Philosophy of Language

Stoicism is a school of philosophy founded (308 BCE) in Athens by Zeno of Citium

(Cyprus). It teaches selfcontrol and detachment from distractin! emotions"
sometimes interpreted as an indifference to pleasure or pain. #his allo$s one to be a
clear thin%er" le&elheaded and unbiased. In practice" 'toicism is desi!ned to empo$er
an indi&idual $ith &irtue" $isdom" and inte!rity of character. 'tudents are
encoura!ed to help those in need" %no$in! that those $ho can" should. 'toicism also
teaches psycholo!ical independence from society" re!ardin! it as an unruly and often
unreasonable entity.
(irtue" reason" and natural la$ are prime directi&es. By masterin! passions and
emotions" it is possible to o&ercome the discord of the outside $orld and find peace
$ithin oneself. 'toicism holds that passion distorts truth" and that the pursuit of truth
is &irtuous. )ree% philosophers such as Cleanthes" Chrysippus" and later *oman
thin%ers such as Cicero" 'eneca the +oun!er" ,arcus Aurelius" Cato the Elder" Cato
the +oun!er" and Epictetus are associated $ith 'toicism. In Cicero-s case" it should be
emphasised that $hile he shared many of the moral tenets of 'toicism" he $as not a
'toic himself but an eclectic. 'toic philosophy is usually contrasted $ith
Epicureanism.
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A compound is a $ord (le/eme) that consists of more than one free morpheme.
A certain type of compounds (endocentric) consist of a head" i.e. the cate!orical part
that contains the basic meanin! of the $hole compound" and modifiers" $hich restrict
this meanin!. 0or e/ample" the En!lish compound doghouse" $here house is the head
and dog is the modifier" is understood as a house intended for a do!. 1b&iously" an
endocentric compound tends to be of the same part of speech ($ord class) as its
head.
In other cases" the compound does not ha&e a head" and its meanin! cannot be
transparently !uessed from its constituent parts. 0or e/ample" the En!lish compound
white-collar is neither a %ind of collar nor a $hite thin!. In the 'ans%rit tradition" this
is called a bahuvrihi compound2 another (modern) term is exocentric compound"
meanin! that the concept represented by the compound lies outside its parts. In an
e/ocentric compound" the $ord class is determined le/ically" disre!ardin! the class of
the constituents. 0or e/ample" a must-have is not a &erb but a noun.
Composition should not be confused $ith deri&ation" $here bound morphemes are
added to free ones.
A special %ind of composition is incorporation" of $hich noun incorporation into a
&erbal root (as in En!lish backstabbing" breastfeed" etc.) is most pre&alent (see
belo$).
Formation of compounds
Compound formation rules &ary $idely across lan!ua!e types.
In a perfectly analytic lan!ua!e" compounds are simply elements strun! to!ether
$ithout any mar%ers. In En!lish" for e/ample" science fiction is a compound noun that
consists of t$o nouns and no mar%ers. A correspondin! e/ample from the ,andarin
lan!ua!e $ould be Hny ( 2 simplified3 )" or 4the 5an Chinese lan!ua!e4"
$hich also consists of t$o nouns and no mar%ers.
1
In a more synthetic lan!ua!e" the relationship bet$een the elements of a compound
may be mar%ed. In )erman" for e/ample" the compound Kapitnspatent consists of
the le/emes Kapitn (sea captain) and Patent (license) 6oined by the !eniti&e case
mar%er -s. In the 7atin lan!ua!e" the le/eme paterfamilias contains the (archaic)
!eniti&e form familias of the le/eme pater (father).
A!!lutinati&e lan!ua!es tend to create &ery lon! $ords $ith deri&ational morphemes.
Compounds may or may not re8uire the use of deri&ational morphemes also. #he $ell
%no$n 9apanese compound kamikaze consists only of the nouns kami (4!od"
spirit4) and kaze (4$ind4). #he lon!est compounds in the $orld may be found in
0innish and )ermanic lan!ua!es" such as '$edish. )erman e/amples include
Kontaktlinsenvertrglichkeitstest (4contactlens compatibility test4) and the 6ocular
heindampfschifffahrtsgesellschaftskapitnsstellvertreter (4*hine steamship
company &icecaptain4). In theory" e&en lon!er compounds are possible" but they are
usually not found in actual discourse.
Conpounds can be rather lon!" $hen translatin! technical document from En!lish to
for e/ample '$edish. 4motion estimation search ran!e settin!s4 can be directly
translated to 4r:relseupps%attnin!ss:%nin!srymdsinst;llnin!4" the len!th of the $ord is
theoretically unlimited.
Compound types in different languages
Compound nouns
,ost natural lan!ua!es ha&e compound nouns and sometimes compound ad6ecti&es.
#he position of the head $ithin a compound often depends on the branchin! tendency
of the lan!ua!e" i. e. the most common order of constituents in phrases $here nouns
are modified by ad6ecti&es" by possessors" by other nouns" etc. <hile )ermanic
lan!ua!es" for e/ample" are leftbranchin! $hen it comes to noun phrases (the
modifiers come before the head)" the *omance lan!ua!es are usually ri!htbranchin!.
In 0rench" compound nouns are often formed by lefthand heads $ith prepositional
components inserted before the modifier" as in chemin-de-fer (4rail$ay4" lit. 4road of
iron4) and moulin vent (4$indmill4" lit. 4mill (that $or%s)bymeansof $ind4).
Verb-noun compounds
In 'panish there is a &ery common type of compound noun consistin! of a &erb
(con6u!ated for third person sin!ular" present tense" indicati&e mood) follo$ed by a
noun (usually plural)" such as rascacielos (modelled on 4s%yscraper4" lit. 4scratches
s%ies4) and sacacorchos (4cor%scre$4" lit. 4remo&es cor%s4). #hese compounds are
formally in&ariable in the plural (but in many cases they ha&e been reanaly=ed as
plural forms" and a sin!ular form has appeared). 0rench and Italian ha&e these same
compounds $ith the noun in the sin!ular form3 Italian grattacielo (4s%yscraper4)"
0rench grille-pain (4toaster4" lit. 4toasts bread4).
En!lish prefers another type of &erbnoun compounds" in $hich an ar!ument of the
&erb is incorporated into the &erb" $hich is then usually turned into a !erund" such as
breastfeeding" finger-pointing" etc. #he noun is usually an instrumental complement.
Compound adpositions
Compound prepositions formed by prepositions and nouns are common in En!lish and
the *omance lan!ua!es (consider En!lish on top of" 'panish encima de" etc.).
2
9apanese sho$s the same pattern" e/cept the $ord order is the opposite ($ith
postpositions)3 no naka (lit. 4of inside on4" i.e. 4on the inside of4).
Other examples
'panish3
!iencia-ficci"n (4science fiction4)3 ciencia" 4science4" > ficci"n" 4fiction4 (#his
$ord is a cal8ue from the En!lish e/pression science fiction. In En!lish" the
head of a compound $ord is the last morpheme3 science fiction. Con&ersely"
the 'panish head is located at the front" so ciencia ficci?n sounds li%e a %ind of
fictional science rather than scientific fiction.)
!iempi#s (4centipede4)3 cien" 4hundred4" > pies" 4feet4
$errocarril (4rail$ay4)3 ferro" 4iron4" > carril" 4lane4
Italian3
!entopiedi (4centipede4)3 cento" 4hundred4" > piedi" 4feet4
$errovia (4rail$ay4)3 ferro" 4iron4" > via" 4$ay4
%ergicristallo (4$indscreen4)3 tergere" 4to $ash4" > cristallo" 4crystal" (pane of)
!lass4
)erman3
&olkenkratzer (4s%yscraper4)3 wolken" 4clouds4" > kratzer" 4scraper4
'isenbahn (4rail$ay4)3 'isen" 4iron4" > bahn" 4trac%4
Kraftfahrzeug (4automobile4)3 Kraft" 4po$er4" > fahren(fahr" 4dri&e4" > zeug"
4machinery4
)tacheldraht (4barbed $ire4)3 stachel" 4barb@barbed4" > draht" 4$ire4
0innish3
sanakir*a (4dictionary4)3 sana" 4$ord4" > kir*a" 4boo%4
tietokone (4computer4)3 tieto" 4%no$led!e" data4" > kone" 4machine4
keskiviikko (4<ednesday4)3 keski" 4middle4" > viikko" 4$ee%4
maailma (4$orld4)3 maa" 4land4" > ilma" 4air4
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In morphemebased morpholo!y" a morpheme is the smallest lan!ua!e unit that
carries a semantic interpretation. ,orphemes are" !enerally" a distincti&e collocation
of phonemes (as the free form pin or the bound form s of pins) ha&in! no smaller
meanin!ful members.
'nglish example+ #he $ord 4unbelie&able4 has three morphemes 4un4" (ne!atory) a
bound morpheme" 4belie&e4 a free morpheme" and 4able4. 4un4 is also a prefi/" 4
able4 is a suffi/. Both are affi/es.
Types of morphemes
0ree morphemes li%e town" dog can appear $ith other le/emes (as in town-hall
or dog-house) or they can stand alone" or 4free4. Allomorphs are &ariants of a
morpheme" e.!. the plural mar%er in En!lish is sometimes reali=ed as @=@" @s@
or @=@.
3
Bound morphemes li%e 4un4 appear only to!ether $ith other morphemes to
form a le/eme. Bound morphemes in !eneral tend to be prefi/es and suffi/es.
,orphemes e/istin! in only one bound form are %no$n as 4cranberry4 ones"
from the 4cran4 in that &ery $ord.
Inflectional morphemes modify a $ord-s tense" number" aspect" and so on. (as
in the dog morpheme if $ritten $ith the plural mar%er morpheme s becomes
dogs).
Aeri&ational morphemes can be added to a $ord to create (deri&e) another
$ord3 the addition of 4ness4 to 4happy4" for e/ample" to !i&e 4happiness4.
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In human lan!ua!e" a phoneme is the basic theoretical unit that can be used to
distin!uish $ords or morphemes. #hat is" chan!in! a phoneme in a $ord produces
either nonsense" or a different $ord $ith a different meanin!.
Bhonemes in oral lan!ua!es are not physical sounds" but mental abstractions of
speech sounds. A phoneme is a family of speech sounds (phones) that the spea%ers of
a lan!ua!e thin% of as bein!" and hear as" the same sound. A 4perfect4 alphabet is one
that has one symbol for each phoneme.
In si!n lan!ua!es" a phoneme is a similarly basic theoretical unit of hand shape"
motion" position" or facial e/pression. It $as formerly called a chereme (or
cheireme)" but usa!e chan!ed to phoneme $hen it $as reco!ni=ed that the mental
abstractions in&ol&ed are essentially the same as in oral lan!ua!es.
Phonemics" a branch of phonolo!y" is the study of the systems of phonemes of
lan!ua!es.
Bacground and related ideas
#he phoneme is an abstraction that $as introduced by the Bolish lin!uist 9an
Ciecisla$ Baudouin de Courtenay (D8EFDGHG) and his student ,i%oIa6 Jrus=e$s%i. #he
concept of the phoneme $as elaborated in the $or%s of Ci%olai #rubet=%oi (D8G0
DG38)" as $ell as in that of structuralists li%e 0erdinand de 'aussure and Ed$ard 'apir.
7ater" it $as also used in !enerati&e lin!uistics" most famously by Coam Choms%y and
,orris 5alle" and remains central in &irtually all modern schools of phonolo!y.
(5o$e&er" some !enerati&e phonolo!ists re6ected the phoneme durin! the DGK0s and
DGL0s.)
#he phoneme can be defined as 4the smallest meanin!ful psycholo!ical unit of sound.4
#he phoneme has mental" physiolo!ical" and physical substance3 our brains process
the sounds2 the sounds are produced by the human speech or!ans2 and the sounds are
physical entities that can be recorded and measured.
0or an e/ample of phonemes" consider the En!lish $ords pat and sat" $hich differ
only in their initial consonants. #his difference" %no$n as contrasti!eness" is
sufficient to distin!uish these $ords" and therefore the B and ' sounds are said to be
different phonemes. A pair of $ords that are identical e/cept for such a sound are
%no$n as a minimal pair2 this is the most fre8uent demonstration that t$o sounds are
separate phonemes.
If no minimal pair can be found to demonstrate that t$o sounds are distinct" it may
be that they are allophones. Allophones are &ariant phones (i.e." sounds) that are not
reco!ni=ed as distinct by a spea%er" and are not meanin!fully different in the
lan!ua!e" and yet are percei&ed as 4the same4. #his is especially li%ely if they
4
consistently occur in different en&ironments. 0or e/ample" the 4dar%4 7 sound at the
end of the En!lish $ord 4$ool4 is 8uite different from the 4li!ht4 7 sound at the
be!innin! of the $ord 4leaf4" but this difference is meanin!less in En!lish" and is
determined by $hether the sound is at the be!innin! or end of a $ord. A nati&e
En!lish spea%er mi!ht ha&e a hard time hearin! the difference at first" but in #ur%ish
the difference bet$een 4li!ht4 and 4dar%4 7 is sufficient to distin!uish $ords. #hat is"
they are t$o separate phonemes in #ur%ish" but allophones of a sin!le phoneme in
En!lish.
#he phonemic relationship of t$o sounds may not be ob&ious to a nonnati&e spea%er"
$hich is $hy minimal pairs and an understandin! of phonetic en&ironments are
important. 0or e/ample" in Jorean" there is a phoneme @r@ that is a flapped r
bet$een &o$els" and is an lsound ne/t to other consonants. #hese sound &ery
different to an En!lish spea%er" $ho is attuned to hearin! them because the
differences are meanin!ful in En!lish. 5o$e&er" the nati&e spea%er has learned from
an early a!e to filter out the difference" as they are not meanin!ful in their lan!ua!e.
In Jorean" for instance" it is impossible to distin!uish the t$o $ords 4ram4 and 4lam4"
despite the fact that both * and 7 sounds occur in the lan!ua!e.
#he e/act number of phonemes in En!lish depends on the spea%er and the method of
determinin! phoneme &s. allophone" but estimates typically ran!e from E0 to EF"
$hich is abo&e a&era!e across all lan!ua!es. BirahM has only D0" $hile NO?P has DED.
Aependin! on the lan!ua!e and the alphabet used" a phoneme may be $ritten
consistently $ith one letter2 ho$e&er there are many e/ceptions to this rule Q see
<ritin! systems belo$.
'ome lan!ua!es ma%e use of pitch for the precise same purpose. In this case" the
tones used are called tonemes. 'ome lan!ua!es distin!uish $ords made up of the
same phonemes (and tonemes) by usin! different durations of some elements" $hich
are called chronemes. 5o$e&er" the chroneme is not employed by the ma6ority of
scholars $or%in! on lan!ua!es $ith distincti&e duration" and the term itself may not
e&en be reco!ni=ed by most lin!uists. Rsually" lon! &o$els and consonants are
represented either by a len!th indicator or doublin! of the sound in 8uestion.
In si!n lan!ua!es" phonemes may be classified as %ab (elements of location" from
7atin tabula)" ,ez (the hand shape" from designator)" )ig (the motion" from
signation)" and $ith some researchers" -ri (orientation). 0acial e/pressions and
mouthin! are also phonemic.
"otation
A transcription that only indicates the different phonemes of a lan!ua!es is said to be
phonemic. 'uch transcriptions are enclosed $ithin &ir!ules (slashes)" # #2 these sho$
that each enclosed symbol is claimed to be phonemically meanin!ful. 1n the other
hand" a transcription that indicates finer detail" includin! allophonic &ariation li%e the
t$o En!lish 7-s" is said to be phonetic" and is enclosed in s8uare brac%ets" $ %.
#he common notation used in lin!uistics employs &ir!ules (slashes) (@ @) around the
symbol that stands for the phoneme. 0or e/ample" the phoneme for the initial
consonant sound in the $ord 4phoneme4 $ould be $ritten as @f@. In other $ords" the
graphemes are SphT" but this di!raph represents one sound @f@. &llophones" real
speech &ariants of a phoneme" are often denoted in lin!uistics by the use of
diacritical or other mar%s added to the phoneme symbols and then placed in s8uare
brac%ets (U V) to differentiate them from the phoneme in slant brac%ets (@ @). #he
5
con&entions of ortho!raphy are then %ept separate from both phonemes and
allophones by the use of the mar%ers S T to enclose the spellin!.
#he symbols of the International Bhonetic Alphabet (IBA) and e/tended sets adapted
to a particular lan!ua!e are often used by lin!uists to $rite phonemes of oral
lan!ua!es" $ith the principle bein! one symbol e8uals one cate!orical sound. Aue to
problems displayin! some symbols in the early days of the Internet" systems such as O
'A,BA and Jirshenbaum $ere de&eloped to represent IBA symbols in plain te/t. As of
H00E" any modern $eb bro$ser can display IBA symbols (as lon! as the operatin!
system pro&ides the appropriate fonts)" and $e use this system in this article.
#he only published set of phonemic symbols for a si!n lan!ua!e is the 'to%oe notation
de&eloped for American 'i!n 7an!ua!e" $hich has since been applied to British 'i!n
7an!ua!e by Jyle and <oll" and to Australian Abori!inal si!n lan!ua!es by Adam
Jendon. 5o$e&er" there are se&eral phonetic systems" such as 'i!n<ritin!.
'xamples
E/amples of phonemes in the En!lish lan!ua!e $ould include sounds from the set of
En!lish consonants" li%e /p/ and /b/. #hese t$o are most often $ritten consistently
$ith one letter for each sound. 5o$e&er" phonemes mi!ht not be so apparent in
$ritten En!lish" such as $hen they are typically represented $ith combined letters"
called digraphs" li%e SshT (pronounced /@) or SchT (pronounced /t@).
#o see a list of the phonemes in the En!lish lan!ua!e" see IBA for En!lish.
#$o sounds that may be allophones (sound &ariants belon!in! to the same phoneme)
in one lan!ua!e may belon! to separate phonemes in another lan!ua!e or dialect. In
En!lish" for e/ample" /p/ has aspirated and nonaspirated allophones3aspirated as in
/pn@" and nonaspirated as in /spn@. 5o$e&er" in many lan!ua!es (e. !. Chinese)"
aspirated /p@ is a phoneme distinct from unaspirated @p@. As another e/ample" there
is no distinction bet$een UrV and UlV in 9apanese" there is only one @r@ phoneme in
9apanese" althou!h the 9apanese @r@ has allophones that ma%e it sound more li%e an
@l@" @d@" or @r@ to En!lish spea%ers. #he sounds @=@ and @s@ are distinct phonemes in
En!lish" but allophones in 'panish. @n@ (as in run) and @W@ (as in rung) are phonemes
in En!lish" but allophones in Italian and 'panish.
An important phoneme is the chroneme" a phonemicallyrele&ant e/tension of the
duration a consonant or &o$el. 'ome lan!ua!es or dialects such as 0innish or
9apanese allo$ chronemes after both consonants and &o$els. 1thers" li%e Italian or
Australian En!lish use it after only one (in the case of Italian" consonants2 in the case
of Australian" &o$els). 1ften a chan!e in 8uantity correlates $ith a chan!e in 8uality"
and thus it may be contentious as to $hether the 8uality or 8uantity" or both" is
phonemically rele&ant.
&rguments against the Phoneme
*ather than a basic mental unit of lan!ua!e" some thin% that the phoneme may $ell
be a perceptual artifact of alphabetic literacy (see the terms Bhonemic a$areness
and Bhonolo!ical a$areness). If not that" it may be an epiphenomenal aspect to
listenin! remo&ed from facetoface encounters" that is" te/tli%e listenin! (8& phone
and feature). It could be said that the unit of the phoneme is a necessary construct if
$e $ish to set a dynamic" comple/ spo%en lan!ua!e into static" $ritten form
e/pressed at a subsyllabic le&el" thou!h the model is a simplification and no $here
near phonolo!ically or phonetically complete. 0or a period durin! the DGK0s and
DGL0s" many !enerati&e phonolo!ists re6ected the notion of phoneme. 5o$e&er"
6
countless e/periments and obser&ations (many of $hich predate the !enerati&ists)
ha&e confirmed its psycholo!ical reality" and today" no mainstream lin!uist re6ects
the phoneme.
(estricted phonemes
A restricted phoneme is a phoneme that can only occur in a certain en&ironment and
has restrictions as to $here it can occur.
@W@" as in sing" can occur only at the end of a syllable or $ord" and can ne&er
occur at the be!innin! of a $ord.
Rnder some interpretations" /w/ and /j/ can occur only before a &o$el" and can
ne&er occur at the end of a syllable or $ord. 5o$e&er" many phonolo!ists
$ould ha&e no difficulty $ith interpretin! a $ord li%e boy as either [boi] or [boj]
($ith the ca&eat that the i in the first e/ample needs a diacritic to indicate it
is nonsyllabic).
@h@ can occur only at the be!innin! of a syllable or $ord" and can ne&er occur
at the end of a syllable or $ord.
Rnder some interpretations" in American accents $ith the cotcau!ht mer!er
/@ can occur only before @r@ and can ne&er occur else$here2 ho$e&er" /@ (or
a similar &o$el) appears before syllablefinal /l/ in some American dialects. In
these dialects" [V mi!ht better be interpreted as an allophone of another
&o$el" rather than as a separate phoneme.
In nonrhotic accents" @r@ can only occur before a &o$el or inter&ocalically"
and can ne&er occur at the end of a $ord or before a consonant.
"eutrali)ation* archiphoneme* underspecification
Bhonemes that are contrasti&e in certain en&ironments may not be contrasti&e in all
en&ironments. In the en&ironments $here they don-t contrast" the contrast is said to
be neutrali)ed. In En!lish there are three nasal phonemes" /m, n, /" as sho$n by the
minimal triplet"
@sm@ sum
@sn@ sun
@sW@ sung
5o$e&er" these sounds are not contrasti&e before plosi&es such as @p" t" %@. Althou!h
all three phones appear before plosi&es" for e/ample in limp. lint. link" only one of
these may appear before each of the plosi&es. #hat is" the @m" n" W@ distinction is
neutralized before each of the plosi&es @p" t" %@3
1nly UmV occurs before UpV"
only UnV before UtV" and
only UWV before U%V.
#hus these phonemes are not contrasti&e in these en&ironments" and accordin! to
some theorists" there is no e&idence as to $hat the underlyin! representation mi!ht
be. If $e hypothesi=e that $e are dealin! $ith only a sin!le underlyin! nasal" there is
no reason to pic% one of the three phonemes @m" n" W@ o&er the other t$o.
(In some lan!ua!es there is only one phonemic nasal any$here" and due to obli!atory
assimilation" it surfaces as Um" n" WV in 6ust these en&ironments" so this idea is not as
farfetched as it mi!ht seem at first !lance.)
7
In certain schools of phonolo!y" such a neutrali=ed distinction is %no$n as an
archiphoneme (Ci%olai #rubet=%oy of the Bra!ue school is often associated $ith this
analysis.). Archiphonemes are often notated $ith a capital letter. 0ollo$in! this
con&ention" the neutrali=ation of /m, n, / before /p, t, k/ could be notated as XCX" and
limp. lint. link $ould be represented as XlCp" lCt" lC%X. (#he XpipesX indicate
archiphonemic representation.) 1ther $ays this archiphoneme could be notated are
@mnW@" Ym" n" WZ" or @n[@.
Another e/ample from En!lish is the neutrali=ation of the plosi&es @%" !@ follo$in!
@s@. Bhonetically" the unaspirated tenuis plosi&e in sky is closer to En!lish @!@" $hich
is partially &oiceless in initial position" than to aspirated @%@. #his can be heard by
comparin! the sky $ith this guy2 also" in the speech of youn! children $ho are not yet
able to produce consonant clusters" they often pronounce sky as $hat sounds like /gai/
to adult ears. #hat is" @%@ and @!@ are constrasti&e $ord initially"
@%ai@ chi
@!ai@ guy
But not after an @s@"
@s%ai@
sky
@s!ai@
#hus one cannot say $hether the underlyin! representation of the plosi&e in sky is
@s%ai@ $ithout aspiration" or @s!ai@ $ithout &oicin!. #his neutrali=ation can instead
be represented as an archiphoneme X)X" in $hich case the underlyin! representation
of sky $ould be Xs)aiX.
Another $ay to tal% about archiphonemes in&ol&es the concept of underspecification.
Bhonemes can be considered fully specified se!ments $hile archiphonemes are
underspecified se!ments. In #u&an" phonemic &o$els are specified $ith the features
of ton!ue hei!ht" bac%ness" and lip roundin!. #he archiphoneme XRX is an
underspecified hi!h &o$el $here only the ton!ue hei!ht is specified.
phoneme#
archiphoneme
height bacness roundedness
@i@ hi!h front unrounded
@@ hi!h bac% unrounded
@u@ hi!h bac% rounded
XRX hi!h
<hether XRX is pronounced as front or bac% and $hether rounded or unrounded
depends on &o$el harmony. If XRX occurs follo$in! a front unrounded &o$el" it $ill
be pronounced as the phoneme /i/2 if follo$in! a bac% unrounded &o$el" it $ill be as
an /@2 and if follo$in! a bac% rounded &o$el" it $ill be an /u/. #his can been seen in
the follo$in! $ords3
XRmX -my- (the &o$el of this suffi/ is underspecified)
Xidi%RmX @idi%im@ -my boot- (@i@ is front \ unrounded)
X/arRmX @/arm@ -my sno$- (@a@ is bac% \ unrounded)
XnomRmX @nomum@ -my boo%- (@o@ is bac% \ rounded)
8
It should be noted that not all phonolo!ists use archiphonemes in their analyses" and
some do not accept the concept itself.
"on-phonemes
Brothesis" epenthesis and para!o!e due to phonotactics add sounds into $ords
$ithout addin! meanin!. Ce&ertheless" the sound is added" and thus the phoneme
status may be ambi!uous. 0or e/ample" 'panish prothetic e- must be added before
consonant clusters" e.!. estres.
Phonological extremes
1f all the sounds that a human &ocal tract can create" different lan!ua!es &ary
considerably in the number of these sounds that are considered to be distincti&e
phonemes in the speech of that lan!ua!e. Rby/ and some dialects of Ab%ha= ha&e
only t$o phonemic &o$els" and many Cati&e American lan!ua!es ha&e three. 1n other
e/treme" the Bantu lan!ua!e C!$e has fourteen &o$el 8ualities" t$el&e of $hich may
occur lon! or short" for t$entysi/ oral &o$els" plus si/ nasali=ed &o$els" lon! and
short" for thirtyei!ht &o$els2 $hile NO?P achie&es thirtyone pure &o$elsQnot
countin! &o$el len!th" $hich it also hasQby &aryin! the phonation. *oto%as has only
si/ consonants" $hile NO?P has some$here in the nei!hborhood of se&entyse&en" and
Rby/ ei!htyone. 0rench has no phonemic tone or stress" $hile se&eral of the Jam'ui
lan!ua!es ha&e nine tones" and one of the Jru lan!ua!es" <obe" has been claimed to
ha&e fourteen" thou!h this is disputed. #he total number of phonemes in lan!ua!es
&aries from as fe$ as ele&en in *oto%as to as many as DDH in NO?P (includin! four
tones). #hese may ran!e from familiar sounds li%e UtV" UsV" or UmV to &ery unusual ones
produced in e/traordinary $ays (see3 Clic% consonant" phonation" airstream
mechanism). #he En!lish lan!ua!e itself uses a rather lar!e set of thirteen to t$enty
t$o &o$els" includin! diphthon!s" thou!h its t$entyt$o to t$entysi/ consonants are
close to a&era!e. (#here are t$entyone consonant and fi&e &o$el letters in the
En!lish alphabet" but this does not correspond to the number of consonant and &o$el
sounds.)
#he most common &o$el system consists of the fi&e &o$els @i@" @e@" @a@" @o@" @u@.
#he most common consonants are @p@" @t@" @%@" @m@" @n@. A &ery fe$ lan!ua!es lac%
one of these3 standard 5a$ai]ian lac%s @t@" ,oha$% lac%s @p@ and @m@" 5upa lac%s
both @p@ and a simple @%@" collo8uial 'amoan lac%s @t@ and @n@" $hile *oto%as and
^uileute lac% @m@ and @n@. <hile most of these lan!ua!es ha&e &ery small
in&entories" ^uileute and 5upa ha&e 8uite comple/ consonant systems.
#he $ays that sounds are pronounced can &ary sli!htly from lan!ua!e to lan!ua!e
e&en if the same IBA symbol is used. 0or e/ample" the 0innish $ord maat (4countries4)
sounds different from the British En!lish (*ecei&ed Bronunciation) $ord mart e&en
thou!h both are transcribed as IBA [m3tVUDV2 the 'panish $ord sin (4$ithout4) has a
some$hat different &o$el from the American En!lish seen thou!h both are
transcribed as [sin].
+riting systems
In a phonemic $ritin! system" a !i&en symbol represents a sin!le phoneme and each
phoneme is represented by a sin!le symbol. #his may differ from a phonetic
ortho!raphy" $hich only re8uires that the spellin! be unambi!uously determined by
the pronunciation" and the pronunciation unambi!uously indicated by the spellin!.
En!lish spellin! is the classic e/ample of an nonphonemic" and indeed unphonetic"

spellin! system. <elsh and Irish are" by contrast" amon! the more predictable
ortho!raphies amon! lan!ua!es usin! the 7atin alphabet. In 0rench" rules to predict
pronunciation from spellin! are 8uite simple and ha&e fe$ e/ceptions" as lon! as
there are some clues such as conte/t or part of speech" but !uessin! spellin! from
pronunciation is 8uite difficult" especially because of the many silent letters. Italian"
'panish and especially 0innish ha&e a &ery close lettertophoneme correspondence.
Jarelian has a perfectly phonemic spellin! system" as it has no standard lan!ua!e" but
it has a complete spellin! system.
5o$e&er" the split bet$een phonemic and nonphonemic ortho!raphies is e/a!!erated.
All lan!ua!es are $ritten $ith con&entions that represent both meanin! and
pronunciation. #his is true at both ends of the scale3 Chinese characters are first and
foremost symbols of $ords" but they ha&e some phonetic information as $ell. At the
other e/treme" there are a fe$ ortho!raphies $hich are perfect phonemic
representations of an artificial national standard" but since they ma%e no effort to
represent &ariation in pronunciation $ithin the lan!ua!e" they too are con&entional.
1ther lan!ua!es fall some$here in bet$een. Althou!h En!lish is often !i&en as an
e/ample of an unphonetic ortho!raphy" its system is no$here near to bein! as purely
con&entional a system as Chinese $ritin! is. En!lish spellin! con&eys etymolo!ical
information" but also &ast amounts of phonetic information. 'panish is often !i&en as
an e/ample of a phonetic ortho!raphy" but it has numerous imperfections includin!
silent letters. It is" at least" possible to tell the correct pronunciation of any $ritten
'panish $ord. Another phonemic ortho!raphy is 'erbian. Its phonemicity $as
established by 'erbian 4<ebster4 (u% 'tefano&i_ Jarad`i_. 5e follo$ed a strict
phonemic principle" $hich is best told by his o$n $ords3 4<rite as you spea% and read
as it is $ritten.4. 5indi" a descendant of 'ans%rit" is an e/ample of phonetic lan!ua!e
$ritten $ith a non*oman Alphabet.
........................................................................
#he linguistic turn refers to a ma6or de&elopment in <estern philosophy durin! the
H0th century" the most important characteristic of $hich is the focusin! of
philosophy" and conse8uently also the other humanities" on lan!ua!e as constructin!
and reproducin! reality.
Its basic principles came primarily from the philosophical@lin!uistic $or% of 7ud$i!
<itt!enstein and 9ohn 7an!sha$ Austin at the be!innin! of the H0th century. #he
linguistic turn ho$e&er had a lon!er tradition" sei=in! an older line of lan!ua!e
philosophy $hich $as pursued by <ilhelm &on 5umboldt" 9ohann )ottfried 5erder and
Ernst Cassirer in the DGth and be!innin! of the H0th century.
In the DGL0s the humanities reco!ni=ed the importance of lan!ua!e as a structurin!
a!ent. #his shift is characteri=ed by re!ardin! reality not as somethin! pree/istin! but
instead as discursi&ely constructed. Bhilosophers and theorists associated $ith this
method include 9udith Butler" 7uce Iri!aray" 9ulia Jriste&a and 9ac8ues Aerrida. #he
linguistic turn is considered to be one of the main characteristics of postmodernism"
and also of last decades- analytic philosophy.
........................................................................
#he term formalist can ha&e many applications3
#he Chambers DGGE edition Aictionary indicates a pe6orati&e 8uality" 4a person
ha&in! an e/a!!erated re!ard to rules or established usa!es4.
1!
In the philosophy of mathematics a formalist is a person $ho belon!s to the
school of formalism" a certain mathematicalphilosophical doctrine $hich
includes for e/ample Aa&id 5ilbert. 'ee formal system.
#he term is often used !enerally in the Arts" but has become a familiar term in
modern poetry in particular. 0ormalist poets may be considered as the opposite
of -0ree (erse- poets" thou!h of course these are 6ust labels" and rarely sum up
matters satisfactorily. -0ormalism- in poetry represents an attachment to poetry
that reco!nises and uses schemes of rhyme and rhythm to create poetic effects
and to inno&ate. #o distin!ush it from archaic poetry the term -neoformalist- is
sometimes used.
In literary theory" the school of criticism of I.A. *ichards and his follo$ers has
sometimes been labelled -formalist-. 'ee also *ussian 0ormalism.
In film studies" formalism is a trait in filmma%in!" $hich o&ertly uses the
lan!ua!e of film" such as editin!" shot composition" camera mo&ement" set
desi!n" etc." so as to emphasise the artificiality of the film e/perience.
E/amples of formalist films may include %he )eventh )eal (DGFL)" /reathless
(DGFG) and 0oulin ouge1 (H00D).
........................................................................
Structuralism is a !eneral approach in &arious academic disciplines that e/plores
the interrelationships bet$een fundamental elements of some %ind" upon $hich
some hi!her mental" lin!uistic" social" cultural etc 4structures4 are built" throu!h
$hich then meanin! is produced $ithin a particular person" system" culture.
'tructuralism appeared in academic psycholo!y for the first time in the DGth century
and then reappeared in the second half of the H0th century" $hen it !re$ to become
one of the most popular approaches in the academic fields that are concerned $ith
analy=in! lan!ua!e" culture" and society. #he $or% of 0erdinand de 'aussure is
!enerally considered to be a startin! point of the H0th century structuralism. As $ith
any cultural mo&ement" the influences and de&elopments are comple/.
