Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
Resolution March 18, 1954
In the Matter of the Petitions for A!ission to the "ar of Unsuccessful Caniates of 194# to
195$%
A&"I'O CU'A'A', ET A&(, petitioners.
Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo, and Antonio Enrile Inton for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor eneral Juan R. !i"ag for respondent.
)IO*'O, J.+
In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much public interest and concern as
Republic Act No. !"# popularly $nown as the %Bar &lun$ers' Act of ()*.% +nder the Rules of Court
,overnin, admission to the bar# %in order that a candidate -for admission to the Bar. may be deemed
to have passed his e/aminations successfully# he must have obtained a ,eneral avera,e of !) per
cent in all sub0ects# without fallin, below )1 per cent in any sub0ect.% -Rule ("!# sec. (2# Rules of
Court.. Nevertheless# considerin, the varyin, difficulties of the different bar e/aminations held since
(23 and the varyin, de,ree of strictness with which the e/amination papers were ,raded# this court
passed and admitted to the bar those candidates who had obtained an avera,e of only !" per cent in
(23# 3 per cent in (2!# !1 per cent in (24# and !2 per cent in (2. In ()1 to ()*# the !2 per
cent was raised to !) per cent.
Believin, themselves as fully 5ualified to practice law as those reconsidered and passed by this court#
and feelin, conscious of havin, been discriminated a,ainst -6ee E/planatory Note to R.A. No. !".#
unsuccessful candidates who obtained avera,es of a few percenta,e lower than those admitted to
the Bar a,itated in Con,ress for# and secured in ()( the passa,e of 6enate Bill No. (" which#
amon, others# reduced the passin, ,eneral avera,e in bar e/aminations to !1 per cent effective
since (23. 7he President re5uested the views of this court on the bill. Complyin, with that re5uest#
seven members of the court subscribed to and submitted written comments adverse thereto# and
shortly thereafter the President vetoed it. Con,ress did not override the veto. Instead# it approved
6enate Bill No. *!(# embodyin, substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill. Althou,h the members
of this court reiterated their unfavorable views on the matter# the President allowed the bill to become
a law on 8une "(# ()* without his si,nature. 7he law# which incidentally was enacted in an election
year# reads in full as follows9
REP+B:IC AC7 N;. !"
AN AC7 7; &I< 7=E PA66IN> MAR?6 &;R BAR E<AMINA7I;N6 &R;M
NINE7EEN =+N@RE@ AN@ &;R7AB6I< +P 7; AN@ INC:+@IN> NINE7EEN
=+N@RE@ AN@ &I&7AB&ICE.
#e it enacted $y the Senate and House of Representati%es of the &hilippines in
Congress asse'$led(
6EC7I;N (. Notwithstandin, the provisions of section fourteen# Rule numbered one hundred
twentyBseven of the Rules of Court# any bar candidate who obtained a ,eneral avera,e of
seventy per cent in any bar e/aminations after 8uly fourth# nineteen hundred and fortyBsi/ up to
the Au,ust nineteen hundred and fiftyBone bar e/aminationsD seventyBone per cent in the
nineteen hundred and fiftyBtwo bar e/aminationsD seventyBtwo per cent in the in the nineteen
hundred and fiftyBthree bar e/aminationsD seventyBthree per cent in the nineteen hundred and
fiftyBfour bar e/aminationsD seventyBfour per cent in the nineteen hundred and fiftyBfive bar
e/aminations without a candidate obtainin, a ,rade below fifty per cent in any sub0ect# shall be
allowed to ta$e and subscribe the correspondin, oath of office as member of the Philippine
Bar9 &ro%ided, ho"e%er# 7hat for the purpose of this Act# any e/act oneBhalf or more of a
fraction# shall be considered as one and included as part of the ne/t whole number.
6EC. ". Any bar candidate who obtained a ,rade of seventyBfive per cent in any sub0ect in any
bar e/amination after 8uly fourth# nineteen hundred and fortyBsi/ shall be deemed to have
passed in such sub0ect or sub0ects and such ,rade or ,rades shall be included in computin,
the passin, ,eneral avera,e that said candidate may obtain in any subse5uent e/aminations
that he may ta$e.
6EC. *. 7his Act shall ta$e effect upon its approval.
Enacted on 8une "(# ()*# without the E/ecutive approval.
After its approval# many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for admission to the
bar invo$in, its provisions# while others whose motions for the revision of their e/amination papers
were still pendin, also invo$ed the aforesaid law as an additional ,round for admission. 7here are
also others who have sou,ht simply the reconsideration of their ,rades without# however# invo$in, the
law in 5uestion. 7o avoid in0ustice to individual petitioners# the court first reviewed the motions for
reconsideration# irrespective of whether or not they had invo$ed Republic Act No. !". +nfortunately#
the court has found no reason to revise their ,rades. If they are to be admitted to the bar# it must be
pursuant to Republic Act No. !" which# if declared valid# should be applied e5ually to all concerned
whether they have filed petitions or not. A complete list of the petitioners# properly classified# affected
by this decision# as well as a more detailed account of the history of Republic Act No. !"# are
appended to this decision as Anne/es I and II. And to realiEe more readily the effects of the law# the
followin, statistical data are set forth9
-(. 7he unsuccessful bar candidates who are to be benefited by section ( of Republic Act No. !"
total (#(34# classified as follows9
(23 -Au,ust. "13 ("( (4
(23 -November. 2!! ""4 2*
(2! !2 *21 1
(24 4 21 ((
(2 (#"(
4
)*" (32
()1 (#*(
3
4* "3
()( "#13
4
4! (3
()" "#!*
4
(#1*
*
2"3
()*
"#))
)
34 "42

Fnbsp7;7A:
("#"
*1
)#2"
(
(#(3
4
;f the total (#(34 candidates# " have passed in subse5uent e/amination# and only )43 have filed
either motions for admission to the bar pursuant to said Republic Act# or mere motions for
reconsideration.
-". In addition# some other (1 unsuccessful candidates are to be benefited by section " of said
Republic Act. 7hese candidates had each ta$en from two to five different e/aminations# but failed to
obtain a passin, avera,e in any of them. Consolidatin,# however# their hi,hest ,rades in different
sub0ects in previous e/aminations# with their latest mar$s# they would be sufficient to reach the
passin, avera,e as provided for by Republic Act No. !".
-*. 7he total number of candidates to be benefited by this Republic Acts is therefore (#12# of which
only 312 have filed petitions. ;f these 312 petitioners# ** who failed in (23 to ()( had individually
presented motions for reconsideration which were denied# while (") unsuccessful candidates of
()"# and )3 of ()*# had presented similar motions# which are still pendin, because they could be
favorably affected by Republic Act No. !"# G althou,h as has been already stated# this tribunal finds
no sufficient reasons to reconsider their ,rades
U'CO'STITUTIO'A&IT, O- REPU"&IC ACT 'O( 9./
=avin, been called upon to enforce a law of farBreachin, effects on the practice of the le,al
profession and the administration of 0ustice# and because some doubts have been e/pressed as to its
validity# the court set the hearin, of the aforeBmentioned petitions for admission on the sole 5uestion
of 0hether or not Re1u2lic Act 'o( 9./ is constitutional(
He have been enli,htened in the study of this 5uestion by the brilliant assistance of the members of
the bar who have amply ar,ued# orally an in writin,# on the various aspects in which the 5uestion may
be ,leaned. 7he valuable studies of Messrs. E. Coltaire >arcia# Cicente 8. &rancisco# Cicente PelaeE
and Buenaventura Evan,elista# in favor of the validity of the law# and of the +.P. Homen's :awyers'
Circle# the 6olicitor >eneral# Messrs. Arturo A. AlafriE# Enri5ue M. &ernando# Cicente Abad 6antos#
Carlos A. Barrios# Cicente del Rosario# 8uan de Blancaflor# Mamerto C. >onEales# and Roman
;Eaeta a,ainst it# aside from the memoranda of counsel for petitioners# Messrs. 8ose M. Arue,o#
M.=. de 8oya# Mi,uel R. Corne0o and Antonio Enrile Inton# and of petitioners Cabrera# Macasaet and
>alema themselves# has ,reatly helped us in this tas$. 7he le,al researchers of the court have
e/hausted almost all Philippine and American 0urisprudence on the matter. 7he 5uestion has been
the ob0ect of intense deliberation for a lon, time by the 7ribunal# and finally# after the votin,# the
preparation of the ma0ority opinion was assi,ned to a new member in order to place it as humanly as
possible above all suspicion of pre0udice or partiality.
Republic Act No. !" has for its ob0ect# accordin, to its author# to admit to the Bar# those candidates
who suffered from insufficiency of readin, materials and inade5uate preparation. Iuotin, a portion of
the E/planatory Note of the proposed bill# its author =onorable 6enator Pablo An,eles @avid stated9
7he reason for rela/in, the standard !) per cent passin, ,rade is the tremendous handicap
which students durin, the years immediately after the 8apanese occupation has to overcome
such as the insufficiency of readin, materials and the inade5uacy of the preparation of
students who too$ up law soon after the liberation.
;f the #3!) candidates who too$ the e/aminations from (23 to ()"# )#"*3 passed. And now it is
claimed that in addition 312 candidates be admitted -which in reality total (#12.# because they
suffered from %insufficiency of readin, materials% and of %inade5uacy of preparation.%
By its declared ob0ective# the law is contrary to public interest because it 5ualifies (#12 law
,raduates who confessedly had inade5uate preparation for the practice of the profession# as was
e/actly found by this 7ribunal in the aforesaid e/aminations. 7he public interest demands of le,al
profession ade5uate preparation and efficiency# precisely more so as le,al problem evolved by the
times become more difficult. An ade5uate le,al preparation is one of the vital re5uisites for the
practice of law that should be developed constantly and maintained firmly. 7o the le,al profession is
entrusted the protection of property# life# honor and civil liberties. 7o approve officially of those
inade5uately prepared individuals to dedicate themselves to such a delicate mission is to create a
serious social dan,er. Moreover# the statement that there was an insufficiency of le,al readin,
materials is ,rossly e/a,,erated. 7here were abundant materials. @ecisions of this court alone in
mimeo,raphed copies were made available to the public durin, those years and private enterprises
had also published them in monthly ma,aEines and annual di,ests. 7he Official a)ette had been
published continuously. Boo$s and ma,aEines published abroad have entered without restriction
since (2). Many law boo$s# some even with revised and enlar,ed editions have been printed locally
durin, those periods. A new set of Philippine Reports be,an to be published since (23# which
continued to be supplemented by the addition of new volumes. 7hose are facts of public $nowled,e.
'ot0ithstanin3 all these, if the la0 in 4uestion is 5ali, it has to 2e enforce(
7he 5uestion is not new in its fundamental aspect or from the point of view of applicable principles#
but the resolution of the 5uestion would have been easier had an identical case of similar bac$,round
been pic$ed out from the 0urisprudence we daily consult. Is there any precedent in the lon, An,loB
6a/on le,al history# from which has been directly derived the 0udicial system established here with its
lofty ideals by the Con,ress of the +nited 6tates# and which we have preserved and attempted to
improve# or in our contemporaneous 0udicial history of more than half a centuryJ &rom the citations of
those defendin, the law# we can not find a case in which the validity of a similar law had been
sustained# while those a,ainst its validity cite# amon, others# the cases of @ay -In re @ay# )2 NE
323.# of Cannon -6tate %s. Cannon# "21 NH# 22(.# the opinion of the 6upreme Court of
Massachusetts in (*" -4( A:R (13(.# of >uariKa -"2 Phil.# *!.# aside from the opinion of the
President which is e/pressed in his vote of the ori,inal bill and which the postponement of the
contested law respects.
7his law has no precedent in its favor. Hhen similar laws in other countries had been promul,ated#
the 0udiciary immediately declared them without force or effect. It is not within our power to offer a
precedent to uphold the disputed law.
7o be e/act# we ou,ht to state here that we have e/amined carefully the case that has been cited to
us as a favorable precedent of the law G that of Cooper -"" NA# 4(.# where the Court of Appeals of
New Aor$ revo$ed the decision of the 6upreme court of that 6tate# denyin, the petition of Cooper to
be admitted to the practice of law under the provisions of a statute concernin, the school of law of
Columbia Colle,e promul,ated on April !# (431# which was declared by the Court of Appeals to be
consistent with the Constitution of the state of New Aor$.
It appears that the Constitution of New Aor$ at that time provided9
7hey -i.e.# the 0ud,es. shall not hold any other office of public trust. All votes for either of them
for any elective office e/cept that of the Court of Appeals# ,iven by the :e,islature or the
people# shall be void. 7hey shall not e/ercise any power of appointment to public office. Any
male citiEen of the a,e of twentyBone years# of ,ood moral character# and who possesses the
re5uisite 5ualifications of learnin, and ability# shall be entitled to admission to practice in all the
courts of this 6tate. -p. *..
Accordin, to the Court of Appeals# the ob0ect of the constitutional precept is as follows9
Attorneys# solicitors# etc.# were public officersD the power of appointin, them had previously
rested with the 0ud,es# and this was the principal appointin, power which they possessed. 7he
convention was evidently dissatisfied with the manner in which this power had been e/ercised#
and with the restrictions which the 0ud,es had imposed upon admission to practice before
them. 7he prohibitory clause in the section 5uoted was aimed directly at this power# and the
insertion of the provision% e/pectin, the admission of attorneys# in this particular section of the
Constitution# evidently arose from its connection with the ob0ect of this prohibitory clause.
7here is nothin, indicative of confidence in the courts or of a disposition to preserve any
portion of their power over this sub0ect# unless the 6upreme Court is ri,ht in the inference it
draws from the use of the word Ladmission' in the action referred to. It is ur,ed that the
admission spo$en of must be by the courtD that to admit means to ,rant leave# and that the
power of ,rantin, necessarily implies the power of refusin,# and of course the ri,ht of
determinin, whether the applicant possesses the re5uisite 5ualifications to entitle him to
admission.
7hese positions may all be conceded# without affectin, the validity of the act. -p. *..
Now# with respect to the law of April !# (431# the decision seems to indicate that it provided that the
possession of a diploma of the school of law of Columbia Colle,e conferrin, the de,ree of Bachelor
of :aws was evidence of the le,al 5ualifications that the constitution re5uired of applicants for
admission to the Bar. 7he decision does not however 5uote the te/t of the law# which we cannot find
in any public or accessible private library in the country.
In the case of Cooper# supra# to ma$e the law consistent with the Constitution of New Aor$# the Court
of Appeals said of the ob0ect of the law9
7he motive for passin, the act in 5uestion is apparent. Columbia Colle,e bein, an institution of
established reputation# and havin, a law department under the char,e of able professors# the
students in which department were not only sub0ected to a formal e/amination by the law
committee of the institution# but to a certain definite period of study before bein, entitled to a
diploma of bein, ,raduates# the :e,islature evidently# and no doubt 0ustly# considered this
e/amination# to,ether with the preliminary study re5uired by the act# as fully e5uivalent as a
test of le,al re5uirements# to the ordinary e/amination by the courtD and as renderin, the latter
e/amination# to which no definite period of preliminary study was essential# unnecessary and
burdensome.
7he act was obviously passed with reference to the learnin, and ability of the applicant# and
for the mere purpose of substitutin, the e/amination by the law committee of the colle,e for
that of the court. It could have had no other ob0ect# and hence no ,reater scope should be
,iven to its provisions. He cannot suppose that the :e,islature desi,ned entirely to dispense
with the plain and e/plicit re5uirements of the ConstitutionD and the act contains nothin,
whatever to indicate an intention that the authorities of the colle,e should in5uire as to the a,e#
citiEenship# etc.# of the students before ,rantin, a diploma. 7he only rational interpretation of
which the act admits is# that it was intended to ma$e the colle,e diploma competent evidence
as to the le,al attainments of the applicant# and nothin, else. 7o this e/tent alone it operates
as a modification of preBe/istin, statutes# and it is to be read in connection with these statutes
and with the Constitution itself in order to determine the present condition of the law on the
sub0ect. -p.4.
/ / / / / / / / /
7he :e,islature has not ta$en from the court its 0urisdiction over the 5uestion of admission# that
has simply prescribed what shall be competent evidence in certain cases upon that 5uestion.
-p.*.
&rom the fore,oin,# the complete inapplicability of the case of Cooper with that at bar may be clearly
seen. Please note only the followin, distinctions9
-(. 7he law of New Aor$ does not re5uire that any candidate of Columbia Colle,e who failed in the
bar e/aminations be admitted to the practice of law.
-". 7he law of New Aor$ accordin, to the very decision of Cooper# has not ta$en from the court its
0urisdiction over the 5uestion of admission of attorney at lawD in effect# it does not decree the
admission of any lawyer.
-*. 7he Constitution of New Aor$ at that time and that of the Philippines are entirely different on the
matter of admission of the practice of law.
In the 0udicial system from which ours has been evolved# the admission# suspension# disbarment and
reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their supervision have been
disputably a 0udicial function and responsibility. Because of this attribute# its continuous and Eealous
possession and e/ercise by the 0udicial power have been demonstrated durin, more than si/
centuries# which certainly %constitutes the most solid of titles.% Even considerin, the power ,ranted to
Con,ress by our Constitution to repeal# alter supplement the rules promul,ated by this Court
re,ardin, the admission to the practice of law# to our 0ud,ment and proposition that the admission#
suspension# disbarment and reinstatement of the attorneys at law is a le,islative function# properly
belon,in, to Con,ress# is unacceptable. 7he function re5uires -(. previously established rules and
principles# -". concrete facts# whether past or present# affectin, determinate individuals. and -*.
decision as to whether these facts are ,overned by the rules and principlesD in effect# a 0udicial
function of the hi,hest de,ree. And it becomes more undisputably 0udicial# and not le,islative# if
previous 0udicial resolutions on the petitions of these same individuals are attempted to be revo$ed or
modified.
