Вы находитесь на странице: 1из 28



[No. 759; Miranda vs. Arizona] On 13 March 1963, Ernesto Miranda was arrested at his
home and taken in custody to a Phoenix police station. He was there identified by the
complaining witness. The police then took him to "Interrogation Room No. 2" of the
detective bureau. There he was questioned by two police officers. The officers did not
advise Miranda that he had a right to have an attorney present. Two hours later, the
officers emerged from the interrogation room with a written confession signed by
Miranda. At the top of the statement was a typed paragraph stating that the confession
was made voluntarily, without threats or promises of immunity and "with full knowledge
of my legal rights, understanding any statement I make may be used against me." At his
trial before a jury, the written confession was admitted into evidence over the objection
of defense counsel, and the officers testified to the prior oral confession made by
Miranda during the interrogation. Miranda was found guilty of kidnapping and rape. He
was sentenced to 20 to 30 years' imprisonment on each count, the sentences to run
concurrently. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arizona held that Miranda's
constitutional rights were not violated in obtaining the confession and affirmed the
conviction. In reaching its decision, the court emphasized heavily the fact that Miranda
did not specifically request counsel.

[No. 760, Vignera vs. New York] Michael Vignera, was picked up by New York police on
14 October 1960, in connection with the robbery three days earlier of a Brooklyn dress
shop. They took him to the 17th Detective Squad headquarters in Manhattan. Sometime
thereafter he was taken to the 66th Detective Squad. While at the 66th Detective
Squad, Vignera was identified by the store owner and a saleslady as the man who
robbed the dress shop. At about 3 p. m. he was formally arrested. The police then
transported him to still another station, the 70th Precinct in Brooklyn, "for detention." At
11 p. m. Vignera was questioned by an assistant district attorney in the presence of a
hearing reporter who transcribed the questions and Vignera's answers. This verbatim
account of these proceedings contains no statement of any warnings given by the
assistant district attorney. At Vignera's trial on a charge of first degree robbery, the
detective testified as to the oral confession. The transcription of the statement taken
was also introduced in evidence. Vignera was found guilty of first degree robbery. He
was subsequently adjudged a third-felony offender and sentenced to 30 to 60 years'
imprisonment. The conviction was affirmed without opinion by the Appellate Division,
Second Department, and by the Court of Appeals, also without opinion, remittitur
amended. In argument to the Court of Appeals, the State contended that Vignera had
no constitutional right to be advised of his right to counsel or his privilege against self-

[No. 761, Westover vs. United States] At approximately 9:45 p. m. on 20 March 1963,
Carl Calvin Westover was arrested by local police in Kansas City as a suspect in two
Kansas City robberies. A report was also received from the FBI that he was wanted on
a felony charge in California. The local authorities took him to a police station and
placed him in a line-up on the local charges, and at about 11:45 p. m. he was booked.
Kansas City police interrogated Westover on the night of his arrest. He denied any
knowledge of criminal activities. The next day local officers interrogated him again
throughout the morning. Shortly before noon they informed the FBI that they were
through interrogating Westover and that the FBI could proceed to interrogate him. There
is nothing in the record to indicate that Westover was ever given any warning as to his
rights by local police. At noon, three special agents of the FBI continued the
interrogation in a private interview room of the Kansas City Police Department, this time
with respect to the robbery of a savings and loan association and a bank in
Sacramento, California. After two or two and one-half hours, Westover signed separate
confessions to each of these two robberies which had been prepared by one of the
agents during the interrogation. At trial one of the agents testified, and a paragraph on
each of the statements states, that the agents advised Westover that he did not have to
make a statement, that any statement he made could be used against him, and that he
had the right to see an attorney. Westover was tried by a jury in federal court and
convicted of the California robberies. His statements were introduced at trial. He was
sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment on each count, the sentences to run
consecutively. On appeal, the conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit.

[No. 584, California vs. Stewart] In the course of investigating a series of purse-snatch
robberies in which one of the victims had died of injuries inflicted by her assailant, Roy
Allen Stewart was pointed out to Los Angeles police as the endorser of dividend checks
taken in one of the robberies. At about 7:15 p. m., 31 January 1963, police officers went
to Stewart's house and arrested him. One of the officers asked Stewart if they could
search the house, to which he replied, "Go ahead." The search turned up various items
taken from the five robbery victims. At the time of Stewart's arrest, police also arrested
Stewart's wife and three other persons who were visiting him. These four were jailed
along with Stewart and were interrogated. Stewart was taken to the University Station of
the Los Angeles Police Department where he was placed in a cell. During the next five
days, police interrogated Stewart on nine different occasions. Except during the first
interrogation session, when he was confronted with an accusing witness, Stewart was
isolated with his interrogators. During the ninth interrogation session, Stewart admitted
that he had robbed the deceased and stated that he had not meant to hurt her. Police
then brought Stewart before a magistrate for the first time. Since there was no evidence
to connect them with any crime, the police then released the other four persons arrested
with him. Nothing in the record specifically indicates whether Stewart was or was not
advised of his right to remain silent or his right to counsel. In a number of instances,
however, the interrogating officers were asked to recount everything that was said
during the interrogations. None indicated that Stewart was ever advised of his rights.
Stewart was charged with kidnapping to commit robbery, rape, and murder. At his trial,
transcripts of the first interrogation and the confession at the last interrogation were
introduced in evidence. The jury found Stewart guilty of robbery and first degree murder
and fixed the penalty as death. On appeal, the Supreme Court of California reversed.


Whether the written confessions made in uncounselled interrogation, with the accused
not appraised of his right to consult with an attorney and to have one during the
inerrogation, nor his right not to be compelled to incriminate himself, are not admissible
as evidence.


