers to ”Heil Hitler” in neonazi termi-
nology (H is the 8th letter in the alphabet), and the Nachtigal battalion was the
name of one of the two Ukrainian SS divisions that sided with Nazi Germany
prior and during the June 1941 attack on the Soviet Union.
Mykhalchyshyn has referred to the Holocaust as a ”period of Light in history”.
Iryna Farion After the 2 May 2014 Odessa massacre in which about 40 people
died after a building was set on fire, she wrote on her website ”Bravo, Odessa.
Pearl of Ukrainian spirit. City of the great nationalists Ivan and Youri Lipa.
Let the demons burn in hell. Football fans are the best. Bravo.”
4.5 Comments
Crimea It is important to realise that the presence of Svaboda in the post
Yanukovich government happened before the Russian intervention in Crimea.
Given that before February 2014 Russia had shown no sign of their intention to
reunite with Crimea, we can deduce that it is the February 2014 regime change
and its new government (we will look in more details at its composition in the
next section) that triggered Russia’s decision.
The radicalisation of the Fatherland party Svaboda is often presented
as the ultra-nationalist party, as opposed to Fatherland. But, as said by Amar
and Rudling in their article, ”While Yushchenko no longer matters, his legacy of
state glorification of ethnic nationalists has left Ukraine with one more burden
to carry” , ”he helped spread a stereotype equating Ukrainians with Ukrainian
nationalists”, and ”he contributed to the polarization of Ukraine”.
- Until 2004 and his speech, the Svaboda leader was part of the Fatherland
parliamentary faction.
- MPs from the Timoshenko party supported the 1 January torch procession in
Kiev, marking the 103rd anniversary of Bandera
16
.
- Andry Paruby (former member of the Social Nationalist Party and commander
of the Maiden armed protesters) is now a member of Fatherland.
- On 3 May 2014, the day after the Odessa massacre, MP Lesya Orobets posed
pictures of herself on facebook and twitter. She was posing with a rifle and
characterised the massacre as a ”great victory” and ”an adequate response” to
the pro-Russian demonstrations.
- In a March 2014 leaked conversation
17
, Tymoshenko’s interlocutor said ”He
asked ’What should we do now with the 8 million Russians that stayed in
Ukraine? They are outcasts!’”, she allegedly replied ”They must be killed with
nuclear weapons.”. When the conversation was revealed, Tymoshenko said ”The
conversation took place, but the ’8 million Russians in Ukraine’ piece is an edit.
In fact, I said Russians in Ukraine are Ukrainians.”. However, given that her
16
http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/mp-euromaidan-exposed-to-neo-nazi-trends-
334612.html
17
See http://rt.com/news/tymoshenko-calls-destroy-russia-917/
13
interlocutor replied ”I won’t argue with you here, because what happened is ab-
solutely unacceptable”, Tymoshenko’s version just does not work. This shows
what the leader of the Fatherland party thinks of the population in Eastern
Ukraine.
- In June 2014, Yatseniuk (Ukrainian PM) called separatists’ backers ”subhu-
mans”
18
.
EU nationalist political parties Some Western commentators have down-
played Ukrainian nationalism, comparing it to EU far right parties such as UKIP
(Farage, UK) and FN (Le Pen, France). We think the reader of this essay will
agree that Ukrainian nationalism is of a totally different nature. Passmore
19
argues that Le Pen is not fascist (but national-populist): ”Le Pen has not at-
tempted to use violence to lever himself into power”, ”The FN does not possess
a mass paramilitary wing comparable to historical fascists”.
5 Euromaidan
5.1 Direct cause of Euromaidan: the trade agreement
Here we step back from our focus on national identities in order to introduce
some background on the trade agreement negociations.
5.1.1 Trade agreement
Negociations On 21 November 2013, Yanukovich announced that he would
postpone a trade agreement with the EU. This triggered the start of the protests.
On 17 December, Yanukovich signed the trade agreement with Russia, Belarus
and Kazakhstan.
During the long negociation process, Yanukovich had been talking to both or-
ganisations (EU and the Russia union). Jose-Manuel Barroso said in February
2013: ”one country cannot at the same time be a member of a customs union
and be in a deep common free-trade area with the European Union”.
After his 21 November decision to postpone the EU deal, Yanukovich still said
he wanted a deal that would include both the EU and Russia: on 29 Novem-
ber 2013 the Daily Telegraph reported: ”Yanukovych said he was now seeking
a trilateral deal which would also include Russia as a player, a notion imme-
diately dismissed. ’When we make a bilateral deal, we don’t need a trilateral
agreement,’ said Barroso”.