Structuralism in linguistics
0erdinand de 'aussure is the ori!inator of the H0th century reappearance of
structuralism" specifically in his DGDK boo% !ourse in 2eneral 3inguistics" $here he
focused not on the use of lan!ua!e (parole" or tal%)" but rather on the underlyin!
system of lan!ua!e (langue) and called his theory semiotics. #his approach focused on
e/aminin! ho$ the elements of lan!ua!e related to each other in the present" that is"
-synchronically- rather than -diachronically-. 0inally" he ar!ued that lin!uistic si!ns
$ere composed of t$o parts" a signifier (the sound pattern of a $ord" either in
mental pro6ection as $hen $e silently recite lines from a poem to oursel&es or in
actual" physical reali=ation as part of a speech act) and a signified (the concept or
meaning of the $ord). #his $as 8uite different from pre&ious approaches $hich
focused on the relationship bet$een $ords on the one hand and thin!s in the $orld
that they desi!nate" on the other.
'aussure-s !ourse influenced many lin!uists in the period bet$een <<I and <<II. In
America" for instance" 7eonard Bloomfield de&eloped his o$n &ersion of structural
lin!uistics" as did 7ouis 56elmsle& in 'candina&ia. In 0rance Antoine ,eillet and amile
Ben&eniste $ould continue 'aussure-s pro!ram. ,ost importantly" ho$e&er" members
of the Bra!ue 'chool of lin!uistics such as *oman 9a%obson and Ci%olai #rubet=%oy
conducted research that $ould be !reatly influential.
#he clearest and most important e/ample of Bra!ue 'chool structuralism lies in
phonemics. *ather than simply compile a list of $hich sounds occur in a lan!ua!e" the
11
Bra!ue 'chool sou!ht to e/amine ho$ they $ere related. #hey determined that the
in&entory of sounds in a lan!ua!e could be analy=ed in terms of a series of contrasts.
#hus in En!lish the $ords -pat- and -bat- are different because the @p@ and @b@ sounds
contrast. #he difference bet$een them is that the &ocal chords &ibrate $hile sayin!
a @b@ $hile they do not $hen sayin! a @p@. #hus in En!lish there is a contrast
bet$een &oiced and non&oiced consonants. Analy=in! sounds in terms of contrasti&e
features also opens up comparati&e scope it ma%es clear" for instance" that the
difficulty 9apanese spea%ers ha&e differentiatin! bet$een @r@ and @l@ in En!lish is due
to the fact that these t$o sounds are not contrasti&e in 9apanese. <hile this approach
is no$ standard in lin!uistics" it $as re&olutionary at the time. Bhonolo!y $ould
become the paradi!matic basis for structuralism in a number of different forms.
Structuralism in the Literary Theory and Literary Criticism
In literary theory structuralism is an approach to analysin! the narrati&e material by
e/aminin! the underlyin! in&ariant structure. 0or e/ample" a literary critic applyin! a
structuralist literary theory mi!ht say that the authors of the <est 'ide 'tory did not
$rite anythin! 4really4 new" because their $or% has the same structure as
'ha%espeare-s *omeo and 9uliet. In both te/ts a !irl and a boy fall in lo&e (a 4formula4
$ith a symbolic operator bet$een them $ould be 4Boy ,LOV' )irl4) despite the fact
that they belon! to t$o !roups that hate each other (4Boy-s )roup -LOV' )irl-s )roup4)
and conflict is resol&ed by their death. #he &ersatility of structuralism is such that a
literary critic could ma%e the same claim about a story of t$o friendly families (4Boy-s
0amily ,LOV' )irl-s 0amily4) that arran!e a marria!e bet$een their children despite
the fact that the children hate each other (4Boy -LOV' )irl4) and then the children
commit suicide to escape the arran!ed marria!e2 the 6ustification is that the second
story-s structure is an -in&ersion- of the first story-s structure3 the relationship bet$een
the &alues of lo&e and the t$o pairs of parties in&ol&ed ha&e been re&ersed.
'tructuralistic literary criticism ar!ues that the -no!elty !alue of a literary text- can
lie only in ne$ structure" rather than in the specifics of character de&elopment and
&oice in $hich that structure is e/pressed.
........................................................................
In mathematics" semantics" and philosophy of lan!ua!e" the Principle of
Compositionality is the principle that the meanin! of a comple/ e/pression is
determined by the meanin!s of its constituent e/pressions and the rules used to
combine them.
#he principle of compositionality states that in a meanin!ful sentence" if the le/ical
parts are ta%en out of the sentence" $hat remains $ill be the rules of composition.
#a%e" for e/ample" the sentence 4'ocrates $as a man4. 1nce the meanin!ful le/ical
items are ta%en a$ay 4'ocrates4 and 4man4 $hat is left is the pseudosentence" 4'
$as a ,4. #he tas% becomes a matter of describin! $hat the connection is bet$een '
and ,.
It is fre8uently ta%en to mean that e&ery operation of the synta/ should be associated
$ith an operation of the semantics that acts on the meanin!s of the constituents
combined by the syntactic operation. As a !uideline for constructin! semantic
theories" this is !enerally ta%en" as in the influential $or% on the philosophy of
lan!ua!e by Aonald Aa&idson" to mean that e&ery construct of the synta/ should be
associated by a clause of the #schema $ith an operator in the semantics that
specifies ho$ the meanin! of the $hole e/pression is built from constituents
combined by the syntactic rule. In some !eneral mathematical theories (especially
those in the tradition of ,onta!ue !rammar) this !uideline is ta%en to mean that the
12
interpretation of a lan!ua!e is essentially !i&en by a homomorphism bet$een an
al!ebra of syntactic representations and an al!ebra of semantic ob6ects.
#his principle is sometimes called Frege.s Principle" because 0re!e is $idely credited
for the first formulation of it. #his claim has also been disputed.
#he Brinciple of Compositionality also e/ists in a similar form in the denotational
semantics of pro!rammin! lan!ua!es.
Criti/ues
#he principle of compositionality has been the sub6ect of intense debate. Indeed"
there is no !eneral a!reement as to ho$ the principle is to be interpreted" althou!h
there ha&e been se&eral attempts to pro&ide formal definitions of it.
'cholars are also di&ided as to $hether the principle should be re!arded as a factual
claim" open to empirical testin!2 an analytic truth" ob&ious from the nature of
lan!ua!e and meanin!2 or a methodolo!ical principle to !uide the de&elopment of
theories of synta/ and semantics. #he principle has been attac%ed in all three
spheres" althou!h so far none of the criticisms brou!ht a!ainst it ha&e been !enerally
re!arded as compellin!. ,ost proponents of the principle" ho$e&er" ma%e certain
e/ceptions for idiomatic e/pressions in natural lan!ua!e.
0urther" in the conte/t of the philosophy of lan!ua!e" the principle of
compositionality does not e/plain all of meanin!. 0or e/ample" you cannot infer
sarcasm purely on the basis of $ords and their composition" yet a phrase used
sarcastically means somethin! completely different from the same phrase uttered
seriously. #he principle of compositionality" then" has to be re&ised to ta%e into
account lin!uistic and e/tralin!uistic conte/t" $hich includes the tone of &oice used"
common !round bet$een the spea%ers" the intentions of the spea%er" and so on.
........................................................................
In lin!uistics" a uni!ersal is a statement $hich applies to all lan!ua!es.
000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
Philosophical realism refers to &arious philosophically unrelated positions" in
some cases diametrically opposed ones" $hich are termed 4realism.4 In lar!e measure
this depends on $hich debates are acti&e at the time" and may be encoura!ed by the
fact that a philosophical position often loo%s stron!er if one attaches the $ord 4real4
to it.
#he oldest use of the term comes from ,edie&al interpretations of )ree% philosophy.
5ere 4realism4 is contrasted $ith 4conceptualism4 and 4nominalism4. #his can be called
4realism about uni&ersals.4 Rni&ersals are terms or properties that can be applied to
many thin!s" rather than denotin! a sin!le specific indi&idualfor e/ample" red"
beauty" fi&e" or do!" as opposed to 'ocrates or Athens. *ealism holds that these
uni&ersals really e/ist" independently and someho$ prior to the $orld2 it is associated
$ith Blato. Conceptualism holds that they e/ist" but only insofar as they are
instantiated in specific thin!s2 they do not e/ist separately. Cominalism holds that
uni&ersals do not 4e/ist4 at all2 they are no more than $ords $e use to describe
specific ob6ects" they do not name anythin!. #his particular dispute o&er realism is
lar!ely moot in contemporary philosophy" and has been for centuries.
13
In another sense realism is contrasted $ith both idealism and materialism and
considered synonymous $ith weak dualism. In still a third" and &ery contemporary
sense realism is contrasted $ith anti-realism" primarily in the philosophy of science.
Both these disputes are often carried out relati&e to some specific area3 one mi!ht"
for e/ample" be a realist about physical matter but an antirealist about ethics. #he
hi!h necessity of specifyin! the area in $hich the claim is made has been increasin!ly
ac%no$led!ed in recent years.
Increasin!ly these last disputes" too" are re6ected as misleadin!" and some
philosophers prefer to call the %ind of realism espoused there 4metaphysical realism"4
and esche$ the $hole debate in fa&our of simple 4naturalism4 or 4natural realism4"
$hich is not so much a theory as the position that these debates are illconcei&ed if
not incoherent" and that there is no more to decidin! $hat is really real than simply
ta%in! our $ords at face &alue.
"ominalism is the position in metaphysics that there e/ist no uni&ersals outside of
the mind.
Cominalism is best understood in contrast to realism. Bhilosophical realism holds that
$hen $e use descripti&e terms such as 4!reen4 or 4tree"4 the 0orms of those concepts
really e/ist" independently of $orld in an abstract realm. 'uch thou!ht is associated
$ith Blato. Cominalism" by contrast" holds that ideas represented by $ords ha&e no
real e/istence beyond our ima!inations.
........................................................................
The Problem of 1ni!ersals
Cominalism arose in reaction to the problem of uni&ersals. 'pecifically" accountin! for
the fact that some thin!s are of the same type. 0or e/ample" 0luffy and Jit=ler are
both cats" or" the fact that certain properties are repeatable" such as3 the !rass" the
shirt" and Jermit the 0ro! are !reen. 1ne $ants to %no$ in &irtue of what ma%es
0luffy and Jit=ler both cats and what ma%es the !rass" the shirt" and Jermit !reen.
#he realist ans$er is that all the !reen thin!s are !reen in &irtue of the e/istence of a
uni&ersal2 a sin!le abstract thin!" in this case" that is a part of all the !reen thin!s.
<ith respect to the colour of the !rass" the shirt and Jermit" one of their parts is
identical. In this respect" the three parts are literally one. )reenness is repeatable
because there is one thin! that manifests itself $here&er there are !reen thin!s.
Cominalism denies the e/istence of uni&ersals. #he moti&ation to deny uni&ersals
flo$s from se&eral concerns. #he first one concerns $here they e/ist. Blato famously
held that there is a realm of abstract forms or uni&ersals apart from the physical
$orld. Barticular physical ob6ects merely e/emplify or instantiate the uni&ersal. But
this raises the 8uestion3 <here is this uni&ersal realmb 1ne possibilty is that it is
outside of space and time. 5o$e&er" some assert that nothin! is outside of space and
time. #o complicate thin!s" $hat is the nature of the instantiation or e/emplification
relationb
,oderate realists hold that there is no realm in $hich uni&ersals e/ist" but rather
uni&ersals are located in space and time $here&er they are manifest. Co$" recall that
a uni&ersal" li%e !reenness" is supposed to be a sin!le thin!. Cominalists consider it
unusual that there could be a sin!le thin! that e/ists in multiple places
simultaneously. #he realist maintains that all the instances of !reenness are held
to!ether by the e/emplification relation" but this relation cannot be e/plained.
14
0inally" many philosophers prefer simpler ontolo!ies populated $ith only the bare
minimum of types of entities" or as <. (. ^uine said 4#hey ha&e a taste for -desert
landscapes-4. #hey attempt to e/press e&erythin! that they $ant to e/plain $ithout
usin! uni&ersals such as 4catness4 or 4chairness4.
Varieties of "ominalism
#here are &arious forms of nominalism ran!in! from e/treme to almostrealist. 1ne
e/treme is 4predicate4 nominalism. 0luffy and Jit=ler are both cats simply because the
predicate -cat- applies to both of them. 5o$e&er" the realist $ill ob6ect as to $hat the
predicate applies to.
*esemblance nominalists belie&e that -cat- applies to both cats because 0luffy and
Jit=ler resemble an e/emplar cat closely enou!h to be classed to!ether $ith it as
members of its %ind" or that they differ from each other (and other cats) 8uite less
than they differ from other thin!s" and this $arrants classin! them to!ether. 'ome
resemblance nominalists $ill concede that the resemblance relation is itself a
uni&ersal" but is the only uni&ersal necessary. #his betrays the spirit of nominalism.
1thers ar!ue that each resemblance relation is a particular" and is a resemblance
relation simply in &irtue of its resemblance to other resemblance relations. #his
!enerates an infinite re!ress" but many a!ree that it is not &icious.
Another form of nominalist is one that attempts to build a theory of resemblance
nominalism on a theory of tropes. A trope is a particular instance of a property" li%e
the specific !reenness of a shirt. 1ne mi!ht ar!ue that there is a primiti&e" ob6ecti&e
resemblance relation that holds amon! li%e tropes. Another route is to ar!ue that all
apparent tropes are constructed out of more primiti&e tropes and that the most
primiti&e tropes are the entities of complete physics. Brimiti&e trope resemblance
may thus be accounted for in terms of causal indiscernibility. #$o tropes are e/actly
resemblin! if substitutin! one for the other $ould ma%e no difference to the e&ents in
$hich they are ta%in! part. (aryin! de!rees of resemblance at the macro le&el can be
e/plained by &aryin! de!rees of resemblance at the micro le&el" and microle&el
resemblance is e/plained in terms of somethin! no less robustly physical than causal
po$er. Armstron!" perhaps the most prominent contemporary realist" ar!ues that
such a tropebased &ariant of nominalism has promise" but holds that it is unable to
account for the la$s of nature in the $ay his theory of uni&ersals can.
Ian 5ac%in! has also ar!ued that much of $hat is called social constructionism of
science in contemporary times is actually moti&ated by an unstated nominalist
metaphysical &ie$. 0or this reason" he claims" scientists and constructionists tend to
4shout past each other.4
'tron! proponents of this school of thou!ht include 9ohn 7oc%e and )eor!e Ber%eley.
........................................................................
The problem of uni!ersals is a phrase used to refer to a nest of intert$ined
problems about uni&ersals $ithin co!niti&e psycholo!y" epistemolo!y" and ontolo!y.
&ncient times
#he debate may ha&e be!un $ith 5eraclitus" $ho said that 4$e ne&er step t$ice into
the same ri&er.4 In the time it ta%es us to mo&e our rear foot for$ard for that second
15
step" $ater has continued to rush for$ard" the ban%s ha&e shifted a bit" and the ri&er
is no lon!er the same.
5eraclitus is often interpreted as su!!estin! a s%eptical conclusion from this
obser&ation. 'ince nothin! e&er stays the same from moment to moment" any
%no$led!e $e may thin% $e ha&e is obsolete before $e ac8uire it. 5e mi!ht also ha&e
been su!!estin! that names are an artificial $ay to impose stability on the flu/ of
reality by callin! this a 4ri&er4 I pretend that it is one entity. #his $ould ma%e of
him the first nominalist.
,uch in the philosophy of Blato may be understood as an ans$er to 5eraclitus"
especially to the s%eptical implications of his $ritin!s. 0or Blato" our intellect can
contemplate the same ri&er any number of times" for ri&er as an idea" as a form"
remains al$ays the same. #here is a sharp distinction bet$een the $orld of the
senses and the $orld of the intellect3 one can only ha&e opinions about the former"
but one can ha&e %no$led!e" 6ustified true belief" about the latter. 0or 6ust that
reason" the intelli!ible $orld is the real $orld" the sensible $orld is only pro&isionally
real" li%e the shado$s on the $all of a ca&e.
It must be noted that the Blatonic notion of timeless ideas" or forms" isn-t confined to
uni&ersals. Barticular terms" too" can be understood as the name of an intelli!ible
form. 'o althou!h ri&er is a form" ,eander is also a form" and 4the ,eander as it $as
at noon last 0riday4 is a form. E&en the concept 45eraclitean flu/4 is a form" and as
such flu/lessly timelessN #here are parado/es aplenty here" and Blato himself
e/plored them in a da==lin!ly dialectical dialo!ue" Barmenides.
But at least part of $hat Blato meant to con&ey is that *i&er" as a uni&ersal" is a
timeless idea in $hich the mutable ri&ers partially participate" as the material $orld
is an imperfect mirror of the really real $orld. Blato" accordin!ly" $as the first
realist.
5is student" Aristotle" disa!reed $ith both Blato and 5eraclitus. Aristotle transformed
Blato-s forms into 4formal causes"4 the blueprints implicit in material thin!s. <here
Blato ideali=ed !eometry" Aristotle practiced biolo!y" and his thin%in! al$ays returns
to li&in! bein!s.
Consider an oa% tree. #his is a member of a species" and it has much in common $ith
all the oa% trees of !enerations past" and all those that shall come. Its uni&ersal" its
oa%ness" is a part of it. Accordin!ly" Aristotle $as much more san!uine than either
5eraclitus or Blato about comin! to %no$ the sensible $orld. A biolo!ist can study oa%
trees and learn about oa%ness" findin! the intelli!ible order $ithin the sensible $orld.
'uch &ie$s made Aristotle a realist as to uni&ersals" but a ne$ sort of realist. 'ome
mi!ht call this &ie$ moderate realism.
2edie!al times
#he most $idely published nonreli!ious te/t in the early middle a!es $as Bocthius-s
Consolation of Bhilosophy. #hrou!h it and his translations of Aristotle" Bocthius $as
able to preser&e the memory and philosophy of Aristotle for Christendom.
,ost authorities a!ree" thou!h" that Islamic scholars preser&ed the tradition of
Aristotelian scholarship in much more depth than that of Christendom. By the
thirteenth century the on!oin! 4recon8uest4 of 'pain had the unintended conse8uence
of brin!in! bac% into the consciousness of the 7atin literate $orld the riches of
ancient )ree% philosophy" as found in the libraries of #oledo.
16
#homas A8uinas made it his personal mission to reconcile Aristotle-s philosophy $ith
*oman Catholic faith. As part of this tas%" in ,e 'nte et 'ssentia he restated
Aristotle-s &ie$s on essence" or uni&ersals.
4#his nature4 he said" meanin! a uni&ersal" 4has a dual bein!3 one in sin!ular thin!s"
another in the soul" and both dra$ accidents to that nature 6ust mentioned. In
sin!ular thin!s it has" after all" a multiple bein! throu!h the di&ersity of those sin!ular
thin!s. But ne&ertheless is the bein! of those thin!s not compulsi&e for that nature"
accordin! to its first consideration" namely the absolute.4
In other $ords" oa%ness e/ists in the particular trees" as $ell as in the soul of the
biolo!ist studyin! them. #he 4bein! in the thin!s is not compulsi&e4 in that the form
itself" oa%ness" doesn-t chan!e thou!h particular oa%s die.
As the middle a!es $aned and the *enaissance approached" European intellectuals
s$itched their alle!iances to nominalism. #he ne$ 5eraclitus of this period $as
<illiam of 1c%ham. 4I maintain4 he $rote" 4that a uni&ersal is not somethin! real that
e/ists in a sub6ect ... but that it has a bein! only as a thou!htob6ect in the mind
Uob6ecti&um in animaV.4 As a !eneral rule" 1c%ham disbelie&ed in any entities that
$ere not necessary for e/planations. Accordin!ly" he $rote" there is no reason to
belie&e that there is an entity called 4humanity4 that resides inside 'ocrates. Cothin!
is e/plained by that. #his method of proceedin! has since come to be called 1c%ham-s
ra=or" and it has had a career outside of the problem of uni&ersals.
2odern times
)eor!e Ber%eley" best %no$n for his immaterialism" $as also an ad&ocate of an
e/treme nominalism. Indeed" he disbelie&ed e&en in the possibility of a !eneral
thou!ht as a psycholo!ical fact. It is impossible to ima!ine a man" unless one has in
mind a &ery specific picture of one $ho is either tall or short" European or Asian"
blueeyed or bro$neyed" etc. <hen one thin%s of a trian!le" li%e$ise" it is al$ays
obtuse" or ri!htan!led" or acute. #here is no mental ima!e of a trian!le in !eneral.
Cot only" then" do !eneral terms fail to correspond to e/tramental realities" they
don-t correspond to thou!hts either.
Ber%eleyan nominalism contributed to the same thin%er-s criti8ue on the possibility of
matter. In the climate of En!lish thou!ht in the period follo$in! Isaac Ce$ton-s !reat
contributions to physics" there $as much discussion of a distinction bet$een 4primary
8ualities4 and 4secondary 8ualities4. #he primary 8ualities $ere supposed to be true of
material ob6ects in themsel&es (si=e" position" momentum) $hereas the secondary
8ualities $ere supposed to be more sub6ecti&e (color and sound). But on Ber%eley-s
&ie$" 6ust as it is meanin!less to spea% of trian!ularity in !eneral aside from specific
fi!ures" so it is meanin!less to spea% of mass in motion $ithout %no$in! the color. If
the color is in the eye of the beholder" so is the mass.
9ohn 'tuart ,ill discussed the problem of uni&ersals in the course of a boo% that
e&iscerated the philosophy of 'ir <illiam 5amilton. ,ill $rote" 4#he formation of a
Concept does not consist in separatin! the attributes $hich are said to compose it
from all other attributes of the same ob6ect" and enablin! us to concei&e those
attributes" dis6oined from any others. <e neither concei&e them" nor thin% them" nor
co!ni=e them in any $ay" as a thin! apart" but solely as formin!" in combination $ith
numerous other attributes" the idea of an indi&idual ob6ect.4
At this point in his discussion he seems to be sidin! $ith Ber%eley. But he proceeds to
concede under some &erbal camoufla!e" that Ber%eley-s position is impossible" and
that e&ery human mind performs the tric% Ber%eley thou!ht impossible.
17
4But" thou!h meanin! them only as part of a lar!er a!!lomeration" $e ha&e the po$er
of fi/in! our attention on them" to the ne!lect of the other attributes $ith $hich $e
thin% them combined. <hile the concentration of attention lasts" if it is sufficiently
intense" $e may be temporarily unconscious of any of the other attributes" and may
really" for a brief inter&al" ha&e nothin! present to our mind but the attributes
constituent of the concept.4
In other $ords" $e may be 4temporarily unconscious4 of $hether an ima!e is $hite"
blac%" or yello$ and concentrate our attention on the fact that it is a man. It may"
then" ha&e the si!nificance of a uni&ersal of manhood.
#he DGth century American lo!ician Charles Beirce 8uite appropriately de&eloped his
o$n &ie$s on the problem of uni&ersals in the course of a re&ie$ of an edition of the
$ritin!s of )eor!e Ber%eley. Beirce be!ins $ith the obser&ation that 4Ber%eley-s
metaphysical theories ha&e at first si!ht an air of parado/ and le&ity &ery unbecomin!
to a bishop.4 5e includes amon! these parado/ical doctrines Ber%eley-s denial of 4the
possibility of formin! the simplest !eneral conception.4
Beirce responded to this parado/ in the $ay that one mi!ht e/pect from a man %no$n
as the father of pra!matism. 5e $rote that if there is some mental fact that $or%s in
practice the $ay that a uni&ersal $ould" that fact is a uni&ersal. 4If I ha&e learned a
formula in !ibberish $hich in any $ay 6obs my memory so as to enable me in each
sin!le case to act as thou!h I had a !eneral idea" $hat possible utility is there in
distin!uishin! bet$een such a !ibberish ... and an ideab4
Beirce also held as a matter of ontolo!y that $hat he called 4thirdness"4 the more
!eneral facts about the $orld" are e/tramental realities.
<illiam 9ames learned pra!matism" this $ay of understandin! an idea by its practical
effects" from his friend Beirce" but he !a&e it ne$ si!nificance. (#oo ne$ for Beirce-s
taste he came to complain that 9ames had 4%idnapped4 the term" and to call
himself a 4pra!maticist4 instead.)
Althou!h 9ames certainly a!reed $ith Beirce and a!ainst Ber%eley that !eneral ideas
e/ist as a psycholo!ical fact" he $as a nominalist in his ontolo!y. 40rom e&ery point of
&ie$"4 he $rote" 4the o&er$helmin! and portentous character ascribed to uni&ersal
conceptions is surprisin!. <hy" from Blato and Aristotle" philosophers should ha&e
&ied $ith each other in scorn of the %no$led!e of the particular" and in adoration of
that of the !eneral" is hard to understand" seein! that the more adorable %no$led!e
ou!ht to be that of the more adorable thin!s" and that the thin!s of $orth are all
concretes and sin!ulars. #he only &alue of uni&ersal characters is that they help us" by
reasonin!" to %no$ ne$ truths about indi&idual thin!s.4
Three contemporary realists
#here are at least three $ays in $hich a realist mi!ht try to ans$er 9ames- challen!e
of e/plainin! the reason why uni&ersal conceptions are more lofty than those of
particulars there is the moral@political ans$er" the mathematical@scientific ans$er"
and the antiparado/ical ans$er. Each has contemporary or near contemporary
ad&ocates.
In DGE8 *ichard ,. <ea&er" a conser&ati&e political philosopher" $rote 5deas Have
!onse6uences" a boo% in $hich he dia!nosed $hat he belie&ed had !one $ron! $ith
the modern $orld" leadin! indeed to the t$o $orld $ars that dominated the first half
of the H0th century. #he problem $as" in his $ords" 4the fateful doctrine of
nominalism.4
18
<estern ci&ili=ation" <ea&er $rote" succumbed to a po$erful temptation in the DEth
century" the time of <illiam of 1c%ham" and has paid dearly for it since. 4#he defeat
of lo!ical realism in the !reat medie&al debate $as the crucial e&ent in the history of
<estern culture2 from this flo$ed those acts $hich issue no$ in modern decadence.4
*o!er Benrose contends that the foundations of mathematics can-t be understood
absent the Blatonic &ie$ that 4mathematical truth is absolute" e/ternal" and eternal"
and not based on manmade criteria ... mathematical ob6ects ha&e a timeless
e/istence of their o$n....4
Cino Cocchiarella" professor emeritus of philosophy at Indiana Rni&ersity" has
maintained that realism is the best response to certain lo!ical parado/es to $hich
nominalism leads. #his is the ar!ument" for e/ample" of his paper 47o!ical Atomism"
Cominalism" and ,odal 7o!ic"4 'ynthese (9une DGLF). Cote that in a sense Brofessor
Cocchiarella has adopted platonism for antiplatonic reasons. Blato" as one sees in the
dialo!ue Barmenides" $as $illin! to accept a certain amount of parado/ $ith his
forms. Cocchiarella adopts the forms to a&oid parado/.
........................................................................
A meaning is a set of thou!hts that people ta%e symbols to ha&e. ,eanin!s can do
many thin!s" such as pro&o%e a certain idea" or denote a certain real$orld entity.
,eanin!s can be linguistic and non-linguistic. 7in!uistic meanin! is any meanin! that
$ords and other items of lan!ua!e ha&e. Conlin!uistic meanin! is $hate&er meanin!
can be con&eyed $ithout the use of lan!ua!e.
,eanin!s can be presented throu!h &arious different mediums" or &ehicles of
communication. #he %ind of medium that is used determines $hether or not a
meanin! is linguistic or non-linguistic. #he ne$spaper" or the &ocal cords" are
mediums for 4lin!uistic meanin!4. By contrast" body lan!ua!e is an e/ample of a
medium for the display of nonlin!uistic meanin!s" such as the 4thumbs up4 in <estern
cultures.
,eanin! as a $hole is studied in philosophy and semiotics" and especially in
philosophy of lan!ua!e" philosophy of mind" and lo!ic" and communication theory.
0ields li%e sociolin!uistics tend to be more interested in nonlin!uistic meanin!s.
7in!uistics lends itself to the study of lin!uistic meanin! in the fields of semantics
($hich studies con&entional meanin!s) and pra!matics (studies in ho$ lan!ua!e is
used by indi&iduals). 7iterary theory" critical theory" and some branches of
psychoanalysis are also in&ol&ed in the discussion of meanin!. 5o$e&er" this di&ision
of labor is not absolute" and each field depends to some e/tent upon the others.
^uestions about ho$ $ords and other symbols mean anythin!" and $hat it means to
somethin! is meanin!ful" are pi&otal to an understandin! of lan!ua!e and human
e/perience.
Philosophical approaches
Bhilosophy is a lin!uistic acti&ity. ,any philosophers includin! Blato" Au!ustine"
)ottlob 0re!e" 7ud$i! <itt!enstein" 9. 7. Austin" 9ohn 'earle" 9ac8ues Aerrida" <.(.
^uine ha&e concerned themsel&es $ith the problem of meanin!.
1
3ottlob Frege
,odern philosophy of lan!ua!e be!an $ith the discussion of sense and reference in
)ottlob 0re!e-s essay 7ber )inn und /edeutung (no$ usually translated as -n )ense
and eference). 0re!e noted that proper names present se&eral problems $ith
respect to meanin!. 'uppose" as one mi!ht casually say" the meanin! of a name is the
thin! it refers to. )am" then" means 'am. But $hat if the ob6ect referred to by the
name does not e/istb Is Pegasus" then" meanin!lessb Clearly not. #here may also be
t$o different names that refer to the same ob6ect3 Hesperus and Phosphorus" for
e/ample" $hich $ere both once used to refer to the planet (enus. If the $ords mean
the same" then substitutin! one for the other in a sentence $ill not result in a
sentence that differs in meanin! form the ori!inal. But in that case 45esperus is
Bhosphorus4 means the same as 45esperus is 5esperus.4 #his is clearly absurd" since
you mi!ht learn somethin! ne$ by the former" but not by the latter.
0re!e can be interpreted as ar!uin! that it $as therefore a mista%e to thin% that the
meanin! of a name is the thin! it refers to. Instead" the meanin! must be somethin!
elseQthe 4sense4 of the $ord. #$o names for the same person" then" can ha&e
different senses. Alternati&ely" the meanin! of a name has t$o components3 the sense
and the reference. Each sense $ill pic% out a uni8ue referent" but one referent mi!ht
be pic%ed out by more than one sense. 0re!e ar!ued that" ultimately" the same
bifurcation of meanin! must apply to most or all lin!uistic cate!ories. Ironically
enou!h" it is no$ accepted by many philosophers as applyin! to all e/pressions but
proper names.
Saul 4ripe
'aul Jrip%e e/amined the relation bet$een sense and reference in dealin! $ith
possible and actual situations. 5e sho$ed that one conse8uence of his interpretation
of certain systems of modal lo!ic $as that the reference of a proper name is
necessarily lin%ed to its referent" but that the sense is not. 'o for instance 45esperus4
necessarily refers to 5esperus" e&en in those ima!inary cases and $orlds in $hich
perhaps 5esperus is not the e&enin! star. #hat is" 5esperus is necessarily 5esperus"
but only contin!ently the mornin! star.
#his results in the curious situation that part of the meanin! of a name that it refers
to some particular thin! is a necessary fact about that name" but another part that
it is used in some particular $ay or situation is not.
Jrip%e also dre$ the distinction bet$een spea%er-s meanin! and semantic meanin!"
elaboratin! on the $or% of ordinary lan!ua!e philosophers Baul )rice and Jeith
Aonnollan. #he spea%er-s meanin! is $hat the spea%er intends to refer to by sayin!
somethin!2 the semantic meanin! is $hat the $ords uttered by the spea%er mean
accordin! to the lan!ua!e.
In some cases" people do not say $hat they mean2 in other cases" they say somethin!
that is in error. In both these cases" the spea%er-s meanin! and the semantic meanin!
seem to be different. 'ometimes $ords do not actually e/press $hat the spea%er
$ants them to e/press2 so $ords $ill mean one thin!" and $hat people intend to
con&ey by them mi!ht mean another. #he meanin! of the e/pression" in such cases" is
ambi!uous.
2eaning as use
2!
#hrou!hout the H0th Century En!lish philosophy focused closely on analysis of
lan!ua!e. #his style of analytic philosophy became &ery influential and led to the
de&elopment of a $ide ran!e of philosophical tools.
9. 7. Austin ar!ued a!ainst fi/atin! on the meanin! of $ords. 5e sho$ed that
dictionary definitions are of limited philosophical use" since there is no simple
4appenda!e4 to a $ord that can be called its meanin!. Instead" he sho$ed ho$ to
focus on the $ay in $hich $ords are used in order to do thin!s. 5e analysed the
structure of utterances into three distinct parts3 locutions" illocutions and
perlocutions. 5is pupil 9ohn 'earle de&eloped the idea under the label 4speech acts4.
#heir $or% !reatly influenced pra!matics.
At around the same time 7ud$i! <itt!enstein $as rethin%in! his approach to
lan!ua!e. In his #ractatus 7o!icoBhilosophicus he had supported the idea of an ideal
lan!ua!e built up from atomic statements usin! lo!ical connecti&es. *eflections on
the comple/ity of lan!ua!e led to a more e/pansi&e approach to meanin! in his
Bhilosophical In&esti!ations. 5is approach is often summarised by the aphorism 4the
meanin! of a $ord is its use in a lan!ua!e4.
In the DGK0s" Aa&id 7e$is published another thesis of meanin! as use" as he described
meanin! as a feature of a social con&ention (see also con&ention (philosophy) and
con&entions as re!ularities of a specific sort. 7e$is- $or% $as an application of !ame
theory in philosophical matters. Con&entions" he ar!ued" are a species of coordination
e8uilibria (see also Cash e8uilibrium).
Translation
<.(. ^uine ar!ued for the indeterminacy of translation2 that is" that it is in principle
not possible to be absolutely certain of the meanin! that a spea%er attaches to an
utterance. All that can be done is to e/amine the utterance as a part of the o&erall
beha&iour of the indi&idual" and to use these obser&ations to interpret the meanin! of
any utterances. 0or ^uine" as for <itt!enstein and Austin" meanin! is not somethin!
that is associated $ith a $ord or sentence" but is one aspect of the o&erall beha&iour
and culture of the spea%er.
^uine-s intellectual disciple" Aonald Aa&idson" sou!ht to find the meanin! of an
utterance in its truthconditions. 5e proposed translatin! the sentences of a natural
lan!ua!e such as En!lish into firstorder predicate calculus" and usin! the #ruth
conditional semantics thus obtained as the definiti&e meanin! of the utterance.
Linguistic approaches
7in!uistic strin!s can be made up of phenomena li%e $ords" phrases" and sentences"
and each seems to ha&e a different %ind of meanin!. Indi&idual $ords all by
themsel&es" such as the $ord 4bachelor"4 ha&e one %ind of meanin!" because they only
seem to refer to some abstract concept. Bhrases" such as 4the bri!htest star in the
s%y4" seem to be different from indi&idual $ords" because they are comple/ symbols
arran!ed into some order. #here is also the meanin! of $hole sentences" such as
4Barry is a bachelor4" $hich is both a comple/ $hole" and seems to e/press a
statement that mi!ht be true or false.