In No. 759, from the testimony of the officers and by the admission of the State of
Arizona, it is clear that Miranda was not in any way apprised of his right to consult with
an attorney and to have one present during the interrogation, nor was his right not to be
compelled to incriminate himself effectively protected in any other manner. Without
these warnings the statements were inadmissible. The mere fact that he signed a
statement which contained a typed-in clause stating that he had "full knowledge" of his
"legal rights" does not approach the knowing and intelligent waiver required to relinquish
constitutional rights. Similarly in No. 760, Vignera was not warned of any of his rights
before the questioning by the detective and by the assistant district attorney. No other
steps were taken to protect these rights. Thus he was not effectively apprised of his
Fifth Amendment privilege or of his right to have counsel present and his statements are
In No. 761, there is nothing in the facts that Westover knowingly and intelligently waived
his right to remain silent and his right to consult with counsel prior to the time he made
the statement. At the time the FBI agents began questioning Westover, he had been in
custody for over 14 hours and had been interrogated at length during that period. The
FBI interrogation began immediately upon the conclusion of the interrogation by Kansas
City police and was conducted in local police headquarters. There is no evidence of any
warning given prior to the FBI interrogation nor is there any evidence of an articulated
waiver of rights after the FBI commenced its interrogation. The record simply shows that
the defendant did in fact confess a short time after being turned over to the FBI
following interrogation by local police. Despite the fact that the FBI agents gave
warnings at the outset of their interview, from Westover's point of view the warnings
came at the end of the interrogation process. In these circumstances an intelligent
waiver of constitutional rights cannot be assumed. Law enforcement authorities are not
precluded from questioning any individual who has been held for a period of time by
other authorities and interrogated by them without appropriate warnings. A different
case would be presented if an accused were taken into custody by the second authority,
removed both in time and place from his original surroundings, and then adequately
advised of his rights and given an opportunity to exercise them. Lastly in No. 584, In
dealing with custodial interrogation, the Court will not presume that a defendant has
been effectively apprised of his rights and that his privilege against self-incrimination
has been adequately safeguarded on a record that does not show that any warnings
have been given or that any effective alternative has been employed. Nor can a
knowing and intelligent waiver of these rights be assumed on a silent record.
Furthermore, Stewart's steadfast denial of the alleged offenses through eight of the nine
interrogations over a period of five days is subject to no other construction than that he
was compelled by persistent interrogation to forgo his Fifth Amendment privilege.


At around 8 p.m. of 27 December 1996, Jason Joniega, Mark Esmeralda and Mark
Lucena were playing inside a jeepney parked in front of a boarding house owned by
Pacita Aguillon at No. 17 Margarita Extension, Libertad St., Purok Amelia 2, Barangay
40, Bacolod City. As one of them hit his head on the rails of the jeepney, the boys were
told by a man sitting inside the jeepney to go home lest they would meet an accident.
The man was later identified by Joniega and Esmeralda as Anthony Escordial. Living in
a boarding house in front of which the jeepney was parked were Michelle Darunday,
Erma Blanca, and Ma. Teresa Gellaver. While the three were asleep, Erma was
awakened by the presence of a man. The man had his head covered with a t-shirt to
prevent identification and carried a knife about four inches long. Michelle and Teresa
were awakened thereafter. The man was able to get P500.00 from Erma and P3,100.00
from Michelle. After getting their money, the man gave a t-shirt to Erma to blindfold
Teresa and another to Michelle to blindfold Erma. He blindfolded Michelle himself and
then began touching her in different parts of her body. The man succeeded in inserting
his penis into Michelle's vagina. Although Michelle was blindfolded and could not see,
she could feel that the man had no cover on his face when he was raping her. She felt
that his chest was rough and had some scars. When he placed her hands on his nape,
she felt that it was also rough. On the other hand, Erma claimed she was able to see
through her blindfold and that she saw the man's face because of the light coming from
the lamp post outside the boarding house. After he had finished raping Michelle, the
man sat on the bed and talked to the three women. After a while, the man told Michelle
he wanted to have sex with her again. Michelle pleaded with him, but the man
threatened to call his companions and said it would be worse for her if his companions
would be the ones to rape her. He ordered Michelle to lie on her stomach and then
inserted his penis into her anus. When he was through, he gave Michelle a blanket to
cover herself and returned to her a pair of earrings which he had taken from her. He
then left, but not before warning the women not to report the matter to anyone or he
would kill them. Michelle, Erma, and Teresa were so frightened that they were not able
to ask for help until 30 minutes after the man had left. They told their neighbor, Tiyo
Anong, that a man had come to the house and robbed them. They also called up Allan
Aguillon, the son of the owner of the boarding house, who in turn reported the incident
to the police. When the policemen arrived, they asked Michelle to describe the attacker,
but she told them that she could only identify his voice and his eyes. Accompanied by
the police, the three women looked for the man around the Libertad area, but they did
not find him. Michelle, Erma, and Teresa were taken to the police station at Bac-Up for
investigation. But, at Michelle's request, Erma and Teresa did not tell the others that
Michelle had been raped by their attacker. Upon returning home, Michelle found her
aunt and uncle. She embraced her aunt and told her about her ordeal. Michelle was
again taken to the police headquarters, where she was referred to the Women's Desk to
report the rape. They were able to go home to the house of Michelle's aunt at around 5
to 6 p.m. The following day, P03 Nicolas Tancinco went around Margarita Extension
and learned about the children playing on the street around the time the intruder
entered the boarding house. The description of the suspect fitted that of a worker at a
caf called Coffee Break Corner, about two houses away from the boarding house. On
2 January 1997, Tancinco and some companions proceeded to the Coffee Break
Corner and interviewed the security guard, who told them that a certain Fidel Hinolan
owned the caf. When interviewed by Tancinco and his companions, Fidel Hinolan told
them that Escordial was his helper and that the latter had gone home on 27 December
1996 to Barangay Miranda, Pontevedra, Negros Occidental. Based on the information
furnished by Hinolan, Tancinco and his fellow police officers, Michelle Darunday, Allan
Aguillon, and Pacita Aguillon went to Barangay Miranda, Pontevedra, Negros
Occidental at around 10 a.m. of 3 January 1997 and asked the assistance of the police
there to locate Escordial. PO2 Rodolfo Gemarino asked one of his colleagues at the
Pontevedra police to accompany Tancinco and his companions. They found Escordial
at the basketball court and "invited" him to go to the police station for questioning. He
was transferred to the Bacolod police station for further investigation. At the Bacolod
police station, Erma Blanca, Ma. Teresa Gellaver, Jason Joniega, and Mark Esmeralda
were asked whether Escordial was the same person they saw on the night of the
incident. They were taken one by one to the jail cell and asked to point to the person
that they had seen that night. They picked Escordial out of four people who were inside
the jail cell. Escordial was charged with the crime of rape in Criminal Case 97-18117.
He was also charged with robbery with rape in Criminal Case 97-18118. When
arraigned on 25 February 1997, Escordial pleaded not guilty to the charges, whereupon
the two cases were jointly tried. On 26 February 1999, the trial court rendered a
decision, finding Escordial guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with
Rape, the commission of which being attended by three aggravating circumstances of
(1) nighttime; (2) that the crime was committed in the dwelling of the offended party, and
(3) that craft, fraud and disguise were employed by the accused in the commission of
the crime under paragraphs 3, 6, and 14 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code. The
court sentenced Escordial to the maximum penalty of death, and condemned him to pay
Darunday the sum of P3,650.00, representing the money taken by the accused;
P50,000.00 as moral damages, P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, and the costs.
Escordial appealed.


