Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 92163 June 5, 1990
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS. JUAN PONCE ENRIE, petitioner
vs.
JU!GE JAIME SAA"AR #P$e%&'&n( Ju'(e o) *+e Re(&on,- T$&,- Cou$* o) .ue/on C&*0 1B$.
1032, SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR AUREIO TRAMPE, PROSECUTOR FER!INAN! R.
ABESAMIS, AN! CIT3 ASSISTANT CIT3 PROSECUTOR EUOGIO MANAN.UI, NATIONA
BUREAU OF IN4ESTIGATION !IRECTOR AFRE!O IM, BRIG. GEN. E!GAR !UA TORRES
#Su5e$&n*en'en* o) *+e No$*+e$n Po-&6e !&%*$&6*7 AN!8 OR AN3 AN! A PERSONS 9HO MA3
HA4E ACTUA CUSTO!3 O4ER THE PERSON OF JUAN PONCE ENRIE, respondents.
G.R. No. 9216: June 5, 1990
SPS. REBECCO E. PANIIO AN! ERIN!A E. PANIIO, petitioners,
vs.
PROSECUTORS FERNAN!O !E EON, AUREIO C. TRAMPE, FFR!INAN! R. ABESAMIS,
AN! EUOGIO C. MANAN.UI, ,n' HON. JAIME 9. SAA"AR, JR., &n +&% 6,5,6&*0 ,%
P$e%&'&n( Ju'(e, Re(&on,- T$&,- Cou$*, .ue/on C&*0, B$,n6+ 103, respondents.

NAR4ASA, J.;
Thirty-four years after it rote history into our cri!inal "urisprudence, People vs. Hernandez
1
once
!ore ta#es center sta$e as the focus of a confrontation at la that ould re-e%a!ine, if not the validity of
its doctrine, the li!its of its applicability. To be sure, the intervenin$ period sa a nu!ber of si!ilar
cases
2
that too# issue ith the rulin$-all ith a !ar#ed lac# of success-but none, it ould Bee!, here
season and circu!stance had !ore effectively conspired to attract ide public attention and e%cite
i!passioned debate, even a!on$ lay!en& none, certainly, hich has seen 'uite the #ind and ran$e of
ar$u!ents that are no brou$ht to bear on the sa!e 'uestion.
The facts are not in dispute. (n the afternoon of )ebruary *+, ,--., /enate Minority )loor 0eader
1uan Ponce Enrile as arrested by la enforce!ent officers led by 2irector Alfredo 0i! of the
National Bureau of (nvesti$ation on the stren$th of a arrant issued by 3on. 1ai!e /ala4ar of the
Re$ional Trial Court of 5ue4on City Branch ,.6, in Cri!inal Case No. -.,.-7,. The arrant had
issued on an infor!ation si$ned and earlier that day filed by a panel of prosecutors co!posed of
/enior /tate Prosecutor Aurelio C. Tra!pe, /tate Prosecutor )erdinand R. Abesa!is and Assistant
City Prosecutor Eulo$io Manan'uil, 1r., char$in$ /enator Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda
Panlilio, and 8re$orio 3onasan ith the cri!e of rebellion ith !urder and !ultiple frustrated
!urder alle$edly co!!itted durin$ the period of the failed coup atte!pt fro! Nove!ber *- to
2ece!ber ,., ,--.. /enator Enrile as ta#en to and held overni$ht at the NB( head'uarters on Taft
Avenue, Manila, ithout bail, none havin$ been reco!!ended in the infor!ation and none fi%ed in
the arrest arrant. The folloin$ !ornin$, )ebruary *9, ,--., he as brou$ht to Ca!p To!as
:arin$al in 5ue4on City here he as $iven over to the custody of the /uperintendent of the
Northern Police 2istrict, Bri$. 8en. Ed$ardo 2ula Torres.
3
;n the sa!e date of )ebruary *9, ,--., /enator Enrile, throu$h counsel, filed the petition
for habeas corpusherein <hich as folloed by a supple!ental petition filed on March *, ,--.=,
alle$in$ that he as deprived of his constitutional ri$hts in bein$, or havin$ been>
<a= held to anser for cri!inal offense hich does not e%ist in the statute
boo#s&
<b= char$ed ith a cri!inal offense in an infor!ation for hich no co!plaint
as initially filed or preli!inary investi$ation as conducted, hence as
denied due process&
<c= denied his ri$ht to bail& and
<d= arrested and detained on the stren$th of a arrant issued ithout the
"ud$e ho issued it first havin$ personally deter!ined the e%istence of
probable cause.
:
The Court issued the rit prayed for, returnable March ?, ,--. and set the plea for hearin$ on March
@, ,--..
5
;n March ?, ,--., the /olicitor 8eneral filed a consolidated return
6
for the respondents in this
case and in 8.R. No. -*,@7
<
Ahich had been conte!poraneously but separately filed by to of /enator
EnrileBs co-accused, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and raised si!ilar 'uestions. /aid return
ur$ed that the petitionersB case does not fall ithin the Hernandezrulin$ because-and this is puttin$ it very
si!ply-the infor!ation in Hernandez char$ed !urders and other co!!on cri!es co!!itted as a
necessary means for the commission of rebellion, hereas the infor!ation a$ainst /en. Enrile et
al. char$ed !urder and frustrated !urder co!!itted on the occasion, but not in furtherance, of
rebellion. /tated otherise, the /olicitor 8eneral ould distin$uish beteen the co!ple% cri!e <Cdelito
co!ple"oC= arisin$ fro! an offense bein$ a necessary !eans for co!!ittin$ another, hich is referred to
in the second clause of Article 79, Revised Penal Code, and is the sub"ect of theHernandez rulin$, and
the co!pound cri!e <Cdelito co!puestoC= arisin$ fro! a sin$le act constitutin$ to or !ore $rave or less
$rave offenses referred to in the first clause of the sa!e para$raph, ith hich Hernandez as not
concerned and to hich, therefore, it should not apply.
The parties ere heard in oral ar$u!ent, as scheduled, on March @, ,--., after hich the Court
issued its Resolution of the sa!e date
=
$rantin$ /enator Enrile and the Panlilio spouses provisional
liberty conditioned upon their filin$, ithin *7 hours fro! notice, cash or surety bonds of P,..,...... <for
/enator Enrile= and P*..,...... <for the Panlilios=, respectively. The Resolution stated that it as issued
ithout pre"udice to a !ore e%tended resolution on the !atter of the provisional liberty of the petitioners
and stressed that it as not passin$ upon the le$al issues raised in both cases. )our Me!bers of the
Court
9
voted a$ainst $rantin$ bail to /enator Enrile, and to
10
a$ainst $rantin$ bail to the Panlilios.
The Court no addresses those issues insofar as they are raised and liti$ated in /enator EnrileBs
petition, 8.R. No. -*,@6.
The partiesB oral and ritten pleas presented the Court ith the folloin$ options>
<a= abandon Hernandez and adopt the !inority vie e%pressed in the !ain
dissent of 1ustice Monte!ayor in said case that rebellion cannot absorb !ore
serious cri!es, and that under Article 79 of the Revised Penal Code rebellion
!ay properly be co!ple%ed ith co!!on offenses, so-called& this option as
su$$ested by the /olicitor 8eneral in oral ar$u!ent althou$h it is not offered
in his ritten pleadin$s&
<b= hold Hernandez applicable only to offenses co!!itted in furtherance, or
as a necessary !eans for the co!!ission, of rebellion, but not to acts
co!!itted in the course of a rebellion hich also constitute Cco!!onC cri!es
of $rave or less $rave character&
<c= !aintain Hernandez as applyin$ to !a#e rebellion absorb all other
offenses co!!itted in its course, hether or not necessary to its co!!ission
or in furtherance thereof.
;n the first option, eleven <,,= Me!bers of the Court voted a$ainst abandonin$ 3ernande4. To <*=
Me!bers felt that the doctrine should be re-e%a!ined.
10
>A (n the vie of the !a"ority, the rulin$
re!ains $ood la, its substantive and lo$ical bases have ithstood all subse'uent challen$es and no
ne ones are presented here persuasive enou$h to arrant a co!plete reversal. This vie is reinforced
by the fact that not too lon$ a$o, the incu!bent President, e%ercisin$ her poers under the ,-9@
)reedo! Constitution, sa fit to repeal, a!on$ others, Presidential 2ecree No. -7* of the for!er re$i!e
hich precisely sou$ht to nullify or neutrali4e Hernandez by enactin$ a ne provision <Art. ,7*-A= into the
Revised Penal Code to the effect that C<=hen by reason, or on the occasion, of any of the cri!es
penali4ed in this Chapter <Chapter ( of Title 6, hich includes rebellion=, acts hich constitute offenses
upon hich $raver penalties are i!posed by la are co!!itted, the penalty for the !ost serious offense
in its !a%i!u! period shall be i!posed upon the offender.CB
11
(n thus actin$, the President in effect by
le$islative flat reinstated Hernandez as bindin$ doctrine ith the effect of la. The Court can do no less
than accord it the sa!e reco$nition, absent any sufficiently poerful reason a$ainst so doin$.
;n the second option, the Court unani!ously voted to re"ect the theory that Hernandez is, or should
be, li!ited in its application to offenses co!!itted as a necessary !eans for the co!!ission of
rebellion and that the rulin$ should not be interpreted as prohibitin$ the co!ple%in$ of rebellion ith
other co!!on cri!es co!!itted on the occasion, but not in furtherance, thereof. Ahile four
Me!bers of the Court felt that the proponentsB ar$u!ents ere not entirely devoid of !erit, the
consensus as that they ere not sufficient to overco!e hat appears to be the real thrust
of Hernandez to rule out the co!ple%in$ of rebellion ith any other offense co!!itted in its course
under either of the aforecited clauses of Article 79, as is !ade clear by the folloin$ e%cerpt fro! the
!a"ority opinion in that case>
There is one other reason-and a funda!ental one at that-hy Article 79 of
our Penal Code cannot be applied in the case at bar. (f !urder ere not
co!ple%ed ith rebellion, and the to cri!es ere punished separately
<assu!in$ that this could be done=, the folloin$ penalties ould be
i!posable upon the !ovant, na!ely> <,= for the cri!e of rebellion, a fine not
e%ceedin$ P*.,... and prision mayor, in the correspondin$ period,
dependin$ upon the !odifyin$ circu!stances present, but never e%ceedin$
,* years of prision mayor, and <*= for the cri!e of !urder, reclusion
temporal in its !a%i!u! period to death, dependin$ upon the !odifyin$
circu!stances present. in other ords, in the absence of a$$ravatin$
circu!stances, the extreme penalty could not be imposed upon hi!.
3oever, under Article 79 said penalty would have to be meted out to
hi!, even in the absence of a single aggravating circumstance. Thus, said
provision, if construed in confor!ity ith the theory of the prosecution, ould
be unfavorable to the !ovant.
Dpon the other hand, said Article 79 as enacted for the purpose
of favoring the culprit, not of sentencin$ hi! to a penalty more severe than
that hich ould be proper if the several acts perfor!ed by hi! ere
punished separately. (n the ords of Rodri$ue4 Navarro>
0a unificacion de penas en los casos de concurso de delitos
a 'ue hace referencia este articulo <+? del Codi$o de ,-6*=,
esta basado franca!ente en el principio pro reo.B <(( 2octrina
Penal del Tribunal /upre!o de Espana, p. *,@9.=
Ae are aare of the fact that this observation refers to Article +, <later +?= of
the /panish Penal Code <the counterpart of our Article 79=, as a!ended in
,-.9 and then in ,-6*, readin$>
0as disposiciones del articulo anterior no son aplicables en el
caso de 'ue un solo hecho constituya dos o !as delitos, o
cuando el uno de ellos sea !edio necesario para co!eter el
otro.
En estos casos solo se i!pondra la pena correspondiente al
delito !as $rave en su $rado !a%i!o, hasta el li!ite 'ue
represents la su!a de las 'ue pudieran i!ponerse, penando
separada!ente los delitos.