In lin!uistics the fields most closely associated $ith meanin! are semantics and
pra!matics. 'emantics deals most directly $ith $hat $ords or phrases mean" and
pra!matics deals $ith ho$ the en&ironment chan!es the meanin!s of $ords. 'ynta/
and morpholo!y also ha&e a profound effect on meanin!. #he synta/ of a lan!ua!e
allo$s a !ood deal of information to be con&eyed e&en $hen the specific $ords used
21
are not %no$n to the listener" and a lan!ua!e-s morpholo!y can allo$ a listener to
unco&er the meanin! of a $ord by e/aminin! the morphemes that ma%e it up.
Semantics
#he field of semantics e/amines the $ays in $hich $ords" phrases" and sentences can
ha&e meanin!. 'emantics usually di&ides $ords into their sense and reference. #he
reference of a $ord is the thin! it refers to3 in the sentence 4)i&e the !uy sittin! ne/t
to you a turn4" the guy refers to a specific person" in this case the male one sittin!
ne/t to you. #his person is the phrase-s reference. #he sense" on the other hand" is
that part of the e/pression that helps us to determine the thin! it refers to. In the
e/ample abo&e" the sense is e&ery piece of information that helps to determine that
the e/pression is referrin! to the male human sittin! ne/t to you and not any other
ob6ect. #his includes any lin!uistic information as $ell as situational conte/t"
en&ironmental details" and so on. #his" ho$e&er" only $or%s for nouns and noun
phrases.
#here are at least four different %inds of sentences. 'ome of them are truthsensiti&e"
$hich are called indicati&e sentences. 5o$e&er" other %inds of sentences are not
truthsensiti&e. #hey include e/pressi&e sentences" li%e 41uchN42 performati&e
sentences" such as 4I damn theeN42 and commandati&e sentences" such as 4)et the
mil% from the frid!e4. #his aspect of meanin! is called the !rammatical mood.
Amon! $ords and phrases" different parts of speech can be distin!uished" such as
noun phrases and ad6ecti&al phrases. Each of these ha&e different %inds of meanin!2
nouns typically refer to entities" $hile ad6ecti&es typically refer to properties. Broper
names" $hich are names that stand for indi&iduals" li%e 49erry4" 4Barry4" 4Baris"4 and
4(enus"4 are !oin! to ha&e another %ind of meanin!.
<hen dealin! $ith &erb phrases" one approach to disco&erin! the $ay the phrase
means is by loo%in! at the thematic roles the child noun phrases ta%e on. (erbs do not
point to thin!s" but rather to the relationship bet$een one or more nouns and some
confi!uration or reconfi!uration therein" so the meanin! of a &erb phrase can be
deri&ed from the meanin! of its child noun phrases and the relationship bet$een
them and the &erb.
Semiotics
0erdinand de 'aussure described lan!ua!e in terms of signs" $hich he in turn di&ided
into signifieds and signifiers. #he si!nifier is the sound of the lin!uistic ob6ect (li%e
'ocrates" 'aussure didn-t much concern himself $ith the $ritten $ord). #he si!nified"
on the other hand" is the mental construction or ima!e associated $ith the sound.
#he si!n" then" is essentially the relationship bet$een the t$o.
'i!ns themsel&es e/ist only in opposition to other si!ns" $hich means that bat has
meanin! only because it is not cat or rat or hat. #his is because si!ns are essentially
arbitrary" as any forei!n lan!ua!e student is $ell a$are3 there is no reason that bat
couldn-t mean 4that bust of Capoleon o&er there4 or 4this body of $ater4. 'ince the
choice of si!nifiers is ultimately arbitrary" the meanin! cannot someho$ be in the
si!nifier. 'aussure instead defers meanin! to the si!n itself3 meanin! is ultimately the
same thin! as the si!n" and meaning means that relationship bet$een si!nified and
si!nifier. #his" in turn" means that all meanin! is both $ithin us and communal. 'i!ns
mean by reference to our internal le/icon and !rammar" and despite their bein! a
matter of con&ention" that is" a public thin!" si!ns can only mean to the indi&idual
$hat red means to one person may not be $hat red means to another. 5o$e&er"
$hile meanin!s may &ary to some e/tent from indi&idual to indi&idual" only those
22
meanin!s $hich stay $ithin a boundary are seen by other spea%ers of the lan!ua!e to
refer to reality3 if one $ere to refer to smells as red" most other spea%ers $ould
assume the person is tal%in! nonsense (althou!h statements li%e this are common
amon! synaesthetics).
Pragmatics
Bra!matics studies the $ays that conte/t affects meanin!. #he t$o primary forms of
conte/t important to pra!matics are lin!uistic conte/t and situational conte/t.
7in!uistic conte/t refers to the lan!ua!e surroundin! the phrase in 8uestion. #he
importance of lin!uistic conte/t becomes e/ceptionally clear $hen loo%in! at
pronouns3 in most situations" the pronoun him in the sentence 49oe also sa$ him4 has
a radically different meanin! if preceded by 49erry said he sa$ a !uy ridin! an
elephant4 than it does if preceded by 49erry sa$ the ban% robber4 or 49erry sa$ your
do! run that $ay4.
'ituational conte/t" on the other hand" refers to e&ery nonlin!uistic factor that
affects the meanin! of a phrase. Cearly anythin! can be included in the list" from the
time of day to the people in&ol&ed to the location of the spea%er or the temperature
of the room. An e/ample of situational conte/t at $or% is e&ident in the phrase 4it-s
cold in here4" $hich can either be a simple statement of fact or a re8uest to turn up
the heat" dependin! on" amon! other thin!s" $hether or not it is belie&ed to be in the
listener-s po$er to affect the temperature.
<hen $e spea% $e perform speech acts. A speech act has an illocutionary point or
illocutionary force. 0or e/ample" the point of an assertion is to represent the $orld as
bein! a certain $ay. #he point of a promise is to put oneself under an obli!ation to do
somethin!. #he illucutionary point of a speech act must be distin!uished from its
perlocutionary effect" $hich is $hat it brin!s about. A re8uest" for e/ample" has as its
illocutionary point to direct someone to do somethin!. Its perlocutionary effect may
be the doin! of the thin! by the person directed. 'entences in different !rammatical
moods" the declarati&e" imperati&e" and interro!ati&e" tend to perform speech acts of
specific sorts. But in particular conte/ts one may perform a different speech act usin!
them than that for $hich they are typically put to use. #hus" as noted abo&e" one may
use a sentence such as 4it-s cold in here4 not only to ma%e an assertion but also to
re8uest that one-s auditor turn up the heat. 'peech acts include performati&e
utterances" in $hich one performs the speech act by usin! a first person present tense
sentence $hich says that one is performin! the speech act. E/amples are3 -I promise
to be there-" -I $arn you not to do it-" -I ad&ise you to turn yourself in-" etc. 'ome
speciali=ed de&ices for performin! speech acts are e/clamati&es and phatics" such as
-1uchN- and -5elloN-" respecti&ely. #he former is used to perform an e/pressi&e speech
act" and the latter for !reetin! someone.
Bra!matics" then" re&eals that meanin! is both somethin! affected by and affectin!
the $orld. ,eanin! is somethin! conte/tual $ith respect to lan!ua!e and the $orld"
and is also somethin! acti&e to$ard other meanin!s and the $orld.
In applied pra!matics (such as neurolin!uistic pro!rammin!)" meanin! is constituted
by an indi&idual throu!h the acti&e si!nificance !enerated by the mental processin! of
stimuli input from the sensory or!ans. #hus" people can see" hear" feel@touch" taste
and smell" and form meanin!s out of those sensory e/periences" acti&ely and
interacti&ely.
E&en althou!h a sensory input created by a stimulus cannot be articulated in lan!ua!e
or si!ns of any %ind" it can ne&ertheless ha&e a meanin!. #his can be e/perimentally
23
demonstrated by sho$in! that people beha&iourally respond in specific" nonarbitrary
$ays to sensin! a stimulus" consciously or subconsciously" e&en althou!h they ha&e no
$ay of tellin! $hat it is or means" and no possible $ay of %no$in! $hat it is or $hat
it means.
........................................................................
A semantic feature is a notational method $hich can be used to e/press the
e/istence or none/istence of semantic properties by usin! plus and minus si!ns.
0an is U>5R,ACV" U>,A7EV" U>AAR7#V
&oman is U>5R,ACV" U,A7EV" U>AAR7#V
/oy is U>5R,ACV" U>,A7EV" UAAR7#V
2irl is U>5R,ACV" U,A7EV" UAAR7#V
Intersectin! semantic classes share the same features.
'ome features need not be specifically mentioned as their presence or absence is
ob&ious from another feature. #his is a redundancy rule.
A definition may be a statement of the essential properties of a certain thin!" or a
statement of e8ui&alence bet$een one e/pression and another" usually more comple/
e/pression that !i&es the meanin! of the first. #hese t$o senses are not mutually
e/clusi&e" nor are they e8ui&alent.
A thin! bein! defined is called (from 7atin) a definiendum2 the e/pression $hich
defines it is called a definiens.
........................................................................
In semantics ($ith applications to both philosophy and mathematics)"
extension is the set of thin!s to $hich a property applies2 see E/tension
(semantics).
In !eneral semantics" e/tension is a process that" as in this mathematical
e/ample" starts $ith uni8ue indi&iduals" and !i&es them uni8ue names" e.!." I"
II" III" etc." or D" H" 3" etc. #he ne/t step if needed !enerali=es or passes
beyond e/tension to infinite&alued hi!herorder abstractions li%e -numbers-"
and so on. #he passin! from lo$erorder abstractions (presented e/tensionally)
to hi!her orders" e.!." from -D" H" 3" etc."- to -numbers"- is said to follo$ the
-natural order of e&aluation"- so that $hen one tal%s about order" e/tension is
implied" and $hen one tal%s about e/tension" order is implied. An e/ample of
re&ersed order is $hen a particular hi!herorder abstraction such as race" e.!."
-$hite-" -blac%- etc." is pro6ected onto the indi&iduals comprisin! it. #he
indi&iduals (each uni8uely different by e/tension" no matter $hat is bein!
discussed) comprise the -race- ($hich e/ists only on hi!herorders)" not the
other $ay around. 'ee e/tensional de&ices.
........................................................................
Accordin! to the semantic analysis of )eoffrey 7eech" the associati!e meaning of
an e/pression has to do $ith indi&idual mental understandin!s of the spea%er. #hey"
in turn" can be bro%en up into si/ subtypes3 connotative. collocative. social.
affective. reflected and thematic (,$iha%i H00E).
24
#he connotati&e meanin!s of an e/pression are the thou!hts pro&o%ed by a
term $hen in reference to certain entities. #hou!h these meanin!s may not be
strictly implied by rele&ant definitions" they sho$ up in common or preferred
usa!e re!ardless. #his is not to be confused $ith $hat is historically referred to
as connotation" $hich more closely describes ri!id definitions of $ords.
Collocati&e meanin! " or 4collocation4" describes $ords that re!ularly appear
to!ether in common use ($ithin certain conte/ts).
'ocial meanin! " $here $ords are used to establish relationships bet$een
people and to delineate social roles. 0or e/ample" in 9apanese" the suffi/ 4san4
$hen added to a proper name denotes respect" sometimes indicatin! that the
spea%er is subordinate to the listener2 $hile the suffi/ 4chan4 denotes that the
spea%er thin%s the listener is a child or childli%e (either for purposes of
affection or derision).
Affecti&e meanin! has to do $ith the personal feelin!s or attitudes of the
spea%er.
*eflected meanin! has to do $ith $hen one sense of a particular $ord affects
the understandin! and usa!e of all the other senses of the $ord.
#hematic meanin! concerns itself $ith ho$ the order of $ords spo%en affects
the meanin! that is entailed.
Connotation
In lo!ic and in some branches of semantics" connotation is more or less synonymous
$ith intension. Connotation is often contrasted $ith denotation" $hich is more or less
synonymous $ith extension.
E&eryday Rsa!e
In e&eryday usa!e" connotation has a different meanin!. #o e/plain this meanin!" it is
helpful to e/plicate the partial theory or meanin! that it presupposes. #he theory
!oes li%e this3 e&ery $ord or phrase has t$o %inds of meanin!3 primary" literal
meanin!s (sometimes called denotations)" and secondary meanin!s %no$n as
connotations. Connotations are thou!ht to color $hat a $ord 4really means4 $ith
emotion or &alue 6ud!ments.
0or e/ample" a stubborn person may be described as bein! either strong-willed or
pig-headed. Althou!h these ha&e the same literal meanin! (i.e. stubborn)" strong-
willed connotes admiration for someone-s con&ictions" $hile pig-headed connotes
frustration in dealin! $ith someone.
Cote that not all theories of lin!uistic meanin! honor the distinction bet$een literal
meanin! and connotations. ('ee 7iteral and fi!urati&e lan!ua!e.) Conetheless" the
distinction probably feels intuiti&ely correct and seems useful to most nati&e En!lish
spea%ers.
A desire for increased positi&e connotations (or fe$er ne!ati&e ones) is one of the
main reasons for usin! euphemisms.
It is often useful to a&oid $ords $ith stron! connotations (especially dispara!in! ones)
$hen stri&in! to achie&e a neutral point of &ie$.
25
Euphemism
A euphemism is an e/pression intended by the spea%er to be less offensi&e"
disturbin!" or troublin! to the listener than the $ord or phrase it replaces" or in the
case of doublespea% to ma%e it less troublesome for the spea%er.
<hen a phrase is used as a euphemism" it often becomes a metaphor $hose literal
meanin! is dropped. Euphemisms are often used to hide unpleasant or disturbin!
ideas" e&en $hen the literal term for them is not necessarily offensi&e. #his type of
euphemism is used in public relations and politics" $here it is sometimes dispara!in!ly
called doublespea%. #here are also superstitious euphemisms" based (consciously or
unconsciously) on the idea that $ords ha&e the po$er to brin! bad fortune (for
e/ample" not spea%in! the $ord 4cancer42 see Etymolo!y and Common e/amples
belo$) and reli!ious euphemisms" based on the idea that some $ords are sacred" or
that some $ords are spiritually imperilin! (taboo2 see Etymolo!y and *eli!ious
euphemisms belo$).
Contents
D Etymolo!y
H #he 4euphemism treadmill4
3 Classification of euphemisms
E #he e&olution of euphemisms
F Euphemisms for the profane
o F.D *eli!ious euphemisms
o F.H E/cretory euphemisms
o F.3 'e/ual euphemisms
K Euphemisms for death
L Aoublespea%
8 Common e/amples
G 'ee also
D0 *eferences
DD E/ternal lin%s
Etymolo!y
7oo% up euphemism in <i%tionary" the free dictionary.
#he $ord euphemism comes from the )ree% $ord euphemos" meanin!
4auspicious@!ood@fortunate speech4 $hich in turn is deri&ed from the )ree% root
$ords eu (de)" 4!ood@$ell4 > pheme (fghi) 4speech@spea%in!4. #he eupheme $as
ori!inally a $ord or phrase used in place of a reli!ious $ord or phrase that should not
be spo%en aloud (see taboo). #he primary e/ample of taboo $ords re8uirin! the use of
a euphemism are the unspea%able names for a deity" such as Bersephone" 5ecate"
Cemesis or +ah$eh. By spea%in! only $ords fa&orable to the !ods or spirits" the
spea%er attempted to procure !ood fortune by remainin! in !ood fa&or $ith them.
5istorical lin!uistics has re&ealed traces of taboo deformations in many lan!ua!es.
'e&eral are %no$n to ha&e occurred in IndoEuropean" includin! the ori!inal Indo
European $ords for bear (8rtkos)" wolf (8wlk
w
os)" and deer (ori!inally" hart). In
different IndoEuropean lan!ua!es" each of these $ords has a difficult etymolo!y
because of taboo deformations Q a euphemism $as substituted for the ori!inal" $hich
no lon!er occurs in the lan!ua!e. An e/ample is the 'la&ic root for bearQ8medu-ed-"
$hich means 4honey eater4.
26
In some lan!ua!es of the Bacific" usin! the name of a deceased chief is taboo. 'ince
people are often named after e&eryday thin!s" this leads to the s$ift de&elopment of
euphemisms. #hese lan!ua!es ha&e a &ery hi!h rate of &ocabulary chan!e.
#he 4euphemism treadmill4
Euphemisms can e&entually become taboo $ords themsel&es throu!h a process the
lin!uist 'te&en Bin%er has called the euphemism treadmill (cf9 )resham-s 7a$ in
economics).
<ords ori!inally intended as euphemisms may lose their euphemistic &alue" ac8uirin!
the ne!ati&e connotations of their referents. In some cases" they may be used
moc%in!ly and become dysphemistic.
0or e/ample concentration camp $as used by the British durin! the 'econd Boer <ar
and until the #hird *eich used the e/pression for their death camps" it $as an
acceptable description for the British concept. 'ince then ne$ terms ha&e been
in&ented as euphemisms for them" such as internment camps" resettlement camps"
fortified &illa!es" etc.
Also" in some &ersions of En!lish" toilet room" itself a euphemism" $as replaced $ith
bathroom and water closet" $hich $ere replaced (respecti&ely) $ith rest room and
&9!9
Connotations easily chan!e o&er time. 5diot $as once a neutral term" and moron a
similar one. Ce!ati&e senses of a $ord tend to cro$d out neutral ones" so the $ord
retarded $as pressed into ser&ice to replace them. Co$ that too is considered rude
(especially $hen used as a noun" such as 4he-s a -*Etard-4)" and as a result" ne$ terms
li%e mentally challenged or special ha&e replaced retarded. In a fe$ decades" callin!
someone special may $ell be a !ra&e insult" and indeed amon! many youn! school
students" it is already a common term of abuse" if not yet a particularly !ra&e one. A
similar pro!ression occurred $ith
crippled handicapped disabled differently-abled
althou!h in that case the meanin! has also broadened2 a dysle/ic or colorblind person
$ould not be termed crippled. In the early DGK0s" Bill (eec%" $ho $as missin! part of
a le!" ar!ued a!ainst the thenfa&ored euphemism 4handicapped4" sayin! he preferred
4crippled4 because it $as merely descripti&e and did not carry connotations of limitin!
one-s capability the $ay 4handicapped4 (and" in fact" all of its subse8uent euphisms)
seem to do.
It can apply to namin! of racial or ethnic !roups as $ell" $hen proposed euphemisms
become successi&ely 4corrupted4. 0or e/ample3
negro colored black :frican-:merican
#he euphemism treadmill also occurs $ith notions of profanity and obscenity" but in
the re&erse direction. <ords once called 4offensi&e4 $ere later described as
4ob6ectionable"4 and later 48uestionable.4
A complementary 4dysphemism treadmill4 e/ists" but is more rarely obser&ed. 1ne
modern e/ample is the $ord 4suc%s.4 4#hat suc%s4 be!an as American slan! for 4that is
&ery unpleasant4" and is shorthand for 4that suc%s dic%.4 It de&eloped o&er the late
H0th century from bein! an e/tremely &ul!ar phrase to nearacceptability. A similar
phenomenon happened $ith 46er%4" $hich be!an as 46er%off4" in reference to someone
27
$ho $as boorish or stupid" and $as a forbidden term in public media" but is no$
acceptable (for e/ample" the 'te&e ,artin film" %he ;erk).
Classification of euphemisms
,any euphemisms fall into one or more of these cate!ories3
#erms of forei!n and@or technical ori!in (derriere" copulation" perspire"
urinate" security breach)
Abbre&iations ()-/ for 4son of a bitch4" /) for 4bullshit4" %) for 4tou!h shit4"
etc.)
Abstractions (it" the situation" go" left the company" do it)
Indirections (behind" unmentionables" privates" live together" go to the
bathroom" sleep together)
,ispronunciation (goldarnit" freakin" shoot" etc. )ee minced oath)
Blays on abbre&iations (barbecue sauce for 4bull shit4" sugar honey ice tea for
4shit4" 0aryland farmer for 4motherfuc%er4" see you next %uesday for 4cunt4"
etc.)
#here is some disa!reement o&er $hether certain terms are or are not euphemisms.
0or e/ample" sometimes the phrase visually impaired is labeled as a politically
correct euphemism for blind. 5o$e&er" &isual impairment can be a broader term"
includin!" for e/ample" people $ho ha&e partial si!ht in one eye" a !roup that $ould
be e/cluded by the $ord blind.
#here are three antonyms of euphemism3 dysphemism" cacophemism" and power
word. #he first can be either offensi&e or merely humorously deprecatin! $ith the
second one !enerally used more often in the sense of somethin! deliberately
offensi&e. #he last is used mainly in ar!uments to ma%e a point seem more correct.
#he e&olution of euphemisms
Euphemisms may be formed in a number of $ays. Periphrasis or circumlocution is one
of the most common to 4spea% around4 a !i&en $ord" implyin! it $ithout sayin! it.
1&er time" circumlocutions become reco!ni=ed as established euphemisms for
particular $ords or ideas.
#o alter the pronunciation or spellin! of a taboo $ord (such as a s$ear $ord) to form
a euphemism is %no$n as taboo deformation. #here are an astonishin! number of
taboo deformations in En!lish" of $hich many refer to the infamous fourletter $ords.
In American En!lish" $ords $hich are unacceptable on tele&ision" such as fuck" may
be represented by deformations such as freak Q e&en in children-s cartoons. 'ome
e/amples of Coc%ney rhymin! slan! may ser&e the same purpose Q to call a person a
berk sounds less offensi&e than to call him a cunt" thou!h berk is short for /erkshire
Hunt $hich rhymes $ith cunt.
Bureaucracies such as the military and lar!e corporations fre8uently spa$n
euphemisms of a more deliberate (and to some" more sinister) nature. 1r!ani=ations
coin doublespeak e/pressions to describe ob6ectionable actions in terms that seem
neutral or inoffensi&e. 0or e/ample" a term used for radiation lea%ed from an
improperly operated nuclear po$er plant is sunshine units.
,ilitaries at $ar fre8uently do %ill people" sometimes deliberately and sometimes by
mista%e2 in doublespea%" the first may be called neutralizing the target and the
second collateral damage. A common term $hen a soldier accidentally is %illed (buys
the farm) by the side they are fi!htin! for is friendly fire. (4Buy the farm4 has its o$n
28
interestin! history.) 'xecution is an established euphemism referrin! to the act of
puttin! a person to death" $ith or $ithout 6udicial process2 it ori!inally referred to
the e/ecution" i.e. the carryin! out" of a death $arrant (an authori=ation to a sheriff"
prison $arden" or other official to put a named person to death). 4E/ecution4 of an
4e/ecutable4 computer pro!ram still uses the ori!inal sense of carryin! out
instructions.
7i%e$ise" industrial unpleasantness such as pollution may be toned do$n to
outgassing or runoff Q descriptions of physical processes rather than their dama!in!
conse8uences. 'ome of this may simply be the application of precise technical
terminolo!y in the place of popular usa!e" but beyond precision" the ad&anta!e of
technical terminolo!y may be its lac% of emotional undertones" the disad&anta!e
bein! the lac% of reallife conte/t.
Euphemisms for the profane
Brofane $ords and e/pressions are !enerally ta%en from three areas3 reli!ion"
e/cretion" and se/. <hile profanities themsel&es ha&e been around for some time"
their limited use in public and by the media has only in the past decade become
socially acceptable" and there are still many e/pressions $hich cannot be used in
polite con&ersation. #he common mar%er of acceptability $ould appear to be use on
primetime tele&ision or in the presence of children. #hus" damn (and most other
reli!ious profanity) is acceptable" and as a conse8uence" euphemisms for reli!ious
profanity ha&e ta%en on a &ery stod!y feelin!. E/cretory profanity such as piss and
shit may be acceptable in adult con&ersation" $hile euphemisms li%e <umber -ne and
<umber %wo are preferred for use $ith children. ,ost se/ual terms and e/pressions
either remain unacceptable for !eneral use or ha&e under!one radical rehabilitation
(penis and vagina" for instance).
*eli!ious euphemisms
Euphemisms for )od and 9esus are used by Christians to a&oid ta%in! the name of )od
in a &ain oath" $hich $ould &iolate one of the #en Commandments. 9e$s say :donai
(7ord) $hen readin! scriptures that refer to )od 4by name4.
Euphemisms for hell" damnation" and the de&il" on the other hand" are often used to
a&oid in&o%in! the po$er of the ad&ersary.
E/cretory euphemisms
<hile urinate and defecate are not euphemisms" they are used almost e/clusi&ely in a
clinical sense. #he basic An!lo'a/on $ords for these functions" piss and shit" are
considered &ul!arities" despite the use of piss in the Jin! 9ames Bible (in Isaiah 3K3DH
and else$here).
#he $ord manure" referrin! to animal feces used as fertili=er for plants" literally
means 4$or%ed $ith the hands4" alludin! to the mi/in! of manure $ith earth. 'e&eral
=oos mar%et the byproduct of elephants and other lar!e herbi&ores as =oo ,oo" and
there is a brand of chic%en manure a&ailable in !arden stores under the name !ock-a-
,oodle ,oo. 'imilarly" the strin! of letters /) often replaces the $ord bullshit in
polite society.
#here are any number of len!thier periphrases for e/cretion used to e/cuse oneself
from company" such as to powder one>s nose or to see a man about a horse (or dog).
'lan! e/pressions $hich are neither particularly euphemistic nor dysphemistic" such
as take a leak" form a separate cate!ory.
2
'e/ual euphemisms
#he term pudendum for the !enitals literally means 4shameful thin!4. 2roin and
crotch refer to a lar!er re!ion of the body" but are euphemistic $hen used to refer to
the !enitals.
(irtually all other se/ual terms are still considered profane and unacceptable for use
e&en in a euphemistic sense.
Euphemisms for death
#he En!lish lan!ua!e contains numerous euphemisms related to dyin!" death" burial"
and the people and places $hich deal $ith death. #he practice of usin! euphemisms
for death is li%ely to ha&e ori!inated $ith the 4ma!ical4 belief that to spea% the $ord
-death- $as to in&ite death ($here to 4dra$ Aeath-s attention4 is the ultimate bad
fortune a common theory holds that death is a taboo sub6ect in most En!lish
spea%in! cultures for precisely this reason). It may be said that one is not dyin!" but
fading 6uickly because the end is near. Beople $ho ha&e died are referred to as
ha&in! passed away or passed or departed. ,eceased is a euphemism for -dead-" and
sometimes the deceased is said to ha&e gone to a better place" but this is used
primarily amon! the reli!ious $ith a concept of hea&en.
#here are many euphemisms for the dead body" some polite and some profane" as
$ell as dysphemisms such as worm food" or dead meat. #he corpse $as once referred
to as the shroud ?or house or tenement@ of clay" and modern funerary $or%ers use
terms such as the loved one (title of a no&el about 5olly$ood underta%ers by E&elyn
<au!h) or the dearly departed. (#hey themsel&es ha&e !i&en up the euphemism
funeral director for grief therapist" and hold arrangement conferences $ith
relati&es.) Amon! themsel&es" mortuary technicians often refer to the corpse as the
client.
Contemporary euphemisms and dysphemisms for death tend to be 8uite colorful" and
someone $ho has died is said to ha&e passed away" passed on" bit the big one" bought
the farm" croaked" given up the ghost (ori!inally a more respectful term)" kicked the
bucket" gone south" tits up" shuffled off this mortal coil (from <illiam 'ha%espeare-s
Hamlet)" or assumed room temperature. <hen buried" they may be said to be
pushing up daisies or taking a dirt nap or six feet under. #here are hundreds of such
e/pressions in use. (1ld Burma'ha&e 6in!le3 4If daisies are your fa&orite flo$er" %eep
pushin- up those miles per hourN4)
Euthanasia also attracts euphemisms. 1ne may put him out of his misery" or put him
to sleep" the latter phrase bein! used primarily $ith nonhumans.
#here are a fe$ euphemisms for %illin! $hich are neither respectful nor playful" but
rather clinical and detached. 'ome e/amples of this type are terminate" wet work" to
take care of one or to take them for a ride" to do them in" to off" frag" smoke" whack
or waste someone. #o cut loose (from R.'. '!t. ,assey-s account of acti&ities durin!
the American occupation of Ira8) or open up on someone" means -to shoot at $ith
e&ery $eapon a&ailable-.
#he Aead Barrot '%etch from ,onty Bython-s 0lyin! Circus contains an e/tensi&e list of
euphemisms for death" referrin! to the deceased parrot that the character played by
9ohn Cleese purchases (the s%etch has led to another euphemism for death3 4pinin!
for the f6ords4" althou!h in the s%etch it $as used by the shop o$ner to mean the
parrot $as not dead" but $as merely 8uiet and contemplati&e). A similar passa!e
occurs near the be!innin! of %he %welve !hairs" $here Be=enchu%" the underta%er"
3!
astonishes (orobyanino& $ith his classification of people by the euphemisms used to
spea% of their deaths.
Aoublespea%
<hat distin!uishes doublespea% from other euphemisms is its deliberate usa!e by
!o&ernmental" military" or corporate institutions. Aoublespea% is in turn distin!uished
from 6ar!on in that doublespea% attempts to confuse and conceal the truth" $hile
6ar!on often pro&ides !reater precision to those that understand it ($hile
inad&ertently confusin! those $ho do not). An e/ample of the distinction is the use by
the military of the $ord casualties instead of deaths Q $hat may appear to be an
attempt to hide the fact that people ha&e been %illed is actually a precise $ay of
sayin! 4personnel $ho ha&e been rendered incapable of fi!htin!" $hether by bein!
%illed" bein! badly $ounded" psycholo!ically dama!ed" incapacitated by disease"
rendered ineffecti&e by ha&in! essential e8uipment destroyed" or disabled in any
other $ay.4 4Casualties4 is used instead of 4deaths"4 not for propa!andistic or
s8ueamish reasons" but because most casualties are not dead" but ne&ertheless
useless for $a!in! $ar.
Broper e/amples of doublespea% included taking friendly fire as a euphemism for
bein! attac%ed by your o$n troops.
Commentators such as Coam Choms%y and )eor!e 1r$ell ha&e $ritten at len!th
about the dan!ers of allo$in! such euphemisms to shape public perceptions and
national policy.
(iolent countercultural !roups and their apolo!ists ha&e doublespea% of their o$n"
such as replacin! 4sabota!e4 and 4&andalism4 $ith 4direct action.4
Common e/amples
1ther common euphemisms include3
restroom for toilet room (the $ord toilet $as itself ori!inally a euphemism).
#his is an Americanism. Also dropping the kids off at the pool or making a pit
stop4
making love to" getting it on" doing it" or sleeping with for having sexual
intercourse with
motion discomfort bag and air-sickness bag for vomit bag or barf bag
sanitary landfill for garbage dump (and a temporary !arba!e dump is a
transfer station)
pre-owned vehicles for used cars
the big ! for cancer (in addition" some people $hisper the $ord $hen they say
it in public" and doctors ha&e euphemisms to use in front of patients" e.!.
4c.a.4)
bathroom tissue" t9p9" or bath tissue for toilet paper (Rsually used by toilet
paper manufacturers)
custodian for *anitor (also ori!inally a euphemismQin 7atin" it means
doorman.)
sanitation worker (or" sarcastically" sanitation engineer) for 4!arba!e man4
(also %no$n as dustman in the R.J.)
&here can 5 wash my handsA or &here can 5 powder my noseA for &here can 5
find a toiletA. (#his is also an Americanism. If this 8uestion is as%ed in Europe
to someone not used to American habits the person $ho as%s the 8uestion
mi!ht actually end up at a place $here there is only a $ashbasin and not at a
place e8uipped accordin! to their needs. 1n the other hand" Americans mi!ht
31
find the more direct 8uestion rude if as%ed by Europeans $ho don-t %no$ about
this euphemism.)
#hese lists mi!ht su!!est that most euphemisms are $ell%no$n e/pressions. 1ften
euphemisms can be some$hat situational2 $hat mi!ht be used as a euphemism in a
con&ersation bet$een t$o friends mi!ht ma%e no sense to a third person. In this case"
the euphemism is bein! used as a type of innuendo. As an e/ample" in the tele&ision
series %he $resh Prince of /el-:ir" the Ban%s family ($ho are blac%) discuss 5ilary-s
ne$ boyfriend" $ho happens to be $hite" usin! tall as a euphemism for white. <ill"
$ho apparently doesn-t catch on" remar%s that he is the only one $ho seems to notice
the ne$ boyfriend is $hite.
#he inflation of occupational titles is similar to the euphemism treadmill. 0or
instance" the en!ineerin! professions ha&e traditionally resisted the tendency by
other technical trades to appropriate the presti!e of the title engineer. ,ost people
callin! themsel&es software engineers or network engineers are not" in fact"
accredited in en!ineerin!. E/treme cases" such as sanitation engineer for *anitor are
cited humorously more often than they are used seriously.
In the tele&ision cartoon series 4#he 0lintstones4" 0red ta%es a 6ob as the li&ein
superintendent of a lar!e apartment buildin! and is !i&en a title usin! the $ord
engineer to ma%e his 6ob sound more important than it actually is. As he and his $ife
are mo&in! in" a policeman is about to $rite him a par%in! tic%et for bein! ille!ally
par%ed in front of the buildin!. 5e informs the officer that he is (as the buildin!-s
o$ner referred to him) the 4esident )tationary 'ngineer4 for the buildin!. #he cop
turns to him and says" 4I don-t care if you are the 6anitor" mo&e this car no$N4
7ess e/treme cases" such as custodian for *anitor" are considered more terms of
respect than euphemisms.
#he $ord euphemism itself can be used as a euphemism. In the animated short 5t>s
2rinch <ight ('ee Ar. 'euss)" a child as%s to !o to the euphemism" $here euphemism
is bein! used as a euphemism for outhouse. #his euphemistic use of 4euphemism4
ori!inally occurred in the play &ho>s :fraid of Birginia &oolfA $here a character
re8uests" 4,artha" $ill you sho$ her $here $e %eep the" uh" euphemismb4.
..........................................................................
Barado/
$or other senses of this word. see paradox ?disambiguation@9
*obert Boyle-s selfflo$in! flas% fills itself in this dia!ram" but perpetual motion
machines do not e/ist.
A parado/ is an apparently true statement or !roup of statements that seems to lead
to a contradiction or to a situation that defies intuition. #ypically" either the
statements in 8uestion do not really imply the contradiction" the pu==lin! result is not
really a contradiction" or the premises themsel&es are not all really true (or" cannot
32
all be true to!ether). #he reco!nition of ambi!uities" e8ui&ocations" and unstated
assumptions underlyin! %no$n parado/es has led to si!nificant ad&ances in science"
philosophy and mathematics.
