1. VILLASOR v.

REPUBLIC
Republic vs. Villasor (Consti1)
Republic of the Philippines, petitioner, vs. Hon. Guillermo P. Villasor, as Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, Branch I, the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal, the Sheriff of the City of Manila, the Clerk
of Court of First Instance of Cebu, P.J. Kiener Co., Ltd., Gavino Unchuan, and International
Construction Corporation, respondents.
November 28, 1973
Fernando, J:
Facts: The decision that was rendered in favor of respondents P.J. Kiener Co., Ltd, Gavino Unchuan
and International Construction Corporation was declared final and executory by Respondent Hon.
Guillermo P. Villasor.
Pursuant to the said declaration, the corresponding Alias Writ of Execution was issued. And for the
strength of this writ, the provincial sheriff served notices of garnishment with several banks,
specially on the 'monies due the Armed Forces of the Philippines in the form of deposits; the
Philippines Veterans Bank received the same notice of garnishment.
The funds of the AFP on deposit with the banks are public funds duly appropriated and allocated for
the payment of pensions of retireees, pay and allowances of military and civillian personnel and for
maintenance and operations of AFP.
Petitioner filed a petition against Villasor for acting in excess jurisdiction amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in granting the issuance of a Writ of Execution against the properties of AFP, hence the
notices and garnishments are null and void.
Issue: Whether or not the Writ of Execution issued by respondent Judge Villasor is valid.
Held: No. What was done by respondent Judge is not in conformity with the dictates of the
Constitution. It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic concept of
sovereignty that the state and its government is immune from suit unless it gives its consent. A
sovereign is exempt from suit not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory but on the
logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the
law on which the right depends.

2. LASCO v. UNRENRE
Lasco vs UNRFNRE
Eldepio Lasco et al v United Nations Revolving Fund For Natural Resources Exploration (UNRFNRE)
G.R. Nos. 109095-109107 February 23, 1995
Facts: Petitioners were dismissed from their employment with privaterespondent, the United
Nations Revolving Fund for NaturalResourcesExploration (UNRFNRE), which is a special fund and
subsidiary organ of theUnited Nations.The UNRFNRE is involved in a joint project of
thePhilippineGovernment and the United Nations for exploration work in Dinagat Island.Petitioners
are thecomplainants for illegal dismissal and damages.Private respondent alleged that respondent
Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over its personality since itenjoyed diplomatic immunity.
Issue: WON specialized agencies enjoy diplomatic immunity
Held: Petition is dismissed. This is not to say that petitioner have no recourse.Section 31 of the
Convention on the Privileges and Immunitiesof the SpecializedAgencies of the United Nations states
that each specialized agency shall makea provision for appropriate modes of settlement of (a)
disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes of private character to which thespecialized
agencyisa party. Private respondent is not engaged in a commercial venture in thePhilippines.Its
presence is by virtue of a joint project entered into by thePhilippine Government and theUnited
Nations for mineral exploration in DinagatIsland

3. SEAFDEC v. NLRC
Seafdec vs. NLRC
G.R. Nos. 97468-70, September 2 1993, 241 SCRA 580
FACTS: Two labor cases were filed by the herein private respondents against the petitioner,
Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center (SEAFDEC), before the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), Regional Arbitration Branch, Iloilo City. In these cases, the private respondents
claim having been wrongfully terminated from their employment by the petitioner.
The petitioner, who claims to be an international inter-government organization composed of
various Southeast Asian countries, filed a Motion to Dismiss, challenged the jurisdiction of the public
respondent in taking cognizance of the above cases.
The private respondents, as well as respondent labor arbiter, allege that the petitioner is not
immune from suit and assuming that if, indeed, it is an international organization, it has, however,
impliedly, if not expressly, waived its immunity by belatedly raising the issue of jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is immune from suit.
HELD: The Court ruled for the petitioner. It is beyond question that petitioner SEAFDEC is an
international agency enjoying diplomatic immunity. It has already been held in Southeast Asian
Fisheries Development Center-Aquaculture Department vs. National Labor Relations Commission
(G.R. No. 86773, 206 SCRA 283/1992). Petitioner Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center-
Aquaculture Department (SEAFDEC-AQD) is an international agency beyond the jurisdiction of public
respondent NLRC.
Being an intergovernmental organization, SEAFDEC including its Departments (AQD), enjoys
functional independence and freedom from control of the state in whose territory its office is
located. One of the basic immunities of an international organization is immunity from local
jurisdiction, i.e., that it is immune from the legal writs and processes issued by the tribunals of the
country where it is found. The obvious reason for this is that the subjection of such an organization
to the authority of the local courts would afford a convenient medium thru which the host
government may interfere in their operations or even influence or control its policies and decisions
of the organization; besides, such objection to local jurisdiction would impair the capacity of such
body to discharge its responsibilities impartially on behalf of its member-states.

