G.R. No.

L-6409 February 5, 1954

LEOPOLDO GONZALES, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE SECRETARY OF LABOR, ATTY. CECILIO I. LIM, as WAS Assistant, ATTY.
ROGELIO L. CRUZ, as Chief Claims and Investigation section, WAS, and SY
KOT, respondents.
Cornelio S. Ruperto for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag and Assistant Solicitor General Francisco Carreon for
respondents Secretary of Labor, Cecilio I. Lim and Rogelio L. Cruz.
REYES, J .:
On June 23, 1952, the petitioner Leopoldo Gonzales filed with the Wage Administration Service a
claim for overtime pay in the total sum of P13,212.59 against his employer, the respondent Sy Kot.
Upon the case being submitted to the WAS (Wage Administration Service) for investigation and
arbitration, the claimant, to establish his claim, had Sy Kot summoned to the witness stand and put
under oath. But before any question could be propounded to him, Sy Kot invoked his constitutional
right not to be compelled to be a witness against himself, calling attention to the fact that the law on
overtime pay provides a penalty for its violation. Considering the point well taken, the investigator
ordered Sy Kot's withdrawal from the witness stand. The ruling was, upon appeal, sustained by the
Secretary of Labor in his decision of November 17, 1952.
Suing for a writ of certiorari, petitioner asks that the ruling be annulled, contending that the same is
illegal and arbitrary and made with grave abuse of discretion.
Except in criminal cases, there is no rule prohibiting a party litigant from utilizing his adversary party
to the witness stand and interrogate him. This rule, of course, subject to the constitutional injunction
not to compel any person to testify against himself. But it is established that the privilege against
self-incrimination must be invoked at the proper time, and the proper time to invoke it is when a
question calling for a criminating answer is propounded. This has to be so, because before a
question is asked there would be no way of telling whether the information to be elicited from the
witness is self-incriminating or not. As stated in Jones on Evidence (Vol. 6, pp. 4926-4927), a person
who has been summoned to testify "cannot decline to appear, nor can he decline to be sworn as a
witness" and "no claim of privilege can be made until a question calling for a criminating answer is
asked; at that time, and, generally speaking, at that time only, the claim of privilege may properly be
interposed."
The point raised by the Solicitor General on behalf of the respondent Secretary of Labor that
petitioner's remedy is to appeal to the President of the Philippines is not well taken. (Section 7 of the
law creating the WAS (Rep. Act No. 602) expressly authorizes any person aggrieved by an order of
the Secretary of Labor to obtain a review of such order in the Supreme Court.
Wherefore, the petition is granted and the ruling of order complained of annulled and set aside.
Without costs
G.R. No. 110353 May 21, 1998
TOMAS H. COSEP, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SANDIGANBAYAN, respondents.

ROMERO, J .:
Petitioner, Tomas Cosep, was the Municipal Planning and Development Coordination Officer
of Olutanga, Zamboanga del Sur. In 1987, the Municipality decided to construct an artesian
well for one of its localities. Hence, it secured the services of private complainant Angelino E.
Alegre to undertake the said project, under a "pakyaw" arrangement for the contract price of
P5,000.00 payable after completion of the project. Petitioner, being the Planning Officer of the
Municipality, monitored the progress of the construction.
Tomas cosep, being the planning officer, withheld the 500 pesos as reimbursement for his
expense in processing the papers in the Municipal Treasurers Office.
After the project was finished, petitioner secured the amount of P5,000.00 from the Municipal
Treasurer. However, only P4,500.00 was given to the private complainant, the balance being
allegedly withheld by petitioner as reimbursement for his expenses in processing the papers
in the Municipal Treasurer's Office.
Aggrieved, private complainant filed a complaint before the Sandiganbayan, First Division,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 17503 against petitioner for violating Section 3(b) of R.A. No.
3019. The information reads:
That on or about August of 1987, or immediately prior and subsequent thereto,
in Olutanga, Zamboanga del Sur, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, accused, a public officer, being the Municipal planning and
Development Officer of the said municipality, with the duty to administer and
award government projects and to prepare the necessary documents required
for money claims against the municipality of OLUTANGA, Zamboanga del Sur,
did then and there, wilfully and unlawfully demand and receive five hundred
pesos (500.00) from a certain Angelino Alegre as a consideration for awarding
the construction of the artesian well, Solar, Olutanga and for facilitation the
necessary documents for the money claims of the latter from the Municipality
of Olutanga for constructing the above mentioned Artesian Well.
Contrary to law.
On April 10, 1992, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty to the charge. Thereafter, trial on the
merits ensued.
Petitioner alleged that respondent is only a laborer thus he receives his salary on a daily
basis and that the 4500 represents the total salary of the other 13 workers
In an effort to escape liability, petitioner advances the theory that private complainant was
never a contractor, but was merely a laborer entitled to a daily rate of P20.00. Moreover, the
amount of P4,500.00 he gave to the private complainant represents the total salary of the
other thirteen (13) workers who constructed the artesian well. Hence, he could not have
withheld the said P500.00 since there was none in the first place. To bolster his contention,
petitioner presented as evidence the Time Book and Payroll Sheet,
1
and a Memorandum
dated May 10, 1987, issued by the Mayor of Olutanga indicating that private complainant was
hired as the head laborer during the construction of the artesian well.
2
The Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner of the crime charged.
Apparently, not impressed with petitioner's defense, the Sandiganbayan, in a decision dated
April 15, 1993
3
filed against him, viz.:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused, Tomas Cosep y Hibayan, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime defined in Section 3, paragraph (b),
Republic Act 3019, as amended, and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
imposes upon him the penalties of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years
and one (1) month, as minimum, to nine (9) years and twenty (20) days, as
maximum, and of perpetual disqualification from public office. The court
orders him to pay Angelino E. Alegre, the private complainant, P500.00
representing the amount which the accused demanded and received from him.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner has filed the instant petition contending that: (a) he was not accorded an impartial
trial by the Sandiganbayan and (b) his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt to
justify his conviction.
Regarding the first assignment of error, petitioner bewails the fact that during his testimony
the Justices of the Sandiganbayan actively participated in the proceeding by propounding no
less than sixty-eight questions
4
which, in his opinion, were indications of partiality or
prejudgment of guilt. Specifically, he cites the questions on pages 34 to 42 of the Transcript
of Stenographic Notes
5
as indications of the Justices' hostility against him.
In short, whether or not the questioning of Sandiganbayan justices was an indication of
partiality
We do not agree.
Admittedly, petitioner, like any other accused individual, is entitled to a fair trial before an
"impartial and neutral judge" as an indispensable imperative of due process.
6
Judges must
not only be impartial, but must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the
parties that the decision will be just.
7
However, this is not to say that judges must remain
passive or silent during the proceedings. Since they are in a better position to observe the
demeanor of the witness as he testifies on the witness stand, it is only natural for judges to
ask questions to elicit
facts with a view to attaining justice for the parties. Questions designed to clarify points
8
and
to elicit additional relevant evidence are not improper.
9
Also, the judge, being the arbiter,
may properly intervene in the presentation of evidence to expedite and prevent unnecessary
waste of time.
10