#he $ord paradox is often used interchan!eably $ith contradiction2 but $here a
contradiction by definition cannot be true" many parado/es do allo$ for resolution"
thou!h many remain unresol&ed or only contentiously resol&ed (such as Curry-s
parado/). 'till more casually" the term is sometimes used for situations that are
merely surprisin! (albeit in a distinctly 4lo!ical4 manner) such as the Birthday Barado/.
#his is also the usa!e in economics" $here a parado/ is an unintuiti&e outcome of
economic theory.
Contents
D Etymolo!y
H Common themes
3 #ypes of parado/es
E 'ee also
F *eferences
K E/ternal lin%s
Etymolo!y
#he etymolo!y of paradox can be traced bac% to the early *enaissance. Early forms of
the $ord appeared in the late 7atin paradoxum and the related )ree% jklmnopoq
paradoxos meanin! -contrary to e/pectation-" -incredible-. #he $ord is composed of
the preposition para $hich means 4a!ainst4 con6oined to the noun stem doxa" meanin!
4belief4. Compare orthodo/ (literally" 4strai!ht teachin!4) and heterodo/ (literally"
4different teachin!4). #he liar parado/ and other parado/es $ere studied in medie&al
times under the headin! insolubilia.
Common themes
Common themes in parado/es include direct and indirect selfreference" infinity"
circular definitions" and confusion of le&els of reasonin!. Barado/es $hich are not
based on a hidden error !enerally happen at the frin!es of conte/t or lan!ua!e" and
re8uire e/tendin! the conte/t (or lan!ua!e) to lose their parado/ 8uality.
In moral philosophy" parado/ plays a central role in ethics debates. 0or instance" an
ethical admonition to 4lo&e thy nei!hbour4 is not 6ust in contrast $ith" but in
contradiction to an armed nei!hbour acti&ely tryin! to %ill you3 if he or she succeeds"
you $ill not be able to lo&e him or her. But to preempti&ely attac% them or restrain
them is not usually understood as lo&in!. #his mi!ht be termed an ethical dilemma.
Another e/ample is the conflict bet$een an in6unction not to steal and one to care for
a family that you cannot afford to feed $ithout stolen money.
#ypes of parado/es
<. (. ^uine (DGKH) distin!uished bet$een three classes of parado/es.
A veridical paradox produces a result that appears absurd but is demonstrated
to be true ne&ertheless. #hus" the parado/ of 0rederic-s birthday in %he Pirates
of Penzance establishes the surprisin! fact that a person may be more than
Cine years old on his Cinth birthday. 7i%e$ise" Arro$-s impossibility theorem
in&ol&es beha&iour of &otin! systems that is surprisin! but all too true.
33
A falsidical paradox establishes a result that not only appears false but actually
is false2 there is a fallacy in the supposed demonstration. #he &arious in&alid
proofs (e.!. that D r H) are classic e/amples" !enerally relyin! on a hidden
di&ision by =ero. Another e/ample $ould be the 5orse parado/.
A parado/ $hich is in neither class may be an antinomy" $hich reaches a self
contradictory result by properly applyin! accepted $ays of reasonin!. 0or
e/ample" the )rellin!Celson parado/ points out !enuine problems in our
understandin! of the ideas of truth and description.
5ysphemism
In lan!ua!e" both dysphemism (from the )ree% -dys- CDEr non and -pheme- FGHI r
speech) and cacophemism (in )ree% -cacos- JKJLE r bad) are rou!h opposites of
euphemism" meanin! the usa!e of an intentionally harsh $ord or e/pression instead of
a polite one.
#he latter is !enerally used more often in the sense of somethin! deliberately
offensi&e" $hile the former can be either offensi&e or merely humorously
deprecatin!. E/amples of dysphemism include dead tree edition for the paper &ersion
of an online ma!a=ine" or the American military personnel-s use of shit on a shingle
for their common brea%fast of creamed chipped beef on toast.
Aysphemism is as common as euphemism in e&eryday usa!e. Co sports team actually
slaughters or annihilates another2 fe$ companies crush their competition2 no one is
dumb as a box of hair (nor" for that matter" a bo/ of roc%s or bric%s" or a sac% of
hammers" $ith or $ithout their heads).
,any of the same sub6ects can be dysphemi=ed as euphemi=ed" such as se/ and death
Qa $ellthou!htof dead person may be said to ha&e passed away" a disrespected one
to ha&e kicked the bucket or to be worm food. 1ddly" some humorous e/pressions can
be both euphemistic and dysphemistic dependin! on conte/t3 for e/ample spank the
monkey mi!ht be used as either a softer alternati&e to 4masturbate4" or as a more
deliberately pro&ocati&e one dependin! on the audience. 7i%e$ise" pushing up daisies
can be ta%en as either softer or harsher than 4died4. #his is because terms $hich can
be dysphemic can also be affectionate.
*etrie&ed from 4http3@@en.$i%ipedia.or!@$i%i@Aysphemism4
........................................................................
#he paradox of the heap (or the Sorites Paradox" sMros bein! )ree% for 4heap4 and
sMrites the ad6ecti&e) is a parado/ that arises $hen people apply lo!ic to certain
&a!ue concepts.
D. #$o or three !rains of sand do not ma%e a heap.
H. A million !rains do ma%e a heap.
3. If n !rains of sand do not ma%e a heap" neither do (n>D) !rains.
E. If n !rains of sand ma%e a heap" so do (nsD) !rains.
#he parado/ is that" contrary to (3)" $e mi!ht add !rain after !rain to our collection
of sand until it truly does become a heap. And accordin! to (E)" if $e be!an $ith a
heap" and too% sin!le !rain after sin!le !rain a$ay from the collection" it $ould ne&er
stop bein! a heap2 e&en if there $ere no !rains of sand left at all.
34
'o common lan!ua!e su!!ests that heaps of sand ha&e the properties described in (3)
and (E)" since the difference of one !rain of sand is thou!ht to be ne!li!able. But it
seems that these properties are actually mutually inconsistent. #hat is the parado/.
Possible solutions
,any philosophers and lo!icians ha&e confronted this pu==lin! ar!ument and
re!istered their analysis. 'ome" li%e Bertrand *ussell" simply deny that lo!ic $or%s
$ith &a!ue concepts. 1thers !o so far as destruction of all ar!uments of this form"
includin! mathematical induction ($hich may or may not be a 'orites ar!ument).
6nduction
Applyin! mathematical induction sho$s that the first property combined $ith the
third implies that a million !rains of sand do not ma%e a heap" in contradiction $ith
the second property. 'imilarly" a combination of the second and fourth properties
sho$s that t$o or three !rains do ma%e a heap" in contradiction $ith the first
property. (If one $as $illin! to $rite out each of the million intermediate premises of
the form" 4If GGGGGG !rains do not ma%e a heap" then GGGGG8 do not"4 one could
formulate the ar!ument $ithout relyin! on induction.)
#his contradiction arises from the interaction of the abo&e properties. #he second
t$o fairly clearly e/press the idea that there is no clear line bet$een 4is a heap4 and
4isn-t a heap4. Cote" ho$e&er" that the four ta%en to!ether also imply that any pile of
sand can nonproblematically be classified as 4heap4 or 4nonheap4. (#his a!ain follo$s
from mathematical induction.) <hat the parado/ seems to sho$ is that these t$o
ideas are contradictory. #hat is" one cannot simultaneously claim" $hen classifyin!
O-s3
D. that there is no clear line separatin! the O-s that are + from the O-s that are not
+.
H. that e&ery O is either a + or not a +.
Another" similar parado/ is3
D. D is a small number
H. Add 0.D to that. D.D is still small.
3. D"000"000 is a lar!e number
E. 'ubtract 0.D from that. GGG"GGG.G is still lar!e.
#he follo$in! can be deri&ed by mathematical induction3 If O is a small number" than
O > 0.D is also a small number. If + is a lar!e number" then + 0.D is also a lar!e
number.
Applyin! rule H to the number D $ill e&entually !et to one million. By induction" one
million must be small" $hich is a!ainst rule 3. 'imilarly" the process $or%s in re&erse.
Applyin! rule E to one million e&entually !ets to D. By induction" D must be lar!e"
$hich is a!ainst rule D.
Consensus
1ne attempt to clarify matters !oes as follo$s3
,any of the e/amples of this ar!ument use $ords $hich refer to members of a
&a!uely defined set $ith an underlyin! 8uantitati&e scale $hich can be used to ma%e
precise analo!s. 0or e/ample" one could define a pheap $hich has at least p !rains of
35
sand. 1ne $ould then ha&e a precise analo! for $hich the 'orites ar!ument $ould
clearly fail because statement H abo&e could not be applied to all pheaps. #here
$ould be a 4least pheap4 to $hich the item could be applied.
Consider the 4hei!ht4 form of the ar!ument.
D. A man $hose hei!ht is se&en feet is tall.
H. *educin! the hei!ht of a tall man by one inch lea&es him still tall.
3. A man $hose hei!ht is four feet is tall.
Co$ consider this ar!ument3
D. A man $hose hei!ht is se&en feet is considered tall by e&eryone.
H. *educin! the hei!ht of a man considered tall by consensus may chan!e the
consensus or not. If the reduction is small" then the consensus may only chan!e
sli!htly.
3. A man $hose hei!ht is four feet is considered tall by &ery fe$ human people.
#he usefulness of lan!ua!e is the consensus $e share on the definitions of terms.
Brecise terms ha&e a mechanism by $hich one can persuade others that a specific
application of the term is &alid. (a!ue terms ha&e no such mechanism. If a person
insists on callin! a se&en foot man short" one mi!ht suspect that its reference set
includes many professional bas%etball players $ho play the center position" but $e
$ould hardly accuse it of a lo!ic error. (a!ue terms are useful to the e/tent that $e
ha&e consensus" but $hen used them out of conte/t" they !enerally confuse.
#he 'orites parado/ merely illustrates lo!ical analysis of ho$ one uses &a!ue
lan!ua!e. It indicates that it is a fallacy to assume that e&erybody a!rees on the
definition of a &a!ue term. 'ome people may a!ree in its application to but not all
members of the uni&erse of discourse $ill as a matter of course.
........................................................................
#he Prototype is $hat a )tereotype is called in co!niti&e lin!uistics. It is an
Ideali=ed co!niti&e model (IC,) of reality $hich is used as a benchmar% $hen
cate!ori=in! ob6ects and ideas.
It $as coined by Eleanor *osch in the DGL0s as she performed e/perimental research
in cate!ori=ation. It $as established that the cate!ori=ation done by the sub6ects did
not resemble the traditional Aristotelian &ie$ $ith necessary and sufficient condition.
1n the contrary it $as disco&ered that there $ere typical members of a cate!ory and
less typical members.
6nfluence
#he Brototype theory has led to se&eral ne$ approaches in lin!uistics" such as
Conceptual metaphors" Brimary metaphors and Conceptual inte!ration (or Blendin!).
........................................................................
In semantics" truth conditions are $hat obtain precisely $hen a sentence is true.
0or e/ample" 4It is sno$in! in Cebras%a4 is true precisely $hen it is sno$in! in
Cebras%a.
36
,ore formally" $e can thin% of a truth condition as $hat ma%es for the truth of a
sentence in an inducti&e definition of truth. (0or details" see the semantic theory of
truth.) Rnderstood this $ay" truth conditions are theoretical entities. #o illustrate
$ith an e/ample3 suppose that" in a particular truth theory" the $ord 4Ci/on4 refers to
*ichard ,. Ci/on" and 4is ali&e4 is associated $ith the set of currently li&in! thin!s.
#hen one $ay of representin! the truth condition of 4Ci/on is ali&e4 is as the ordered
pair SCi/on" Y/3 / is ali&eZT. And $e say that 4Ci/on is ali&e4 is true if and only if the
referent of 4Ci/on4 belon!s to the set associated $ith 4is ali&e4" that is" if and only if
Ci/on is ali&e.
In semantics" the truth condition of a sentence is almost uni&ersally considered to be
distinct from its meanin!. #he meanin! of a sentence is con&eyed if the truth
conditions for the sentence are understood. Additionally" there are many sentences
that are understood althou!h their truth condition is uncertain. 1ne popular ar!ument
for this &ie$ is that some sentences are necessarily truethat is" they are true
$hate&er happens to obtain. All such sentences ha&e the same truth conditions" but
ar!uably do not thereby ha&e the same meanin!. 7i%e$ise" the sets Y/3 / is ali&eZ and
Y/3 / is ali&e and / is not a roc%Z are identicalthey ha&e precisely the same
membersbut presumably the sentences 4Ci/on is ali&e4 and 4Ci/on is ali&e and is not
a roc%4 ha&e different meanin!s.
........................................................................
Logical positi!ism (later referred to as logical empiricism" also referred to as neo
positi&ism) is a philosophy (of science) that ori!inated in the (ienna Circle in the
DGH0s. 7o!ical positi&ism holds that philosophy should aspire to the same sort of ri!or
as science. Bhilosophy should pro&ide strict criteria for 6ud!in! sentences true" false
and meanin!less.
E/amples of lo!ical positi&ists include ,orit= 'chlic%" *udolf Carnap" 1tto Ceurath"
and A.9. Ayer. Althou!h Jarl Bopper belon!ed to the (ienna Circle in his early days"
he became the main critic of the neopositi&ist approach.
&ssertions and origins of Logical Positi!ism
Althou!h the lo!ical positi&ists held a $ide ran!e of beliefs on many matters" they all
shared an interest in science and deep s%epticism of the theolo!ical and
metaphysical. 0ollo$in! <itt!enstein" many subscribed to the correspondence theory
of truth" althou!h some" li%e Ceurath" belie&ed in coherentism. #hey belie&ed that all
%no$led!e should be based on lo!ical inference from simple 4protocol sentences4
!rounded in obser&able facts. 5ence many supported forms of realism" materialism"
philosophical naturalism" and empiricism.
#he lo!ical positi&ists $ere &ery much influenced by and $ere !reat admirers of the
early 7ud$i! <itt!enstein (from the period of the #ractatus). <itt!enstein himself
$as not a lo!ical positi&ist" althou!h he $as on friendly terms $ith many members of
the (ienna Circle" especially 0riedrich <aismann.
7o!ical positi&ism is perhaps best %no$n for the &erifiability criterion of meanin!"
$hich asserts that a statement is meanin!ful if and only if it is empirically &erifiable.
1ne intended conse8uence of the &erification criterion is that all nonempirical forms
of discourse" includin! ethics and aesthetics" are not 4literally4 or 4co!niti&ely4
meanin!ful" and so belon!s to 4metaphysics4.
7o!ical positi&ism $as essential to the de&elopment of early analytic philosophy. It
$as disseminated throu!hout the European continent and" later" in American
37
uni&ersities by the members of the (ienna Circle. A.9. Ayer is considered responsible
for the spread of lo!ical positi&ism to Britain. #he term subse8uently came to be
almost interchan!eable $ith 4analytic philosophy4 in the first half of the t$entieth
century. 7o!ical positi&ism $as immensely influential in the philosophy of lan!ua!e
and represented the dominant philosophy of science bet$een <orld <ar I and the
Cold <ar. ,any subse8uent commentators on 4lo!ical positi&ism4 ha&e attributed to
its proponents a !reater unity of purpose and creed than they actually shared"
o&erloo%in! the comple/ disa!reements amon! the lo!ical positi&ists themsel&es.
Criticisms
Critics of 7o!ical Bositi&ism say that its fundamental tenets could not themsel&es be
formulated in a $ay that $as clearly consistent. #he &erifiability criterion of meanin!
did not seem &erifiable2 but neither $as it simply a lo!ical tautolo!y" since it had
implications for the practice of science and the empirical truth of other statements.
#his presented se&ere problems for the lo!ical consistency of the theory. Another
problem $as that" $hile positi&e e/istential claims (#here is at least one human
bein!) and ne!ati&e uni&ersals (<ot all ra&ens are blac%) allo$ for clear methods of
&erification (find a human or a nonblac% ra&en)" ne!ati&e e/istential claims and
positi&e uni&ersal claims do not.
Rni&ersal claims could apparently ne&er be &erified3 5o$ can you tell that all ra&ens
are blac%" unless you-&e hunted do$n e&ery ra&en e&er" includin! those in the past
and futureb #his led to a !reat deal of $or% on induction" probability" and
4confirmation"4 ($hich combined &erification and falsification2 see belo$).
Jarl Bopper" a $ell %no$n critic of 7o!ical Bositi&ism" published the boo% 3ogik der
$orschung (En!.3%he 3ogic of )cientific ,iscovery) in DG3E. In it he presented an
influential alternati&e to the &erifiability criterion of meanin!" definin! scientific
statements in terms of falsifiability. 0irst" thou!h" Bopper-s concern $as not $ith
distin!uishin! meanin!ful from meanin!less statements" but distin!uishin! scientific
from metaphysical statements. 5e did not hold that metaphysical statements must be
meanin!less2 neither did he hold that a statement that in one century $as
metaphysical" $hile unfalsifiable (li%e the ancient )ree% philosophy about atoms)"
could not in another century become falsifiable" and thus scientific (by the H0th
century atoms $ould become part of science). About psychoanalysis he thou!ht
somethin! similar3 in his day it offered no method for falsification" and thus $as not
falsifiable and not scientific" but he didn-t e/clude it bein! meaningful" nor did he say
psychoanalists $ere necessarily wrong (it only couldn-t be pro&en either $ay3 that
$ould ha&e meant it $as falsifiable)" nor did he e/clude that one day psychoanalysis
could e&ol&e into somethin! falsifiable" and thus scientific. 5e $as" in !eneral" more
concerned $ith scientific practice than $ith the lo!ical issues that troubled the
positi&ists. 'econd" althou!h Bopper-s philosophy of science en6oyed !reat popularity
for some years" if his criterion is construed as an ans$er to the 8uestion the
positi&ists $ere as%in! it turns out to fail in e/actly parallel $ays. Ce!ati&e e/istential
claims (#here are no unicorns) and positi&e uni&ersals (All ra&ens are blac%) can be
falsified" but positi&e e/istential and ne!ati&e uni&ersal claims cannot.
7o!ical positi&ists- response to the first criticism is that 7o!ical Bositi&ism" li%e all
other philosophies of science" is a philosophy of science" not an a/iomatic system that
can pro&e its o$n consistency. (see ):del-s incompleteness theorem) 'econdly" a
theory of lan!ua!e and mathematical lo!ic $ere created to ans$er $hat it really
means to say thin!s li%e 4all ra&ens are blac%4.
A response to the second criticism $as pro&ided by A. 9. Ayer in 3anguage. %ruth and
3ogic" in $hich he sets out the distinction bet$een -stron!- and -$ea%- &erification. 4A
38
proposition is said to be &erifiable" in the stron! sense of the term" if" and only if" its
truth could be conclusi&ely established by e/perience.4 (Ayer DGEK3F0) It is this sense
of &erifiable that causes the problem of &erification $ith ne!ati&e e/istential claims
and positi&e uni&ersal claims. 5o$e&er" the $ea% sense of &erification states that a
proposition is 4&erifiable... if it is possible for e/perience to render it probable.4 (ibid)
After establishin! this distinction" Ayer !oes on to claim that 4no proposition" other
than a tautolo!y" can possibly be anythin! more than a probable hypothesis4 (Ayer
DGEK3FD) and therefore can only be sub6ect to $ea% &erification. #his defence $as
contro&ersial amon! 7o!ical Bositi&ists" some of $hom stuc% to stron! &erification"
and claimed that !eneral propositions $ere indeed nonsense.
'ubse8uent philosophy of science tends to ma%e use of the better aspects of both of
these approaches. <or% by <. (. ^uine and #homas Juhn has con&inced many that it
is not possible to pro&ide a strict criterion for !ood or bad scientific method outside
of the science $e already ha&e. But e&en this sentiment $as not un%no$n to the
lo!ical positi&ists3 1tto Ceurath famously compared science to a boat $hich $e must
rebuild on the open sea.
........................................................................
In the early t$entieth century" the lo!ical positi&ists put forth $hat came to be
%no$n as the !erifiability theory of meaning. #he &erifiability theory $as based
upon the &erifiability principle" $hich states 4A statement is literally meanin!ful (it
e/presses a proposition) if and only if it is either analytic or empirically &erifiable.4
5o$e&er" the &erifiability principle is not empirically &erifiable" thou!h there is
speculation that there is an analytic proof possible. Considerable misunderstandin!
e/ists as to the thou!ht that the principle in&alidates itself since some formulations of
the theory do not mention analytic &erifiability.
Brior to the de&elopment of the &erifiability principle" Immanuel Jant classified
statements into t$o cate!ories" a set of analytic statements" and a set of synthetic
statements UDV. 0or Jant" the truth of a mathematical statement had to be
determined inside the mind" and he called any such statement analytic" in contrast to
a synthetic statement li%e 4the s%y is blue4" $hich re8uires the use of sensory
perception to &erify.
#he classification terms analytic@synthetic ha&e fallen into disuse in contemporary
formal lo!ic" but the idea of a statement bein! empirically &erifiable $as ta%en up by
in the t$entieth century by the lo!ical positi&ists of the (ienna Circle" $ho used it to
build upon the theory of lan!ua!e that 7ud$i! <itt!enstein had introduced in his
3ogisch-Philosophische :bhandlung. In essence" Jant-s synthetic statements are $hat
are no$ called empirical statements. If an empirical statement is true" it ou!ht to be
empirically &erifiable" and if an empirical statement is false" it ou!ht to be
empirically falsifiable. But" the &erifiability priniciple is indeed an e/ample of one of
Jant-s analytic statements. #he &erifiability theory of meanin! is also closely related
to the correspondence theory of truth.
#he &erifiability theory is an important ar!ument for nonco!niti&ism.
........................................................................
Set theory is the mathematical theory of sets" $hich represent collections of
abstract ob6ects. It encompasses the e&eryday notions" introduced in primary school"
of collections of ob6ects" and the elements of" and membership in" such collections.
In most modern mathematical formalisms" set theory pro&ides the lan!ua!e in $hich
mathematical ob6ects are described. It is (alon! $ith lo!ic and the predicate calculus)
3
one of the a/iomatic foundations for mathematics" allo$in! mathematical ob6ects to
be constructed formally from the undefined terms of 4set4" and 4set membership4. It is
in its o$n ri!ht a branch of mathematics and an acti&e field of on!oin! mathematical
research.
In nai&e set theory" sets are introduced and understood usin! $hat is ta%en to be the
selfe&ident concept of sets as collections of ob6ects considered as a $hole.
In a/iomatic set theory" the concepts of sets and set membership are defined
indirectly by first postulatin! certain a/ioms $hich specify their properties. In this
conception" sets and set membership are fundamental concepts li%e point and line in
Euclidian !eometry" and are not themsel&es directly defined.
........................................................................
7o!ical Atomism is a philosophical belief that ori!inated in the early H0th century
$ith the de&elopment of Analytic philosophy. Its principal e/ponents $ere the British
philosopher Bertrand *ussell" the early $or% of his Austrianborn collea!ue 7ud$i!
<itt!enstein" and his )erman counterpart *udolf Carnap.
#he theory proposes that lan!ua!e" li%e other components of the $orld" consists of
ultimate lo!ical 4parts4 (or 4atoms4) that cannot be bro%en do$n any further. In order
to understand ordinary lan!ua!e" $e must perform 4analysis4 upon it" attemptin! to
brea% it do$n to these elemental components. *ussell and <itt!enstein disa!reed as
to the nature of these elementary components" and in his Bhilosophical In&esti!ations"
<itt!enstein re6ected them.
#he name for this %ind of theory $as coined in DGD8 by *ussell in response to $hat he
called 47o!ical holism42 i.e. the belief that the $orld operates in such a $ay that no
part can be %no$n $ithout the $hole bein! %no$n first. #his belief is commonly
called ,onism" and in particular" *ussell (and ).E. ,oore) reacted to Absolute
idealism dominant then in Britain.
........................................................................
1rdinary lan!ua!e philosophy is less a philosophical doctrine or school than it is a
loose net$or% of approaches to traditional philosophical problems. #hese approaches
typically in&ol&e esche$in! philosophical 4theories4 in fa&our of close attention to the
details of the use of e&eryday" 4ordinary4 lan!ua!e. #hey are !enerally associated $ith
the $or%s of 9. 7. Austin" )ilbert *yle and $ith the later $or% of 7ud$i! <itt!enstein.
#he name comes from the contrast bet$een these approaches and the earlier
approaches that had been dominant in analytic philosophy" and are no$ sometimes
called 5deal language philosophy.
5istory
Early analytic philosophy had a less positi&e &ie$ of ordinary lan!ua!e. Bertrand
*ussell tended to dismiss lan!ua!e as bein! of little philosophical si!nificance" and
ordinary lan!ua!e as 6ust bein! too confused to help sol&e metaphysical and
epistemolo!ical problems. 0re!e" the (ienna Circle (especially *udolf Carnap)" the
youn! <itt!enstein" and <. (. ^uine" all attempted to impro&e upon it" in particular
usin! the resources of modern lo!ic. <itt!enstein-s &ie$ in the #ractatus 7o!ico
4!
Bhilosophicus more or less a!reed $ith *ussell that lan!ua!e ou!ht to be reformulated
so as to be unambi!uous" so as to accurately represent the $orld" so that $e could
better deal $ith the 8uestions of philosophy.
#he seachan!e brou!ht on by <itt!enstein-s $or% in the DG30s centred lar!ely around
the idea that there is nothin! wrong $ith ordinary lan!ua!e as it stands" and that
many traditional philosophical problems $ere only illusions brou!ht on by
misunderstandin!s about lan!ua!e and related sub6ects. #he former idea led to
re6ectin! the approaches of earlier analytic philosophyar!uably" of any earlier
philosophyand the latter led to replacin! them $ith the contemplation of lan!ua!e
in its normal use" in order to 4dissol&e4 the appearance of philosophical problems"
rather than attempt to sol&e them. 1rdinary lan!ua!e philosophy" also called
linguistic philosophy is thus sometimes ta%en as an e/tension of" and sometimes as
an alternati&e to" analytic philosophy.
Althou!h hea&ily influenced by <itt!enstein and his students at Cambrid!e" ordinary
lan!ua!e analysis lar!ely flourished and de&eloped at 1/ford in the DGE0s" under
Austin and )ilbert *yle" and $as 8uite $idespread for a time before declinin! rapidly
in popularity in the late DGK0s and early DGL0s. It is no$ not uncommon to hear that
4ordinary lan!ua!e philosophy is dead.4 <itt!enstein is perhaps the only one amon!
the ma6or fi!ures in this &ein to retain anythin! li%e the reputation he had at that
time.
Central Ideas
<itt!enstein held that the meanin!s of $ords reside in their ordinary uses" and that
that is $hy philosophers trip o&er $ords ta%en in abstraction. 0rom En!land came the
idea that philosophy has !ot into trouble by tryin! to understand $ords outside of the
conte/t of their use in ordinary lan!ua!e (see conte/tualism).
0or e/ample3 $hat is realityb Bhilosophers ha&e treated it as a noun denotin!
somethin! that has certain properties. 0or thousands of years" they ha&e debated
those properties. 1rdinary 7an!ua!e philosophy $ould instead loo% at ho$ $e use the
$ord 4reality4. In some instances" people $ill say" 4It seems to me that soandso2 but
in reality" suchandsuch is the case4. But this e/pression isn-t used to mean that
there is some special dimension of bein! that suchandsuch has that soandso doesn-t
ha&e. <hat $e really mean is" 4'oandso only sounded ri!ht" but $as misleadin! in
some $ay. Co$ I-m about to tell you the truth3 suchandsuch4. #hat is" 4in reality4 is a
bit li%e 4ho$e&er4. And the phrase" 4#he reality of the matter is ...4 ser&es a similar
function to set the listener-s e/pectations. 0urther" $hen $e tal% about a 4real
!un4" $e aren-t ma%in! a metaphysical statement about the nature of reality2 $e are
merely opposin! this !un to a toy !un" pretend !un" ima!inary !un" etc.
#he contro&ersy really be!ins $hen ordinary lan!ua!e philosophers apply the same
le&ellin! tendency to 8uestions such as -<hat is #ruthb- or -<hat is Consciousnessb-.
Bhilosophers in this school $ould insist that $e cannot assume that (for e/ample)
-#ruth- -is- a -thin!- (in the same sense that tables and chairs are -thin!s-)" $hich the
$ord -truth- represents. Instead" $e must loo% at the differin! $ays in $hich the
$ords -truth- and -conscious- actually function in ordinary lan!ua!e. <e may $ell
disco&er" after in&esti!ation" that there is no sin!le entity to $hich the $ord -truth-
corresponds" somethin! <itt!enstein attempts to !et across &ia his concept of a
-family resemblance- (see Bhilosophical In&esti!ations). #herefore ordinary lan!ua!e
philosophers tend to be antiessentialist. 1f course" this $as and is a &ery
contro&ersial &ie$point.
41
Important names in the 1rdinary 7an!ua!e school include3 9ohn <isdom" )ilbert *yle
and Beter 'tra$son.
........................................................................
#he semantic theory of truth holds that any assertion that a proposition is true
can be made only as a formal re8uirement re!ardin! the lan!ua!e in $hich the
proposition itself is e/pressed.
#he semantic conception of truth" $hich is related in different $ays to both the
correspondence and deflationary conceptions" is due to $or% published by Bolish
lo!ician Alfred #ars%i in the DG30s. #ars%i" in 41n the concept of truth in 0ormal
7an!ua!es"4 attempted to formulate a ne$ theory of truth in order to resol&e the 7iar
parado/. In the course of this he made se&eral metamathematical disco&eries" most
notably #ars%i-s Indefinablity #heorem" $hich is similar to ):del-s Incompleteness
#heorem. *ou!hly" this states that the concept of 4truth4 for the sentences of a !i&en
lan!ua!e cannot consistently be defined within that lan!ua!e.
#o formulate theories about lin!uistic matters" it is !enerally necessary (in a&oidin!
the semantic parado/es such as the 7iar Barado/) to set the lan!ua!e one is tal%in!
about (the 4ob6ect lan!ua!e4) apart from the lan!ua!e one is using (the
4metalan!ua!e4 or" later" 4use lan!ua!e4) to tal% about it. In the follo$in!" 8uoted
sentences li%e 4B4 are al$ays sentences of the ob6ect lan!ua!e. e&erythin! not in
8uotation is part of the uselan!ua!e. #ars%i-s ,aterial Ade8uacy Condition
(sometimes called 4Con&ention #4) holds that any &iable theory of truth must entail"
for e&ery sentence 4B4 of a lan!ua!e" that3
(D) 4B4 is true if" and only if" p.
($here p abbre&iates" in the metalan!ua!e" the proposition e/pressed by the
sentence 4B4 of the ob6ect lan!ua!e.)
0or e/ample"
(H) 4'no$ is $hite4 is true if and only if sno$ is $hite.
#he first half of (H) is about the sentence" 4'no$ is $hite4. #he second half is about
sno$. #hese sentences (D and H" etc.) ha&e come to be called the 4#sentences.4 #he
reason they loo% tri&ial is that the ob6ectlan!ua!e and the uselan!ua!e are both
En!lish. But this $ould also be a #sentence3
(3) 4Aer 'chnee ist $eiss4 is true (in )erman) if and only if sno$ is $hite.
(It is important to note that as #ars%i ori!inally formulated it" this theory applies only
to formal lan!ua!es. 5e felt that natural lan!ua!es $ere too comple/ and irre!ular to
be suited to such formal treatment. But #ars%i-s approach $as e/tended by Aa&idson
into an approach to theories of meaning for natural lan!ua!es" $hich in&ol&es treatin!
4truth4 as a primiti&e" rather than a defined concept. ('ee truthconditional
semantics.)
#ars%i de&eloped the theory" to !i&e an inducti&e definition of truth" as follo$s.
0or a lan!ua!e 3 containin! t (4not4)" \ (4and4)" & (4or4) and 8uantifiers (4for all4 and
4there e/ists4)" #ars%i-s inducti&e definition of truth loo%s li%e this3
(i) A ne!ation tA is true iff A is not true.
42
(ii) A con6unction A\B is true if A is true and B is true
(iii) A dis6unction A & B is true if A is true or B is true.
(i&) A uni&ersal statement 4for all / A(/)4 is true if each ob6ect satisfies 4A(/)4.
(&) An e/istential statement 4there e/ists / A(/)4 is true if there is an ob6ect
$hich satisfies 4A(/)4.
#hese e/plain ho$ the truth conditions of complex sentences (built up from
connecti&es and 8uantifiers) can be reduced to the truth conditions of their
constituents. #he simplest constituents are atomic sentences. A contemporary
semantic definition of truth $ould define truth for the atomic sentences as follo$s3
(&i) An atomic sentence 0(/D"..."/n) is true (relati&e to an assi!nment of &alues
to the &ariables /D" ..." /n)) if the correspondin! &alues of &ariables bear the
relation e/pressed by the predicate 0.
#ars%i himself defined truth for atomic sentences in a &ariant $ay that does not use
any technical terms from semantics" such as the 4e/pressed by4 abo&e. #his is because
he $anted to define these semantic terms in terms of truth" so it $ould be circular
$ere he to use one of them in the definition of truth itself. #ars%i-s semantic
conception of truth plays an important role in modern lo!ic and also in much
contemporary philosophy of lan!ua!e. It is rather contro&ersial matter $hether
#ars%i-s semantic theory should be counted as either a correspondence theory or as a
deflationary theory. #ars%i himself seems to ha&e intended his account to be a
refinement of the classical correspondence theory.
........................................................................
#he &alidity conditions of &arious sentences $e may encounter in ar!uments $ill
depend upon their meanin!" and so conscientious lo!icians cannot completely a&oid
the need to pro&ide some treatment of the meanin! of these sentences. #he
semantics of lo!ic refers to the approaches that lo!icians ha&e introduced to
understand and determine that part of meanin! in $hich they are interested2 the
lo!ician traditionally is not interested in the sentence as uttered but in the
proposition" an idealised sentence suitable for lo!ical manipulation.
Rntil the ad&ent of modern lo!ic" Aristotle-s 1r!anon" especially 1n Interpretation"
pro&ided the basis for understandin! the si!nificance of lo!ic. #he introduction of
8uantification" needed to sol&e the problem of multiple !enerality" rendered
impossible the %ind of sub6ectpredicate analysis that !o&erned Aristotle-s account"
althou!h there is a rene$ed interest in term lo!ic" attemptin! to find calculi in the
spirit of Aristotle-s syllo!istic but $ith the !enerality of modern lo!ics based on the
8uantifier.
