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OPEN ASSESSMENT
EXAM NUMBER: Y4848066
1- Use conveyors are a good way to reduce the risk and Vehicle hazards
(accidents, fire ...)
2- Dust extractions and air filters can be used during conveying operation to prevent
dust generation and environmental protection.
3- Conveyors can eliminate the multiple handling of materials or products while
preventing all the hazards typically caused by trucks and /or loaders
4- Conveyor system allows users to install conveyor quickly and easily.
5- Conveyor promotes the effective ,use of people equipment , space and energy
6- Engineering control system (Engineering design) can be applied to conveyor
systems to minimize the hazards (noise, vibration and loads or products falling ...)
at the source.
Powered conveyor system Drawbacks
1- Products may fall off the conveyor when a conveyor passes over a walkway,
roadway, or work station.
2- Dust can be generated at the feed and discharged points during conveyor
operation.
3- Need to complex guarding system.
4- Conveyor has dangerous moving parts moving parts (head, tail end pulleys, belt.)
5- Electrical power may cause electric shock hazards.
6- The nature of operation can be creating noise hazards.
Barnaton bypass Drawbacks
To Identifying Safety Issues we must break down the system in terms of its
functions and analyse each of them separately, Operation process including
the buildings and connections of services such as power and communication,
control System and Safety standards, The maintenance of the conveyor
system, and finally the environment in which the conveyor system operate, to
identify these issues we have to apply checklist as in the table below, these
issues should be addressed by the safety case.
II. ( 1 mark )
The wording of a suitable top-level goal for the safety case is Argument by
satisfaction of all conveyor belt system safety requirements
III. The reasonable strategy for arguing the safety of the conveyor belt system.
(3 marks)
EXAM NUMBER: Y4848066
A reasonable strategy for arguing the safety of the conveyor system we have to
apply safety case the safety case will have safety plan and functional hazard
assessment (FHA) report, witch content the complete list of hazards and safety
objectives , to ensure that the risk managed during the design of the conveyor
belt system , also the safety case should be content safety analyses for the
system as a whole to prove that the safety requirements have been satisfied and
the hazards identified have been mitigated , The safety plan should be apply to
the system to identify the, safety requirements and safety component, the safety
requirements should prove that the system component has not any failures.
The second step will be the consequence analysis to establish the hazard log
also use fault tree analysis (FTA) to minimize any safety impact of the system,
the strategy should define if the hazards have been eliminated, the severity of the
hazard resulting from the failure is minimised and the probability of the
component is sufficiently remote.
The safety case shall be consist of structured argument supported by a body of
evidence, that provides a compelling , comprehensible and valid case that a
system is safe for given application in a given environmental.
FHA
Integration
Safety
PSSA
Consequence
Systems
Conveyor
Primary
Platform
Safety platform
Implementation
Design
SSA
Causal
Integration
Units &Caseof&safety
System
Analysis
Hazards test
Decomposition
Analyses
Definition
Identification
Evidence
PHI
EXAM NUMBER: Y4848066
IV. The strategy can apply to all issues identified in( ii ) as the following :
(3 marks)
Communication between operating staff is very Good supervision and follow the procedures
important during operation process and in and operations manual to close this hazard
emergency cases bad communication could .
introduce hazards.
“When a conveyor is stopped for maintenance Machinery must include a safety interlock
purposes, starting devices or powered circuit to prevent inadvertent starting. The
accessories shall be locked or tagged out in maintenance procedures should include a
accordance with a formalized procedure designed safe system of work that puts the system in
to protect all person or groups involved with the to a safe shut down state for maintenance.
conveyor against an unexpected start”(3).
Without proper training operators and Appropriate training must be provided
maintenance staff may not appreciate safety for operating and maintenance staff.
critical nature of the operation.
The conveyor would be in several sections The safety case report should include that to
EXAM NUMBER: Y4848066
converting a total length of 2 KM and would cross insure the design of the conveyor provided
above canal and road on a high level bridge , so with spill guards, pan guards, or the
the materials may fall off the conveyor to the road equivalent to prevent materials fall off, also
and canal ,also the weather –strong winds may Use prominent a wariness devices, such as
be cause sand fall off to the buildings and warning signs or lights.
vehicles and cause hazards .
Health safety and environmental considerations if This hazard would be mitigated through the
don’t follow up during operation and maintenance Application of the strategy by apply HSE
could introduce hazards to the human and the requirement by keep an overview of the SHE
system. regulations.
Classification Factors
Technical 1- The warning systm was not working (buzzer, light)
2- The electrical bell between the outocoach and locomotive was not
working.