With the above doctrines serving as guidelines, we have scrutinized carefully the questions
propounded by the Justices, and none was indicative of their partiality for the prosecution in
proving its case against the petitioner. More precisely, on pages 34 to 35 of the Transcript of
Stenographic Notes, the gist of the questions were on the monitoring procedure being
undertaken by the petitioner in supervising the project. While on pages 36 to 39, the
questions dealt with the identities and qualifications of the workers who participated in the
construction of the project. Those on pages 41 to 42, referred to queries which sought to
clarify the facts and circumstances of another case filed against the petitioner by a certain
Mr. Macapala. All told, these questions cannot be said to have crossed the limits of propriety.
In propounding these questions, the Justices merely attempted to ferret (search) the truth as
to the facts to which the witness was testifying.
In any case, if petitioner were under the impression that the Justices were unduly interfering
in his testimony, he was free to manifest his objection.
11
However, the records show that he
answered the questions freely and without any objection from his counsel on the alleged
active participation of the Justices when he gave his testimony.
While we do not see any merit in petitioner's first assigned error, we, however, agree with him
that his guilt was not adequately proven beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution.
It is well settled that whether the accused is guilty or not of the offense charged is a question
which involves a determination of facts as presented by the prosecution and the defense. The
duty to ascertain which is more credible is lodged with the trial court which had the
opportunity to observe the witness directly and to test his credibility by his demeanor on the
stand. Thus, the Sandiganbayan's factual findings are generally accorded respect, even
finality, unless: (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises
and conjectures; (2) the inferences made are manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of
discretion; (4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts or premised on the
absence of evidence on the record.
12
A re-examination of the entire proceedings of the
instant case compels us to take exception to the aforementioned general rule.
It must be borne in mind that criminal cases elevated by convicted public officials from the
Sandiganbayan deserve the same thorough review by this Court as criminal cases involving
ordinary citizens, simply because the constitutional presumption of innocence must be
overcome by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
13

Where the state fails to meet the quantum of proof required to overcome the constitutional
presumption, the accused is entitled to acquittal, regardless of the weakness or even the
absence of his defense
14
for any conviction must rest on the strength of the prosecution's
case and not on the weakness of the defense.
Going over the records and the TSN of the private complainant, we entertain serious
misgivings about his testimony, especially after he had erred as regards important facts and
information, not to mention the questionable lapses of memory. Indeed, for evidence to be
believed, it must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but must be credible
in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as
probable under the circumstances.
15