#he main modern approaches to semantics for formal lan!ua!es are the follo$in!3
,odeltheoretic semantics is the archetype of Alfred #ars%i-s semantic theory
of truth" based on his #schema" and is one of the foundin! concepts of model
theory. #his is the most $idepsread approach" and is based on the idea that
the meanin! of the &arious parts of the propositions are !i&en by the possible
$ays $e can !i&e a recursi&ely specified !roup of interpretation functions from
them to some predefined mathematical domains3 an interpretation of first
order predicate lo!ic is !i&en by a mappin! from terms to a uni&erse of
indi&iduals" and a mappin! from propositions to the truth &alues 4true4 and
43
4false4. ,odeltheoretic semantics pro&ides the foundations for an approach to
the theory of meanin! %no$n as #ruthconditional semantics" $hich $as
pioneered by Aonald Aa&idson. Jrip%e semantics introduces inno&ations" but is
broadly in the #ars%ian mold.
Brooftheoretic semantics associates the meanin! of propositions $ith the roles
that they can play in inferences. )erhard )ent=en" Aa! Bra$it= and ,ichael
Aummett are !enerally seen as the founders of this approach2 it is hea&ily
influenced by 7ud$i! <itt!enstein-s later philosophy" especially his aphorism
4meanin! is use4.
#ruth&alue semantics (also commonly referred to as substitutional
6uantification) $as ad&ocated by *uth Barcan ,arcus for modal lo!ics in the
early DGK0s and later championed by Aunn" Belnap" and 7eblanc for standard
firstorder lo!ic. 9ames )arson has !i&en some results in the areas of ade8uacy
for intensional lo!ics outfitted $ith such a semantics. #he truth conditions for
8uantified formulas are !i&en purely in terms of truth $ith no appeal to
domains $hatsoe&er (and hence its name truth-value semantics).
)ametheoretical semantics as made a resur!ence lately mainly due to 9aa%%o
5inti%%a for lo!ics of (finite) partially ordered 8uantification $hich $ere
ori!inally in&esti!ated by 7eon 5en%in $ho studied Henkin 6uantifiers.
Brobabilistic semantics ori!inated from 5. 0ield and has been sho$n e8ui&alent
to and a natural !enerali=ation of truth&alue semantics. 7i%e truth&alue
semantics" it is also nonreferential in nature.
........................................................................
Broof theory" studied as a branch of mathematical lo!ic" represents proofs as
formal mathematical ob6ects" facilitatin! their analysis by mathematical techni8ues.
Broofs are typically presented as inducti&elydefined data structures" such as plain
lists" bo/ed lists" or trees" $hich are constructed accordin! to the a/ioms and rules of
inference of the lo!ical system. As such" proof theory is closer to synta/" $hile model
theory is more purely semantical. #o!ether $ith model theory" a/iomatic set theory"
and recursion theory" proof theory is one of the socalled four pillars of the
foundations of mathematics.
Broof theory can also be considered a branch of philosophical lo!ic" $here the
primary interest is in the idea of a prooftheoretic semantics" an idea $hich depends
upon technical ideas in structural proof theory to be feasible.
........................................................................
#ruthconditional semantics is the name for an approach to semantics of natural
lan!ua!e that sees the meanin! of a sentence bein! the same as" or reducible to" the
truth conditions of that sentence. #his approach to semantics is principally associated
$ith Aonald Aa&idson" and carries out for the semantics of natural lan!ua!e $hat
#ars%i-s semantic theory of truth achie&es for the semantics of lo!ic.
........................................................................
0irstorder predicate calculus or first-order logic (FOL) permits the formulation
of 6uantified statements such as 4there e/ists an x such that...4 ( ) or 4for any x" it
is the case that...4 ( )" $here x is a member of the domain of discourse. A first
44
order (recursi&ely)a/iomatisable theory is a theory that can be a/iomatised as an
e/tension of firstorder lo!ic by addin! a recursi&ely enumerable set of firstorder
sentences as a/ioms. <hat follo$s the 4that...4 is called the predicate and it
e/presses some property. A predicate is an e/pression that can be true of somethin!.
#hus" the e/pressions 4is yello$4 or 4li%es broccoli4 are true of those thin!s that are
yello$ or li%e broccoli" respecti&ely.
0irstorder lo!ic is mathematical lo!ic that is distin!uished from hi!herorder lo!ic in
that it does not allo$ 8uantification o&er properties. A property is an attribute of an
ob6ect2 thus a red ob6ect is said to ha&e the property of redness. #he property may be
considered a form of ob6ect in its o$n ri!ht" able to possess other properties. A
property is considered to be distinct from the ob6ects $hich possess it. #hus first
order lo!ic cannot e/press statements such as 4for e&ery property B" it is the case
that...4 or 4there e/ists a property B such that...4.
Ce&ertheless" firstorder lo!ic is stron! enou!h to formali=e all of set theory and
thereby &irtually all of mathematics. Its restriction to 8uantification o&er indi&iduals
ma%es it difficult to use for the purposes of topolo!y" but it is the classical lo!ical
theory underlyin! mathematics. It is a stron!er theory than sentential lo!ic" but a
$ea%er theory than secondorder lo!ic.
Aefinin! firstorder lo!ic
A predicate calculus consists of
formation rules (i.e. recursi&e definitions for formin! $ellformed formulas).
transformation rules (i.e. inference rules for deri&in! theorems).
a (possibly countably infinite) set of a/ioms or a/iom schemata.
#here are t$o types of a/ioms3 logical axioms $hich are &alid $ith respect to the
predicate calculus and non-logical axioms $hich are true under a special" i.e. the
standard" interpretation of the theory of $hich they are part. 0or e/ample" the non
lo!ical Beano a/ioms are true under the standard interpretation of the symbolism of
arithmetic" but they are not &alid $ith respect to the predicate calculus.
<hen the set of a/ioms is infinite" it is re8uired that there is an al!orithm $hich can
decide for a !i&en $ellformed formula $hether it is an a/iom or not. 0urthermore"
there should be an al!orithm $hich can decide $hether a !i&en application of an
inference rule is correct or not.
(ocabulary
#he 4&ocabulary4 is composed of
D. Rppercase letters B" ^" *"... $hich are predicate &ariables.
H. 7o$ercase letters a" b" c"... $hich are (indi&idual) constants.
3. 7o$ercase letters /" y" ="... $hich are (indi&idual) &ariables.
E. 7o$ercase letters f" !" h"... $hich are function &ariables.
5" 'ymbols denotin! lo!ical operators3 u (lo!ical not)" (lo!ical and)" (lo!ical
or)" (lo!ical conditional)" # (lo!ical biconditional).
6" 'ymbols denotin! 8uantifiers3 (uni&ersal 8uantification)" (e/istential
8uantification).
L. 7eft and ri!ht parenthesis.
'ome symbols may be omitted as primiti&e and ta%en as abbre&iations instead2 e.!. (B
# ^) is an abbre&iation for (B ^) (^ B). #he minimum number of operators
45
and 8uantifiers needed is three (or t$o if $e define the operator nor or nand)2 for
e/ample" u" " and suffice. A term is a constant" &ariable" or function symbol of
nv0 ar!uments.
0ormation rules
#he set of $ellformed formulas (wffs) is recursi&ely defined by the follo$in! rules3
D. 'imple and comple/ predicates If B is an nadic (n v 0) predicate" then
Pa
D
"..."a
n
is $ellformed. If n w D" B is atomic.
H. Inducti&e Clause I 7 If f is a wff" then u f is a wff.
3" Inducti&e Clause II 7 If f and x are wffs" then " " (f x)" (f
# x) are wffs.
E. Inducti&e Clause III 7 If f is a wff containin! a free instance of &ariable x" then
and are wffs. (#hen any instance of x is said to be bound Q not free
Q in and .)
F. Closure Clause 7 Cothin! else is a wff.
#ransformation (inference) rules
,odus ponens suffices as the sole rule of inference. If there are no a/iom schemata"
then a rule of uniform substitution is also re8uired.
Calculus
#he predicate calculus is an e/tension of the propositional calculus. If the
propositional calculus is defined $ith ele&en a/ioms and one inference rule (modus
ponens)" not countin! some au/iliary la$s for the lo!ical e8ui&alence operator" then
the predicate calculus can be defined by appendin! four additional a/ioms and one
additional inference rule.
A/iomatic e/tension
#he follo$in! four lo!ical a/ioms characteri=e a predicate calculus3
B*EAD3
B*EAH3
B*EA33
B*EAE3
#hese are actually a/iom schemata" because the predicate letters & and = in them
can be replaced by any other predicate letters" $ithout alterin! the &alidity of these
formulae.
Inference rule
#he inference rule called Rni&ersal )enerali=ation is characteristic of the predicate
calculus. It can be stated as
46
$here =?x@ is supposed to stand for an alreadypro&en theorem of predicate calculus
and /Z(/) is its closure $ith respect to the &ariable /. #he predicate letter Z can be
replaced by any other predicate letter.
Cotice that )enerali=ation is analo!ous to the Cecessitation *ule of modal lo!ic"
$hich is
.
,etalo!ical theorems of firstorder lo!ic
'ome important metalo!ical theorems are listed belo$ in bulleted form.
1" Rnli%e the propositional calculus" firstorder lo!ic is undecidable. #here is
pro&ably no decision procedure for determinin! for an arbitrary formula B"
$hether or not B is &alid (see 5altin! problem). (*esults came independently
from Church and #urin!.)
2" #he decision problem for &alidity is semidecidable. As ):del-s completeness
theorem sho$s" for any !alid formula B" B is pro&able.
3. ,onadic predicate lo!ic (i.e." predicate lo!ic $ith only predicates of one
ar!ument) is decidable.
........................................................................
In philosophy" an analytic statement" or analytic proposition" is one such that its
truth can be determined (solely) throu!h analysis of its meanin!. 7oosely defined" an
analytic proposition is a proposition the ne!ation of $hich is selfcontradictory" or a
proposition that is true in e&ery concei&able $orld" or a proposition that is true by
definition.
0or e/ample" :ll white cats are white is not only true" but also necessarily true Q
since a ne!ation of it Q 4Cot all $hite cats are $hite4 is selfcontradictory. #he
statement
Begetarians don>t eat meat
is true by &irtue of the meanin!s of its $ords" and it doesn-t ma%e sense to thin% of
!oin! out and studyin! the beha&iour of &e!etarians to see $hether it-s true or not.
'tatements that aren-t analytic Q that is" $hose truth or falsity cannot be established
by reflectin! on their meanin! Q are termed synthetic2 see synthetic proposition.
#here is no sin!le" !enerally accepted" precise definition for analytic proposition" but
philosophers ha&e proposed a small number of closely related definitions" some of
$hich are presented in the remainder of this article.
#he term $as first defined by Immanuel Jant (DLHEyD80E)3
Either the predicate B belon!s to sub6ect A" as somethin! $hich is contained
(thou!h co&ertly) in the conception of A2 or the predicate B lies entirely out of
the conception of A" althou!h it stands in connection $ith it. In the first
instance" I term the 6ud!ement analytical" in the second" synthetical.
:nalytical 6ud!ements (affirmati&e) are therefore those in $hich the
connection of the predicate $ith the sub6ect is co!itated throu!h identity2
those in $hich this connection is co!itated $ithout identity" are called
synthetical 6ud!ments. (0rom the Introduction to %he !riti6ue of Pure
eason.)
47
#his definition is narro$er than definitions currently in use.
7ater philosophers pointed out that if Jantzs definition is accepted" some propositions
that are true by definition are not analytic.
0or e/ample" -A is A- is analytic by Jantzs definition.
But an e8ually ob&ious -If A" then A- is not analytic since it is not framed in the
sub6ectpredicate form. As a result" the definition of analytic proposition $as
e/panded to include statements that are not in sub6ectpredicate form.
#$o principle definitions for -analytic proposition- ha&e since been ad&anced3
D. An analytic proposition is one the ne!ation of $hich is selfcontradictory. If you
deny a true analytic proposition" you al$ays !et a selfcontradictory
proposition.
H. An analytic proposition is a proposition the truth of $hich can be determined
solely throu!h the analysis of the meanin! of its $ords. Cothin! in the $orld
apart from lan!ua!e needs to be e/amined.
0or e/ample" 4All bachelors are unmarried4 is true if $e ta%e 4bachelor4 to
mean 4unmarried man4 y and its ne!ation is selfcontradictory y so it is an
analytic proposition. Its truth is apparent throu!h the definition of its $ords.
But if by 4bachelors4 $e mean 4indi&iduals $ho ha&e recei&ed a certain %ind of
academic de!ree4 then $e ha&e a statement that may or may not be true" but
certainly one that can be ne!ated $ith no contradiction. In other $ords" in this
case $e no lon!er ha&e an analytic proposition" but a synthetic one.
Analytic propositions need not be tri&ial tautolo!ies li%e 4All $hite cats are cats4.
Comple/ mathematical and !eometrical theorems are analytic propositions" since a
denial of such theorems leads to a contradiction. 5o$e&er" in the case of
mathematical and !eometric theorems" the statement that analytic propositions are
true in any concei&able $orld brea%s do$n.
0or e/ample" the theorems of Euclidean !eometry are analytic y but only if the a/ioms
of Euclidean !eometry are assumed. In other $ords" these theorems are analytic
$ithin a specific deducti&e system rather than 4any concei&able $orld4.
Analytic propositions and a priori %no$led!e
Analytic propositions and a priori %no$led!e are related" thou!h not the same.
Analytic propositions are propositions of a certain %ind.
: priori %no$led!e is %no$led!e that can be ac8uired $ithout e/perience of the
$orld.
'o %no$led!e of analytic propositions is commonly held to be a priori %no$led!e.
<hether other %inds of a priori %no$led!e can e/ist is a matter of considerable
debate $ithin philosophy (see synthetic proposition).
........................................................................
48
A synthetic proposition is a proposition that is capable of bein! true or untrue
based on facts about the $orld in contrast to an analytic proposition $hich is true by
definition.
0or e/ample" 4,ary had a little lamb4 is a synthetic proposition since its truth
depends on $hether or not she in fact had a little lamb.
#he truth or falsity of synthetic propositions is contin!ent their truth depends on
$hat the uni&erse is li%e.
Are there synthetic propositions %no$n a priorib
<hether or not it is possible for a synthetic proposition to be a priori is a matter of
considerable contro&ersy in philosophy.
#he empiricists hold that there are no synthetic a priori truths.
#he rationalists hold a contrary &ie$ that there are synthetic truths that are also a
priori.
In rationalist &ie$" certain concepts are deri&ed from e/perience but once these
concepts ha&e been deri&ed" they are seen as necessarily true.
0or e/ample" in this &ie$" $e deri&e the notion that H > H r E from e/perience it
$ould not ha&e occurred to us had $e not e/perienced t$o thin!s" and another t$o
thin!s" becomin! four thin!s but once $e do e/perience it" $e reco!ni=e it as a
necessary truth.
#he Jantian &ie$
Immanuel Jant-s &ie$ $as more in&ol&ed.
In his &ie$" our %no$led!e of the $orld is limited to the phenomenal $orld the
$orld as it is %no$n by the mind. #he noumenal $orld the $orld as it is $hen it is
not sub6ect to the mind is fundamentally not %no$able. #he nature of the
phenomenal $orld is constrained by the nature of the human mind.
Be$are. Althou!h often the noumenal $orld is spo%en about as the $orld 4the $ay it
really is4" the mere proposition that the noumenal $orld contains %no$led!e that
someho$ isn-t accesible to the human mind is false and certainly contrary to the $ay
Jant concei&ed this distinction. #he distinction bet$een phenomenal and noumenal is
merely the distinction bet$een 4sub6ect to the mind4 and 4not sub6ect to the mind4
(-mind- not to be ta%en psycholo!ically but epistemolo!ically).
'o" certain fundamental truths about the $orld for e/ample" that if A precedes B
and B precedes C" A must precede C are truths about the phenomenal $orld only.
<e can-t pro&e 4A must precede C4 in the noumenal $orld. 'o such fundamental truths
are not uni&ersal truths and thus not analytic. 5o$e&er" they are a priori in the
sense that our minds could not possibly thin% other$ise.
........................................................................
In lin!uistics" many !rammars ha&e the concept of !rammatical mood" $hich
describes the relationship of a &erb $ith reality and intent. ,any lan!ua!es e/press
distinctions of mood throu!h morpholo!y" by chan!in! (inflectin!) the form of the
&erb.
4
Because modern En!lish does not ha&e all of the moods described belo$" and has a
&ery simplified system of &erb inflection as $ell" it is not strai!htfor$ard to e/plain
the moods in En!lish. Cote" too" that the e/act sense of each mood differs from
lan!ua!e to lan!ua!e.
)rammatical mood per se is not the same thin! as !rammatical tense or !rammatical
aspect" althou!h these concepts are conflated to some de!ree in many lan!ua!es"
includin! En!lish and most other modern IndoEuropean lan!ua!es" insofar as the
same $ord patterns are used to e/press more than one of these concepts at the same
time.
Currently identified moods include conditional" imperati&e" indicati&e" in6uncti&e"
ne!ati&e" optati&e" potential" sub6uncti&e" and more. Infiniti&e is a cate!ory apart
from all these finite forms" and so are !erunds and participles. 'ome Rralic 'amoyedic
lan!ua!es ha&e o&er ten moods. #he ori!inal IndoEuropean in&entory of moods $as
indicati&e" sub6uncti&e" optati&e" and imperati&e. Cot e&ery IndoEuropean lan!ua!e
has each of these moods" but the most conser&ati&e ones such as Ancient )ree%" and
'ans%rit ha&e them all.
It should be noted that not all of the moods listed belo$ are clearly conceptually
distinct. Indi&idual terminolo!y &aries from lan!ua!e to lan!ua!e" and the co&era!e of
(e.!.) the 4conditional4 mood in one lan!ua!e may lar!ely o&erlap $ith that of the
4hypothetical4 or 4potential4 mood in another. E&en $hen t$o different moods e/ist in
the same lan!ua!e" their respecti&e usa!es may blur" or may be defined by syntactic
rather than semantic criteria. 0or e/ample" the sub6uncti&e and optati&e moods in
Ancient )ree% alternate syntactically in many subordinate clauses" dependin! on the
tense of the main &erb. #he usa!e of the indicati&e" sub6uncti&e and 6ussi&e moods in
Classical Arabic is almost completely controlled by syntactic conte/t2 the only
possible alternation in the same conte/t is bet$een indicati&e and 6ussi&e follo$in!
the ne!ati&e particle -l{-.
Contents
D Indicati&e mood
H Imperati&e mood
3 'ub6uncti&e mood
E Conditional mood
F )eneric mood
K Ce!ati&e mood
L Interro!ati&e mood
8 1ptati&e mood
G Admirati&e mood
D0 Cohortati&e mood
DD 9ussi&e mood
DH Botential mood
D3 E&enti&e mood
DE Aubitati&e mood
DF Bresumpti&e mood
DK 5ypothetical mood
DL Ener!etic mood
Indicati&e mood
#he indicati!e mood is used in factual statements. All intentions in spea%in! that a
particular lan!ua!e does not put into another mood use the indicati&e. It is the most
5!
commonly used mood and is found in all lan!ua!es. E/ample3 4Baul is readin! boo%s4
or 4Baul reads boo%s4.
Closely related is the declarati!e mood $hich indicates that the statement is true"
$ithout any 8ualifications bein! made. It is in many lan!ua!es e8ui&alent to the
indicati&e mood" althou!h sometimes distinctions bet$een them are dra$n.
Imperati&e mood
#he imperati!e mood e/presses commands" direct re8uests" and prohibitions. In
many circumstances" directly usin! the imperati&e mood seems blunt or e&en rude" so
it is often used $ith care. E/ample3 4Baul" read that boo%4.
,any lan!ua!es" includin! En!lish" use the bare &erb stem to form the imperati&e. In
En!lish" secondperson is implied by the imperati&e e/cept $hen firstperson plural is
specified" as in 47et-s !o.4
'ub6uncti&e mood
#he sub8uncti!e mood has se&eral uses in independent clauses. E/amples include
discussin! hypothetical or unli%ely e&ents" e/pressin! opinions or emotions" or ma%in!
polite re8uests (the e/act scope is lan!ua!especific). A sub6uncti&e mood e/ists in
En!lish" but appears to be fallin! out of common use2 many nati&e En!lish spea%ers do
not use it. E/ample3 4I su!!ested that Baul read boo%s4. Baul is not in fact readin! the
boo%. Contrast this $ith the sentence 4Baul reads boo%s4" $here the &erb read has the
third person sin!ular endin!. Another $ay" especially in British En!lish" of e/pressin!
this mi!ht be 4I su!!ested that Baul should read boo%s.4" deri&ed from 4Baul should
read boo%s.4 1ther uses of the sub6uncti&e in En!lish" as in 4And if he be not able to
brin! a lamb" then he shall brin! for his trespass...4 (J9( 7e&iticus F3L) ha&e definitely
become archaic. 'tatements such as 4I $ill ensure that he lea&e immediately4 often
sound archaic or o&erly formal" and ha&e been almost completely supplented by
constructions li%e 4I $ill ensure that he lea&es immediately42 of course" one could
easily ar!ue that the sub6uncti&e mood is not truly fadin! from use" but is simply
becomin! morphologically indistin!uishible from the indicati&e mood $hile remainin!
contextually ali&e and $ell.
#he sub6uncti&e mood fi!ures prominently in the !rammar of the *omance lan!ua!es"
$hich re8uire this mood for certain types of dependent clauses. #his point commonly
causes difficulty for En!lish spea%ers learnin! these lan!ua!es.
In certain other lan!ua!es" the dubitati&e mood is employed instead of the
sub6uncti&e in referrin! to doubtful or unli%ely happenin!s and the li%e (see also
belo$).
Conditional mood
#he conditional mood is used to e/press a lac% of certainty about $hether the action
e&er occurs" particularly" but not e/clusi&ely" in conditional clauses. In En!lish" the
conditional is manifested by means of the modal au/iliary -$ould- added to the bare
infiniti&e" e.!. 5 would buy. In other lan!ua!es" such as 'panish" it is e/pressed by
means of morpholo!ical mar%in! on the &erb. 'o" the conditional of -9ohn eats- is" in
En!lish" -9ohn $ould eat- (-$ould- > bare infiniti&e of main &erb) and" in 'panish" -9uan
comer|a- (infiniti&e comer ((to) eat)) > thirdsin!ular Na).
#ypically" it introduces subordinate clauses $hich are headed by a phrase rou!hly
meanin! -on the condition that-" such as -if-" -as lon! as-" etc." and these phrases can
51
ha&e their meanin! intensified by items li%e -e&en-" as in -e&en if-. A peculiarity in
En!lish and se&eral related lan!ua!es is that the conditional mood occurs only in the
main clause3 the &erb of the subordinate clause is mar%ed for sub6uncti&e modality.
#his is unusual2 in 0innish" for e/ample" the conditional mood is used both in the main
and the subordinate clauses. An e/ample in En!lish $ith a conditional main clause and
a sub6uncti&e subordinate clause is3 5 would buy a house if 5 earned a lot of money (I
mi!ht buy a house" if I earn a lot of money" but I do not and thus earnin! a lot of
money is a condition for buyin! a house.) Compare 0innish" $here the both clauses
ha&e a conditional mar%er (-isi-)3 -staisin talon. *os ansaitsisin pal*on rahaa.
#he conditional mood does not e/press uncertainty2 this is a distinct mood" the
potential mood" $hich is e/pressed $ith the $ords 4probably4 or 4may4 in En!lish. #he
conditional mood is sometimes erroneously called a tense rather than a mood. #his
practice should be a&oided" as tense refers e/clusi&ely to temporal location" and
therefore in no $ay does it in&ol&e conditions" desires" etc." $hich are all modal.
5o$e&er" despite this" lin!uistics tends to be the only area in $hich such
discrimination ta%es place Q in forei!n lan!ua!e courses" for e/ample" nontemporal
distinctions such as the conditional mood may be erroneously called -tenses-.
)eneric mood
#he generic mood is used to ma%e !enerali=ations about a particular class of thin!s"
e.!. in 4abbits are fast4. one is spea%in! about rabbits in general" rather than about
particular fast rabbits. En!lish has no means of morpholo!ically distin!uishin! !eneric
mood from indicati&e mood" ho$e&er the distinction can easily be understood in
conte/t by surroundin! $ords. Compare" for e/ample3 rabbits are fast" &ersus" the
rabbits are fast. Rse of the $ord 4the4 implies specific" particular rabbits" $hereas
omittin! the $ord 4the4 implies the !eneric mood simply by default.
Ancient )ree% had a species of !eneric mood (the socalled gnomic utterance)"
mar%ed by the aorist indicati&e (normally reser&ed for statements about the past). It
$as used especially to e/press philosophical truths about the $orld.
Ce!ati&e mood
#he negati!e mood e/presses a ne!ated action. In many lan!ua!es" this is not distinct
mood2 ne!ati&ity is e/pressed by addin! a particle before (as in *ussian or Esperanto3
47i ne iras.4)" after (as in archaic or dialectic En!lish3 4#hou remembrest notb4)" or
both (as in 0rench3 49e ne sais pas.4.) 'tandard En!lish brin!s in a helper &erb" do
usually" and then adds not after it3 4I did not !o there4.
In IndoEuropean lan!ua!es" it is not customary to spea% of a ne!ati&e mood" since in
these lan!ua!es ne!ation is ori!inally a !rammatical particle that can be applied to a
&erb in any of these moods. In some nonIndoEuropean lan!ua!es" the ne!ati&e mood
counts as a separate mood" an e/ample of $hich is 9apanese" $hich con6u!ates &erbs
in the ne!ati&e after the suffi/ -nai (indicatin! ne!ation) has been added" e.!. tabeta
(ate) and tabenaatta (did not eat).
It could be ar!ued that ,odern En!lish has 6oined the ran%s of these lan!ua!es" since
ne!ation in the indicati&e mood re8uires the use of an au/iliary &erb and a distinct
synta/ in most cases. Contrast" for instance" 45e sin!s4 T 45e doesn.t sin!4 ($here the
au/iliary to do has to be supplied" inflected to does" and the clitic form of not
suffi/ed to deri&e the ne!ati&e from 45e sin!s4) $ith 4Il chante4 T 4Il ne chante pas42
52
0rench adds the (discontinuous) ne!ati&e particle ne999pas" $ithout chan!in! the form
of the &erb.
Interro!ati&e mood
#he interrogati!e mood is used for as%in! 8uestions. ,ost lan!ua!es do not ha&e a
special mood for as%in! 8uestions" but Cenets does.
1ptati&e mood
#he optati!e mood e/presses hopes" $ishes or commands and has other uses that
may o&erlap $ith the sub6uncti&e mood. 0e$ lan!ua!es ha&e an optati&e as a distinct
mood2 Albanian" Ancient )ree%" 'ans%rit" 9apanese" and 0innish are some that do.
In 0innish" the mood may be called an 4archaic4 or 4formal imperati&e4" e&en if it has
other uses2 ne&ertheless" it does e/press formality at least. 0or e/ample" Gth Article
of the Rni&ersal Aeclaration of 5uman *i!hts be!ins $ith OlkPPn ketn pidtettkP
mielivaltaisesti" 4Cot anyone shall be arrested arbitrarily4" $here lkPPn pidtettkP
4shall not be arrested4 is the optati&e of ei pidtet 4is not arrested4. (Also" usin! the
conditional mood -isi- in con6unction $ith the clitic -pa yields an optati&e meanin!"
e.!. olisinpa 4if I only $as4. 5ere" it is e&ident that the $ish is not" and probably $ill
not be fulfilled.)
In 9apanese the &erb inflection -tai e/presses the spea%er-s desire" e.!. watashi wa
asoko ni ikitai 4I $ant to !o there4. 1ddly enou!h" this &erb form is treated as a
pseudoad6ecti&e3 the au/iliary &erb garu is used by droppin! the end i of an
ad6ecti&e to indicate the out$ard appearance of another-s mental state" in this case
the desire of a person other than the spea%er (e.!. ;on-san wa tabetagatte imasu
49ohn $ants to eat4).
'ometimes this is called a 4desiderati&e mood4" since it indicates desires. 1ccasionally
distinctions are made bet$een different optati&e moods" e.!. a mood to e/press
hopes &.s. mood to e/press desires. (Aesires are $hat $e $ant to be the case2 a hope
is a desire $hich $e ha&e a positi&e attitude to$ards its fulfilment. If you desire
somethin!" but are pessimistic about its occurrence" then you desire but do not hope
for it.)
Admirati&e mood
#he admirati!e mood is used to e/press surprise" but also doubt" irony" sarcasm" etc.
In IndoEuropean lan!ua!es" the admirati&e" unli%e the optati&e" is not one of the
ori!inal moods" but a later de&elopment. Admirati&e constructs occur in Bal%an 'la&ic
(Bul!arian and ,acedonian)" Albanian" ,e!leno*omanian and R%rainian #os%
Albanian. A form of the admirati&e" deri&ed from the Albanian pattern" can be found
in 0rasheriote Arumanian. It seems that the dubitati&e@inferential patterns of #ur%ish
a nonIndoEuropean lan!ua!e influenced Albanian and Bal%an 'la&ic lan!ua!es in
this re!ard.
#he admirati&e carries e&idential &alue. <ritin! on the typolo!y of e&identiality in
Bal%an lan!ua!es" (ictor 0riedman says3
4As !rammaticali=ed in the Bal%an lan!ua!es" e&identiality encodes the spea%er-s
e&aluation of the narrated e&ent" often" but not al$ays" predicated upon the nature
of the a&ailable e&idence. #hese e&identials can be of t$o types3 Confirmati&e
(sometimes called -$itnessed-) and nonconfirmati&e (sometimes called -reported-"
53
-inferential-" and@or -non$itnessed-). #he nonconfirmati&es can" in Austin-s terms" be
felicitous (neutral) or infelicitous. 0elicitous nonconfirmati&es are used for reports"
inferences" etc." for $hich the spea%er chooses not to ta%e responsibility. An
infelicitous nonconfirmati&e e/presses either acceptance of a pre&iously une/pected
state of affairs (surprise" i.e. somethin! the spea%er $ould not ha&e been $illin! to
confirm prior to disco&ery" the mirati&e or admirati&e) or sarcastic re6ection of a
pre&ious statement (doubt" irony" etc." the dubitati&e).4
5bid9" 4Illustrati&e data (rele&ant forms are in slashes and interlinear !lossin! is
omitted to sa&e space" ortho!raphy is simplified for the internet)3 U...V
#o6 @bil@ bo!atN (,acedonian" nonconfirmati&e past)
1 =en!in@mish@N (#ur%ish" nonconfirmati&e past)
Ai @8en%a@ i pasurN (Albanian" nonconfirmati&e present)
5e is richN (to my surprise2 nonconfirmati&e refers to disco&ery of pree/istin!
state)
Ju @8en%a@ m6eshtrib (Albanian" nonconfirmati&e present)
Jade @bil@ ma6storot b (,acedonian" nonconfirmati&e past)
Rsta neredey@mish@b (#ur%ish" nonconfirmati&e past)
<here is the bossb (I am surprised at his absence2 Albanian can ha&e true
present meanin!" Bal%an 'la&ic@#ur%ish cannot)4
Bresent and future tenses also e/ist for such a mood in the abo&ementioned
lan!ua!es" but" $ith the e/ception of the Albanian true nonconfirmative present
illustrated abo&e" these 4nonconfirmati&es" (from perfects)" al$ays ha&e a past
reference to either a real or a putati&e narrated e&ent" speech e&ent" or state of
mind. #hey cannot be used $ith true nonpast reference.4
4Ao t-u hap%a n6c uni&ersitet pri&at4 (Albanian3 A pri&ate Rni&ersity $ill be
opened apparently" i.e. as reported by someone \ to my surprise.)
4(araca%@mish@4 (#ur%ish3 5e $ill be arri&in! as told by someone)
Cohortati&e mood
#he cohortati!e mood is used to e/press plea" insistence" implorin!" self
encoura!ement" $ish" desire" intent" command" purpose or conse8uence. It does not
e/ist in En!lish" but phrases such as 4let us4 are often used to denote it.
9ussi&e mood
#he 6ussi&e mood is similar to the cohortati!e mood" in that it e/presses plea"
insistence" implorin!" selfencoura!ement" $ish" desire" intent" command" purpose or
conse8uence. In some lan!ua!es" the t$o are distin!uished in that cohortati&e occurs
in the first person and the 6ussi&e in the second or third.
Botential mood
#he potential mood is a mood of probability" indicatin! that the action most li%ely"
but not certainly" occurs. It is used in 0innish" 9apanese and in 'ans%rit. (In 9apanese
it is often called somethin! li%e tentati!e* since potential is used to refer to a &oice
indicatin! capability to perform the action.)
In 0innish" it is mostly a literary de&ice" as it has &irtually disappeared from daily
spo%en lan!ua!e in most dialects. Its suffi/ is -ne-" as in [menQneQe mennee
4probably (s@he@it) $ill !o4. 'ome %inds of consonant clusters simplify to !eminates.
54
#his simplification occurs pro!ressi&ely ([rne rre) $ith the resonant consonants 7"
*" and '" and re!ressi&ely $ith stops ([tne nne) and is related to the &iolation of
phonotactical rules concernin! sonority hierarchy. 0or e/ample" kor*ata
[kor*atQneQt kor*annet (4probably you $ill fi/4)" or tulla [tulQneQe tullee
(4probably s@he@it $ill come4). #he potential mood can be used only in present and
perfect tenses. #he &erb ole- 4be4 is replaced by lie" thus 4probably (it) is4 is lienee
(not [ollee). #hus" in the perfect tense" $hich is formed $ith an au/iliary &erb" the
au/iliary &erb lie is used instead of ole- as liene-" e.!. lienet kor*annut 4you probably
ha&e fi/ed4 (not [ollet kor*annut).
In En!lish" it is formed by means of the au/iliaries may" can" ought and must.
E&enti&e mood
#he e!enti!e mood is used in the 0innish epic poem" Jale&ala. It is a combination of
the potential and the conditional. It is also used in dialects of Estonian. In 0innish"
there are theoretically forms li%e this3
-%;&elleisin- r -I probably $ould $al%-
Aubitati&e mood
#he dubitati&e mood is used in 16ib$e" #ur%ish" and other lan!ua!es. It e/presses the
spea%er-s doubt or uncertainty about the e&ent denoted by the &erb. 'ee irrealis.