He have said that in the 0udicial system from which ours has been derived# the act of admittin,#
suspendin,# disbarrin, and reinstatin, attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly
0udicial. A comprehensive and conscientious study of this matter had been underta$en in the case of
6tate %s. Cannon -(*". "21 NH 22(# in which the validity of a le,islative enactment providin, that
Cannon be permitted to practice before the courts was discussed. &rom the te/t of this decision we
5uote the followin, para,raphs9
7his statute presents an assertion of le,islative power without parallel in the history of the
En,lish spea$in, people so far as we have been able to ascertain. 7here has been much
uncertainty as to the e/tent of the power of the :e,islature to prescribe the ultimate
5ualifications of attorney at law has been e/pressly committed to the courts# and the act of
admission has always been re,arded as a 0udicial function. 7his act purports to constitute Mr.
Cannon an attorney at law# and in this respect it stands alone as an assertion of le,islative
power. -p. 222.
+nder the Constitution all le,islative power is vested in a 6enate and Assembly. -6ection (#
art. 2.. In so far as the prescribin, of 5ualifications for admission to the bar are le,islative in
character# the :e,islature is actin, within its constitutional authority when it sets up and
prescribes such 5ualifications. -p. 222.
But when the :e,islature has prescribed those 5ualifications which in its 0ud,ment will serve
the purpose of le,itimate le,islative solicitude# is the power of the court to impose other and
further e/actions and 5ualifications foreclosed or e/haustedJ -p. 222.
+nder our Constitution the 0udicial and le,islative departments are distinct# independent# and
coordinate branches of the ,overnment. Neither branch en0oys all the powers of soverei,nty
which properly belon,s to its department. Neither department should so act as to embarrass
the other in the dischar,e of its respective functions. 7hat was the scheme and thou,ht of the
people settin, upon the form of ,overnment under which we e/ist. 6tate %s. =astin,s# (1 His.#
)")D Attorney >eneral e/ rel. Bashford %s. Barstow# 2 His.# )3!. -p. 22).
7he 0udicial department of ,overnment is responsible for the plane upon which the
administration of 0ustice is maintained. Its responsibility in this respect is e/clusive. By
committin, a portion of the powers of soverei,nty to the 0udicial department of our state
,overnment# under 2"a scheme which it was supposed rendered it immune from
embarrassment or interference by any other department of ,overnment# the courts cannot
escape responsibility fir the manner in which the powers of soverei,nty thus committed to the
0udicial department are e/ercised. -p. 22).
7he relation at the bar to the courts is a peculiar and intimate relationship. 7he bar is an
attache of the courts. 7he 5uality of 0ustice dispense by the courts depends in no small de,ree
upon the inte,rity of its bar. An unfaithful bar may easily brin, scandal and reproach to the
administration of 0ustice and brin, the courts themselves into disrepute. -p.22).
7hrou,h all time courts have e/ercised a direct and severe supervision over their bars# at least
in the En,lish spea$in, countries. -p. 22).
After e/plainin, the history of the case# the Court ends thus9
;ur conclusion may be epitomiEed as follows9 &or more than si/ centuries prior to the adoption
of our Constitution# the courts of En,land# concededly subordinate to Parliament since the
Revolution of (344# had e/ercise the ri,ht of determinin, who should be admitted to the
practice of law# which# as was said in Matter of the 6er,eant's at :aw# 3 Bin,ham's New Cases
"*)# %constitutes the most solid of all titles.% If the courts and 0udicial power be re,arded as an
entity# the power to determine who should be admitted to practice law is a constituent element
of that entity. It may be difficult to isolate that element and say with assurance that it is either a
part of the inherent power of the court# or an essential element of the 0udicial power e/ercised
by the court# but that it is a power belon,in, to the 0udicial entity and made of not only a
soverei,n institution# but made of it a separate independent# and coordinate branch of the
,overnment. 7hey too$ this institution alon, with the power traditionally e/ercise to determine
who should constitute its attorney at law. 7here is no e/press provision in the Constitution
which indicates an intent that this traditional power of the 0udicial department should in any
manner be sub0ect to le,islative control. Perhaps the dominant thou,ht of the framers of our
constitution was to ma$e the three ,reat departments of ,overnment separate and
independent of one another. 7he idea that the :e,islature mi,ht embarrass the 0udicial
department by prescribin, inade5uate 5ualifications for attorneys at law is inconsistent with the
dominant purpose of ma$in, the 0udicial independent of the le,islative department# and such a
purpose should not be inferred in the absence of e/press constitutional provisions. Hhile the
le,islature may le,islate with respect to the 5ualifications of attorneys# but is incidental merely
to its ,eneral and un5uestioned power to protect the public interest. Hhen it does le,islate a
fi/in, a standard of 5ualifications re5uired of attorneys at law in order that public interests may
be protected# such 5ualifications do not constitute only a minimum standard and limit the class
from which the court must ma$e its selection. 6uch le,islative 5ualifications do not constitute
the ultimate 5ualifications beyond which the court cannot ,o in fi/in, additional 5ualifications
deemed necessary by the course of the proper administration of 0udicial functions. 7here is no
le,islative power to compel courts to admit to their bars persons deemed by them unfit to
e/ercise the prero,atives of an attorney at law. -p. 2)1.
&urthermore# it is an unlawful attempt to e/ercise the power of appointment. It is 5uite li$ely
true that the le,islature may e/ercise the power of appointment when it is in pursuance of a
le,islative functions. =owever# the authorities are wellBni,h unanimous that the power to admit
attorneys to the practice of law is a 0udicial function. In all of the states# e/cept New 8ersey -In
re Reisch# 4* N.8. E5. 4"# 1 A. (".# so far as our investi,ation reveals# attorneys receive their
formal license to practice law by their admission as members of the bar of the court so
admittin,. Cor. 8ur. )!"D E* parte 6ecombre# ( =ow. #() :. Ed. )3)D E* parte>arland# 2
Hall. ***# (4 :. Ed. *33D Randall %s. Bri,ham# ! Hall. )*# ( :. Ed. "4)D =anson %s. >rattan#
24 ?an# 42*# (() P. 323# *2 :.R.A. )(D @anforth %s. E,an# "* 6. @. 2*# (( N.H. (1"(# (*1
Am. 6t. Rep. (1*1# "1 Ann. Cas. 2(*.
7he power of admittin, an attorney to practice havin, been perpetually e/ercised by the
courts# it havin, been so ,enerally held that the act of the court in admittin, an attorney to
practice is the 0ud,ment of the court# and an attempt as this on the part of the :e,islature to
confer such ri,ht upon any one bein, most e/ceedin,ly uncommon# it seems clear that the
licensin, of an attorney is and always has been a purely 0udicial function# no matter where the
power to determine the 5ualifications may reside. -p. 2)(.
In that same year of (*"# the 6upreme Court of Massachusetts# in answerin, a consultation of the
6enate of that 6tate# (41 NE !")# said9
It is indispensible to the administration of justice and to interpretation of the laws that
there be members of the bar of sufficient ability, adequate learning and sound moral
character. 7his arises from the need of enli,htened assistance to the honest# and restrainin,
authority over the $navish# liti,ant. It is hi,hly important# also that the public be protected from
incompetent and vicious practitioners# whose opportunity for doin, mischief is wide. It was said
by CardoE# C.:.# in People e/ rel. ?arlin %s. Cul$in# "2" N.A. 2)3# 2!1# 2!(# (3" N.E. 24!# 24#
31 A.:.R. 4)(9 %Membership in the bar is a privile,e burden with conditions.% ;ne is admitted
to the bar %for somethin, more than private ,ain.% =e becomes an %officer of the court%# and
#li$e the court itself# an instrument or a,ency to advance the end of 0ustice. =is cooperation
with the court is due %whenever 0ustice would be imperiled if cooperation was withheld.%
Hithout such attorneys at law the 0udicial department of ,overnment would be hampered in the
performance of its duties. 7hat has been the history of attorneys under the common law# both
in this country and En,land. Admission to practice as an attorney at law is almost without
e/ception conceded to be a 0udicial function. Petition to that end is filed in courts# as are other
proceedin,s invo$in, 0udicial action. Admission to the bar is accomplish and made open and
notorious by a decision of the court entered upon its records. 7he establishment by the
Constitution of the 0udicial department conferred authority necessary to the e/ercise of its
powers as a coordinate department of ,overnment. It is an inherent power of such a
department of ,overnment ultimately to determine the 5ualifications of those to be admitted to
practice in its courts# for assistin, in its wor$# and to protect itself in this respect from the unfit#
those lac$in, in sufficient learnin,# and those not possessin, ,ood moral character. Chief
8ustice 7aney stated succinctly and with finality in E* parte 6ecombe# ( =ow. # (*# () :. Ed.
)3)# %It has been well settled# by the rules and practice of commonBlaw courts# that it rests
e/clusively with the court to determine who is 5ualified to become one of its officers# as an
attorney and counselor# and for what cause he ou,ht to be removed.% -p.!"!.
In the case of @ay and others who collectively filed a petition to secure license to practice the le,al
profession by virtue of a law of state -In re @ay# )2 NE 323.# the court said in part9
In the case of E* parte >arland# 2 Hall# ***# (4 :. Ed. *33# the court# holdin, the test oath for
attorneys to be unconstitutional# e/plained the nature of the attorney's office as follows9 %7hey
are officers of the court# admitted as such by its order# upon evidence of their possessin,
sufficient le,al learnin, and fair private character. It has always been the ,eneral practice in
this country to obtain this evidence by an e/amination of the parties. In this court the fact of the
admission of such officers in the hi,hest court of the states to which they# respectively# belon,
for# three years precedin, their application# is re,arded as sufficient evidence of the
possession of the re5uisite le,al learnin,# and the statement of counsel movin, their admission
sufficient evidence that their private and professional character is fair. 7he order of admission
is the 0ud,ment of the court that the parties possess the re5uisite 5ualifications as attorneys
and counselors# and are entitled to appear as such and conduct causes therein. &rom its entry
the parties become officers of the court# and are responsible to it for professional misconduct.
7hey hold their office durin, ,ood behavior# and can only be deprived of it for misconduct
ascertained and declared by the 0ud,ment of the court after opportunity to be heard has been
afforded. E* parte =oyfron# admission or their e/clusion is not the e/ercise of a mere
ministerial power. It is the e/ercise of 0udicial power# and has been so held in numerous cases.
It was so held by the court of appeals of New Aor$ in the matter of the application of Cooper
for admission. Re Cooper "" N. A. 4(. %Attorneys and Counselors%# said that court# %are not
only officers of the court# but officers whose duties relate almost e/clusively to proceedin,s of
a 0udicial natureD and hence their appointment may# with propriety# be entrusted to the court#
and the latter# in performin, his duty# may very 0ustly considered as en,a,ed in the e/ercise of
their appropriate 0udicial functions.% -pp. 3)1B3)(..
He 5uote from other cases# the followin, pertinent portions9
Admission to practice of law is almost without e/ception conceded everywhere to be the
e/ercise of a 0udicial function# and this opinion need not be burdened with citations in this
point. Admission to practice have also been held to be the e/ercise of one of the inherent
powers of the court. G Re Bruen# (1" Hash. 2!"# (!" Pac. 13.
Admission to the practice of law is the e/ercise of a 0udicial function# and is an inherent power
of the court. G A.C. Brydon0ac$# %s. 6tate Bar of California# "4( Pac. (1(4D 6ee Annotation on
Power of :e,islature respectin, admission to bar# 3)# A.:. R. ()(".
;n this matter there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the 0udicial and le,islative
departments of the ,overnment.
7he distinction $et"een the functions of the legislati%e and the judicial depart'ents is that it is
the province of the le3islature to establish rules that shall regulate and go%ern in 'atters of
transactions occurring su$se+uent to the legislati%e action# while the 6uiciar7 determines
ri,hts and obli,ations with reference to transactions that are past or conditions that e/ist at the
time of the e/ercise of 0udicial power# and the distinction is a vital one and not sub0ect to
alteration or chan,e either by le,islative action or by 0udicial decree.
7he 0udiciary cannot consent that its province shall be invaded by either of the other
departments of the ,overnment. G (3 C.8.6.# Constitutional :aw# p. "".
If the le,islature cannot thus indirectly control the action of the courts by re5uirin, of them
construction of the law accordin, to its own views# it is very plain it cannot do so directly# by
settlin, aside their 0ud,ments# compellin, them to ,rant new trials# orderin, the dischar,e of
offenders# or directin, what particular steps shall be ta$en in the pro,ress of a 0udicial in5uiry.
G Cooley's Constitutional :imitations# (".
In decreein, the bar candidates who obtained in the bar e/aminations of (23 to ()"# a ,eneral
avera,e of !1 per cent without fallin, below )1 per cent in any sub0ect# be admitted in mass to the
practice of law# the disputed law is not a le,islationD it is a 0ud,ment G a 0ud,ment revo$in, those
promul,ated by this Court durin, the aforecited year affectin, the bar candidates concernedD and
althou,h this Court certainly can revo$e these 0ud,ments even now# for 0ustifiable reasons# it is no
less certain that only this Court# and not the le,islative nor e/ecutive department# that may be so. Any
attempt on the part of any of these departments would be a clear usurpation of its functions# as is the
case with the law in 5uestion.
7hat the Constitution has conferred on Con,ress the power to repeal# alter or supplement the rule
promul,ated by this 7ribunal# concernin, the admission to the practice of law# is no valid ar,ument.
6ection (*# article CIII of the Constitution provides9
6ection (*. 7he 6upreme Court shall have the power to promul,ate rules concernin, pleadin,#
practice# and procedure in all courts# and the admission to the practice of law. 6aid rules shall
be uniform for all courts of the same ,rade and shall not diminish# increase or modify
substantive ri,hts. 7he e/istin, laws on pleadin,# practice and procedure are hereby repealed
as statutes# and are declared Rules of Court# sub0ect to the power of the 6upreme Court to
alter and modify the same. 7he Con,ress shall have the power to repeal# alter# or supplement
the rules concernin, pleadin,# practice# and procedure# and the admission to the practice of
law in the Philippines. G Constitution of the Philippines# Art. CIII# sec. (*.
It will be noted that the Constitution has not conferred on Con,ress and this 7ribunal e5ual
responsibilities concernin, the admission to the practice of law. the primary power and responsibility
which the Constitution reco,niEes continue to reside in this Court. =ad Con,ress found that this Court
has not promul,ated any rule on the matter# it would have nothin, over which to e/ercise the power
,ranted to it. Congress 'ay repeal, alter and supple'ent the rules pro'ulgated $y this Court, $ut the
authority and responsi$ility o%er the ad'ission, suspension, dis$ar'ent and reinstate'ent of
attorneys at la" and their super%ision re'ain %ested in the Supre'e Court . 7he power to repeal# alter
and supplement the rules does not si,nify nor permit that Con,ress substitute or ta$e the place of this
7ribunal in the e/ercise of its primary power on the matter. ,he Constitution does not say nor 'ean
that Congress 'ay ad'it, suspend, dis$ar or reinstate directly attorneys at la", or a deter'inate
,roup of individuals to the practice of law. Its po"er is li'ited to repeal, 'odify or supple'ent the
existing rules on the 'atter, if according to its judg'ent the need for a $etter ser%ice of the legal
profession re+uires it. But this power does not relieve this Court of its responsibility to admit# suspend#
disbar and reinstate attorneys at law and supervise the practice of the le,al profession.
Bein, coordinate and independent branches# the power to promul,ate and enforce rules for the
admission to the practice of law and the concurrent power to repeal# alter and supplement them may
and should be e/ercised with the respect that each owes to the other# ,ivin, careful consideration to
the responsibility which the nature of each department re5uires. 7hese powers have e/isted to,ether
for centuries without diminution on each partD the harmonious delimitation bein, found in that the
le,islature may and should e/amine if the e/istin, rules on the admission to the Bar respond to the
demands which public interest re5uires of a Bar endowed with hi,h virtues# culture# trainin, and
responsibility. 7he le,islature may# by means of appeal# amendment or supplemental rules# fill up any
deficiency that it may find# and the 0udicial power# which has the inherent responsibility for a ,ood and
efficient administration of 0ustice and the supervision of the practice of the le,al profession# should
consider these reforms as the minimum standards for the elevation of the profession# and see to it
that with these reforms the lofty ob0ective that is desired in the e/ercise of its traditional duty of
admittin,# suspendin,# disbarrin, and reinstatin, attorneys at law is realiEed. 7hey are powers which#
e/ercise within their proper constitutional limits# are not repu,nant# but rather complementary to each
other in attainin, the establishment of a Bar that would respond to the increasin, and e/actin,
necessities of the administration of 0ustice.
7he case of >uariKa -((*. "2 Phil.# *!# illustrates our criterion. >uariKa too$ e/amination and failed
by a few points to obtain the ,eneral avera,e. A recently enacted law provided that one who had
been appointed to the position of &iscal may be admitted to the practice of law without a previous
e/amination. 7he >overnment appointed >uariKa and he dischar,ed the duties of &iscal in a remote
province. 7his tribunal refused to ,ive his license without previous e/aminations. 7he court said9
Relyin, upon the provisions of section " of Act No. ()!# the applicant in this case see$s
admission to the bar# without ta$in, the prescribed e/amination# on the ,round that he holds
the office of provincial fiscal for the Province of Batanes.