It is worthy to note that private complainant narrated that he was the one who paid the
workers their wages during the construction of the well.
16
However, it baffles us that in
paying these workers, he never bothered to have them sign any payroll or voucher
receipt,
17
a practice which is routine for those engaged in hiring workers for construction
projects. At the very least, the payroll or voucher receipts are necessary, not only for
accounting purposes, but for protection against spurious or unsubstantiated claims that may
arise. Simply put, private complainant's behavior was in total disregard of logic and usual
management practice expected from a prudent businessman(*because of his failure to keep a
payroll.)
What is incredible is the failure of private complainant to remember even a single name of his
workers.
18
Since six of the thirteen (13) laborers bore his own surname Alegre, it strains
credulity that he could not remember any of them. Obviously, private complainant's claim
that he is a contractor is a falsehood.
If he were indeed one, he should have presented documentary evidence to support his claim.
In fact, the record is bereft of any project study, purchase order, delivery receipt, proofs of
procurement of materials and other evidence which would sustain the finding that he was
indeed a contractor engaged in his normal work. His testimony alone in this regard is grossly
inadequate, thus rendering the prosecution's cause inherently weak.
Likewise, in the Time and Book Payroll Sheet
19
issued by the Municipality, a document duly
signed by the private complainant stated that he was the head laborer during the
construction. In the early case of U.S. v. Carrington,
20
we have asserted the public document
character of the municipal payroll; as such, it is prima facie evidence of the facts stated
therein.
21
The same can only be rebutted by other competent evidence
22
and cannot be
overcome by the testimony of a single witness.
23
As earlier stated, private complainant never
even offered any evidence to contravene the presumption that the recitals in the municipal
payroll giving his status as a head laborer were true. Besides, the Time and Payroll Sheet,
having been signed by the Municipal Treasurer, it is clothed with the presumption of
regularity, particularly since it was not objected to by the private complainant.
Aside from the foregoing considerations, private complainant signed the payroll sheet
indicating his status as a head laborer. Therefore, this representation is conclusive upon him
and he cannot deny or disprove the same without violating the principle of estoppel.
All these considerations taken together, it is clear that the prosecution failed to establish
private complainant's assertion that he is a contractor. Hence, we agree with the defense that
private complainant, as laborer, together with thirteen (13) other workers was entitled only to
a total of P4,475.00 and not P5,000.00 representing their salaries. This being the case, the
P4,500.00 that he received from petitioner was even in excess of the amount which he and the
other workers, was originally entitled to. Consequently, to affirm petitioner's conviction
would result in a serious injustice. It is axiomatic that in every criminal prosecution, if the
state fails to discharge its burden of proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt, it fails utterly.
24
Accordingly, when the guilt of the accused has not been proven with
moral certainty, it is our policy of long standing that the presumption of innocence of the
accused must be favored and his exoneration be granted as a matter of right.
25

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the assailed decision of the Sandiganbayan insofar as
it convicted and sentenced petitioner Tomas Cosep of violating Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019
is hereby SET ASIDE. Petitioner Cosep is ACQUITTED on grounds of reasonable doubt.
Costs against the appellant.
SO ORDERED
G.R. Nos. L-75511-14 March 16, 1987
AGUSTIN V. TALINO, petitioner,
vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

CRUZ, J .:
It is settled that if a separate trial is allowed to one of two or more defendants, his testimony therein
imputing guilt to any of the co-accused is not admissible against the latter who was not able to cross-
examine him. 1 The issue in this case is whether or not such testimony was considered by the
respondent court against the petitioner, who claims that it was in fact the sole basis of his conviction.
The petitioner, along with several others, were charged in four separate informations with estafa
through falsification of public documents for having allegedly conspired to defraud the government in
the total amount of P26,523.00, representing the cost of repairs claimed to have been undertaken,
but actually not needed and never made, on four government vehicles, through falsification of the
supporting papers to authorize the illegal payments.
2
Docketed as CC Nos. 6681, 6682, 6683 and
6684, these cases were tried jointly for all the accused until after the prosecution had rested, when
Genaro Basilio, Alejandro Macadangdang and petitioner Talino asked for separate trials, which were
allowed.
3
They then presented their evidence at such trials, while the other accused continued
defending themselves in the original proceedings, at which one of them, Pio Ulat gave damaging
testimony against the petitioner, relating in detail his participation in the questioned
transactions.(sandiganbayan convicted them guilty)
4
In due time, the Sandiganbayan rendered its
decision in all the four cases finding Talino, Basilio, Macadangdang Ulat and Renato Valdez guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged while absolving the other defendants for insufficient
evidence. This decision is now challenged by the petitioner on the ground that it violates his right of
confrontation as guaranteed by the Constitution.
In its decision, the respondent court * makes the following remarks about the separate trial:
The peculiarity of the trial of these cases is the fact that We allowed, upon their
petition, separate trials for the accused Basilio and Talino and Macadangdang. This
being the case, We can only consider, in deciding these cases as against them, the
evidence for the, prosecution as wen as their own evidence. Evidence offered by the
other accused can not be taken up.
It would really have been simpler had there been no separate trial because the
accused Pio B. Ulat said so many incriminatory things against the other accused
when he took the stand in his own defense. But because Basilio, Talino and
Macadangdang were granted separate trials and they did not cross examine Ulat
because, as a matter of fact, they were not even required to be present when the
other accused were presenting their defenses, the latter's testimonies can not now
be considered against said three accused.
We cannot understand why, after it had heard the long and sordid story related by Ulat on
the stand, the prosecution did not endeavor to call Ulat and put him on he stand as part
f its rebuttal evidence. Had this been done, there would have been no impediment to
the consideration of Ulat's testimony against all the accused.
5

The grant of a separate trial rests in the sound discretion of the court and is not a matter of right to
the accused, especially where, as in this case, it is sought after the presentation of the evidence of
the prosecution.
6
While it is true that Rule 119, Section 8, of the Rules of Court does not specify
when the motion for such a trial should be filed, we have held in several cases that this should be
done before the prosecution commences presenting its evidence, although, as an exception, the
motion may be granted later, even after the prosecution shall have rested, where there appears to
be an antagonism in the respective defenses of the accused.
7
In such an event, the evidence in
chief of the prosecution shall remain on record against an the accused, with right of rebuttal on the
part of the fiscal in the separate trial of the other accused.
8

