Geluz vs CA

TI TLE: Geluz vs CA
CI TATI ON: 2 SCRA 801

FACTS:

Nita Villanueva, the wife of Oscar lazo, respondent,
came to know Antonio Geluz, the petitioner and
physician, through her aunt Paula Yambot. Nita
became pregnant some time in 1950 before she and
Oscar were legally married. As advised by her aunt
and to conceal it from her parents, she decided to
have it aborted by Geluz. She had her pregnancy
aborted again on October 1953 since she found it
inconvenient as she was employed at COMELEC.
After two years, on February 21, 1955, she again
became pregnant and was accompanied by her sister
Purificacion and the latters daughter Lucida at
Geluz clinic at Carriedo and P. Gomez Street. Oscar
at this time was in the province of Cagayan
campaigning for his election to the provincial board.
He doesnt have any idea nor given his consent on
the abortion.

ISSUE: Whether husband of a woman, who
voluntarily procured her abortion, could recover
damages from the physician who caused the same.

HELD:

The Supreme Court believed that the minimum award
fixed at P3,000 for the death of a person does not
cover cases of an unborn fetus that is not endowed
with personality which trial court and Court of
Appeals predicated.

Both trial court and CA wasnt able to find any basis
for an award of moral damages evidently because
Oscars indifference to the previous abortions of Nita
clearly indicates he was unconcerned with the
frustration of his parental affections. Instead of filing
an administrative or criminal case against Geluz, he
turned his wifes indiscretion to personal profit and
filed a civil action for damages of which not only he
but, including his wife would be the beneficiaries. It
shows that hes after obtaining a large money
payment since he sued Geluz for P50,000 damages
and P3,000 attorneys fees that serves as indemnity
claim, which under the circumstances was clearly
exaggerated.
CASE DIGEST ON JOAQUIN V. NAVARRO
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CASE DIGEST ON JOAQUIN V. NAVARRO [93
P 257] - F: On 2/6/45, while the battle for the
liberation of Mla. was raging, the spouses
Joaquin Navarro, Sr. (JN, Sr.) and Angela
Joaquin (AJ), together w/ their 3 daughters and
their son Joaquin, Jr. (JN, Jr.) and the latter's
wife, sought refuge in the ground floor of the
building known as the German Club. During their
stay, the bldg. was packed w/ refugees, shells
were exploding around, and the Club was set on
fire. Simultaneously, the Japanese started
shooting at the people inside the bldg, especially
those who were trying to escape. the 3
daughters were hit and fell on the ground near
the entrance; and JN, Sr. and his son decided to
abandon the premises to seek a safer haven.
They could not convince AJ, who refused to join
them, and so JN, Sr. and his son, JN, Jr. and the
latter's wife dashed out of the burning edifice. As
they came out, JN, Jr. was shot in the head by a
Japanese soldier and immediately dropped. The
others lay flat on the ground in front of the Club
premises to avoid the bullets. Minutes later, the
Club, already on fire, collapsed, trapping many
people, presumably including AJ. JN, Sr., Mrs.
JN, Jr. managed to reach an air raid shelter
nearby and stayed there for about 3 days, until
they were forced to leave bec. the shelling tore it
open. They fled but unfortunately met Japanese
patrols who fired at them, killing the two.
The trial court found the deaths to have occurred
in this order: 1st. The Navarro girls; 2nd. JN, Jr.;
3rd. AJ; 4th. JN, Sr. The CA found that the
deaths occurred in the following order: 1st. The
Navarro girls; 2nd. AJ; 3rd. JN, Jr.; 4th JN, Sr.