6ection " of Act No. ()!# enacted &ebruary "4# (1!# is as follows9
6ec. ". Para,raph one of section thirteen of Act Numbered ;ne =undred and ninety# entitled
%An Act providin, a Code of Procedure in Civil Actions and 6pecial Proceedin,s in the
Philippine Islands#% is hereby amended to read as follows9
(. 7hose who have been duly licensed under the laws and orders of the Islands under the
soverei,nty of 6pain or of the +nited 6tates and are in ,ood and re,ular standin, as members
of the bar of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this codeD &ro%ided# 7hat any
person who# prior to the passa,e of this act# or at any time thereafter# shall have held# under
the authority of the +nited 6tates# the position of 0ustice of the 6upreme Court# 0ud,e of the
Court of &irst Instance# or 0ud,e or associate 0ud,e of the Court of :and Re,istration# of the
Philippine Islands# or the position of Attorney >eneral# 6olicitor >eneral# Assistant Attorney
>eneral# assistant attorney in the office of the Attorney >eneral# prosecutin, attorney for the
City of Manila# city attorney of Manila# assistant city attorney of Manila# provincial fiscal#
attorney for the Moro Province# or assistant attorney for the Moro Province# may be licensed to
practice law in the courts of the Philippine Islands without an e/amination# upon motion before
the 6upreme Court and establishin, such fact to the satisfaction of said court.
7he records of this court disclose that on a former occasion this appellant too$# and failed to
pass the prescribed e/amination. 7he report of the e/aminin, board# dated March "*# (1!#
shows that he received an avera,e of only !( per cent in the various branches of le,al learnin,
upon which he was e/amined# thus fallin, four points short of the re5uired percenta,e of !).
He would be delin5uent in the performance of our duty to the public and to the bar# if# in the
face of this affirmative indication of the deficiency of the applicant in the re5uired 5ualifications
of learnin, in the law at the time when he presented his former application for admission to the
bar# we should ,rant him license to practice law in the courts of these Islands# without first
satisfyin, ourselves that despite his failure to pass the e/amination on that occasion# he now
%possesses the necessary 5ualifications of learnin, and ability.%
But it is contented that under the provisions of the aboveBcited statute the applicant is entitled
as of ri,ht to be admitted to the bar without ta$in, the prescribed e/amination %upon motion
before the 6upreme Court% accompanied by satisfactory proof that he has held and now holds
the office of provincial fiscal of the Province of Batanes. It is ur,ed that havin, in mind the
ob0ect which the le,islator apparently sou,ht to attain in enactin, the aboveBcited amendment
to the earlier statute# and in view of the conte/t ,enerally and especially of the fact that the
amendment was inserted as a proviso in that section of the ori,inal Act which specifically
provides for the admission of certain candidates without e/amination. It is contented that this
mandatory construction is imperatively re5uired in order to ,ive effect to the apparent intention
of the le,islator# and to the candidate's claim de jure to have the power e/ercised.
And after copyin, article of Act of 8uly (# (1" of the Con,ress of the +nited 6tates# articles "# (3
and (! of Act No. (*3# and articles (* to (3 of Act (1# the Court continued9
Manifestly# the 0urisdiction thus conferred upon this court by the commission and confirmed to
it by the Act of Con,ress would be limited and restricted# and in a case such as that under
consideration wholly destroyed# by ,ivin, the word %may#% as used in the above citation from
Act of Con,ress of 8uly (# (1"# or of any Act of Con,ress prescribin,# definin, or limitin, the
power conferred upon the commission is to that e/tent invalid and void# as transcendin, its
ri,htful limits and authority.
6pea$in, on the application of the law to those who were appointed to the positions enumerated# and
with particular emphasis in the case of >uariKa# the Court held9
In the various cases wherein applications for the admission to the bar under the provisions of
this statute have been considered heretofore# we have accepted the fact that such
appointments had been made as satisfactory evidence of the 5ualifications of the applicant.
But in all of those cases we had reason to believe that the applicants had been practicin,
attorneys prior to the date of their appointment.
In the case under consideration# however# it affirmatively appears that the applicant was not
and never had been practicin, attorney in this or any other 0urisdiction prior to the date of his
appointment as provincial fiscal# and it further affirmatively appears that he was deficient in the
re5uired 5ualifications at the time when he last applied for admission to the bar.
In the li,ht of this affirmative proof of his defieciency on that occasion# we do not thin$ that his
appointment to the office of provincial fiscal is in itself satisfactory proof if his possession of the
necessary 5ualifications of learnin, and ability. He conclude therefore that this application for
license to practice in the courts of the Philippines# should be denied.
In view# however# of the fact that when he too$ the e/amination he fell only four points short of
the necessary ,rade to entitle him to a license to practiceD and in view also of the fact that
since that time he has held the responsible office of the ,overnor of the Province of 6orso,on
and presumably ,ave evidence of such mar$ed ability in the performance of the duties of that
office that the Chief E/ecutive# with the consent and approval of the Philippine Commission#
sou,ht to retain him in the >overnment service by appointin, him to the office of provincial
fiscal# we thin$ we would be 0ustified under the aboveBcited provisions of Act No. ()! in
waivin, in his case the ordinary e/amination prescribed by ,eneral rule# provided he offers
satisfactory evidence of his proficiency in a special e/amination which will be ,iven him by a
committee of the court upon his application therefor# without pre0udice to his ri,ht# if he desires
so to do# to present himself at any of the ordinary e/aminations prescribed by ,eneral rule. G
-In re >uariKa# pp. 24B2..
It is obvious# therefore# that the ultimate power to ,rant license for the practice of law belon,s
e/clusively to this Court# and the law passed by Con,ress on the matter is of permissive character# or
as other authorities say# merely to fi/ the minimum conditions for the license.
7he law in 5uestion# li$e those in the case of @ay and Cannon# has been found also to suffer from the
fatal defect of bein, a class le,islation# and that if it has intended to ma$e a classification# it is
arbitrary and unreasonable.
In the case of @ay# a law enacted on &ebruary "(# (4 re5uired of the 6upreme Court# until
@ecember *( of that year# to ,rant license for the practice of law to those students who be,an
studyin, before November 2# (4!# and had studied for two years and presented a diploma issued by
a school of law# or to those who had studied in a law office and would pass an e/amination# or to
those who had studied for three years if they commenced their studies after the aforementioned date.
7he 6upreme Court declared that this law was unconstitutional bein,# amon, others# a class
le,islation. 7he Court said9
7his is an application to this court for admission to the bar of this state by virtue of diplomas
from law schools issued to the applicants. 7he act of the ,eneral assembly passed in (4#
under which the application is made# is entitled %An act to amend section ( of an act entitled
%An act to revise the law in relation to attorneys and counselors#% approved March "4# (442# in
force 8uly (# (4!2.% 7he amendment# so far as it appears in the enactin, clause# consists in the
addition to the section of the followin,9 %And every application for a license who shall comply
with the rules of the supreme court in re,ard to admission to the bar in force at the time such
applicant commend the study of law# either in a law or office or a law school or colle,e# shall
be ,ranted a license under this act notwithstandin, any subse5uent chan,es in said rules%. G
In re @ay et al# )2 N.A.# p. 323.
. . . After said provision there is a double proviso# one branch of which is that up to @ecember
*(# (4# this court shall ,rant a license of admittance to the bar to the holder of every diploma
re,ularly issued by any law school re,ularly or,aniEed under the laws of this state# whose
re,ular course of law studies is two years# and re5uirin, an attendance by the student of at
least *3 wee$s in each of such years# and showin, that the student be,an the study of law
prior to November 2# (4!# and accompanied with the usual proofs of ,ood moral character.
7he other branch of the proviso is that any student who has studied law for two years in a law
office# or part of such time in a law office# %and part in the aforesaid law school#% and whose
course of study be,an prior to November 2# (4!# shall be admitted upon a satisfactory
e/amination by the e/aminin, board in the branches now re5uired by the rules of this court. If
the ri,ht to admission e/ists at all# it is by virtue of the proviso# which# it is claimed# confers
substantial ri,hts and privile,es upon the persons named therein# and establishes rules of
le,islative creation for their admission to the bar. -p. 32!..
Considerin, the proviso# however# as an enactment# it is clearly a special le,islation# prohibited
by the constitution# and invalid as such. If the le,islature had any ri,ht to admit attorneys to
practice in the courts and ta$e part in the administration of 0ustice# and could prescribe the
character of evidence which should be received by the court as conclusive of the re5uisite
learnin, and ability of persons to practice law# it could only be done by a ,eneral law# persons
or classes of persons. Const. art 2# section ". 7he ri,ht to practice law is a privile,e# and a
license for that purpose ma$es the holder an officer of the court# and confers upon him the
ri,ht to appear for liti,ants# to ar,ue causes# and to collect fees therefor# and creates certain
e/emptions# such as from 0ury services and arrest on civil process while attendin, court. 7he
law conferrin, such privile,es must be ,eneral in its operation. No doubt the le,islature# in
framin, an enactment for that purpose# may classify persons so lon, as the law establishin,
classes in ,eneral# and has some reasonable relation to the end sou,ht. 7here must be some
difference which furnishes a reasonable basis for different one# havin, no 0ust relation to the
sub0ect of the le,islation. Braceville Coal Co. %s. People# (2! Ill. 33# *) N.E. 3"D Ritchie %s.
&eople# ()) Ill. 4# 21 N.E. 2)2D Railroad Co. %s. Ellis# (3) +.6. ()1# (! 6up. Ct. ")).
7he len,th of time a physician has practiced# and the s$ill ac5uired by e/perience# may furnish
a basis for classification -Hilliams %s. People ("( Ill. 24# II N.E. 44(.D but the place where such
physician has resided and practiced his profession cannot furnish such basis# and is an
arbitrary discrimination# ma$in, an enactment based upon it void -6tate %s. Pennyeor# 3) N.E.
((*# (4 Atl. 4!4.. =ere the le,islature underta$es to say what shall serve as a test of fitness for
the profession of the law# and plainly# any classification must have some reference to learnin,#
character# or ability to en,a,e in such practice. 7he proviso is limited# first# to a class of
persons who be,an the study of law prior to November 2# (4!. 7his class is subdivided into
two classes G &irst# those presentin, diplomas issued by any law school of this state before
@ecember *(# (4D and# second# those who studied law for the period of two years in a law
office# or part of the time in a law school and part in a law office# who are to be admitted upon
e/amination in the sub0ects specified in the present rules of this court# and as to this latter
subdivision there seems to be no limit of time for ma$in, application for admission. As to both
classes# the conditions of the rules are dispensed with# and as between the two different
conditions and limits of time are fi/ed. No course of study is prescribed for the law school# but
a diploma ,ranted upon the completion of any sort of course its mana,ers may prescribe is
made allBsufficient. Can there be anythin, with relation to the 5ualifications or fitness of
persons to practice law restin, upon the mere date of November 2# (4!# which will furnish a
basis of classification. Plainly not. 7hose who be,an the study of law November 2th could
5ualify themselves to practice in two years as well as those who be,an on the *rd. 7he classes
named in the proviso need spend only two years in study# while those who commenced the
ne/t day must spend three years# althou,h they would complete two years before the time
limit. 7he one who commenced on the *rd. If possessed of a diploma# is to be admitted without
e/amination before @ecember *(# (4# and without any prescribed course of study# while as
to the other the prescribed course must be pursued# and the diploma is utterly useless. 6uch
classification cannot rest upon any natural reason# or bear any 0ust relation to the sub0ect
sou,ht# and none is su,,ested. 7he proviso is for the sole purpose of bestowin, privile,es
upon certain defined persons. -pp. 32!B324..
In the case of Cannon above cited# 6tate %s. Cannon# "21 N.H. 22(# where the le,islature attempted
by law to reinstate Cannon to the practice of law# the court also held with re,ards to its aspect of
bein, a class le,islation9
But the statute is invalid for another reason. If it be ,ranted that the le,islature has power to
prescribe ultimately and definitely the 5ualifications upon which courts must admit and license
those applyin, as attorneys at law# that power can not be e/ercised in the manner here
attempted. 7hat power must be e/ercised throu,h ,eneral laws which will apply to all ali$e and
accord e5ual opportunity to all. 6pea$in, of the ri,ht of the :e,islature to e/act 5ualifications of
those desirin, to pursue chosen callin,s# Mr. 8ustice &ield in the case of -ent. %s. .est
/irginia, (" +.6. ((2# ("(# 6. Ct. "*"# "**# *" :. Ed. 3"3# said9 %It is undoubtedly the ri,ht
of every citiEen of the +nited 6tates to follow any lawful callin,# business or profession he may
choose# sub0ect only to such restrictions as are imposed upon all persons of li$e a,e# se/# and
condition.% 7his ri,ht may in many respects be considered as a distin,uishin, feature of our
republican institutions. =ere all vocations are all open to every one on li$e conditions. All may
be pursued as sources of livelihood# some re5uirin, years of study and ,reat learnin, for their
successful prosecution. 7he interest# or# as it is sometimes termed# the %estate% ac5uired in
them G that is# the ri,ht to continue their prosecution G is often of ,reat value to the
possessors and cannot be arbitrarily ta$en from them# any more than their real or personal
property can be thus ta$en. It is fundamental under our system of ,overnment that all similarly
situated and possessin, e5ual 5ualifications shall en0oy e5ual opportunities. Even statutes
re,ulatin, the practice of medicine# re5uirin, medications to establish the possession on the
part of the application of his proper 5ualifications before he may be licensed to practice# have
been challen,ed# and courts have seriously considered whether the e/emption from such
e/aminations of those practicin, in the state at the time of the enactment of the law rendered
such law unconstitutional because of infrin,ement upon this ,eneral principle. 6tate %s.
7homas Call# ("( N.C. 32*# "4 6.E. )(!D see# also# 7he 6tate e/ rel. Hin$ler %s. Rosenber,#
(1( His. (!"# !3 N.H. *2)D 6tate %s. Hhitcom# ("" His. ((1# N.H. 234.
7his law sin,les out Mr. Cannon and assumes to confer upon him the ri,ht to practice law and
to constitute him an officer of this Court as a mere matter of le,islative ,race or favor. It is not
material that he had once established his ri,ht to practice law and that one time he possessed
the re5uisite learnin, and other 5ualifications to entitle him to that ri,ht. 7hat fact in no matter
affect the power of the :e,islature to select from the ,reat body of the public an individual
upon whom it would confer its favors.
A statute of the state of Minnesota -:aws ("# c. 2"2. commanded the 6upreme Court to
admit to the practice of law without e/amination# all who had served in the military or naval
forces of the +nited 6tates durin, the Horld Har and received a honorable dischar,e
therefrom and who -were disabled therein or thereby within the purview of the Act of Con,ress
approved 8une !th# ("2# $nown as %Horld Har Ceteran's Act# ("2 and whose disability is
rated at least ten per cent thereunder at the time of the passa,e of this Act.% 7his Act was held
Munconstitutional on the ,round that it clearly violated the 5uality clauses of the constitution of
that state. In re Application of >eor,e H. =umphrey# (!4 Minn. **(# ""! N.H. (!.
A ,ood summary of a classification constitutionally acceptable is e/plained in (" Am. 8ur. ()(B()* as
follows9
7he ,eneral rule is well settled by unanimity of the authorities that a classification to be valid
must rest upon material differences between the person included in it and those e/cluded and#
furthermore# must be based upon substantial distinctions. As the rule has sometimes avoided
the constitutional prohibition# must be founded upon pertinent and real differences# as
distin,uished from irrelevant and artificial ones. 7herefore# any law that is made applicable to
one class of citiEens only must be based on some substantial difference between the situation
of that class and other individuals to which it does not apply and must rest on some reason on
which it can be defended. In other words# there must be such a difference between the
situation and circumstances of all the members of the class and the situation and
circumstances of all other members of the state in relation to the sub0ects of the discriminatory
le,islation as presents a 0ust and natural cause for the difference made in their liabilities and
burdens and in their ri,hts and privile,es. A law is not ,eneral because it operates on all within
a clause unless there is a substantial reason why it is made to operate on that class only# and
not ,enerally on all. -(" Am. 8ur. pp. ()(B()*..
Pursuant to the law in 5uestion# those who# without a ,rade below )1 per cent in any sub0ect# have
obtained a ,eneral avera,e of 3.) per cent in the bar e/aminations in (23 to ()(# !1.) per cent in
()"# !(.) per cent in ()*# and those will obtain !".) per cent in ()2# and !*.) per cent in ())#
will be permitted to ta$e and subscribe the correspondin, oath of office as members of the Bar#
notwithstandin, that the rules re5uire a minimum ,eneral avera,e of !) per cent# which has been
invariably followed since ()1. Is there any motive of the nature indicated by the abovementioned
authorities# for this classification J If there is none# and none has been ,iven# then the classification is
fatally defective.
It was indicated that those who failed in (22# (2( or the years before# with the ,eneral avera,e
indicated# were not included because the 7ribunal has no record of the unsuccessful candidates of
those years. 7his fact does not 0ustify the une/plained classification of unsuccessful candidates by
years# from (23B()(# ()"# ()*# ()2# ()). Neither is the e/clusion of those who failed before
said years under the same conditions 0ustified. 7he fact that this Court has no record of e/aminations
prior to (23 does not si,nify that no one concerned may prove by some other means his ri,ht to an
e5ual consideration.
7o defend the disputed law from bein, declared unconstitutional on account of its retroactivity# it is
ar,ued that it is curative# and that in such form it is constitutional. Hhat does Rep. Act !" intend to
cure J ;nly from (23 to (2 were there cases in which the 7ribunal permitted admission to the bar
of candidates who did not obtain the ,eneral avera,e of !) per cent9 in (23 those who obtained only
!" per centD in the (2! and those who had 3 per cent or moreD in (24# !1 per cent and in (2# !2
per centD and in ()1 to ()*# those who obtained !2 per cent# which was considered by the Court as
e5uivalent to !) per cent as prescribed by the Rules# by reason of circumstances deemed to be
sufficiently 0ustifiable. 7hese chan,es in the passin, avera,es durin, those years were all that could
be ob0ected to or criticiEed. Now# it is desired to undo what had been done G cancel the license that
was issued to those who did not obtain the prescribed !) per cent J Certainly not. 7he disputed law
clearly does not propose to do so. Concededly# it approves what has been done by this 7ribunal.