The rule in every case is that the trial court should exercise the utmost circumspection in granting a
motion for separate trial, allowing the same only after a thorough study of the claimed justification
therefor, if only to avoid the serious difficulties that may arise, such as the one encountered and
regretted by the respondent court, in according the accused the right of confrontation.
The right of confrontation is one of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution
9
to the
person facing criminal prosecution who should know, in fairness, who his accusers are and must be
given a chance to cross-examine them on their charges. No accusation is permitted to be made
against his back or in his absence nor is any derogatory information accepted if it is made
anonymously, as in poison pen letters sent by persons who cannot stand by their libels and must
shroud their spite in secrecy. That is also the reason why ex parte affidavits are not permitted unless
the affiant is presented in court 10 and hearsay is barred save only in the cases allowed by the Rules
of Court, like the dying declaration. 11
In United States v. Javier, 12 this Court emphasized:
... With reference to the clause of the Bill of Rights, which we have quoted, Justice
Day said in a case of Philippine origin (Dowdell v. U.S. 119111, 221 U.S. 325) that it
intends to secure the accused in the right to be tried, so far as facts provable by
witnesses are concerned, by only such witnesses as meet him face to face at the trial
who give their testimony in his presence, and give to the accused an opportunity of
cross-examination. It was intended to prevent the conviction of the accused upon
depositions or ex parte affidavits, and particularly to preserve the right of the accused
to test the recollection of the witness in the exercise of the right of cross-
examination.' In other words, confrontation is essential because cross-examination is
essential. A second reason for the prohibition is that a tribunal may have before it the
deportment and appearance of the witness while testifying. (U.S. v. Anastacio [1906],
6 Phil. 413.) The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands has applied this
constitutional provision on behalf of accused persons in a number of cases. (See for
example U.S. v. Tanjuanco [1902], 1 Phil., 374; U.S. v. Bello [1908], 11 Phil., 526;
U.S. v. De la Cruz [1908], 12 Phil. 87.) ...
We have carefully studied the decision under challenge and find that the respondent court did not
consider the testimony given by Ulat in convicting the petitioner. The part of that decision finding
Talino guilty made no mention of Ulat at all but confined itself to the petitioner's own acts in
approving the questioned vouchers as proof of his complicity in the plot to swindle the government.
Thus:
If, as claimed, by Macadangdang, he had no knowledge nor participation in the
conspiracy to defraud, he would have questioned this obvious irregularity. He would
have asked whoever was following up the vouchers why two biddings were
conducted, why the awards to "D" Alfenor' were cancelled, when the latter were
cancelled, and when the new bidding was made.
The very same case is true as regards the accused Agustin Talino. While his duty to
initial or sign the vouchers as regards the adequacy of funds may have been
ministerial, his failure to observe the obvious irregularity is clear evidence of his
complicity in the conspiracy.
Talino declared that in the morning of May 23, 1980, four vouchers (including three
made out in favor of "D" Alfenor Repair Shop') were brought to him for his certificate
as regards the availability of funds. He had signed all the four vouchers. In the
afternoon of the same day, three other vouchers were also presented to him for
certification as to funds these three were in substitution of Exhibits "A", "B" and "C"
which he had earlier signed but which, according to Talino, were disallowed and
cancelled, Talino claims that he had examined the supporting documents of the last
three vouchers the RIV, the bids signed by the repair shops and the abstract of bids.
If what Talino says is true, at least the abstract of bids submitted in the morning,
where "D" Alfenor Motor Shop' appears to be the lowest bidder, must have been
different from the ones submitted together with vouchers in the afternoon. This would
have raised his suspicions as to why these last three abstracts could be dated as
they were (May 18, May 15 and May 11, respectively) when it was only that morning
that the abstracts containing the name of "D"; Alfenor Motor Shop' were submitted.
The fact that he readily approved the substitute vouchers with the substitute winning
bidders is a clear indication that he knew he was facilitating an irregular transaction.
It is our view that the evidence on record has established beyond doubt the participation
of both Agustin Talino and Alejandro Macadangdang in all the four felonies charged in
the informations. 13
The petitioner makes much of the statement in the Comment that the petitioner's guilt could be
deduced "from the evidence for the prosecution and from the testimony of Pio Ulat," 14 but that was
not the respondent court speaking. That was the Solicitor General's analysis. As far as the
Sandiganbayan was concerned, the said testimony was inadmissible against the petitioner because
he "did not cross examine Ulat and was not even required to be present when the latter was
testifying. In fact, the respondent court even expressed the wish that Ulat had been presented as
rebuttal witness in the separate trial of the petitioner as there would then have been "no impediment
to the use of his testimony against the other accused. " As it was not done, the trial court could not
and did not consider Ulat's testimony in determining the petitioner's part in the offenses.
The factual findings of the respondent court being supported by substantial evidence other than
Ulat's testimony, we see no reason to disturb them. It is futile for the petitioner to invoke his
constitutional presumption of innocence because his guilt has in the view of the trial court been
established beyond reasonable doubt, and we agree.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioner.
G.R. Nos. L-35978 and L-36069 December 26, 1974
EMMA MONDRAGON, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Felipe C. Sta. Ana, Jr. and Pedro A. Lopez for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Hector C. Fule and
Solicitor Francisco J. Bautista for respondents.