Whether the out-of-court identification in the show up at the police station, made after
the start of the custodial investigation, may be used in court.


While it cannot be denied that Escordial was deprived of his right to be informed of his
rights to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel, he has not
shown that, as a result of his custodial interrogation, the police obtained any statement
from him whether inculpatory or exculpatory - which was used in evidence against
him. No uncounseled statement was obtained from Escordial which should have been
excluded as evidence against him. However, Escordial was never assisted by counsel,
whether of his own choice or provided by the police officers, from the time of his arrest
in Pontevedra, Negros Occidental to the time of his continued detention at the Bacolod
police station. Although Escordial made no statement during this time, this fact remains
important insofar as it affects the admissibility of the out-of-court identification of
Escordial by the prosecution witnesses, namely, Michelle Darunday, Erma Blanca, Ma.
Teresa Gellaver, Mark Esmeralda, and Jason Joniega. As a rule, an accused is not
entitled to the assistance of counsel in a police line-up considering that such is usually
not a part of the custodial inquest. However, the previous cases are different inasmuch
as Escordial, having been the focus of attention by the police after he had been pointed
to by a certain Ramie as the possible perpetrator of the crime, was already under
custodial investigation when these out-of-court identifications were conducted by the
police. An out-of-court identification of an accused can be made in various ways. In a
show-up, the accused alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification,
while in a police line-up, the suspect is identified by a witness from a group of persons
gathered for that purpose. During custodial investigation, these types of identification
have been recognized as "critical confrontations of the accused by the prosecution"
which necessitate the presence of counsel for the accused. This is because the results
of these pre-trial proceedings "might well settle the accused's fate and reduce the trial
itself to a mere formality." The Court thus ruled that any identification of an uncounseled
accused made in a police line-up, or in a show-up for that matter, after the start of the
custodial investigation is inadmissible as evidence against him. Herein, Escordial was
identified by Michelle Darunda in a show-up on 3 January 1997 and by Erma Blanca,
Ma. Teresa Gellaver, Jason Joniega, and Mark Esmeralda in a police line-up on various
dates after his arrest. Having been made when Escordial did not have the assistance of
counsel, these out-of-court identifications are inadmissible in evidence against him.
Consequently, the testimonies of these witnesses regarding these identifications should
have been held inadmissible for being "the direct result of the illegal lineup 'come at by
exploitation of [the primary] illegality.'"


On 15 September 1997 at around 7:00 p.m., Helen Ramos was asleep in her house
together with her husband (Danilo Ramos) and children, Nimrod, Neres and Nairube,
the victim. Nairube slept close to her "on the upper part" of her body. At around 12:30
a.m., her husband woke her up because he sensed someone going down the stairs of
their house. She noticed that Nairube was no longer in the place where she was
sleeping but she assumed that Nairube merely answered the call of nature. Nairube's
blanket was also no longer at the place she slept but that her slippers were still there.
After three minutes of waiting for Nairube's return, she stood up and began calling out
for Nairube but there was no answer. Thereafter, she went downstairs and saw that the
backdoor of their house was open. She went outside through the backdoor to see if
Nairube was there but she was not. She found a pair of rubber slippers on top of a
wooden bench outside of her backdoor. The sole of the slippers was red while the strap
was a combination of yellow and white; said slippers did not belong to any member of
her family. Thereafter, she proceeded to the house of Alma Diaz to ask her for help.
Then, in the morning of 16 September 1997, she went to the police station to report the
loss of her child. She also reported the discovery of the pair of slippers to SP02 Quirino
Gallardo. She then went home while the police began their search for Nairube. At
around 12:30 p.m., Alma Diaz requested her to go with the searching team. During the
search, Alma Diaz found a panty which she recognized as that of her daughter. After
seeing the panty, she cried. She was thereafter ordered to go home while the others
continued the search. Thereafter, they continued the search and found a black collared
T-shirt with buttons in front and piping at the end of the sleeve hanging on a guava twig.
Alma Diaz gave the shirt to SP02 Gallardo. Loreto Veloria informed him that the two
items were worn by Clemente John Lugod when he went to the house of Violeta
Cabuhat. At around 7:00 p.m., SP02 Gallardo apprehended Lugod on the basis of the
pair of slippers and the black T-shirt. He then brought Lugod to the police station where
he was temporarily incarcerated. At first, the accused denied that he did anything to
Nairube but after he told him what happened to the girl. Later, although he admitted to
having raped and killed Nairube, Lugud refused to make a statement regarding the
same. After having been informed that the body of Nairube was in the grassy area,
Gallardo together with other members of the PNP, the Crime Watch and the
townspeople continued the search but they were still not able to find the body of
Nairube. It was only when they brought Lugod to Villa Anastacia to point out the location
of the cadaver, on 18 September 1997, that they found the body of Nairube. On 10
October 1997, Lugod was charged for rape with homicide. Upon arraignment, Lugod
with the assistance of counsel entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial ensued. On 8
October 1998, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santa Cruz, Laguna found Lugod guilty
beyond reasonable doubt, sentenced him to death, and ordered him to indemnify the
heirs of the victim, Nairube Ramos the sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for her
death and P37,200.00 as actual damages. Hence, the automatic review.


Whether Lugods confession and subesequent act of pointing the location of the
Nairubes body may be used against him as evidence