Hhat Con,ress lamented is that the Court did not consider 3.) per cent obtained by those
candidates who failed in (23 to ()" as sufficient to 5ualify them to practice law. =ence# it is the
lac$ of will or defect of 0ud,ment of the Court that is bein, cured# and to complete the cure of this
infirmity# the effectivity of the disputed law is bein, e/tended up to the years ()*# ()2 and ())#
increasin, each year the ,eneral avera,e by one per cent# with the order that said candidates be
admitted to the Bar. 7his purpose# manifest in the said law# is the best proof that what the law
attempts to amend and correct are not the rules promul,ated# but the will or 0ud,ment of the Court# by
means of simply ta$in, its place. 7his is doin, directly what the 7ribunal should have done durin,
those years accordin, to the 0ud,ment of Con,ress. In other words# the power e/ercised was not to
repeal# alter or supplement the rules# which continue in force. Hhat was done was to stop or suspend
them. And this power is not included in what the Constitution has ,ranted to Con,ress# because it
falls within the power to apply the rules. 7his power corresponds to the 0udiciary# to which such duty
been confided.
Article " of the law in 5uestion permits partial passin, of e/aminations# at indefinite intervals. 7he
,rave defect of this system is that it does not ta$e into account that the laws and 0urisprudence are
not stationary# and when a candidate finally receives his certificate# it may happen that the e/istin,
laws and 0urisprudence are already different# seriously affectin, in this manner his usefulness. 7he
system that the said law prescribes was used in the first bar e/aminations of this country# but was
abandoned for this and other disadvanta,es. In this case# however# the fatal defect is that the article
is not e/pressed in the title will have temporary effect only from (23 to ())# the te/t of article "
establishes a permanent system for an indefinite time. 7his is contrary to 6ection "( -(.# article CI of
the Constitution# which vitiates and annuls article " completelyD and because it is inseparable from
article (# it is obvious that its nullity affect the entire law.
:aws are unconstitutional on the followin, ,rounds9 first# because they are not within the le,islative
powers of Con,ress to enact# or Con,ress has e/ceeded its powersD second# because they create or
establish arbitrary methods or forms that infrin,e constitutional principlesD and third# because their
purposes or effects violate the Constitution or its basic principles. As has already been seen# the
contested law suffers from these fatal defects.
6ummariEin,# we are of the opinion and hereby declare that Republic Act No. !" is
unconstitutional and therefore, #oid, and without any force nor effect for the following
reasons, to wit$
(. Because its declared purpose is to admit 4(1 candidates who failed in the bar e/aminations of
(23B()"# and who# it admits# are certainly inade5uately prepared to practice law# as was e/actly
found by this Court in the aforesaid years. It decrees the admission to the Bar of these candidates#
deprivin, this 7ribunal of the opportunity to determine if they are at present already prepared to
become members of the Bar. It obli,es the 7ribunal to perform somethin, contrary to reason and in
an arbitrary manner. 7his is a manifest encroachment on the constitutional responsibility of the
6upreme Court.
". Because it is# in effect# a 0ud,ment revo$in, the resolution of this Court on the petitions of these
4(1 candidates# without havin, e/amined their respective e/amination papers# and althou,h it is
admitted that this 7ribunal may reconsider said resolution at any time for 0ustifiable reasons# only this
Court and no other may revise and alter them. In attemptin, to do it directly Republic Act No. !"
violated the Constitution.
*. By the disputed law# Con,ress has e/ceeded its le,islative power to repeal# alter and supplement
the rules on admission to the Bar. 6uch additional or amendatory rules are# as they ou,ht to be#
intended to re,ulate acts subse5uent to its promul,ation and should tend to improve and elevate the
practice of law# and this 7ribunal shall consider these rules as minimum norms towards that end in
the admission# suspension# disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers to the Bar# inasmuch as a ,ood
bar assists immensely in the daily performance of 0udicial functions and is essential to a worthy
administration of 0ustice. It is therefore the primary and inherent prero,ative of the 6upreme Court to
render the ultimate decision on who may be admitted and may continue in the practice of law
accordin, to e/istin, rules.
2. 7he reason advanced for the pretended classification of candidates# which the law ma$es# is
contrary to facts which are of ,eneral $nowled,e and does not 0ustify the admission to the Bar of law
students inade5uately prepared. 7he pretended classification is arbitrary. It is undoubtedly a class
le,islation.
). Article " of Republic Act No. !" is not embraced in the title of the law# contrary to what the
Constitution en0oins# and bein, inseparable from the provisions of article (# the entire law is void.
3. :ac$in, in ei,ht votes to declare the nullity of that part of article ( referrin, to the e/aminations of
()* to ())# said part of article (# insofar as it concerns the e/aminations in those years# shall
continue in force.
R E S O & U T I O '
+pon mature deliberation by this Court# after hearin, and availin, of the ma,nificent and impassioned
discussion of the contested law by our Chief 8ustice at the openin, and close of the debate amon,
the members of the Court# and after hearin, the 0udicious observations of two of our beloved
collea,ues who since the be,innin, have announced their decision not to ta$e part in votin,# we# the
ei,ht members of the Court who subscribed to this decision have voted and resolved# and have
decided for the Court# and under the authority of the same9
(. 7hat -a. the portion of article ( of Republic Act No. !" referrin, to the e/aminations of (23 to
()"# and -$. all of article " of said law are unconstitutional and# therefore# void and without force and
effect.
". 7hat# for lac$ of unanimity in the ei,ht 8ustices# that part of article ( which refers to the
e/aminations subse5uent to the approval of the law# that is from ()* to ()) inclusive# is valid and
shall continue to be in force# in conformity with section (1# article CII of the Constitution.
Conse5uently# -(. all the aboveBmentioned petitions of the candidates who failed in the e/aminations
of (23 to ()" inclusive are denied# and -". all candidates who in the e/aminations of ()* obtained
a ,eneral avera,e of !(.) per cent or more# without havin, a ,rade below )1 per cent in any sub0ect#
are considered as havin, passed# whether they have filed petitions for admission or not. After this
decision has become final# they shall be permitted to ta$e and subscribe the correspondin, oath of
office as members of the Bar on the date or dates that the chief 8ustice may set. 6o ordered.
#eng)on, Monte'ayor, Jugo, !a$rador, &a$lo, &adilla, and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
8(R( 'o( &9/.#54 -e2ruar7 18, 19.:
I' T;E MATTER O- PROCEE)I'8S -OR )ISCIP&I'AR, ACTIO' A8AI'ST ATT,( <ICE'TE
RAU& A&MACE' In &9/.#54, A'TO'IO ;( CA&ERO,vs.
<IR8I'IA ,( ,APTI'C;A,(
R E 6 ; : + 7 I ; N
CASTRO, J.$
Before us is Atty. Cicente Raul Almacen's %Petition to 6urrender :awyer's Certificate of 7itle#% filed on
6eptember ")# (3!# in protest a,ainst what he therein asserts is %a ,reat in0ustice committed a,ainst
his client by this 6upreme Court.% =e indicts this Court# in his own phrase# as a tribunal %peopled by
men who are calloused to our pleas for 0ustice# who i,nore without reasons their own applicable
decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity.% =is client's he continues#
who was deeply a,,rieved by this Court's %un0ust 0ud,ment#% has become %one of the sacrificial
victims before the altar of hypocrisy.% In the same breath that he alludes to the classic symbol of
0ustice# he ridicules the members of this Court# sayin, %that 0ustice as administered by the present
members of the 6upreme Court is not only blind# but also deaf and dumb.% =e then vows to ar,ue the
cause of his client %in the people's forum#% so that %the people may $now of the silent in0ustice's
committed by this Court#% and that %whatever mista$es# wron,s and in0ustices that were committed
must never be repeated.% =e ends his petition with a prayer that
... a resolution issue orderin, the Cler$ of Court to receive the certificate of the
undersi,ned attorney and counsellorBatBlaw IN 7R+67 with reservation that at any time
in the future and in the event we re,ain our faith and confidence# we may retrieve our
title to assume the practice of the noblest profession.
=e reiterated and disclosed to the press the contents of the aforementioned petition. 7hus# on
6eptember "3# (3!# the Manila ,i'es published statements attributed to him# as follows9
Cicente Raul Almacen# in an unprecedented petition# said he did it to e/pose the
tribunal's0unconstitutional and o$no*ious0 practice of arbitrarily denyin, petitions or
appeals without any reason.
Because of the tribunal's 0short1cut justice,0 Almacen deplored# his client was
condemned to pay P("1#111# without $nowin, why he lost the case.
/// /// ///
7here is no use continuin, his law practice# Almacen said in this petition# 0"here our
Supre'e Court is co'posed of 'en "ho are calloused to our pleas for justice, "ho
ignore "ithout reason their o"n applica$le decisions and co''it culpa$le %iolations of
the Constitution "ith i'punity.
/// /// ///
=e e/pressed the hope that by divestin, himself of his title by which he earns his livin,#
the present members of the 6upreme Court 0"ill $eco'e responsi%e to all cases
$rought to its attention "ithout discri'ination, and "ill purge itself of those
unconstitutional and o$no*ious 0lac2 of 'erit0 or 0denied resolutions. -Emphasis
supplied.
Atty. Almacen's statement that
... our own 6upreme Court is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas of NsicO
0ustice# who i,nore their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the
Constitution with impunity
was 5uoted by columnist Cicente Albano Pacis in the issue of the Manila Chronicle of 6eptember "4#
(3!. In connection therewith# Pacis commented that Atty. Almacen had %accused the hi,h tribunal of
offenses so serious that the Court must clear itself#% and that %his char,e is one of the constitutional
bases for impeachment.%
7he ,enesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case entitled /irginia 3. 3aptinchay %s. Antonio H.
Calero,
1
in which Atty. Almacen was counsel for the defendant. 7he trial court# after due hearin,#
rendered 0ud,ment a,ainst his client. ;n 8une ()# (33 Atty. Almacen received a copy of the
decision. 7wenty days later# or on 8uly )# (33# he moved for its reconsideration. =e served on the
adverse counsel a copy of the motion# but did not notify the latter of the time and place of hearin, on
said motion. Meanwhile# on 8uly (4# (33# the plaintiff moved for e/ecution of the 0ud,ment. &or %lac$
of proof of service#% the trial court denied both motions. 7o prove that he did serve on the adverse
party a copy of his first motion for reconsideration# Atty. Almacen filed on Au,ust (!# (33 a second
motion for reconsideration to which he attached the re5uired re,istry return card. 7his second motion
for reconsideration# however# was ordered withdrawn by the trial court on Au,ust *1# (33# upon
verbal motion of Atty. Almacen himself# who# earlier# that is# on Au,ust ""# (33# had already
perfected the appeal. Because the plaintiff interposed no ob0ection to the record on appeal and
appeal bond# the trial court elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.
But the Court of Appeals# on the authority of this Court's decision in Manila Surety 4 5idelity Co., Inc.
%s. #atu Construction 4 Co., :B(33*3# 8une "2# (3)# dismissed the appeal# in the followin, words9
+pon consideration of the motion dated March "!# (3!# filed by plaintiffBappellee
prayin, that the appeal be dismissed# and of the opposition thereto filed by defendantB
appellantD the Court RE6;:CE@ 7; @I6MI66# as it hereby dismisses# the appeal# for
the reason that the motion for reconsideration dated 8uly )# (33 -pp. 1B((*# printed
record on appeal. does not contain a notice of time and place of hearin, thereof and is#
therefore# a useless piece of paper -Manila 6urety F &idelity Co.# Inc. vs. Batu
Construction F Co.# >.R. No. :B(33*3# 8une "2# (3).# which did not interrupt the
runnin, of the period to appeal# and# conse5uently# the appeal was perfected out of
time.
Atty. Almacen moved to reconsider this resolution# ur,in, that Manila Surety 4 5idelity Co. is not
decisive. At the same time he filed a pleadin, entitled %:atest decision of the 6upreme Court in
6upport of Motion for Reconsideration#% citin, Repu$lic of the &hilippines %s. regorio A. /enturan)a#
:B"12(!# decided by this Court on May *1# (33# as the applicable case. A,ain# the Court of Appeals
denied the motion for reconsideration# thus9
Before this Court for resolution are the motion dated May # (3! and the supplement
thereto of the same date filed by defendantB appellant# prayin, for reconsideration of the
resolution of May 4# (3!# dismissin, the appeal.
Appellant contends that there are some important distinctions between this case and
that of Manila Surety and 5idelity Co., Inc. %s. #atu Construction 4 Co., >.R. No. :B
(33*3# 8une "2# (3)# relied upon by this Court in its resolution of May 4# (3!.
Appellant further states that in the latest case#Repu$lic %s. /enturan)a# :B"12(!# May
*1# (33# decided by the 6upreme Court concernin, the 5uestion raised by appellant's
motion# the rulin, is contrary to the doctrine laid down in the Manila 6urety F &idelity
Co.# Inc. case.
7here is no substantial distinction between this case and that of Manila 6urety F &idelity
Co.
In the case of Repu$lic %s. /enturan)a# the resolution denyin, the motion to dismiss the
appeal# based on ,rounds similar to those raised herein was issued on November "3#
(3"# which was much earlier than the date of promul,ation of the decision in the
Manila 6urety Case# which was 8une "2# (3). &urther# the resolution in the CenturanEa
case was interlocutory and the 6upreme Court issued it %without pre0udice to appellee's
restorin, the point in the brief.% In the main decision in said case -Rep. vs. CenturanEa
the 6upreme Court passed upon the issue sub silencio presumably because of its prior
decisions contrary to the resolution of November "3# (3"# one of which is that in the
Manila 6urety and &idelity case. 7herefore Repu$lic %s. /enturan)a is no authority on
the matter in issue.
Atty. Almacen then appealed to this Court by certiorari. He refused to ta$e the case# and by minute
resolution denied the appeal. @enied shortly thereafter was his motion for reconsideration as well as
his petition for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration and for e/tension of time. Entry of
0ud,ment was made on 6eptember 4# (3!. =ence# the second motion for reconsideration filed by
him after the 6aid date was ordered e/pun,ed from the records.
It was at this 0uncture that Atty. Almacen ,ave vent to his disappointment by filin, his %Petition to
6urrender :awyer's Certificate of 7itle#% already adverted to G a pleadin, that is interspersed from
be,innin, to end with the insolent contemptuous# ,rossly disrespectful and dero,atory remar$s
hereinbefore reproduced# a,ainst this Court as well as its individual members# a behavior that is as
unprecedented as it is unprofessional.
Nonetheless we decided by resolution dated 6eptember "4# (3! to withhold action on his petition
until he shall have actually surrendered his certificate. Patiently# we waited for him to ma$e ,ood his
proffer. No word came from him. 6o he was reminded to turn over his certificate# which he had earlier
vociferously offered to surrender# so that this Court could act on his petition. 7o said reminder he
manifested %that he has no pendin, petition in connection with Case >.R. No. :B"!3)2# Calero %s.
3aptinchay# said case is now final and e/ecutoryD% that this Court's 6eptember "4# (3! resolution did
not re5uire him to do either a positive or ne,ative actD and that since his offer was not accepted# he
%chose to pursue the ne,ative act.%
In the e/ercise of its inherent power to discipline a member of the bar for contumely and ,ross
misconduct# this Court on November (!# (3! resolved to re5uire Atty. Almacen to show cause %why
no disciplinary action should be ta$en a,ainst him.% @enyin, the char,es contained in the November
(! resolution# he as$ed for permission %to ,ive reasons and cause why no disciplinary action should
be ta$en a,ainst him ... in an open and public hearin,.% 7his Court resolved -on @ecember !. %to
re5uire Atty. Almacen to state# within five days from notice hereof# his reasons for such re5uest#
otherwise# oral ar,ument shall be deemed waived and incident submitted for decision.% 7o this
resolution he manifested that since this Court is %the complainant# prosecutor and 8ud,e#% he
preferred to be heard and to answer 5uestions %in person and in an open and public hearin,% so that
this Court could observe his sincerity and candor. =e also as$ed for leave to file a written e/planation
%in the event this Court has no time to hear him in person.% 7o ,ive him the ampliest latitude for his
defense# he was allowed to file a written e/planation and thereafter was heard in oral ar,ument.
=is written answer# as undi,nified and cynical as it is unchastened# offers Bno apolo,y. &ar from bein,
contrite Atty. Almacen unremittin,ly repeats his 0eremiad of lamentations# this time embellishin, it with
abundant sarcasm and innuendo. 7hus9
At the start# let me 5uote passa,es from the =oly Bible# Chapter !# 6t. Matthew9 G
%@o not 0ud,e# that you may not be 0ud,ed. &or with what 0ud,ment you
0ud,e# you shall be 0ud,ed# and with what measure you measure# it shall
be measured to you. But why dost thou see the spec$ in thy brother's eye#
and yet dost not consider the beam in thy own eyeJ ;r how can thou say
to thy brother# %:et me cast out the spec$ from thy eye%D and behold# there
is a beam in thy own eyeJ 7hou hypocrite# first cast out the beam from thy
own eye# and then thou wilt see clearly to cast out the spec$ from thy
brother's eyes.%
%7herefore all that you wish men to do to you# even to do you also to them9
for this is the :aw and the Prophets.%
/// /// ///
Aour respondent has no intention of disavowin, the statements mentioned in his
petition. ;n the contrary# he refirms the truth of what he stated# compatible with his
lawyer's oath that he will do no falsehood# nor consent to the doin, of any in court. But
he vi,orously @ENA under oath that the underscored statements contained in the
C=AR>E are insolent# contemptuous# ,rossly disrespectful and dero,atory to the
individual members of the CourtD that they tend to brin, the entire Court# without
0ustification# into disreputeD and constitute conduct unbecomin, of a member of the
noble profession of law.
