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James Quinlan
Policy Intern at IARS

19 Walsingham Road
Enfield
Middlesex
EN2 6EX

07762948454
jamesquinln@gmail.com



The Case of Nationality and the Duty to Assist
Do we have greater obligations of justice to co-nationals?

Abstract
This article challenges the belief that shared nationality is a reason to offer greater support to one
individual over another. It draws upon a range of social science research, ranging from philosophy, to
psychology and social anthropology, to analyse why nationality could be seen to bind people
together and to argue that, in fact, it should not. It contends that a duty of assistance applies no
more to our fellow citizens than to those overseas. It challenges the importance of nationality in an
increasingly globalised world, and argues that, in the end, rather than there being a greater moral
duty to help fellow countrymen, we are more likely to help them over foreigners because we can see
the results more easily and thus receive a boost to our egos more readily.






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Introduction

Discussions of justice tend to revolve around the issue of who should receive the assistance that we
are able to offer. In saying this, I am making the assumption, with which not everyone might agree,
that justice debates arise because there is some form of inequality that we wish to resolve, and that
one side is in a stronger position and is, therefore, able to assist the other. In seeking to help others,
however, we may find ourselves unable to help everyone equally and therefore in a position where
we must decide to whom we will offer the assistance.
Authors such as David Miller (1988) and Andrea Sangiovanni (2007) argue that there is something
special about our relationship with our fellow citizens the relational view such to create a greater
duty of justice to them than towards foreigners. However, in this age of globalisation, where trade
and communication links together countries, thousands of miles apart, can it really be the case that
we are able to maintain such a clearly defined separation between us and them?
In this paper, I will reject the view that there is inherently anything special about co-citizens. I do not
argue that we do not have closer relationships with certain people than with others, such as with
family and friends, but that any such close relationships are morally arbitrary; that they do not entail
a greater duty of justice than we owe to any other human being. Despite the moral arbitrariness,
one explanation for our seeking to help those close to us over others may be that we share a
stronger emotional bond with those to whom we are close a point I will argue more fully later.
I will begin my argument by stating that there are more important factors, other than nationality, in
shaping ones identity and forming bonds with others, such as socio-economic status or race. I will
then contend that nationality is an arbitrary distinction between peoples, in many cases determined
by other nations carving up natural resources, and that as our world becomes more globalised,
nationality may become even less important. I will conclude with the claim that people tend to offer
help to feed their own egos, and, as fellow citizens are closer to home, it is easier to see the effects.


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Before I begin with the main task of this paper, I feel it is necessary to define the term, nationality.
For the purposes of this essay I will accept David Millers conception that,
nationality is essentially a subjective phenomenon constituted by the shared beliefs of a set
of people: a belief that each belongs together with the rest; that this association is neither
transitory nor merely instrumental but stems from a long history of living together which (it
is hoped and expected) will continue into the future; that the community is marked off from
other communities by its members distinctive characteristics; and that each member
recognises a loyalty to the community, expressed in a willingness to sacrifice personal gain
to advance its interests...the nation should enjoy some degree of political autonomy.
(p.648)
Like Miller, I see no reason to include that nationality requires a sovereign state though in many
cases nationality and citizenship go together or, that there is any one defining feature that
distinguishes nationalities from each other. However, whilst I accept his definition of nationality, I do
not agree with Miller that it holds within it any ethical importance in terms of attributing justice to
others; I will seek to refute the idea that nationality plays any role in our ideas of justice.

Is nationality really the one?

One of my main issues with this relational view of justice is that it presumes that nationality is a
sufficiently strong commonality to bind people into a duty of justice. I would argue, however, that
nationality is but one factor which may influence ones identity but is not necessarily the one with
which people most strongly attach themselves. I, for example, was born in England but I do not
support, or feel an association with, the English football or rugby teams. This may seem to be idle
nonsense, but I think there are many people in a similar situation of not feeling attached to their