3- The teadly system was not operating correcttly. the treadle arm is
not set at the correct height , this increase the total length of
warning .
4- The brake controls is difficult to use in an emergency “The RAIB
and the DFR carried out tests using the auto-train to establish how
the braking system behaves in various different modes of operation.
These tests confirmed that, once the vacuum brake has been
applied, it is not possible to release it quickly: it can take up to thirty
seconds to re-create vacuum using the ejector by placing the
combination valve in the ‘release’ position“(1).
5- No having working sanding equipments on the train . “The DFR had
no requirement for the train crew to check that the sand boxes for the
locomotive and the auto coach were filled and operational Not having
working sanding equipment on the train may have contributed to the
accident. “(1).
Management 1- Lack of training and experiece of fire man . “When the locomotive is
and training propelling the coach, the fireman is alone on the footplate and
unable to seek advice from the driver if unsure about what to do at
any point, he had only two days experience on the auto-train before the
accident occurred, and had no training in or experience of the action to be
taken in emergency situations. “(1).
2- The DFR known about the problem with the warning systm but they
dont take action. “ The treadle operated approach warning
mechanism was known to be faulty. This had been reported four
days before the accident and the DFR proposed to rectify the fault,
but had not done so by the time of the accident, and had not
informed operating staff of the fault“(1).
3- The DFR does not pressure from road to minimize traffic delays.
4- The age of the driver (71 year) retired . “The driver was over the
maximum age for driving“(1).
5- The medical examination for the driver should be every one year as
DFR requirments but the managment were only requiring every five
years.
6- The driver axceeded the speed over 10 mph(16 Km/h) , the train
speed was 20mph (30Km/h) when it bassed the speed restricion
board .this is lack of training.
7- The crossing keepers have delay to opening the gates to the
railway crossing .
8- The driver did not anticipate the effect that the wet condition of the
rail head would have on the braking performance of the train. This
was contributory to the accident.
9- The crossing keepers noticed during the first passage of the train
EXAM NUMBER: Y4848066
earlier in the day that the treadle operated flashing light and the
warning buzzer had not operated, and they only became aware of
the approach of the train when they saw it coming.
10-The possible outcome of using the release valve needs to be fully
understood by the railway and by individual drivers and firemen so
that the brakes can be safely handled in all situations and proper
training can be given to staff.
11-The crews on the DFR had not practised handling the brake in
emergencies
12- There are not procedures in place to inform staff that system have
failed or the operating in adegraded conditions .
13-“Steam engine footplate crews are selected from volunteer engine
cleaners and are trained by the locomotive inspectors. They are
assessed for competence to act as firemen, and in due course may
advance to driver“(1).
Design 1- The low position of the warning treadly arm .
2- No effective system for inform the train crews that the warning
system was not working .
3-
4- The speed indicator board position is not clear.
5- “The arm of a treadle device that has been mechanically designed
such that its return from the depressed position takes place in a
controlled timed manner (usually slow) “(1)
To draw a timeline we should identify all the events leading up to the accident,
first we identify the event of the period preceding the accident ,as the figure
below :
The
The
The
The Service
crossing
train
14:4
12: Norchord
crossing
crossing
driver
The station
keepers
keepers
keepers
The station
crossing
blows
The tow
close
train
the
signals
stop
crossing
keepers
driver
operates
the
train
the
four
with
whistle
reduce
road
secure
keepers
gates
the
green
traffic
treadle
to
speed
and
the
flag
confirm
move
and
crossing
permit
to
to
(the
open
to
the
20mph
the
the
buzz
road
train
train
the
gates
crossing
+light)
traffic
to
railway
approaching
processing
togates
resume
10 through the crossing
0
Second the events of the final few minutes before the accidant.
EXAM NUMBER: Y4848066
TheThe
fire
The
The
The
train
man
The
leading
leading
The
crossing
passed
operate
detached
The
The
train
end
end
crossing
crossing
The
stand
keepers
over
the
Train
of
ofgate
The
driver
the
the
combination
The
the
with
The
The
keepers
speed
autocoach
struck
keepers
train
wheels
autocoach
began
treadle
driver
saw
it
driver
driver
sapproached
passed
leading
the
one
saw
to
locked
fully
had
but
sounded
sounded
brake
stop
gates
struck
of
struck
the
warning
applied
no
the
end
and
the
train
valve
warning
not
10
crossing
the
the
the
the
30
the
road
the
mph
completely
when
the
buzzer
stop
partially
metres
and
partially
whistle
whistle
train
traffic
to
brakes
to
the
board
it
keepers
open
20
slide
come
and
past
reservoir
open
open
and
mph
open
light
the
the
into
open
(he
crossing
crossing
gates
crossing
did
view
injured)
but
the
not
the
gates
gate
gate
operate
train did not
stop
EXAM NUMBER: Y4848066
EXAM NUMBER: Y4848066
Timeline
100
The
40
20
327
m
500
485
431
455
400
300
272
Mph200
driver
Speed
The
Crossing
The
Stoop fully
crossing
train
indicator
board
gate
cross
keepers
board
the Treadle
start opens the gates
applied the brakes
40
20
100 200 272 300 327 400 431 455 485 500
EXAM NUMBER: Y4848066
This Figure shows the comparing between the train speed and the distance; we
assume the accident event start when the train cross the treadle.