4. CALLADO v. IRRI
G.R. No. 106483 May 22, 1995/ ROMERO, J.:
Facts: Ernesto Callado, petitioner, was employed as a driver at the IRRI. One day while driving an IRRI
vehicle on an official trip to the NAIA and back to the IRRI, petitioner figured in an accident.
Petitioner was informed of the findings of a preliminary investigation conducted by the IRRI's Human
Resource Development Department Manager. In view of the findings, he was charged with:
(1) Driving an institute vehicle while on official duty under the influence of liquor;
(2) Serious misconduct consisting of failure to report to supervisors the failure of the vehicle to start
because of a problem with the car battery, and
(3) Gross and habitual neglect of duties.
Petitioner submitted his answer and defenses to the charges against him. However, IRRI issued a
Notice of Termination to petitioner.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal, illegal
suspension and indemnity pay with moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
IRRI wrote the Labor Arbiter to inform him that the Institute enjoys immunity from legal process by
virtue of Article 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1620, 5 and that it invokes such diplomatic immunity
and privileges as an international organization in the instant case filed by petitioner, not having
waived the same.
While admitting IRRI's defense of immunity, the Labor Arbiter, nonetheless, cited an Order issued by
the Institute to the effect that "in all cases of termination, respondent IRRI waives its immunity,"
and, accordingly, considered the defense of immunity no longer a legal obstacle in resolving the
case.
The NLRC found merit in private respondent's appeal and, finding that IRRI did not waive its
immunity, ordered the aforesaid decision of the Labor Arbiter set aside and the complaint dismissed.
In this petition petitioner contends that the immunity of the IRRI as an international organization
granted by Article 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1620 may not be invoked in the case at bench
inasmuch as it waived the same by virtue of its Memorandum on "Guidelines on the handling of
dismissed employees in relation to P.D. 1620."
Issue: Did the (IRRI) waive its immunity from suit in this dispute which arose from an employer-
employee relationship?
Held: No. P.D. No. 1620, Article 3 provides:
Art. 3. Immunity from Legal Process. The Institute shall enjoy immunity from any penal, civil and
administrative proceedings, except insofar as that immunity has been expressly waived by the
Director-General of the Institute or his authorized representatives.
The SC upholds the constitutionality of the aforequoted law. There is in this case "a categorical
recognition by the Executive Branch of the Government that IRRI enjoys immunities accorded to
international organizations, which determination has been held to be a political question conclusive
upon the Courts in order not to embarass a political department of Government.
It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers that
diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a
determination by the executive branch of the government, and where the plea of diplomatic
immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the government as in the case at
bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by
the principal law officer of the government or other officer acting under his direction.
The raison d'etre for these immunities is the assurance of unimpeded performance of their functions
by the agencies concerned.
The grant of immunity to IRRI is clear and unequivocal and an express waiver by its Director-General
is the only way by which it may relinquish or abandon this immunity.
In cases involving dismissed employees, the Institute may waive its immunity, signifying that such
waiver is discretionary on its part.

6. DEL MAR V. PHILIPPINE VETERANS ADM (PVA)

Facts:
Del Mar averred that he served during WW II as chief Judge advocate of the Cebu Area Command(a
duly recognized guerrilla org.) w/ the rank of major; that he subsequently obtained an honorable
discharge from the service on 10/20/46 on a cert. of permanent total physical disability;that upon
proper claim presented and after hearing and adjudication, the Phil. Veterans BD granted him a
monthly life pension of P50 effective 1/28/47;that in 3/50,the aid Bd,discounted payment of
monthly life pension on the ground that his receipt of similar pension from the Us govt,thru the US
Veterans Admin. by reason of military service rendered in the US in the Far East during the war,
precluded him from receiving any further monthly life pension from the Phil. Govt; that he wrote the
said BB. Twice, demanding the continued payment of his monthly pension but his demands went
unheeded. And petition for mandamus was filed w/ CFI Cebu w/c rendered judgement upholding Del
mars claim.
The PVA argues that the court a quo was w/o jurisdiction to try civil cases bec.it involves a money
claim against PVA- a mere agency of the Govt performing governmental functions w/ no juridical
personality of its own-and,in reality, partakes of an action against the Phil. Govt which is immune
from suit w/o its consent.

HELD: As a general proposition, the rule on the immunity of the Government from suit w/o its
consent holds true in all actions resulting in adverse consequences on the public treasury,whether
in the disbursements of funds or loss pf prop. Needless to say,in such actions,w/c,in effect,constitute
suit against the Govt, the court has no option but to dismiss them. Nonetheless,the rule admits of
an exception. It finds no application where a claimant. As clearly discernible from the circumstances,
the case at bar falls under the exception.