BARREDO, J .:p
Petition for review, insofar as herein petitioner is concerned, of the decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. Nos. 06943-44-Cr. of the said court, affirming, with modification of the penalties, the
judgments of the City Court of Quezon City (Branch III) which found petitioner together with her
alleged paramour guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of adultery in two separate cases and
sentenced her to two indeterminate terms of six (6) months ofarresto mayor, as minimum, to two (2)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as maximum, plus payment of the
costs.
The basic and decisive question raised by petitioner is stated in her brief thus:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING THE EVIDENCE RELATING TO
THE ADMINISTRATIVE CASE BEFORE THE BUREAU OF POSTS AND THE CIVIL
SERVICE COMMISSION AND IN NOT FINDING THE SAME WITHOUT ANY
BEARING WHATEVER UPON THE CASES AT BAR.
It is not disputed that herein petitioner is married to Frank Fernando and that during said marriage
she came to know rather closely her co-accused Luis Abdon Jr. It is in fact admitted by her that while
her husband was away in the United States serving in the armed forces of that country, Abdon Jr.
frequented the house where she was living, namely, No. 10 Cadena de Amor Street, Quezon City,
although she explained that, as the said house consisted of two units with common receiving and
dining rooms and Abdon Jr. was just renting one of said units for the use of his parents, the reason
for his being there was to visit and stay with his parents from time to time. She herself was living
together with her daughter Dora, a child of a previous marriage, who subsequently left her only when
she got married.
But the Court of Appeals refused to believe petitioners testimony and held thus:
The record is replete with evidence positively attesting to the illicit relations between
herein appellants, among these being the testimony of Aristeo Mondragon, Emma
Mondragon's own brother who asserted having seen the appellants sleeping together
at No. 10 Cadena de Amor St., Quezon City, (t.s.n. pp. 62-65, May 23, 1962,
Nisperos),belying appellant Mondragon's claim that he merely went to her aforesaid
house to visit his parents who were then renting her bungalow. (T.s.n. pp. 228-229,
June 15, 1964, id.)
Aristeo Mondragon's testimony is corroborated by that of Caridad Abdon,
complainant in the concubinage charge against Luis Abdon, Jr. who declared that
she became suspicious of the actuations of her husband when she found a
telephone number in his wallet which she later on found to belong to appellant
Mondragon; and that following her discovery of said telephone number, she went
several times at night to Mondragon's house in Quezon City to verify her suspicion
which were confirmed when, on one of these occasions she found both her husband
and appellant Mondragon lying in bed under the mosquito net, the woman clad only
in a chemis while the man was wearing singlets and briefs (T.s.n. pp. 170-171,
March 16, 1964, id.)
A third witness, Maria Catalan, appellant Mondragon's long-time neighbor and
"comadre" admitted having seen both appellants living together like husband and
wife in the latter's house, at times seeing Abdon, Jr. dressed in his pajamas and
sharing the only bed in the room with his co-appellant. (T.s.n. pp. 111-112,
November 23, 1962, id.)
All these witnesses have not been shown to have an ulterior motive to testify falsely
against both appellants, so that the trial court did not err in giving full faith and
credence to their testimonies. In fact, perhaps realizing too late the predicament his
statements had placed his sister in, Aristeo Mondragon made an effort while under
cross-examination to retract his testimony given at the direct examination. But we are
in full accord with the lower Court's observation that the said recantation should not
be given any weight as "during the recantation of the testimony made by Mondragon
it was in the presence of his father and this Court observed the father looking sharply
to his testifying son. (p. 11, Decision.) The same is true with respect to Caridad
Abdon's attempt at recantation for
... the fact that she bore child after the infidelity of her erring husband even way back
from June 22, 1959 leading her to recondite with the erring spouse is
understandable. ... (p. 11, Decision.)
Consequently this Court is not disposed to disturb the trial Court's findings on the
weight accorded the testimonies of the aforesaid witness, in keeping with the general
principle in this jurisdiction that
The general rule, based on logic and experience, is that the findings
of the judge who tried the case and heard the witnesses are not
disturb on appeal, unless there are substantial facts and
circumstances which have been overlooked and which, if properly
considered might affect the result of the case. (People vs. Brioso and
Taeza, 37 SCRA 336.)
Anent appellant Mondragon's first three assigned errors (pp. 1-2, Brief for Appellant
Emma Mondragon), suffice it to say that the Court a quo did not rely upon the
evidence adduced during the administrative case before the Bureau of Posts and the
Civil Service Commission, nor upon the evidence submitted before the City Fiscal as
the preliminary investigation of these cases, in establishing the guilt of the appellants
in the two adultery cases against them, but merely referred to them in the course of
its discourse on the evidence submitted to show that as early as the year 1959,
Emma Mondragon and Luis Abdon, Jr. were fully aware that both of them were
legally married to someone else. (pp. 13-17, printed copy of CA decision p. 131,
Rec.)
As may be seen, while the Court of Appeals found as a fact that the two principal witnesses of the
prosecution, Aristeo Mondragon, petitioner's brother, and Caridad Abdon, the wife of her alleged
paramour, recanted during their cross-examination all the inculpatory evidence they had given
against petitioner in the course of their testimonies-in-chief, it nevertheless proceeded to evaluate
their declarations and held that their direct testimonies should be believed in preference to their
contrary declarations during the cross-examination. In other words, the Court of Appeals upheld the
reasoning of the trial judge which ran as follows:
As regards the two cases of Adultery against Emma Mondragon and Luis Abdon, Jr.
under Criminal Cases Nos. 50386 and 50391, it is the belief of this Court that the
defense relied too much on the motive behind the filing of the complainants regarding
the ownership or acquisition by the Fernandos of the properties acquired by both
spouses and the recanted testimonies of both Aristeo Mondragon and Caridad
Abdon the complaining wife in the case of Concubinage. Considering the retraction
of the testimonies of a witness, this Court relies on the concept of that recantation in
the principle enunciated by the Supreme Court in "People vs. Samson L-9528,
October 31, 1957", which states in part that it would be a dangerous rule for courts to
respect testimonies solemnly taken before courts of justice simply because the
witness had given them and later on changed their minds for one reason or another.
More so that during the recantation of the testimony made by Aristeo Mondragon it
was in the presence of his father and this Court observed the father looking sharply
to his testifying son. As regards Caridad Abdon, the fact that she bore child after the
infidelity of her erring husband even way back from June 22, 1959 leading her to
reconcile with her erring spouse is understandable. It is therefore the belief of this
court, that notwithstanding the recantation made by the said witnesses, the court still
finds in the truth of their testimonies which they first gave during the direct
examination, especially that of Aristeo Mondragon, the brother of Emma Mondragon,
who saw them kissing each other before Abdon, Jr. leaves the house and sleeping in
one room where there is only one bed, and more so when corroborated by Mrs.
Catalan, a neighbor and a kumadre living just adjacent to her house, who in her in
testimony was worrying of her kumadre's illicit relationship with Abdon, Jr., and
Emma when asked by her kumadre of such anomalous situation, told her that her
husband (Frank Fernando) might not be arriving anymore. To these testimonies may
also be added, that of Caridad Abdon, which could be considered as this is a joint
trial of the three cases, who has gone twice in the midst of the night at No. 10
Cadena de Amor, Quezon City, where in those instances she found them alone in
their room sleeping together in one bed." (pp. XVII-XIX, Appellant's brief in CA.)
In regard to the rulings thus made by the courts below, petitioner submits that it was an error of law
for said courts to have considered or taken into account the testimonies of her brother and Mrs.
Abdon, after they confessed having willfully, testified falsely during their direct examination because
they were taught to do so by the private prosecutor. She contends that under the circumstances, the
court should have disregarded completely said testimonies, particularly because Atty. Vicente
Fernando, the private prosecutor, made no effort to rebut their accusations against him.
In order to better appreciate the extent of the contradictions and retractions referred to by petitioner,
We have, in the exercise of Our plenary judicial power gone over the complete record of the trial of
these cases. After a review thereof, We are convinced that it would be unsafe to draw any positive
conclusion from the declarations of the witnesses referred to. In the course of the cross-examination
of both of them, they categorically admitted having tailored their declarations-in-chief to what had
been taught to them by the private prosecutor, and that the truth was that they said on cross-
examination. In the redirect examination by the private prosecutor, they gave more revealing
circumstances of how they stayed in the residence of the family of the offended party, a brother of
the private prosecutor. In particular, Aristeo Mondragon revealed what considerations were offered
and given to him for his testimony favorable to the prosecution.
Involving a witness in contradictions during cross-examination is one of the recognized modes of
impeachment which renders the evidence from his lips worthless for both parties. Neither one of his
contradictory declarations can be relied upon. In the cases at bar, We have something more than
mere contradictions. What the witnesses did here was to correct their previous inculpatory
testimonies, explaining the reasons therefore. And from their answers given in the lengthy redirect
questioning of Atty. Fernando, We are not prepared to say that they are not believable, specially
because no rebuttal evidence was even offered against them.
The earlier cases of more than sixty years ago
1
dealt with either inconsistencies between different
witnesses or inconsistencies between statements of the same witness on different occasions. In
Lasada, the Court enjoined that the discrepancies in the testimonies of different witnesses should be
reconciled whenever possible, since all witnesses are presumed to tell the truth, but if the conflicts
cannot be reconciled, "the court must adopt that testimony which it believes to be true ... taking into
consideration the general character of the witness, his manner and demeanor on the stand while
testifying, the consistency or inconsistency of his statements, their probability or improbability, his
ability and willingness to speak the truth, his intelligence and means of knowledge, his motive to
speak the truth or swear a falsehood" (at p. 97). On the other hand, in Pala, the Court postulated that
"(W)hen a witness makes two statements, both being sworn to as a witness in one case, and these
two statements incur in the gravest contradiction, then the Court cannot accept either the first or the
second statements as proof. He himself by his own act of giving false testimony impeaches his own
testimony and the court is compelled to exclude it from all consideration." These rulings are still good
law.
As already noted, in the instant cases, however, witnesses Aristeo Mondragon and Caridad Abdon,
did not in a sense incur in contradictions; when they were cross-examined, they positively stated that
their testimonies on direct examination damaging to accused-petitioner were not exactly true and by
way of explanation, they both pointed to the private prosecutor as the one who instructed them what
to say. Thus, We find here an instance where the explanation of the self-contradictions of witnesses
shows willful falsehood induced by counsel for the private prosecution. We hold that in such a
situation, the evidence from said witnesses cannot as a matter of law be evaluated to determine
which of the contradictory material statements is true and both have to be disregarded.
Now, without the testimonies of Aristeo Mondragon and Caridad Abdon, the remaining evidence
given by the third witness Maria Catalan, which in the light of the efforts displayed by the private
prosecutor in tailoring the testimonies of Aristeo and Caridad has become suspect, cannot serve as
basis for conviction.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, it is our judgment that for insufficiency of evidence, petitioner
should be as she is hereby acquitted in both cases before Us, with the consequent reversal of the
decision of the Court of Appeals under review and without prejudice to the appropriate proceedings
that may be instituted against those who appear as discussed above, to have imposed on the good
faith of the courts.
Costs de officio.
G.R. No. L-67823 July 9, 1991
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DANILO MESIAS y SEBASTIAN, defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Jose B. Barce for defendant-appellant.