Records reveal that Lugod was not informed of his right to remain silent and to counsel,
and that if he cannot afford to have counsel of his choice, he would be provided with
one. Moreover, there is no evidence to indicate that he intended to waive these rights.
Besides, even if he did waive these rights, in order to be valid, the waiver must be made
in writing and with the assistance of counsel. Consequently, Lugod's act of confessing
to SPO2 Gallardo that he raped and killed Nairube without the assistance of counsel
cannot be used against him for having transgressed Lugod's rights under the Bill of
Rights. This is a basic tenet of our Constitution which cannot be disregarded or ignored
no matter how brutal the crime committed may be. In the same vein, Lugod's act in
pointing out the location of the body of Nairube was also elicited in violation of the
Lugod's right to remain silent. The same was an integral part of the- uncounselled
confession and is considered a fruit of the poisonous tree. Even if we were to assume
that Lugod was not yet under interrogation and thus not entitled to his constitutional
rights at the time he was brought to the police station, Lugod's acts subsequent to his
apprehension cannot be characterized as having been voluntarily made considering the
peculiar circumstances surrounding his detention. His confession was elicited by SPO2
Gallardo who promised him that he would help him if he told the truth. Furthermore,
when Lugod allegedly pointed out the body of the victim, SPO2 Gallardo, the whole
police force as well as nearly 100 of the townspeople of Cavinti escorted him there.
Ricardo Vida stated that the townspeople were antagonistic towards Lugod and wanted
to hurt him. The atmosphere from the time Lugod was apprehended and taken to the
police station up until the time he was alleged to have pointed out the location of the
body of the victim was highly intimidating and was not conducive to a spontaneous
response. Amidst such a highly coercive atmosphere, Lugod's claim that he was beaten
up and maltreated by the police officers raises a very serious doubt as to the
voluntariness of his alleged confession. The Vice-Mayor, who testified that when he
visited Lugod in the jail cell, he noticed that Lugod had bruises on his face, corroborated
Lugod's assertion that he was maltreated. Considering that the confession of Lugod
cannot be used against him, the only remaining evidence which was established by the
prosecution is the fact that several persons testified having seen Lugod the night before
the murder of Nairube and on several other occasions wearing the rubber slippers and
black T-shirt found at the house of the victim and Villa Anastacia respectively as well as
the testimony of Romualdo Ramos, the tricycle driver who stated that he saw Lugod in
the early morning of 16 September 1997 leaving Villa Anastacia without a T-shirt and
without slippers. These pieces of evidence are circumstantial in nature. The
combination of the above-mentioned circumstances does not lead to the irrefutably
logical conclusion that Lugod raped and murdered Nairube. At most, these
circumstances, taken with the testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses, merely
establish Lugod's whereabouts on that fateful evening and places Lugod at the scene of
the crime and nothing more. Lugod was acquitted.



Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines (PAL), assigned at its
Baguio City station. It having allegedly come to light that he was involved in irregularities
in the sales of plane tickets, the PAL management notified him of an investigation to be
conducted into the matter of 9 February 1986. That investigation was scheduled in
accordance with PAL's Code of Conduct and Discipline, and the Collective Bargaining
Agreement signed by it with the Philippine Airlines Employees' Association (PALEA) to
which Ramos pertained. On the day before the investigation, 8 February 1986, Ramos
gave to his superiors a handwritten note stating the at he was willing to settle
irregularities allegedly charged against him in the amount of P76,000 (approximately)
subject to conditions as may be imposed by PAL on or before 1700/9 February 1986. At
the investigation of 9 February 1986, conducted by the PAL Branch Manager in Baguio
City, Edgardo R. Cruz, in the presence of Station Agent Antonio Ocampo, Ticket Freight
Clerk Rodolfo Quitasol, and PALEA Shop Steward Cristeta Domingo, Felipe Ramos
was informed "of the finding of the Audit Team." Thereafter, his answers in response to
questions by Cruz, were taken down in writing. Ramos' answers were to the effect inter
alia that he had not indeed made disclosure of the tickets mentioned in the Audit Team's
findings, that the proceeds had been "misused" by him, that although he had planned
on paying back the money, he had been prevented from doing so, "perhaps (by)
shame," that he was still willing to settle his obligation, and proferred a "compromise to
pay on staggered basis, (and) the amount would be known in the next investigation;"
that he desired the next investigation to be at the same place, "Baguio CTO," and that
he should be represented therein by "Shop stewardees ITR Nieves Blanco;" and that he
was willing to sign his statement (as he in fact afterwards did). How the investigation
turned out is not dealt with the parties at all; but it would seem that no compromise
agreement was reached much less consummated. About 2 months later, an information
was filed against Felipe Ramos charging him with the crime of estafa allegedly
committed in Baguio City during the period from 12 March 1986 to 29 January 1987. On
arraignment on this charge, Felipe Ramos entered a plea of "Not Guilty," and trial
thereafter ensued. At the close of the people's case, the private prosecutors made a
written offer of evidence dated 21 June 1988, which included the statement of Ramos
taken on 9 February 1986 at PAL Baguio City Ticket Office, as well as his handwritten
admission given on 8
February 1986. Ramos' attorneys filed "Objections/Comments to Plaintiffs Evidence."
By Order dated 9 August 1988, Judge Ruben Ayson (Branch 6, RTC Baguio City)
admitted all the exhibits "as part of the testimony of the witnesses who testified in
connection therewith and for whatever they are worth," except Ramos' statement of 9
February and his handwritten admission dated 8 February. The private prosecutors
fileda motion for reconsideration. It was denied, by Order dated 14 September 1988.
The private prosecutors, in the name of the People of the Philippines, filed the petition
for certiorari and prohibition assailing the orders of 9 August 1988 and 14 September


Whether the constitutional rights of a person under custodial investigation comes into
play during the administrative inquiry.


Felipe Ramos was not in any sense under custodial interrogation, as the term should be
properly understood, prior to and during the administrative inquiry into the discovered
irregularities in ticket sales in which he appeared to have had a hand. The constitutional
rights of a person under custodial interrogation did not therefore come into play, were of
no relevance to the inquiry. It is also clear, too, that Ramos had voluntarily answered
questions posed to him on the first day of the administrative investigation, 9 February
1986 and agreed that the proceedings should be recorded, the record having thereafter
been marked during the trial of the criminal action subsequently filed against him, just
as it is obvious that the note that he sent to his superiors on 8 February 1986, the day
before the investigation, offering to compromise his liability in the alleged irregularities,
was a free and even spontaneous act on his part. They may not be excluded on the
ground that the so-called "Miranda rights" had not been accorded to Ramos. As to the
danger of violation of the right of any person against self-incrimination when the
investigation is conducted by the complaining companies or employers, it suffices to
draw attention to the specific and peremptory requirement of the law that disciplinary
sanctions may not be imposed on any employee by his employer until and unless the
employee has been accorded due process, by which is meant that the latter must be
informed of the offenses ascribed to him and afforded adequate time and opportunity to
explain his side. The requirement entails the making of statements, oral or written, by
the employee under such administrative investigation in his defense, with opportunity to
solicit the assistance of counsel, or his colleagues and friends. The employee may, of
course, refuse to submit any statement at the investigation, that is his privilege. But if he
should opt to do so, in his defense to the accusation against him, it would be absurd to
reject his statements, whether at the administrative investigation, or at a subsequent
criminal action brought against him, because he had not been accorded, prior to his
making and presenting them, his "Miranda rights" (to silence and to counsel and to be
informed thereof, etc.) which, to repeat, are relevant only in custodial investigations.
Indeed, it is self-evident that the employee's statements, whether called "position
paper," "answer," etc., are submitted by him precisely so that they may be admitted and
duly considered by the investigating officer or committee, in negation or mitigation of his



Petitioner is the collecting and disbursing officer of Numancia National Vocational
School found to have misappropriated public funds for private benefit after a COA
audit. He failed to restitute the amount despite COA demands. A warrant of
arrest was issued but petitioner pleaded not guilty and invokes his right to custodial
investigation since during the COA audit and actual cash count he was made to sign
the certification on the fund shortage in the absence of a counsel. He further
contends that the shortage of funds was due to the assurance of certain Macasemo to
settle his unliquidated cash advance and his failure to do so resulted to the
fund shortage.