10. RAYO VS. CFI OF BULACAN
Facts: During the height of typhoon Kading , the National Power Corporations plant superintendent
Chavez opened simultaneously all the three floodgates of the Angat Dam.
As a direct and immediate result, several towns in Bulacan were flooded (particularly Norzagaray).
About a hundred of its residents died and properties worth million of pesos were destroyed.
The petitioners, who are among the unfortunate victims of the man-caused flood, filed several
complaints for damages against NPC and the plant superintendent.
NPC claimed, as its defense, that in the operation of the Angat Dam, it is performing a purely
governmental function. Thus, it cannot be sued without the express consent of the State.
The petitioners opposed the claim of NPC and claimed that it is performing not governmental but
merely proprietary functions and that based on the organic charter (charter -a legal document that
provides for the creation of a corporate entity ) of NPC, it can be sued and be sued in any court.
Issue: Whether or not the power of NPC to sue and be sued under its organic charter includes the
power to be sued for tort.
Held : The government has organized a private corporation, put money in it and has allowed it to sue
and be sued in any court under its charter. NPC, as a government owned and controlled corporation,
has a personality of its own, distinct and separate from that of the Government. In any court, NPC
can sue and be sued for tort. The petition of the petitioners was granted.
Notes:
Government-owned and controlled corporations have a personality of their own, separate and
distinct from the government. Therefore, although they are considered to be public in character,
they are not exempt from garnishment (legal proceedings).
11. MALONG VS. PNR, G.R. NO. L-49930
Facts: The Petitioners, Malong spouses alleged in their complaint that on October 30, 1977 their son,
Jaime Aquino, a paying passenger, was killed when he fell from a PNR train while it was between
Tarlac City and Capas. The said train was overloaded with passengers and baggage in view of the
proximity of All Saints Day. The Malong spouses prayed that the PNR be ordered to pay them
damages totalling P136,370.
The trial court dismissed the complaint, ruling that it had no jurisdiction because the PNR, being a
government instrumentality, the action was a suit against the State.
The petitioners appealed to SC pursuant to RA No. 5440.
Issue: W/N the PNR is immune from suit? NO.
Although the PNR is a government instrumentality under Republic Act No. 4156, as amended
by Republic Act No. 6366 and Presidential Decree No. 741, it was held that the State
divested itself of its sovereign capacity when it organized the PNR which is no different from
its predecessor, the Manila Railroad Company. The PNR did not become immune from suit.
It did not remove itself from the operation of articles 1732 to 1766 of the Civil Code on
common carriers.
However, as held in precedents, the correct rule is that "not all government entities,
whether corporate or non-corporate, are immune from suits. Immunity from suit is
determined by the character of the objectives for which the entity was organized.
The Manila Hotel case also relied on the following rulings: By engaging in a particular
business through the instrumentality of a corporation, the government divests itself pro hac
vice of its sovereign character, so as to render the corporation subject to the rules of law
governing private corporations.
Held: The order of dismissal is reversed and set aside. The case is remanded to the trial court for
further proceedings, costs against the Philippine National Railways.
It would be unjust if the heirs of the victim of an alleged negligence of the PNR employees could not
sue the PNR for damages. Like any private common carrier, the PNR is subject to the obligations of
persons engaged in that private enterprise. It is not performing any governmental function.
Notes
Abad Santos, J., concurring:
The claim that Philippine National Railways is immune from suit because it is an
instrumentality of the government is so outlandish that it deserves slight consideration.
He mentioned the Central Bank of the Philippines as an example of government
instrumentality that is not immune from suit for it also performs proprietary functions.
He also contended the use of the immunity from suit on the part of the government
corporations to deny justice that is due to the people they are to serve.
12. JESUS DISNI v. SANDIGANBAYAN
Hermino T. Disini vs. the Honorable Sandiganbayan
Decision: The Sandiganbayan has exclusive original jurisdiction over the criminal action of Hermino
T. Disini notwithstanding that he is a private individual considering his criminal prosecution is
intimately related to the recovery of ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses, their immediate family,
subordinates and close associates.
Facts:
1. Disini, is the husband of Paciencia Escolin-Disini, the first cousin of First Lady Imelda
Romualdez-Marcos, and at the same time the family physician of the Marcoses, had close
personal relations and intimacy with and free access to President Marcos, a public official.
2. Mr. Disini was charged by the Sandiganbayan on June 30, 2004 with corruption of public
officials and violation of Section 4a of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
a. Criminal Case No. 28001 from the period of 1974 to February 1986 conspired with
then President Marcos to give gifts and presents to President Marcos in forms of 2.5
billion shares of stock in Vulcan Industrial and Mining Corporation and 4 billion
shares of stock in the Energy Corporation with both shares having a book value of P
100.00/share.
b. Criminal Case No. 28002 - from the period of 1974 to February 1986, conspired with
then President Marcos to request and receive from Burns and Roe, a foreign
consultant, the total amount of One Million U.S. Dollars ($1,000,000.00),more or
less, and also from Westinghouse Electric Corporation(WESTINGHOUSE), the total
amount of Seventeen Million U.S. Dollars($17,000,000.00), more or less, all for and
in consideration of Disini to secure and obtain, which Disini did secure and obtain,
the contract for the said Burns and Roe and Westinghouse to do the engineering
and architectural design, and construct, of the Philippine Nuclear Power Plant
Project at Morong, Bataan.
3. Mr. Disini via petition for critoriari alleging the Sandiganbayan committed grace abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
a. Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction
b. Grave abuse of discretion by denial of petitioners constitutional and statutory right
of prescription erring in the following:
i. Determining applicable prescriptive period;
ii. Commencement of prescriptive period; and
iii. Determination of point of prescriptive period.
c. Sandiganbayan showed prejudgement of the case by upholding the glaringly absent
elements of the offenses charged
d. Sandiganbayan refused to quash the information despite utter failure to comply to
prescribed form denying the petitioners constitutional and statutory right to be
informed the nature and cause of accusations against him.
Issue: The jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan over the criminal action of Hermino Disina and the grave
abuse of the Sandiganbayan to Mr. Disinis statutory and constitutional rights of prescription and
rights to be informed the cause and nature of accusations against him.
Ruling:
1. The petition for critiorari has no merit
2. On the issue of jurisdiction, Section 2 of E.O. No.1 has tasked the PCGG to assist the recovery
of ill-gotten wealth of President Marcos. It is underscored that it was the PCGG that had
initially filed the criminal complaints in the Sandiganbayan, with the Office of the
Ombudsman taking over the investigation of Disini only after the Court issued in Cojuangco,
Jr. the directive to the PCGG to refer the criminal cases to the Office of the Ombudsman on
the ground that the PCGG would not be an impartial office following its finding of a prima
facie case being established against Disini
3. Similarly, The Sandiganbayan also holds jurisdiction of Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant
to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986 under
Section c of RA 8249.
4. On the issue of offenses charged has not yet prescribed:
a. Applicability of prescription period: Although period of prescription for corruption of
public officials charged against Disini is 15 years, it would not be held that the
prescriptive period began to run from 1974 since during the Marcos regime, no
person would have dared to assail the legality of the transaction.
b. Prescriptive period for the crime commenced from the date of its discovery in 1992
after the Committee made an exhaustive investigation. When the complaint was
filed in 1997, only five years have elapsed, and, hence, prescription has not yet set
in.
c. Criminal complaints were filed and their records transmitted by the PCGG to the
Office of the Ombudsman on April 8, 1991for the conduct the preliminary
investigation and as such there was no interruption of proscriptive period.
5. Information was insufficient in form and substance:
a. Information on Criminal Case 28001 and 28002 is sufficiently complied to the
requirements of Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of the Court since it states the
name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended
party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where
the offense was committed.
b. Allegations are also sufficiently upheld as the elements of the offenses under
Section 4(a) of RA 3019 are present.