/// /// ///
Respondent stands fourBs5uare that his statement is borne by 7R+7= and has been
asserted with N; MA:ICE BE&;RE AN@ A&7ER 7=;+>=7 but mainly motivated with
the hi,hest interest of 0ustice that in the particular case of our client# the members have
shown callousness to our various pleas for 8+67ICE# our pleadin,s will bear us on this
matter# ...
/// /// ///
7o all these be,,in,s# supplications# words of humility# appeals for charity# ,enerosity#
fairness# understandin,# sympathy and above all in the hi,hest interest of 8+67ICE# G
what did we ,et from this C;+R7J ;ne word# @ENIE@# with all its hardiness and
insensibility. 7hat was the unfeelin, of the Court towards our pleas and prayers# in
simple word# it is plain callousness towards our particular case.
/// /// ///
Now that your respondent has the ,uts to tell the members of the Court that
notwithstandin, the violation of the Constitution# you remained unpunished# this Court in
the reverse order of natural thin,s# is now in the attempt to inflict punishment on your
respondent for acts he said in ,ood faith.
@id =is =onors care to listen to our pleadin,s and supplications for 8+67ICE#
C=ARI7A# >ENER;6I7A and &AIRNE66J @id =is =onors attempt to 0ustify their
stubborn denial with any semblance of reason# NECER. Now that your respondent is
,iven the opportunity to face you# he reiterates the same statement with emphasis# @I@
A;+J 6ir. Is this. the way of life in the Philippines today# that even our own President#
said9 G %the story is current# thou,h nebulous #is to its truth# it is still bein, circulated
that 0ustice in the Philippines today is not what it is used to be before the war. 7here are
those who have told me fran$ly and brutally that 0ustice is a commodity# a mar$etable
commodity in the Philippines.%
/// /// ///
He condemn the 6IN# not the 6INNER. He detest the AC76# not the AC7;R. He
attac$ the decision of this Court# not the members. ... He were provo$ed. He were
compelled by force of necessity. He were an,ry but we waited for the finality of the
decision. He waited until this Court has performed its duties. He never interfered nor
obstruct in the performance of their duties. But in the end# after seein, that the
Constitution has placed finality on your 0ud,ment a,ainst our client and sensin, that you
have not performed your duties with %circumspection# carefulness# confidence and
wisdom%# your Respondent rise to claim his >od ,iven ri,ht to spea$ the truth and his
Constitutional ri,ht of free speech.
/// /// ///
7he IN8+67ICE6 which we have attributed to this Court and the further violations we
sou,ht to be prevented is impliedly shared by our President. ... .
/// /// ///
Hhat has been abhored and condemned# are the very thin,s that were applied to us. Recallin,
Madam Roland's famous apostrophe durin, the &rench revolution# %; :iberty# what crimes are
committed in thy name%# we may dare say# %; 8+67ICE# what technicalities are committed in thy
name' or more appropriately# '; 8+67ICE# what in0ustices are committed in thy name.%
/// /// ///
He must admit that this Court is not free from commission of any abuses# but who
would correct such abuses considerin, that yours is a court of last resort. A stron,
public opinion must be ,enerated so as to curtail these abuses.
/// /// ///
7he phrase# Justice is $lind is symboliEe in paintin,s that can be found in all courts and
,overnment offices. He have added only two more symbols# that it is also deaf and
dumb. @eaf in the sense that no members of this Court has ever heard our cries for
charity# ,enerosity# fairness# understandin, sympathy and for 0usticeD dumb in the
sense# that inspite of our be,,in,s# supplications# and pleadin,s to ,ive us reasons why
our appeal has been @ENIE@# not one word was spo$en or ,iven ... He refer to no
human defect or ailment in the above statement. He only describe the. impersonal state
of thin,s and nothin, more.
/// /// ///
As we have stated# we have lost our faith and confidence in the members of this Court
and for which reason we offered to surrender our lawyer's certificate# IN 7R+67 ;N:A.
Because what has been lost today may be re,ained tomorrow. As the offer was
intended as our selfBimposed sacrifice# then we alone may decide as to when we must
end our selfBsacrifice. If we have to choose between forcin, ourselves to have faith and
confidence in the members of the Court but disre,ard our Constitution and to uphold the
Constitution and be condemned by the members of this Court# there is no choice# we
must uphold the latter.
But overloo$in,# for the nonce# the vituperative chaff which he claims is not intended as a studied
disrespect to this Court# let us e/amine the ,rain of his ,rievances.
=e chafes at the minute resolution denial of his petition for review. He are 5uite aware of the
criticisms
/
e/pressed a,ainst this Court's practice of re0ectin, petitions by minute resolutions. He
have been as$ed to do away with it# to state the facts and the law# and to spell out the reasons for
denial. He have ,iven this su,,estion very careful thou,ht. &or we $now the ab0ect frustration of a
lawyer who tediously collates the facts and for many weary hours meticulously marshalls his
ar,uments# only to have his efforts rebuffed with a terse unadorned denial. 7ruth to tell# however#
most petitions re0ected by this Court are utterly frivolous and ou,ht never to have been lod,ed at
all.
$
7he rest do e/hibit a firstBimpression co,ency# but fail to# withstand critical scrutiny. By and lar,e#
this Court has been ,enerous in ,ivin, due course to petitions for certiorari.
Be this as it may# were we to accept every case or write a full opinion for every petition we re0ect# we
would be unable to carry out effectively the burden placed upon us by the Constitution. 7he proper
role of the 6upreme Court# as Mr. Chief 8ustice Cinson of the +.6. 6upreme Court has defined it# is to
decide %only those cases which present 5uestions whose resolutions will have immediate importance
beyond the particular facts and parties involved.% Pertinent here is the observation of Mr. 8ustice
&ran$furter in Maryland %s. #alti'ore Radio Sho"# 2 :. ed )3"# )339
A variety of considerations underlie denials of the writ# and as to the same petition
different reasons may read different 0ustices to the same result ... .
6ince there are these conflictin,# and# to the uninformed# even confusin, reasons for
denyin, petitions for certiorari# it has been su,,ested from time to time that the Court
indicate its reasons for denial. Practical considerations preclude. In order that the Court
may be enabled to dischar,e its indispensable duties# Con,ress has placed the control
of the Court's business# in effect# within the Court's discretion. @urin, the last three
terms the Court disposed of "31# "(!# ""2 cases# respectively# on their merits. &or the
same three terms the Court denied# respectively# (#"31# (#(1)#(#(4 petitions callin, for
discretionary review. If the Court is to do its wor$ it would not be feasible to ,ive
reasons# however brief# for refusin, to ta$e these cases. 7he tune that would be
re5uired is prohibitive. Apart from the fact that as already indicated different reasons not
infre5uently move different members of the Court in concludin, that a particular case at
a particular time ma$es review undesirable.
6i/ years a,o# in 6o%ino, et al., vs. Court of Appeals, et al., (#"(14# May *(# (3* -31 ;.>. 41.#
this Court# throu,h the then Chief 8ustice Cesar Ben,Eon# articulated its considered view on this
matter. 7here# the petitioners counsel ur,ed that a %lac$ of merit% resolution violates 6ection (" of
Article CIII of the Constitution. 6aid Chief 8ustice Ben,Eon9
In connection with identical short resolutions# the same 5uestion has been raised
beforeD and we held that these %resolutions% are not %decisions% within the above
constitutional re5uirement. 7hey merely hold that the petition for review should not be
entertained in view of the provisions of Rule 23 of the Rules of CourtD and even ordinary
lawyers have all this time so understood it. It should be remembered that a petition to
review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of ri,ht# but of sound 0udicial
discretionD and so there is no need to fully e/plain the court's denial. &or one thin,# the
facts and the law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals' opinion.
By the way# this mode of disposal has G as intended G helped the Court in alleviatin,
its heavy doc$etD it was patterned after the practice of the +.6. 6upreme Court# wherein
petitions for review are often merely ordered %dismissed%.
He underscore the fact that cases ta$en to this Court on petitions for certiorari from the Court of
Appeals have had the benefit of appellate review. =ence# the need for compellin, reasons to buttress
such petitions if this Court is to be moved into acceptin, them. &or it is a/iomatic that the supervisory
0urisdiction vested upon this Court over the Court of Appeals is not intended to ,ive every losin, party
another hearin,. 7his a/iom is implied in sec. 2 of Rule 2) of the Rules of Court which recites9
Re%ie" of Court of Appeals7 decision discretionary.GA review is not a matter of ri,ht but
of sound 0udicial discretion# and will be ,ranted only when there are special and
important reasons therefor. 7he followin,# while neither controllin, nor fully measurin,
the court's discretion# indicate the character of reasons which will be considered9
-a. Hhen the Court of Appeals has decided a 5uestion of substance# not theretofore
determined by the 6upreme Court# nor has decided it in a way probably not in accord
with law or with the applicable decisions of the 6upreme CourtD
-b. Hhen the Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted and usual course
of 0udicial proceedin,s# or so far sanctioned such departure by the lower court# as to call
for the e/ercise of the power of supervision.
Recallin, Atty. Almacen's petition for review# we found# upon a thorou,h,oin, e/amination of the
pleadin,s. and records# that the Court of Appeals had fully and correctly considered the dismissal of
his appeal in the li,ht of the law and applicable decisions of this Court. &ar from strayin, away from
the %accepted and usual course of 0udicial proceedin,s#% it traced the procedural lines etched by this
Court in a number of decisions. 7here was# therefore# no need for this Court to e/ercise its
supervisory power.
As a law practitioner who was admitted to the Bar as far bac$ as (2(# Atty. Almacen $new G or
ou,ht to have $nown G that for a motion for reconsideration to stay the runnin, of the period of
appeal# the movant must not only serve a copy of the motion upon the adverse party -which he did.#
but also notify the adverse party of the time and place of hearin, -which admittedly he did not.. 7his
rule was une5uivocally articulated in Manila Surety 4 5idelity %s. #atu Construction 4 Co., supra9
7he written notice referred to evidently is prescribed for motions in ,eneral by Rule ()#
6ections 2 and ) -formerly Rule "3.# which provides that such notice shall state the
time# and place of hearin, and shall be served upon all the Parties concerned at least
three days in advance. And accordin, to 6ection 3 of the same Rule no motion shall be
acted upon by the court without proof of such notice. Indeed it has been held that in
such a case the motion is nothin, but a useless piece of paper -Philippine National
Ban$ v. @amasco# I#(43*4# &eb. "4# (3*D citin, Mana$il v. Revilla# 2" Phil. 4(D Roman
Catholic Bishop of :ipa v. Municipality of +nisan# 2( Phil. 433D and @irector of :ands vs.
6anE# 2) Phil. ((!.. 7he reason is obvious9 +nless the movant sets the time and place
of hearin, the Court would have no way to determine whether that party a,rees to or
ob0ects to the motion# and if he ob0ects# to hear him on his ob0ection# since the Rules
themselves do not fi/ any period within which he may file his reply or opposition.
If Atty. Almacen failed to move the appellate court to review the lower court's 0ud,ment# he has only
himself to blame. =is own ne,li,ence caused the forfeiture of the remedy of appeal# which#
incidentally# is not a matter of ri,ht. 7o shift away from himself the conse5uences of his carelessness#
he loo$ed for a %whippin, boy.% But he made sure that he assumed the posture of a martyr# and# in
offerin, to surrender his professional certificate# he too$ the liberty of vilifyin, this Court and inflictin,
his e/acerbatin, rancor on the members thereof. It would thus appear that there is no 0ustification for
his scurrilous and scandalous outbursts.
Nonetheless we ,ave this unprecedented act of Atty. Almacen the most circumspect consideration.
He $now that it is natural for a lawyer to e/press his dissatisfaction each time he loses what he
san,uinely believes to be a meritorious case. 7hat is why lawyers are ,iven 'wide latitude to differ
with# and voice their disapproval of# not only the courts' rulin,s but# also the manner in which they are
handed down.
Moreover# every citiEen has the ri,ht to comment upon and criticiEe the actuations of public officers.
7his ri,ht is not diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed at a 0udicial authority#
4
or that it is
articulated by a lawyer.
5
6uch ri,ht is especially reco,niEed where the criticism concerns a concluded
liti,ation#
#
because then the court's actuations are thrown open to public consumption.
.
%;ur
decisions and all our official actions#% said the 6upreme Court of Nebras$a#
8
%are public property# and
the press and the people have the undoubted ri,ht to comment on them# criticiEe and censure them
as they see fit. 8udicial officers# li$e other public servants# must answer for their official actions before
the chancery of public opinion.%
7he li$ely dan,er of confusin, the fury of human reaction to an attac$ on one's inte,rity# competence
and honesty# with %imminent dan,er to the administration of 0ustice#% is the reason why courts have
been loath to inflict punishment on those who assail their actuations.
9
7his dan,er lur$s especially in
such a case as this where those who 6it as members of an entire Court are themselves collectively
the a,,rieved parties.
Courts thus treat with forbearance and restraint a lawyer who vi,orously assails their
actuations.
1:
&or coura,eous and fearless advocates are the strands that weave durability into the
tapestry of 0ustice. =ence# as citiEen and officer of the court# every lawyer is e/pected not only to
e/ercise the ri,ht# but also to consider it his duty to e/pose the shortcomin,s and indiscretions of
courts and 0ud,es.
11
Courts and 0ud,es are not sacrosanct.
1/
7hey should and e/pect critical evaluation of their
performance.
1$
&or li$e the e/ecutive and the le,islative branches# the 0udiciary is rooted in the soil of
democratic society# nourished by the periodic appraisal of the citiEens whom it is e/pected to serve.
HellBreco,niEed therefore is the ri,ht of a lawyer# both as an officer of the court and as a citiEen# to
criticiEe in properly respectful terms and throu,h le,itimate channels the acts of courts and 0ud,es.
7he reason is that
An attorney does not surrender# in assumin, the important place accorded to him in the
administration of 0ustice# his ri,ht as a citiEen to criticiEe the decisions of the courts in a
fair and respectful manner# and the independence of the bar# as well as of the 0udiciary#
has always been encoura,ed by the courts. -In re Ades# 3 & 6upp. 24!. .
Criticism of the courts has# indeed# been an important part of the traditional wor$ of the bar. In the
prosecution of appeals# he points out the errors of lower courts. In written for law 0ournals he dissects
with detachment the doctrinal pronouncements of courts and fearlessly lays bare for Ball to see that
flaws and inconsistence% of the doctrines -Hill %. !y'an# ("3 NA6 "d "43.. As aptly stated by Chief
8ustice 6harswood in E* &arte Stein'an# 21 Am. Rep. 32(9
No class of the community ou,ht to be allowed freer scope in the e/pansion or
publication of opinions as to the capacity# impartiality or inte,rity of 0ud,es than
members of the bar. 7hey have the best opportunities for observin, and formin, a
correct 0ud,ment. 7hey are in constant attendance on the courts. ... 7o say that an
attorney can only act or spea$ on this sub0ect under liability to be called to account and
to be deprived of his profession and livelihood# by the 0ud,e or 0ud,es whom he may
consider it his duty to attac$ and e/pose# is a position too monstrous to be
entertained. ... .
=ence# as a citiEen and as ;fficer of the court a lawyer is e/pected not only to e/ercise the ri,ht# but
also to consider it his duty to avail of such ri,ht. No law may abrid,e this ri,ht. Nor is he
%professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the official conduct of the 0ud,es# which would not
e/pose him to le,al animadversion as a citiEen.% -Case of Austin, "4 Am. @ee. 3)!# 33)..
Above all others# the members of the bar have the beat ;pportunity to become
conversant with the character and efficiency of our 0ud,es. No class is less li$ely to
abuse the privile,e# as no other class has as ,reat an interest in the preservation of an
able and upri,ht bench. -State #oard of E*a'iners in !a" %. Hart# ((3 N.H. "("# "(3.
7o curtail the ri,ht of a lawyer to be critical of the foibles of courts and 0ud,es is to seal the lips of
those in the best position to ,ive advice and who mi,ht consider it their duty to spea$ dispara,in,ly.
%+nder such a rule#% so far as the bar is concerned# %the merits of a sittin, 0ud,e may be rehearsed#
but as to his demerits there must be profound silence.% -State %. Circuit Court# !" N.H. (3.
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be $ona fide# and shall not spill over the
walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm e/ists between fair criticism# on the ;ne hand# and
abuse and slander of courts and the 0ud,es thereof# on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a
,ross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is 6uch a misconduct that sub0ects a lawyer to
disciplinary action.
&or# membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obli,ations and duties which are not mere flu/
and ferment. =is investiture into the le,al profession places upon his shoulders no burden more
basic# more e/actin, and more imperative than that of respectful behavior toward the courts. =e vows
solemnly to conduct himself %with all ,ood fidelity ... to the courtsD
14
and the Rules of Court constantly
remind him %to observe and maintain the respect due to courts of 0ustice and 0udicial officers.%
15
7he
first canon of le,al ethics en0oins him %to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude# not for the
sa$e of the temporary incumbent of the 0udicial office# but for the maintenance of its supreme
importance.%
As Mr. 8ustice &ield puts it9
... the obli,ation which attorneys impliedly assume# if they do not by e/press declaration
ta$e upon themselves# when they are admitted to the Bar# is not merely to be obedient
to the Constitution and laws# but to maintain at all times the respect due to courts of
0ustice and 0udicial officers. 7his obli,ation is not dischar,ed by merely observin, the
rules of courteous demeanor in open court# but includes abstainin, out of court from all
insultin, lan,ua,e and offensive conduct toward 0ud,es personally for their 0udicial acts.
-Bradley# v. &isher# "1 :aw. 2d. 32!# 3)".