Issue: Whether or not the right to counsel be invoked during the COA audit


No, the right to counsel could not be invoked during the COA audit since the
procedure is not within the ambit of custodial investigation. A person may be
subject to malversation of funds even in the absence of direct proof of
misappropriation as long as there is evidence of fund shortage which the petitioner
failed to explain with convincing justification.



On a busy street in Puerto Princesa City in the evening of 16 October 1991, an
emboldened Gerry Galgarin (@ Toto), uncle of Edward Endino, suddenly and without
warning lunged at Dennis Aquino and stabbed him repeatedly on the chest. Dennis'
girlfriend Clara Agagas who was with him, stunned by the unexpected attack, pleaded
to Galgarin to stop. Dennis struggled and succeeded momentarily to free himself from
his attacker. Dennis dashed towards the nearby Midtown Sales but his escape was
foiled when from out of nowhere Edward Endino appeared and fired at Dennis. As
Dennis staggered for safety, the 2 assailants fled in the direction of the airport.
Meanwhile, Dennis, wounded and bleeding, sought refuge inside the Elohim Store
where he collapsed on the floor. He was grasping for breath and near death. Clara with
the help of some onlookers took him to the hospital but Dennis expired even before he
could receive medical attention. On 18 October 1991, an Information for the murder of
Dennis Aquino was filed against Edward Endino and Gerry Galgarin and warrants were
issued for their arrest. However, as both accused remained at large, the trial court
issued on 26 December 1991 an order putting the case in the archives without prejudice
to its reinstatement upon their apprehension. On 19 November 1992, Gerry Galgarin
was arrested through the combined efforts of the Antipolo and Palawan police forces at
a house in Sitio Sto. Nio, Antipolo, Rizal. He was immediately taken into temporary
custody by the Antipolo Police. Early in the evening of the following day, he was fetched
from the Antipolo Police Station by PO3 Gaudencio Manlavi and PO3 Edwin Magbanua
of the Palawan police force to be taken to Palawan and be tried accordingly. On their
way to the airport, they stopped at the ABS-CBN television station where Galgarin was
interviewed by reporters. Video footages of the interview were taken showing Galgarin
admitting his guilt while pointing to his nephew Edward Endino as the gunman.
According to Galgarin, after attacking Aquino, they left for Roxas, Palawan, where his
sister Langging who is Edward's mother, was waiting. Langging gave them money for
their fare for Manila. They took the boat for Batangas, where they stayed for a few days,
and proceeded to Manila where they separated, with him heading for Antipolo. Galgarin
appealed for Edward to give himself up to the authorities. His interview was shown over
the ABS-CBN evening news program TV Patrol. During trial, Galgarin disowned the
confession which he made over TV Patrol and claimed that it was induced by the
threats of the arresting police officers. He asserted that the videotaped confession was
constitutionally infirmed and inadmissible under the exclusionary rule provided in Sec.
12, Art. III, of the Constitution. The trial court found Galgarin guilty of murder qualified by
Treachery, sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, and ordered him to indemnify the heirs
of Dennis Aquino in the amount of P50,000.00 as compensatory damages and
P72,725.35 as actual damages.


Whether the ABS-CBN interview recording Galgarins confession is admissible as


The interview was recorded on video and it showed Galgarin unburdening his guilt
willingly, openly and publicly in the presence of newsmen. Such confession does not
form part of custodial investigation as it was not given to police officers but to media
men in an attempt to elicit sympathy and forgiveness from the public. Besides, if he had
indeed been forced into confessing, he could have easily sought succor from the
newsmen who, in all likelihood, would have been sympathetic with him. However,
because of the inherent danger in the use of television as a medium for admitting one's
guilt, and the recurrence of this phenomenon in several cases, it is prudent that trial
courts are reminded that extreme caution must be taken in further admitting similar
confessions. For in all probability, the police, with the connivance of unscrupulous
media practitioners, may attempt to legitimize coerced extra-judicial confessions and
place them beyond the exclusionary rule by having an accused admit an offense on
television. Such a situation would be detrimental to the guaranteed rights of the accused
and thus imperil our criminal justice system. It is not suggested that videotaped
confessions given before media men by an accused with the knowledge of and in the
presence of police officers are impermissible. Indeed, the line between proper and
invalid police techniques and conduct is a difficult one to draw, particularly in cases
such as this where it is essential to make sharp judgments in determining whether a
confession was given under coercive physical or psychological atmosphere. A word of
counsel then to lower courts: "we should never presume that all media confessions
described as voluntary have been freely given. This type of confession always remains
suspect and therefore should be thoroughly examined and scrutinized. Detection of
coerced confessions is admittedly a difficult and arduous task for thecourts to make. It
requires persistence and determination in separating polluted confessions from
untainted ones. We have a sworn duty to be vigilant and protective of the rights
guaranteed by the Constitution."