13. DA v. NLRC
Department of Agriculture vs. the National Labor Relations Commission
Decision: Petition to nullify the Resolution, 1 dated 27 November 1991, of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC), Fifth Division, Cagayan de Oro City, which will deny the petition for
injunction, prohibition and mandamus that prays to enjoin permanently the NLRC's Regional
Arbitration Branch X and Cagayan de Oro City Sheriff from enforcing the decision 2 of 31 May 1991
of the Executive Labor Arbiter and from attaching and executing on petitioner's property.

Facts:
1. The NLRC rendered a decision on May 31, 1990 finding the DA jointly and severally liable
with Sultan Security Agency for the payment of money claims, aggregating P266,483.91, of
the complainant security guards. The petitioner and Sultan Security Agency did not appeal
the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Thus, the decision became final and executory.
2. On 18 July 1991, the Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution. 5 commanding the City Sheriff
to enforce and execute the judgment against the property of the two respondents.
Forthwith, or on 19 July 1991, the City Sheriff levied on execution the motor vehicles of the
petitioner, i.e. one (1) unit Toyota Hi-Ace, one (1) unit Toyota Mini Cruiser, and one (1) unit
Toyota Crown. 6 These units were put under the custody of Zacharias Roa, the property
custodian of the petitioner, pending their sale at public auction or the final settlement of the
case, whichever would come first.
3. Petitioner charged that the NLRC with grave abuse of discretion for refusing to quash the
writ of execution as the NLRC assumes jurisdiction over a money claim which should fall
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit and the NLRC disregards the
cardinal rule of the non-suability of the State.
Issue: The non-suability of the State and execution of the NLRC to acquire the government property.
Ruling:
1. Petition was granted.
2. The basic postulate in the Constitution states that "The State may not be sued without its
consent. (Article XVI, Section 3 of the Constitution). This rule though does not say that the
State cannot be sued in any circumstances.
3. When the state gives its consent to be sued, it does thereby necessarily consent to
unrestrained execution against it. In other words, when the State waives its immunity, all it
does, in effect, is to give the other party an opportunity to prove, if it can, that the State has
a liability.
4. The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either
by general or special law, it may limit the claimant's action "only up to the completion of
proceedings anterior to the stage of execution"
5. That the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds
and properties may not be seized under writs or execution or garnishment to satisfy such
judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public
funds must be covered by the correspondent appropriation as required by law. The
functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or
disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as
appropriated by law.