The trade agreements Let’s have a closer look at the the two different offers
Ukraine had to choose from.
• The EU option offered Ukraine a USD 838m loan and (together with the
18
He said ”killed by invaders and sponsored by subhumans”, see
http://edition.cnn.com/2014/06/15/world/europe/ukraine-crisis/?hpt=hp t1
19
Fascism, a very short introduction
14
IMF) asked the Ukrainian government to increase gas bills by 40% and make
big budget cuts (austerity).
• The Russia option offered Ukraine a loan 18 times that size (USD 15bn) plus
33% discounts on gas prices (Ukraine imports gas from Russia).
Given the better Russia offer, and that Yanukovich had been elected as a
”pro-Russia” candidate (his party claims to defend the rights of ethnic Russians
and speakers of the Russian language in Ukraine), it is not surprising that he
decided for the Russia option.
5.1.2 Public opinion and East-West divide on the trade agreement
A 04-09 December 2013 KIIS poll
20
said that 48% of Ukrainians thought Yanukovich
had been right not to sign the EU trade agreement. 35% thought he had been
wrong.
82% of Western Ukrainians were in favour of signing the EU trade agreement,
and 18% of Eastern Ukrainans supported the EU agreement.
5.2 A Western backed revolution
5.2.1 EU and US leaders
Since our focus is on national identities, we do not want to spend too much time
on Western support for the Euromaidan and the government that came out of
it.
John McCain, Victoria Nuland, Cathryn Ashton and others went to Kiev and
basically participated in the revolution.
One could debate about their exact responsibility in the revolution, we do not
want to discuss this here. It is sufficient to say that they actively supported it.
5.2.2 The Ukrainian diaspora
Amar and Rudling wrote:
”Last but not least, a significant section of the Ukrainian diaspora abroad, have
too often reflexively taken a right-or-wrong-our-freedom-fighters approach to
wartime and postwar ethnic nationalists.(...)
Some emigre scholars selectively omitted compromising statements from na-
tionalist pronouncements. In some cases the OUN’s deliberate forgeries have
been circulated as authentic evidence to refute allegations of anti-Semitism.
One of these consisted of an autobiography of a fictitious Jewish woman, Stella
Krentsbakh or Kreutzbach, titled ”I am Alive thanks to the Ukrainian Insur-
gent Army,” presented as ”evidence” to ”disprove” any and all genuine survivor
20
For example http://www.bne.eu/content/ukraine-land-two-halves-euromaidan-moves-
third-week
15
testimony to nationalist anti-Semitism.A similar tactic has been used, with
Yushchenkos direct involvement, to deny nationalist involvement in pogroms
in 1941. A popular rhetorical strategy to counter scholars querying nationalist
narratives has been to implicitly or explicitly, publicly or more quietly denounce
them as ”neo-Soviet,” deceived by or pandering to former Soviet or current Rus-
sian propaganda.(...)”
Ostriitchouk wrote:
”The Ukrainian diaspora is an actor too important to be ignored, as is shown
by the many pro-Maidian actions (including financial backing), the debates it
started in Canada and the US, the way it influences their foreign policies and
watches all public interventions.
This direct and long dated implication on Ukrainian politics is explained, amongst
other things, by the fact that the most active part of the diaspora comes from
the third wave of immigration of the 1950s, which was essentially made of West-
ern Ukrainians and actors of the nationalist struggle, strongly opposed to the
communist regime.”
5.3 A West Ukrainian revolution
Because of our focus on national identities, we are not going to document the
violence. We still should say that according to Ostriitchouk, violence took place
on both sides. Also, it is far from sure that Yanukovich gave the orders to the
snipers (see Paet Ashton leaked conversation, and the investigation by the Ger-
man TV channel ARD).
Right Sector The paramilitary organisation Right Sector was founded in
November 2013 (note that it was formed early in the Euromaidan timeline) as
a coalition of different ultranationalist groups and was one of the main actors
of the violent stages. Many people had come to Kiev from the Lviv region (and
other regions, mainly from the West) in December or January.