Victor Francisco Keyser, was the owner and manager of Keyser Plastic Manufacturing
Corp., with principal place of business at Sitio Halang, Lornaville, San Roque, Antipolo
City. Keyser Plastics shared its building with Greatmore Corporation, a manufacturer of
faucets. Separating the respective spaces being utilized by the two firms in their
operations was a wall, the lower portion of which was made of concrete hollow blocks,
while the upper portion was of lawanit boards. The part of the wall made of lawanit had
two large holes, which could allow a person on one side of the wall to see what was on
the other side. On 22 March 1998, Romualdo Campos, a security guard assigned to
Greatmore was on duty. At around 8:00 a.m., he saw Eric G. Guillermo enter the
premises of Keyser Plastics. Campos ignored Guillermo, as he knew him to be one of
the trusted employees of Keyser Plastics. An hour later, he saw Victor F. Keyser arrive.
Keyser checked the pump motor of the deep well, which was located in the area of
Greatmore, after which he also went inside the part of the building occupied by Keyser
Plastics. Campos paid scant attention to Keyser. Later, at around 10:00 a.m., Campos
was making some entries in his logbook, when he heard some loud noises
(kalabugan) coming from the Keyser Plastics area. He stopped to listen, but thinking
that the noise was coming from the machines used to make plastics, he did not pay
much attention to the sound. At around noontime, Campos was suddenly interrupted in
the performance of his duties when he saw Guillermo look through one of the holes in
the dividing wall. According to Campos, appellant calmly told him that he had killed
Victor Keyser and needed Campos assistance to help him carry the corpse to the
garbage dump where he could burn it. Shocked by this revelation, Campos immediately
dashed off to telephone the police. The police told him to immediately secure the
premises and not let the suspect escape, while a reaction team was being dispatched to
the scene. 10 minutes later, a team composed of SPO4 Felix Bautista, SPO1 Carlito
Reyes, and Police Aide Jovenal Dizon, Jr., all from the Antipolo Philippine National
Police (PNP) Station, arrived at the crime scene. With them was Felix Marcelo, an
official police photographer. They were immediately met by Campos, who informed
them that Guillermo was still inside the building. The law enforcers tried to enter the
premises of Keyser Plastics, but found the gates securely locked. The officers then
talked to Guillermo and after some minutes, persuaded him to give them the keys. This
enabled the police to open the gate. Once inside, SPO4 Bautista and SPO1 Reyes
immediately accosted Guillermo, who was clad only in a pair of shorts, naked from the
waist up. SPO1 Reyes then asked him where the body of the victim was and Guillermo
pointed to some cardboard boxes. On opening the boxes, the police found the
dismembered limbs and chopped torso of Keyser. The victims head was found stuffed
inside a cement bag.
When the police asked how he did it, according to the prosecution witness, Guillermo
said that he bashed the victim on the head with a piece of wood, and after Keyser fell,
he dismembered the body with a carpenters saw. He then mopped up the blood on the
floor with a plastic foam. Guillermo then turned over to the police a bloodstained, two-
foot long piece of coconut lumber and a carpenters saw. Photographs were taken of the
suspect, the dismembered corpse, and the implements used in committing the crime.
When asked as to his motive for the killing, Guillermo replied that Keyser had been
maltreating him and his co-employees. He expressed no regret whatsoever about his
actions. The police then brought Guillermo to the Antipolo PNP Station for further
investigation. SPO1 Carlos conducted the investigation, without apprising Guillermo
about his constitutional rights and without providing him with the services of counsel.
SPO1 Carlos requested the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to conduct a post-
mortem examination on Keysers remains. The Antipolo police then turned over the
bloodstained piece of wood and saw, recovered from the locus delicti, to the PNP Crime
Laboratory for testing. Keysers death shocked the nation. Guillermo, who was then in
police custody, was interviewed on separate occasions by two TV reporters, namely:
Augusto Gus Abelgas of ABS-CBN News and Kara David of GMA Channel 7. Both
interviews were subsequently broadcast nationwide. Guillermo admitted to David that
he committed the crime and never gave it second thought. He disclosed to David the
details of the crime, including how he struck Keyser on the head and cut up his body
into pieces, which he placed in sacks and cartons. When asked why he killed his
employer, Guillermo stated that Keyser had not paid him for years, did not feed him
properly, and treated him like an animal. Both Abelgas and David said that Guillermo
expressed absolutely no remorse over his alleged misdeed during the course of their
respective interviews with him. On 23 March 1998, Guillermo was charged by State
Prosecutor Jaime Augusto B. Valencia, Jr., of murdering his employer, Victor Francisco
Keyser. When arraigned on 3 April 1998, Guillermo, assisted by counsel de oficio,
pleaded guilty to the charge. On 23 April 1998, however, Guillermo moved to withdraw
his plea of guilty and prayed for a re-arraignment. The trial court granted the motion and
on 28 April 1998, he was re-arraigned. Assisted by counsel de parte, he entered a plea
of not guilty. The case then proceeded to trial. After trial, the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Antipolo City, Branch 73, dated 7 March 2001 (Criminal Case 98-14724), found Eric
Guillermo y Garcia guilty of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death.
The court also ordered Guillermo to pay the mother of the victim P50,000.00 for death
indemnity, P50,000.00 for funeral expenses, P500,000.00 as compensatory damages,
P500,000.00 as moral damages, P300,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P100,000
plus P3,000 per court appearance as attorney's fees. Hence, the automatic review.


Whether Guillermos confession to the police officers, to the security guard of
Greatmore Corp., and to the newsmen are admissible as evidence.


The confession Guillermo made while he was under investigation by SPO1 Carlito
Reyes for the killing of Keyser at the Antipolo PNP Station, falls short of the protective
standards laid down by the Constitution. The investigating officer made no serious effort
to make Guillermo aware of his basic rights under custodial investigation. While the
investigating officer was aware of Guillermos right to be represented by counsel, the
officer exerted no effort to provide him with one on the flimsy excuse that it was a
Sunday. Despite the absence of counsel, the officer proceeded with said investigation.
Moreover, the record is bare of any showing that Guillermo had waived his
constitutional rights in writing and in the presence of counsel. Be that as it may,
however, the inadmissibility of Guillermos confession to SPO1 Reyes at the Antipolo
PNP Station as evidence does not necessarily lead to his acquittal. For constitutional
safeguards on custodial investigation (known, also as the Miranda principles) do not
apply to spontaneous statements, or those not elicited through questioning by law
enforcement authorities but given in an ordinary manner whereby the appellant verbally
admits to having committed the offense. The rights enumerated in the Constitution,
Article III, Section 12, are meant to preclude the slightest use of the States coercive
power as would lead an accused to admit something false. But it is not intended to
prevent him from freely and voluntarily admitting the truth outside the sphere of such
power. Herein, Guillermo admitted the commission of the crime not just to the police but
also to private individuals. According to the testimony of the security guard, Romualdo
Campos, on the very day of the killing Guillermo called him to say that he had killed his
employer and needed assistance to dispose of the cadaver. Campos testimony was not
rebutted by the defense, and thus Guillermo's statements to Campos are admissible for
being part of the res gestae. Further, when interviewed on separate occasions by the
media, Guillermo not only agreed to be interviewed by the news reporters, but he
spontaneously admitted his guilt to them. He even supplied the details regarding the
commission of the crime to reporter Kara David of GMA Channel 7. The TV news
reporters were acting as media professionals when they interviewed Guillermo. They
were not under the direction and control of the police. There was no coercion for
Guillermo to face the TV cameras. The interviews also took place on several occasions,
not just once. Each time, Guillermo did not protest or insist on his innocence. Instead,
he repeatedly admitted what he had done. He even supplied details of Keysers killing.
As held in Andan, statements spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters
during a televised interview are voluntary and admissible in evidence.