14. VMPSI v. CA
Facts: Veterans Manpower and Protective Services, Inc. (VMPSI) alleges that the provisions under
Section 4 and 17 of Republic Act No. 5487 or the Private Security Agency Law violate the 1987
Constitution against monopolies, unfair competition and combinations in restraint of trade, and tend
to favor and institutionalize the Philippine Association of Detective and Protective Agency Operators,
Inc. (PADPAO) which is monopolistic because it has an interest in more than one security agency.
Respondent VMPSI likewise questions the validity of paragraph 3, subparagraph (g) of the Modifying
Regulations on the Issuance of License to Operate and Private Security Licenses and Specifying
Regulations for the Operation of PADPAO issued by then PC Chief Lt. Gen. Fidel V. Ramos, through
Col. Sabas V. Edades, requiring that all private security agencies/company security forces must
register as members of any PADPAO Chapter organized within the Region where their main offices
are located.... As such membership requirement in PADPAO is compulsory in nature, it allegedly
violates legal and constitutional provisions against monopolies, unfair competition and combinations
in restraint of trade.
A Memorandum of Agreement was executed by PADPAO and the PC Chief, which fixed the minimum
monthly contract rate per guard for eight (8) hours of security service per day at P2,255.00 within
Metro Manila and P2,215.00 outside of Metro Manila.
Odin Security Agency (Odin) filed a complaint with PADPAO accusing VMPSI of cut-throat
competition by undercutting its contract rate for security services rendered to the Metropolitan
Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS), charging said customer lower than the standard
minimum rates provided in the Memorandum of Agreement dated May 12, 1986.
PADPAO found VMPSI guilty of cut-throat competition, hence, the PADPAO Committee on Discipline
recommended the expulsion of VMPSI from PADPAO and the cancellation of its license to operate a
security agency. The PC-SUSIA affirmed the findings and likewise recommended the cancellation of
VMPSIs license. As a result, PADPAO refused to issue a clearance/certificate of membership to
VMPSI.
VMPSI made a request letter to the PC Chief to set aside or disregard the findings of PADPAO and
consider VMPSIs application for renewal of its license, even without a certificate of membership
from PADPAO.
Issue: Whether or not VMPSIs complaint against the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA is a suit against the
State without its consent.
Held: Yes. A public official may sometimes be held liable in his personal or private capacity if he acts
in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction, however, since the acts for which
the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA are being called to account in this case, were performed as part of their
official duties, without malice, gross negligence, or bad faith, no recovery may be had against them
in their private capacities. Furthermore, the Supreme Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that
the Memorandum of Agreement dated May 12, 1986 does not constitute an implied consent by the
State to be sued. The consent of the State to be sued must emanate from statutory authority, hence,
a legislative act, not from a mere memorandum. Without such consent, the trial court did not
acquired jurisdiction over the public respondents. Petition for review is denied and the judgment
appealed from is affirmed in toto.
15. LARKINS v. NLRC
T/Sgt. Larkins vs NLRC (1995) G.R. 92432
Facts: On August 12, 1988, private respondents filed a complaint with the Regional Arbitration
Branch No. III of the NLRC, San Fernando, Pampanga, against petitioner Larkins, a member of the
United States Air Force (USAF) assigned to oversee the dormitories of the Third Aircraft Generation
Squadron (3 AGS) at Clark Air Base, Pampanga., Lt. Col. Frankhauser, and Cunanan (the new
contractor ) for illegal dismissal and underpayment of wages. Petitioner and Lt. Col. Frankhauser
failed to answer the complaint and to appear at the hearings.
They, likewise, failed to submit their position paper, which the Labor Arbiter deemed a waiver on
their part to do so. On the basis of private respondents' position paper and supporting documents,
the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision granting all the claims of private respondents. He found both
Lt. Col. Frankhauser and petitioner "guilty of illegal dismissal" and ordered them to reinstate private
respondents with full back wages, or if that is no longer possible, to pay private respondents'
separation pay. Petitioner appealed to the NLRC claiming that the Labor Arbiter never acquired
jurisdiction over her person because no summons or copies of the complaints, both original and
amended, were ever served on her. In her "Supplemental Memorandum to Memorandum of
Appeal," petitioner argued that the attempts to serve her with notices of hearing were not in
accordance with the provisions of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement of 1947.
Issue: Whether or not the questioned resolutions are null and void.
Held: No jurisdiction was ever acquired by the Labor Arbiter over the case and the person of
petitioner and the judgment rendered is null and void. Summonses and other processes issued by
Philippine courts and administrative agencies for United States Armed Forces personnel within any
U.S. base in the Philippines could be served therein only with the permission of the Base
Commander. If he withholds giving his permission, he should instead designate another person to
serve the process, and obtain the server's affidavit for filing with the appropriate court. Respondent
Labor Arbiter did not follow said procedure. He instead, addressed the summons to Lt. Col.
Frankhauser and not the Base Commander. Respondents do not dispute petitioner's claim that no
summons was ever issued and served on her. They contend, however, that they sent notices of the
hearings to her Notices of hearing are not summonses. The provisions and prevailing jurisprudence
in Civil Procedure may be applied by analogy to NLRC proceedings (Revised Rules of the NLRC, Rule I,
Sec. 3). It is basic that the Labor Arbiter cannot acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
respondent without the latter being served with summons. In the absence of service of summons or
a valid waiver thereof, the hearings and judgment rendered by the Labor Arbiter are null and void.
Petitioner, in the case at bench, appealed to the NLRC and participated in the oral argument before
the said body. This, however, does not constitute a waiver of the lack of summons and a voluntary
submission of her person to the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. She may have raised in her
pleadings grounds other than lack of jurisdiction, but these grounds were discussed in relation to
and as a result of the issue of the lack of jurisdiction. In effect, petitioner set forth only one issue and
that is the absence of jurisdiction over her
person. If an appearance before the NLRC is precisely to question the jurisdiction of the said agency
over the person of the defendant, then this appearance is not equivalent to service of summons. Be
that as it may, on the assumption that petitioner validly waived service of summons on her, still the
case could not prosper. There is no allegation from the pleadings filed that Lt. Col. Frankhauser and
petitioner were being sued in their personal capacities for tortious acts. However, private
respondents named 3 AGS as one of the respondents in their complaint. Private respondents were
dismissed from their employment by Lt. Col. Frankhauser acting for and in behalf of the U.S.
Government. The employer of private respondents was neither Lt. Col. Frankhauser nor petitioner.
The employer of private respondents, as found by NLRC, was the U.S. Government which, by right of
sovereign power, operated and maintained the dormitories at Clark Air Base for members of the
USAF. Indeed, assuming that jurisdiction was acquired over the United States Government and the
monetary claims of private respondents proved, such awards will have to be satisfied not by Lt. Col.
Frankhauser and petitioner in their personal capacities, but by the United States government