7he lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the orderly
administration of 0ustice. =ence# in the G assertion of their clients' ri,hts# lawyers G even those ,ifted
with superior intellect are en0oined to rein up their tempers.
7he counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or more learned lawyer than the
0ud,e# and it may ta/ his patience and temper to submit to rulin,s which he re,ards as
incorrect# but discipline and selfBrespect are as necessary to the orderly administration
of 0ustice as they are to the effectiveness of an army. 7he decisions of the 0ud,e must
be obeyed# because he is the tribunal appointed to decide# and the bar should at all
times be the foremost in renderin, respectful submission. -In Re Scouten# 21 Atl. 24(.
He concede that a lawyer may thin$ hi,hly of his intellectual endowment 7hat is his
privile,e. And he may suffer frustration at what he feels is others' lac$ of it. 7hat is his
misfortune. 6ome such frame of mind# however# should not be allowed to harden into a
belief that he may attac$ a court's decision in words calculated to 0ettison the timeB
honored aphorism that courts are the temples of ri,ht. -Per 8ustice 6ancheE in Rhee'
of the &hilippines %s. 5errer# :B""!. 8une "3# (3!.
In his relations with the courts# a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one
time and a mere citiEen at another. 7hus# statements made by an attorney in private conversations or
communications
1#
or in the course of a political# campai,n#
1.
if couched in insultin, lan,ua,e as to
brin, into scorn and disrepute the administration of 0ustice# may sub0ect the attorney to disciplinary
action.
;f fundamental pertinence at this 0uncture is an e/amination of relevant parallel precedents.
(. Admittin, that a %0ud,e as a public official is neither sacrosanct nor immune to public criticism of his
conduct in office#% the 6upreme Court of 5lorida in State %. Calhoon, (1" 6o. "d 312# 314#
nevertheless declared that %any conduct of a lawyer which brin,s into scorn and disrepute the
administration of 0ustice demands condemnation and the application of appropriate penalties#% addin,
that9
It would be contrary to# every democratic theory to hold that a 0ud,e or a court is beyond
bona fide comments and criticisms which do not e/ceed the bounds of decency and
truth or which are not aimed at. the destruction of public confidence in the 0udicial
system as such. =owever# when the li$ely impairment of the administration of 0ustice the
direct product of false and scandalous accusations then the rule is otherwise.
". In In Re lenn# (*1 N.H. "d 3!"# an attorney was suspended for puttin, out and circulatin, a
leaflet entitled %8+67ICEJJJ IN ;7+MHA#% which accused a municipal 0ud,e of havin, committed
0udicial error# of bein, so pre0udiced as to deny his clients a fair trial on appeal and of bein, sub0ect to
the control of a ,roup of city officials. As a prefatory statement he wrote9 %7hey say that 8ustice is
B:IN@# but it too$ Municipal 8ud,e Hillard to prove that it is also @EA& and @+MBP% 7he court did not
hesitate to find that the leaflet went much further than the accused# as a lawyer# had a ri,ht to do.
7he entire publication evidences a desire on the part ;f the accused to belittle and
besmirch the court and to brin, it into disrepute with the ,eneral public.
*. In In Re Hu'phrey# (3* Pac. 31# the 6upreme Court of California affirmed the twoByear
suspension of an attorney who published a circular assailin, a 0ud,e who at that time was a
candidate for reBelection to a 0udicial office. 7he circular which referred to two decisions of the 0ud,e
concluded with a statement that the 0ud,e %used his 0udicial office to enable Bsaid ban$ to $eep that
money.% 6aid the court9
He are aware that there is a line of authorities which place no limit to the criticism
members of the bar may ma$e re,ardin, the capacity# impartiality# or inte,rity of the
courts# even thou,h it e/tends to the deliberate publication by the attorney capable of
correct reasonin, of baseless insinuations a,ainst the intelli,ence and inte,rity of the
hi,hest courts. 6ee State #oard, etc. %. Hart. ((3 N.H. "("# (! :RA -N.6.. )4)# () Ann
Cas (! and note9 E/ parte 6teinman ) Pac. ""1# 21 Am. Rep. 3*!. In the first case
mentioned it was observed# for instance9
%It may be -althou,h we do not so decide. that a libelous publication by an
attorney# directed a,ainst a 0udicial officer# could be so vile and of such a
nature as to 0ustify the disbarment of its author.%
Aet the false char,es made by an attorney in that case were of ,raver character than
those made by the respondent here. But# in our view# the better rule is that which
re5uires of those who are permitted to en0oy the privile,e of practicin, law the strictest
observance at all times of the principles of truth# honesty and fairness# especially in their
criticism of the courts# to the end that the public confidence in the due administration of
0ustice be upheld# and the di,nity and usefulness of the courts be maintained. In re
Collins# 4( Pac. ""1.
2. In &eople e* rel Chicago #ar Asso. %. Met)en, ("* N.E. !*2# an attorney# representin, a woman
who had been ,ranted a divorce# attac$ed the 0ud,e who set aside the decree on bill of review. =e
wrote the 0ud,e a threatenin, letter and ,ave the press the story of a proposed libel suit a,ainst the
0ud,e and others. 7he letter be,an9
+nless the record in In re &etersen %. &etersen is cleared up so that my name is
protected from the libel# lies# and per0ury committed in the cases involved# I shall be
compelled to resort to such drastic action as the law allows and the case warrants.
&urther# he said9 %=owever let me assure you I do not intend to allow such dastardly wor$ to ,o
unchallen,ed#% and said that he was en,a,ed in dealin, with men and not irresponsible political
mani$ins or appearances of men. ;rderin, the attorney's disbarment# the 6upreme Court of Illinois
declared9
... 8ud,es are not e/empt from 0ust criticism# and whenever there is proper ,round for
serious complaint a,ainst a 0ud,e# it is the ri,ht and duty of a lawyer to submit his
,rievances to the proper authorities# but the public interest and the administration of the
law demand that the courts should have the confidence and respect of the people.
+n0ust criticism# insultin, lan,ua,e# and offensive conduct toward the 0ud,es personally
by attorneys# who are officers of the court# which tend to brin, the courts and the law
into disrepute and to destroy public confidence in their inte,rity# cannot be permitted.
7he letter written to the 0ud,e was plainly an attempt to intimidate and influence him in
the dischar,e of 0udicial functions# and the brin,in, of the unauthoriEed suit# to,ether
with the writeBup in the 6unday papers# was intended and calculated to brin, the court
into disrepute with the public.
). In a public speech# a Rhode Island lawyer accused the courts of the state of bein, influenced by
corruption and ,reed# sayin, that the seats of the 6upreme Court were bartered. It does not appear
that the attorney had criticiEed any of the opinions or decisions of the Court. 7he lawyer was char,ed
with unprofessional conduct# and was ordered suspended for a period of two years. 7he Court said9
A calumny of that character# if believed# would tend to wea$en the authority of the court
a,ainst whose members it was made# brin, its 0ud,ments into contempt# undermine its
influence as an unbiased arbiter of the people's ri,ht# and interfere with the
administration of 0ustice. ...
Because a man is a member of the bar the court will not# under the ,uise of disciplinary
proceedin,s# deprive him of any part of that freedom of speech which he possesses as
a citiEen. 7he acts and decisions of the courts of this state# in cases that have reached
final determination# are not e/empt from fair and honest comment and criticism. It is
only when an attorney transcends the limits of le,itimate criticism that he will be held
responsible for an abuse of his liberty of speech. He well understand that an
independent bar# as well as independent court# is always a vi,ilant defender of civil
ri,hts. In Re ,roy# ((( Atl. !"*. !").
3. In In Re Roc2'ore# ((( NA6 4!# an attorney was suspended for si/ months for submittin, to an
appellate court an affidavit reflectin, upon the 0udicial inte,rity of the court from which the appeal was
ta$en. 6uch action# the Court said# constitutes unprofessional conduct 0ustifyin, suspension from
practice# notwithstandin, that he fully retracted and withdrew the statements# and asserted that the
affidavit was the result of an impulse caused by what he considered ,rave in0ustice. 7he Court said9
He cannot shut our eyes to the fact that there is a ,rowin, habit in the profession of
criticisin, the motives and inte,rity of 0udicial officers in the dischar,e of their duties#
and thereby reflectin, on the administration of 0ustice and creatin, the impression that
0udicial action is influenced by corrupt or improper motives. Every attorney of this court#
as well as every other citiEen# has the ri,ht and it is his duty# to submit char,es to the
authorities in whom is vested the power to remove 0udicial officers for any conduct or act
of a 0udicial officer that tends to show a violation of his duties# or would 0ustify an
inference that he is false to his trust# or has improperly administered the duties devolved
upon himD and such char,es to the tribunal# if based upon reasonable inferences# will be
encoura,ed# and the person ma$in, them
protected. ... Hhile we reco,niEe the inherent ri,ht of an attorney in a case decided
a,ainst him# or the ri,ht of the Public ,enerally# to criticise the decisions of the courts# or
the reasons announced for them# the habit of criticisin, the motives of 0udicial officers in
the performance of their official duties# when the proceedin, is not a,ainst the officers
whose acts or motives are criticised# tends to subvert the confidence of the community
in the courts of 0ustice and in the administration of 0usticeD and when such char,es are
made by officers of the courts# who are bound by their duty to protect the administration
of 0ustice# the attorney ma$in, such char,es is ,uilty of professional misconduct.
!. In In Re Mitchell# !( 6o. 23!# a lawyer published this statement9
I accepted the decision in this case# however# with patience# barrin, possible temporary
observations more or less vituperative and finally concluded# that# as my clients were
forei,ners# it mi,ht have been e/pectin, too much to loo$ for a decision in their favor
a,ainst a widow residin, here.
7he 6upreme Court of Alabama declared that9
... the e/pressions above set out# not only transcend the bounds of propriety and
privile,ed criticism# but are an unwarranted attac$# direct# or by insinuation and
innuendo# upon the motives and inte,rity of this court# and ma$e out a pri'a facie case
of improper conduct upon the part of a lawyer who holds a license from this court and
who is under oath to demean himself with all ,ood fidelity to the court as well as to his
client.
7he char,es# however# were dismissed after the attorney apolo,iEed to the Court.
4. In State e* rel. -a$ney %. #rec2enridge# ")4 Pac. !2!# an attorney published in a newspaper an
article in which he impu,ned the motives of the court and its members to try a case# char,in, the
court of havin, arbitrarily and for a sinister purpose underta$en to suspend the writ of ha$eas corpus.
7he Court suspended the respondent for *1 days# sayin, that9
7he privile,es which the law ,ives to members of the bar is one most subversive of the
public ,ood# if the conduct of such members does not measure up to the re5uirements
of the law itself# as well as to the ethics of the profession. ...
7he ri,ht of free speech and free discussion as to 0udicial determination is of prime
importance under our system and ideals of ,overnment. No ri,ht thin$in, man would
concede for a moment that the best interest to private citiEens# as well as to public
officials# whether he labors in a 0udicial capacity or otherwise# would be served by
denyin, this ri,ht of free speech to any individual. But such ri,ht does not have as its
corollary that members of the bar who are sworn to act honestly and honorably both
with their client and with the courts where 0ustice is administered# if administered at all#
could ever properly serve their client or the public ,ood by desi,nedly misstatin, facts
or carelessly assertin, the law. 7ruth and honesty of purpose by members of the bar in
such discussion is necessary. 7he health of a municipality is none the less impaired by
a polluted water supply than is the health of the thou,ht of a community toward the
0udiciary by the filthy wanton# and mali,nant misuse of members of the bar of the
confidence the public# throu,h its duly established courts# has reposed in them to deal
with the affairs of the private individual# the protection of whose ri,hts he lends his
stren,th and money to maintain the 0udiciary. &or such conduct on the part of the
members of the bar the law itself demands retribution G not the court.
. In #ar Ass7n of San 5rancisco %. &hil$roo2# (!1 Pac. 221# the filin, of an affidavit by an attorney in
a pendin, action usin, in respect to the several 0ud,es the terms criminal corrupt# and wic$ed
conspiracies##% %criminal confederates#% %colossal and confident insolence#% %criminal prosecution#%
%calculated brutality#% %a corrupt deadfall#% and similar phrases# was considered conduct unbecomin,
of a member of the bar# and the name of the errin, lawyer was ordered stric$en from the roll of
attorneys.
(1. In State #oard of E*a'iners %. Hart, ((3 N.H. "()# the errin, attorney claimed that ,reater
latitude should be allowed in case of criticism of cases finally ad0udicated than in those pendin,. 7his
lawyer wrote a personal letter to the Chief 8ustice of the 6upreme Court of Minnesota impu,nin, both
the intelli,ence and the inte,rity of the said Chief 8ustice and his associates in the decisions of
certain appeals in which he had been attorney for the defeated liti,ants. 7he letters were published in
a newspaper. ;ne of the letters contained this para,raph9
Aou assi,ned it -the property involved. to one who has no better ri,ht to it than the
bur,lar to his plunder. It seems li$e robbin, a widow to reward a fraud# with the court
actin, as a fence# or umpire# watchful and vi,ilant that the widow ,ot no undue
advanta,e. ... 7he point is this9 Is a proper motive for the decisions discoverable# short
of assi,nin, to the court emasculated intelli,ence# or a constipation of morals and
faithlessness to dutyJ If the state bar association# or a committee chosen from its ran$#
or the faculty of the +niversity :aw 6chool# aided by the researches of its hundreds of
bri,ht# active students# or if any member of the court# or any other person# can formulate
a statement of a correct motive for the decision# which shall not re5uire fumi,ation
before it is stated# and 5uarantine after it is made# it will ,ratify every ri,htBminded
citiEen of the state to read it.
7he 6upreme Court of Minnesota# in orderin, the suspension of the attorney for si/ months# delivered
its opinion as follows9
7he 5uestion remains whether the accused was ,uilty of professional misconduct in
sendin, to the Chief 8ustice the letter addressed to him. 7his was done# as we have
found# for the very purpose of insultin, him and the other 0ustices of this courtD and the
insult was so directed to the Chief 8ustice personally because of acts done by him and
his associates in their official capacity. 6uch a communication# so made# could never
subserve any ,ood purpose. Its only effect in any case would be to ,ratify the spite of
an an,ry attorney and humiliate the officers so assailed. It would not and could not ever
enli,hten the public in re,ard to their 0udicial capacity or inte,rity. Nor was it an e/ercise
by the accused of any constitutional ri,ht# or of any privile,e which any reputable
attorney# uninfluenced by passion# could ever have any occasion or desire to assert. No
0udicial officer# with due re,ard to his position# can resent such an insult otherwise than
by methods sanctioned by lawD and for any words# oral or written# however abusive# vile#
or indecent# addressed secretly to the 0ud,e alone# he can have no redress in any
action triable by a 0ury. %7he sendin, of a libelous communication or libelous matter to
the person defamed does not constitute an actionable publication.% (4 Am. F En,. Enc.
:aw -"d Ed.. p. (1(!. In these respects the sendin, by the accused of this letter to the
Chief 8ustice was wholly different from his other acts char,ed in the accusation# and# as
we have said# wholly different principles are applicable thereto.
7he conduct of the accused was in every way discreditableD but so far as he e/ercised
the ri,hts of a citiEen# ,uaranteed by the Constitution and sanctioned by considerations
of public policy# to which reference has been made# he was immune# as we hold# from
the penalty here sou,ht to be enforced. 7o that e/tent his ri,hts as a citiEen were
paramount to the obli,ation which he had assumed as an officer of this court. Hhen#
however he proceeded and thus assailed the Chief 8ustice personally# he e/ercised no
ri,ht which the court can reco,niEe# but# on the contrary# willfully violated his obli,ation
to maintain the respect due to courts and 0udicial officers. %7his obli,ation is not
dischar,ed by merely observin, the rules of courteous demeanor in open court# but it
includes abstainin, out of court from all insultin, lan,ua,e and offensive conduct toward
the 0ud,es personally for their official acts.%#radley %. 5isher# (* Hall. -+.6.. *))# "1 :.
Ed. 323. And there appears to be no distinction# as re,ards the principle involved#
between the indi,nity of an assault by an attorney upon a 0ud,e# induced by his official
act# and a personal insult for li$e cause by written or spo$en words addressed to the
0ud,e in his chambers or at his home or elsewhere. Either act constitutes misconduct
wholly different from criticism of 0udicial acts addressed or spo$en to others. 7he
distinction made is# we thin$ entirely lo,ical and well sustained by authority. It was
reco,niEed in E* parte Mc:eod supra. Hhile the court in that case# as has been shown#
fully sustained the ri,ht of a citiEen to criticise rulin,s of the court in actions which are
ended# it held that one mi,ht be summarily punished for assaultin, a 0udicial officer# in
that case a commissioner of the court# for his rulin,s in a cause wholly concluded. %Is it
in the power of any person#% said the court# %by insultin, or assaultin, the 0ud,e
because of official acts# if only the assailant restrains his passion until the 0ud,e leaves
the buildin,# to compel the 0ud,e to forfeit either his own selfBrespect to the re,ard of the
people by tame submission to the indi,nity# or else set in his own person the evil
e/ample of punishin, the insult by ta$in, the law in his own handsJ ... No hi,hBminded#
manly man would hold 0udicial office under such conditions.%
7hat a communication such as this# addressed to the 8ud,e personally# constitutes
professional delin5uency for which a professional punishment may be imposed# has
been directly decided. %An attorney who# after bein, defeated in a case# wrote a
personal letter to the trial 0ustice# complainin, of his conduct and reflectin, upon his
inte,rity as a 0ustice# is ,uilty of misconduct and will be disciplined by the court.% Matter
of Manheim (** App. @iv. (*3# N.A. 6upp. 4! 7he same is held in Re >riffin -City
Ct.. ( N.A. ! and in Re Hil$es -City Ct.. * N.A. In the latter case it appeared that the
accused attorney had addressed a sealed letter to a 0ustice of the City Court of New
Aor$# in which it was stated# in reference to his decision9 %It is not lawD neither is it
common sense. 7he result is I have been robbed of 41.% And it was decided that# while
such conduct was not a contempt under the state# the matter should be %called to the
attention of the 6upreme Court# which has power to discipline the attorney.% %If#% says
the court# %counsel learned in the law are permitted by writin,s leveled at the heads of
0ud,es# to char,e them with i,norance# with un0ust rulin,s# and with robbery# either as
principals or accessories# it will not be lon, before the ,eneral public may feel that they
may redress their fancied ,rievances in li$e manner# and thus the lot of a 0ud,e will be
anythin, but a happy one# and the administration of 0ustice will fall into bad repute.%
7he recent case of Johnson %. State -Ala.. 22 6outh. 3!(# was in this respect much the
same as the case at bar. 7he accused# an attorney at law# wrote and mailed a letter to
the circuit 0ud,e# which the latter received by due course of mail# at his home# while not
holdin, court# and which referred in insultin, terms to the conduct of the 0ud,e in a
cause wherein the accused had been one of the attorneys. &or this it was held that the
attorney was ri,htly disbarred in havin, %willfully failed to maintain respect due to him
Nthe 0ud,eO as a 0udicial officer# and thereby breached his oath as an attorney.% As
reco,niEin, the same principle# and in support of its application to the facts of this case#
we cite the followin,9 E* parte Bradley# ! Hall -+.6.. *32# ( :. Ed. "(2D #eene %. State#
"" Ar$. (2DCo''on"ealth %. -andridge# " Ca. Cas. 214D &eople %. reen# ! Colo "*!#
"22# * Pac. 3)# *!2# 2 Am. Rep. *)(D 6mith's Appeal# (! Pa. (2# *3 Atl. (*2D
6couten's Appeal# (43 Pa. "!1# Atl. 24(.