HELD: Where there are facts, known or
knowable, from w/c a rational conclusion can be
made, the presumption (in the Rules of Court)
does not step in, and the rules of preponderance
of evidence controls.
Are there particular circumstances on record
from w/c reasonable inference of survivorship
bet. AJ and her son can be drawn? Is Francisco
Lopez' (the sole witness) testimony competent
and sufficient for the purpose?
It is our opinion that the testimony contains facts
quite adequate to solve the problem of
survivorship bet. AJ and JN, Jr. and keep the
statutory presumption out of the case. It is
believed that in the light of the conditions
painted by Lopez, a fair and reasonable
inference can be arrived at, namely: that JN, Jr.
died before his mother.
While the possibility that the mother died before
the son can not be ruled out, it must be noted
that this possibility is entirely speculative and
must yield to the more rational deduction from
proven facts that it was the other way around.
JN, Jr., was killed, while running, in front of, and
15 meters from the Club. Still in the prime of life,
30, he must have negotiated that distance in 5
seconds or less, and so died w/in that interval
from the time he dashed out of the bldg. AJ
could have perished w/in those 5 or fewer
seconds, but the probabilities that she did seem
very remote.
According to Lopez' testimony, the collapse of
the club occurred about 40 minutes after JN, Jr.
died, and it was the collapse that killed AJ. The
CA said that the interval bet. JN, Jr.'s death and
the breaking down of the edifice was "minutes."
Even so, it was much longer than 5 seconds,
long enough to warrant the inference that AJ
was still alive when her son expired.
The CA mentioned several causes, besides the
bldg's collapse, by which AJ could have been
killed. All these causes are speculative. xxx Nor
was AJ likely to have been killed by falling
beams bec. the bldg. was made of concrete and
its collapse, more likely than not, was sudden.
As to fumes, these do not cause instantaneous
death; certainly, not w/in the brief space of 5
seconds bet. her son's departure and his death.
It will be said that all this is indulging in
inferences that are not conclusive. Sec. 69 (ii) of
R 123 does not require that the inference
necessary to exclude the presumption therein
provided be certain. It is the "particular
circumstances from w/c it (survivorship) can be
inferred" that are required to be certain as tested
by the rules of evidence. In speaking of
inference the rule can not mean beyond doubt,
for "inference is never certainty, but it may be
plain enough to justify a finding of fact."
In conclusion, the presumption that AJ died
before her son is based purely on surmises,
speculations, or conjectures w/o any sure
foundation in evidence. The opposite theory is
deduced from established facts w/c, weighed by
common experience, engender the inference as
a very strong probability. Gauged by the doctrine
of preponderance of evidence by w/c civil cases
are decided, this inference ought to prevail.


Case Digest on Standard Oil Co. v. Arenas
(Capacity to Act)
Facts:The SOCNY sued the 5 debtors for
payment, including the appellant Vicente
Villanueva whoacted as surety to the loan. The
CFI of Manila ordered the defendants to pay
jointly and severally to theplaintiffs SOCNY.
While the judgment was in the course of
execution, Elisa Villanueva, wife of
Vicenteappeared and alleged that her
husband was declared insane on July 24, 1909,
and that on Oct. 11, shewas authorized by the
court as guardian to institute the proper legal
proceedings for the annulment of several
bonds given by her husband while in a state of
insanity.Issues:(1)Whether or not suffering
from monomania of wealth necessarily
warrants the conclusion that theperson does
not have capacity to act.(2) Whether or not
the appellant, was incapable of entering into
contract at the time the bond wasexecuted
on December 15, 1908.Held:The court
affirmed the trial court decision that
Villanueva possessed the capacity to act. The
SCheld that there is no evidence to warrant
the conclusion, in a judicial decision, that a
person sufferingfrom monomania of wealth is
really insane and therefore is deranged and
incapable of binding himself in a
contract. From the testimony of his wife, it
seemed that Vicente has the liberty to go
wherever hewished, that he had property of
his own and was not deprived of its
management, as well as the factthat he had
never squandered any large sum of money.As
for the 2nd issue, there was no direct proof
that showed that at the date of the giving of
thebond, December 15, 1908, the appellant
was incapable of acting because of insanity.
The witnesses whoas physicians, testified
that they observed insane periods in
Villanueva twice prior to 1903, once on1908,
but none at the time of the execution of the
said bond on December 15, 1908. It was also
shownthat the wife never before sought to
legally deprive her husband management over
his estate knowingfull well that he was insane.