On 21 January, Alec Luhn
21
wrote in The Nation
22
”Spearheading the clashes
with police was Right Sector, a group with ties to far-right parties including
the Patriots of Ukraine and Trident, which BBC Ukraine reported is largely
comprised of nationalist football fans. In a statement the next day, the group
claimed credit for Sundays unrest and promised to continue fighting until Pres-
ident Viktor Yanukovich stepped down.”
Ukraine above all Alec Luhn: ”Svoboda is the most visible party on the
square, it has essentially taken over Kiev City Hall as its base of operations,
and it has a large influence in the protestors security forces.
21
Young American journalist Alec Luhn writes mainly for The Guardian and The Nation.
He is based in Moscow but has spent many of the last few months in Ukraine.
22
http://www.thenation.com/article/178013/ukrainian-nationalism-heart-euromaidan
16
It also has revived three slogans originating in the Ukrainian nationalist move-
ment of the 1930s [the UIA] that have become the most popular chants at
Euromaidan. Almost all speakers on Independence Squareeven boxer-turned-
opposition-leader Vitaly Klitschko, who has lived mostly in Germany and has a
US residence permitstart and end with the slogan, Glory to Ukraine!, to which
the crowd responds To heroes glory! Two other nationalist call-and-response
slogans often heard on the square are Glory to the nation! Death to enemies!
and Ukraine above all!”.
Other nationalist symbolic Ostriitchouk: ”For those who wanted to see
and listen, the ultranationalist symbolic of Maidan had quickly supplanted and
marginilised the EU’s symbolic. At the beginning of the rallyes, the red and
black flags of Bandera were on Maidan next to other flags of the far right like the
ones of Svaboda, KUN, UNA-UNSO, Bandera’s trident and Patriot of Ukraine.
The large poster of Bandera was put at Kiev’s city hall as soon as the protesters
took control of it. Later, the funerals of the first deads took place among those
flags”.
Memorial dates Ostriitchouk: ”All commemorial dates going in that direc-
tion [threat of Russian imperialism, or indeed Soviet] and falling during Euro-
maidan were exploited to feed popular anger, starting with the 80th anniversary
of Holodomor, followed closely by the celebration of the Orange revolution, to
the 200th anniversary of Taras Chevtchenko, but with also the 105th anniversary
of Bandera, the memorial pilgrimage on the battlefield of the heroes of Kruty
who died in the struggle against the bolsheviks defending the young Ukrainian
nation on 29 January 1918.”
Pro EU or anti-Russian? In the same article, Alec Luhn describes Sv-
aboda’s tactics: ”How can the slogan ’Ukraine above all!’ sound on Indepen-
dence Square alongside the slogan ’Ukraine in the EU!’, Ukrainian progressive
activist Olga Papash asked in a recent piece on the politics and culture website
Korydor. (...) Even Yury Noyevy, a member of Svoboda’s political council,
admitted that the party is only pro-EU because it is anti-Russia.”
5.3.1 Public opinion and East-West divide on EuroMaidan
A 04-09 December 2013 poll
23
said 49% supported Euromaidan, and 45% didn’t
support it.
But what was interesting was that the country was geographically divided: 84%
in the West of Ukraine supported it (against 11%), 66% in the Centre supported
it (against 27%), 33% in the South supported it (against 60%), and only 13%
in the East supported it (against 81%).
23
See http://rb.com.ua/eng/projects/omnibus/8840/
17
6 What came out of Euromaidan
6.1 The post Yanukovich government
Let’s move on to the coalition government, after Yanukovich fled Kiev. The
PM was Fatherland’s Yatseniuk (he had done 6.96% in the 2010 presidential
elections), and the rest of the government was made of:
• 6 members of Fatherland.
• 4 members of Svaboda (Oleksandr Sych as vice PM, Ihor Tenyukh, Andrei
Mokhnyk, Ihor Shvaika, ).
• 1 (Serhiy Kvit, Minister of Education and Science) member of the far-right
Ukrainian paramilitary organisation the Stepan Bandera Tryzub (this organi-
sation is one of the founding organisations of Right Sector).
• 4 people from Lviv with unclear affiliation (the Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Finance, Health, Economy).
• 2 Euromaiden activists (the Euromaiden podium presenter became Minister
of Culture, another one became Minister of Youth and Sports)
• 1 former minister under the former Timoshenko government (before 2010).