Court interpreter Felicidad Malla, who was the officer-in-charge from 1 July 1992 to 15
November 1992, took a maternity leave for 1 month (16 November 1992 to 15
December 1992) and reassumed her position on 16 December 1992, until her
resignation on 31 August 1993. On 1 September 1993, Rebecca Avanzado assumed
the position of officer in charge. It was during her tenure on 8 August 1994, that an
onthe- spot audit examination was conducted by the Fiscal Audit Division of the Office
of Court Administrator. In the course of the examination, several anomalous
transactions were discovered. One involved a manager's check deposited in the name
of Teodorico Dizon in connection with Civil Case 858, wherein Entero Villarica, on 7
August 1992 during the tenure of Malla entrusted the amount of P240,000.00 to Malla
instead of handling it over to the Clerk of Court pursuant to Supreme Court Circular 13-
92. When asked to explain where the P240,000.00 was, Malla, explained that she
deposited it at the Sta. Cruz, Laguna branch of the Philippine National Bank (PNB) but
she and Judge Sumilang later withdrew it allegedly under the belief that Dizon would
demand the delivery of the money upon the termination of the case. Upon further
questioning by the examining team, however, Malla admitted that she lent the amount of
P87,000.00 to steno-reporter Edelita Lagmay, P40,000.00 to steno-reporter Nieva
Mercado, and P81,000.00 to Mrs. Sumilang, wife of Judge Sumilang. She spent
P32,000.00 for the hospitalization of her husband and the remaining balance for
personal purposes. Later on, she executed an affidavit stating that only Lagmay and
Mercado borrowed P55,000.00 and P40,000.00, respectively. On the other hand, she
used P100,000.00 for her personal needs. Upon learning that they were being
implicated in the anomalous transaction, Lagmay executed an affidavit stating that the
amount of P55,000.00 was from the personal account of Malla and not from the
P240,000.00 amount deposited before the court and such loan has already been paid.
Mercado, on the other hand, claims that the amount of P40,000.00 was borrowed only
two weeks before the audit took place, when Malla was no longer employed with the
court. Mrs. Sumilang, for her part, denied any involvement in any of the transactions.
Judge Augusto Sumilang, Felicidad Malla, Edelita Lagmay and Nieva Mercado, court
employees of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pila, Laguna were charged in a
memorandum report by the Office of Court Administrator dated 16 August 1994, for
misappropriating funds deposited by Spouses Entero Villarica and Felicidad Domingo in
Civil Case 858. On 5 October 1994, the Supreme Court issued a resolution treating the
memorandum report as an administrative complaint (Administrative Matter MTJ-94-
989). In addition, a second complaint was lodged against Malla for removing judicial
records outside the court premises. The Court decided to include this matter in the
original complaint earlier docketed as AM MTJ-94-989 in a resolution dated 6 March


Whether Malla's constitutional rights were violated when she signed an affidavit dated
14 September 1994 before the Office of the Court Administrator, where she admitted
her misdeed.


The constitutional provision under Section 12, Article III of the Constitution may be
invoked only during "custodial investigation" or as in "custody investigation" which has
been defined as "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has
been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way." The investigation is defined as an "investigation conducted by police authorities
which will include investigation conducted by the Municipal Police, P.C. (now PNP) and
the NBI and such other police agencies in our government." Thus, the Office of the
Court Administrator can hardly be deemed to be the law enforcement authority
contemplated in the constitutional provision. At any rate, Malla admitted during her
testimony that she received the said check from Villarica covering the amount of
P240,000.00 payable to Dizon. However, when she tried to deposit it with the Municipal
Treasurer, the latter refused because there was no order from Judge Sumilang.
Consequently, Villarica entrusted said check to her. It was at this juncture that she used
the money for personal purposes. During the investigation, Malla repeated what she
basically stated in her affidavit i.e., that she used a substantial amount of the
P240,000.00 for her personal needs. This effectively refutes whatever pressure and
coercion she claims was employed against her. By repeating her confession in open
court, Malla thereby converted it into a judicial confession.


FACTS: The Department of Internal Affairs of Metrobank conducted an investigation
regarding anomalies made in the issuance of cashier checks. Salonga was interviewed
and was appraised of his constitutional rights during the interview. Salonga admitted
that he committed the anomalies and signed a confession. The trial court and the CA
convicted Salonga of qualified theft. Salonga contends that his confession is
inadmissible as evidence as it violated his constitutional right to counsel.

HELD: The confession was admissible. His right to counsel only existed when he is
under custodial investigation. He was not under custodial investigation during his
interview. He was interviewed by a bank officer, not a police officer



RATIO DECIDENDI: The phrase preferably of his own choice does not convey the message
that the choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation is exclusive as to preclude other
equally competent and independent attorneys from handling the defense.

QUICK FACTS: Appellant who was accused of the crime of rape with homicide is assailing the
admissibility of his confession because allegedly the confession was not freely, intelligently and
voluntarily entered into and that he was not assisted by a counsel. The Court convicted
appellant of rape but is acquited as to the killing.

Rogelio Rayco was having some drinks with a group.
On his way home, he saw his niece, Lenlen with appellant Dindo Mojello, a nephew of
Roger Capacito, walking together. Since he was used to seeing them together, he did
not find anything strange about this.
The following day, the Rayco family was informed that the body of Lenlen was found.
Mojello was arrested while attempting to board a motor launch.
On an investigation conducted by SPO2 Giducos, he admitted to the rape and the killing.
His confession was witnessed by Barangay Captains Bastobalanos and Landao.
Batobalanos testified that after it was executed, the contents of the document were
read to the appellant who later on voluntarily signed it. Appellant's extrajudicial
confession was sworn before Judge Jaca.
Appellant Mojello was charged with the crime of rape with homicide.
The trial court rendered judgment finding appellant guilty of the crime of rape with
Appellant alleges that the lower court gravely erred in admitting evidence the alleged
extrajudicial confession. Appellant avers that the confession which he executed was not
freely, intelligently and voluntarily entered into. He argues that he was not knowingly
and intelligently apprised of his constitutional rights before the confession was taken
from him.

WON the extrajudicial confession executed by appellant is admissible in evidence
WON appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide

DECISION: Decision AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Mojello found GUILTY of
statutory rape.