Case Digest on Mercado v. Espiritu (Legal Age)
Facts:The plaintiffs alleged that as the sole
heirs, along with their two sisters, to a 48
hectare tract of land which belonged to their
mother the sister of the defendant. The
defendant cajoled, induced, andfraudulently
succeeded in getting the plaintiffs to sell
their land for a sum of P400 as opposed to
itsoriginal value. The plaintiffs demand the
annulment of the sale, the return of the land,
and theremuneration of the thing benefited
by the defendant.
According to the Defendant, the plaintiffs
mother had sold a portion of t
he original land to the
defendant for a sum. (instrument exhibit
1)The plaintiffs father subsequently,
mortgaged the remainingparcel to the
defendant for a sum to cover his childrens
welfare after his wifes death. (Pacto de
retro;
instrument exhibit 2) The plaintiffs had
alleged themselves of legal age and ratified
the absolute andperpetual sale of the land in
consideration of the P400 (instrument exhibit
3). Cross-complaint filed fordamages due to
the malicious and unfounded complaint by the
plaintiffs.

Case Digest on Braganza v. Villa Abrille (Minor
Signing Contract)
Facts:Rosario Braganza and her sons loaned
from De Villa Abrille P70,000 in Japanese war
notes and inconsideration thereof, promised
in writing to pay him P10,00 + 2% per annum in
legal currency of thePhilippines 2 years after
the cessation of the war. Because they have
no paid, Abrille is sued them inMarch
1949. The Manila court of first instance and
CA held the family solidarily liable to pay
accordingto the contract they signed.The
family petitioned to review the decision of
the CA whereby they wereordered to
solidarily pay De Villa Abrille P10,000 + 2%
interest, praying for consideration of the
minorityof the Braganza sons when
they signed the contract.Issue:Whether or
not the boys, who were 16 and 18
respectively, are to be bound by the contract
of loan theyhave signed.Held:The SC found
that Rosario will still be liable to pay her
share in the contract because theyminority of
her sons does not release her from
liability. She is ordered to pay 1/3 of P10,000
+ 2%interest.However with her sons, the SC
reversed the decision of the CA which found
them similarly liabledue to their failure to
disclose their minority. The SC sustained
previous sources in Jurisprudence


in
order to hold the infant liable, the fraud
must be actual and not constructive. It has
been held that hismere silence when making a
contract as to his age does not constitute a
fraud which can be made the
basis of an action of deceit.
The boys, though not bound by the provisions
of the contract, are still liable to pay the
actualamount they have profited from the
loan. Art. 1340 states that even if the
written contract isunenforceable because of
their non-age, they shall make restitution to
the extent that they may haveprofited by the
money received. In this case, 2/3 of P70,00,
which is P46,666.66, which when convertedto
Philippine money is equivalent to P1,166.67
Case Digest on Bambalan vs. Maramba and
Muerong
Case:APPELANT: Isidro Bambalan Y
PradoAPPELEE: German Maramba and
Genoveva MuerongDECIDED: January 30,
1928 DECISION: Dispositive part of
judgment affirmedOPINON: J. StreetFacts:
Bambalans parents Paula Prado and her first
husband, Isidro Bambalan Y Calcotura
received a loan from
Genoveva Muerong and German Maramba in
1915.Calcotura died leaving Bambalan as the
sole heir of his estate.In 1922, Muerong and
Maramba forced Bambalan, who was at that
time, a minor, to sell their land aspayment for
the loan
Bambalan signed, but said that he was forced
because they were threatening his mother
withimprisonment.
Muerong and Maramba bought Bambalans
first cedula to acknowledge the document.
Important Statutes:Civil code, Art. 1327.
The following cannot give consent to a
contract: (1) Unemancipated minors;
(2)Insane or demented persons, and deaf-
mutes who do not know how to write. (1263a)
Civil code, Art.1390. The following contracts
are voidable or annullable, even though there
may have been no damageto the contracting
parties: (1) Those where one of the parties is
incapable of giving consent to acontract; (2)
Those where the consent is vitiated by
mistake, violence, intimidation, undue
influence orfraud.Issues:Whether or not
Bambalan sold the land to Maramaba and
Muerong CourtAnalysis:Whether or not
Bambalan sold the land to Maramaba and
MuerongContract has been vitiated to the
extent of being void because:1.The vendor
was a minor.
2.His age was well known to the purchaser.
(Maramba bought plaintiffs ceedula)
3.Mercado vs Espiritu CANNOT be applied:
Plaintiff did not pretend to be of age.