Amount of water on RWY surface The driver excessive the train speed
Gateman severely injured by
The train reach the stop displaced crossing gate
board
The crossing keepers saw the train when it come into view
The train did not stop
Noise from road traffic The wheels locked & the train slide
EXAM NUMBER: Y4848066
Lack of maintenance
The treadle operated approach warning was faulty
The cross keepers close the
four gates & resume the traffic
Internal event Source event The crossing keepers stop the road traffic
& open the railway gates The signalman belled the crossing keepers by telephone
iii. (4 marks).
The rail trnsport sector should learned from this accidant by devlope The railway with
respect to the safety by follow the safety standerd and all the recommendations
made by like these investigations reports.
• Install automatic open crossing remotely monitored ( AOCR) , for all crossing
gates , AOCR will have the standard steady member and flashing traffic light
signals these will be activated automatically by an approaching train, these
automatic gates will prevent the accidents that occur by human errors .
• Improve the old design of the singes of the level crossing (whistle board , speed
indicator board, and remove the trees in the area that near the gates) also the
size and the location of the singes should be as the standard.
EXAM NUMBER: Y4848066
• Training courses for all employees for rail transport sector by create career
development plans.
• Initiate and apply risk assessment model to all level crossing to establish
reasonably practical safety system options and control, to minimize the risks.
References
(1) Accident report. Website: www.raib.gov.uk
From number (1) we find Southwark council did not carry out fire risk assessment
which required by law, to implement appropriate fire safety measures to minimise
the risk to life from fire, also from( 2 ) Southwark council was knew in 2000 that
Lakanal House posed a risk of rapid fire spread but did nothing for seven years and
don’t take actions to eliminate or reduce the risk from fire according to the law
( responsibilities ) also in (3) the council should take additional measures to ensure
fire safety where flammable or explosive materials are used or stored, but the
council replaced all the facades and window frames with flammable uPVC which
melts in fire in (4) the council should Create a detailed plan to deal with any
emergency and, in most cases, document the findings but the Emergency plan
relevant to premises had not been communicated effectively to residents.
EXAM NUMBER: Y4848066
I think the situation of other councils has changed and they are learn from the fire at
lakanal house, because “more than one in five councils stepped up fire safety work
on tower blocks following a high-rise blaze that killed six people, for example A
Hackney Council carried out 52 fire risk assessment, after 3 July” (1) (INSIDE
HOUSING 23/10/2009)
“Also Sheffield Council has 25 tower blocks and had done no ‘formal comprehensive
fire risk assessments’ before the Lakanal fire. It had completed 20 FRAs by 21
September.”(2)
“Lambeth Council had assessed just two of its 75 blocks of seven or more storeys
before the Lakanal blaze. By the time it responded to the FOI, on 2 October, it had
started FRAs on three more blocks and it has now pledged to assess the fire risks of
all its blocks of six or more storeys by March 2010”(1).
In (Inside house ) total survey found 282 blocks of four or more storeys that did not
have a fire risk assessment before 3 July, but now most of the councils situations
changed and they start carried out fire risk assessment for the high –rise blocks
Safety in numbers survey shown in the table below this survey is completed by
inside housing , the survey comparing between the actions have taken by the
councils to fulfil their fire safety responsibilities before Lakanal and whether they
have changed their stance since.
EXAM NUMBER: Y4848066
http://www.insidehousing.co.uk/story.aspx?storycode=6506865
ii. ( 4 marks ) The impact of the coverage on the residents of high-rise blocks was
very strong. because there are many blocks like lakanal house with one central
stairwell and same the design of lakanal house, and many people ask questions
about what happens when the fire breaks out in these flats, also there are
families with young children living in high blocks, they described these flats as
“death traps” and others described it disaster waiting to happen.
References
1) Inside housing http://www.insidehousing.co.uk/story.aspx?storycode=6506865
2) BBC London news.