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national team, and I think it is a perfect representation of the point I am attempting to make. Here,
nationality is not a strong enough influence to form a bond with the national team. Now, this lack of
support may stem from my parents insisting on us referring to ourselves as British I will attempt to
make a similar point to this in the next section on the arbitrariness of nationality or simply from a
dislike of their style of play or their conduct on the pitch, but this suggests that there are other
bonds and factors which may have a more important role in ones identity than ones nationality.
One reason for my argument that nationality is insufficient as an explanation for a bond between
people is that, whilst, individuals may share a nationality they may be from such radically different
backgrounds that they simply do not recognise anything of themselves in those with whom they
share a nation.
A social group is a collective of persons differentiated from at least one other group by
cultural forms, practices, or way of life. Members of a group have a specific affinity with one
another because of their similar experience of way of life, which prompts them to associate
with one another more than with those not identified with the group, or in a different way.
(Young, p. 43)
If someone does not associate themselves with the norms or practices of a group then they will not
identify themselves as part of that social group. My argument is that nationality is too broad to
encompass the differences between persons, and, therefore, individuals will more readily attach
themselves to more immediate identifying factors, such as gender or race. Iris Marion Young (1990)
says that social processes...differentiate groups within a single society. (p.43) She gives the example
of the gender division of labour which separates men and women on the basis of a supposed
capacity to be able or unable to do certain jobs. She focuses, mainly, on the struggles of women and
says that she, and many other women, experience the affinity for other women which we have
called sisterhood, even across differences. (p.13) The sisterhood does not take account of
nationality, but suggests that there are some sufficiently shared characteristics or a shared way of


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life that binds women together; there is some aspect of being female, a mutual understanding of
what it is to be a woman that creates a link between them, regardless of nationality. And, whilst,
Young speaks from a female perspective, she acknowledges that many other groups have a similar
tie between them, such as homosexuals, different races, even the elderly.
Miller, Sangiovanni, and other such authors, would reject this argument and defend the view that
nationality is an important bond between individuals based on the shared history of their people. In
stating that nationality creates greater bonds of justice between people, they are, in my opinion,
suggesting that nationality ranks higher than other aspects which people share. But, how can we say
that any one of these factors is more important than another in terms of self-identification? Can we
really say that nationality is more important than sexuality, or that race is more important than age?
Surely, if peoples identities are partly constructed by their group affinities (Young, p.9) then we
cannot say that one grouping is more important than another, without changing the identities of the
people involved. Life is complex; people are made up of multiple interests and affinities. We should
not seek to simplify ourselves into one thing or another, but be made up of those things that make
us who we are. I am not suggesting that individuals do not feel more closely attached to one group
than to another, but that from the outside, as theorists, we are unable to specify the grouping which
is most important to ones identity. It is my contention, therefore, that other factors, such as race,
socio-economic status or even ones profession, are equally important in forming bonds between
people. Thus, the question I am asking is, if we subscribe to a relational view, why pick nationality as
the relationship of choice?
David Miller argues that nationality is most important because it is through shared institutions and
practices, regardless of their truth, that we stand in relation to our compatriots and form a bond of
obligation. (p.648) He argues that we are heavily laden with particularist commitments, including
national loyalties (p.662) which act as the grounding for special obligations to those with whom we


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share a relationship; *T+o divest oneself of such commitments would be, in one important sense, to
change ones identity. (p.662)
In my opinion, Millers defence of the importance of nationality is insufficient. Why are these shared
practices special? There are many other instances of shared practices that do not revolve around a
shared nationality that, in fact, may be strong enough to pierce the bond of nationality. Take, for
example, the Christmas Day football match during the First World War, where Allied soldiers and
soldiers of the Central Powers, set aside their weapons and national rivalries, and participated in a
game of football on the battlefield. Perhaps, this is evidence of a shared socio-economic group
overcoming bonds of nationality, as many of the frontline soldiers would have been from working-
class backgrounds, and football is often referred to as a working-class game; or, the example of
Ancient Greece, where they would often celebrate their defeats of fellow countrymen over their
similarities. (In Our Time, Radio 4, 2010) One cannot simply offer nationality as the basis for duties of
justice, when there are many examples of other shared aspects having an equal or greater influence.