6.2 Focus on Kvit, the new Minister of Education and
Science
Let’s quote Amar and Rudling:
” What is worrying at this moment and has, unfortunately, come to be linked
to the Maidan Revolution is that several key promoters of nationalist memory
politics have come into high office. Thus, Serhy Kvit, head of Kyiv Mohyla
Academy, Ukraine’s most prestigious university, is now the Minister of Edu-
cation. Kvit insists that the nationalists of WW2 can serve as examples for
today’s Ukraine, demanding that this should be strictly separated from what
he considers Russian propaganda. He is the author of an admiring biography of
Dmytro Dontsov, one of the key theoreticians of Ukrainian ethnic nationalism.
It denies and rationalizes Dontsov’s anti-Semitism and marginalizes his enthu-
siasm for Nazi Germany and fascist Italy. It also denounces John-Paul Himka
as one of the leaders of an ”academic Internationale of Ukrainophobes.” Such
statements show that nationalist memory production deliberately cuts itself off
from up-to-date international scholarship, in particular on the role of Ukrainian
ethnic nationalism in the Holocaust.(...)
Kvit has also participated in robustly nationalist public activism, promoting
Dontsovian ideology through the ”Dmytro Dontsov Research-Ideological Cen-
ter.” In the 1990s Kvit was a member of the Presidium of the Congress of
Ukrainian Nationalists and the organization ”Tryzub imeni Bandery,” a wing
of KUN which split from the party in 2000. He is open about the fact that he
does not regard Dmytro Yarosh, leader of the ”Right Sector” as an extremist”.
18
6.3 Let’s have a look at other nominations that took place
• Oleh Mahnitsky (Svaboda MP) was named General Prosecutor.
• Tetiana Chornovol (member since aged 17 of the UNA-UNS organisation, a far
right organisation of which the political wing merged with Right Sector in May
2014) was appointed head of Ukrainian government’s National Anti-Corruption
Committee on 5 March 2014.
• Andry Paruby (former member of the Social Nationalist Party and commander
of the Maiden armed protesters) became head of the National Security and
Defense Council on 27 February 2014.
• Egor Sobolev became head of the new lustration committee. ”He said in
interviews that the goal of the lustration la will be to ban Yanukovich and his
closest allies from politic for life”
24
. The Svaboda bill mentioned in the article
”that public servants at all levels, as well as applicants for state jobs will have to
undergo a screening procedure. Those who fail the screening will be dismissed
from their positions.”. We don’t know if the bill pas passed.
• On 2 March 2014, new governors were named in the following regions: in the
Dnieproptrovsk region the olligarch Ihor Kolomoisky (second or third richest
man in Ukraine, 337th richest person in the world according to Forbes 2011),
in the Donetsk region the olligarch Sergei Taruta (billionaire in dollars too).
6.4 Comments
The new government in short The new government had no representant of
the Party of Regions, it was a coalition Fatherland+Svaboda+people from Lviv+
Euromaidan activists. There was no representent from the East of Ukraine.
The first day of the new government On 23 February 2014, only the
day after Yanukovich fled Kiev, with no debate, the parliament voted to remove
Russian as a second official language (a week later, probably because of Western
advice, the interim president vetoed it).
We ask the reader to step back and reflect. Even if the law was later vetoed,
the fact that on the very first day it is this that they wanted to do is enough to
understand the nature of this government.
6.5 Elections
Polls at the end of January 2014 The last polls that were made with
Yanukovich in them were made in the period 24 January - 1 February 2014
25
.
He was top of the polls with 29.2%. Second was boxer turned politican Klitschko
(22.8%), then Tymoshenko (19.1%) and Poroshenko’s rise had already started
(15.9%).
24
See http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/04/09/what-is-
lustration-and-is-it-a-good-idea-for-ukraine-to-adopt-it/
25
See wikipedia, 2014 Ukraine presidential elections.
19
After Yanukovich’s ousting, the Party of Regions, representing the South and
the East of Ukraine, desintegrated.
6.5.1 Election of Poroshenko
Poroshenko The olligarch Poroshenko was elected in the first round of the
elections with 54.7%.
Svaboda Svaboda did a low national score, but as we saw before (low score
at 2010 presidential elections followed by very high scores at the 2010 local
elections), it seems that Svaboda sympathisers prefer to vote for the closest
popular candidate at presidential elections.
It is also crucial to notice that Poroshenko has kept the same government. All
the new jobs (in government and outside goverbment) gained by Svaboda at the
end of February 2014 were kept. The presence of Svaboda in the government was
not temporary. Its presence in the government is based on a coaltion between
close political parties.