US v. Vaquilar
27 Phil 88
Facts:
Evaristo Vaquilar was found guilty of killing his wife
and his daughter, as well as injuring other persons
with a bolo. Eyewitnesses testified that the defendant
appeared to be insane prior to the commission of the
crimes. They also testified that the appellant was
complaining of pains in his head and stomach prior to
the killing. The witnesses evidence for insanity
include:
appellants eyes were very big and red with his
sight penetrating at the time he was killing his wife.
he looked at me he was crazy because if he was
not, he wouldnt have killed his family
at the moment of cutting those people, he looked
like a madman; crazy because he would cut anybody
at random
sister said, then he pursued me.he must have
been crazy because he cut me

Issue:
Whether or not these pieces of evidence are sufficient
to declare the accused as insane, therefore exempt
from criminal liability.

Held:
The evidence is insufficient to declare him insane.
The appellants conduct was consistent with the acts
of an enraged criminal, not of a person with an
unsound mind at the time he committed the crimes.
The fact that a person acts crazy is not conclusive
that he is insane. The popular meaning of crazy is
not synonymous with the legal terms insane. The
conduct of the appellant after he was confined in jail is
not inconsistent with the actions of a sane person (not
saying a word in the cell, crying out loud at night) who
has reflected and felt remorse after the commission of
the crime.
The court further held that mere mental depravity, or
moral insanity which results not from any disease of
the mind, but from a perverted condition of the moral
system where the person is mentally sane, does not
exempt one from criminal responsibility. In the
absence of proof that the defendant had lost his
reason or became demented after a few moments
prior to or during the perpetration of the crime, it is
presumed that he was in a normal state of mind.
Director of Lands v.
Abelardo
Facts: The case revolves around proving the
ownership of 2 parcels of lands, which were
properties subject in a successional
litigation. Siblings Fulgencia and Jose Dino
are contesting the ownership of subject
properties in Manuel Libunaos possession.
They further claim that as deaf-mutes, they
should not be barred by prescription in filing
the case.

Issue: Whether or not the prescription period in
filing the case should be relaxed due to their being
deaf-mutes.

Held: No, they are not. The SC ruled that the
subject lands are still and should still be owned by
Manuel Libuano and family due to the following
reasons (1) the preponderance of evidence as to the
ownership of the lands are in favor of Libunao, (2)
the action for filing a claim regarding the partition
of the estate has already prescribed.

Being a deaf-mute is not by itself alone, without
the concurrence of any of the incapacities
recognized by law, considered included among the
exceptions which in matters of prescription, are
granted to incapacitated persons, in connection
with the running of the prescriptive period.

Martinez vs Martinez
Martinez vs Martinez
GR No. 162084, J une 28, 2005

FACTS:

Daniel Martinez Sr. and Natividad de
Guzman-Martinez were the owners of a parcel
of land. The former executed a last will and
testament directing the subdivision of the
property into 3 lots bequeathed to each of his
sons namely Rodolfo, Manolo (designated as
administrator of the estate), and Daniel Jr. In
October 1997, Daniel Sr. died. Rodolfo then
found a deed of sale purportedly signed by his
father on September 1996 where it appears
that the land was sold to Manolo and his wife
Lucila and was also issued to them. Rodolfo
filed a complaint against his brother Manolo
and sister-in-law Lucila for the annulment of
the deed of sale and cancellation of the TCT.
Spouses wrote Rodolfo demanding him to
vacate the property which the latter ignored
and refused to do so. This prompted the
spouses to file a complaint for unlawful
detainer against Rodolfo. This matter was
referred to the barangay for conciliation and
settlement but none was reached. It was
alleged in the position paper of the spouses
that earnest efforts toward a compromise had
been made but the same proved futile.

ISSUE: WON spouses Martinez complied
with the requirements of Art 151 of the Family
Code.

HELD:

No suit between members of the same family
shall prosper unless it should appear from the
verified complaint that earnest efforts toward a
compromise have been made, but the same
have failed.

Lucila Martinez, the respondents sister-in-law
was one of the plaintiffs in the case at bar.
The petitioner is not a member of the same
family as that of her deceased husband and the
respondent. Her relationship with the
respondent is not one of those enumerated in
Article 150. It should also be noted that the
petitioners were able to comply with the
requirements of Article 151 because they
alleged in their complaint that they had
initiated a proceeding against the respondent
for unlawful detainer in the katarungan
Pambarangay in compliance with PD1508 and
that after due proceedings, no amicable
settlement was arrived at resulting in the
barangay chairmans issuance of a certificate
to file action.