Nationality is arbitrary

David Miller is mistaken in believing that nationality is sufficient to create duties of justice between
persons. As the examples above illustrate, there are many other factors with which individuals
associate in other people, thus to pick nationality from this group seems to be arbitrary.
Moreover, it seems odd to focus on any one of them, as all of these potential commonalities are
morally arbitrary in themselves they are factors over which we have no control. One does not
choose ones parents, nor the place of ones birth, thus anything arising from such conditions cannot
be said to have been caused by the individual. For example, a child born into an aristocratic family is
no more deserving of their wealth than the child born into poverty is deserving of the abject


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conditions they suffer. It is, in my opinion, unreasonable to reward or punish individuals on the
grounds of these arbitrary factors, and we should seek to equalise their effects.
It is my contention that nationality is simply one of these arbitrary factors, not merely because one
cannot control who ones parents are, but also because the creation of many states was an arbitrary
act by colonial powers seeking to divide up land and natural resources. The scramble for Africa
the name given to the division of Africa by European powers is a prime example. The countries
created in this process bore little resemblance to the tribal structure that existed the character of
boundaries and border areas which existed among precolonial African polities...were very different
from the straight lines imposed by colonialism. (Harneit-Sievers, p.162) It is undoubtedly the case
that this process will have separated close relations in creating these states, and created an arbitrary
barrier between them. It seems, therefore, far more plausible that this would be a case where the
separated tribes-people would feel a greater affinity to the other members of that tribe, even if they
were now in different countries, than to their new countrymen. And, whilst I acknowledge that we
are now approximately 250 years removed from this process, the effects of the colonial powers in
Africa can still be seen today.
Here, some may argue that, given my earlier definition of nationality, I am confusing nationality with
state membership by arguing that the imperial division of continents has lead to an arbitrariness of
nationality. As Miller contends nationality must be something more than de facto citizenship. It
must amount to a common identity that grounds citizenship. (p.657) I acknowledge that if we stick
to this basic concept of nationality that of a shared history between peoples, regardless of state
boundaries then it is not nationality, but citizenship, that I am arguing against here.
My argument, however, is that these shared histories that connect people under a national identity
have been formed through colonial processes, such as subjugation and occupation, and the struggles
that these peoples suffered, as a consequence of the imperial creation of states. As Iris Marion
Young argues, groups


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are socially prior to individuals, because peoples identities are partly constructed by their
group affinities. Social groups reflect ways that people identify themselves and others, which
lead them to associate with some people more than others, and to treat others as different.
(p.9)

As these peoples lived under colonialism, their identities changed, they were forced into different
relations with each other and created a new shared history. By going through this process they
formed social groups sharing a history, status and a form of self-identification. Social groups are
more than mere aggregations, they are fundamentally intertwined with the identities of the people
that comprise them. (Young, p.43)
As a result of the imperial divisions, there were physical changes to the political structure of the
time. The groupings that existed before, such as the particular tribes which would have been divided
by the colonial partitions, would have been permanently altered by the creation of new dividing
lines. The people would have gone from being landowners, providing for themselves, to tenants on
the land, now owned by the colonialists. (Osborn, The Guardian, 2002) This shift will have altered
their lives and caused them to identify themselves differently and this change would have been
passed on through generations.
As post-colonial theorists, such as Ashis Nandy (1988) and Dipesh Chakrabarty (2000), contend the
colonial history of global politics has unalterably affected the lives, not only of the colonies but of
the imperial powers as well. Chakrabarty argues that colonialism changed the world, in as much as it
is now impossible to conceive of anything without thinking of Western conceptions. He contends
that, despite colonial independence, there remains a continued economic and cultural domination
by the West. (Chakrabarty, 2000)
As the European powers entered their new dominions, they imposed their way of life onto their new
subjects. New economic forms, professional methods, and cultural ideas were spread across


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empires, attempting to show that Europe was the pinnacle and giving the new colonies the route to
achieve similar levels of progress. As these new ideals were imposed, they began to be accepted by
the members of the colonies, such that they were merged with traditional concepts and structures.
Nandy gives multiple examples of the recasting of traditional literature, history, and culture in India
during colonialism, to fit them to Western models of worth and meaningfulness. He offers one
example of the reinterpretation of traditional religion which projected into the Hindu past...the
qualities of Christianity which seemingly gave Christians their strength (p.23). There was an attempt
to moralise Indian life and culture in Western terms.
It is this cultural influence which, I argue, changed the nature of the social groups within the newly
created states, and thus how I feel able to argue that nationality is arbitrary, even if one accepts the
definition of nationality which Miller provides. If my argument has been persuasive, then it should
be clear how the arbitrary division of land by colonial powers led to the creation of new social
groups based around a shared history, and thus, they themselves are also arbitrary, for if the lines
had been drawn differently or a different power had acquired that land then the groups may well
have been different.
Another argument for the arbitrariness of nationality is the globalised world in which we live. The
increased speed of communication and travel, and the stronger and more varied trade links between
countries have brought us closer, metaphorically, to people on the other side of the globe. The lives
that we enjoy would be unsustainable without the clothes manufacturers in Bangladesh, the coffee
growers in Ecuador, or the farmers in Kenya. When we have a world that is so reliant on the efforts
of other states, how can we argue that we owe greater justice to our own nation, when in fact we
may have closer links to the farmer in Kenya than to a person that lives across town from us? As
Onora ONeill (2000) says,