19. ACT NO. 3083
ACT NO. 3083 - AN ACT DEFINING THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS MAY BE SUED
Section 1
Complaint against Government. Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Government of the
Philippine Islands hereby consents and submits to be sued upon any moneyed claim involving
liability arising from contract, expressed or implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action
between private parties.
Section 2
A person desiring to avail himself of the privilege herein conferred must show that he has presented
his claim to the Insular Auditor 1 and that the latter did not decide the same within two months
from the date of its presentation.
Section 3
Venue. Original actions brought pursuant to the authority conferred in this Act shall be instituted
in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila or of the province were the claimant resides, at
the option of the latter, upon which court exclusive original jurisdiction is hereby conferred to hear
and determine such actions.
Sec. 4. Actions instituted as aforesaid shall be governed by the same rules of procedure, both
original and appellate, as if the litigants were private parties.
Sec. 5. When the Government of the Philippine Island is plaintiff in an action instituted in any court
of original jurisdiction, the defendant shall have the right to assert therein, by way of set-off or
counterclaim in a similar action between private parties.
Sec. 6. Process in actions brought against the Government of the Philippine Islands pursuant to the
authority granted in this Act shall be served upon the Attorney-General 2 whose duty it shall be to
appear and make defense, either himself or through delegates.
Sec. 7. Execution. No execution shall issue upon any judgment rendered by any court against the
Government of the Philippine Islands under the provisions of this Act; but a copy thereof duly
certified by the clerk of the Court in which judgment is rendered shall be transmitted by such clerk to
the Governor-General, 3 within five days after the same becomes final.
Sec. 8. Transmittal of Decision. The Governor-General, 4 at the commencement of each regular
session of the Legislature, 5 shall transmit to that body for appropriate action all decisions so
received by him, and if said body determine that payment should be made, it shall appropriate the
sum which the Government has been sentenced to pay, including the same in the appropriations for
the ensuing year.
Sec. 9. This Act shall take effect on its approval.
Approved: March 16, 1923.

21. ARTICLE 2180 OF THE CIVIL CODE
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed
by the provisions of this Chapter.
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts
or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
* The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the
damages caused by the minor children who live in their company.
* Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are
under their authority and live in their company.
* The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for
damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are
employed or on the occasion of their functions.
* Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not
engaged in any business or industry.
* The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when
the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in
which case what is provided in Article 2176 shall be applicable.
* Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages
caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned
prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
22. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE (DOA), petitioner, vs. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, et al., respondents.
Facts:
DOA and Sultan Security Agency (SSA) entered into a contract for security services. Several
guards filed a complaint against DOA and SSA for under payment of wages, non-payment of
13th month pay and etc.
The Labor Arbiter of Cagayan de Oro found DOA and SSA liable for the payment of money
claim of the guards. The Labor Arbiter issued a Writ of Execution commanding the City
Sheriff to execute the judgment against the DOA and SSA. Hence, the City Sheriff seized
three motorcycles of the DOA.
In a petition of certiorari, DOA filed a petition for injunction, prohibition and mandamus,
with prayer for preliminary injunction to the NLRC Cagayan De Oro for reasons that the
writ was null and void
and the seizure of motorcycles jeopardizes governmental functions. NLRC --- dismissed the
petition.
DOA charges NLRC for grave abuse of discretion for refusing to nullify the writ of
execution. DOA further asserts that NLRC has disregarded the rule on the non-suability of
the State.
Issue: Whether or not the doctrine of non-suability of the State applies in the case
Held: Under the Constitution, the rule which says the State cannot be sued without its consent is
not really absolute. The States consent may be given expressly through a general or special law, or
impliedly when the State commences litigation or enters a contract. In this jurisdiction, the general
law waiving the immunity of the state from suit is found in Act No. 3083, where the Philippine
government "consents and submits to be sued upon any money claim involving liability arising from
contract, express or implied. The claims of the guards for underpayment of wages and similar other
items, arising from the Contract for Security Services, clearly constitute money claims. However,
pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 327, as amended by PD No. 1445, the money claim should first
be brought to the Commission on Audit.