Case Digest: G.R. No.
174689. October 22,
2007

Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio,
petitioner, vs. Republic of the
Philippines, respondent.
________________________________
________________________________
_______


Facts: Petitioner was born and
registered as male. He admitted that he
is a male transsexual, that is,
anatomically male but feels, thinks and
acts as a female and that he had
always identified himself with girls since
childhood. He underwent psychological
examination, hormone treatment, breast
augmentation and sex reassignment
surgery. From then on, petitioner lived
as female and was in fact engaged to be
married. He then sought to have his
name in his birth certificate changed
from Rommel Jacinto to Mely, and his
sex from male to female. The trial court
rendered a decision in favor of the
petitioner. Republic of the Philippines
thru the OSG filed a petition for certiorari
in the Court of Appeals. CA rendered a
decision in favor of the Republic.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is
entitled to the relief asked for.

Ruling: Article 376 of the Civil Code
provides that no person can change his
name or surname without judicial
authority which was amended by RA
9048 Clerical Error Law which does
not sanction a change of first name on
the ground of sex reassignment. Before
a person can legally change his given
name, he must present proper or
reasonable cause or any compelling
reason justifying such change. In
addition, he must show that he will be
prejudiced by the use of his true and
official name. In this case, he failed to
show, or even allege, any prejudice that
he might suffer as a result of using his
true and official name. Article 412 of the
Civil Code provides that no entry in the
civil register shall be changed or
corrected without a judicial order. The
birth certificate of petitioner contained
no error. All entries therein, including
those corresponding to his first name
and sex, were all correct. Hence, no
correction is necessary. Article 413 of
the Civil Code provides that all other
matters pertaining to the registration of
civil status shall be governed by special
laws. However, there is no such special
law in the Philippines governing sex
reassignment and its effects. Under the
Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a
historical record of the facts as they
existed at the time of birth. Thus, the
sex of a person is determined at birth,
visually done by the birth attendant (the
physician or midwife) by examining
the genitals of the infant. Considering
that there is no law legally recognizing
sex reassignment, the determination of
a persons sex made at the time of his
or her birth, if not attended by error is
immutable

For these reasons, while petitioner may
have succeeded in altering his body and
appearance through the intervention of
modern surgery, no law authorizes the
change of entry as to sex in the civil
registry for that reason. Thus, there is
no legal basis for his petition for the
correction or change of the entries in his
birth certificate. The remedies petitioner
seeks involve questions of public policy
to be addressed solely by the
legislature, not by the courts. Hence,
petition is denied.

republic vs
Cagandahan
Republic vs. Cagandahan
GR. No. 166676, September 12, 2008

FACTS:

Jennifer Cagandahan was registered as a
female in her Certificate of Live Birth.
During her childhood years, she suffered from
clitoral hypertrophy and was later on
diagnosed that her ovarian structures had
minimized. She likewise has no breast nor
menstruation. Subsequently, she was
diagnosed of having Congenital Adrenal
Hyperplasia (CAH), a condition where those
afflicted possess secondary male
characteristics because of too much secretion
of male hormones, androgen. According to
her, for all interests and appearances as well as
in mind and emotion, she has become a male
person. She filed a petition at RTC Laguna
for Correction of Entries in her Birth
Certificate such that her gender or sex be
changed to male and her first name be
changed to Jeff.

ISSUE: WON correction of entries in her
birth certificate should be granted.

HELD:

The Court considered the compassionate calls
for recognition of the various degrees of
intersex as variations which should not be
subject to outright denial. SC is of the view
that where the person is biologically or
naturally intersex the determining factor in his
gender classification would be what the
individual, having reached the age of majority,
with good reason thinks of his/her sex. As in
this case, respondent, thinks of himself as a
male and considering that his body produces
high levels of male hormones, there is
preponderant biological support for
considering him as being a male. Sexual
development in cases of intersex persons
makes the gender classification at birth
inconclusive. It is at maturity that the ge