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if there is now no general reason to suppose that distance obstructs action, or that action
must affect or respect only a few, there is no general reason to think that justice or other
moral relations between vast numbers of distant strangers are impossible. (p.187)
In this age of globalisation, I am unsure as to how a relational view of justice based on nationality, or
citizenship, can stand without strong contestation. There is such reliance on others to manufacture
goods and such an ability to travel and communicate with others, that it is probable that we have
closer bonds to people across the world than to people across town from us.
Even if nationality is arbitrary, as I have argued above, some may argue that there remain greater
obligations of justice to those with whom we share a political territory.
In the earlier definition of nationality, Miller states that nations should enjoy a certain political
autonomy. (p.648) If we take this to mean, at some level, the ability to govern themselves, even if it
is by local government only, then I believe this critique, that I am outlining, applies.
The critique holds that, in sharing a territory, the members of it work together to ensure its
continuation and as a result of the collective effort there is an increased duty of justice.
My response to this is to offer an account akin to Robert Goodins (1988) idea of governments as
assigned-responsibility models (p.678). Much like one would visit the doctor if one was ill, the
government is the specialist actor in terms of distributing duties that owed to everyone. There are
no special duties, just duties that all human beings are owed, and the government is a way of
simplifying the process.
The issue with this model is that some governments are more able to distribute justice than others;
they have greater resources at their disposal. This is an argument for another paper, but for this
model to truly work, in my opinion, the capabilities of all governments would need to be equalised.
I have attempted to show that nationality is an arbitrary term often based on crude dividing lines
drawn by foreign powers over their new lands. Whilst there may exist a shared history and set of
norms between a group of people, this is insufficient as a cause for any greater dues of justice. Also,


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in this globalised world in which we live, we can no longer give the excuse that persons outside of
our borders do not share a link with us, especially as trade and communications continue to grow.
If we cannot morally justify greater duties of justice to our compatriots as a result of our shared
nationality, then why do people seek to help others? What is the basis for the assistance that many
individuals hand out to those in need?

The moral psychology of help

My final contention, which is perhaps the most controversial, is that individuals help others because
there are certain rewards in their actions. Humans are egoists. We like to have our deeds
acknowledged, see their effects, and receive some form of appraisal for them.
Humans, as with other animals, are social beings; we spend time cultivating relationships with those
close to us, and as a result feel a closer emotional bond with them.
A man naturally loves his children better than his nephews, his nephews better than his
cousins, his cousins better than strangers, where everything else is equal. Hence arise our
common measures of duty, in preferring the one to the other. Our sense of duty always
follows the common and natural course of our passions. (Hume, p.535)
I take Humes claim to be undeniable; we have a naturally stronger affinity to those close to us, than
to strangers as most human beings lack a general feeling of benevolence for the strangers we pass
in the street (Singer, 2005, p.334). Whilst, I acknowledge this, it is my contention that, despite their
closeness, family members and friends, or even compatriots as some argue, evince no greater moral
duty than a stranger thousands of miles away. The moral nature of help does not change depending
on the relation of the person to us; we cannot say that in a moral sense any one human is more


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important than another. I would argue that any attempt to do this, to suggest that a person is
morally more important, is to say that there is some aspect of them which makes them more
important than those that do not share it. This to me seems arbitrary, at best, and, I would argue it is
actually quite a worrying prospect, with many historical examples of attempts to divide peoples
based on arbitrary features. Whilst, this could be an interesting tangent, I do not have the ability to
discuss it fully in this paper.
My contention however, is that whilst the moral nature of help does not change, it is our desire to
help, however, which may be affected by the relationship we have with the individual in need.
Peter Singer (2005) argues for an evolutionary conception of justice. Singer contends that because
our evolutionary history is one of struggle with other humans for survival, and as such, there was no
advantage in having sympathetic feelings towards others. (Singer, 2005, p.333-337) As humanity
evolved through history, so did its concepts of morality and justice; more complex beings require
more complex forms of justice.
David Hume argues for a similar conception of morality and justice a conception for which I do not
have the ability to outline in full in this paper. Hume argues that they are conventions, based on
feelings, between people which prove to be useful in maintaining society and allowing it to function,
which evolve and are refined over time. Humans form social relations in order to individually
benefit; any action which proves to be useful in this cause is praised, and vice versa, creating a
system of norms to which people adhere. (Hume, 529-670)
Whilst, Hume argues that morality is a human invention, Singer says it goes further back than that. In
our evolutionary history, we find examples of non-human relatives displaying reciprocity and casting
out members of the group for failing to act in a socially acceptable manner, such as apes picking ticks
from each others bodies. (2005, p.336) Singer contends that this is the origin of human morality and
of our conceptions of fairness and cheating; an argument I find to be convincing. If we concede that


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there is an evolutionary history to the origins of morality, then the concept of help can be said to be
based in an expectation of reciprocation or appraisal by the social group.
As I discussed earlier, humans have a tendency to assimilate into social groups with others who have
a shared way of life or similar experiences. It is this group identification which, I believe, causes us to
help others of a similar position, not out of a moral duty, but because we are more able to
empathise with them; we imagine ourselves in that position and act in such a way as we would like
to see if we were in that same position of need. As Christopher Heath Wellman (2001) says, a
friends distress can give one moral reasons to respond with compassion but...these moral reasons
do not leave one bound by duty. (p.226) The fact that we know them means that we can empathise
more easily with their predicament, and means that we, therefore, feel a greater desire to help.
I think it is undeniable that humans have a tendency to help those close to them above others, not
out of a moral drive to do so, but out of an emotional one. It may be, as Singer suggests, that there is
an evolutionary tale to be told. Perhaps, in helping those close to us, we are, in some way,
protecting the continuation of our genes.
The second part of this argument is that humans help others out of egoism; that is, people seek to
help others on the basis of promoting their own interests or satisfying their own desires. (Lemos,
p.540)
In his article, Ramon Lemos (1960) discusses psychological egoism the act of helping others out of
self-interest. He argues that psychological egoism is false because it does not account for an action
that promotes the welfare or satisfies the interests of someone else. He argues it must be false
otherwise we would be unable to tell someone they should act altruistically. I disagree with this
view. Firstly, I would argue that even when we may seek to act in the interests of another, we might
still be satisfying our own desires. For example, think of an action that helps a loved one. It is
conceivable that one of our desires is to see our loved ones succeed and be happy, thus in acting in


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their interests, we are also, or even only, acting in our own.
Secondly, I disagree that in acting altruistically towards a stranger, it is not possible that we may also
be satisfying our own desires. Lemos offers the example of a shop keeper who gives too much
change back to you, the customer. He argues that psychological egoism cannot accommodate this
because it is not impossible that someone may return the extra change to prevent the worker from
suffering or because we believe it is our duty to act in that way, without expecting commendation
from the shop keeper. My contention is that in acting in this manner, especially in this case where
there is a socially accepted custom to return the extra change, we are still acting to prevent
ourselves from suffering. We do not wish to suffer the public disapproval that comes from breaking
social norms such as this and we enjoy the respect or appraisal we receive when we act in
accordance with them.
Even in cases where it would seem that we are acting altruistically, I would argue that there is still
sufficient personal gain to be made to stimulate a desire to act. As David Hume argues, humans are
naturally self-interested and have a desire to promote their interests. His conception of society
states that it develops as a means through which humans can best promote their interests.
Men being naturally selfish, or endowd only with a confind generosity, they are not easily
inducd to perform any action for the interest of strangers, except with a view to some
reciprocal advantage, which they had no hope of obtaining but by such a performance.
(p.571)
Humans tend to be incentive driven. We like to believe there will be a reward for our good actions,
even if it is that the person we help will repay us with a similar action at some point in the future, or
that we will receive some kind of social approbation for our action.
As a way of demonstrating my contention, I will analyse Peter Singers two famous examples of
situations where help is required: the example of the child drowning in a pond, and the famine that
struck East Bengal in 1971. Singers argument is that if it is in our power to prevent something very


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bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything morally significant, we ought, morally, to
do it. (1972, p.231) My main issue with this claim is the demandingess of it but this paper is not the
place for that discussion. For this paper, I will focus on Singers subsequent points that the claim
does not take proximity to the subject into account nor whether the actor is alone or one of many
who could help. The argument I want to make is that, morally, Singer is right that neither distance to
the person in need, nor being the sole actor or part of a group, is important in terms of deciding to
help someone especially in our globalised world. However, I argue that psychologically these
factors are important. The proximity of the drowning child sparks a greater desire to help, especially
as the reward is immediate and, in the case of the famine, it might take years to see a difference.
Also, the fact that, in the drowning case, there is only one actor who can help, whereas in the famine
case there are 7 billion other humans in the world who could offer some assistance, makes the need
to help even more pressing.
Or, as a different example, take the charity evening on British television, Comic Relief. Each year they
put on a show for the public to enjoy in order to raise millions of pounds for charities in the United
Kingdom and in developing countries worldwide. This year they raised almost 94m, a very
impressive figure, but less so when you consider that this is approximately 1.85 per adult in the
United Kingdom. This is a prime example of the crowd mentality; there is always someone else who
will take care of it. It is also an example of proximity to a problem coming into play, because, for that
one evening, being aware of the issue is unavoidable. Whilst, some may say that the problem is
constantly there, in the news for example, it is easy for many to ignore it or to feel that other groups,
such as charities or political organisations, are tackling it. However, on that evening there are
constant reminders of the work to be done and the problems that the less fortunate must face.
In the examples above, I am not arguing that it is always a conscious calculation of self-interest in
deciding to help or not, but that there is some part of the process which acknowledges the reward
one will receive for acting. In the drowning child example, there would not be time to consider the


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approbation one will receive, but there is a subconscious knowledge that, in acting, one is doing the
right thing.
I agree with Singer that neither proximity nor number should affect how one approaches helping
another human being. However, I think it is undeniable that it does. People are, essentially, selfish;
not in the sense that they only act for themselves, but that their actions are generally for their own
benefit, even when they are seemingly acting in the interests of others.

Conclusion

Whilst it may seem like this paper is an argument for impartiality that was not my intention. In fact, I
think our differences are important to our approach to politics; we need a politics that recognises
rather than represses difference because a denial of difference contributes to social group
oppression(Young, p.10). I would also like to make it clear that this paper is neither against
egalitarian justice nor against a duty of assistance, but against any attempt to create distinctions
which suggest justice or assistance should be more readily applied to those who are like us.
My argument has been an attempt to show that there is no difference, in a moral sense, between
those with whom we may share a certain feature and those with whom we do not. We are all human
beings, and as such are deserving of equal treatment regardless of our relationships. We share, with
family and friends, a close bond of love and empathy, but even this does not create a moral duty.
There is no moral justification for helping any one person over another. The cases where we offer
help may be a result of the fact that we share, with some people, a close, perhaps emotional, bond
which stimulates within us feelings of empathy, or perhaps, in less emotional cases, because we are
the only able to or because we think it will be in our self-interest. The empathy stimulated by a
cultivated relationship allows us to imagine ourselves in their position and how we would like others


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to act, and therefore we seek to minimise their suffering. But, even this seemingly altruistic action is
stimulated by a desire to satisfy our own desires we want to see those close to us prosper and act
in a way to bring that about.
I have disputed the theoretical idea that we can create moral divisions between humans based on
arbitrary distinctions. In my opinion, any attempt to do this is, in some way, a version of superiority.
If one subscribes to the view that humans are equal then, I do not believe, one can also claim that
we have any greater obligations to anyone, regardless of the links we have with them.
















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Author Note
James Quinlan is a recent MSc graduate from the London School of Economics and Political Science,
and is currently working as a policy intern for Independent Academic Research Studies (IARS). He
assists with their work to create community-led solutions to social issues, working to increase their
online profile, writing policy responses, and assisting with their restorative justice training
programmes.
Funding: This research received no funding.