FERNAN, C.J .:p
This is an appeal from a decision of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXXI, Quezon
City, through Judge Rodolfo A. Ortiz, finding Danilo Mesias y Sebastian guilty of the crime of robbery
with homicide committed against Vivencio Cruz y Ramos. The dispositive part reads:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered convicting the accused, DANILO
MESIAS y SEBASTIAN, beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide, as charge in the information, and as defined and penalized under Article
294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, and in accordance therewith, applying the
provisions of Article 63, paragraph 2(2) of the Revised Penal Code there being no
litigating or aggravating circumstances which attended the commission of the
offense, the said accused is hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua, with all the
accessory penalties provided for by law; to indemnify the Heirs of Vivencio Cruz y
Ramos the sums of P12,000.00, as compensatory damages; P9,073.75,
representing the unrecovered cash and the value of the goods robbed by the
accused; P10,000.00 as burial expenses; P20,000.00, by way of moral damages;
and, P1,500.00 monthly, for the loss of the earning capacity of the victim, from
October, 1980 until the victim shall have reached the age of 65 years if he were alive,
and to pay the costs.
The accused being detained and considering the practice in the Quezon City Jail for
all detention prisoners to agree in writing that they be governed with the same rules
regarding convicted prisoners, he is credited with the full extent of the period under
which he was under detention.
xxx xxx xxx
1