Lyashko It is also worth mentioning the relatively high score (8.32%) of Oleh
Lyashko, the candidate for the Radical Party. During the Crimea crisis he tried
pass (but failed) to pass a bill in parliament that would give death penalty to
separatists. Later he took matters into his own hands. On 23 May the KievPost
reported ”Paramilitaries from a group organized by presidential candidate Oleh
Lyashko stormed a local government building in a sleepy eastern Ukrainian
mining city and killed a pro-Russian separatist while maiming another in a
gangland-style shooting on May 23. One man was shot in the head and ab-
domen, while a second man sustained three gunshot wounds to his neck and
abdomen and was fighting for his life in a nearby hospital after the attack.”
26
.
6.5.2 Ukraine still divided
Poroshenko’s totall number of votes was 9,857,308. In the 2nd round of the 2010
elections, Yanukovich’s number of votes was 12,481,266, and Tymoshenko’s was
11,593,357.
Turnout The turnout was much higher in the West of Ukraine (and in the
Centre), than in the South and in the East (see turnout electoral map at the
end, as well as the map of turnout differences between 2014 and 2010). In the
Donbass most people just couldn’t vote.
Odessa 2010 and 2014 We have picked a random disctrict of Odessa (the
first Odessa district, district 135)
27
. In the first round of the 2010 elections,
26
http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/militia-backed-by-presidential-candidate-
lyashko-takes-credit-for-murder-of-russian-backed-separatists-349093.html
27
See http://electionresources.org/ua/president.php?election=2010&district=135
20
there were 65.7% valid ballots. Yanukovich got 44.6% in the first round, i.e.
53,978 votes. In the 2010 elections, there were only 48.9% valid ballots. The
42.8% obtained by Poroshenko represented 36,563 votes.
Now, in the 2nd round of the 2010 elections, participation was stable and
Yanukovich got 87,807 votes (74.4%), which is more than the total number
of people who (validly) voted in 2010! (the total number of valid votes was
85,372)
Earlier referendums Here we should also mention the other referendums
that took place after Euromaidan:
- Crimeans voted for joining Russia in March 2014 . The referendum was organ-
ised by Crimeans and Russians against the will of the Ukrainian government.
While some contest the figures, we are not aware of anybody contesting that a
majority of Crimeans wanted to be part of Russia. A Pew Research poll (April
2014) showed that 92% of Crimeans think that Russia is playing a positive role
in Crimea, and 2% think that the US are having a good influence on the way
things are going in Crimea.
- People in the Donbass voted for independence in early May 2014. This referen-
dum was organised by separatists. Polls organised on the day of the referendum
by Western journalists, as well as the reporting of journalists on the ground
tend to show that a large majority wanted separation (for completion: accord-
ing to a LA Times article ”Opinion polls conducted in April by both foreign and
domestic agencies showed a sizable majority - at least 70% even in the eastern
regions - opposed to secession from Ukraine or union with Russia. But the re-
cent violence has turned many against the Kiev government”, ”Scores of deaths
during confrontations in Odessa on May 2 and in Mariupol on Friday appear to
have spurred the massive turnout Sunday”, ”there were huge queues of people,
almost all of whom said they were voting yes to separatism.”
28
, note also that
in the Donbass people are more likely to be for separation than in other parts
of Eastern Ukraine, and that the Pew April poll also showed that 67% of East
Ukrainians had a negative opinon of the new coalition).
Again, to those who sympathised with Ukrainians who went to the street
during Euromaidan because they were fed up with corruption, with bad gov-
ernance, or who wanted closer ties with the EU, we ask them to look at the
composition of the government, to the first thing they tried to do as they came
into power, and to the nominations that were made shortly after the formation
of the Yatsenyuk government.
28
http://touch.latimes.com/#section/-1/article/p2p-80173097/,
http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland/separatisten-verkuenden-grosse-mehrheit-fuer-
abspaltung-von-ukraine-12934681.html, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/11/eastern-
ukraine-referendum-donetsk-luhansk
21
7 Conclusions
National identities We have highlighted and documented the strong correla-
tion between: geographical location in Ukraine, political support, and national
identity. In particular we have highlighted the two poles: Western Ukraine
(Ukrainian nationalism, strong popularity of Bandera, anti Soviet and anti Rus-
sian feelings), and the Donbass region (Soviet identity, sympathy for Russia,
Bandera seen as an ennemy). The South and the rest of the East are closer to
the Donbass, while the Centre is closer to Western Ukraine.