Bresumpti&e mood
#he presumpti&e mood is used in *omanian to e/press presupposition or hypothesis
re!ardin! the fact denoted by the &erb" as $ell as other more or less similar
attitudes3 doubt" curiosity" concern" condition" indifference" ine&itability. 0or
e/ample" 4Acolo so fi dus.4 (He might have gone there) sho$s the basic
presupposition use" $hile the follo$in! e/cerpt from a poem of Eminescu
4Aeo fi una" deo fi alta... Ce e scris }i pentru noi" @ Bucuro}i leom duce
toate" de e pace" dei r~=boi.4
(/e it one. be it the other999 &hatever fate we have. ( &e will gladly go
through all. be it peace or be it war9)
sho$s the use both in a conditional clause (4deo fi4 suppose it is) and in a main clause
sho$in! an attitude of submission to fate (4leom duce4 we would bear).
5ypothetical mood
#he hypothetical mood" found in *ussian" 7a%ota" and other lan!ua!es" e/presses a
counterfactual but possible e&ent or situation.
Ener!etic mood
0ound in Classical Arabic and &arious other 'emitic lan!ua!es" the ener!etic mood
e/presses somethin! $hich is stron!ly belie&ed or $hich the spea%er $ishes to
emphasi=e" e.!. 4+a%tubun4. (45e certainly $rites.4)
........................................................................
55
Aeflationary theories
1ther philosophers re6ect the idea that truth is a robust concept in this sense. 0rom
this point of &ie$" to say 4R Q R S T4 is true is to say no more than that H > H r E" and
that there is no more to say about truth than this. #hese positions are broadly called
4deflationary4 theories of truth (because the concept has been 4deflated4 of
importance) or 4dis8uotational4 theories (to dra$ attention to the mere
4disappearance4 of the 8uotation mar%s in cases li%e the abo&e e/ample).
In addition to hi!hli!htin! this formal feature of the predicate 4is true4" some
deflationists point out that the concept enables us to e/press thin!s that mi!ht
other$ise re8uire an infinitely lon! sentences. 0or e/ample" I cannot e/press my
confidence in ,ichael-s accuracy by assertin! the endless sentence3
0ichael says. >snow is white> and snow is white. or he says >roses are red> and
roses are red or he says 999 etc9
But I can e/press it succinctly 6ust by sayin!3
&hatever 0ichael says is true.
1nce $e ha&e identified the truth predicate-s formal features and utility"
deflationsists ar!ue" $e ha&e said all there is to be said about truth. #he primary
theoretical concern of these &ie$s is to e/plain a$ay those special cases $here it
appears that the concept of truth does ha&e peculiar and interestin! properties. ('ee
'emantic parado/es" and belo$.)
0rom this point of &ie$ (see )ottlob 0re!e and 0. B. *amsey)" truth is not the name of
some property of propositions Q some thing about $hich one could ha&e a theory. #he
belief that truth is a property is 6ust an illusion caused by the fact that $e ha&e the
predicate 4is true4 in our lan!ua!e. 'ince most predicates name properties" $e
naturally assume that 4is true4 does as $ell. But" deflationists say" statements that
seem to predicate truth actually do nothin! more than si!nal a!reement $ith the
statement.
0or e/ample" the redundancy theory of truth holds that to assert that a statement is
true is 6ust to assert the statement itself. #hus" to say that 4)now is white4 is true is
to say nothin! more nor less than that sno$ is $hite.
A second e/ample" attributed to B. 0. 'tra$son" is the performati&e theory of truth
$hich holds that to say 4)now is white4 is true is to perform the speech act of
si!nallin! one-s a!reement $ith the claim that sno$ is $hite (much li%e noddin! one-s
head in a!reement). #he idea that some statements are more actions than
communicati&e statements is not as odd as it may seem. Consider" for e/ample" that
$hen the bride says 4I do4 at the appropriate time in a $eddin!" she is performin! the
act of ta%in! this man to be her la$ful $edded husband. 'he is not describing herself
as ta%in! this man.
A third type of deflationary theory is the dis8uotational theory $hich uses a &ariant
form of #ars%i-s schema3 #o say that -4B4 is true- is to say that B. 1ne of the most
thorou!hly $or%ed out &ersions of this &ie$ is the prosentential theory of truth" first
de&eloped by Aorothy )ro&er" 9oseph Camp" and Cuel Belnap as an elaboration of
0ran% B. *amsey-s claims. #hey ar!ue that sentences li%e 4#hat-s true4 are
prosentences (see proform)" e/pressions that merely repeat the content of other
e/pressions. In the same $ay that it means the same as my dog in the sentence 0y
56
dog was hungry. so 5 fed it" %hat>s true is supposed to mean the same as 5t>s raining if
you say the latter and I then say the former.
........................................................................
A direct reference theory is a theory of meanin! that claims that the meanin! of
an e/pression lies in $hat it points out in the $orld. It stands in contrast to mediated
reference theories.
9ohn 'tuart ,ill
#he philosopher 9ohn 'tuart ,ill $as one of the earliest ad&ocates of a direct
reference theory of names.
Bertrand *ussell
A paradi!m e/ample of a direct reference theory is that of philosopher Bertrand
*ussell.
Airect *eference
In his direct reference theory" *ussell first distin!uished bet$een a logical sub*ect
and a grammatical sub*ect. #he former is the thin! in the real $orld the referent2
$hile the latter is a description or concept. 5e then claimed that in lo!ic a 4feelin!
for reality4 had to be maintained in order to sa&e discussion from a $hole host of
troubles. And since the lo!ical sub6ect $as made up only of reference" tied to!ether
in strin!s by propositional functions" in lo!ic there $as no meanin! e/cept reference.
*ussell $as also 8uite ali&e to the topic of descriptions. 5is particular interest $as in
definite and indefinite descriptions. Aefinite descriptions ha&e the form of 4the such
andsuch4" and indefinite descriptions ha&e the form of 4a suchandsuch4. *ussell
then made a surprisin! ar!ument3 that descriptions had meaning only if they were
put into bigger statement?s@. #his is because his method of translatin! sentences
necessitated that they be re$ritten in lo!ical notation" and an isolated description
cannot be effecti&ely captured by any such notation.
#a%e the sentence" 4#he %in! of 0rance is bald4" for instance. 0or *ussell" $hat it
really translates as (in a reformed" better En!lish) is3
There is one and only one x such that, x is a King of France, and x is bald.
In this ne$er" better form" the $ord 4the4 no lon!er appears2 it is diffused throu!hout
the rest of the lo!ical translation. #his" for *ussell" is $hy the definite description
4the %in! of 0rance4 is not meanin!ful on its o$n2 the $ord" -the-" doesn-t $or% unless
it appears in the conte/t of a full sentence.
0urthermore" the abo&e can be e/pressed in a more strict lo!ical form ($here J
means 4%in! of france4" B means 4bald4" the bullet means 4and4" and the arro$ means
4ifthen4)3
57
<hich says3 4there is an /" and it is the %in! of 0rance and bald2 and for e&ery y that is
the %in! of 0rance and bald" that y is also /4. In other $ords" this is a &ery lon! $ay of
statin! that there is one and only one %in! of 0rance.
0or *ussell" this lo!ical form $ould pro&ide the spea%er of a lan!ua!e $ith
metaphysical insi!ht as to $hat they are actually spea%in! about.
'aul Jrip%e
7ater on" the philosopher 'aul Jrip%e $ould defend direct reference theory $hen it
comes to proper names. Jrip%e claims that proper names do not ha&e any 4senses4 at
all" because senses only offer contin!ent facts about thin!s.
#o e/plain" he uses the formal e/planation of possible $orlds. #he possible $orlds
thou!hte/periment first ta%es the sub6ect" and then tries to ima!ine the sub6ect in
other possible $orlds. #a%in! )eor!e <. Bush" for e/ample. 0irst (D) the thou!ht
e/periment must state that the name 4)eor!e < Bush4 is the name used to describe
the particular indi&idual man that is typically meant. #hen (H)" the e/perimentor must
ima!ine the possible states of affairs that reality could ha&e been $here Bush $as
not president" or $ent into a different career" $as ne&er born at all" etc. <hen this is
done" it becomes ob&ious that the phrase 4Bresident of the Rnited 'tates in H00E4
does not necessarily describe )eor!e < Bush" because it is not necessarily true in all
possible $orlds2 it only contin!ently describes him. By contrast" for instance" the
$ord 4apple4 $ill al$ays describe the same thin!s across all possible $orlds" because
of premise (D). 'o use of the $ord 4apple4 to describe apples is true in all possible
$orlds.
#erms that are true across all possible $orlds in this $ay are called rigid designators.
........................................................................
A modal lo!ic" or (less commonly) intensional logic" is a lo!ic that deals $ith
sentences that are 8ualified by modalities such as can" could" might" may" must"
possibly. necessarily. eventually. etc. ,odal lo!ics are characteri=ed by semantic
intensionality3 the truth &alue of a comple/ formula cannot be determined by the
truth &alues of its subformulae. A lo!ic that instead allo$s this determination is called
extensionalU classical lo!ic is for e/ample e/tensional. ,odal operators cannot be
formali=ed by an e/tensional semantics3 both 4)eor!e <. Bush is Bresident of the
Rnited 'tates4 and 4H > H r E4 are true" yet 4<ecessarily" )eor!e <. Bush is Bresident
of the Rnited 'tates4 is false" $hile 4<ecessarily" H > H r E4 is true.
A formal modal lo!ic represents modalities usin! modal sentential operators. #he
basic modal operators are usually and . #heir meanin! depends on the particular
modal lo!ic3 in alethic modal lo!ic (the lo!ic of necessity and possibility)"
represents necessity and possibility. A sentence is said to be
possible if it might be true ($hether it is actually true or actually false)2
necessary if it could not possibly be false2
contingent if it is not necessarily true" i.e." is possibly true" and possibly false.
A contin!ent truth is one $hich is actually true" but $hich could have been
otherwise.
58
Contents
D ,etaphysical and other modalities
o D.D Alethic" epistemic
o D.H Aeontic" temporal
H Interpretations of modal lo!ic
3 0ormal *ules
E Ae&elopment of modal lo!ic
,etaphysical and other modalities
Alethic" epistemic
,odal lo!ic is most often used for tal% of the socalled alethic modalities3 4it is
necessarily the case that...4 or 4it is possibly the case that....4 #hese ($hich include
metaphysical modalities and logical modalities) are most easily confused $ith
epistemic modalities (from the )ree% episteme" %no$led!e)3 4It is certainly true
that...4 and 4It may (!i&en the a&ailable information) be true that...4 In ordinary
speech both modalities are often e/pressed in similar $ords2 the follo$in! contrasts
may help3
A person" 9ones" mi!ht reasonably say both3 (D) 4Co" it is not possible that Bi!foot
e/ists2 I am 8uite certain of that24 and" (H) 4'ure" Bi!foot possibly could e/ist.4 <hat
9ones means by (D) is that !i&en all the a&ailable information" there is no 8uestion
remainin! as to $hether Bi!foot e/ists. #his is an epistemic claim. By (H) he means
that thin!s mi!ht ha&e been other$ise. 5e does not mean 4it is possible that Bi!foot
e/istsfor all I %no$.4 ('o he is not contradictin! (D).) *ather" he is ma%in! the
metaphysical claim that it-s possible for Bi!foot to e/ist" even though he doesn>t9
0rom the other direction" 9ones mi!ht say" (3) 4It is possible that )oldbach-s
con6ecture is true2 but also possible that it is false" and also (E) if it is true" then it is
necessarily true" and not possibly false.4 5ere 9ones means that it is epistemically
possible that it is true or false" for all he %no$s ()oldbach-s con6ecture has not been
pro&en either true or false). But if there is a proof (heretofore undisco&ered)" then
that $ould sho$ that it is not logically possible for )oldbach-s con6ecture to be falseQ
there could be no set of numbers that &iolated it. 7o!ical possibility is a form of
alethic possibility2 (E) ma%es a claim about $hether it is possible for a mathematical
truth to ha&e been false" but (3) only ma%es a claim about $hether it is possible that
the mathematical claim turns out false" for all ;ones knows" and so a!ain 9ones does
not contradict himself.
Epistemic possibilities also bear on the actual $orld in a $ay that metaphysical
possibilities do not. ,etaphysical possibilities bear on $ays the $orld might have
been. but epistemic possibilities bear on the $ay the $orld may be (for all $e %no$).
'uppose" for e/ample" that I $ant to %no$ $hether or not to ta%e an umbrella before
I lea&e. If you tell me 4It is possible that it is rainin! outside4in the sense of
epistemic possibilitythen that $ould $ei!h on $hether or not I ta%e the umbrella.
But if you 6ust tell me that 4It is possible for it to rain outside4in the sense of
metaphysical possibilitythen I am no better off for this bit of modal enli!htenment.
#he &ast bul% of philosophical literature on modalities concerns alethic rather than
epistemic modalities. (Indeed" most of it concerns the broadest sort of alethic
modalitythat is" bare lo!ical possibility). #his is not to say that alethic possibilities
are more important to our e&eryday life than epistemic possibilities (consider the
e/ample of decidin! $hether or not to ta%e an umbrella). It is 6ust to say that the
5
priorities in philosophical in&esti!ations ha&e not been set by importance to e&eryday
life.
Aeontic" temporal
#here are se&eral analo!ous modes of speech" $hich thou!h less li%ely to be confused
$ith alethic modalities are still closely related. 1ne is tal% of time. It seems
reasonable to say that possibly it $ill rain tomorro$" and possibly it $on-t2 on the
other hand" if it rained yesterday" if it really already did so" then it cannot be 8uite
correct to say 4It may not ha&e rained yesterday.4 It seems the past is 4fi/ed"4 or
necessary" in a $ay the future is not. ,any philosophers and lo!icians thin% this
reasonin! is not &ery !ood2 but the fact remains that $e often tal% this $ay and it is
!ood to ha&e a lo!ic to capture its structure. 7i%e$ise tal% of morality" or of
obli!ation and norms !enerally" seems to ha&e a modal structure. #he difference
bet$een 4+ou must do this4 and 4+ou may do this4 loo%s a lot li%e the difference
bet$een 4#his is necessary and this is possible.4 'uch lo!ics are called deontic" from
the )ree% for 4duty4.
'i!nificantly" modal lo!ics can be de&eloped to accommodate most of these idioms2 it
is the fact of their common lo!ical structure (the use of 4intensional4 or nontruth
functional sentential operators) that ma%e them all &arieties of the same thin!.
Epistemic lo!ic is ar!uably best captured in the system 4'E4 2 deontic lo!ic in the
system 4A4" temporal lo!ic in 4t4 (sic3lo$ercase) and alethic lo!ic ar!uably $ith 4'F4.
Interpretations of modal lo!ic
In the most common interpretation of modal lo!ic" one considers 4all lo!ically possible
$orlds4. If a statement is true in all possible $orlds" then it is a necessary truth. If a
statement happens to be true in our $orld" but is not true in all possible $orlds" then
it is a contin!ent truth. A statement that is true in some possible $orld (not
necessarily our o$n) is called a possible truth.
<hether this 4possible $orlds idiom4 is the best $ay to interpret modal lo!ic" and ho$
literally this idiom can be ta%en" is a li&e issue for metaphysicians. 0or e/ample" the
possible $orlds idiom $ould translate the claim about Bi!foot as 4#here is some
possible $orld in $hich Bi!foot e/ists4. #o maintain that Bi!foot-s e/istence is
possible" but not actual" one could say" 4#here is some possible $orld in $hich Bi!foot
e/ists2 but in the actual $orld" Bi!foot does not e/ist4. But it is unclear $hat it is that
ma%in! modal claims commits us to. Are $e really alle!in! the e/istence of possible
$orlds" e&ery bit as real as our actual $orld" 6ust not actualb Aa&id 7e$is infamously
bit the bullet and said yes" possible $orlds are as real as our o$n. #his position is
called 4modal realism4. Rnsurprisin!ly" most philosophers are un$illin! to si!n on to
this particular doctrine" see%in! alternate $ays to paraphrase a$ay the apparent
ontolo!ical commitments implied by our modal claims.
0ormal *ules
#here are many modal lo!ics" $ith many different properties. In many of them the
concepts of necessity and possibility satisfy the follo$in! de ,or!anes8ue
relationship3
4It is not necessary that V4 is e8ui&alent to 4It is possible that not V4.
4It is not possible that V4 is e8ui&alent to 4It is necessary that not V4.
Althou!h modal lo!ic te/ts li%e 5u!hes and Cress$ell-s 4A Ce$ Introduction to ,odal
7o!ic4 co&er some systems $here this isn-t true.
6!
,odal lo!ic adds to the well formed formulae of propositional lo!ic operators for
necessity and possibility. In some notations 4necessarily p4 is represented usin! a 4bo/4
( )" and 4possibly p4 is represented usin! a 4diamond4 ( ). <hate&er the
notation" the t$o operators are definable in terms of each other3
(necessarily p) is e8ui&alent to (not possible that notp)
(possibly p) is e8ui&alent to (not necessarily notp)
5ence" the and are called dual operators.
Brecisely $hat a/ioms must be added to propositional lo!ic to create a usable system
of modal lo!ic has been the sub6ect of much debate. 1ne $ea% system" named J after
'aul Jrip%e" adds only the follo$in! to a classical a/iomati=ation of propositional
lo!ic3
Cecessitation *ule3 If p is a theorem of J" then so is .
Aistribution A/iom3 If then (this is also %no$n as
a/iom J)
#hese rules lac% an a/iom to !o from the necessity of p to p actually bein! the case"
and therefore are usually supplemented $ith the follo$in! 4refle/i&ity4 a/iom" $hich
yields a system often called T.
(If it-s necessary that p" then p is the case)
#his is a rule of most" but not all modal lo!ic systems. 9ay Zeman-s boo% 4,odal 7o!ic4
co&ers systems li%e 'D0 that don-t ha&e this rule.
J is a $ea% modal lo!ic" ho$e&er. In particular" it lea&es it open that a proposition be
necessary but only contin!ently necessary. #hat is" it is not a theorem of J that if
is true then is true" i.e." that necessary truths are necessarily necessary. #his
may not be a !reat defect for J" since these seem li%e a$fully stran!e 8uestions and
any attempt to ans$er them in&ol&es us in confusin! issues. In any case" different
solutions to 8uestions such as these produce different systems of modal lo!ic.
#he system most commonly used today is modal logic S9* $hich robustly ans$ers the
8uestions by addin! a/ioms $hich ma%e all modal truths necessary3 for e/ample" if it-s
possible that p" then it-s necessarily possible that p" and if it-s necessary that p it-s
also necessary that it-s necessary. #his has been thou!ht by many to be 6ustified on
the !rounds that it is the system $hich is obtained $hen $e demand that e&ery
possible $orld is possible relati&e to e&ery other $orld. Ce&ertheless" other systems
of modal lo!ic ha&e been formulated" in part" because 'F may not be a !ood fit for
e&ery %ind of metaphysical modality of interest to us. (And if so" that may mean that
possible $orlds tal% is not a !ood fit for these %inds of modality either.)
Ae&elopment of modal lo!ic
Althou!h Aristotle-s lo!ic is almost entirely concerned $ith the theory of the
cate!orical syllo!ism" his $or% also contains some e/tended ar!uments on points of
modal lo!ic (such as his famous 'eaBattle Ar!ument in Ae Interpretatione G) and
their connection $ith potentialities and $ith time. 0ollo$in! on his $or%s" the
'cholastics de&eloped the !round$or% for a ri!orous theory of modal lo!ic" mostly
$ithin the conte/t of commentary on the lo!ic of statements about essence and
61
accident. Amon! the medie&al $riters" some of the most important $or%s on modal
lo!ic can be found in the $or%s of <illiam of 1c%ham and 9ohn Auns 'cotus.
#he founder of formal modal lo!ic is C. I. 7e$is" $ho introduced a system (later
called '3) in his mono!raph : )urvey of )ymbolic 3ogic (DGD8) and ($ith C. 5.
7an!ford) the systems 'D'F in the boo% )ymbolic 3ogic (DG3H). 9. C. C. ,cJinsey used
al!ebraic methods (Boolean al!ebras $ith operators) to pro&e the decidability of
7e$is- 'H and 'E in DGED. 'aul Jrip%e de&ised the relational semantics or possible
worlds semantics for modal lo!ics startin! in DGFG. (au!han Bratt introduced dynamic
lo!ic in DGLK. Amir Bnueli proposed the use of temporal lo!ic to formalise the
beha&iour of continually operatin! concurrent pro!rams in DGLL.
#emporal lo!ic" ori!inated by A. C. Brior in DGFL" is closely related to modal lo!ic" as
addin! modal operators U0V and UBV" meanin!" respecti&ely" henceforth and hitherto"
leads to a system of temporal lo!ic.
0la&ours of modal lo!ics include3 propositional dynamic lo!ic (BA7)" propositional
linear temporal lo!ic (B7#7)" linear temporal lo!ic (7#7)" computational tree lo!ic
(C#7)" 5ennessy,ilner lo!ic" 'D'F" and #.
........................................................................
#he term natural lan!ua!e is used to distin!uish lan!ua!es spo%en and si!ned (by
hand si!nals and facial e/pressions) by humans for !eneralpurpose communication
from constructs such as $ritin!" computerpro!rammin! lan!ua!es or the 4lan!ua!es4
used in the study of formal lo!ic" especially mathematical lo!ic. In the philosophy of
lan!ua!e" the term ordinary language is sometimes used as synonymous $ith natural
(as opposed to mathematical or lo!ical) lan!ua!e. Catural lan!ua!e is also considered
a field of $ea% artificial intelli!ence. #he term has been adopted to describe
computer input terms and lan!ua!e modeled after or based on natural human
lan!ua!es rather than the artificial synta/ and terms of computer lan!ua!es"
particularly in the areas of search en!ines or search functions.
A natural lan!ua!e is any lan!ua!e that is spo%en and can be understood
Additionally" the indi!enous si!ned lan!ua!es of the $orld merit inclusion as natural
lan!ua!es o$in! to e/tensi&e lin!uistic analysis in the latter H0th century confirmin!
their uni8ue and consistent !rammar" synta/" rules and &isual lo!ic dramatically
unli%e the spo%en lan!ua!es of the nations or !eo!raphic re!ions in $hich they arose.
American" 0rench" and British 'i!n 7an!ua!es are the best documented e/amples in
the literature.
Constructed lan!ua!es
Beside ethnic lan!ua!es constructed lan!ua!es such as Esperanto that ha&e e&ol&ed to
the point of ha&in! nati&e spea%ers may also be considered natural lan!ua!es. (#here
are estimated to be H00H000 nati&e spea%ers of Esperanto2 the number of persons
fluent in Esperanto is much lar!er.)
<ritten lan!ua!es
<ritten lan!ua!es are not considered natural lan!ua!es because until &ery recently"
most people could neither read nor $rite but $ere nonetheless fluent spea%ers of at
least some spo%en or si!ned lan!ua!e. Also" people pic% up natural lan!ua!es
spontaneously as children" but ha&e to be tau!ht to read and $rite.
62
Computer science
Catural lan!ua!es are deemed to be unsuitable for pro!rammin! lan!ua!es simply
because they ha&e a &ast &ocabulary that can be deemed infinite" comple/
!rammatical rules and a sense of ambi!uity surroundin! them. #a%e En!lish and
0rench" for e/ample. It ta%es many years to completely master a lan!ua!e" and this
$ould ha&e been a $aste of time $hen dealin! $ith computin! learnin! a simple yet
efficient embedded lan!ua!e is deemed much easier.
........................................................................
Bra!matics is !enerally the study of natural lan!ua!e understandin!" and specifically
the study of ho$ conte/t influences the interpretation of meanin!s. It is a subfield of
lin!uistics.
Conte/t here must be interpreted as situation as it may include any ima!inable
e/tralin!uistic factor" includin! social" en&ironmental" and psycholo!ical factors.
,ethodolo!y and presuppositions
Bra!matics is interested predominantly in utterances" made up of sentences" and
usually in the conte/t of con&ersations.
A distinction is made in pra!matics bet$een sentence meaning and speaker meaning.
'entence meanin! is the literal meanin! of the sentence" $hile the spea%er meanin!
is the concept that the spea%er is tryin! to con&ey.
#he ability to understand another spea%er-s intended meanin! is called pragmatic
competence.
*elated fields
Accordin! to Charles <. ,orris" pra!matics tries to understand the relationship
bet$een si!ns and interpretations" $hile semantics tends to focus on the actual
ob6ects or ideas that a $ord refers to" and synta/ (or 4syntactics4) e/amines the
relationship bet$een si!ns.
........................................................................
In the main" semantics (from the )ree% semantikos" or 4si!nificant meanin!"4
deri&ed from sema. si!n) is the study of meanin!" in some sense of that term. It
should not be confused $ith the !eneral semantics of Alfred Jor=ybs%i" a some$hat
different discipline. 'emantics is often opposed to synta/" in $hich case the former
pertains to $hat somethin! means $hile the latter pertains to the formal
structure@patterns in $hich somethin! is expressed (for e/ample $ritten or spo%en).
'emantics is distin!uished from ontolo!y (study of e/istence) in bein! about the use of
a $ord more than the nature of the entity referenced by the $ord. #his is reflected in
the ar!ument" 4#hat-s only semantics"4 $hen someone tries to dra$ conclusions about
$hat is true about the $orld based on $hat is true about a $ord.
'e&eral more particular senses of the $ord can be identified3
In lin!uistics
63
Semantics is a subfield of lin!uistics that is traditionally defined as the study of
meanin! of (parts of) $ords" phrases" sentences" and te/ts. Semantics can be
approached from a theoretical as $ell as an empirical (for e/ample psycholin!uistic
and neuroscientific) point of &ie$. #he decompositional perspecti&e to$ards meanin!
holds that the meanin! of $ords can be analy=ed by definin! meanin! atoms or
primiti&es" $hich establish a language of thought. An area of study is the meanin! of
compounds" another is the study of relations bet$een different lin!uistic e/pressions
(homonymy" synonymy" antonymy" polysemy" paronyms" hypernymy" hyponymy"
meronymy" metonymy" holonymy" e/ocentric" and endocentric). 'emantics includes
the study of thematic roles" ar!ument structure" and its lin%in! to synta/. 'emantics
deals $ith sense and reference" truth conditions" and discourse analysis. Bra!matics
is often considered a part of semantics" but other$ise is treated as a branch of its
o$n.
'ee also
semantic class
semantic feature
'emantic Chan!e
semantic pro!ression
semantic property
Colorless !reen ideas sleep furiously
sememe
In mathematics and computer science
4Semantics4 is also used as a term in mathematics and computer science.
'ee also
a/iomatic semantics
denotational semantics
!ame semantics
formal semantics of pro!rammin! lan!ua!es
operational semantics
semantic spectrum
theorybased semantics
In lo!ic
,any of the formal approaches to semantics applied in lin!uistics" mathematical
lo!ic" and computer science ori!inated in techni8ues for the semantics of lo!ic" most
influentially bein! Alfred #ars%i-s ideas in model theory and his semantic theory of
truth. Also" inferential role semantics has its roots in the $or% of )erhard )ent=en on
64
proof theory and prooftheoretic semantics. 1ne of the most popular alternati&es to
the standard model theoretic semantics is truth&alue semantics.
'ee also
formal lo!ic
!ame semantics
!eneral semantics
natural semantic metalan!ua!e
semantic lin%
semantic net$or%
semantics of lo!ic
semantic $eb
semiotics
truth&alue semantics
........................................................................
Universal pragmatics (more recently %no$n as formal pragmatics) is a pro!ram that
tries to e/plain all of the conditions that are necessary for an understandin! bet$een
people to be reached. It is of special interest to many fields" includin! Bra!matics"
'emantics" Aiscourse ethics" 'ociolo!y" symbolic interactionism" 'ocial philosophy"
Ethics" 'emiotics" Informal lo!ic" Epistemolo!y" and the Bhilosophy of mind.
1ne of its most note$orthy proponents" and the one $ho coined the term" is the
philosopher 9r!en 5abermas. 5e su!!ests in his essay" 4<hat is Rni&ersal
Bra!maticsb4 (5abermas DGLG)" that human competition" conflict" and strate!ic action
are really attempts to reach an understandin!. #he implication is that comin! to
terms $ith ho$ people mi!ht understand one another $ould reduce conflict in the
$orld.
0or 5abermas" the !oal of comin! to an understandin! is 4intersub6ecti&e mutuality...
shared %no$led!e" mutual trust" and accord $ith one another4 (3). In other $ords" to
ha&e the !oal of comin! to an understandin! in one-s mind $ould foster
enli!htenment" consensus" and !ood $ill. 'o" for these reasons" one mi!ht see ho$
the pro6ect ou!ht to be ta%en on $ith earnest.
By comin! to an 4understandin!4" he means at least $hen t$o or more actors share
the same meanin!s about certain $ords or phrases" and at most $hen t$o or more
actors share the meanin!s and are confident that those meanin!s fit rele&ant social
e/pectations (or a 4mutually reco!ni=ed normati&e bac%!round4 U3V).
Contents
D 5istory
H )oals and ,ethodolo!y
3 #hree Aspects of Rni&ersal Bra!matics
65
o 3.D #heory of 'peech Acts
E 0ormal Bra!matics and Communicati&e Action
o E.D Communicati&e Competence3 the Basis for (alidity of 'peech
E.D.D An InAepth 7oo% at the (alidity of 'peech
o E.H #he Ideali=ed Bresuppositions of Communication
5istory
Rni&ersal Bra!matics (RB) is the name of a position $ithin contemporary philosophy
$hich see%s to o&ercome three &enerable dichotomies3 body@mind" theory@practice"
and analytic@continental. Coined by 9r!en 5abermas in his DGLK article 4<as heit
Rni&ersalpra!mati%b4 it is part of a lar!er pro6ect" !oin! bac% to ,a/ 5or%heimer-s
foundin! of the pro!ram of Critical #heory in the DG30s" to rethin% at a time of
social crisis the relationship bet$een philosophy and the indi&idual sciences.
#he term itself is already indicati&e of the t$o !reat traditions it see%s to reconcile.
1n the one hand" ideas are dra$n from the tradition of Blato" Aristotle and Jant"
$herein $ords (and their correspondin! concepts) are re!arded as uni&ersally &alid
idealisations ($hose truth content is !leaned by a refle/i&e e/amination of the
collecti&ely shared meanin!s $hich he@she shares $ith most other spea%ers). And on
the other hand" theory is dra$n out of the American Bra!matist tradition ()eor!e
5erbert ,ead" Charles Beirce" Charles <. ,orris) for $hom $ords are arbitrary si!ns
de&oid of intrinsic meanin!" and $hose function is to denote the thin!s and processes
in the ob6ecti&e $orld that surrounds the spea%ers.
RB shares $ith 'peech Act #heory" 'emiotics and 7in!uistics an interest in the details
of lan!ua!e use" but it insists on a cate!oric difference bet$een the lin!uistic data
that $e observe in the -analytic- mode" and the rational reconstruction of the rules of
symbol systems that each reader@listener posesses intuiti&ely $hen interpretin!
strin!s of $ords. In this sense RB is as much a study of the prior conditions for
successful -communicati&e action- as it is a formalisation of the distinction bet$een
lan!ua!e use as an ob6ect of scientific in&esti!ation" and lan!ua!e use as a -rational
reconstruction- of intuiti&e -%no$ho$- that spea%ers and actors in an e/istin!
lin!uistic community (or 4life$orld4) ha&e access to.
)oals and ,ethodolo!y
Rni&ersal Bra!matics is associated $ith the philosophical method of 4rational
reconstruction4.
#he basic concern in uni&ersal pra!matics are utterances (or 4speech acts4) in !eneral.
#his is in contrast to most other fields of lin!uistics" $hich tend to be more
speciali=ed" focusin! e/clusi&ely on &ery specific sorts of utterances such as sentences
($hich in turn are made up of words" morphemes" and phonemes).
0or 5abermas" the most si!nificant difference bet$een a sentence and an utterance
is in that sentences are 6ud!ed accordin! to ho$ $ell they ma%e sense !rammatically"
$hile utterances are 6ud!ed accordin! to their communicati&e &alidity (see section D).
(DGLG2 p.3D)
Rni&ersal Bra!matics is also distinct from the field of sociolin!uistics (or 4empirical
pra!matics4). #his is because R.B. is only interested in the meanin!s of utterances if
they have to do with claims about truth or rightness" $hile sociolin!uistics is
interested in all utterances in their social conte/ts (3D" 33).
66
#hree Aspects of Rni&ersal Bra!matics
#here are three $ays to e&aluate an utterance" accordin! to uni&ersal pra!matics.
4#heory of elementary propositions4 Q the thin!s in the real $orld that are
bein! referenced by an utterance" and the thin!s that are implied by an
utterance" or predicate it.
0or e/ample" the utterance 4#he first Brime ,inister of Canada4 refers to a man
$ho $ent by the name of 'ir 9ohn A. ,acAonald. And the utterance" 4,y
husband is a la$yer4" implies that the spea%er is married to a man.
,ore on these sub6ects can be found in the philosophy of lan!ua!e and formal
semantics.
4#heory of firstperson sentences4 Q the e/pression of the intentions of the
actor(s) throu!h lan!ua!e and in the firstperson.
4#heory of speech acts4 Q the settin! of standards for interpersonal relations
throu!h lan!ua!e.
#his is the domain that 5abermas is most interested in de&elopin! as a theory
of communicati!e action.
#heory of 'peech Acts
#he basic !oal for speech act theory is to e/plain ho$ and $hen utterances in !eneral
are performative. (DGLG2 p.3E)
Central to the notion of speech acts are the ideas of 4Illocutionary force4 and
Berlocutionary force" both terms coined by philosopher 9.7. Austin. 5llocutionary
force describes the intent of the spea%er" $hile perlocutionary force means the
effect an utterance has in the world" or more specifically" the effect on others.
A performati&e utterance is a sentence $here an action bein! performed is done by
the utterance itself. 0or e/ample3 4I inform you that you ha&e a moustache4" or 4I
promise you I $ill not burn do$n the house4. In these cases" the $ords are also ta%en
as si!nificant actions.
5abermas adds to this the obser&ation that speech acts can either succeed or fail"
dependin! on $hether or not they succeed on influencing another person in the
intended $ay (3F).
0ormal Bra!matics and Communicati&e Action
#here are a number of $ays to approach 5abermaszs pro6ect of de&elopin! a formal
pra!matic analysis of communication. Because 5abermas de&eloped it in order to
ha&e a normati&e and philosophical foundation for his critical social theory most of
the inroads into formal pra!matics start from sociolo!y" specifically $ith $hat is
called action theory. #his concerns the nature of human action" especially the manner
in $hich collecti&e actions are coordinated in the functionin! of societies. #he
coordination and inte!ration of social action has been e/plained in many $ays by
many theories. *ational choice theory and !ame theory are t$o e/amples" $hich
describe the inte!ration of indi&iduals into social !roups by detailin! the comple/
manner in $hich indi&iduals moti&ated only by selfinterest $ill form mutually
beneficial and cooperati&e social arran!ements. In contrast to these 5abermas has
formulated a theory of communicative action (DG8E2 DG8L). #his theory and the
pro6ect of de&elopin! a formal pra!matic analysis of communication are inseparable.