;ur conclusion is that the char,es a,ainst the accused have been so far sustained as
to ma$e it our duty to impose such a penalty as may be sufficient lesson to him and a
suitable warnin, to others. ...
((. In Co$$ %. 8nited States# (!" &. 32(# the court affirmed a lawyer's suspension for (4 months for
publishin, a letter in a newspaper in which he accused a 0ud,e of bein, under the sinister influence of
a ,an, that had paralyEed him for two years.
(". In In Re ra%es# ""( Pac. 2((# the court held that an attorney's un0ustifiable attac$ a,ainst the
official acts and decisions of a 0ud,e constitutes %moral turpitude.% 7here# the attorney was disbarred
for criticisin, not only the 0ud,e# but his decisions in ,eneral claimin, that the 0ud,e was dishonest in
reachin, his decisions and unfair in his ,eneral conduct of a case.
(*. In In Re -oss# (" N.E. "d 3)# an attorney published newspaper articles after the trial of cases#
criticisin, the court in intemperate lan,ua,e. 7he invariable effect of this sort of propa,anda# said the
court# is to breed disrespect for courts and brin, the le,al profession into disrepute with the public# for
which reason the lawyer was disbarred.
(2. In State %. ri'es# *)2 Pac. "d (14# an attorney# dissatisfied with the loss of a case# prepared
over a period of years vicious attac$s on 0urists. 7he ;$lahoma 6upreme Court declared that his acts
involved such ,ross moral turpitude as to ma$e him unfit as a member of the bar. =is disbarment was
ordered# even thou,h he e/pressed an intention to resi,n from the bar.
7he teachin, derived from the above dis5uisition and impressive affluence of 0udicial
pronouncements is indubitable9 PostBliti,ation utterances or publications# made by lawyers# critical of
the courts and their 0udicial actuations# whether amountin, to a crime or not# which transcend the
permissible bounds of fair comment and le,itimate criticism and thereby tend to brin, them into
disrepute or to subvert public confidence in their inte,rity and in the orderly administration of 0ustice#
constitute ,rave professional misconduct which may be visited with disbarment or other lesser
appropriate disciplinary sanctions by the 6upreme Court in the e/ercise of the prero,atives inherent
in it as the duly constituted ,uardian of the morals and ethics of the le,al fraternity.
;f course# rarely have we wielded our disciplinary powers in the face of unwarranted outbursts of
counsel such as those catalo,ued in the aboveBcited 0urisprudence. Cases of comparable nature
have ,enerally been disposed of under the power of courts to punish for contempt which# althou,h
restin, on different bases and calculated to attain a different end# nevertheless illustrates that
universal abhorrence of such condemnable practices.
A perusal of the more representative of these instances may afford enli,htenment.
(. In Salcedo %s. Hernande)# 3( Phil. !"2# where counsel branded the denial of his motion for
reconsideration as %absolutely erroneous and constitutin, an outra,e to the ri,ths of the petitioner
&elipe 6alcedo and a moc$ery of the popular will e/pressed at the polls#% this Court# althou,h
concedin, that
It is ri,ht and plausible that an attorney# in defendin, the cause and ri,hts of his client#
should do so with all the fervor and ener,y of which he is capable# but it is not# and
never will be so for him to e/ercise said ri,ht by resortin, to intimidation or proceedin,
without the propriety and respect which the di,nity of the courts re5uires. 7he reason for
this is that respect for the courts ,uarantees the stability of their institution. Hithout such
,uaranty# said institution would be restin, on a very sha$y foundation#
found counsel ,uilty of contempt inasmuch as# in its opinion# the statements made disclosed
... an ine/cusable disrespect of the authority of the court and an intentional contempt of
its di,nity# because the court is thereby char,ed with no less than havin, proceeded in
utter disre,ard of the laws# the ri,hts to the parties# and 'of the untoward conse5uences#
or with havin, abused its power and moc$ed and flouted the ri,hts of Attorney Cicente
8. &rancisco's client ... .
". In In re Sotto# 4" Phil. ))# counsel# a senator and the author of the Press &reedom :aw# reachin,
to# the imprisonment for contempt of one An,el ParaEo# who# invo$in, said law# refused to divul,e the
source of a news item carried in his paper# caused to be published in i local newspaper a statement
e/pressin, his re,ret %that our =i,h 7ribunal has not only erroneously interpreted said law# but it is
once more puttin, in evidence the incompetency or narrow mindedness of the ma0ority of its
members#% and his belief that %In the wa$e of so many blunders and in0ustices deliberately committed
durin, these last years# ... the only remedy to put an end to ,o much evil# is to chan,e the members
of the 6upreme Court#% which tribunal he denounced as %a constant peril to liberty and democracy%
and %a far cry from the impre,nable bulwar$ of 0ustice of those memorable times of Cayetano
Arellano# Cictorino Mapa# Manuel Araullo and other learned 0urists who were the honor and ,lory of
the Philippine 8udiciary.% =e there also announced that one of the first measures he would introduce
in then forthcomin, session of Con,ress would have for its ob0ect the complete reor,aniEation of the
6upreme Court. &indin, him in contempt# despite his avowals of ,ood faith and his invocation of the
,uarantee of free speech# this Court declared9
But in the aboveB5uoted written statement which he caused to be published in the
press# the respondent does not merely criticiEe or comment on the decision of the
ParaEo case# which was then and still is pendin, consideration by this Court upon
petition of An,el ParaEo. =e not only intends to intimidate the members of this Court
with the presentation of a bill in the ne/t Con,ress# of which he is one of the members#
reor,aniEin, the 6upreme Court and reducin, the number of 8ustices from eleven# so
as to chan,e the members of this Court which decided the ParaEo case# who accordin,
to his statement# are incompetent and narrow minded# in order to influence the final
decision of said case by this Court# and thus embarrass or obstruct the administration of
0ustice. But the respondent also attac$s the honesty and inte,rity of this Court for the
apparent purpose of brin,in, the 8ustices of this Court into disrepute and de,radin, the
administration. of 0ustice ... .
7o hurl the false char,e that this Court has been for the last years committin,
deliberately so many blunders and in0ustices# that is to say# that it has been decidin, in
favor of Iue party $nowin, that the law and 0ustice is on the part of the adverse party
and not on the one in whose favor the decision was rendered# in many cases decided
durin, the last years# would tend necessarily to undermine the confidence of the people
in the honesty and inte,rity of the members of this Court# and conse5uently to lower #or
de,rade the administration of 0ustice by this Court. 7he 6upreme Court of the
Philippines is# under the Constitution# the last bulwar$ to which the &ilipino people may
repair to obtain relief for their ,rievances or protection of their ri,hts when these are
trampled upon# and if the people lose their confidence in the honesty and inte,rity of the
members of this Court and believe that they cannot e/pect 0ustice therefrom# they mi,ht
be driven to ta$e the law into their own hands# and disorder and perhaps chaos mi,ht
be the result. As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts# Atty. Cicente 6otto#
li$e any other# is in duty bound to uphold the di,nity and authority of this Court# to which
he owes fidelity accordin, to the oath he has ta$en as such attorney# and not to
promote distrust in the administration of 0ustice. Respect to the courts ,uarantees the
stability of other institutions# which without such ,uaranty would be restin, on a very
sha$y foundation.
6i,nificantly# too# the Court therein hastened to emphasiEe that
... an attorney as an officer of the court is under special obli,ation to be respectful in his
conduct and communication to the courtsD he may be removed from office or stric$en
from the roll of attorneys as bein, ,uilty of fla,rant misconduct -(! :.R.A. NN.6.O# )43#
)2..
*. In Rhee' of the &hilippines %s. 5errer( In re &roceedings against Alfonso &once Enrile, et al.,
supra# where counsel char,ed this Court with havin, %repeatedly fallen% into #the pitfall of blindly
adherin, to its previous %erroneous% pronouncements# %in disre,ard of the law on 0urisdiction% of the
Court of Industrial Relations# our condemnation of counsel's misconduct was une5uivocal. Articulatin,
the sentiments of the Court# Mr. 8ustice 6ancheE stressed9
As we loo$ bac$ at the lan,ua,e -heretofore 5uoted. employed in the motion for
reconsideration# implications there are which inescapably arrest attention. It spea$s of
one pitfall into which this Court has repeatedly fallen whenever the 0urisdiction of the
Court of Industrial Relations comes into 5uestion. 7hat pitfall is the tendency of this
Court to rely on its own pronouncements in disregard of the law on 0urisdiction. It ma$es
a sweepin, char,e that the decisions of this Court# $lindly adhere to earlier rulin,s
without as much as ma$in, any reference to and analysis of the pertinent statute
,overnin, the 0urisdiction of the industrial court. 7he plain import of all these is that this
Court is so patently inept that in determinin, the 0urisdiction of the industrial court# it has
committed error and continuously repeated that error to the point of perpetuation. It
pictures this Court as one which refuses to hew to the line drawn by the law on
0urisdictional boundaries. Implicit in the 5uoted statements is that the pronouncements
of this Court on the 0urisdiction of the industrial court are not entitled to respect. 7hose
statements detract much from the di,nity of and respect due this Court. 7hey brin, into
5uestion the capability of the members G and some former members of this Court to
render 0ustice. 7he second para,raph 5uoted yields a tone of sarcasm which counsel
labelled as %so called% the %rule a,ainst splittin, of 0urisdiction.%
6imilar thou,hts and sentiments have been e/pressed in other cases
18
which# in the interest of
brevity# need not now be reviewed in detail.
;f course# a common denominator underlies the aforecited cases G all of them involved
contumacious statements made in pleadin,s filed pendin, liti,ation. 6o that# in line with the doctrinal
rule that the protective mantle of contempt may ordinarily be invo$ed only a,ainst scurrilous remar$s
or malicious innuendoes while a court mulls over a pendin, case and not after the conclusion
thereof#
19
Atty. Almacen would now see$ to sidestep the thrust of a contempt char,e by his studied
emphasis that the remar$s for which he is now called upon to account were made only after this
Court had written finis to his appeal. ,his is of no 'o'ent.
7he rule that bars contempt after a 0udicial proceedin, has terminated# has lost much of its vitality.
&or sometime# this was the prevailin, view in this 0urisdiction. 7he first stir for a modification thereof#
however# came when# in&eople %s. Alarcon#
/:
the then Chief 8ustice Manuel C. Moran dissented with
the holdin, of the ma0ority# spea$in, thru 8ustice 8ose P. :aurel# which upheld the rule aboveB
adverted to. A complete disen,a,ement from the settled rule was later to be made in In re
#rillantes,
/1
a contempt proceedin,# where the editor of the Manila uardianwas ad0ud,ed in
contempt for publishin, an editorial which asserted that the (22 Bar E/aminations were conducted
in a farcical manner after the 5uestion of the validity of the said e/aminations had been resolved and
the case closed. Cirtually# this was an adoption of the view e/pressed by Chief 8ustice Moran in his
dissent inAlarcon to the effect that them may still be contempt by publication even after a case has
been terminated. 6aid Chief 8ustice Moran in Alarcon9
A publication which tends to impede# obstruct# embarrass or influence the courts in
administerin, 0ustice in a pendin, suit or proceedin,# constitutes criminal contempt
which is 'summarily punishable by courts. A publication which tends to de,rade the
courts and to destroy public confidence in them or that which tends to brin, them in any
way into disrepute# constitutes li$ewise criminal contempt# and is e5ually punishable by
courts. Hhat is sou,ht# in the first $ind of contempt# to be shielded a,ainst the influence
of newspaper comments# is the allBimportant duty of the courts to administer 0ustice in
the decision of a pendin, case. In the second $ind of contempt# the punitive hand of
0ustice is e/tended to vindicate the courts from any act or conduct calculated to brin,
them into disfavor or to destroy public confidence in them. In the first there is no
contempt where there is no action pendin,# as there is no decision which mi,ht in any
way be influenced by the newspaper publication. In the second# the contempt e/ists#
with or without a pendin, case# as what is sou,ht to be protected is the court itself and
its di,nity. Courts would lose their utility if public confidence in them is destroyed.
Accordin,ly# no comfort is afforded Atty. Almacen by the circumstance that his statements and
actuations now under consideration were made only after the 0ud,ment in his client's appeal had
attained finality. =e could as much be liable for contempt therefor as if it had been perpetrated durin,
the pendency of the said appeal.
More than this# however# consideration of whether or not he could be held liable for contempt for such
post liti,ation utterances and actuations# is here immaterial. By the tenor of our Resolution of
November (!# (3!# we have confronted the situation here presented solely in so far as it concerns
Atty. Almacen's professional identity# his sworn duty as a lawyer and his fitness as an officer of this
Court# in the e/ercise of the disciplinary power the morals inherent in our authority and duty to
safe,uard and ethics of the le,al profession and to preserve its ran$s from the intrusions of
unprincipled and unworthy disciples of the noblest of callin,s. In this in5uiry# the pendency or nonB
pendency of a case in court is alto,ether of no conse5uence. 7he sole ob0ective of this proceedin, is
to preserve the purity of the le,al profession# by removin, or suspendin, a member whose
misconduct has proved himself unfit to continue to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities
belon,in, to the office of an attorney.
+ndoubtedly# this is well within our authority to do. By constitutional mandate#
//
our is the solemn
duty# amon,st others# to determine the rules for admission to the practice of law. Inherent in this
prero,ative is the correspondin, authority to discipline and e/clude from the practice of law those
who have proved themselves unworthy of continued membership in the Bar. 7hus G
7he power to discipline attorneys# who are officers of the court# is an inherent and
incidental power in courts of record# and one which is essential to an orderly dischar,e
of 0udicial functions. 7o deny its e/istence is e5uivalent to a declaration that the conduct
of attorneys towards courts and clients is not sub0ect to restraint. 6uch a view is without
support in any respectable authority# and cannot be tolerated. Any court havin, the ri,ht
to admit attorneys to practice and in this state that power is vested in this courtBhas the
inherent ri,ht# in the e/ercise of a sound 0udicial discretion to e/clude them from
practice.
/$
7his# because the admission of a lawyer to the practice of law is a representation to all that he is
worthy of their confidence and respect. 6o much so that G
... whenever it is made to appear to the court that an attorney is no lon,er worthy of the
trust and confidence of the public and of the courts# it becomes# not only the ri,ht# but
the duty# of the court which made him one of its officers# and ,ave him the privile,e of
ministerin, within its bar# to withdraw the privile,e. 7herefore it is almost universally
held that both the admission and disbarment of attorneys are 0udicial acts# and that one
is admitted to the bar and e/ercises his functions as an attorney# not as a matter of
ri,ht# but as a privile,e conditioned on his own behavior and the e/ercise of a 0ust and
sound 0udicial discretion.
/4
Indeed# in this 0urisdiction# that power to remove or suspend has risen above bein, a mere inherent or
incidental power. It has been elevated to an e/press mandate by the Rules of Court.
/5
;ur authority and duty in the premises bein, unmista$able# we now proceed to ma$e an assessment
of whether or not the utterances and actuations of Atty. Almacen here in 5uestion are properly the
ob0ect of disciplinary sanctions.
7he proffered surrender of his lawyer's certificate is# of course# purely potestative on Atty. Almacen's
part. +northodo/ thou,h it may seem# no statute# no law stands in its way. Beyond ma$in, the mere
offer# however# he went farther. In hau,hty and coarse lan,ua,e# he actually availed of the said move
as a vehicle for his vicious tirade a,ainst this Court. 7he inte,rated entirety of his petition bristles with
vile insults all calculated to drive home his contempt for and disrespect to the Court and its members.
Picturin, his client as %a sacrificial victim at the altar of hypocrisy#% he cate,orically denounces the
0ustice administered by this Court to be not only blind %but also deaf and dumb.% Hith unmiti,ated
acerbity# he virtually ma$es this Court and its members with verbal talons# imputin, to the Court the
perpetration of %silent in0ustices% and %shortBcut 0ustice% while at the same time brandin, its members
as %calloused to pleas of 0ustice.% And# true to his announced threat to ar,ue the cause of his client %in
the people's forum#% he caused the publication in the papers of an account of his actuations# in a
calculated effort Dto startle the public# stir up public indi,nation and disrespect toward the Court.