The extrajudicial confession executed by appellant applying Art. III, Sec. 12, par 1 of the
Constitution in relation to RA No. 7438, Sec. 2 complies with the strict constitutional
requirements on the right to counsel. In other words, the extrajudicial confession of the
appellant is valid and therefore admissible in evidence.
Appellant was undoubtedly apprised of his Miranda rights under the Constitution. The
court observed that the confession itself expressly stated that the investigating officers
informed him of such rights. Atty. Giduquio testified that while he was attending a
Sangguniang Bayan session, he was requested by the Chief of Police to assist appellant.
Appellant manifested on record his desire to have Atty. Giduquio as his counsel, with
the latter categorically stating that before the investigaion was conducted and
appellant's statement taken, he advised appellant of his constitutional rights. Atty.
Giduquio represented appellant during the initial stages of the trial of the present case.
The phrase preferably of his own choice does not convey the message that the choice
of a lawyer by a person under investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally
competent and independent attorneys from handling the defense.
On cross-examination, appellant Mojello claimed his life was threatened, thereby
inducing him to execute an extrajudicial confession, yet he neither filed any case against
the person who threatened him, nor did he report this to his counsel. He further
claimed that he did not understand the contents of the confession which was read in
the Visayan dialects, yet he admits that he uses the Visayan dialect in his daily discourse.
The presumption of voluntariness of appellant's confession remain unrebutted by
his failure to present independent evidence that the same was coerced.
The categorical admission of the appellant to the crime of rape, coupled with the corpus
delicti as established by Medico-Legal Report and the testimony of Rogelio Rayco, leads
the Court to no other conclusion than that of appellant's guilt for the rape of Lenlen.
However, the records do not adequately show that appellant admitted to killing the
victim. Neither is the circumstantial evidence sufficient to establish that by reason or on
the occasion of the rape a homicide was committed by the appellant.




The accused-appelant was charged with murder. On arraignment, accused-appellant
pleaded not guilty to the charge, and trial thereafter ensued. After trial, accused was
found guilty

There were no eyewitnesses to the incident, and the prosecutions evidence, aside from
appellants extrajudicial confession, was mainly circumstantial.

Said extrajudicial confession was given in the presence of a barangay captain who is
also a lawyer. Appellant questions the admissibility of
the extrajudicial confession because it was an uncounselled confession. Accused-
appellant contends that the barangay captain, although a lawyer, may not be
considered an independent counsel within the purview of Section 12, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution.


Whether or not the extrajudicial confession executed by appellant, with the assistance
of a barangay captain, is admissible in evidence against him.


No. Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:

(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right
to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of
counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing
and in the presence of counsel.

The words competent and independent counsel in the constitutional provision is not an
empty rhetoric. It stresses the need to accord the accused, under the uniquely stressful
conditions of a custodial investigation, an informed judgment on the choices explained
to him by a diligent and capable lawyer.

A barangay captain is called upon to enforce the law and ordinances in his barangay
and ensure peace and order at all times.

In fact, a barangay captain is deemed a person in authority under Article 152 of the
Revised Penal Code, to wit:

ART. 152. Persons in authority and agents of persons in authority. Who shall be
deemed as such. In applying the provisions of the preceding and other articles of this
Code, any person directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as an individual or as a
member of some court or government corporation, board, or commission, shall be
deemed a person in authority. A barrio captain and a barangay chairman shall also be
deemed a person in authority.

On these bases, it is not legally possible to consider the barangay captain as an
independent counsel of appellant.

In this case the role of the barangay captain, was a peacekeeping officer of his
barangay and therefore in direct conflict with the role of providing competent legal
assistance to appellant who was accused of committing a crime in his jurisdiction, the
barangay captain could not be considered as an independent counsel of appellant,
when the latter executed his extrajudicial confession. What the Constitutionrequires
is the presence of an independent and competent counsel, one who will effectively
undertake his clients defense without any intervening conflict of interest.




Alejandro Lucero, Bienvenido Echavez, Balbino Echavez, Peter Doe, Richard Doe and
John Doe were charged with the crime of robbery with homicide. The prosecution:
Accused-appellant (alighted from a gray-reddish car), armed with handgun, blocked the
way of the said complainant who was on board a Mercedes Benz passing along Road
14, Mindanao Avenue, Pag-asa, QC, rob and carry away cash money; one gold
necklace with cross pendant, 7 karat; one gold Rolex watch; one 3 karat gold ring; one
2 karat gold ring, domino style; one solid gold bracelet; all worth P363,600.00,
belonging to DR. DEMETRIO Z. MADRID. Accused shot LORENZO BERNALES y
ALERIA, a driver of the said offended party, thus inflicting upon him mortal wounds,
which resulted to the instantaneous death of ALERIA. Only the accused Echavez
brothers and Alejandro Lucero were apprehended. When Lucero told him that he had
no lawyer, in due time, Atty. Diosdado Peralta conferred with Lucero. He apprised
Lucero of his constitutional rights. He observed no reaction from Lucero. Nonetheless,
Atty. Peralta gathered the impression that Lucero understood his advice. When the
investigator started asking the preliminary questions, Atty. Peralta left to attend the
wake of his friend. The next morning, Lucero was accompanied by CIS agents to Atty.
Peralta's house. The extrajudicial statement of Lucero was presented to Atty. Peralta. It
was already signed by Lucero. The three accused denied complicity in the crime
charged. Appellant Lucero's defense is alibi. He testified that he was at his house in
Caloocan City. He said he was surprised when several unidentified men accosted him
while he was walking towards his house. They chased him, handcuffed and blindfolded
him and pushed him into a jeep. He was blindfolded the whole night and did not know
where he was taken. The men turned out to be police officers.
The next day, he learned he was in Camp Crame. He claimed that he was tortured. He
was not informed of the offense for which he was being investigated. Neither did they
reveal the identity of the complainant.
Lucero denied knowing Dr. Madrid, the Echavez brothers and the other accused in this
case. He said he only met Dr. Madrid at the CIS Office during the police line-up. He was
made to line-up four (4) times before Dr. Madrid finally identified him on the fourth time.
Lucero also claimed he signed the extrajudicial confession under duress. He denied
engaging the services of Atty, Peralta. He likewise confirmed that Atty. Peralta was not
present during his actual custodial interrogation. After trial, the court a quo acquitted the
Echavez brothers for insufficient evidence. The trial court, however, convicted accused
Lucero GUILTY as principal by direct participation of Robbery with Homicide and
sentenced to suffer an imprisonment term of RECLUSION PERPETUA.


Whether or Not the lower court erred in convicting accused-appellant.


Appellant's conviction cannot be based on his extrajudicial confession. Constitution
requires that a person under investigation for the commission of a crime should be
provided with counsel. The Court have constitutionalized the right to counsel because of
hostility against the use of duress and other undue influence in extracting confessions
from a suspect. Force and fraud tarnish confessions can render them inadmissible. The
records show that Atty. Peralta, who was not the counsel of choice of appellant. Atty.
Peralta himself admitted he received no reaction from appellant although his impression
was that appellant understood him. More so, it was during his absence that appellant
gave an uncounselled confession. Constitution requires the right to counsel, it did not
mean any kind of counsel but effective and vigilant counsel. The circumstances clearly
demonstrate that appellant received no effective counseling from Atty. Peralta. Whereof,
Decision convicting appellant Alejandro Lucero y Cortel is hereby reversed.