67
5abermas ma%es a series of distinctions in the ser&ice of e/plainin! social action. #he
first ma6or differention $as bet$een t$o social realms" the system and the lifeworld.
#hese desi!nate t$o distinct modes of social inte!ration3
#he %ind of social inte!ration accomplished in the system is accomplished
throu!h the functional integration of the conse6uences of actions. It bypasses
the consciousness of indi&iduals and does not depend upon their bein! oriented
to$ards actin! collecti&ely. Economic and industrial systems are !reat
e/amples" often producin! comple/ forms of social inte!ration and
interdependence despite the openly competiti&e orientations of indi&iduals.
#he social inte!ration accomplished in the life$orld" by contrast" depends upon
the coordination of action plans and the conscious action-orientations of
individuals. It relies on processes of human interaction in&ol&in! symbolic and
cultural forms of meanin!. ,ore specifically" as 5abermas maintains" the
coordination of the life$orld is accomplished throu!h communicati&e action.
#hus" communicati&e action is an indispensable facet of society. It is at the heart of
the life$orld and is" 5abermas claims" responsible for accomplishin! se&eral
fundamental social functions3 reachin! understandin!" cultural reproduction"
coordinatin! actionplans and sociali=in! indi&iduals. 5o$e&er" 5abermas is 8uic% to
note" different modes of interaction can (in some $ays) facilitate these social
functions and achie&e inte!ration $ithin the life$orld. #his points to$ards the second
%ey distinction 5abermas ma%es" $hich differentiates communicati!e action from
strategic action2 the coordination of action plans" $hich constitutes the social
inte!ration of the life$orld" can be accomplished either throu!h consensus or
influence.
'trate!ic action is action oriented to$ards success" $hile communicati&e action is
action oriented to$ards understandin!. Both in&ol&e the symbolic resources of the
life$orld and occur primarily by $ay of lin!uistic interaction. 1n the one hand" actors
employin! communicati&e actions dra$ on the uni8uely impellin! force of mutual
understandin! to ali!n the orientation of their action plans. It is this subtle but
insistent bindin! force of communicati&e interactions that opens the door to an
understandin! of their meanin!s. 1n the other hand" actors employin! strate!ic
actions do not e/ploit the potential of communication that resides in the mutual
reco!nition of a shared actionoriented understandin!. Instead strate!ic actors relate
to others $ith no intention of reachin! consensus or mutual understandin!" but only
the intention of accomplishin! predetermined ends unrelated to reachin! an
understandin!. 'trate!ic action often in&ol&es the use of communicati&e actions to
achie&e the isolated intentions of indi&iduals" manipulatin! shared understandin! in
the ser&ice of pri&ate interests. #hus" 5abermas claims" strate!ic action is parasitic
on communicati&e action" $hich means communicati&e action is the primary mode of
lin!uistic interaction. *eachin! a reciprocally defined understandin! is
communicationzs basic function.
Jeepin! in mind this delineation of the ob6ect domain" the formal pra!matics of
communication can be more readily laid out. #he essential insi!ht has already been
mentioned" $hich is that communication is responsible for irreplaceable modes of
social inte!ration" and this is accomplished throu!h the uni8ue bindin! force of a
shared understandin!. #his is" in a sense" the pra!matic piece of formal pra!matics3
communication does somethin! in the $orld. <hat needs to be e/plained are the
conditions for the possibility of $hat communication already does. #his is" in a sense"
the formal piece of formal pra!matics3 a rational reconstruction of the deep
!enerati&e structures that are the uni&ersal conditions for the possibility of a bindin!
and compellin! mutual understandin!.
68
0rom here" 5abermas heads the analysis in t$o directions (DGG8). In one direction is a
%ind of lin!uistic (speech act) analysis" $hich can be placed under the headin! of the
&alidity dimensions of communication. #he other direction entails a cate!ori=ation of
the ideali=ed presuppositions of communication.
Communicati&e Competence3 the Basis for (alidity of 'peech
5abermas ar!ues that $hen a spea%er is communicatin! successfully" they $ill ha&e
to defend their meanin! by usin! these four claims.
D. #hat they ha&e uttered something understandably Q or their statements are
intelligible2
H. #hat they ha&e !i&en other people something to understand Q or are
spea%in! something true2
3. #hat the speaker is therefore understandable Q or their intentions are
recogni)ed and appreciated for $hat they are2 and"
E. #hat they ha&e come to an understandin! with another person Q or" they
ha&e used :ords that both actors can agree upon. (DGLG2 p.E)
'o" for an ad&ocate of uni&ersal pra!matics" these four claims are the basis for &alid
communication.
Any meanin! that meets the abo&e criteria" and is reco!ni=ed by another as meetin!
the criteria" is considered 4vindicated4 or communicatively competent.
In order for anyone to spea% &alidly Q and therefore" to ha&e one-s comments
&indicated" and therefore reach a !enuine consensus and understandin! Q 5abermas
notes that a fe$ more fundamental commitments are re8uired. 0irst" he notes actors
have to treat this formulation of validity so seriously that they might be a
precondition for any communication at all. 'econd" he asserts that all actors must
believe that their claims are able to meet these standards of validity. And third" he
insists that there must be a common con&iction amon! actors that all &alidity claims
are either already vindicated or could be vindicated.
An InAepth 7oo% at the (alidity of 'peech
5abermas claims that communication rests upon a decentered (or none!oistic)
understandin! of the $orld" $hich is an idea he borro$ed from thin%ers li%e Bia!et. A
sub6ect capable of a decentered understandin! can ta%e up three fundamentally
different attitudes to the $orld. 5abermas refers to such attitudes as dimensions of
validity. 'pecifically" this means indi&iduals can reco!ni=e different standards for
&alidity i.e." that the &alidation of an empirical truth claim re8uires different
methods and procedures then the &alidation of sub6ecti&e truthfulness" and that both
of those re8uire different methods and procedures of &alidation than claims to
normati&e ri!htness.
#hese dimensions of &alidity can be summari=ed as claims to truth ;6T<* truthfulness
;6<* and rightness ;+'<. 'o the ability to differentiate bet$een the attitudes (and
their respecti&e $orlds) mentioned abo&e should be understood as an ability to
distin!uish bet$een types of &alidity claims.
6
As Coo%e ($ho has pro&ided the only boo% len!th treatment of 5abermas-
communication theory) e/plains3 $hen $e adopt an ob6ectifyin! attitude $e relate"
in the first instance to the ob6ecti&e $orld of facts and e/istin! states of affairs UI#V2
$hen $e adopt a normconformati&e attitude $e relate" in the first instance" to the
social $orld of normati&ely re!ulated interactions U<EV2 $hen $e adopt an e/pressi&e
attitude $e relate" in the first instance to the sub6ecti&e $orld of inner e/perience U I
V (Coo%e" DGGE).
#his is fundamental to 5abermaszs analysis of communication. 5e maintains that the
performance of any speech act necessarily ma%es reference to these dimensions of
&alidity" by raisin! at least three &alidity claims.
1ne $ay to !rasp this idea is to ta%e an in&entory of the $ays in $hich an attempt at
communication can misfire" the $ays a speech act can fail. A hearer may re6ect the
offerin! of a speech act on the !rounds that it is in&alid because it3
D. presupposes or e/plicates states of affairs $hich are not the case (I#)2
H. does not conform to accepted normati&e e/pectations (<E)2
3. raises doubts about the intensions or sincerity of the spea%er (I).
1f course from this it follo$s that if a hearer accepts the offerin! of a speech act
they do so on the !rounds that it is &alid because it3
D. presupposes or e/plicates states of affairs that are true (I#)2
H. conforms to accepted normati&e e/pectations (<E)2
3. raises no doubts concernin! the intensions or sincerity of the spea%er (I).
#his means that $hen en!a!in! in communication the spea%er and hearer are
inescapably oriented to the &alidity of $hat is said. A speech act can be understood as
an offerin!" the success or failure of $hich depends upon the hearerzs response of
either acceptin! or re6ectin! the &alidity claims it raises. #he three dimensions of
&alidity pointed out abo&e are implicated in any attempt at communication.
#hus" communication relies on its bein! embedded $ithin relations to &arious
dimensions of &alidity. Any and e&ery speech act is infused $ith intersub6ecti&ely
reco!ni=ed claims to be &alid. #his implicitly ties communication to ar!umentation
and &arious discursi&e procedures for the redemption of &alidity claims. #his is
because raisin! a &alidity claim in communication is to simultaniously imply that one
is able to sho$" if challen!ed" that their claim is 6ustified. Communication is possible
because a spea%er is accountable for the &alidity of $hat they say. #his assumption of
responsibility on the part of the spea%er is described by 5abermas as a WwarrantyX. It
is described as a $arranty because in most cases the &alidity claims raised durin!
communication are ta%en as 6ustified" and communication proceeds unproblematically
on that basis. 'imilarly" the hearer is accountable for the stance they ta%e up in
relation to the &alidity claims raised by the spea%er. Both spea%er and hearer are
bound to the &alidity claims raised by the utterances they share durin!
communication. #hey are bound by the $ea% obli!ations inherent in pursin! actions
oriented to$ards reachin! an understandin!. 5abermas $ould claim that this
obli!ation is a rational one3
4<ith e&ery speech act" by &irtue of the &alidity claims it raises" the spea%er enters
into an interpersonal relationship of mutual obli!ation $ith the hearer3 #he spea%er is
obli!ed to support her claims $ith reasons" if challen!ed" and the hearer is obli!ed to
accept a claim unless he has !ood reason not to do so. #he obli!ation in 8uestion is" in
the first instance" not a moral one but a rational one the penalty of failure to fulfill
7!
it is the char!e not of immorality but of irrationality althou!h clearly the t$o $ill
often o&erlap (Coo%e" DGGE).4
#his be!ins to point to$ards the idea of communicati&e rationality" $hich is the
potential for rationality that is implicit in the &alidity basis of e&eryday
communication" the shape of reason that can be e/tracted from 5abermaszs formal
pra!matic analyses.
4#he modern decentered understandin! of the $orld has opened up different
dimensions of &alidity2 to the e/tent that each dimension of &alidity has its o$n
standards of truth and falsity and its o$n modes of 6ustification for determinin!
these" one may say that $hat has been opened up are dimensions of rationality
(Coo%e" DGGE).4
5o$e&er" before the idea of communicati&e rationality can be described the other
direction of 5abermaszs formal pra!matic analyses of communication needs to be
e/plained. #his direction loo%s to$ards the ideali=ed presuppositions of
communication.
#he Ideali=ed Bresuppositions of Communication
<hen indi&iduals pursue actions oriented to$ards reachin! an understandin!" the
speech acts they e/chan!e ta%e on the $ei!ht of a mutually reco!ni=ed &alidity. #his
means each actor in&ol&ed in communication ta%es the other as accountable for $hat
they ha&e said" $hich implies that !ood reasons could be !i&en by all to 6ustify the
&alidity of the understandin! that is bein! achie&ed. A!ain" in most situations the
redemption of &alidity claims is not an e/plicit underta%in! (e/cept in discourses" see
belo$). Instead" each actor issues a WwarrantyX of accountability to the other" $hich
only needs to be redeemed if certain &alidity claims are thro$n into 8uestion. #his
su!!ests that the &alidity claims raised in e&ery communicati&e interaction implicitly
tie communication to ar!umentation.
It is here that the ideali=ed presuppositions of communication arise. 5abermas claims
that all forms of ar!umentation" e&en implicit and rudimentary ones" rest upon
certain ideali=in! suppositions" $hich are rooted in the &ery structures of action
oriented to$ards understandin!. #hese stron! ideali=ations are al$ays understood
as at least appro/imately satisfied by participants in situations $here ar!umentation
(and communication) is thou!ht to be ta%in! place. #hus" $hen durin! communication
it is disco&ered that the belief that these presuppositions are satisfied is not 6ustified
it is al$ays ta%en as problematic. As a result" steps are usually ta%en to reestablish
and maintain the belief that they are appro/imately satisfied" or communication is
simply called off.
D. #he most basic of these ideali=ed presuppositions is the presupposition that
participants in communicati!e exchange are using the same linguistic
expressions in the same :ay. #his is an ob&ious but interestin! point" $hich
clearly illustrates $hat an ideali=ed presupposition is. Itzs a presupposition
because communication $ould not proceed if those in&ol&ed did not thin% it
$as at least appro/imately satisfied (in this case that a shared lan!ua!e $as
bein! used). Itzs ideali=ed because no matter ho$ closely it is appro/imated it
is al$ays counterfactual (because" in this case" the fact is that all meanin!s are
to some de!ree personally defined).
H. Another" basic ideali=ed presupposition of ar!umentation is the
presupposition that no rele!ant argument is suppressed or excluded by the
participants.
71
3. Another is the presupposition that no persuasi!e force except that of the
better argument is exerted.
E. #here is also the presupposition that all the participants are moti!ated only
by a concern for the better argument.
F. #here is the presupposition of attributin! a context-transcending
significance to !alidity claims. #his presupposition is contro&ersial but
important (and becomes e/panded and clarified in the presuppositions of
discourse" see belo$). #he idea is that participants in communication instill
their claims $ith a &alidity that is understood to ha&e si!nificance beyond the
specific conte/t of their a!reement.
K. #he presupposition that no !alidity claim is exempt in principle from
critical e!aluation in argumentation2
L. #he presupposition that e!eryone capable of speech and action is entitled
to participate" and e&eryone is e8ually entitled to introduce ne$ topics or
e/press attitudes needs or desires.
In sum" all these presuppositions must be assumed to be appro/imately satisfied in
any situation of communication" despite their bein! necessarily counterfactual.
5abermas refers to the positin! of these ideali=ed presuppositions as the
simultaneously una&oidable and tri&ial accomplishments that sustain communicati&e
action and ar!umentation.
5abermas calls discourses those forms of communication that come sufficiently close
to actually satisfyin! these presuppositions. Aiscourses often occur $ithin
institutionali=ed forms of ar!umentation that selfreflecti&ely refine their procedures
of communication" and as a result ha&e a more ri!orous set of presuppositions in
addition to the ones listed abo&e.
A stri%in! feature of discourse is that &alidity claims tend to be e/plicitly themati=ed
and there is the presupposition that all possible interlocutors $ould a!ree to the
uni&ersal &alidity of the conclusions reached. 5abermas especially hi!hli!hts this in
$hat he calls theoretical discourses and practical discourses. #hese are tied directly
to t$o of the three dimensions of &alidity discussed abo&e3 theoretical discourse
bein! concerned $ith &alidity claims themati=ed re!ardin! ob6ecti&e states of affairs
(I#)2 practical discourse bein! concerned $ith &alidity claims themati=ed concernin!
the ri!htness of norms !o&ernin! social interactions (<E).
5abermas understands presupposition (F) to be responsible for !eneratin! the self
understandin! and continuation of theoretical and practical discourses. Bresupposition
(F) points out that the &alidity of an understandin! reached in theoretical or practical
discourse" concernin! some factual %no$led!e or normati&e principle" is al$ays
e/panded beyond the immediate conte/t in $hich it is achie&ed. #he idea is that
participants in discourses such as these presuppose that any understandin! reached
could attain uni&ersal a!reement concernin! its uni&ersal &alidity if these discourses
could be relie&ed of the constraints of time and space. #his ideali=ed presupposition
directs discourses concernin! truth and normati&e certainty beyond the contin!encies
of specific communicati&e situations and to$ards the ideali=ed achie&ements of
uni&ersal consensus and uni&ersal &alidity. It is a rational reconstruction of the
conditions for the possibility of earnest discourses concernin! facts and norms. *ecall
that" for 5abermas" rational reconstructions aim at offerin! the most acceptable
account of $hat allo$s for the competencies already mastered by a $ide ran!e of
sub6ects. In order for discourse to proceed" the e/istence of facts and norms must be
presupposed" yet the certainty of an absolute %no$led!e of them must be" in a sense"
postponed.
72
'tri%in! a Bia!etian and Beircian chord" 5abermas understands the deep structures of
collecti&e in8uiry as de&elopmental. #hus" the presupposition shared by indi&iduals
in&ol&ed in discourse is ta%en to reflect this. #he pursuit of truth and normati&e
certainty is ta%en to be moti&ated and !rounded" not in the !i&enness of an ob6ecti&e
or social $orld" but in a learnin! process. Indeed" 5abermas himself is al$ays careful
to formulate his $or% as a research pro6ect" open to refinement.
In any case" reconstructin! the presuppositions and &alidity dimensions inherent to
communication is &aluable because it brin!s into relief the inescapable foundations of
e&eryday practices. Communicati&e action and the rudimentary forms of
ar!umentation that orient the !reater part of human interaction cannot be left
behind. By reconstructin! the deep structures of these 5abermas has disco&ered a
seed of rationality planted in the &ery heart of the life$orld. E&eryday practices"
$hich are common enou!h to be tri&ial" such as reachin! an understandin! $ith
another" or contestin! the reasons for pursuin! a course of action" contain an implicit
and ideali=ed rationality.
In other $ords" communication is al$ays some$hat rational. Communication could
not occur if the participants thou!ht that the speech acts e/chan!ed did not carry the
$ei!ht of a &alidity for $hich those participatin! could be held accountable. Cor
$ould anyone feel that a conclusion $as 6ustified if it $as achie&ed by any other
means than the uncoerced force of the better ar!ument. Cor could the speciali=ed
discourses of la$" science and morality continue if the pro!ress of %no$led!e and
insi!ht $as denied in fa&or of relati&ism.
........................................................................
7o!ical harmony" a name coined by 'ir ,ichael Aummett" is a supposed constraint
on the rules of inference that can be used in a !i&en lo!ical system.
#he lo!ician )erhard )ent=en proposed that the meanin!s of lo!ical connecti&es
could be !i&en by the rules for introducin! them into discourse. 0or e/ample" if one
belie&es that the sky is blue and one also belie&es that grass is green" then one can
introduce the connecti&e and as follo$s3 %he sky is blue :<, grass is green9 )ent=en-s
idea $as that ha&in! rules li%e this is $hat !i&es meanin! to one-s $ords" or at least to
certain $ords. #he idea has also been associated $ith <itt!enstein-s dictum that in
many cases $e can say" the meanin! is the use. ,ost contemporary lo!icians prefer to
thin% that the introduction rules and the elimination rules for an e/pression are
e8ually important. In this case" and is characteri=ed by the follo$in! rules3
Intro3 Elim3
p 8 p and 8 p and 8

p and 8 p 8
An apparent problem $ith this $as pointed out by Arthur Brior3 <hy can-t $e ha&e an
e/pression (call it 4ton%4) $hose introduction rule is that of 1* (from 4p4 to 4p ton% 84)
but $hose elimination rule is that of ACA (from 4p ton% 84 to 484)b #his lets us deduce
anythin! at all from any startin! point. Brior su!!ested that this meant that
inferential rules could not determine meanin!. 5e $as ans$ered by Cuel Belnap" that
e&en thou!h introduction and elimination rules can constitute meanin!" not 6ust any
pair of such rules $ill determine a meanin!ful e/pressionthey must meet certain
73
constraints" such as not allo$in! us to deduce any ne$ truths in the old &ocabulary
(see3 Inferential Conser&ati&eness). #hese constraints are $hat Aummett $as
referrin! to.
5armony" then" referes to certain constraints that a proof theory must let hold
bet$een introduction and elimination rules for it to be meanin!ful" or in other $ords"
for its inference rules to be meanin!constitutin!.
#he application of harmony to lo!ic may be considered a special case2 it ma%es sense
to tal% of harmony $ith respect to not only inferential systems" but also conceptual
systems in human co!nition" and to type systems in pro!rammin! lan!ua!es.
'emantics of this form has not pro&ided a &ery !reat challen!e to that s%etched in
#ars%i-s 'emantic theory of truth" but many philosophers interested in reconstitutin!
the semantics of lo!ic in a $ay that respects 7ud$i! <itt!enstein-s meaning is use
ha&e felt that harmony holds the %ey.
........................................................................
,ediated reference theory is a semantic philosophy that posits that meanin!s
reference somethin! in the e/ternal $orld" but are mediated by some other process.
1ne of the paradi!m cases of a mediated reference theory came courtesy of
mathematician and philosopher )ottlob 0re!e.
,ediated *eference
0re!e sa$ that meanin! could be e/plained as consistin! of t$o elements. 0or 0re!e"
a meanin! has a sense" $hich is $hate&er attributes surround or inhere $ithin an
ob6ect2 and the reference" $hich is the actual thin! bein! referred to. ,oreo&er"
sentences and names ha&e different %inds of senses and referents. #he sense of a
sentence is a proposition" or state of affairs2 the reference is a truth &alue 4true4 or
4false4. #he sense of a proper name is a concept that describes some person2 the
referent of a proper name is the actual indi&idual in the $orld.
U*ussell thou!ht that names $ere a sort of description in dis!uise" $hich seems to be
a similar position to 0re!e-s. 5o$e&er" some scholars (such as )areth E&ans) ha&e
8uestioned $hether or not 0re!e did hold such a &ie$.V
#here are some e/ceptions to the mediated reference theory" ho$e&er. 'ome names
don-t seem to point to thin!s in the $orld as their referent. 0or e/ample" if a person
utters the statement 4It is common %no$led!e that -,ar% #$ain- $as an author4" they
are not 6ust tal%in! about the man ,ar% #$ain" but also tal%in! about $hether or not
people %no$ and reco!ni=e somethin! about the e/pression 4,ar% #$ain4. In this case"
the e/pression itself the si!ns" the strin! of $ords are the sense of the proposition"
and not 6ust the content of the e/pression. In today-s lan!ua!e" these e/ceptions are
called opa/ue contexts.
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74
5irect reference theory* pp =>?
........................................................................
Beha&iorism in philosophy
Beha&iorism is both a psycholo!ical mo&ement and a philosophy. #he basic premise of
radical beha&iorism is that the study of beha&ior should be a natural science" such as
chemistry or physics" $ithout any reference to hypothetical inner states of or!anisms.
1ther &arieties" such as theoretical beha&iorism" permit internal states" but do not
re8uire them to be mental or ha&e any relation to sub6ecti&e e/perience. Beha&iorism
ta%es a functional &ie$ of beha&ior.
#here are points of &ie$ $ithin analytic philosophy that ha&e called themsel&es" or
ha&e been called by others" beha&iorist. In lo!ical beha&iorism (as held" e.!." by
*udolf Carnap and Carl 5empel)" psycholo!ical statements meant their &erification
conditions" $hich consisted of performed o&ert beha&ior. <. (. ^uine made use of a
&ariety of beha&iorism" influenced by some of '%inner-s ideas" in his o$n $or% on
lan!ua!e. )ilbert *yle defended a distinct strain of philosophical beha&iorism"
s%etched in his boo% %he !oncept of 0ind9 *yle-s central claim $as that instances of
dualism fre8uently represented -cate!ory mista%es"- and hence that they $ere really
misunderstandin!s of the use of ordinary lan!ua!e.
It is sometimes ar!ued that 7ud$i! <itt!enstein defended a beha&iorist position" and
there are important areas of o&erlap bet$een his philosophy" lo!ical beha&iorism" and
radical beha&iorism (e.!." the beetle in a box ar!ument). 5o$e&er" <itt!enstein $as
not a beha&iorist" and his style of $ritin! is sufficiently elliptical to admit of a ran!e
of interpretations. ,athematician Alan #urin! is also sometimes considered a
beha&iorist" but he himself did not ma%e this identification.
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#he term Cati&ism is used in both politics and psycholo!y in t$o fundamentally
different $ays. In politics 4nati&ist4 refers to the sociopolitical positions ta%en up by
those $ho identify themsel&es as 4nati&eborn4. In psycholo!y" 4nati&ist4 is comparable
to 4innate4" the 4hard$ired4 components of human psycholo!y.
Bsycholo!ical Cati&ism
In psycholo!y" nati&ism is the &ie$ that certain s%ills or abilities are -nati&e- or hard
$ired into the brain at birth. #his is in contrast to the -blan% slate- or tabula rasa &ie$
$hich states that the brain has little innate ability and almost e&erythin! is learnt
throu!h interaction $ith the en&ironment.
Cati&ism is most associated $ith the $or% of 9erry 0odor" Coam Choms%y and 'te&en
Bin%er" $ho ar!ue that $e are born $ith certain co!niti&e models (specialised
!enetically inherited psycholo!ical abilities) that allo$ us to learn and ac8uire certain
s%ills (such as lan!ua!e). #hey ar!ue that many such abilities $ould other$ise be
!reatly impaired $ithout this !enetic contribution (see uni&ersal !rammar for an
e/ample).
Bsycholo!ist Annette Jarmiloff'mith has put for$ard a theory %no$n as the
representational redescription or ** model of de&elopment $hich ar!ues a!ainst such
strict nati&ism and $hich proposes that the brain may become modular throu!h
e/perience $ithin certain domains (such as social interaction or &isual perception)
rather than modules bein! !enetically prespecified.
75
........................................................................
Connectionism is an approach in the fields of artificial intelli!ence" co!niti&e
science" neuroscience" psycholo!y and philosophy of mind. Connectionism models
mental or beha&ioral phenomena as the emer!ent processes of interconnected
net:ors of simple units. #here are many different forms of connectionism" but the
most common forms utili=e neural net$or% models.
Basic principles
#he central connectionist principle is that mental phenomena can be described by
interconnected net$or%s of simple units. #he form of the connections and the units
can &ary from model to model. 0or e/ample" units in the net$or% could represent
neurons and the connections could represent synapses. Another model mi!ht ma%e
each unit in the net$or% a $ord" and each connection an indication of semantic
similarity.
'preadin! acti&ation
,ost connectionist models include time" i.e. there is a &ariable $hich represents time
and the net$or% chan!es o&er time. A closely related and e/tremely common aspect
of connectionist models is acti!ation. At any time a unit in the net$or% has an
acti&ation" $hich is a numerical number intended to represent some aspect of the
unit. 0or e/ample" if the units in the model are neurons the acti&ation could
represent the probability that the neuron $ould !enerate an action potential spi%e. If
the model is a spreading acti!ation model then o&er time a unit-s acti&ation spreads
to all the other units connected to it. 'preadin! acti&ation is al$ays a feature of
neural net$or% connectionist models. Also see co!niti&e psycholo!y
Ceural net$or%s
,ain article3 <eural networks
Ceural net$or%s are by far the dominant form of connectionist model today. A lot of
research utili=in! neural net$or%s is carried out under the more !eneral name
4connectionist4. #hese connectionist models adhere to t$o ma6or principles re!ardin!
the mind3
1" Any !i&en mental state can be described as a (C)dimensional &ector of numeric
acti&ation &alues o&er neural units in a net$or%.
2" ,emory is created by modifyin! the stren!th of the connections bet$een
neural units. #he connection stren!ths" or 4$ei!hts4" are !enerally represented
as a (CC)dimensional matri/.
#hou!h there is a lar!e &ariety of neural net$or% models" they &ery rarely stray from
these t$o basic principles. ,ost of the &ariety comes from3
5nterpretation of unitsQunits can be interpreted as neurons or !roups of
neurons.
,efinition of activationQacti&ation can be defined in a &ariety of fashions. 0or
e/ample" in a Bolt=mann machine" the acti&ation is interpreted as the
probability of !eneratin! an action potential spi%e" and it-s determined &ia a
lo!istic function on the sum of the inputs to a unit.
3earning algorithmQdifferent net$or%s modify their connections differently.
)enerally" any mathematically defined chan!e in connection $ei!hts o&er time
is referred to as the 4learnin! al!orithm4.
76
Connectionists are !enerally in a!reement that recurrent neural net$or%s (net$or%s
$herein connections of the net$or% can form a directed cycle) are a better model of
the brain than feedfor$ard neural net$or%s (net$or%s $ith no directed cycles). A lot
of recurrent connectionist models incorporate dynamical systems theory as $ell. ,any
researchers" such as the connectionist Baul 'molens%y" ha&e ar!ued that the direction
connectionist models $ill ta%e is to$ards fully continuous" hi!hdimensional" non
linear" dynamic systems approaches.
Biological realism
#he neural net$or% branch of connectionism su!!ests that the study of mental
acti&ity is really the study of neural systems. #his lin%s connectionism to
neuroscience" and models in&ol&e &aryin! de!rees of biolo!ical realism. Connectionist
$or% in !eneral need not be biolo!ically realistic" but some neural net$or%
researchers try to model the biolo!ical aspects of natural neural systems &ery closely.
As $ell" many authors find the clear lin% bet$een neural acti&ity and co!nition to be
an appealin! aspect of connectionism. 5o$e&er" this is also a source of criticism" as
some people &ie$ this as reductionism.
Learning
Connectionists !enerally stress the importance of learnin! in their models. As a result"
many sophisticated learnin! procedures for neural net$or%s ha&e been de&eloped by
connectionists. 7earnin! al$ays in&ol&es modifyin! the connection $ei!hts. #hese
!enerally in&ol&e mathematical formulas to determine the chan!e in $ei!hts $hen
!i&en sets of data consistin! of acti&ation &ectors for some subset of the neural units.
By formali=in! learnin! in such a $ay connectionists ha&e many tools at their hands. A
&ery common tactic in connectionist learnin! methods is to incorporate !radient
descent o&er an error surface in a space defined by the $ei!ht matri/. All !radient
descent learnin! in connectionist models in&ol&es chan!in! each $ei!ht by the partial
deri&ati&e of the error surface $ith respect to the $ei!ht. Bac%propa!ation" first
made popular in the DG80s" is probably the most commonly %no$n connectionist
!radient descent al!orithm today.
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In philosophy" emergentism is the belief in emer!ence" particularly as it in&ol&es
consciousness and the philosophy of mind" and as it contrasts $ith reductionism.
A property of a system is said to be emer!ent if it is more than the sum of the
properties of the system-s parts. ,ore ri!orously" a property P of composite ob6ect -
is emer!ent if it is metaphysically possible for another ob6ect to lac% property P e&en
if that ob6ect is composed of parts $ith intrinsic properties identical to those in - and
has those parts in an identical confi!uration.
Emer!entism in&ol&es a layered &ie$ of nature" $ith the layers arran!ed in terms of
increasin! comple/ity and each correspondin! to its o$n special science. 'ome
philosophers hold that emer!ent properties causally interact $ith more fundamental
le&els" $hile others maintain that hi!herorder properties simply super&ene o&er
lo$er le&els $ithout direct causal interaction.
@istory
Aohn Stuart 2ill
77
9ohn 'tuart ,ill outlined his &ersion of emer!entism in )ystem of 3ogic (D8E3). ,ill
ar!ued that the properties of some physical systems" such as those in $hich dynamic
forces combine to produce simple motions" are sub6ect to a la$ of nature he called
the 4Composition of Causes4. Accordin! to ,ill" emer!ent properties are not sub6ect to
this la$" but instead amount to more than the sums of the properties of their parts.
,ill belie&ed that &arious chemical reactions (poorly understood in his time) could
pro&ide e/amples of emer!ent properties" althou!h modern chemistry has sho$n that
these reactions can be !i&en satisfactory reductionist e/planations. #his raises the
possibility that the emer!entist position is more a matter of epistemolo!y than
metaphysics.
C? 5? Broad
British philosopher C. A. Broad defended a realistic epistemolo!y in %he 0ind and its
Place in <ature (DGHF) ar!uin! that emer!ent materialism is the most li%ely solution
to the mindbody problem. Broad-s definition of emer!ence amounted to the claim
that mental properties $ould count as emer!ent if and only if philosophical =ombies
$ere metaphysically possible. ,any philosophers ta%e this position to be inconsistent
$ith some formulations of psychophysical super&enience.
C? Lloyd 2organ and Samuel &lexander
'amuel Ale/ander-s &ie$s on emer!entism" ar!ued in )pace. %ime. and ,eity" $ere
inspired in part by the ideas in . psycholo!ist C. 7loyd ,or!an-s 'mergent 'volution.
Ale/ander belie&ed that emer!ence $as fundamentally ine/plicable" and that
emer!entism $as simply a 4brute empirical fact43
4#he hi!her 8uality emer!es from the lo$er le&el of e/istence and has its roots
therein" but it emer!es therefrom" and it does not belon! to that le&el" but
constitutes its possessor a ne$ order of e/istent $ith its special la$s of beha&iour.
#he e/istence of emer!ent 8ualities thus described is somethin! to be noted" as some
$ould say" under the compulsion of brute empirical fact" or" as I should prefer to say
in less harsh terms" to be accepted $ith the natural piety of the in&esti!ator. It
admits no e/planation. ('pace" #ime" and Aeity)4
Aespite the causal and e/planatory !ap bet$een the phenomena on different le&els"
Ale/ander held that emer!ent 8ualities $ere not epiphenomenal. 5is &ie$ can
perhaps best be described as a form of nonreducti&e physicalism (C*B) or
super&enience theory.
)eneral 'ystems #heory
7ud$i! &on Bertalanffy founded )eneral 'ystem #heory ()'#)" $hich is a more
contemporary approach to emer!entism. A populari=ation of many of the elements of
)'# may be found in %he &eb of 3ife by 0rit6of Capra.
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*eductionism in philosophy describes a number of related" contentious theories
that hold" &ery rou!hly" that the nature of comple/ thin!s can al$ays be reduced to
(be e/plained by) simpler or more fundamental thin!s. #his is said of ob6ects"
phenomena" e/planations" theories" and meanin!s. In short" it is philosophical
materialism ta%en to its lo!ical conse8uences.
78
*ou!hly this means that chemistry is based on physics" biolo!y is based on chemistry"
psycholo!y and sociolo!y are based on biolo!y. #he first of these are commonly
accepted but the last step is contro&ersial and therefore the frontier of reductionism3
e&olutionary psycholo!y and sociolo!y &s. those $ho claim people ha&e a soul or
another 8uality that separates them from the material $orld. *eductionists belie&e
that the beha&ioralsciences should become a !enuine scientific discipline by bein!
based on !enetic biolo!y.
A &ery typical reductionistic boo% is %he )elfish 2ene by *ichard Aa$%ins. It ar!ues
that because !enes are the fundamental elements of life" all life and all natural
beha&ior can best be understood by studyin! !enetic mechanisms. #his $ay all life is
best re!arded as temporary accommodation and a reproduction de&ice for the !enes.
In his boo% %he /lind &atchmaker" Aa$%ins introduced the term 4hierarchic
reductionism4. #his means that reductionism can only $or% $hen it is used one le&el
at a time. 0or e/ample3 $hen you thro$ 'tephen )ould out of a $indo$" his fall can
be e/plained by classic mechanics. But you should not try to understand his $or% from
such elementary principles.
(#he term is also sometimes used to critici=e an ima!ined position rather than to
describe a real one.)