The prosecution's version of the incident, drawn substantially from the testimonies of the victim's wife
and son and relied upon by the trial court in convicting Danilo Mesias, is as follows:
At around 8:00 o'clock in the evening of September 26, 1980, while Mrs. Olympia Cruz was setting
the table for dinner, five (5) armed men, four of them wearing masks, barged into their house
situated at No. 41 Kasunduan St., Barangay Commonwealth, Quezon City. Her husband, Vivencio
Cruz, was in the living room while their son, Marlon, then six (6) years old, was in the bedroom
watching television. Three (3) men poked their guns at Vivencio. Upon seeing this, Olympia shouted,
"Ina ko po, Diyos ko!" One man pointed a gun at her and another one, who was not wearing a mask,
pointed an ice pick at her chest. She was ordered to lie down, so she sat on a sack of rice. Her head
was pressed down and she was blindfolded with a red handkerchief. She was then frisked and
brought inside a room where she was told to produce the family's money and gun. She said that they
had no gun but there was money since they had a store in their house. Then, she heard the armed
men ransacking their house. She also heard her husband being ordered to produce their money,
jewelry and gun but her husband explained that he had lost his watch in a drinking spree. Later, her
son Marlon was brought to her and was also asked where their money was placed, but the boy
replied that he did not know.
2

( 5 men entered their house, only one was not wearing a mask. They ordered the victims to produce
their money and a gun but they only gave money. After they ransack the place, the man without
mask on stabbed the father and the 6 yr old son saw the incident)
Marlon was allowed by the malefactors to return to the bedroom to watch television. Then through
the open door, Marlon saw the robber without a mask stab Vivencio three times, twice on the chest
and once on the left neck, with what appeared to be an icepick. Upon seeing his father wounded,
Marlon ran to his mother and exclaimed "Nanay, naku si Tatay!" Olympia removed her blindfold and
saw Vivencio apparently lifeless and bathed in his own blood. The five robbers were nowhere in
sight. Olympia rushed out of the house and cried to the neighbors for help. The barangay officials
promptly called the police and an investigation was undertaken at about ten o'clock that evening.
The investigation revealed that the five robbers had taken with them cash and various items valued
at P9,249.00.
3

In her subsequent sworn statement before the Quezon City police, Olympia gave a description of
one of the five robbers who was not wearing a mask during the night in question.
4
This led to the
apprehension of Danilo Mesias, a twenty-five year old mechanic, who was recognized by Olympia
and her son Marlon as among the malefactors who robbed their house and store and stabbed
Vivencio to death.
The body of the deceased Vivencio Cruz, 44 years old, a driver and storeowner, was autopsied on
September 27, 1980. The postmortem report disclosed that he sustained three stab wounds: two on
the chest and one at the back of his neck. Death was due to severe hemorrhage caused by the three
wounds.
5

Of the alleged five offenders, only Mesias was charged. At his arraignment, he pleaded not guilty to
the crime of robbery with homicide. Trial followed. On January 26, 1982, the lower court rendered
the assailed judgment of conviction.
In this appeal, accused Mesias insists on his innocence. His principal defense is alibi. He alleges
that on the night of September 26, 1980, he slept early in his sister's house located at the IBP site,
Constitution Hills, Quezon City, about a half (1/2) kilometer away from the crime scene. This was
corroborated by his sister, Leni Claudio, who testified that Mesias was in her house between 6:00 in
the evening of September 26, 1980 and 6:00 in the morning of September 27, 1989.
6