Polarisation As Amar and Rudling wrote, ”Yushchenko’s legacy of state glo-
rification of ethnic nationalists has left Ukraine with one more burden to carry”,
”he helped spread a stereotype equating Ukrainians with Ukrainian national-
ists”, and ”he contributed to the polarization of Ukraine”.
Euromaidan As Ostriitchouk wrote, ”The Maidan revolution is firstly a prod-
uct of Western Ukraine, of a nationalist Ukrainianian West and of its Western
backers, among which the Ukrainian diaspora is too important a factor to be
ignored.”.
Poroshenko election By looking in details at the 2014 election results, we
have seen that Proshenko’s election in the first round was not due to him being
a unifying figure, but to the fact that many Ukrainians in the South and in
the East stayed home (the Party of Regions had desintegrated). We looked in
details at the Odessa results (district 135) and found that the total number of
people who went to vote in 2014 was smaller than the number of people who
voted for Yanukovich in 2010.
Ukraine We have shown that the new government represents West Ukraine
nationalism, and that this nationalism is a strong divisive factor in Ukraine.
Given the disintegration of the political party representing South and East
Ukrainians, and the measures taken by the new government (eg the new lustra-
tion committee), we are pessimistic for Ukraine, and non nationalist Ukrainians.
Ostriitchouk talks of a ”witchhunt” against those who were connected (closely
or remotely) to Yanukovich (how far would it be extended to East and South
Ukrainians?) and of a will to ban political opposition (Svaboda want to ban
the Communist Party).
EU and US The reason why the EU and the US have backed this revolution
and this new government (part of it described by the EU as xenophobic in 2012)
cannot be known for sure - we can only speculate. It is of course not impossible
that the support given by the US and the EU to the new Ukrainian government
is due to blindness.
Emmanuel Todd’s original hypothesis is that the US have lost control of Ger-
many, and that it is Germany that led the West into this (the US didn’t want
22
to show public disagreements with Germany).
We think it is more likely that the West’s decision to support Ukrainian nation-
alists was US led, and that it was based on what they thought was in their best
interest, which they think has to be (because of old cold war thinking?) oppo-
site to Russia’s interest. As Hudson wrote ”the aim of a Ukrainian anti-Russian
turn thus is not to help Ukraine, but to use that unfortunate country as a pawn
in the New Cold War.”
29
.
Historical parallel 1 We cannot help but remember the Soviet-Afghan war,
in which the US supported Mujahideens, and in the process created Al Qaeda.
In the Ukrainian situation there was no war though.
Historical parallel 2 Fom the Ukrainian nationalists’ point of view, a parall
can be drawn with their predecessors in WW2. In WW2 they sided with Ger-
many in order to fight against the Soviets (and the Poles). Today’s nationalists
have sided with the EU and the US to make sure Ukraine has no link with Rus-
sia economically, to drive away East Ukrainians from power, and to put in place
their nationalist agenda. Again, in the 2014 situation, there was no occupation,
Ukraine was an independent state.
Historical parallel 3 The last parallel is simply between the US and Ukrainian
nationalists just after WW2, as mentioned earlier in our essay. The CIA de-
scribed then Bandera’s organisation as ”terrorist”. Less than seventy years
later, the US (and the EU) had no moral issue backing their heirs . And had no
moral issue eithers when these heirs called ”terrorists”
30
East Ukrainians who
refused to be part of the new nationalist Ukraine, or when the Ukrainian PM
called people supporting the separatists ”subhumans”
31
.
29
See Michael Hudson, The New Cold War’s Ukraine Gambit.
30
The Ukrainian government call ATO (anti terrorist operation) the civil war in the Donbass.
31
See http://edition.cnn.com/2014/06/15/world/europe/ukraine-crisis/?hpt=hp t1
23
Figure 1: 1994 presidential elections.
Figure 2: 2004 (2005?) presidential elections.
24
Figure 3: 2010 presidential elections (Yanukovich’s score).
Figure 4: 7 February 2010 presidential elections. Yanukovich (Party of Regions)
won in the 2nd round with 51.84%.
25
Figure 5: 2012 parliamentary elections (Svaboda).
Figure 6: 2012 parliamentary elections (Communist Party).
Figure 7: TurnOut in the 2014 presidential elections.
26
Figure 8: TurnOut difference between the 2014 and 2010 presidential elections.
27