1ntolo!ical reductionism is the idea that e&erythin! that e/ists is made from a
small number of basic substances that beha&e in re!ular $ays. Compare to
monism.
,ethodolo!ical reductionism is the idea that e/planations of thin!s" such as
scientific e/planations" ou!ht to be continually reduced to the &ery simplest
entities possible (but no simpler). 1ccam-s *a=or forms the basis of this type of
reductionism.
#heoretical reductionism is the idea that older theories or e/planations are not
!enerally replaced outri!ht by ne$ ones" but that ne$ theories are refinements
or reductions of the old theory in !reater detail.
'cientific reductionism has been used to describe all of the abo&e ideas as they
relate to science" but is most often used to describe the idea that all
phenomena can be reduced to scientific e/planations.
7in!uistic reductionism is the idea that e&erythin! can be described in a
lan!ua!e $ith a limited number of core concepts" and combinations of those
concepts. ('ee Basic En!lish and the constructed lan!ua!e #o%i Bona).
#he term 4!reedy reductionism4 $as coined by Aaniel Aennett to condemn
those forms of reductionism that try to e/plain too much $ith too little.
Analytical reductionism as used in 4Is *eductionism A )ood Approach In
'cienceb4 4is the underlyin! a priori of ontolo!ical reductionism4.
#he denial of reductionist ideas is holism2 the idea that thin!s can ha&e properties as
a $hole that are not e/plainable from the properties of their parts. Bhenomena such
as emer!ence and $or% $ithin the field of comple/ systems theory is considered to
brin! forth possible ob6ections to reductionism.
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'ymbolic interactionism is a sociolo!ical perspecti&e (paradi!m) $hich e/amines
ho$ indi&iduals and !roups interact" focusin! on the creation of personal identity
throu!h interaction $ith others. 1f particular interest is the relationship bet$een
indi&idual action and !roup pressures.
7
'ymbolic interactionism su!!ests that the first unit of analysis is the interaction of
indi&iduals. #hrou!h their interactions" indi&iduals create structures" $hich are
symbolic structures. It is not that reality imposes upon us to name thin!s" but rather
that $e re8uire !i&in! names to thin!s in order to ma%e them real. #hrou!h
interaction $e create structure that $e all a!ree on3 this is ho$ society is created.
'ymbolic interactionism allo$s indi&iduals to ne!otiate" manipulate" and chan!e the
structure and reality to a certain e/tent. Indi&iduals are already born into a society
$hich has symbolic structures. 'ymbolic interactionism is &ery physical2 it is about the
thin!s $e see.
#he unit of analysis is facetoface interaction. #his leads to the main deficiency of
the approach3 it tends to i!nore the material reality outside the interaction. 'ymbolic
interactionist analyses i!nore thin!s that cannot be a!!re!ated into the interaction"
such as demo!raphy. #here are other factors that must be ta%en into consideration"
factors $hich are not &isible and are not o&ertly present in the facetoface
interaction.
Coted symbolic interactionists are 5erbert Blumer and Er&in! )offman. )eor!e
5erbert ,ead is seen as a predecessor to symbolic interactionism.
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*hetoric (from )ree% lgl" rhYtZr" 4orator4) is one of the three ori!inal liberal arts
or trivium (the other members are dialectic and !rammar) in <estern culture. In
ancient and medie&al times" both rhetoric and dialectic $ere understood to aim at
bein! persuasi&e. #he concept of rhetoric has shifted from time to time durin! its
HF00year history. #oday rhetoric is !enerally described as the art of persuasion
throu!h lan!ua!e. *hetoric can be described as a persuasi&e $ay in $hich one relates
a theme or idea in an effort to con&ince. 5o$e&er" both the terms 4rhetoric4 and
4sophistry4 can be used today in a pe6orati&e or dismissi&e sense" $hen someone $ants
to deni!rate certain &erbal reasonin! as spurious.
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Aidactic refers to literature or other types of art that are instructional or
informati&e. It does not merely entertain. In this sense the Bible is didactic because it
offers !uidance in moral" reli!ious" and ethical matters. It tells stories of the li&es of
people that follo$ed Christian teachin!s" and stories of people that decided to !o
a!ainst )od and the conse8uences that they faced. Another e/ample is Ale/ander
Bope-s :n 'ssay on !riticism" $hich offers a ran!e of !ood criticism and ad&ice.
#he term 4didactic4 also refers to te/ts that are o&erburdened $ith instructi&e and
factual information" sometimes to the detriment of a reader-s en6oyment. #he
opposite of 4didactic4 is 4nondidactic.4 If a $riter is more concerned $ith artistic
8ualities and techni8ues than $ith con&eyin! a messa!e" then that piece of $or% is
considered to be nondidactic" e&en if it is instructi&e.
'ome ha&e su!!ested that nearly all of the best poetry is didactic. In the contrary
Ed!ar Allan Boe called didacticism the $orst of 4heresies4 in his essay %he Poetic
Principle.
1ther e/amples of didactic literature include3
5nstructions for Parish Priests by 9ohn ,ir%.
%racts by #omas 'titny
8!
<ew 'ngland Primer
2oody %wo-)hoes
%he !o6uette
the ;ataka %ales
#he poem 2eorgics by (ir!il
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7in!uistic transparency is a phrase $hich is used in multiple" o&erlappin! sub6ects
in the fields of lin!uistics and the philosophy of lan!ua!e. It has both normati&e and
descripti&e senses.
Cormati&e
Cormati&ely" the phrase can be used to describe the effort to suit one-s rhetoric to
the $idest possible audience" $ithout losin! rele&ant information in the process.
Ad&ocates of normati&e lin!uistic transparency often ar!ue that lin!uistic opacity is
dan!erous to a democracy. #hese critics point out that 6ar!on is used in both
!o&ernment and the pri&ate sector in order to purposefully encrypt morally suspect
information in order to dull the constituency-s reaction to it3 for e/ample" the phrase
4collateral dama!e4 to refer to the manslau!hter of innocents.
1ne play upon this &ie$ $as by <illiam 'trun% 9r. and E.B. <hite" $ho in the
Elements of 'tyle commanded that the $riter ou!ht to 4esche$ obfuscation4.
#he Blain 7an!ua!e ,o&ement is an e/ample of people $ho ad&ocate usin! clearer"
common lan!ua!e $ithin the $ider academic community.
Brofessor at Ce$ +or% Rni&ersity Alan 'o%al" perpetrator of the 'o%al hoa/" is another
note$orthy e/ample of an ad&ocate of lin!uistic transparency.
<riter and political philosopher )eor!e 1r$ell $as a proponent of this &ie$" $hich he
captured in the landmar% essay" Bolitics and the En!lish 7an!ua!e. 1r$ell $rote a
no&el called DG8E about a dystopian future controlled by use of a politically crafted
lan!ua!e called Ce$spea%. Ce$spea% is a lan!ua!e that $as lin!uistically transparent
in the descripti&e sense" but not in the normati&e one.
Comedian )eor!e Carlin has famously parodied the phenomenon in his standup
comedy.
#he approach may sound li%e common sense" but it faces the difficulty of fi!urin! out
ho$ to communicate comple/ and uncommon ideas in a popular $ay.
Aescripti&e
'emantic transparency is a descripti&e phrase that has been used in lin!uistics to
describe endocentric compounds. Endocentric compound $ords are those $hose
$hole meanin! can be fi!ured out by an analysis of its parts or 4morphemes4. An
e/ample of an endocentric compound is the $ord 4car$ash4. By contrast" some
compound $ords are e/ocentric" meanin! their $hole meanin! cannot be established
by an analysis of parts2 for e/ample" the $ord 4ho!$ash4. E/ocentric $ords are also
%no$n as semantically opa8ue.
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81
An utterance is a performati&e $hen its function is to perform the action mentioned
rather than to e/press a proposition about it (as a constati&e does).
#he term $as introduced by 9. 7. Austin in his paper 41ther ,inds4" and de&eloped in
later $or%s" especially in his DGFF <illiam 9ames lectures" published as How to ,o
%hings with &ords. 5e found !reat difficulty in dra$in! a completely clear distinction
bet$een performati&es and constati&es and e&entually abandoned it in fa&our of a
much more comple/ set of distinctions.
Berformati&es are a special case of illocutions" $hich form the $ider set of utterances
that perform actions rather than e/pressin! propositions (4hoorayN4 is the act of
cheerin!" 4loo% outN4 is the action of $arnin! but not the action of loo%in! out2 they
are thus illocutionary but not performati&e). A clear e/ample of a performati&e
utterance is 4I promise42 uttered in the appropriate conte/t" this is the action of
promisin! rather than a description of such an act. #hus performati&es can be neither
true nor false (one $ho promises can-t be lyin!" thou!h may intend not to %eep the
promise). 1ther e/amples include 4I !i&e and be8ueath this $atch to my brother4 (in a
$ill)" 4I do4 (uttered at the ri!ht point in the $eddin! ceremony)" 4I name this ship the
[ueen 'lizabeth4 ($hen hittin! it $ith a bottle of champa!ne)" 4I bet you si/pence it
$ill rain tomorro$4 (How to ,o %hings with &ords" p.F).
Austin-s insi!hts $ere anticipated by Aa&id 5ume in his discussion of promisin! in :
%reatise of Human <ature" and e&en earlier by #homas 5obbes in 3eviathan.
........................................................................
#he domain of discourse" sometimes called the uni!erse of discourse" is an
analytic tool used in deducti&e lo!ic" especially predicate lo!ic. It indicates the
rele&ant set of entities that are bein! dealt $ith by 8uantifiers.
#he term 4uni&erse of discourse4 !enerally refers to the entire set of terms used in a
specific discourse" i.e. the family of lin!uistic or semantic terms that are specific to
any one area of interest. In modeltheoretical semantics" the term 4uni&erse of
discourse4 refers to the set of entities that a model is based on.
A database is a model of some aspect of the reality of an or!anisation. It is
con&entional to call this reality the 4uni&erse of discourse4 or 4domain of discourse4.
........................................................................
7iterary theory is the theory (or the philosophy) of the interpretation of literature
and literary criticism. Its history be!ins $ith classical )ree% poetics and rhetoric and
includes" since the D8th century" aesthetics and hermeneutics. In the H0th century"
4theory4 has become an umbrella term for a &ariety of scholarly approaches to readin!
te/ts" most of $hich are informed by &arious strands of Continental philosophy. (In
much academic discussion" the terms 4literary theory4 and 4Continental philosophy4
are nearly synonymous" thou!h some scholars $ould ar!ue that a clear distinction can
be dra$n bet$een the t$o.)
7iterary theory and literature
1ne of the fundamental 8uestions of literary theory is 4<hat is literatureb4" thou!h
many contemporary theorists and literary scholars belie&e either that the term
4literature4 is undefinable or that it can potentially refer to any use of lan!ua!e.
'pecific theories are distin!uished not only by their methods and conclusions" but
e&en by ho$ they define a 4te/t.4 0or some scholars of literature" 4te/ts4 means 4boo%s
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belon!in! to the literary canon4. But the principles and methods of literary theory
ha&e been applied to nonfiction" popular fiction" film" historical documents" la$"
ad&ertisin!" etc." in the related field of cultural studies. In fact" some scholars $ithin
cultural studies treat cultural e&ents li%e fashion" football" riots" etc. as 4te/ts4 to be
interpreted. #a%en broadly" then" literary theory can be thou!ht of as the !eneral
theory of interpretation.
'ince theorists of literature often dra$ on a &ery hetero!eneous tradition of
Continental philosophy and the philosophy of lan!ua!e" any classification of their
approaches is only an appro/imation. #here are many 4schools4 or types of literary
theory" $hich ta%e different approaches to understandin! te/ts. ,ost theorists" e&en
amon! those listed belo$" combine methods from more than one of these approaches
(for instance" the deconstructi&e approach of Baul de ,an dre$ on a lon! tradition of
close readin! pioneered by the Ce$ Critics" and de ,an $as trained in the European
hermeneutic tradition).
Broad schools of theory that ha&e historically been important include the Ce$
Criticism" formalism" *ussian formalism" and structuralism" poststructuralism"
,ar/ism" feminism and 0rench feminism" ne$ historicism" deconstruction" reader
response criticism" and psychoanalytic criticism.
5istory
#he practice of literary theory became a profession in the H0th century" but it has
historical roots that run as far bac% as ancient )reece (7on!inus- -n the )ublime is an
often cited early e/ample as is Aristotle-s Poetics)" and the aesthetic theories of
philosophers from ancient philosophy throu!h the D8th and DGth centuries are
important influences on current literary study. #he theory and criticism of literature
are" of course" also closely tied to the history of literature.
#he modern sense of 4literary theory"4 ho$e&er" dates only to appro/imately the
DGF0s" $hen the structuralist lin!uistics of 0erdinand de 'aussure be!an stron!ly to
influence En!lish lan!ua!e literary criticism. #he Ce$ Critics and &arious European
influenced formalists (particularly the *ussian 0ormalists) had described some of their
more abstract efforts as 4theoretical4 as $ell. But it $as not until the broad impact of
structuralism be!an to be felt in the En!lishspea%in! academic $orld that 4literary
theory4 $as thou!ht of as a unified domain.
In the academic $orld of the Rnited Jin!dom and the Rnited 'tates" literary theory
$as at its most popular from the late DGK0s ($hen its influence $as be!innin! to
spread out$ard from elite uni&ersities li%e 9ohns 5op%ins and +ale) throu!h the DG80s
(by $hich time it $as tau!ht nearly e&ery$here in some form). Aurin! this span of
time" literary theory $as percei&ed as academically cuttin!ed!e research" and most
uni&ersity literature departments sou!ht to teach and study theory and incorporate it
into their curricula. Because of its meteoric rise in popularity and the difficult
lan!ua!e of its %ey te/ts" theory $as also often critici=ed as faddish or trendy
obscurantism (and many academic satire no&els of the period" such as those by Aa&id
7od!e" feature theory prominently). 'ome scholars" both theoretical and anti
theoretical" refer to the DGL0s and DG80s debates on the academic merits of theory as
4the theory $ars.4
By the early DGG0s" the popularity of 4theory4 as a sub6ect of interest by itself $as
declinin! sli!htly (alon! $ith 6ob openin!s for pure 4theorists4) e&en as the te/ts of
literary theory $ere incorporated into the study of almost all literature. As of H00E"
the contro&ersy o&er the use of theory in literary studies has all but died out" and
discussions on the topic $ithin literary and cultural studies tend no$ to be
83
considerably milder and less acrimonious. 'ome scholars dra$ hea&ily on theory in
their $or%" $hile others only mention it in passin! or not at all2 but it is an
ac%no$led!ed" important part of the study of literature.
Aifferences amon! schools
#he intellectual traditions and priorities of the &arious %inds of literary theory are
often radically different. 'ome differ so stron!ly that e&en findin! a set of common
terms upon $hich to compare them is not a tri&ial effort.
0or instance" the $or% of the Ce$ Critics often contained an implicit moral
dimension" and sometimes e&en a reli!ious one3 a Ce$ Critic mi!ht read a poem by
#.'. Eliot or )erard ,anley 5op%ins for its de!ree of honesty in e/pressin! the
torment and contradiction of a serious search for belief in the modern $orld.
,ean$hile a ,ar/ist critic mi!ht find such 6ud!ments merely ideolo!ical rather than
critical2 the ,ar/ist $ould say that the Ce$ Critical readin! did not %eep enou!h
critical distance from the poem-s reli!ious stance to be able to understand it. 1r a
poststructuralist critic mi!ht simply a&oid the issue by understandin! the reli!ious
meanin! of a poem as an alle!ory of meanin!" treatin! the poem-s references to 4)od4
by discussin! their referential nature rather than $hat they refer to.
'uch a disa!reement cannot be easily resol&ed" because it is inherent in the radically
different terms and !oals (that is" the theories) of the critics. #heir theories of
readin! deri&e from &astly different intellectual traditions3 the Ce$ Critic bases his
$or% on an EastCoast American scholarly and reli!ious tradition" $hile the ,ar/ist
deri&es her thou!ht from a body of critical social and economic thou!ht" and the post
structuralist-s $or% emer!es from t$entiethcentury Continental philosophy of
lan!ua!e. #o e/pect such different approaches to ha&e much in common $ould be
na&e2 so callin! them all 4theories of literature4 $ithout ac%no$led!in! their
hetero!eneity is itself a reduction of their differences.
In the late DGF0s" Canadian literary critic Corthrop 0rye attempted to establish an
approach for reconcilin! historical criticism and Ce$ Criticism $hile addressin!
concerns of early readerresponse and numerous psycholo!ical and social approaches.
5is approach" laid out in his Anatomy of Criticism" $as e/plicitly structuralist" relyin!
on the assumption of an interete/tual 4order of $ords4 and uni&ersality of certain
structural types. 5is approach held s$ay in En!lish literature pro!rams for se&eral
decades but lost fa&or durin! the ascendence of poststructuralism.
0or some theories of literature (especially certain %inds of formalism)" the distinction
bet$een -literary- and other sorts of te/ts is of paramount importance. 1ther schools
(particuarly poststructuralism in its &arious forms3 ne$ historicism" deconstruction"
some strains of ,ar/ism and feminism) ha&e sou!ht to brea% do$n distinctions
bet$een the t$o and ha&e applied the tools of te/tual interpretation to a $ide ran!e
of -te/ts-" includin! film" nonfiction" historical $ritin!" and e&en cultural e&ents.
Another crucial distinction amon! the &arious theories of literary interpretation is
intentionality" the amount of $ei!ht !i&en to the author-s o$n opinions about and
intentions for a $or%. 0or most preH0th century approaches" the author-s intentions
are a !uidin! factor and an important determiner of the -correct- interpretation of
te/ts. #he Ce$ Criticism $as the first school to disa&o$ the role of the author in
interpretin! te/ts" preferrin! to focus on 4the te/t itself4 in a close readin!. In fact" as
much contention as there is bet$een formalism and later schools" they share the
tenet that the author-s interpretation of a $or% is no more inherently meanin!ful than
any other.
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'chools of literary theory
7isted belo$ are some of the most commonly identified schools of literary theory"
alon! $ith their ma6or authors. (In many of these cases" such as those of the historian
and philosopher ,ichel 0oucault and the anthropolo!ist Claude 7&i'trauss" these
authors $ere not literary critics and did not primarily $rite about literature2 but"
since their $or% has been broadly influential in literary theory" they are nonetheless
listed here.)
American pra!matism and other American approaches
o 5arold Bloom " 'tanley 0ish" *ichard *orty
Cultural studies emphasi=ed the role of literature in e&eryday life
o Baul )ilroy " 9ohn )uillory
Aeconstruction a strate!y of close readin! $hich dra$s out 4undecidable4
interpreti&e decisions" renderin! intelli!ible $hat the te/t does not itself thin%
but ne&ertheless allo$s to be thou!ht
o 9ac8ues Aerrida " Baul de ,an" 9. 5illis ,iller" Bhilippe 7acoue7abarthe"
)ayatri 'pi&a%" A&ital *onell
0eminism (see feminist literary criticism) $hich emphasi=es themes of !ender
relations
o 7uce Iri!aray " 5lne Ci/ous" Elaine 'ho$alter
0ormalism
)erman hermeneutics and philolo!y
o 0riedrich 'chleiermacher " <ilhelm Ailthey" 5ans)eor! )adamer" Erich
Auerbach
,ar/ism (see ,ar/ist literary criticism) $hich emphasi=ed themes of class
conflict
o )eor! 7u%cs " (alentin (oloshino&" *aymond <illiams" #erry Ea!leton"
0redric 9ameson" #heodor Adorno" <alter Ben6amin"
Ce$ Criticism $hich loo%ed at literary $or%s on the basis of $hat is $ritten"
and not at the !oals of the author or bio!raphical issues
o <.J. <imsatt " 0.*. 7ea&is" 9ohn Cro$e *ansom" Cleanth Broo%s" *obert
Benn <arren
Ce$ historicism $hich e/amines a te/t by also e/aminin! other te/ts of the
time period
o 'tephen )reenblatt " 7ouis ,ontrose" 9onathan )oldber!" 5. Aram (esser
Bostcolonialism focuses on the influences of colonialism in literature"
especially re!ardin! the historical conflict resultin! from the e/ploitation of
less de&eloped countries and indi!enous peoples by $estern nations
o Ed$ard 'aid " )ayatri Cha%ra&orty 'pi&a%" 5omi Bhabha
Boststructuralism criticism of structuralism
o ,ichel 0oucault " 9ulia Jriste&a" the late *oland Barthes" )illes Aeleu=e
and 0li/ )uattari" ,aurice Blanchot
Bsychoanalysis (see psychoanalytic literary criticism) E/plores the role of the
subconscious in literature includin! that of the author" reader" and characters
in the te/t
o 'i!mund 0reud " 9ac8ues 7acan" 'la&o6 Zi=e%" (i%tor #aus%
^ueer theory e/amines" 8uestions" and critici=es the role of !ender in
literature
o 9udith Butler " E&e 'ed!e$ic%" ,ichel 0oucault
*eader *esponse focusses upon the acti&e response of the reader to a te/t
o <olf!an! Iser " 5ans*obert 9auss" 'tuart 5all
*ussian 0ormalism
o (ictor 'h%lo&s%y " (ladimir Bropp
'tructuralism and semiotics (see semiotic literary criticism) e/amined the
underlyin! structures in the content of a te/t (plot" for e/ample)
85
o *oman 9a%obson " Claude 7&i'trauss" the early *oland Barthes" ,i%hail
Ba%htin" 9uri6 7otman
1ther theorists3 *obert )ra&es" Alam!ir 5ashmi" 9ohn 'utherland" Corthrop
0rye" 7eslie 0iedler
..........................................................................
5ermeneutics may be described as the theory of interpretation and
understandin! of a te/t throu!h empirical means. It should not be confused $ith the
concrete practice of interpretation called exegesis. E/e!esis e/tracts the meanin! of
a passa!e of te/t and enlar!es upon it and e/plicates it $ith e/planatory !losses2
hermeneutics addresses the $ays in $hich a reader may come to the broadest
understandin! of the creator of te/t and his relation to his audiences" both local and
o&er time" $ithin the constraints of culture and history. #hus it is a branch of
philosophy concerned $ith human understandin! and the interpretation of te/ts.
*ecently the concept of texts has been e/tended beyond $ritten documents to
include" for e/ample" speech" performances" $or%s of art" and e&en e&ents.
'tymology
#he $ord hermeneutics (@ermeneutic means interpretive) is a term deri&ed from the
)ree% &erb -to interpret- (hermneu) and has t$o deri&ations. 1ne is from the )ree%
!od 5ermes in his role as patron of interpreti&e communication and human
understandin!" $hile the other is from the syncretic Btolemaic deity 5ermes
#risme!istus" in his role as representin! hidden or secret %no$led!e.
$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
$
'emiotics or semiolo!y is the study of si!ns" both indi&idually and !rouped in si!n
systems" and includes the study of ho$ meanin! is made and understood. 'emioticians
also sometimes e/amine ho$ or!anisms" no matter ho$ bi! or small" ma%e predictions
about and adapt to their semiotic niche in the $orld (see 'emiosis). 'emiotics
theorises at a !eneral le&el about signs" $hile the study of the communication of
information in li&in! or!anisms is co&ered in biosemiotics.
#he sub6ect $as ori!inally spelled semeiotics to honour 9ohn 7oc%e (DK3HyDL0E)" $ho"
in An Essay Concernin! 5uman Rnderstandin! (DKG0)" first coined the term
4semeioti%e4 from the )ree% $ord ihdo or semeion" meanin! 4mar%4 or 4si!n4.
Clarification of terms
'emioticians classify si!ns and si!n systems in relation to the $ay they are
transmitted (see modality). #his process of carryin! meanin! depends on the use of
codes that may be the indi&idual noises or letters that humans use to form $ords" the
body mo&ements they ma%e to sho$ attitude or emotion" or e&en somethin! as
!eneral as the clothes they $ear. #o coin a $ord to refer to a thing (see le/ical
$ords)" the community must a!ree on a simple meanin! (a denotati&e meanin!)
$ithin their lan!ua!e. But that $ord can transmit that meanin! only $ithin the
lan!ua!e-s !rammatical structures and codes (see synta/ and semantics). Codes also
86
represent the &alues of the culture" and are able to add ne$ shades of connotation to
e&ery aspect of life.
#o e/plain the relationship bet$een 'emiotics and Communication 'tudies"
communication is defined as the process of transferin! data from a source to a
recei&er as efficiently and effecti&ely as possible. 5ence" communication theorists
construct models based on codes" media" and conte/ts to e/plain the biolo!y"
psycholo!y" and mechanics in&ol&ed. Both disciplines also reco!nise that the technical
process cannot be separated from the fact that the recei&er must decode the data"
i.e. be able to distin!uish the data as salient and ma%e meanin! out of it. #his implies
that there is a necessary o&erlap bet$een semiotics and communication. Indeed"
many of the concepts are shared" althou!h in each field the emphasis is different. In
0essages and 0eanings+ :n 5ntroduction to )emiotics" ,arcel Aanesi (DGGE)"
su!!ested that semioticians- priorities $ere to study si!nification first and
communication second. A more e/treme &ie$ is offered by 9ean9ac8ues Cattie=
(DG8L2 trans. DGG03 DK) $ho" as a musicolo!ist" considered the theoretical study of
communication irrele&ant to his application of semiotics.
'emiotics should also be distin!uished from lin!uistics. Althou!h both start from the
same point" semiotics lin%s lin!uistic facts to nonlin!uistic facts to !i&e a broader
empirical co&era!e and to offer conclusions that seem more plausible because"
intuiti&ely" humans understand that one can only interpret language in a social
conte/t (sometimes termed the semiosphere). Bure lin!uistics dismantles lan!ua!e
into its components" analysin! usa!e in slo$time" $hereas" in the real $orld of
human semiotic interaction there is an often chaotic blur of lan!ua!e and si!nal
e/chan!e $hich semiotics attempts to analyse and so identify the systemic rules
accepted by all the participants.
Berhaps more difficult is the distinction bet$een semiotics and the philosophy of
lan!ua!e. In a sense" the difference is a difference of traditions more than a
difference of sub6ects. Aifferent authors ha&e called themsel&es 4philosopher of
lan!ua!e4 or 4semiotician4. #his difference does not match the separation bet$een
analytic and continental philosophy. 1n a closer loo%" there may be found some
differences re!ardin! sub6ects. Bhilosophy of lan!ua!e pays more attention to natural
lan!ua!es or to lan!ua!es in !eneral" $hile semiotics is deeply concerned about non
lin!uistic si!nification. Bhilosophy of lan!ua!e also bears a stron!er connection to
lin!uistics" $hile semiotics is closer to some of the humanities (includin! literary
theory and cultural anthropolo!y).
'emiosis or semeiosis is the process that forms meanin! from any or!anism-s
apprehension of the $orld throu!h si!ns.
@istory
#he importance of si!ns and si!nification has been reco!nised throu!hout much of the
history of philosophy" and in psycholo!y as $ell. Blato and Aristotle both e/plored the
relationship bet$een si!ns and the $orld" and Au!ustine considered the nature of the
si!n $ithin a con&entional system. #hese theories ha&e had a lastin! effect in <estern
philosophy" especially throu!h 'cholastic philosophy. ,ore recently" Rmberto Eco" in
his 4'emiotics and philosophy of lan!ua!e4 has ar!ued that semiotic theories are
implicit in the $or% of most" perhaps all" ma6or thin%ers.
Some important semioticians
Charles Beirce (D83GyDGDE)" the founder of the philosophical doctrine %no$n as
pra!matism" preferred the term 4semeiotic.4 5e defined semiosis as 4...action" or
87
influence" $hich is" or in&ol&es" a cooperation of three sub6ects" such as a si!n" its
ob6ect" and its interpretant" this trirelati&e influence not bein! in any $ay resol&able
into actions bet$een pairs.4 (4Bra!matism4" 'ssential Peirce R3 EDD2 $ritten DG0L). 5is
notion of semiosis e&ol&ed throu!hout his career" be!innin! $ith the triadic relation
6ust described" and endin! $ith a system consistin! of FG"0EG possible elements and
relations. 1ne reason for this hi!h number is that he allo$ed each interpretant to act
as a si!n" thereby creatin! a ne$ si!nifyin! relation. Beirce $as also a notable
lo!ician" and he considered semiotics and lo!ic as facets of a $ider theory. 0or an
earnest attempt to systemati=e Beirce-s unsystematic contributions to semiotics" see
7is=%a (DGGK).
0erdinand de 'aussure (D8FLyDGD3)" the 4father4 of modern lin!uistics" proposed a
dualistic notion of si!ns" relatin! the signifier as the form of the $ord or phrase
uttered" and to the signified as the mental concept. It is important to note that"
accordin! to 'aussure" the si!n is completely arbitrary" i.e. there $as no necessary
connection bet$een the si!n and its meanin!. #his sets him apart from pre&ious
philosophers such as Blato or the 'cholastics" $ho thou!ht that there must be some
connection bet$een a si!nifier and the ob6ect it si!nifies. 'aussure-s insistence on the
arbitrariness of the si!n has also !reatly influenced later philosophers" especially
postmodern theorists such as 9ac8ues Aerrida" *oland Barthes" and 9ean Baudrillard.
7ouis #rolle 56elmsle& (D8GG DGKF) de&eloped a structuralist approach to 'aussure-s
theories. 5is best %no$n $or% is Prolegomena+ : %heory of 3anguage" $hich $as
e/panded in esum#e of the %heory of 3anguage" a formal de&elopment of
glossematics" his scientific calculus of lan!ua!e.
Charles <. ,orris (DG0DyDGLG). In his DG38 $oundations of the %heory of )igns. he
defined semiotics as !roupin! the triad synta/" semantics and pra!matics. 'ynta/
studies the interrelation of the si!ns" $ithout re!ard to meanin!. 'emantics studies
the relation bet$een the si!ns and the ob6ects to $hich they apply. Bra!matics
studies the relation bet$een the si!n system and its human (or animal) user. Rnli%e
his mentor )eor!e 5erbert ,ead" ,orris $as a beha&iorist and sympathetic to the
(ienna Circle positi&ism of his collea!ue *udolf Carnap. ,orris has been accused of
misreadin! Beirce.
Rmberto Eco made a $ider audience a$are of semiotics by &arious publications" most
notably : %heory of )emiotics and his no&el %he <ame of the ose $hich includes
semiotic elements. 5is most important contributions to the field bear on
interpretation" encyclopedia" and model reader.
Al!irdas 9ulius )reimas de&eloped a structural &ersion of semiotics named !enerati&e
semiotics" tryin! to shift the focus of discipline from si!ns to systems of si!nification.
5is theories de&elop the ideas of 'aussure" 7ouis 56elmsle&" Claude 7&i'trauss" and
,aurice ,erleauBonty.
#homas A. 'ebeo%" a student of Charles <. ,orris" $as a prolific and $ideran!in!
American semiotician. #hou!h he insisted that animals are not capable of lan!ua!e"
he e/panded the pur&ie$ of semiotics to include nonhuman si!nalin! and
communication systems" thus raisin! some of the issues addressed by philosophy of
mind and coinin! the term =oosemiotics. 'ebeo% insisted that all communication $as
made possible by the relationship bet$een an or!anism and the en&ironment it li&es
in. 5e also posed the e8uation bet$een semiosis (the acti&ity of interpretin! si!ns)
and life.
9uri 7otman DGHH DGG3 $as the foundin! member of the #artu (or #artu,osco$)
'emiotic 'chool. 5e de&eloped a semiotic approach to the study of culture and
88
established a communication model for the study of te/t semiotics. 5e also
introduced the concept of the semiosphere.
Current applications
Applications of semiotics include3
It represents a methodolo!y for the analysis of te/ts re!ardless of modality. 0or
these purposes" 4te/t4 is any messa!e preser&ed in a form $hose e/istence is
independent of both sender and recei&er2
Its concepts and methods are hi!hly portable" and ha&e enriched our
understandin! of many disciplines" e.!." biolo!y" anthropolo!y" computin!"
en!ineerin!" lin!uistics" mathematics" philosophy" and psycholo!y2
It can impro&e er!onomic desi!n in situations $here it is important to ensure
that human bein!s can interact more effecti&ely $ith their en&ironments"
$hether it be on a lar!e scale" as in architecture" or on a small scale" such as
the confi!uration of instrumentation for human use.
'emiotics is only slo$ly establishin! itself as a discipline to be respected. In some
countries" its role is limited to literary criticism and an appreciation of audio and
&isual media" but this narro$ focus can inhibit a more !eneral study of the social and
political forces shapin! ho$ different media are used and their dynamic status $ithin
modern culture. Issues of technolo!ical determinism in the choice of media and the
desi!n of communication strate!ies assume ne$ importance in this a!e of mass
media. #he use of semiotic methods to re&eal different le&els of meanin! and"
sometimes" hidden moti&ations has led some to demonise elements of the sub6ect as
,ar/ist" nihilist" etc. (e.!. critical discourse analysis in Bostmodernism and
deconstruction in Boststructuralism).
Bublication of research is both in dedicated 6ournals such as )ign )ystems )tudies"
established by 9uri 7otman and published by #artu Rni&ersity Bress2 )emiotica"
founded by 'ebeo%" =eitschrift f\r )emiotik2 'uropean ;ournal of )emiotics2 %he
:merican ;ournal of )emiotics2 Bersus (founded and directed by Eco)" et al.2 and as
articles accepted in periodicals of other disciplines" especially 6ournals oriented
to$ard philosophy and cultural criticism.
Branches#Subfields
'emiotics has sprouted a number of subfields" includin! but not limited to the
follo$in!3
Biosemiotics is the study of semiotic processes at all le&els of biolo!y" or a
semiotic study of li&in! systems.
Computational semiotics attempts to en!ineer the process of semiosis" say in
the study of and desi!n for 5umanComputer Interaction or to mimic aspects of
human co!nition throu!h artificial intelli!ence and %no$led!e representation.
Cultural and literary semiotics e/amines the literary $orld" the &isual media"
the mass media" and ad&ertisin! in the $or% of $riters such as *oland Barthes"
,arcel Aanesi" and +uri 7otman
,usic semiolo!y 4#here are stron! ar!uments that music inhabits a semiolo!ical
realm $hich" on both onto!enetic and phylo!enetic le&els" has de&elopmental
priority o&er &erbal lan!ua!e.4 (,iddleton DGG0" p.DLH) 'ee Cattie= (DGLK"
DG8L" DG8G)" 'tefani (DGL3" DG8K)" Baroni (DG83)" and )emiotica (KK3 Dy3
(DG8L)).
8
'tructuralism and poststructuralism in the $or% of 9ac8ues Aerrida" ,ichel
0oucault" 7ouis 56elmsle&" *oman 9a%obson" 9ac8ues 7acan" Claude 7&i
'trauss" etc.
!