To further support his claim of innocence, Mesias alleges that the victim's widow and young son,
mistook him for another person because there is another man who looks just like him, which he calls
his "double", and who happens to live in the same area.
The defense also calls the attention of the Court to the testimony of the medico-legal officer which
stated that the victim, Vivencio Cruz, was stabbed with a "single bladed pointed type of stabbing
instrument" and not an ice pick, contrary to the statement of the prosecution witnesses, Olympia and
Marlon Cruz.
After a careful review and examination of the records of the case, we find that accused Danilo
Mesias is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide.
Admittedly, there is a discrepancy between the testimony of the witnesses and the autopsy report
and testimony of the medico-legal officer on the weapon used. The witnesses, Olympia and Marlon
Cruz, stated that accused Mesias had used an ice pick in killing the victim while the medico-legal
officer testified that based on the wounds, the instrument used in stabbing the victim was a "single
bladed pointed stabbing instrument."
This discrepancy has to give way to the positive identification of accused Mesias as the one who
killed Vivencio. Although the victim's wife admitted that she did not see who stabbed her husband
since she was blindfolded, her son's testimony should be given full weight and credit.
During direct and cross-examination, the boy Marlon, a six-year old kindergarten pupil, remained
firm in his assertion that it was none other than Danilo Mesias, the unmasked one, who stabbed his
father. The defense, on cross-examination, repeatedly asked Marlon who killed his father and each
time Marlon replied that it was the accused Mesias. In the light of Marlon's categorical and
straightforward testimony which recounted the violence that transpired on September 26, 1980, as
well as his consistent declaration that among the five (5) men who entered their house, it was
Mesias who fatally knifed his father, we cannot but conclude that the boy Marlon was indeed telling
the truth and that what he stated on the witness stand was what he had actually witnessed on the
night in question.
Children of sound mind are likely to be more observant of incidents which take place within their
view than older persons, and their testimony is therefore likely to be more correct in detail than that
of older persons; and when once established that they understood the nature and character of an
oath, full faith and credit should be given to their testimony.
7

Dr. Hans Gross, a noted Austrian Jurist and expert in criminology, said that an intelligent child is
undoubtedly the best observer to be found. He is, as a rule, little influenced by the suggestions of
others and he describes objects and occurrences as he has really seen them. Generally, children
have good and retentive memory.
8

Although Marlon may have mistakenly described the type of weapon his father's assailant had used,
this is but a minor lapse when weighed against his unerring recognition of the killer. Inconsistencies
in the testimony of prosecution witnesses do not affect their credibility. What is essential, particularly
in the instant case, is that Marlon unhesitatingly identified the accused as the sole person
responsible for the death of his father. In People vs. Encipido,
9
this Court held that the credibility of
the testimony of a witness is not affected by some flaws and inconsistencies in minor details, if, as
regards the main incident, the identities of the malefactors and the testimonies appear to be
consistent with each other.
Accused's defense of alibi deserves little consideration. In no way did it prove that Mesias could not
have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. In fact, Mesias even admitted that
the house of his married sister Leni where he was allegedly sleeping, was a mere one-half kilometer
from the Cruz' residence.
In the case of People vs. Reunir,
10
it was held that for an effectual alibi, it must be shown that not
only was the accused at some other place at the same time but that it was physically impossible for
him to have been at the scene of the crime when it occurred.
The testimony of his sister corroborating his defense of alibi is similarly unacceptable. Leni's
testimony is not only biased for it is a natural desire for a sister to exculpate her brother from criminal
liability, it is also inconclusive. Alibi is at best a weak defense and easy of fabrication especially
between parents and children, relatives, and even those not so related.
11
For alibi to be credible, it
must count with a strong corroboration.
12

Moreover, Mesias' alibi, aside from being inherently weak, has been rendered inutile by the fact that
he was conclusively identified by two witnesses. In People vs. Guevarra,
13
we reiterated the almost
inflexible rule that alibi cannot prevail over the positive testimony of prosecution witnesses and their
clear identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime.
14

The allegation of accused-appellant Mesias that he was erroneously identified by the witnesses
because he has a "double" in the area, is absurd. This defense is self-serving and uncorroborated.
Not even an iota of proof to support this allegation was presented. Accused Mesias, in making such
a claim, seems to be grasping at straws in a desperate bid to clear himself.
The trial court correctly adjudged Mesias guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide. The killing of Vivencio Cruz resulted by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery.
15
But
in imposing the penalty under review, the lower court erred in holding that the subject felony was not
attended by any aggravating circumstance. Dwelling should have been appreciated as an
aggravating circumstance, the reason being that dwelling is not inherent in robbery with homicide
since the author thereof could have accomplished the heinous deed without having to violate the
domicile of the victim.
16

The monetary awards in favor of the victim's heirs must be modified. They are only entitled to be
paid the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P9,073,75 representing the unrecovered cash
and goods and P10,000.00 as burial expenses. That part of the decision awarding P12,000.00 as
compensatory damages, P20,000.00 as moral damages and P1,500 monthly to compensate for the
loss of the earning capacity of the deceased must be eliminated for want of sufficient proof that the
victim's heirs had a legal right thereto.
WHEREFORE, accused-appellant Danilo Mesias y Sebastian is hereby declared guilty of the special
complex crime of robbery with homicide as defined under paragraph 1, Article 294 of the Revised
Penal Code. Taking into account the aggravating circumstance of dwelling, the prescribed penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death is imposed in its maximum period which is death. But in view of the
abolition of the capital punishment in the 1987 Constitution, the Court AFFIRMS the penalty
of reclusion perpetua imposed by the trial court as a reduction from the death penalty. The decision
under review is however MODIFIED to the extent that the heirs of the victim are adjudged to be
entitled to receive from the accused-appellant Danilo Mesias civil indemnity of P50,000.00 in line
with recent jurisprudence, P10,000.00 for burial expenses and P9,073.75 representing the
unrecovered cash and value of the stolen goods. The portion of the decision awarding in favor of the
heirs P12,000.00 as compensatory damages, P20,000.00 as moral damages as well as P1,500.00
monthly for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased Vivencio Cruz is ordered DELETED for
want of sufficient legal basis. Costs against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED