15 cases DAY 2, Torts (June 24, 2014)

General Rule: Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable
1 BARREDO v GARCIA and ALMARIO .
At about 1:30am on May 3, 1936, Fontanillas taxi collided with a kalesa thereby killing the 16 year old
Faustino Garcia. Faustinos parents filed a criminal suit against Fontanilla and reserved their right to file
a separate civil suit. Fontanilla was eventually convicted. After the criminal suit, Garcia filed a civil suit
against Barredo the owner of the taxi (employer of Fontanilla). The suit was based on Article 1903 of
the civil code (negligence of employers in the selection of their employees). Barredo assailed the suit
arguing that his liability is only subsidiary and that the separate civil suit should have been filed against
Fontanilla primarily and not him.

ISSUE: Whether or not Barredo is just subsidiarily liable.

HELD: No. He is primarily liable under Article 1903 which is a separate civil action against negligent
employers. Garcia is well within his rights in suing Barredo. He reserved his right to file a separate civil
action and this is more expeditious because by the time of the SC judgment Fontanilla is already serving
his sentence and has no property. It was also proven that Barredo is negligent in hiring his employees
because it was shown that Fontanilla had had multiple traffic infractions already before he hired him
something he failed to overcome during hearing. Had Garcia not reserved his right to file a separate civil
action, Barredo would have only been subsidiarily liable. Further, Barredo is not being sued for damages
arising from a criminal act (his drivers negligence) but rather for his own negligence in selecting his
employee (Article 1903).

2 ELCANO v HILL .
Reginald Hill, a minor, caused the death of Agapito (son of Elcano). Elcano filed a criminal case against
Reginald but Reginald was acquitted for lack of intent coupled with mistake. Elcano then filed a civil
action against Reginald and his dad (Marvin Hill) for damages based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Hill
argued that the civil action is barred by his sons acquittal in the criminal case; and that if ever, his civil
liability as a parent has been extinguished by the fact that his son is already an emancipated minor by
reason of his marriage.

ISSUE: Whether or not Marvin Hill may be held civilly liable under Article 2180.

HELD: Yes. The acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case does not bar the filing of a separate civil action.
A separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally
prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if accused is
actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such
eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In
other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively
to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same
act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the
criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the
accused. Briefly stated, culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable
by law.
While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil
Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes place by the marriage of the minor child, it is,
however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full
or absolute. Thus Emancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental
authority over the childs person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property as though he were
of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real property without the consent of his
father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father,
mother or guardian. Therefore, Article 2180 is applicable to Marvin Hill the SC however ruled since at
the time of the decision, Reginald is already of age, Marvins liability should be subsidiary only as a
matter of equity.

3 VORATA v OCHOA .
In September 1975, Borilla was driving a jeep when he hit Arsenio Virata thereby causing the latters
death. The heirs of Virata sued Borilla through an action for homicide through reckless imprudence in
the CFI of Rizal. Viratas lawyer reserved their right to file a separate civil action the he later withdrew
said motion. But in June 1976, pending the criminal case, the Viratas again reserved their right to file a
separate civil action. Borilla was eventually acquitted as it was ruled that what happened was a mere
accident. The heirs of Virata then sued Borilla and Ochoa (the owner of the jeep and employer of Borilla)
for damages based on quasi delict. Ochoa assailed the civil suit alleging that Borilla was already
acquitted and that the Viratas were merely trying to recover damages twice. The lower court agreed
with Ochoa and dismissed the civil suit.

ISSUE: Whether or not the heirs of Virata may file a separate civil suit.

HELD: Yes. It is settled that in negligence cases the aggrieved parties may choose between an action
under the Revised Penal Code or of quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
What is prohibited by Article 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines is to recover twice for the same
negligent act. Therefore, under the proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal
negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for
civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.
But said article forestalls a double recovery.

4 BANAL v TADEO .
Petitioner herein is one of the complainants in the criminal cases filed against Rosario Claudio. Claudio is
charged with 15 separate information for violation of BP22. Claudio pleaded not guilty, thus trial
ensued. Petitioner moved to intervene through private prosecutor but it was rejected by respondent
judge on the ground that the charge is for the violation of BP 22 which does not provide for any civil
liability or indemnity and hence, it is not a crime against property but public order. Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration but was denied by the respondent judge. Hence this appeal.

Issue: Whether or not a private prosecutor may intervene in the prosecution for violation of BP
22 which does not provide for civil liability.
YES. Under Art. 100 of the RPC, every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. Thus a
person committing a felony offends namely (1) the society in which he lives in or the political entity
called the State whose law he had violated; and (2) the individual member of that society whose person,
right, honor, chastity or property was actually or directly injured or damaged by the same punishable
actor or omission. While an act or omission is felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives rise to
civil liability not so much because it is a crime but because it caused damage to another. Viewing things
pragmatically, we can readily see that what gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation and the
moral duty of everyone to repair or make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his own act
or omission, done intentionally or negligently, whether or not the same be punishable by law. In other
words, criminal liability will give rise to civil liability only if the same
feloniousact or omission results in damage or injury to another and is the direct andproximate cause
thereof. Damage or injury to another is evidently the foundation of the civil action. Such is not the case
in criminal actions for, to be criminally liable,
itis enough that the act or omission complained of is punishable, regardless of whether or not it
also causes material damage to another. Article 20 of the New Civil Code provides: Every person who,
contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the
same.Regardless, therefore, of whether or not a special law so provides,indemnification of the
offended party may be had on account of the damage, loss or injury directly suffered as a consequence
of the wrongful act of another.
5 OCCENA v HON. ICAMINA
Petitioner Occena filed a criminal complaint for Grave Oral Defamation against private respondent
Cristina Vegrafia for allegedly openly, publicly and maliciously uttering the following insulting words and
statements: "Gago ikaw nga Barangay Captain, montisco, traidor, malugus, Hudas." Private respondent
as accused therein entered a plea of not guilty. After trial, private respondent was convicted of the
offense of Slight Oral Defamation and was sentenced to pay a fine of Fifty Pesos (P50.00) with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs. No damages were awarded to petitioner.

WON pet. is entitled to damages from (lowercrt-declared) defamatory remarks by private respondent

Ruling: PETITION GRANTED. The decision of the RTC is MODIFIED and private respondent is ordered to
pay petitioner the amount of P5,000.00 as moral damages and another P5,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
What gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation of everyone to repair or to make whole the
damage caused to another by reason of his act or omission, whether done intentionally or negligently
and whether or not punishable by law. The offense of which private respondent was found guilty is not
one of those felonies where no civil liability results because either there is no offended party or no
damage was caused to a private person.
Article 2219, par. (7) of the Civil Code allows the recovery of moral damages in case of libel, slander or
any other form of defamation. This provision of law establishes the right of an offended party in a case
for oral defamation to recover from the guilty party damages for injury to his feelings and reputation.
The offended party is likewise allowed to recover punitive or exemplary damages.
6 SPOUSES PACIS v MORALES .
Petitioners are the parents of Alfred Pacis, a 17-year old student who died in a shooting incident inside
the Top Gun Firearms and Ammunitions Store in Baguio City. Morales is the owner of the gun store.
On the fateful day, Alfred was in the gun store, with Matibag and Herbolario as sales agents and
caretakers of the store while owner Morales was in Manila. The gun which killed Alfred is a gun owned
by a store customer which was left with Morales for repairs, which he placed inside a drawer. Since
Morales would be going to Manila, he left the keys to the store with the caretakers. It appears that the
caretakers took the gun from the drawer and placed it on top of a table. Attracted by the sight of the
gun, the young Alfred got hold of the same. Matibag asked Alfred to return the gun. The latter followed
and handed the gun to Matibag. It went off, the bullet hitting the young Alfred in the head.
A criminal case for homicide was filed against Matibag. Matibag, however, was acquitted of the charge
against him because of the exempting circumstance of accident under Art. 12, par. 4 of the RPC.
By agreement of the parties, the evidence adduced in the criminal case for homicide against Matibag
was reproduced and adopted by them as part of their evidence in the instant case.
The trial court rendered its decision in favor of petitioners, ordering the defendant to pay plaintiffs
indemnity for the death of Alfred, actual damages for the hospitalization and burial, expenses incurred
by the plaintiffs, compensatory damages, MD and AF.
Respondent appealed to the CA, which reversed the trial courts Decision and absolved respondent from
civil liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. MR denied, hence this petition.
ISSUE: Was Morales negligent?
HELD: Petition granted. The CA decision is set aside and the trial courts Decision reinstated.
YES
This case for damages arose out of the accidental shooting of petitioners son. Under Article 1161 of the
Civil Code, petitioners may enforce their claim for damages based on the civil liability arising from the
crime under Article 100 of the RPC or they may opt to file an independent civil action for damages under
the Civil Code. In this case, instead of enforcing their claim for damages in the homicide case filed
against Matibag, petitioners opted to file an independent civil action for damages against respondent
whom they alleged was Matibags employer. Petitioners based their claim for damages under Articles
2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code.
**
Unlike the subsidiary liability of the employer under Article 103 of the RPC, the liability of the employer,
or any person for that matter, under Article 2176 of the Civil Code is primary and direct, based on a
persons own negligence. Article 2176 states:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
This case involves the accidental discharge of a firearm inside a gun store. Under PNP Circular No. 9,
entitled the Policy on Firearms and Ammunition Dealership/Repair, a person who is in the business of
purchasing and selling of firearms and ammunition must maintain basic security and safety
requirements of a gun dealer, otherwise his License to Operate Dealership will be suspended or
canceled.
Indeed, a higher degree of care is required of someone who has in his possession or under his control an
instrumentality extremely dangerous in character, such as dangerous weapons or substances. Such
person in possession or control of dangerous instrumentalities has the duty to take exceptional
precautions to prevent any injury being done thereby. Unlike the ordinary affairs of life or business
which involve little or no risk, a business dealing with dangerous weapons requires the exercise of a
higher degree of care.
As a gun store owner, respondent is presumed to be knowledgeable about firearms safety and should
have known never to keep a loaded weapon in his store to avoid unreasonable risk of harm or injury to
others. Respondent has the duty to ensure that all the guns in his store are not loaded. Firearms should
be stored unloaded and separate from ammunition when the firearms are not needed for ready-access
defensive use. With more reason, guns accepted by the store for repair should not be loaded precisely
because they are defective and may cause an accidental discharge such as what happened in this case.
Respondent was clearly negligent when he accepted the gun for repair and placed it inside the drawer
without ensuring first that it was not loaded. In the first place, the defective gun should have been
stored in a vault. Before accepting the defective gun for repair, respondent should have made sure that
it was not loaded to prevent any untoward accident. Indeed, respondent should never accept a firearm
from another person, until the cylinder or action is open and he has personally checked that the weapon
is completely unloaded. For failing to insure that the gun was not loaded, respondent himself was
negligent. Furthermore, it was not shown in this case whether respondent had a License to Repair which
authorizes him to repair defective firearms to restore its original composition or enhance or upgrade
firearms.
Clearly, respondent did not exercise the degree of care and diligence required of a good father of a
family, much less the degree of care required of someone dealing with dangerous weapons, as would
exempt him from liability in this case.

Reservation of right to institute a separate civil action for damages (Rule 111
ROC)
Plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for same act or omission committed by
defendant (Art. 2177, CC)
7 PEOPLE v AMISTAD .
In CFI Baguio and Benguet, action (INFORMATION) was filed against ITONG AMISTAD
ESTAFA. He allegedly sold by deed of sale on Oct 11, 1962 Ben Palispis an unsegregated portion of
42,000 sqm of land in Baguio
KNOWING FULL WELL that he had already previously entered into an agreement with JAVELLANA last
Feb 10, 1962 of 10,000 sqm of that exact described parcel
xx RTC = acquitted him, guilty not proven beyond reasonable doubt. Case is Civil in nature
xx CA = dismissed appeal
ISSUE whether an appeal by the complainant for estafa, may be allowed from a decision
acquitting the accused of the crime charged, only insofar as the latter's civil liability is concerned.
We find no ground to reverse the Resolution of the Court of Appeals on the purely legal question of
whether the petitioner, as complainant in Criminal Case No. 4025 of the Court of First Instance of Baguio
and Benguet, for estafa, can appeal from the judgment acquitting the accused, because the trial court
failed to declare the latter's civil liability to the complainant, which was allegedly proven by the
evidence.
The provision of Article 29 of the Civil Code relied upon by the petitioner clearly requires the institution
of a separate action by the filing of the proper complaint. To such complaint, the accused as the
defendant therein, may file the appropriate responsive pleading, which may be an answer or a motion
to dismiss. In a criminal action, notwithstanding that the action for the recovery of civil liability is
impliedly instituted therewith, if not reserved or waived, the accused is not afforded the same remedy.
Neither is the mandatory pre-trial held as is required of all civil actions. The obvious reason is that the
civil liability recoverable in the criminal action is one solely dependent upon conviction, because said
liability arises from the offense, with respect to which pre-trial is never held to obtain admission as to
the commission thereof, except on the occasion of arraignment. This is the kind of civil liability involved
in the civil action deemed filed simultaneously with the filing of criminal action, unless it is reserved or
waived, as so expressly provided in Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court and as held in People vs.
Herrera, 74 Phil. 21.
If the civil liability arises from other sources than the commission of the offense, such as from law or
contract or quasi-delict, its enforcement has to be by an ordinary civil action, which, as expressly
provided in Article 29 of the Civil Code may be disposed of as a mere preponderance of evidence would
warrant. Then, all the defenses available, such as prescription, lack of jurisdiction, set-off, and the other
grounds for a motion to dismiss may be availed of, as may be proper under the peculiar facts and
circumstances of the case, complete with pre-trial after issues have been joined. Upon these
considerations, it becomes clear that the argument of petitioner invoking the rule against multiplicity of
action may not forcefully or convincingly be put forth.
xxx
Brought out in bold relief in the aforequoted ruling is that what is impliedly brought simultaneously with
the criminal action is the civil action to recover civil liability arising from the offense. Hence, the two
actions may rise or fall together. However, if the civil action is reserved, or if the ground of acquittal is
reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused, a separate civil action may be filed, the complainant
alleging a cause of action independent of, and not based on, the commission of an offense. Only
preponderance of evidence would then be required.
8 JARANTILLA v CA .
Private respondent Jose Kuan Sing was "side-swiped by a Volkswagon Beetle driven by Edgar
Jarantilla in the evening of July 7, 1971 in lznart Street, Iloilo City" towards the direction of the
provicional capitol resulting to serious physical injuries thru reckless inprudence.
Sing did not reserve his right to institute a separate civil action. Jarantilla was eventually
acquitted because of reasonable doubt.
On October 30, 1974, Sing filed a complaint (civil case) against the Jarantilla in the former Court
of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch IV, in which civil action involved the same subject matter and
act complained of in the dismissed criminal case. RTC wanted to enrich our jurisprudence. So
RTC denies motion to dismiss, grants damages to Sing, proposed that the case be elevated to
the SC by certiorari. CA affirmed.

ISSUE: Whether Sing, who was the complainant in the dismissed criminal action (grounded on
reasonable dobut) for physical injuries and who participated in the prosecution without reserving
the civil action can file a separate action for civil liability arising from the same act or omission.

HELD: YES, because the civil action here is not based on DELICT, but on QUASI-DELICT.

RATIO/DOCTRINES:
Well settled is the rule that the same act or omission can create two kinds of liability on the part
of the offender, that is, civil liability ex delicto and civil liability ex quasi delicto. Since the same
negligence can give rise either to a delict or crime or to a quasi-delict or tort, either of these two
types of civil liability may be enforced against the culprit, subject to Article 2177 of the Civil
Code that the offended party cannot recover damages under both types of liability.
Where the offended party elected to claim damages arising from the offense charged in the
criminal case through her intervention as a private prosecutor, the final judgment rendered
therein constituted a bar to the subsequent civil action based upon the same cause.
The well-settled doctrine is that a person, while not criminally liable may still be
civilly liable. 'The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the
accused only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil
liability might arise did not exist'
Another consideration in favor of Sing is the doctrine that the failure of the court to make any
pronouncement, favorable or unfavorable, as to the civil liability of the accused amounts to a
reservation of the right to have the civil liability litigated and determined in a separate action.
The rules nowhere provide that if the court fails to determine the civil liability it becomes no
longer enforceable.
Furthermore, in the present case the civil liability sought to be recovered through the application
of Article 29 is no longer that based on or arising from the criminal offense. There is persuasive
logic in the view that, under such circumstances, the acquittal of the accused foreclosed the civil
liability based on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code which presupposes the existence of
criminal liability or requires a conviction of the offense charged. Divested of its penal element by
such acquittal, the causative act or omission becomes in effect a quasi-delict, hence only a civil
action based thereon may be instituted or prosecuted thereafter, which action can be proved by
mere preponderance of evidence. 28 Complementary to such considerations, Article 29
enunciates the rule, as already stated, that a civil action for damages is not precluded by an
acquittal on reasonable doubt for the same criminal act or omission.
Since this action is based on a quasi-delict, the failure of the respondent to reserve his right to
file a separate civil case and his intervention in the criminal case did not bar him from filing such
separate civil action for damages. 30 The Court has also heretofore ruled in Elcano vs.
Hill 31 that
The extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (c) of Sec. 3 Rule 111, refers
exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code;
whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and
not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that
the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the
accused . . .
9 HUN HYUNG PARK v EUNG WON CHOI .