Called upon to ma$e an e/planation# he e/pressed no re,ret# offered no apolo,y. Instead# with
characteristic arro,ance# he rehashed and reiterated his vituperative attac$s and# alludin, to the
6criptures# virtually tarred and feathered the Court and its members as inveterate hypocrites
incapable of administerin, 0ustice and unworthy to impose disciplinary sanctions upon him.
7he virulence so blatantly evident in Atty. Almacen's petition# answer and oral ar,umentation spea$s
for itself. 7he vicious lan,ua,e used and the scurrilous innuendoes they carried far transcend the
permissible bounds of le,itimate criticism. 7hey could never serve any purpose but to ,ratify the spite
of an irate attorney# attract public attention to himself and# more important of all# brin, Dthis Court and
its members into disrepute and destroy public confidence in them to the detriment of the orderly
administration of 0ustice. ;dium of this character and te/ture presents no redeemin, feature# and
completely ne,ates any pretense of passionate commitment to the truth. It is not a whit less than a
classic e/ample of ,ross misconduct# ,ross violation of the lawyer's oath and ,ross trans,ression of
the Canons of :e,al Ethics. As such# it cannot be allowed to ,o unrebu$ed. 7he way for the e/ertion
of our disciplinary powers is thus laid clear# and the need therefor is unavoidable.
He must once more stress our e/plicit disclaimer of immunity from criticism. :i$e any other
>overnment entity in a viable democracy# the Court is not# and should not be# above criticism. But a
criti5ue of the Court must be intelli,ent and discriminatin,# fittin, to its hi,h function as the court of
last resort. And more than this# valid and healthy criticism is by no means synonymous to oblo5uy#
and re5uires detachment and disinterestedness# real 5ualities approached only throu,h constant
strivin, to attain them. Any criticism of the Court must# possess the 5uality of 0udiciousness and must
be informed Bby perspective and infused by philosophy.
/#
It is not accurate to say# nor is it an obstacle to the e/ercise of our authority in Dthe premises# that# as
Atty. Almacen would have appear# the members of the Court are the %complainants# prosecutors and
0ud,es% all rolled up into one in this instance. 7his is an utter misapprehension# if not a total distortion#
not only of the nature of the proceedin, at hand but also of our role therein.
Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedin,s li$e the present are sui generis.
Neither purely civil nor purely criminal# this proceedin, is not G and does not involve G a trial of an
action or a suit# but is rather an investi,ation by the Court into the conduct of its officers.
/.
Not bein,
intended to. inflict punishment# it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordin,ly# there is neither a
plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein It may be initiated by the Court 'otu proprio.
/8
Public interest is its
primary ob0ective# and the real 5uestion for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit
person to be allowed the privile,es as such. =ence# in the e/ercise of its disciplinary powers# the
Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court
with the end in view of preservin, the purity of the le,al profession and the proper and honest
administration of 0ustice by pur,in, the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved
themselves no lon,er worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertainin, to the
office of an attorney.
/9
In such posture# there can thus be no occasion to spea$ of a complainant or a
prosecutor.
+ndeniably# the members of the Court are# to a certain de,ree# a,,rieved parties. Any tirade a,ainst
the Court as a body is necessarily and ine/tricably as much so a,ainst the individual members
thereof. But in the e/ercise of its disciplinary powers# the Court acts as an entity separate and distinct
from the individual personalities of its members. Consistently with the intrinsic nature of a colle,iate
court# the individual members act not as such individuals but. only as a duly constituted court. 7heir
distinct individualities are lost in the ma0esty of their office.
$:
6o that# in a very real sense# if there be
any complainant in the case at bar# it can only be the Court itself# not the individual members thereof
G as well as the people themselves whose ri,hts# fortunes and properties# nay# even lives# would be
placed at ,rave haEard should the administration of 0ustice be threatened by the retention in the Bar
of men unfit to dischar,e the solemn responsibilities of membership in the le,al fraternity.
&inally# the power to e/clude persons from the practice of law is but a necessary incident of the power
to admit persons to said practice. By constitutional precept# this power is vested e/clusively in this
Court. 7his duty it cannot abdicate 0ust as much as it cannot unilaterally renounce 0urisdiction le,ally
invested upon it.
$1
6o that even if it be conceded that the members collectively are in a sense the
a,,rieved parties# that fact alone does not and cannot dis5ualify them from the e/ercise of that power
because public policy demands that they.# actin, as a Court# e/ercise the power in all cases which
call for disciplinary action. 7he present is such a case. In the end# the ima,ined anomaly of the
mer,er in one entity of the personalities of complainant# prosecutor and 0ud,e is absolutely ine/istent.
:ast to en,a,e our attention is the nature and e/tent of the sanctions that may be visited upon Atty.
Almacen for his trans,ressions. As mar$ed out by the Rules of Court# these may ran,e from mere
suspension to total removal or disbarment.
$/
7he discretion to assess under the circumstances the
imposable sanction is# of course# primarily addressed to the sound discretion of the Court which#
bein, neither arbitrary and despotic nor motivated by personal animosity or pre0udice# should ever be
controlled by the imperative need that the purity and independence of the Bar be scrupulously
,uarded and the di,nity of and respect due to the Court be Eealously maintained.
7hat the misconduct committed by Atty. Almacen is of considerable ,ravity cannot be
overemphasiEed. =owever# heedin, the stern in0unction that disbarment should never be decreed
where a lesser sanction would accomplish the end desired# and believin, that it may not perhaps be
futile to hope that in the sober li,ht of some future day# Atty. Almacen will realiEe that abrasive
lan,ua,e never fails to do disservice to an advocate and that in every effervescence of candor there
is ample room for the added ,low of respect# it is our view that suspension will suffice under the
circumstances. =is demonstrated persistence in his misconduct by neither manifestin, repentance
nor offerin, apolo,y therefor leave us no way of determinin, how lon, that suspension should last
and# accordin,ly# we are impelled to decree that the same should be indefinite. 7his# we are
empowered to do not alone because 0urisprudence ,rants us discretion on the matter
$$
but also
because# even without the comfortin, support of precedent# it is obvious that if we have authority to
completely e/clude a person from the practice of law# there is no reason why indefinite suspension#
which is lesser in de,ree and effect# can be re,arded as fallin, outside of the compass of that
authority. 7he merit of this choice is best shown by the fact that it will then be left to Atty. Almacen to
determine for himself how lon, or how short that suspension shall last. &or# at any time after the
suspension becomes effective he may prove to this Court that he is once a,ain fit to resume the
practice of law.
ACC;R@IN>:A# I7 I6 7=E 6EN6E of the Court that Atty. Cicente Raul Almacen be# as he is hereby#
suspended from the practice of law until further orders# the suspension to ta$e effect immediately.
:et copies of this resolution. be furnished the 6ecretary of 8ustice# the 6olicitor >eneral and the Court
of Appeals for their information and ,uidance.
Concepcion,. C.J., Reyes, J.#.!., -i)on, Ma2alintal, 9aldi%ar, Sanche), ,eehan2ee, #arredo and
/illa'or JJ., concur.
5ernando, J., too2 no part.
-ootnotes
( @oc$eted as Civil Case 41 on 6eptember (!# (3) in the Court of &irst Instance of
RiEal.
" 6ee e.g. %Mountin, @iscontent a,ainst the 6upreme Court's Minute Resolution#% *"
:awyers 8. p. *")D %:ac$ of Merit Resolutions are ;bno/ious#% *( :awyers 8. p. *".
* In the years (33# (3! and (34# this Court re0ected by minute resolutions 41*# 34"
and 424 petitions# respectively# and resolved by e/tended decisions or resolutions )42#
3(( and !31 cases# respectively. &or the period coverin, the first si/ months of the year
(3# this Court re0ected by minute resolutions 22) petitions# and resolved by e/tended
decision or resolutions "! cases.
2 8.S. %s. #ustos# *! Phil. !*( -((4.D In re o'e)# 2* Phil. *!3D Salcedo %s.
Hernande)# 3( Phil. !*3 -Malcolm# 8.# dissentin,.D Austria %s. Masa+uel# >.R. :B"")*3#
Au,. *(# (3!D Ca$ansag %s. 5ernande), et al., >.R. :B4!2# ;ct. (4# ()!.
) In re o'e), supra.
3 In re o'e), supraD In re !o)ano and :ue%edo# )2 Phil. 41( -(*1. D In re
A$istado )! Phil. 334 -(*".D &eople %s. Alarcon; In re Conte'pt &roceedings,
Mangahas# 3 Phil. "3) -(*.. 6ee&enne2a'p %. State of 5lorida# *"4 +.6. **(# 1 :.
ed. (")D In re #o)orth, ((4 A. "d 2*"D In re Ja'eson, *21 Pac. "d 2*" -(). D In re
&ryor# "3 Am. Rep. 2!2D Hill %s. !y'an# ("3 NA6 "d "43DCaig %. Hecht, 34 :. ed. "*
-Concurrin, opinion of 8ustice 7aft..
! Stre$el %. 5igueras# 3 Phil. *"( -()2..
4 State %. #ee &u$. Co., 4* N.H. "12# 6ullivan# 8. 6ee also State e* rel Atty. en. %.
Circuit Ct., !" N. H. (*.
In re Ja'eson# *21 Pac. "d 2*" -()..
(1 8.S. %s. #ustos# *! Phil. !*( -((4. D In re o'e)# 2* Phil. *!3D Ca$ansag %.
5ernande)# :B(4!2# ;ct. (4# ()!D Austria %s. Masa+uel# :B"")*3# Au,. *(# (3!D Re
,roy -("1.# ((( Atl. !"*D 6tate e/ rel. Atty. >en. v. Circuit Ct. -(4!.# 3) Am. 6t. Rep.
1D oons %. State# (*2 N.E. (2D State %s. S"eetland, )2 N.H. 2()D Hill %s. !y'an#
("3 NA6 "d "43D Case of Austin# "4 Am. @ec. 3)!.
(( State #oard of E*a'iners %. Hart# ((3 N.H. "("# (! :RA -N6. )4)D Re &ryor# "3
Am. Rep. !2!D E* &arte Stein'an# 21 Am. Rep. 3*!D Case of Austin# "4 Am. @ec.
3)!D #rannon %. State# " 6o. "d (4DMedgar E%ers %. State# (*( 6o. "d 3)*D Re Ades#
3 & "d 23!.
(" %A 0ud,e as a public official#% said 8ustice 7hornal in State %. Calhoon, (1" 6o. "d
312# %is neither sacrosanct nor immune to public criticism of his conduct in office.%
(* In re #o)orth, ((4 Atl. 2*"9 %7he harsh and sometimes unfounded criticism of the
members of any of the three branches of our >overnment may be unfortunate lot of
public officials ...# but it has always been deemed a basic principle that such comment
may be made by the public ... . Nor should the 0udicial branch ... en0oy any more
enviable condition than the other two branches.%
In #ridges %. California# 43 :. ed. ("# Mr. 8ustice Blac$# spea$in, for the ma0ority# said9
%... an enforced silence# however# limited# solely in the name of preservin, the di,nity of
the bench# would probably en,ender resentment# suspicion# and contempt much more
than it would enhance respect.% Mr. 8ustice &ran$furter# who wrote the minority opinion#
said9 %8ud,es as persons# or courts as institutions# are entitled to no ,reater immunity
from criticism than other persons or institutions. 8ust because the holders of 0udicial
office are identified with the interest of 0ustice they may for,et their common human
frailties and fallibilities. 7here have sometimes been martinets upon the bench as there
have sometimes been wielders of authority who have used the paraphernalia of power
in support of what they called their di,nity. 7herefore 0ud,es must be $ept mindful of
their limitations and of their ultimate public responsibility by a vi,orous stream of
criticism e/pressed with candor however blunt %A man cannot be summarily laid by the
heels because his words may ma$e public feelin, more unfavorable in case the 0ud,e
should be as$ed to act at some later date# any more than he can for e/citin, public
feelin, a,ainst a 0ud,e for what he already has done.% ... Courts and 0ud,es mast ta$e
their share of the ,ains and pains of discussion "hich is unfettered e*cept $y la"s of
li$el, $y self1 restraint, and $y good taste. Hinds of doctrine should freely blow for the
promotion of ,ood and the correction of evil. Nor should restrictions be permitted that
cramp the feelin, of freedom in the use of ton,ue or pen re,ardless of the temper of the
truth of what may be uttered.%
(2 6ec. *# Rule (*4. transition
() 6ec. "1-b.# Rule (*4.
(3 6ee e.,. Re Chopac, 33 &. 6upp.# where an attorney was suspended for three years
for writin, a 0ud,e a letter in which he said that the 0ud,e in si,nin, an order too$
%advanta,e of your office to rule with passion and vehemence.% Also &eople %. reen# *
P. 3)# where an attorney was disbarred for stoppin, a 0ud,e upon the street and
addressed abusive# insultin, lan,ua,e to him. 6ee alsoJohnson %. State# 22 6o. 3!(D In
re McCo"an, (!1 P. ((1(D State %. Calhoon, (1"# "d 312D Re Huppe, (( Pac. "d
!*D State %. Rhodes# (*( NH "d ((4D Re Rogers# "(" Pac. (1*2D In re riffin# ( NA6
!D In re .il2es# * NA6 !)*D Re Manhei', NA6 4!D Re reenfield# "3" NA6 "d
*2D In re <lein# "3" NA6 "d 2(3D In re S'ith# *3 A (*1.
(! In re Hu'phrey# (3* P. 31D In re ,hatcher, 4 N.E. *D In Snyder7s Case# !3 A:R
333D Re ,roy# ((( A. !"*D State %. Sprigs# ()) P. "d "4).
(4 Medina %s. Ri%era# 33 Phil. ()(D In the 'atter of the Intestate Estate of Rosario
Ol$a, Conte'pt proceedings against Antonio 5ranco# 3! Phil. *("# *()D &eople
%s. Carillo, !! Phil. )!D &eople %s. /enturan)a, et al., 4) Phil. "((# "(2D -e Joya, et al.
%s. C5I of Ri)al# Phil. 1!# (2D Sison %s. Sandejas# :B"!1# April "# ()D &aragas
%s. Cru)# :B"22*4# 8uly *1# (3)D Cornejo %s. ,an# 4) Phil. !!"# !!).
( In re o'e)# 2* Phil. *!3D In re !o)ano# )2 Phil. 41(D In re A$istado, )! Phil.
334D &eople %s. Alarcon, 3 Phil. (3)D Cornejo %s. ,an# 4) Phil. !!"# !!). State %s.
-ist. Court, ()( Pac. "d (11"D In re Shannon# "! Pac. *)"D State e* rel. rice %s. -ist.
Court# ! Pac. (1*"D .eston %s. Co''on"ealth# !! 6.E. "d 21)D State %s. <aiser, (*
P. 32D State %s. #ee &u$. Co. 4* N.H. "12D&atterson %s. Colorado. )( :. ed. 4!D Re
Hart# ((3 N.H. "(".
"1 3 Phil. "3).
"( 2" ;.>. ).
"" Article CIII# 6ection ("# Constitution.
"* Re Si'pson# 4* N.H. )2(.
"2 Re ,hatcher# 4 N.E. *# 42.
") 6ection "!# Rule (*4# Rules of Court.
"3 6ee Norman @orsen# 5rontiers of Ci%il !i$erties# pp. 31B3(D >riswold# %;f 7ime and
Attitudes#% !2Har%ard !a" Re%ie"# 4(# 2D Paul A. &reund# ,he Supre'e Court of the
8nited States# -(3(. pp. (!3B(!!D see also &reund# On !a" and Justice -(34. ch. 2.
"! In re Montagne and -o'ingue)# * Phil. )!!D -e -urant, (1 Ann. Cas. ((*# (""1.
"4 State %s. &ec2# ( Atl. "!2D "43D 5airfield County #ar %s. ,aylor# "" Atl. 22(.
" E* &arte ,yler# 21 Pac. **# *2D ,read"ell7s case# ! Pac. !"2D -eles %s. Aragona#
March "4# (3# "! 6CRA 3*2# 322# and the cases therein cited.
*1 Sarcos %s. Castillo, et al., :B"!))# 8anuary "(# (3.
*( Cf. Radio"ealth, Inc. %s. Agregado# 2! ;.>.# No. (" -6upp. pp. 4!# 4# citin, Cooley#
Constitutional :imitations# Col. "# P. 4!1D &erfecto %s. Meer# 4) Phil. ))"# ))*D E* parte
Ala$a'a State #ar Ass7n., 4 6o. !34.
*" 6ection "!# Rule (*4# Rules of Court.
** Melville vs. Hetten,el# )! Pa. "d 3D People vs. Hino,ard# "4! Pac. 432D People
vs. ?elly# "4) Pac. !3!D People vs. =arris# ((" N.E. !4D People vs. Anderson# ((" N.E.
"!*D In re >ullic$son# (4( Atl. !(3D =aitmane$ vs. 7urano# ()4 A. 4!4D >rimsell vs.
Hilco/# 4 A. !D 6tates vs. ?ern# "** N.H. 3"D In re Borchardt# (" N.E. *4*D 6tate
vs. 7rapley# ") Pac. !4*D 6tate vs. 8ennin,s# () 6.E. 3"!D In re 8acobson# ("3 6.E.
"d *23D Mulvey vs. ;'Niell# 22 Atl. "d 441D 6tate e/ rel ;$lahoma Bar Ass'n vs. =atcher#
"1 Pac. "d 4!*D Cleveland Bar Ass'n vs. Hil$erson# ()3 N.E. "d (*3 N.E. "d (*3D In re
Eddy# "" N.A.6. 3(.