29. SANTIAGO v. CA
Facts: On 20 Jan 1971, Santiago gratuitously donated a parcel of land to the Bureau of Plant
Industry. The terms of the donation are; that the Bureau should construct a building on the said lot
and that the building should be finished by December 7, 1974, that the Bureau should install lighting
facilities on the said lot. However, come 1976 there were still no improvements on the lot. This
prompted Santiago to file a case pleading for the revocation of such contract of donation. The trial
court dismissed the petition claiming that it is a suit against the government and should not prosper
without the consent of the government.
Issue: Whether or not the state has not waived its immunity from suit.
Held: The government has waived its immunity and such waiver is implied by virtue of the terms
provided in the deed of donation. The government is a beneficiary of the terms of the donation. But
the government through the Bureau has breached the terms of the deed by not complying with
such, therefore, the donor Santiago has the right to have his day in court and be heard. Further, to
not allow the donor to be heard would be unethical and contrary to equity which the government so
advances. Case should prosper.

30. FROILAN V. ORIENTAL PAN SHIPPING, SEPTEMBER 30, 1950
Facts: Fernando A. Froilan purchased the vessel FS-197 from the Shipping Commission for P200,000,
paying P50,000 down and agreeing to pay the balance in installments. However, the installments
were not paid and the Shipping Commission took possession of the vessel and considered the sale
cancelled. The Shipping Commission then chartered the vessel to Pan Oriental Shipping Co.
Froilan then filed a complaint against Pan Oriental Shipping Co. Pan Oriental Shipping Co. filed its
answer denying the right of Froilan to the vessel. Following this, the Republic of the Philippines, as
intervenor, filed a complaint in intervention alleging that Froilan had failed to pay to the Shipping
Commission the balance. Froilan then tendered to the Board of Liquidators (which was liquidating
the affairs of the Shipping Administration) a check in payment of his obligation for the vessel. The
lower court held that the check constituted a payment and a discharge of Froilan's obligation to the
government.
However, Pan Oriental Shipping Co. had also filed an answer to the government's complaint in
intervention saying that the government was obligated to deliver the vessel to it by contract. In
response, the government filed a motion to dismiss the counterclaim of Pan Oriental Shipping Co.
against it on the grounds that the action of delivering the vessel to Pan Oriental Shipping Co. was no
longer feasible and was barred by prior judgment, and also that the court has no jurisdiction over
the intervenor government of the Republic of the Philippines.
Issue: Whether or not the Government's motion to dismiss Pan Oriental's counterclaims are
allowable.
Held: The counterclaim was not barred by prior judgment, as the counterclaim was filed before the
decision had been made with regards to Froilan's payment. The State was also not immune from
suit, since by filing its complaint in intervention, the Government waived its right of nonsuability.
Appellee
31. RCBC v. DE CASTRO
Facts: The Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City issued an order regarding civil case Badoc
Planters, Inc v. Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration, et al. for the recovery of unpaid tobacco
deliveries to BADOC. The Branch clerk of court then issued a Writ of Execution to Special Sheriff
Faustion Rigor, who issued a Notice of Garnishment to the General Manager/Cashier of RCBC
requesting a reply within 5 days to any property that PVTA that was currently in control of RCBC. On
the same day, BADOC filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for a Writ of Execution, which was also
granted by the respondent judge. In compliance, RCBC delivered to Sheriff Rigor a certified check
with the amount.
PVTA then filed a Motion for Reconsideration to restore the account of PTVA in RCBC to the
condition it was in before the issuance of the Writ of Execution and the Orders. It was granted, and
then RCBC filed a Motion for Reconsideration as well. This, however, was denied, so RCBC filed a
Notice of Appeal to the Court of Appeals from the said orders.
Issues:
1) Whether or not PVTA funds are public funds not subject to garnishment;
2) Whether or not the respondent Judge correctly ordered the petitioner to reimburse the
amount paid to the special sheriff
Ruling: The court found that RCBC should not be held liable since it was following the court order
which instructed that a check be delivered to Sheriff Rigor. They could also not be held responsible
that the check was later encashed, which was also directed by a court order. In response to the
issues at hand, the court found that PVTA funds are not exempt from garnishment because PVTA
was created by RA 2265 as an ordinary corporation subject to the provisions of Corporation Law.
Hence, it possesses the power to sue and be sued and "to acquire and hold such assets and incur
such liabilities resulting directly from operations authorized by the provisions of this Act or as
essential to the proper conduct of such operations." [Section 3, Republic Act No. 2265.].
RCBC cannot therefore be compelled to make restitution solidarily with the plaintiff BADOC. Plaintiff
BADOC alone was responsible for the issuance of the Writ of Execution and Order of Payment and
so, the plaintiff alone should bear the consequences of a subsequent annulment of such court
orders; hence, only the plaintiff can be ordered to restore the account of the PVTA.

33. MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI VS CA 190 SCRA 206
Facts: An expropriation proceeding was filed by the Municipality of Makati, herein petitioner,
against the private property of Arceli Jo. In compliance to PD 42, the petitioner opened an account
under its name at PNB depositing an amount of P417,510.00. The court fixed the appraised value of
the expropriated property at P5,291,666.00 and an advanced payment was made in the amount of
P338,160 leaving a balance of P4,953,506. After the decision becomes final and executory, the
private respondent moved for the issuance of a writ of execution. A notice of garnishment was
thereafter issued by the court to the PNB account. A manifestation was filed by the petitioner
informing the court that the private respondent was no longer the true owner of the expropriated
property. The court consolidated the ownership of the property to PSB as a mortgagee/purchaser.
The private respondent and PSB agreed to divide the compensation due from the expropriation
proceeding. The judge ordered PNB to immediately release to them the sum of P4,953.506
corresponding to the balance of the appraised value of the expropriated property. The PNB bank
manager refused as he is waiting for the approval of their head office. The Municipality of Makati
contends that its fund with DBP could neither be be garnished or levied upon execution for to do so
would result to the disbursement of public funds without the proper appropriation required under
the law. The lower court denied the motion for reconsideration of the petitioner ruling that the
account with DBP of the petitioner was an account specifically opened for the expropriation
proceeding. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the lower
courts decision. A petition for review with a prayer for preliminary injunction was filed to the S.C. A
temporary restraining order was issued by the S.C.
Issue: Whether or not the PNB funds may be levied in the expropriation proceeding?
Held: The petitioner belatedly informed the court that there are two existing accounts with PNB.
Account A was the one intended for the expropriation proceeding and account B is primarily
intended for financing governmental functions and activities. Because account A has a fund that is
insufficient to meet the remaining amount of its balance for the expropriation proceeding, it is
unlawful to get the remaining balance from Account B without an ordinance appropriating said
funds for expropriation purpose. Thus the court ruled that account A maybe levied but not account
B. The respondents are without recourse however should the petitioner refuse to pay its remaining
obligation. Where a municipality refuses without justifiable reason to effect payment of a final
money judgment rendered against it, the claimant may avail the remedy of mandamus in order to
compel the enactment and approval of the necessary appropriation ordinance and the
corresponding disbursement of municipal funds for such purpose.



34. MERITT VS. GOVT OF THE PHIL. ISLANDS.

Facts: Meritt, riding in a motorcycle collided with an ambulance of the General Hospital. He was
severely injured damaging his efficiency as contractor. The inquiry arises whether the Government is
liable for the damages due to the negligence committed by an agent or employee of the government
which is the chauffer.
Issue: Whether or not the Government is liable in this case.

Held: No. According to Art. 1903, Paragraph 5 of Civil Code, in a damage case, the responsibility of
the State is limited to that which it contracts through a special agent. The evidence showed that the
chauffer, who acted negligently, of the ambulance was not such of an agent. The court held that the
judgment rests solely with the Legislature and not with the Court.

35. National Irrigation Administration (NIA) v Court of Appeals

Facts:
Petitioner NIA awarded HYDRO a contract for construction of the main civil works of the Magat River
Multi-purpose Project. The contract provided Respondent HYDRO would be paid partly in Philippine
pesos and partly in US dollars. Respondent HYDRO substantially completed in 1982 and final
acceptance by Petitioner NIA was made in 1984. Thereafter, HYDRO still had an account receivable
from NIA representing dollar differential rate after the prescribed provided in the contract. HYDRO
filed Request for Adjudication in Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC). Petitioner NIA
filed its Answer wherein it questioned the jurisdiction of the CIAC alleging lack of cause of action,
laches and estoppel in view of Respondent HYDROs alleged failure to avail of its right to submit the
dispute to arbitration within the prescribed period as provided in the contract.
Later, Petitioner NIA filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging lack of jurisdiction over the disputes.
Petitioner NIA filed with the CA an Original Action of Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for
Restraining Order and/or Injunction which dismissed the same.
Hence, the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with urgent prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction.

Issue: Whether or not the CIAC has jurisdiction over the case.
Held: Yes. The CIAC has jurisdiction over the controversy, contrary to the claim of NIA. The instant
Petition is dismissed for lack of merit.