Cuando la pena asi co!putada e%ceda de este li!ite, se
sancionaran los delitos por separado. <Rodri$ue4 Navarro,
2octrina Penal del Tribunal /upre!o, Eol. ((, p. *,@6=
and that our Article 79 does not contain the 'ualification inserted in said
a!end!ent, restrictin$ the i!position of the penalty for the $raver offense in
its !a%i!u! period to the case hen it does not e%ceed the su! total of the
penalties i!posable if the acts char$ed ere dealt ith separately. The
absence of said li!itation in our Penal Code does not, to our !ind, affect
substantially the spirit of said Article 79. (ndeed, if one act constitutes to or
!ore offenses, there can be no reason to inflict a punish!ent $raver than
that prescribed for each one of said offenses put to$ether. (n directin$ that
the penalty for the $raver offense be, in such case, i!posed in its !a%i!u!
period, Article 79 could have had no other purpose than to prescribe a
penalty lower than the a$$re$ate of the penalties for each offense, if i!posed
separately. The reason for this benevolent spirit of article 79 is readily
discernible. Ahen to or !ore cri!es are the result of a sin$le act, the
offender is dee!ed less perverse than hen he co!!its said cri!es thru
separate and distinct acts. (nstead of sentencin$ hi! for each cri!e
independently fro! the other, he !ust suffer the !a%i!u! of the penalty for
the !ore serious one, on the assu!ption that it is less $rave than the su!
total of the separate penalties for each offense.
12
The re"ection of both options shapes and deter!ines the pri!ary rulin$ of the Court, hich is
that Hernandezre!ains bindin$ doctrine operatin$ to prohibit the co!ple%in$ of rebellion ith any
other offense co!!itted on the occasion thereof, either as a !eans necessary to its co!!ission or
as an unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion.
This, hoever, does not rite finis to the case. PetitionerBs $uilt or innocence is not here in'uired
into, !uch less ad"ud$ed. That is for the trial court to do at the proper ti!e. The CourtBs rulin$ !erely
provides a ta#e-off point for the disposition of other 'uestions relevant to the petitionerBs co!plaints
about the denial of his ri$hts and to the propriety of the recourse he has ta#en.
The Court rules further <by a vote of ,, to 6= that the infor!ation filed a$ainst the petitioner does in
fact char$e an offense. 2isre$ardin$ the ob"ectionable phrasin$ that ould co!ple% rebellion ith
!urder and !ultiple frustrated !urder, that indict!ent is to be read as char$in$ simple rebellion.
Thus, in Hernandez, the Court said>
(n conclusion, e hold that, under the allegations of the amended
information a$ainst defendant-appellant A!ado E. 3ernande4, the !urders,
arsons and robberies described therein are mere ingredients of the cri!e of
rebellion alle$edly co!!itted by said defendants, as !eans CnecessaryC <7=
for the perpetration of said offense of rebellion& that the cri!e charged in the
afore!entioned a!ended infor!ation is, therefore, si!ple rebellion, not the
co!ple% cri!e of rebellion ith !ultiple !urder, arsons and robberies& that
the !a%i!u! penalty i!posable under such char$e cannot e%ceed telve
<,*= years of prision mayor and a fine of P*3,333& and that, in confor!ity
ith the policy of this court in dealin$ ith accused persons a!enable to a
si!ilar punish!ent, said defendant !ay be alloed bail.
13
The plaint of petitionerBs counsel that he is char$ed ith a cri!e that does not e%ist in the statute
boo#s, hile technically correct so far as the Court has ruled that rebellion !ay not be co!ple%ed
ith other offenses co!!itted on the occasion thereof, !ust therefore be dis!issed as a !ere fli$ht
of rhetoric. Read in the conte%t of Hernandez, the infor!ation does indeed char$e the petitioner ith
a cri!e defined and punished by the Revised Penal Code> si!ple rebellion.
Aas the petitioner char$ed ithout a co!plaint havin$ been initially filed andFor preli!inary
investi$ation conductedG The record shos otherise, that a co!plaint a$ainst petitioner for si!ple
rebellion as filed by the 2irector of the National Bureau of (nvesti$ation, and that on the stren$th of
said co!plaint a preli!inary investi$ation as conducted by the respondent prosecutors,
cul!inatin$ in the filin$ of the 'uestioned infor!ation.
1:
There is nothin$ inherently irre$ular or contrary
to la in filin$ a$ainst a respondent an indict!ent for an offense different fro! hat is char$ed in the
initiatory co!plaint, if arranted by the evidence developed durin$ the preli!inary investi$ation.
(t is also contended that the respondent 1ud$e issued the arrant for petitionerBs arrest ithout
first personallydeter!inin$ the e%istence of probable cause by e%a!inin$ under oath or affir!ation
the co!plainant and his itnesses, in violation of Art. (((, sec. *, of the Constitution.
15
This Court has
already ruled, hoever, that it is not the unavoidable duty of the "ud$e to !a#e such a personal
e%a!ination, it bein$ sufficient that he follos established procedure bypersonally evaluatin$ the report
and the supportin$ docu!ents sub!itted by the prosecutor.
16
Petitioner clai!s that the arrant of arrest
issued barely one hour and tenty !inutes after the case as raffled off to the respondent 1ud$e, hich
hardly $ave the latter sufficient ti!e to personally $o over the volu!inous records of the preli!inary
investi$ation.
1<
Merely because said respondent had hat so!e !i$ht consider only a relatively brief
period ithin hich to co!ply ith that duty, $ives no reason to assu!e that he had not, or could not
have, so co!plied& nor does that sin$le circu!stance suffice to overco!e the le$al presu!ption that
official duty has been re$ularly perfor!ed.
Petitioner finally clai!s that he as denied the ri$ht to bail. (n the li$ht of the CourtBs reaffir!ation
of Hernandezas applicable to petitionerBs case, and of the lo$ical and necessary corollary that the
infor!ation a$ainst hi! should be considered as char$in$ only the cri!e of si!ple rebellion, hich is
bailable before conviction, that !ust no be accepted as a correct proposition. But the 'uestion
re!ains> 8iven the facts fro! hich this case arose, as a petition for habeas corpus in this Court
the appropriate vehicle for assertin$ a ri$ht to bail or vindicatin$ its denialG
The cri!inal case before the respondent 1ud$e as the nor!al venue for invo#in$ the petitionerBs
ri$ht to have provisional liberty pendin$ trial and "ud$!ent. The ori$inal "urisdiction to $rant or deny
bail rested ith said respondent. The correct course as for petitioner to invo#e that "urisdiction by
filin$ a petition to be ad!itted to bail, clai!in$ a ri$ht to bail per se by reason of the ea#ness of the
evidence a$ainst hi!. ;nly after that re!edy as denied by the trial court should the revie
"urisdiction of this Court have been invo#ed, and even then, not ithout first applyin$ to the Court of
Appeals if appropriate relief as also available there.
Even acceptance of petitionerBs pre!ise that $oin$ by the Hernandez rulin$, the infor!ation char$es
a non-e%istent cri!e or, contrarily, theori4in$ on the sa!e basis that it char$es !ore than one
offense, ould not e%cuse or "ustify his i!proper choice of re!edies. Dnder either hypothesis, the
obvious recourse ould have been a !otion to 'uash brou$ht in the cri!inal action before the
respondent 1ud$e.
1=
There thus see!s to be no 'uestion that All the $rounds upon hich petitioner has founded the
present petition, hether these ent into the substance of hat is char$ed in the infor!ation or
i!puted error or o!ission on the part of the prosecutin$ panel or of the respondent 1ud$e in dealin$
ith the char$es a$ainst hi!, ere ori$inally "usticiable in the cri!inal case before said 1ud$e and
should have been brou$ht up there instead of directly to this Court.
There as and is no reason to assu!e that the resolution of any of these 'uestions as beyond the
ability or co!petence of the respondent 1ud$e-indeed such an assu!ption ould be de!eanin$ and
less than fair to our trial courts& none hatever to hold the! to be of such co!ple%ity or
transcendental i!portance as to dis'ualify every court, e%cept this Court, fro! decidin$ the!& none,
in short that ould "ustify by passin$ established "udicial processes desi$ned to orderly !ove
liti$ation throu$h the hierarchy of our courts. Parenthentically, this is the reason behind the vote of
four Me!bers of the Court a$ainst the $rant of bail to petitioner> the vie that the trial court should
not thus be precipitately ousted of its ori$inal "urisdiction to $rant or deny bail, and if it erred in that
!atter, denied an opportunity to correct its error. (t !a#es no difference that the respondent 1ud$e
here issued a arrant of arrest fi%in$ no bail. (!!e!orial practice sanctions si!ply folloin$ the
prosecutorBs reco!!endation re$ardin$ bail, thou$h it !ay be perceived as the better course for the
"ud$e motu proprio to set a bail hearin$ here a capital offense is char$ed.
19
(t is, in any event,
incu!bent on the accused as to ho! no bail has been reco!!ended or fi%ed to clai! the ri$ht to a bail
hearin$ and thereby put to proof the stren$th or ea#ness of the evidence a$ainst hi!.
(t is apropos to point out that the present petition has tri$$ered a rush to this Court of other parties in
a si!ilar situation, all apparently ta#in$ their cue fro! it, distrustful or conte!ptuous of the efficacy of
see#in$ recourse in the re$ular !anner "ust outlined. The proliferation of such pleas has only
contributed to the delay that the petitioner !ay have hoped to avoid by co!in$ directly to this Court.
Not only because popular interest see!s focused on the outco!e of the present petition, but also
because to ash the CourtBs hand off it on "urisdictional $rounds ould only co!pound the delay that
it has already $one throu$h, the Court no decides the sa!e on the !erits. But in so doin$, the
Court cannot e%press too stron$ly the vie that said petition interdicted the ordered and orderly
pro$ression of proceedin$s that should have started ith the trial court and reached this Court only if
the relief appealed for as denied by the for!er and, in a proper case, by the Court of Appeals on
revie.
0et it be !ade very clear that hereafter the Court ill no lon$er countenance, but ill $ive short shrift
to, pleas li#e the present, that clearly short-circuit the "udicial process and burden it ith the
resolution of issues properly ithin the ori$inal co!petence of the loer courts. Ahat has thus far
been stated is e'ually applicable to and decisive of the petition of the Panlilio spouses <8.R. No.
-*,@7= hich is virtually (dentical to that of petitioner Enrile in factual milieu and is therefore
deter!inable on the sa!e principles already set forth. /aid spouses have uncontestedly
pleaded
20
that arrants of arrest issued a$ainst the! as co-accused of petitioner Enrile in Cri!inal Case
No. -.-,.-7,, that hen they appeared before NB( 2irector Alfredo 0i! in the afternoon of March ,,
,--., they ere ta#en into custody and detained ithout bail on the stren$th of said arrants in violation-
they clai!-of their constitutional ri$hts.
(t !ay be that in the li$ht of conte!porary events, the act of rebellion has lost that 'uitessentiany
'ui%otic 'uality that "ustifies the relative leniency ith hich it is re$arded and punished by la, that
present-day rebels are less i!pelled by love of country than by lust for poer and have beco!e no
better than !ere terrorists to ho! nothin$, not even the sanctity of hu!an life, is alloed to stand
in the ay of their a!bitions. Nothin$ so underscores this aberration as the rash of see!in$ly
senseless #illin$s, bo!bin$s, #idnappin$s and assorted !ayhe! so !uch in the nes these days,
as often perpetrated a$ainst innocent civilians as a$ainst the !ilitary, but by and lar$e attributable
to, or even clai!ed by so-called rebels to be part of, an on$oin$ rebellion.
(t is enou$h to $ive anyone pause-and the Court is no e%ception-that not even the croded streets of
our capital City see! safe fro! such unsettlin$ violence that is disruptive of the public peace and
sty!ies every effort at national econo!ic recovery. There is an apparent need to restructure the la
on rebellion, either to raise the penalty therefor or to clearly define and deli!it the other offenses to
be considered as absorbed thereby, so that it cannot be conveniently utili4ed as the u!brella for
every sort of ille$al activity underta#en in its na!e. The Court has no poer to effect such chan$e,
for it can only interpret the la as it stands at any $iven ti!e, and hat is needed lies beyond
interpretation. 3opefully, Con$ress ill perceive the need for pro!ptly sei4in$ the initiative in this
!atter, hich is properly ithin its province.
A3ERE);RE, the Court reiterates that based on the doctrine enunciated in People vs.
Hernandez, the 'uestioned infor!ation filed a$ainst petitioners 1uan Ponce Enrile and the spouses
Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio !ust be read as char$in$ si!ple rebellion only, hence said petitioners
are entitled to bail, before final conviction, as a !atter of ri$ht. The CourtBs earlier $rant of bail to
petitioners bein$ !erely provisional in character, the proceedin$s in both cases are ordered
REMAN2E2 to the respondent 1ud$e to fi% the a!ount of bail to be posted by the petitioners. ;nce
bail is fi%ed by said respondent for any of the petitioners, the correspondin$ bail bond flied ith this
Court shall beco!e functus oficio. No pronounce!ent as to costs.
/; ;R2ERE2.
Cruz, Gancayco and Regalado, ., concur.
!edialdea, ., concurs in G.R. "o. #$%&' but too( no part in G.R. "o. #$%&).
Cortes and Gri*o+,-uino, ., are on leave.


Se5,$,*e O5&n&on%

MEENCIO>HERRERA, J., concurrin$>
( "oin !y collea$ues in holdin$ that the Hernandez doctrine, hich has been ith us for the past
three decades, re!ains $ood la and, thus, should re!ain undisturbed, despite periodic challen$es
to it that, ironically, have only served to stren$then its pronounce!ents.
( ta#e e%ception to the vie, hoever, that habeas corpus as not the proper re!edy.
3ad the (nfor!ation filed belo char$ed !erely the si!ple cri!e of Rebellion, that proposition could
have been plausible. But that (nfor!ation char$ed Rebellion co!ple%ed ith Murder and Multiple
)rustrated Murder, a cri!e hich does not e%ist in our statute boo#s. The char$e as obviously
intended to !a#e the penalty for the !ost serious offense in its !a%i!u! period i!posable upon the
offender pursuant to Article 79 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, no bail as reco!!ended in the
(nfor!ation nor as any prescribed in the Aarrant of Arrest issued by the Trial Court.
Dnder the attendant circu!stances, therefore, to have filed a Motion to 5uash before the loer
Court ould not have brou$ht about the speedy relief fro! unlaful restraint that petitioner as
see#in$. 2urin$ the pendency of said Motion before the loer Court, petitioner could have continued
to lan$uish in detention. Besides, the Arit ofHabeas Corpus !ay still issue even if another re!edy,
hich is less effective, !ay be availed of <Chave4 vs. Court of Appeals, *7 /CRA @@6=.
(t is true that habeas corpus ould ordinarily not he hen a person is under custody by virtue of a
process issued by a Court.
The Court, hoever, !ust have "urisdiction to issue the process. (n this case, the Court belo !ust
be dee!ed to have been ousted of "urisdiction hen it ille$ally curtailed petitionerBs liberty. 3abeas
corpus is thus available.
The rit of habeas corpus is available to relieve persons fro! unlaful
restraint. But here the detention or confine!ent is the result of a process
issued by the court or "ud$e or by virtue of a "ud$!ent or sentence, the rit
ordinarily cannot be availed of. .t may still be invo(ed though if the process,
/udgment or sentence proceeded from a court or tribunal the /urisdiction of
which may be assailed. 0ven if it had authority to act at the outset, it is now
the prevailing doctrine that a deprivation of constitutional right, if shown to
exist, would oust it of /urisdiction. .n such a case, habeas corpus could be
relied upon to regain one1s liberty <Celeste vs. People, 6, /CRA 6-,=
HE!phasis e!phasisI.
The Petition for habeas corpus as precisely pre!ised on the violation of petitionerBs constitutional
ri$ht to bail inas!uch as rebellion, under the present state of the la, is a bailable offense and the
cri!e for hich petitioner stands accused of and for hich he as denied bail is non-e%istent in la.
Ahile liti$ants should, as a rule, ascend the steps of the "udicial ladder, nothin$ should stop this
Court fro! ta#in$ co$ni4ance of petitions brou$ht before it raisin$ ur$ent constitutional issues, any
procedural fla notithstandin$.
The rules on habeas corpus are to be liberally construed <8anaay v.
5uilen, 7* Phil. 9.?=, the rit of habeas corpus bein$ the funda!ental
instru!ent for safe$uardin$ individual freedo! a$ainst arbitrary and laless
state action. The scope and fle%ibility of the rit-its capacity to reach all
!anner of ille$al detention-its ability to cut through barriers of form and
procedural mazes+have alays been e!phasi4ed and "ealously $uarded by
courts and la!a#ers <8u!abon v. 2irector of Bureau of Prisons, 6+ /CRA
7*.= He!phasis suppliedI.
The proliferation of cases in this Court, hich folloed in the a#e of this Petition, as brou$ht
about by the insistence of the prosecution to char$e the cri!e of Rebellion co!ple%ed ith other
co!!on offenses notithstandin$ the fact that this Court had not yet ruled on the validity of that
char$e and had $ranted provisional liberty to petitioner.
(f, indeed, it is desired to !a#e the cri!e of Rebellion a capital offense <no punishable by reclusion
perpetua=, the re!edy lies in le$islation. But Article ,7*-A
1
of the Revised Penal Code, alon$ ith P.2.
No. -7*, ere repealed, for bein$ Crepressive,C by E; No. ,9+ on ? 1une ,-9+. E; ,9+ further e%plicitly
provided that Article ,67 <and others enu!erated= of the Revised Penal Code as Crestored to its full
force and effect as it e%isted before said a!endatory decrees.C 3avin$ been so repealed, this Court is
bereft of poer to le$islate into e%istence, under the $uise of re-e%a!inin$ a settled doctrine, a Ccreature
un#non in laC- the co!ple% cri!e of Rebellion ith Murder. The re!and of the case to the loer Court
for further proceedin$s is in order. The Arit of Habeas Corpus has served its purpose.

GUTIERRE", JR., J., concurrin$>
( "oin the CourtBs decision to $rant the petition. (n reiteratin$ the rule that under e%istin$ la rebellion
!ay not be co!ple%ed ith !urder, the Court e!phasi4es that it cannot le$islate a ne-cri!e into
e%istence nor prescribe a penalty for its co!!ission. That function is e%clusively for Con$ress.
( rite this separate opinion to !a#e clear ho ( vie certain issues arisin$ fro! these cases,
especially on ho the defective infor!ations filed by the prosecutors should have been treated.
( a$ree ith the ponente that a petition for habeas corpus is ordinarily not the proper procedure to
assert the ri$ht to bail. Dnder the special circu!stances of this case, hoever, the petitioners had no
other recourse. They had to co!e to us.
)irst, the trial court as certainly aare of the decision in People v. 3ernande4, -- Phil. ?,? <,-?@=
that there is no such cri!e in our statute boo#s as rebellion co!ple%ed ith !urder, that !urder
co!!itted in connection ith a rebellion is absorbed by the cri!e of rebellion, and that a resort to
ar!s resultin$ in the destruction of life or property constitutes neither to or !ore offenses nor a
co!ple% cri!e but one cri!e-rebellion pure and si!ple.
/econd, Hernandez has been the la for 67 years. (t has been reiterated in e'ually sensational
cases. All layers and even la students are aare of the doctrine. Atte!pts to have the doctrine
re-e%a!ined have been consistently re"ected by this Court.
Third, President Marcos throu$h the use of his then le$islative poers, issued Pres. 2ecree -7*,
thereby installin$ the ne cri!e of rebellion co!ple%ed ith offenses li#e !urder here $raver
penalties are i!posed by la. 3oever, President A'uino usin$ her then le$islative poers
e%pressly repealed P2 -7* by issuin$ E%ec. ;rder ,9+. /he thereby erased the cri!e of rebellion
co!ple%ed ith !urder and !ade it clear that theHernandez doctrine re!ains the controllin$ rule.
The prosecution has not e%plained hy it insists on resurrectin$ an offense e%pressly iped out by
the President. The prosecution, in effect, 'uestions the action of the President in repealin$ a
repressive decree, a decree hich, accordin$ to the repeal order, is violative of hu!an ri$hts.
)ourth, any re-e%a!ination of the 3ernande4 doctrine brin$s the e% post facto principle into the
picture. 2ecisions of this Court for! part of our le$al syste!. Even if e declare that rebellion !ay
be co!ple%ed ith !urder, our declaration can not be !ade retroactive here the effect is to
i!prison a person for a cri!e hich did not e%ist until the /upre!e Court reversed itself.
And fifth, the atte!pts to distin$uish this case fro! the Hernandez case by stressin$ that the #illin$s
char$ed in the infor!ation ere co!!itted Con the occasion of, but not a necessary !eans for, the
co!!ission of rebellionC result in outlandish conse'uences and i$nore the basic nature of rebellion.
Thus, under the prosecution theory a bo!b dropped on PTE-7 hich #ills $overn!ent troopers
results in si!ple rebellion because the act is a necessary !eans to !a#e the rebellion succeed.
3oever, if the sa!e bo!b also #ills so!e civilians in the nei$hborhood, the droppin$ of the bo!b
beco!es rebellion co!ple%ed ith !urder because the #illin$ of civilians is not necessary for the
success of a rebellion and, therefore, the #illin$s are only Con the occasion of but not a Bnecessary
!eans forB the co!!ission of rebellion.
This ar$u!ent is puerile.
The cri!e of rebellion consists of !any acts. The droppin$ of one bo!b cannot be isolated as a
separate cri!e of rebellion. Neither should the droppin$ of one hundred bo!bs or the firin$ of
thousands of !achine $un bullets be bro#en up into a hundred or thousands of separate offenses, if
each bo!b or each bullet happens to result in the destruction of life and property. The sa!e act
cannot be punishable by separate penalties dependin$ on hat stri#es the fancy of prosecutors-
punish!ent for the #illin$ of soldiers or retribution for the deaths of civilians. The prosecution also
loses si$ht of the re$rettable fact that in total ar and in rebellion the #illin$ of civilians, the layin$
aste of civilian econo!ies, the !assacre of innocent people, the bloin$ up of passen$er
airplanes, and other acts of terroris! are all used by those en$a$ed in rebellion. Ae cannot and
should not try to ascertain the intent of rebels for each sin$le act unless the act is plainly not
connected to the rebellion. Ae cannot use Article 79 of the Revised Penal Code in lieu of still-to- be-
enacted le$islation. The #illin$ of civilians durin$ a rebel attac# on !ilitary facilities furthers the
rebellion and is part of the rebellion.
The trial court as certainly aare of all the above considerations. ( cannot understand hy the trial
1ud$e issued the arrant of arrest hich cate$orically states therein that the accused was not
entitled to bail. The petitioner as co!pelled to co!e to us so he ould not be arrested without
bail for a none%istent cri!e. The trial court for$ot to apply an established doctrine of the /upre!e
Court. Aorse, it issued a arrant hich reversed 67 years of established procedure based on a ell-
#non /upre!e Court rulin$.
All courts should re!e!ber that they for! part of an independent "udicial syste!& they do not belon$
to the prosecution service. A court should never play into the hands of the prosecution and blindly
co!ply ith its erroneous !anifestations. )aced ith an infor!ation char$in$ a !anifestly non-
e%istent cri!e, the duty of a trial court is to throw it out. ;r, at the very least and here possible,
!a#e it confor! to the la.
A loer court cannot re-e%a!ine and reverse a decision of the /upre!e Court especially a decision
consistently folloed for 67 years. Ahere a 1ud$e disa$rees ith a /upre!e Court rulin$, he is free
to e%press his reservations in the body of his decision, order, or resolution. 3oever, any "ud$!ent
he renders, any order he prescribes, and any processes he issues must follow the 2upreme Court
precedent. A trial court has no "urisdiction to reverse or i$nore precedents of the /upre!e Court. (n
this particular case, it should have been the /olicitor 8eneral co!in$ to this Court to 'uestion the
loer courtBs re"ection of the application for a arrant of arrest ithout bail. (t should have been the
/olicitor-8eneral provo#in$ the issue of re-e%a!ination instead of the petitioners as#in$ to be freed
fro! their arrest for a non-e%istent cri!e.
The principle bears repeatin$>
Respondent Court of Appeals really as devoid of any choice at all. (t could
not have ruled in any other ay on the le$al 'uestion raised. This Tribunal
havin$ spo#en, its duty as to obey. (t is as si!ple as that. There is
relevance to this e%cerpt fro! Barrera v. Barrera. <0-6,?9-, 1uly 6,, ,-+., 67
/CRA -9= BThe delicate tas# of ascertainin$ the si$nificance that attaches to
a constitutional or statutory provision, an e%ecutive order, a procedural nor!
or a !unicipal ordinance is co!!itted to the "udiciary. (t thus dischar$es a
role no less crucial than that appertainin$ to the other to depart!ents in the
!aintenance of the rule of la. To assure stability in le$al relations and avoid
confusion, it has to spea# ith one voice. (t does so ith finality, lo$ically and
ri$htly, throu$h the hi$hest "udicial or$an, this Court. Ahat it says then should
be definitive and authoritative, bindin$ on those occupyin$ the loer ran#s in
the "udicial hierarchy. They have to defer and to sub!it.B <.bid, ,.+. The
opinion of 1ustice 0aurel in People v. Eera, @? Phil. ?@ H,-6+I as cited=. The
ensuin$ para$raph of the opinion in Barrera further e!phasi4es the point>
/uch a thou$ht as reiterated in an opinion of 1ustice 1.B.0. Reyes and
further e!phasi4ed in these ords> B1ud$e 8audencio Cloribel need not be
re!inded that the /upre!e Court, by tradition and in our syste! of "udicial
ad!inistration, has the last ord on hat the la is& it is the final arbiter of
any "ustifiable controversy. There is only one /upre!e Court fro! hose
decisions all other courts should ta#e their bearin$s. <.bid. 1ustice 1.B.0.
Reyes spo#e thus in Albert v. Court of )irst (nstance of Manila <Br. E(=, 0-
*@6@7, May *-, ,-@9, *6 /CRA -79, -@,. <Tu$ade v. Court of Appeals, 9?
/CRA **@ H,-+9I. /ee also Albert v. Court of )irst (nstance, *6 /CRA -79
H,-@9I and Eir-1en /hippin$ and Marine /ervices, (nc. v. N0RC, ,*? /CRA
?++ H,-96I=
( find the situation in 2pouses Panlilio v. Prosecutors 3ernando de 4eon, et al. even !ore
ine%plicable. (n the case of the Panlilios, any probable cause to co!!it the non- e%istent cri!e of
rebellion co!ple%ed ith !urder e%ists only in the !inds of the prosecutors, not in the records of the
case.
( have $one over the records and pleadin$s furnished to the !e!bers of the /upre!e Court. (
listened intently to the oral ar$u!ents durin$ the hearin$ and it as 'uite apparent that the
constitutional re'uire!ent of probable cause as not satisfied. (n fact, in anser to !y 'uery for any
other proofs to support the issuance of a arrant of arrest, the anser as that the evidence would
be submitted in due time to the trial court.
The spouses Panlilio and one parent have been in the restaurant business for decades. Dnder the
records of these petitions, any restaurant oner or hotel !ana$er ho serves food to rebels is a co-
conspirator in the rebellion. The absurdity of this proposition is apparent if e bear in !ind that
rebels ride in buses and "eepneys, eat !eals in rural houses hen !ealti!e finds the! in the
vicinity, "oin eddin$s, fiestas, and other parties, play bas#etball ith barrio youths, attend !asses
and church services and otherise !i% ith people in various $atherin$s. Even if the hosts
reco$ni4e the! to be rebels and fail to shoo the! aay, it does not necessarily follo that the
for!er are co-conspirators in a rebellion.
The only basis for probable cause shon by the records of the Panlilio case is the alle$ed fact that
the petitioners served food to rebels at the Enrile household and a hotel supervisor as#ed to or
three of their aiters, ithout reason, to $o on a vacation. Clearly, a !uch, !uch stron$er shoin$
of probable cause !ust be shon.
(n 2alonga v. Cruz Pa*o, ,67 /CRA 769 <,-9?=, then /enator /alon$a as char$ed as a
conspirator in the heinous bo!bin$ of innocent civilians because the !an ho planted the bo!b
had, so!eti!e earlier, appeared in a $roup photo$raph ta#en durin$ a birthday party in the Dnited
/tates ith the /enator and other $uests. (t as a case of conspiracy proved throu$h a $roup
picture. 3ere, it is a case of conspiracy sou$ht to proved throu$h the caterin$ of food.
The Court in 2alonga stressed>
The purpose of a preli!inary investi$ation is to secure the innocent a$ainst
hasty, !alicious and oppressive prosecution, and to protect hi! fro! an
open and public accusation of cri!e, fro! the trouble, e%pense and an%iety
of a public trial, and also to protect the state fro! useless and e%pensive
trials. <Trocio v. Manta, ,,9 /CRA *7,& citin$ 3ashi!n v. Boncan, +, Phil.
*,@=. The ri$ht to a preli!inary investi$ation is a statutory $rant, and to
ithhold it ould be to trans$ress constitutional due process. </ee People v.
;andasa, *? /CRA *++= 3oever, in order to satisfy the due process clause
it is not enou$h that the preli!inary investi$ation is conducted in the sense of
!a#in$ sure that a trans$ressor shall not escape ith i!punity. A preli!inary
investi$ation serves not only the purposes of the /tate. More i!portant, it is a
part of the $uarantees of freedo! and fair play hich are birthri$hts of all
ho live in our country. (t is, therefore, i!perative upon the fiscal or the "ud$e
as the case !ay be, to relieve the accused fro! the pain of $oin$ throu$h a
trial once it is ascertained that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a pri!a
facie case or that no probable cause e%ists to for! a sufficient belief as to the
$uilt of the accused. Althou$h there is no $eneral for!ula or fi%ed rule for the
deter!ination of probable cause since the sa!e !ust be decided in the li$ht
of the conditions obtainin$ in $iven situations and its e%istence depends to a
lar$e de$ree upon the findin$ or opinion of the "ud$e conductin$ the
e%a!ination, such a findin$ should not disre$ard the facts before the "ud$e
nor run counter to the clear dictates of reason </ee 0a Che!ise 0acoste,
/.A. v. )ernande4, ,*- /CRA 6-,=. The "ud$e or fiscal, therefore, should not
$o on ith the prosecution in the hope that so!e credible evidence !i$ht
later turn up durin$ trial for this ould be a fla$rant violation of a basic ri$ht
hich the courts are created to uphold. (t bears repeatin$ that the "udiciary
lives up to its !ission by vitali4in$ and not deni$ratin$ constitutional ri$hts.
/o it has been before. (t should continue to be so. <id., pp. 7@,- 7@*=
Because of the fore$oin$, ( ta#e e%ception to that part of the ponencia hich ill read the
infor!ations as char$in$ si!ple rebellion. This case did not arise fro! innocent error. (f an
infor!ation char$es !urder but its contents sho only the in$redients of ho!icide, the 1ud$e !ay
ri$htly read it as char$in$ ho!icide. (n these cases, hoever, there is a deliberate atte!pt to char$e
the petitioners for an offense hich this Court has ruled as non-e%istent. The prosecution anted
3ernande4 to be reversed. /ince the prosecution has filed infor!ations for a cri!e hich, under our
rulin$s, does not e%ist, those infor!ations should be treated as null and void. Ne infor!ations
char$in$ the correct offense should be filed. And in 8.R. No. -*,@7, an e%tra effort should be !ade
to see hether or not the Principle in 2alonga v. Cruz Patio, et al. 5supra6 has been violated.
The Court is not, in any ay, preventin$ the 8overn!ent fro! usin$ !ore effective eapons to
suppress rebellion. (f the 8overn!ent feels that the current situation calls for the i!position of !ore
severe penalties li#e death or the creation of ne cri!es li#e rebellion co!ple%ed ith !urder, the
re!edy is ith Con$ress, not the courts.
(, therefore, vote to 8RANT the petitions and to ;R2ER the respondent court to 2(/M(// the void
infor!ations for a non-e%istent cri!e.

FEICIANO, J., concurrin$>
( concur in the result reached by the !a"ority of the Court.
( believe that there are certain aspects of the Hernandez doctrine that, as an abstract 'uestion of
la, could stand ree%a!ination or clarification. ( have in !ind in particular !atters such as the
correct or appropriate relationship beteen Article ,67 and Article ,6? of the Revised Penal Code.
This is a !atter hich relates to the le$al concept of rebellion in our le$al syste!. (f one e%a!ines
the actual ter!s of Article ,67 <entitled> CRebellion or (nsurrection-3o Co!!ittedC=, it ould appear
that this Article specifies both the overt acts and the criminal purpose hich, hen put to$ether,
ould constitute the offense of rebellion. Thus, Article ,67 states that Cthe cri!e of rebellion is
co!!itted by risin$ publicly and ta#in$ ar!s a$ainst the 8overn!ent C<i.e., the overt acts co!prisin$
rebellion=, Cfor the purpose of <i.e., the specific cri!inal intent or political ob"ective= re!ovin$ fro! the
alle$iance to said $overn!ent or its las the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any part
thereof, or any body of land, naval or other ar!ed forces, or deprivin$ the Chief E%ecutive or the
0e$islature, holly or partially, of their poers or prero$atives.C At the sa!e ti!e, Article ,6?
<entitled> CPenalty for Rebellion or (nsurrection.C= sets out a listin$ of acts or particular !easures
hich appear to fall under the rubric of rebellion or insurrection> Cen$a$in$ in ar a$ainst the forces
of the 8overn!ent, destroyin$ property or co!!ittin$ serious violence, e%actin$ contributions or
divertin$ public funds fro! the laful purpose for hich they have been appropriated.C Are these
!odalities of rebellion generally7 ;r are they particular !odes by hich those Chopromote 8 9,
maintain 8 9 or head 8 9 a rebellion or insurrection: co!!it rebellion, or particular !odes of
participation in a rebellion by public officers or employees7 Clearly, the scope of the le$al concept of
rebellion relates to the distinction beteen, on the one hand, the indispensable acts or in$redients of
the cri!e of rebellion under the Revised Penal Code and, on the other hand, differin$ optional
!odes of see#in$ to carry out the political or social ob"ective of the rebellion or insurrection.
The difficulty that is at once raised by any effort to e%a!ine once !ore even the above threshold
'uestions is that the results of such re-e%a!ination !ay ell be that acts hich under
the Hernandez doctrine are absorbed into rebellion, !ay be characteri4ed as separate or discrete
offenses hich, as a !atter of la, can either be prosecuted separately fro! rebellion or prosecuted
under the provisions of Article 79 of the Revised Penal Code, hich <both Clause , and Clause *
thereof= clearly envisa$e the e%istence of at least to <*= distinct offenses. To reach such a
conclusion in the case at bar, ould, as far as ( can see, result in collidin$ ith the funda!ental non-
retroactivity principle <Article 7, Civil Code& Article **, Revised Penal Code& both in relation to Article
9, Civil Code=.
The non-retroactivity rule applies to statutes principally. But, statutes do not e%ist in the abstract but
rather bear upon the lives of people ith the specific for! $iven the! by "udicial decisions
interpretin$ their nor!s. 1udicial decisions construin$ statutory nor!s $ive specific shape and
content to such nor!s. (n ti!e, the statutory nor!s beco!e encrusted ith the $losses placed upon
the! by the courts and the $losses beco!e inte$ral ith the nor!s <Cf Caltex v. Palomar, ,9 /CRA
*7+ H,-@@I=. Thus, hile in le$al theory, "udicial interpretation of a statute beco!es part of the la as
of the date that the la as ori$inally enacted, ( believe this theory is not to be applied ri$orously
here a ne "udicial doctrine is announced, in particular one overrulin$ a previous e%istin$ doctrine
of lon$ standin$ <here, 6@ years= and !ost specially not here the statute construed is cri!inal in
nature and the ne doctrine is !ore onerous for the accused than the pre-e%istin$ one <People v.
1abinal, ?? /CRA @.+ H,-+7I& People v. 0icera, @? /CRA *+. H,-+?I& 8u!abon v. 2irector of
Prisons, 6+ /CRA 7*. H,-+,I=. Moreover, the non-retroactivity rule hether in respect of le$islative
acts or "udicial decisions has constitutional i!plications. The prevailin$ rule in the Dnited /tates is
that a "udicial decision that retroactively renders an act cri!inal or enhances the severity of the
penalty prescribed for an offense, is vulnerable to constitutional challen$e based upon the rule
a$ainst e% post facto las and the due process clause <Bouie v. City of Colu!bia, 6+9 D/ 67+,,* 0.
Ed. *d 9-7 H,-@7I& Mar#s v. D./., 76 D/ ,99, ?, 0. Ed. *d *@. H,-++I& 2evine v. Ne Me%ico
2epart!ent of Corrections, 9@@ ). *d 66- H,-9-I=.
(t is ur$ed by the /olicitor 8eneral that the non-retroactivity principle does not present any real
proble! for the reason that the Hernandez doctrine as based upon Article 79, second clause, of
the Revised Penal Code and not upon the first clause thereof, hile it is precisely the first clause of
Article 79 that the 8overn!ent here invo#es. (t is, hoever, open to serious doubt
hether Hernandez can reasonably be so si!ply and sharply characteri4ed. And assu!in$
the Hernandez could be so characteri4ed, subse'uent cases refer to theHernandez doctrine in ter!s
hich do not distin$uish clearly beteen the first clause and the second clause of Article 79 <e.$.,
People v. 8eroni!o, ,.. Phil. -. H,-?@I& People v. Rodri$ue4, ,.+ Phil. @?- H,-@.I=. Thus, it
appears to !e that the critical 'uestion ould be hether a !an of ordinary intelli$ence ould have
necessarily read or understood the Hernandez doctrine as referrin$ e%clusively to Article 79, second
clause. Put in sli$htly different ter!s, the i!portant 'uestion ould be hether the ne doctrine here
proposed by the 8overn!ent could fairly have been derived by a !an of avera$e intelli$ence <or
counsel of avera$e co!petence in the la= fro! an e%a!ination of Articles ,67 and ,6? of the
Revised Penal Code as interpreted by the Court in theHernandez and subse'uent cases. To
for!ulate the 'uestion ill these ter!s ould al!ost be to co!pel a ne$ative anser, especially in
vie of the conclusions reached by the Court and its several Me!bers today.
)inally, there appears to be no 'uestion that the ne doctrine that the 8overn!ent ould have us
discover for the first ti!e since the pro!ul$ation of the Revised Penal Code in ,-6*, ould be !ore
onerous for the respondent accused than the si!ple application of the Hernandez doctrine that
!urders hich have been co!!itted on the occasion of and in furtherance of the cri!e of rebellion
!ust be dee!ed absorbed in the offense of si!ple rebellion.
( a$ree therefore that the infor!ation in this case !ust be vieed as char$in$ only the cri!e of
si!ple rebellion.

FERNAN, C.J., concurrin$ and dissentin$>
( a! constrained to rite this separate opinion on hat see!s to be a ri$id adherence to the ,-?@
rulin$ of the Court. The nu!erous challen$es to the doctrine enunciated in the case of People vs.
Hernandez, -- Phil. ?,? <,-?@= should at once de!onstrate the need to redefine the applicability of
said doctrine so as to !a#e it confor!able ith accepted and ell-settled principles of cri!inal la
and "urisprudence.
To !y !ind, the 3ernande4 doctrine should not be interpreted as an all-e!bracin$ authority for the
rule that all co!!on cri!es co!!itted on the occasion, or in furtherance of, or in connection ith,
rebellion are absorbed by the latter. To that e%tent, ( cannot $o alon$ ith the vie of the !a"ority in
the instant case that B3ernande4 re!ains bindin$ doctrine operatin$ to prohibit the co!ple%in$ of
rebellion ith any other offense co!!itted on the occasion thereof, either as a !eans necessary to
its co!!ission or as an unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellionC <p. -, 2ecision=.
The 3ernande4 doctrine has served the purpose for hich it as appealed by the Court in ,-?@
durin$ the co!!unist-inspired rebellion of the 3u#s. The chan$es in our society in the span of 67
years since then have far-reachin$ effects on the all-e!bracin$ applicability of the doctrine
considerin$ the e!er$ence of alternative !odes of sei4in$ the poers of the duly constituted
8overn!ent not conte!plated in Articles ,67 and ,6? of the Revised Penal Code and their
conse'uent effects on the lives of our people. The doctrine as $ood la then, but ( believe that
there is a certain aspect of the 3ernande4 doctrine that needs clarification.
Aith all due respect to the vies of !y brethren in the Court, ( believe that the Court, in the instant
case, should have further considered that distinction beteen acts or offenses hich
are indispensable in the co!!ission of rebellion, on the one hand, and those acts or offenses that
are merely necessary but not indispensable in the co!!ission of rebellion, on the other. The
!a"ority of the Court is correct in adoptin$, albeit i!pliedly, the vie in 3ernande4 case that hen an
offense perpetrated as a necessary !eans of co!!ittin$ another, hich is an ele!ent of the latter,
the resultin$ interloc#in$ cri!es should be considered as only one si!ple offense and !ust be
dee!ed outside the operation of the co!ple% cri!e provision <Article 79= of the Revised Penal
Code. As in the case of 3ernande4, the Court, hoever, failed in the instant case to distin$uish hat
is indispensable fro! hat is !erely necessary in the co!!ission of an offense, resultin$ thus in the
rule that co!!on cri!es li#e !urder, arson, robbery, etc. co!!itted in the course or on the
occasion of rebellion are absorbed or included in the latter as ele!ents thereof.
The relevance of the distinction is si$nificant, !ore particularly, if applied to conte!poraneous
events happenin$ in our country today. Theoretically, a cri!e hich is indispensable in the
co!!ission of another !ust necessarily be an ele!ent of the latter& but a cri!e that is !erely
necessary but not indispensable in the co!!ission of another is not an ele!ent of the latter, and if
and hen actually co!!itted, brin$s the interloc#in$ cri!e ithin the operation of the co!ple% cri!e
provision <Art. 79= of the Revised Penal Code. Aith that distinction, co!!on cri!es co!!itted
a$ainst 8overn!ent forces and property in the course of rebellion are properly considered
indispensable overt acts of rebellion and are lo$ically absorbed in it as virtual in$redients or
ele!ents thereof, but co!!on cri!es co!!itted a$ainst the civilian population in the course or on
the occasion of rebellion and in furtherance thereof, !ay be necessary but not indispensable in
co!!ittin$ the latter, and !ay, therefore, not be considered as ele!ents of the said cri!e of
rebellion. To illustrate, the deaths occurrin$ durin$ ar!ed confrontation or clashes beteen
$overn!ent forces and the rebels are absorbed in the rebellion, and ould be those resultin$ fro!
the bo!bin$ of !ilitary ca!ps and installations, as these acts are indispensable in carryin$ out the
rebellion. But deliberately shootin$ don an unar!ed innocent civilian to instill fear or create chaos
a!on$ the people, althou$h done in the furtherance of the rebellion, should not be absorbed in the
cri!e of rebellion as the felonious act is !erely necessary, but not indispensable. (n the latter case,
Article 79 of the Revised Penal Code should apply.
The occurrence of a coup dB etat in our country as a !ode of sei4in$ the poers of the duly-
constituted $overn!ent by sta$in$ surprise attac#s or occupyin$ centers of poers, of hich this
Court should ta#e "udicial notice, has introduced a ne di!ension to the interpretation of the
provisions on rebellion and insurrection in the Revised Penal Code. 8enerally, as a !ode of sei4in$
the poers of the duly constituted $overn!ent, it falls ithin the conte!plation of rebellion under the
Revised Penal Code, but, strictly construed, a coup dBetat per se is a class by itself. The !anner of
its e%ecution and the e%tent and !a$nitude of its effects on the lives of the people distin$uish a coup
dBetat fro! the traditional definition and !odes of co!!ission attached by the Revised Penal Code
to the cri!e of rebellion as applied by the Court to the co!!unist-inspired rebellion of the ,-?.Bs. A
coup dBetat !ay be e%ecuted successfully ithout its perpetrators resortin$ to the co!!ission of
other serious cri!es such as !urder, arson, #idnappin$, robbery, etc. because of the ele!ent of
surprise and the precise ti!in$ of its e%ecution. (n e%tre!e cases here !urder, arson, robbery, and
other co!!on cri!es are co!!itted on the occasion of a coup dB etat, the distinction referred to
above on hat is necessary and hat is indispensable in the co!!ission of the coup dBetat should
be painsta#in$ly considered as the Court should have done in the case of herein petitioners.
( concur in the result insofar as the other issues are resolved by the Court but ( ta#e e%ception to the
vote of the !a"ority on the broad application of the 3ernande4 doctrine.
BI!IN, J., concurrin$ and dissentin$>
( concur ith the !a"ority opinion e%cept as re$ards the dispositive portion thereof hich orders the
re!and of the case to the respondent "ud$e for further proceedin$s to fi% the a!ount of bail to be
posted by the petitioner.
( sub!it that the proceedin$s need not be re!anded to the respondent "ud$e for the purpose of
fi%in$ bail since e have construed the indict!ent herein as char$in$ si!ple rebellion, an offense
hich is bailable. Conse'uently, habeas corpus is the proper re!edy available to petitioner as an
accused ho had been char$ed ith si!ple rebellion, a bailable offense but ho had been denied
his ri$ht to bail by the respondent "ud$e in violation of petitionerBs constitutional ri$ht to bail. (n vie
thereof, the responsibility of fi%in$ the a!ount of bail and approval thereof hen filed, devolves upon
us, if co!plete relief is to be accorded to petitioner in the instant proceedin$s.
(t is indubitable that before conviction, ad!ission to bail is a !atter of ri$ht to the defendant, accused
before the Re$ional Trial Court of an offense less than capital </ection ,6 Article (((, Constitution and
/ection 6, Rule ,,7=. Petitioner is, before Ds, on a petition for habeas corpus prayin$, a!on$ others,
for his provisional release on bail. /ince the offense char$ed <construed as si!ple rebellion= ad!its
of bail, it is incu!bent upon us ! the e%ercise of our "urisdiction over the petition for habeas
corpus </ection ? <,=, Article E(((, Constitution& /ection *, Rule ,.*=, to $rant petitioner his ri$ht to
bail and havin$ ad!itted hi! to bail, to fi% the a!ount thereof in such su!s as the court dee!s
reasonable. Thereafter, the rules re'uire that Cthe proceedin$s to$ether ith the bondC shall forthith
be certified to the respondent trial court </ection ,7, Rule ,.*=.
Accordin$ly, the cash bond in the a!ount of P ,..,...... posted by petitioner for his provisional
release pursuant to our resolution dated March @, ,--. should no be dee!ed and ad!itted as his
bail bond for his provisional release in the case <si!ple rebellion= pendin$ before the respondent
"ud$e, ithout necessity of a re!and for further proceedin$s, conditioned for his <petitionerBs=
appearance before the trial court to abide its order or "ud$!ent in the said case.

SARMIENTO, J., concurrin$ and dissentin$>
( a$ree that People v. 3ernande4
1
should abide. More than three decades after hich it as penned, it
has fir!ly settled in the to!es of our "urisprudence as correct doctrine.
As 3ernande4 put it, rebellion !eans Cen$a$in$ ! ar a$ainst the forces of the $overn!ent,C
2
hich
i!plies Cresort to ar!s, re'uisition of property and services, collection of ta%es and contributions, restraint
of liberty, da!a$e to property, physical in"uries and loss of life, and the hun$er, illness and unhappiness
that ar leaves in its a#e. ...C
3
hether co!!itted in furtherance, of as a necessary !eans for the
co!!ission, or in the course, of rebellion. To say that rebellion !ay be co!ple%ed ith any other offense,
in this case !urder, is to play into a contradiction in ter!s because e%actly, rebellion includes !urder,
a!on$ other possible cri!es.
( also a$ree that the infor!ation !ay stand as an accusation for si!ple rebellion. /ince the acts
co!plained of as constitutin$ rebellion have been e!bodied in the infor!ation, !ention therein of
!urder as a co!ple%in$ offense is a surplusa$e, because in any case, the cri!e of rebellion is left
fully described.
:
At any rate, the $overn!ent need only a!end the infor!ation by a clerical correction, since an
a!end!ent ill not alter its substance.
( dissent, hoever, insofar as the !a"ority orders the re!and of the !atter of bail to the loer court. (
ta#e it that hen e, in our Resolution of March @, ,--., $ranted the petitioner Cprovisional libertyC
upon the filin$ of a bond of P,..,......, e $ranted hi! bail. The fact that e $ave hi! Cprovisional
libertyC is in !y vie, of no !o!ent, because bail !eans provisional liberty. (t ill serve no useful
purpose to have the trial court hear the incident a$ain hen e ourselves have been satisfied that
the petitioner is entitled to te!porary freedo!.

PA!IA, J., dissentin$>
( concur in the !a"ority opinion insofar as it holds that the rulin$ in People vs. Hernandez, -- Phil.
?,? Cre!ains bindin$ doctrine operatin$ to prohibit the co!ple%in$ of rebellion ith any other offense
co!!itted on the occasion thereof, either as a !eans necessary to its co!!ission or as an
unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion.C
( dissent, hoever, fro! the !a"ority opinion insofar as it holds that the infor!ation in 'uestion, hile
char$in$ the co!ple% cri!e of rebellion ith !urder and !ultiple frustrated !urder, :is to be read as
charging simple rebellion.:
The present cases are to be distin$uished fro! the Hernandez case in at least one <,= !aterial
respect. (n theHernandez case, this Court as confronted ith an appealed case, i.e., 3ernande4
had been convicted by the trial court of the co!ple% cri!e of rebellion ith !urder, arson and
robbery, and his plea to be released on bail before the /upre!e Court, pendin$ appeal, $ave birth to
the no celebrated Hernandez doctrine that the cri!e of rebellion co!ple%ed ith !urder, arson
and robbery does not e%ist. (n the present cases, on the other hand, the Court is confronted ith
an original case, i.e., here an infor!ation has been recently filed in the trial court and the
petitioners have not even pleaded thereto.
)urther!ore, the /upre!e Court, in the Hernandez case, as C$round-brea#in$C on the issue of
hether rebellion can be co!ple%ed ith !urder, arson, robbery, etc. (n the present cases, on the
other hand, the prosecution and the loer court, not only had the Hernandez doctrine <as case law=,
but E%ecutive ;rder No. ,9+ of President Cora4on C. A'uino dated ? 1une ,-9+ <as statutory law= to
bind the! to the le$al proposition thatthe crime of rebellion complexed with murder, and multiple
frustrated murder does not exist.
And yet, notithstandin$ these unmista(able and controlling beacon li$hts-absent hen this Court
laid don theHernandez doctrine-the prosecution has insisted in filin$, and the loer court has
persisted in hearin$, an infor!ation char$in$ the petitioners ith rebellion co!ple%ed ith !urder an
!ultiple frustrated !urder. ;hat information is clearly a nullity and plainly void ab initio. (ts head
should not be alloed to surface. As a nullity in substantive la, it char$es nothin$& it has $iven rise
to nothin$. The arrants of arrest issued pursuant thereto are as null and void as the infor!ation on
hich they are anchored. And, since the entire 'uestion of the infor!ationBs validity is before the
Court in these habeas corpus cases, ( venture to say that the infor!ation isfatally defective, even
under procedural la, because it char$es !ore than one <,= offense </ec. ,6, Rule ,,., Rules of
Court=.
( sub!it then that it is not for this Court to ener$i4e a dead and, at best, fatally decrepit infor!ation
by labellin$ or Cbapti4in$C it differently fro! hat it announces itself to be. The prosecution !ust file
an entirely new and properinfor!ation, for this entire e%ercise to !erit the serious consideration of
the courts.
ACC;R2(N80J, ( vote to 8RANT the petitions, 5DA/3 the arrants of arrest, and ;R2ER the
infor!ation for rebellion co!ple%ed ith !urder and !ultiple frustrated !urder in Cri!inal Case
Nos. -.-,.-7,, RTC of 5ue4on City, 2(/M(//E2.
Conse'uently, the petitioners should be ordered per!anently released and their bails cancelled.
Paras, ., concurs.


Se5,$,*e O5&n&on%
MEENCIO>HERRERA, J., concurrin$>
( "oin !y collea$ues in holdin$ that the Hernandez doctrine, hich has been ith us for the past
three decades, re!ains $ood la and, thus, should re!ain undisturbed, despite periodic challen$es
to it that, ironically, have only served to stren$then its pronounce!ents.
( ta#e e%ception to the vie, hoever, that habeas corpus as not the proper re!edy.
3ad the (nfor!ation filed belo char$ed !erely the si!ple cri!e of Rebellion, that proposition could
have been plausible. But that (nfor!ation char$ed Rebellion co!ple%ed ith Murder and Multiple
)rustrated Murder, a cri!e hich does not e%ist in our statute boo#s. The char$e as obviously
intended to !a#e the penalty for the !ost serious offense in its !a%i!u! period i!posable upon the
offender pursuant to Article 79 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, no bail as reco!!ended in the
(nfor!ation nor as any prescribed in the Aarrant of Arrest issued by the Trial Court.
Dnder the attendant circu!stances, therefore, to have filed a Motion to 5uash before the loer
Court ould not have brou$ht about the speedy relief fro! unlaful restraint that petitioner as
see#in$. 2urin$ the pendency of said Motion before the loer Court, petitioner could have continued
to lan$uish in detention. Besides, the Arit ofHabeas Corpus !ay still issue even if another re!edy,
hich is less effective, !ay be availed of <Chave4 vs. Court of Appeals, *7 /CRA @@6=.
(t is true that habeas corpus ould ordinarily not he hen a person is under custody by virtue of a
process issued by a Court.
The Court, hoever, !ust have "urisdiction to issue the process. (n this case, the Court belo !ust
be dee!ed to have been ousted of "urisdiction hen it ille$ally curtailed petitionerBs liberty. 3abeas
corpus is thus available.
The rit of habeas corpus is available to relieve persons fro! unlaful
restraint. But here the detention or confine!ent is the result of a process
issued by the court or "ud$e or by virtue of a "ud$!ent or sentence, the rit
ordinarily cannot be availed of. .t may still be invo(ed though if the process,
/udgment or sentence proceeded from a court or tribunal the /urisdiction of
which may be assailed. 0ven if it had authority to act at the outset, it is now
the prevailing doctrine that a deprivation of constitutional right, if shown to
exist, would oust it of /urisdiction. .n such a case, habeas corpus could be
relied upon to regain one1s liberty <Celeste vs. People, 6, /CRA 6-,=
HE!phasis e!phasisI.
The Petition for habeas corpus as precisely pre!ised on the violation of petitionerBs constitutional
ri$ht to bail inas!uch as rebellion, under the present state of the la, is a bailable offense and the
cri!e for hich petitioner stands accused of and for hich he as denied bail is non-e%istent in la.
Ahile liti$ants should, as a rule, ascend the steps of the "udicial ladder, nothin$ should stop this
Court fro! ta#in$ co$ni4ance of petitions brou$ht before it raisin$ ur$ent constitutional issues, any
procedural fla notithstandin$.
The rules on habeas corpus are to be liberally construed <8anaay v.
5uilen, 7* Phil. 9.?=, the rit of habeas corpus bein$ the funda!ental
instru!ent for safe$uardin$ individual freedo! a$ainst arbitrary and laless
state action. The scope and fle%ibility of the rit-its capacity to reach all
!anner of ille$al detention-its ability to cut through barriers of form and
procedural mazes+have alays been e!phasi4ed and "ealously $uarded by
courts and la!a#ers <8u!abon v. 2irector of Bureau of Prisons, 6+ /CRA
7*.= He!phasis suppliedI.
The proliferation of cases in this Court, hich folloed in the a#e of this Petition, as brou$ht
about by the insistence of the prosecution to char$e the cri!e of Rebellion co!ple%ed ith other
co!!on offenses notithstandin$ the fact that this Court had not yet ruled on the validity of that
char$e and had $ranted provisional liberty to petitioner.
(f, indeed, it is desired to !a#e the cri!e of Rebellion a capital offense <no punishable by reclusion
perpetua=, the re!edy lies in le$islation. But Article ,7*-A
1
of the Revised Penal Code, alon$ ith P.2.
No. -7*, ere repealed, for bein$ Crepressive,C by E; No. ,9+ on ? 1une ,-9+. E; ,9+ further e%plicitly
provided that Article ,67 <and others enu!erated= of the Revised Penal Code as Crestored to its full
force and effect as it e%isted before said a!endatory decrees.C 3avin$ been so repealed, this Court is
bereft of poer to le$islate into e%istence, under the $uise of re-e%a!inin$ a settled doctrine, a Ccreature
un#non in laC- the co!ple% cri!e of Rebellion ith Murder. The re!and of the case to the loer Court
for further proceedin$s is in order. The Arit of Habeas Corpus has served its purpose.

GUTIERRE", JR., J., concurrin$>
( "oin the CourtBs decision to $rant the petition. (n reiteratin$ the rule that under e%istin$ la rebellion
!ay not be co!ple%ed ith !urder, the Court e!phasi4es that it cannot le$islate a ne-cri!e into
e%istence nor prescribe a penalty for its co!!ission. That function is e%clusively for Con$ress.
( rite this separate opinion to !a#e clear ho ( vie certain issues arisin$ fro! these cases,
especially on ho the defective infor!ations filed by the prosecutors should have been treated.
( a$ree ith the ponente that a petition for habeas corpus is ordinarily not the proper procedure to
assert the ri$ht to bail. Dnder the special circu!stances of this case, hoever, the petitioners had no
other recourse. They had to co!e to us.
)irst, the trial court as certainly aare of the decision in People v. 3ernande4, -- Phil. ?,? <,-?@=
that there is no such cri!e in our statute boo#s as rebellion co!ple%ed ith !urder, that !urder
co!!itted in connection ith a rebellion is absorbed by the cri!e of rebellion, and that a resort to
ar!s resultin$ in the destruction of life or property constitutes neither to or !ore offenses nor a
co!ple% cri!e but one cri!e-rebellion pure and si!ple.
/econd, Hernandez has been the la for 67 years. (t has been reiterated in e'ually sensational
cases. All layers and even la students are aare of the doctrine. Atte!pts to have the doctrine
re-e%a!ined have been consistently re"ected by this Court.
Third, President Marcos throu$h the use of his then le$islative poers, issued Pres. 2ecree -7*,
thereby installin$ the ne cri!e of rebellion co!ple%ed ith offenses li#e !urder here $raver
penalties are i!posed by la. 3oever, President A'uino usin$ her then le$islative poers
e%pressly repealed P2 -7* by issuin$ E%ec. ;rder ,9+. /he thereby erased the cri!e of rebellion
co!ple%ed ith !urder and !ade it clear that theHernandez doctrine re!ains the controllin$ rule.
The prosecution has not e%plained hy it insists on resurrectin$ an offense e%pressly iped out by
the President. The prosecution, in effect, 'uestions the action of the President in repealin$ a
repressive decree, a decree hich, accordin$ to the repeal order, is violative of hu!an ri$hts.
)ourth, any re-e%a!ination of the 3ernande4 doctrine brin$s the e% post facto principle into the
picture. 2ecisions of this Court for! part of our le$al syste!. Even if e declare that rebellion !ay
be co!ple%ed ith !urder, our declaration can not be !ade retroactive here the effect is to
i!prison a person for a cri!e hich did not e%ist until the /upre!e Court reversed itself.
And fifth, the atte!pts to distin$uish this case fro! the Hernandez case by stressin$ that the #illin$s
char$ed in the infor!ation ere co!!itted Con the occasion of, but not a necessary !eans for, the
co!!ission of rebellionC result in outlandish conse'uences and i$nore the basic nature of rebellion.
Thus, under the prosecution theory a bo!b dropped on PTE-7 hich #ills $overn!ent troopers
results in si!ple rebellion because the act is a necessary !eans to !a#e the rebellion succeed.
3oever, if the sa!e bo!b also #ills so!e civilians in the nei$hborhood, the droppin$ of the bo!b
beco!es rebellion co!ple%ed ith !urder because the #illin$ of civilians is not necessary for the
success of a rebellion and, therefore, the #illin$s are only Con the occasion of but not a Bnecessary
!eans forB the co!!ission of rebellion.
This ar$u!ent is puerile.
The cri!e of rebellion consists of !any acts. The droppin$ of one bo!b cannot be isolated as a
separate cri!e of rebellion. Neither should the droppin$ of one hundred bo!bs or the firin$ of
thousands of !achine $un bullets be bro#en up into a hundred or thousands of separate offenses, if
each bo!b or each bullet happens to result in the destruction of life and property. The sa!e act
cannot be punishable by separate penalties dependin$ on hat stri#es the fancy of prosecutors-
punish!ent for the #illin$ of soldiers or retribution for the deaths of civilians. The prosecution also
loses si$ht of the re$rettable fact that in total ar and in rebellion the #illin$ of civilians, the layin$
aste of civilian econo!ies, the !assacre of innocent people, the bloin$ up of passen$er
airplanes, and other acts of terroris! are all used by those en$a$ed in rebellion. Ae cannot and
should not try to ascertain the intent of rebels for each sin$le act unless the act is plainly not
connected to the rebellion. Ae cannot use Article 79 of the Revised Penal Code in lieu of still-to- be-
enacted le$islation. The #illin$ of civilians durin$ a rebel attac# on !ilitary facilities furthers the
rebellion and is part of the rebellion.
The trial court as certainly aare of all the above considerations. ( cannot understand hy the trial
1ud$e issued the arrant of arrest hich cate$orically states therein that the accused was not
entitled to bail. The petitioner as co!pelled to co!e to us so he ould not be arrested without
bail for a none%istent cri!e. The trial court for$ot to apply an established doctrine of the /upre!e
Court. Aorse, it issued a arrant hich reversed 67 years of established procedure based on a ell-
#non /upre!e Court rulin$.
All courts should re!e!ber that they for! part of an independent "udicial syste!& they do not belon$
to the prosecution service. A court should never play into the hands of the prosecution and blindly
co!ply ith its erroneous !anifestations. )aced ith an infor!ation char$in$ a !anifestly non-
e%istent cri!e, the duty of a trial court is to throw it out. ;r, at the very least and here possible,
!a#e it confor! to the la.
A loer court cannot re-e%a!ine and reverse a decision of the /upre!e Court especially a decision
consistently folloed for 67 years. Ahere a 1ud$e disa$rees ith a /upre!e Court rulin$, he is free
to e%press his reservations in the body of his decision, order, or resolution. 3oever, any "ud$!ent
he renders, any order he prescribes, and any processes he issues must follow the 2upreme Court
precedent. A trial court has no "urisdiction to reverse or i$nore precedents of the /upre!e Court. (n
this particular case, it should have been the /olicitor 8eneral co!in$ to this Court to 'uestion the
loer courtBs re"ection of the application for a arrant of arrest ithout bail. (t should have been the
/olicitor-8eneral provo#in$ the issue of re-e%a!ination instead of the petitioners as#in$ to be freed
fro! their arrest for a non-e%istent cri!e.
The principle bears repeatin$>
Respondent Court of Appeals really as devoid of any choice at all. (t could
not have ruled in any other ay on the le$al 'uestion raised. This Tribunal
havin$ spo#en, its duty as to obey. (t is as si!ple as that. There is
relevance to this e%cerpt fro! Barrera v. Barrera. <0-6,?9-, 1uly 6,, ,-+., 67
/CRA -9= BThe delicate tas# of ascertainin$ the si$nificance that attaches to
a constitutional or statutory provision, an e%ecutive order, a procedural nor!
or a !unicipal ordinance is co!!itted to the "udiciary. (t thus dischar$es a
role no less crucial than that appertainin$ to the other to depart!ents in the
!aintenance of the rule of la. To assure stability in le$al relations and avoid
confusion, it has to spea# ith one voice. (t does so ith finality, lo$ically and
ri$htly, throu$h the hi$hest "udicial or$an, this Court. Ahat it says then should
be definitive and authoritative, bindin$ on those occupyin$ the loer ran#s in
the "udicial hierarchy. They have to defer and to sub!it.B <.bid, ,.+. The
opinion of 1ustice 0aurel in People v. Eera, @? Phil. ?@ H,-6+I as cited=. The
ensuin$ para$raph of the opinion in Barrera further e!phasi4es the point>
/uch a thou$ht as reiterated in an opinion of 1ustice 1.B.0. Reyes and
further e!phasi4ed in these ords> B1ud$e 8audencio Cloribel need not be
re!inded that the /upre!e Court, by tradition and in our syste! of "udicial
ad!inistration, has the last ord on hat the la is& it is the final arbiter of
any "ustifiable controversy. There is only one /upre!e Court fro! hose
decisions all other courts should ta#e their bearin$s. <.bid. 1ustice 1.B.0.
Reyes spo#e thus in Albert v. Court of )irst (nstance of Manila <Br. E(=, 0-
*@6@7, May *-, ,-@9, *6 /CRA -79, -@,. <Tu$ade v. Court of Appeals, 9?
/CRA **@ H,-+9I. /ee also Albert v. Court of )irst (nstance, *6 /CRA -79
H,-@9I and Eir-1en /hippin$ and Marine /ervices, (nc. v. N0RC, ,*? /CRA
?++ H,-96I=
( find the situation in 2pouses Panlilio v. Prosecutors 3ernando de 4eon, et al. even !ore
ine%plicable. (n the case of the Panlilios, any probable cause to co!!it the non- e%istent cri!e of
rebellion co!ple%ed ith !urder e%ists only in the !inds of the prosecutors, not in the records of the
case.
( have $one over the records and pleadin$s furnished to the !e!bers of the /upre!e Court. (
listened intently to the oral ar$u!ents durin$ the hearin$ and it as 'uite apparent that the
constitutional re'uire!ent of probable cause as not satisfied. (n fact, in anser to !y 'uery for any
other proofs to support the issuance of a arrant of arrest, the anser as that the evidence would
be submitted in due time to the trial court.
The spouses Panlilio and one parent have been in the restaurant business for decades. Dnder the
records of these petitions, any restaurant oner or hotel !ana$er ho serves food to rebels is a co-
conspirator in the rebellion. The absurdity of this proposition is apparent if e bear in !ind that
rebels ride in buses and "eepneys, eat !eals in rural houses hen !ealti!e finds the! in the
vicinity, "oin eddin$s, fiestas, and other parties, play bas#etball ith barrio youths, attend !asses
and church services and otherise !i% ith people in various $atherin$s. Even if the hosts
reco$ni4e the! to be rebels and fail to shoo the! aay, it does not necessarily follo that the
for!er are co-conspirators in a rebellion.
The only basis for probable cause shon by the records of the Panlilio case is the alle$ed fact that
the petitioners served food to rebels at the Enrile household and a hotel supervisor as#ed to or
three of their aiters, ithout reason, to $o on a vacation. Clearly, a !uch, !uch stron$er shoin$
of probable cause !ust be shon.
(n 2alonga v. Cruz Pa*o, ,67 /CRA 769 <,-9?=, then /enator /alon$a as char$ed as a
conspirator in the heinous bo!bin$ of innocent civilians because the !an ho planted the bo!b
had, so!eti!e earlier, appeared in a $roup photo$raph ta#en durin$ a birthday party in the Dnited
/tates ith the /enator and other $uests. (t as a case of conspiracy proved throu$h a $roup
picture. 3ere, it is a case of conspiracy sou$ht to proved throu$h the caterin$ of food.
The Court in 2alonga stressed>
The purpose of a preli!inary investi$ation is to secure the innocent a$ainst
hasty, !alicious and oppressive prosecution, and to protect hi! fro! an
open and public accusation of cri!e, fro! the trouble, e%pense and an%iety
of a public trial, and also to protect the state fro! useless and e%pensive
trials. <Trocio v. Manta, ,,9 /CRA *7,& citin$ 3ashi!n v. Boncan, +, Phil.
*,@=. The ri$ht to a preli!inary investi$ation is a statutory $rant, and to
ithhold it ould be to trans$ress constitutional due process. </ee People v.
;andasa, *? /CRA *++= 3oever, in order to satisfy the due process clause
it is not enou$h that the preli!inary investi$ation is conducted in the sense of
!a#in$ sure that a trans$ressor shall not escape ith i!punity. A preli!inary
investi$ation serves not only the purposes of the /tate. More i!portant, it is a
part of the $uarantees of freedo! and fair play hich are birthri$hts of all
ho live in our country. (t is, therefore, i!perative upon the fiscal or the "ud$e
as the case !ay be, to relieve the accused fro! the pain of $oin$ throu$h a
trial once it is ascertained that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a pri!a
facie case or that no probable cause e%ists to for! a sufficient belief as to the
$uilt of the accused. Althou$h there is no $eneral for!ula or fi%ed rule for the
deter!ination of probable cause since the sa!e !ust be decided in the li$ht
of the conditions obtainin$ in $iven situations and its e%istence depends to a
lar$e de$ree upon the findin$ or opinion of the "ud$e conductin$ the
e%a!ination, such a findin$ should not disre$ard the facts before the "ud$e
nor run counter to the clear dictates of reason </ee 0a Che!ise 0acoste,
/.A. v. )ernande4, ,*- /CRA 6-,=. The "ud$e or fiscal, therefore, should not
$o on ith the prosecution in the hope that so!e credible evidence !i$ht
later turn up durin$ trial for this ould be a fla$rant violation of a basic ri$ht
hich the courts are created to uphold. (t bears repeatin$ that the "udiciary
lives up to its !ission by vitali4in$ and not deni$ratin$ constitutional ri$hts.
/o it has been before. (t should continue to be so. <id., pp. 7@,- 7@*=
Because of the fore$oin$, ( ta#e e%ception to that part of the ponencia hich ill read the
infor!ations as char$in$ si!ple rebellion. This case did not arise fro! innocent error. (f an
infor!ation char$es !urder but its contents sho only the in$redients of ho!icide, the 1ud$e !ay
ri$htly read it as char$in$ ho!icide. (n these cases, hoever, there is a deliberate atte!pt to char$e
the petitioners for an offense hich this Court has ruled as non-e%istent. The prosecution anted
3ernande4 to be reversed. /ince the prosecution has filed infor!ations for a cri!e hich, under our
rulin$s, does not e%ist, those infor!ations should be treated as null and void. Ne infor!ations
char$in$ the correct offense should be filed. And in 8.R. No. -*,@7, an e%tra effort should be !ade
to see hether or not the Principle in 2alonga v. Cruz Patio, et al. 5supra6 has been violated.
The Court is not, in any ay, preventin$ the 8overn!ent fro! usin$ !ore effective eapons to
suppress rebellion. (f the 8overn!ent feels that the current situation calls for the i!position of !ore
severe penalties li#e death or the creation of ne cri!es li#e rebellion co!ple%ed ith !urder, the
re!edy is ith Con$ress, not the courts.
(, therefore, vote to 8RANT the petitions and to ;R2ER the respondent court to 2(/M(// the void
infor!ations for a non-e%istent cri!e.

FEICIANO, J., concurrin$>
( concur in the result reached by the !a"ority of the Court.
( believe that there are certain aspects of the Hernandez doctrine that, as an abstract 'uestion of
la, could stand ree%a!ination or clarification. ( have in !ind in particular !atters such as the
correct or appropriate relationship beteen Article ,67 and Article ,6? of the Revised Penal Code.
This is a !atter hich relates to the le$al concept of rebellion in our le$al syste!. (f one e%a!ines
the actual ter!s of Article ,67 <entitled> CRebellion or (nsurrection-3o Co!!ittedC=, it ould appear
that this Article specifies both the overt acts and the criminal purpose hich, hen put to$ether,
ould constitute the offense of rebellion. Thus, Article ,67 states that Cthe cri!e of rebellion is
co!!itted by risin$ publicly and ta#in$ ar!s a$ainst the 8overn!ent C<i.e., the overt acts co!prisin$
rebellion=, Cfor the purpose of <i.e., the specific cri!inal intent or political ob"ective= re!ovin$ fro! the
alle$iance to said $overn!ent or its las the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any part
thereof, or any body of land, naval or other ar!ed forces, or deprivin$ the Chief E%ecutive or the
0e$islature, holly or partially, of their poers or prero$atives.C At the sa!e ti!e, Article ,6?
<entitled> CPenalty for Rebellion or (nsurrection.C= sets out a listin$ of acts or particular !easures
hich appear to fall under the rubric of rebellion or insurrection> Cen$a$in$ in ar a$ainst the forces
of the 8overn!ent, destroyin$ property or co!!ittin$ serious violence, e%actin$ contributions or
divertin$ public funds fro! the laful purpose for hich they have been appropriated.C Are these
!odalities of rebellion generally7 ;r are they particular !odes by hich those Chopromote 8 9,
maintain 8 9 or head 8 9 a rebellion or insurrection: co!!it rebellion, or particular !odes of
participation in a rebellion by public officers or employees7 Clearly, the scope of the le$al concept of
rebellion relates to the distinction beteen, on the one hand, the indispensable acts or in$redients of
the cri!e of rebellion under the Revised Penal Code and, on the other hand, differin$ optional
!odes of see#in$ to carry out the political or social ob"ective of the rebellion or insurrection.
The difficulty that is at once raised by any effort to e%a!ine once !ore even the above threshold
'uestions is that the results of such re-e%a!ination !ay ell be that acts hich under
the Hernandez doctrine are absorbed into rebellion, !ay be characteri4ed as separate or discrete
offenses hich, as a !atter of la, can either be prosecuted separately fro! rebellion or prosecuted
under the provisions of Article 79 of the Revised Penal Code, hich <both Clause , and Clause *
thereof= clearly envisa$e the e%istence of at least to <*= distinct offenses. To reach such a
conclusion in the case at bar, ould, as far as ( can see, result in collidin$ ith the funda!ental non-
retroactivity principle <Article 7, Civil Code& Article **, Revised Penal Code& both in relation to Article
9, Civil Code=.
The non-retroactivity rule applies to statutes principally. But, statutes do not e%ist in the abstract but
rather bear upon the lives of people ith the specific for! $iven the! by "udicial decisions
interpretin$ their nor!s. 1udicial decisions construin$ statutory nor!s $ive specific shape and
content to such nor!s. (n ti!e, the statutory nor!s beco!e encrusted ith the $losses placed upon
the! by the courts and the $losses beco!e inte$ral ith the nor!s <Cf Caltex v. Palomar, ,9 /CRA
*7+ H,-@@I=. Thus, hile in le$al theory, "udicial interpretation of a statute beco!es part of the la as
of the date that the la as ori$inally enacted, ( believe this theory is not to be applied ri$orously
here a ne "udicial doctrine is announced, in particular one overrulin$ a previous e%istin$ doctrine
of lon$ standin$ <here, 6@ years= and !ost specially not here the statute construed is cri!inal in
nature and the ne doctrine is !ore onerous for the accused than the pre-e%istin$ one <People v.
1abinal, ?? /CRA @.+ H,-+7I& People v. 0icera, @? /CRA *+. H,-+?I& 8u!abon v. 2irector of
Prisons, 6+ /CRA 7*. H,-+,I=. Moreover, the non-retroactivity rule hether in respect of le$islative
acts or "udicial decisions has constitutional i!plications. The prevailin$ rule in the Dnited /tates is
that a "udicial decision that retroactively renders an act cri!inal or enhances the severity of the
penalty prescribed for an offense, is vulnerable to constitutional challen$e based upon the rule
a$ainst e% post facto las and the due process clause <Bouie v. City of Colu!bia, 6+9 D/ 67+,,* 0.
Ed. *d 9-7 H,-@7I& Mar#s v. D./., 76 D/ ,99, ?, 0. Ed. *d *@. H,-++I& 2evine v. Ne Me%ico
2epart!ent of Corrections, 9@@ ). *d 66- H,-9-I=.
(t is ur$ed by the /olicitor 8eneral that the non-retroactivity principle does not present any real
proble! for the reason that the Hernandez doctrine as based upon Article 79, second clause, of
the Revised Penal Code and not upon the first clause thereof, hile it is precisely the first clause of
Article 79 that the 8overn!ent here invo#es. (t is, hoever, open to serious doubt
hether Hernandez can reasonably be so si!ply and sharply characteri4ed. And assu!in$
the Hernandez could be so characteri4ed, subse'uent cases refer to theHernandez doctrine in ter!s
hich do not distin$uish clearly beteen the first clause and the second clause of Article 79 <e.$.,
People v. 8eroni!o, ,.. Phil. -. H,-?@I& People v. Rodri$ue4, ,.+ Phil. @?- H,-@.I=. Thus, it
appears to !e that the critical 'uestion ould be hether a !an of ordinary intelli$ence ould have
necessarily read or understood the Hernandez doctrine as referrin$ e%clusively to Article 79, second
clause. Put in sli$htly different ter!s, the i!portant 'uestion ould be hether the ne doctrine here
proposed by the 8overn!ent could fairly have been derived by a !an of avera$e intelli$ence <or
counsel of avera$e co!petence in the la= fro! an e%a!ination of Articles ,67 and ,6? of the
Revised Penal Code as interpreted by the Court in theHernandez and subse'uent cases. To
for!ulate the 'uestion ill these ter!s ould al!ost be to co!pel a ne$ative anser, especially in
vie of the conclusions reached by the Court and its several Me!bers today.
)inally, there appears to be no 'uestion that the ne doctrine that the 8overn!ent ould have us
discover for the first ti!e since the pro!ul$ation of the Revised Penal Code in ,-6*, ould be !ore
onerous for the respondent accused than the si!ple application of the Hernandez doctrine that
!urders hich have been co!!itted on the occasion of and in furtherance of the cri!e of rebellion
!ust be dee!ed absorbed in the offense of si!ple rebellion.
( a$ree therefore that the infor!ation in this case !ust be vieed as char$in$ only the cri!e of
si!ple rebellion.

FERNAN, C.J., concurrin$ and dissentin$>
( a! constrained to rite this separate opinion on hat see!s to be a ri$id adherence to the ,-?@
rulin$ of the Court. The nu!erous challen$es to the doctrine enunciated in the case of People vs.
Hernandez, -- Phil. ?,? <,-?@= should at once de!onstrate the need to redefine the applicability of
said doctrine so as to !a#e it confor!able ith accepted and ell-settled principles of cri!inal la
and "urisprudence.
To !y !ind, the 3ernande4 doctrine should not be interpreted as an all-e!bracin$ authority for the
rule that all co!!on cri!es co!!itted on the occasion, or in furtherance of, or in connection ith,
rebellion are absorbed by the latter. To that e%tent, ( cannot $o alon$ ith the vie of the !a"ority in
the instant case that B3ernande4 re!ains bindin$ doctrine operatin$ to prohibit the co!ple%in$ of
rebellion ith any other offense co!!itted on the occasion thereof, either as a !eans necessary to
its co!!ission or as an unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellionC <p. -, 2ecision=.
The 3ernande4 doctrine has served the purpose for hich it as appealed by the Court in ,-?@
durin$ the co!!unist-inspired rebellion of the 3u#s. The chan$es in our society in the span of 67
years since then have far-reachin$ effects on the all-e!bracin$ applicability of the doctrine
considerin$ the e!er$ence of alternative !odes of sei4in$ the poers of the duly constituted
8overn!ent not conte!plated in Articles ,67 and ,6? of the Revised Penal Code and their
conse'uent effects on the lives of our people. The doctrine as $ood la then, but ( believe that
there is a certain aspect of the 3ernande4 doctrine that needs clarification.
Aith all due respect to the vies of !y brethren in the Court, ( believe that the Court, in the instant
case, should have further considered that distinction beteen acts or offenses hich
are indispensable in the co!!ission of rebellion, on the one hand, and those acts or offenses that
are merely necessary but not indispensable in the co!!ission of rebellion, on the other. The
!a"ority of the Court is correct in adoptin$, albeit i!pliedly, the vie in 3ernande4 case that hen an
offense perpetrated as a necessary !eans of co!!ittin$ another, hich is an ele!ent of the latter,
the resultin$ interloc#in$ cri!es should be considered as only one si!ple offense and !ust be
dee!ed outside the operation of the co!ple% cri!e provision <Article 79= of the Revised Penal
Code. As in the case of 3ernande4, the Court, hoever, failed in the instant case to distin$uish hat
is indispensable fro! hat is !erely necessary in the co!!ission of an offense, resultin$ thus in the
rule that co!!on cri!es li#e !urder, arson, robbery, etc. co!!itted in the course or on the
occasion of rebellion are absorbed or included in the latter as ele!ents thereof.
The relevance of the distinction is si$nificant, !ore particularly, if applied to conte!poraneous
events happenin$ in our country today. Theoretically, a cri!e hich is indispensable in the
co!!ission of another !ust necessarily be an ele!ent of the latter& but a cri!e that is !erely
necessary but not indispensable in the co!!ission of another is not an ele!ent of the latter, and if
and hen actually co!!itted, brin$s the interloc#in$ cri!e ithin the operation of the co!ple% cri!e
provision <Art. 79= of the Revised Penal Code. Aith that distinction, co!!on cri!es co!!itted
a$ainst 8overn!ent forces and property in the course of rebellion are properly considered
indispensable overt acts of rebellion and are lo$ically absorbed in it as virtual in$redients or
ele!ents thereof, but co!!on cri!es co!!itted a$ainst the civilian population in the course or on
the occasion of rebellion and in furtherance thereof, !ay be necessary but not indispensable in
co!!ittin$ the latter, and !ay, therefore, not be considered as ele!ents of the said cri!e of
rebellion. To illustrate, the deaths occurrin$ durin$ ar!ed confrontation or clashes beteen
$overn!ent forces and the rebels are absorbed in the rebellion, and ould be those resultin$ fro!
the bo!bin$ of !ilitary ca!ps and installations, as these acts are indispensable in carryin$ out the
rebellion. But deliberately shootin$ don an unar!ed innocent civilian to instill fear or create chaos
a!on$ the people, althou$h done in the furtherance of the rebellion, should not be absorbed in the
cri!e of rebellion as the felonious act is !erely necessary, but not indispensable. (n the latter case,
Article 79 of the Revised Penal Code should apply.
The occurrence of a coup dB etat in our country as a !ode of sei4in$ the poers of the duly-
constituted $overn!ent by sta$in$ surprise attac#s or occupyin$ centers of poers, of hich this
Court should ta#e "udicial notice, has introduced a ne di!ension to the interpretation of the
provisions on rebellion and insurrection in the Revised Penal Code. 8enerally, as a !ode of sei4in$
the poers of the duly constituted $overn!ent, it falls ithin the conte!plation of rebellion under the
Revised Penal Code, but, strictly construed, a coup dBetat per se is a class by itself. The !anner of
its e%ecution and the e%tent and !a$nitude of its effects on the lives of the people distin$uish a coup
dBetat fro! the traditional definition and !odes of co!!ission attached by the Revised Penal Code
to the cri!e of rebellion as applied by the Court to the co!!unist-inspired rebellion of the ,-?.Bs. A
coup dBetat !ay be e%ecuted successfully ithout its perpetrators resortin$ to the co!!ission of
other serious cri!es such as !urder, arson, #idnappin$, robbery, etc. because of the ele!ent of
surprise and the precise ti!in$ of its e%ecution. (n e%tre!e cases here !urder, arson, robbery, and
other co!!on cri!es are co!!itted on the occasion of a coup dB etat, the distinction referred to
above on hat is necessary and hat is indispensable in the co!!ission of the coup dBetat should
be painsta#in$ly considered as the Court should have done in the case of herein petitioners.
( concur in the result insofar as the other issues are resolved by the Court but ( ta#e e%ception to the
vote of the !a"ority on the broad application of the 3ernande4 doctrine.
BI!IN, J., concurrin$ and dissentin$>
( concur ith the !a"ority opinion e%cept as re$ards the dispositive portion thereof hich orders the
re!and of the case to the respondent "ud$e for further proceedin$s to fi% the a!ount of bail to be
posted by the petitioner.
( sub!it that the proceedin$s need not be re!anded to the respondent "ud$e for the purpose of
fi%in$ bail since e have construed the indict!ent herein as char$in$ si!ple rebellion, an offense
hich is bailable. Conse'uently, habeas corpus is the proper re!edy available to petitioner as an
accused ho had been char$ed ith si!ple rebellion, a bailable offense but ho had been denied
his ri$ht to bail by the respondent "ud$e in violation of petitionerBs constitutional ri$ht to bail. (n vie
thereof, the responsibility of fi%in$ the a!ount of bail and approval thereof hen filed, devolves upon
us, if co!plete relief is to be accorded to petitioner in the instant proceedin$s.
(t is indubitable that before conviction, ad!ission to bail is a !atter of ri$ht to the defendant, accused
before the Re$ional Trial Court of an offense less than capital </ection ,6 Article (((, Constitution and
/ection 6, Rule ,,7=. Petitioner is, before Ds, on a petition for habeas corpus prayin$, a!on$ others,
for his provisional release on bail. /ince the offense char$ed <construed as si!ple rebellion= ad!its
of bail, it is incu!bent upon us ! the e%ercise of our "urisdiction over the petition for habeas
corpus </ection ? <,=, Article E(((, Constitution& /ection *, Rule ,.*=, to $rant petitioner his ri$ht to
bail and havin$ ad!itted hi! to bail, to fi% the a!ount thereof in such su!s as the court dee!s
reasonable. Thereafter, the rules re'uire that Cthe proceedin$s to$ether ith the bondC shall forthith
be certified to the respondent trial court </ection ,7, Rule ,.*=.
Accordin$ly, the cash bond in the a!ount of P ,..,...... posted by petitioner for his provisional
release pursuant to our resolution dated March @, ,--. should no be dee!ed and ad!itted as his
bail bond for his provisional release in the case <si!ple rebellion= pendin$ before the respondent
"ud$e, ithout necessity of a re!and for further proceedin$s, conditioned for his <petitionerBs=
appearance before the trial court to abide its order or "ud$!ent in the said case.

SARMIENTO, J., concurrin$ and dissentin$>
( a$ree that People v. 3ernande4
1
should abide. More than three decades after hich it as penned, it
has fir!ly settled in the to!es of our "urisprudence as correct doctrine.
As 3ernande4 put it, rebellion !eans Cen$a$in$ ! ar a$ainst the forces of the $overn!ent,C
2
hich
i!plies Cresort to ar!s, re'uisition of property and services, collection of ta%es and contributions, restraint
of liberty, da!a$e to property, physical in"uries and loss of life, and the hun$er, illness and unhappiness
that ar leaves in its a#e. ...C
3
hether co!!itted in furtherance, of as a necessary !eans for the
co!!ission, or in the course, of rebellion. To say that rebellion !ay be co!ple%ed ith any other offense,
in this case !urder, is to play into a contradiction in ter!s because e%actly, rebellion includes !urder,
a!on$ other possible cri!es.
( also a$ree that the infor!ation !ay stand as an accusation for si!ple rebellion. /ince the acts
co!plained of as constitutin$ rebellion have been e!bodied in the infor!ation, !ention therein of
!urder as a co!ple%in$ offense is a surplusa$e, because in any case, the cri!e of rebellion is left
fully described.
:
At any rate, the $overn!ent need only a!end the infor!ation by a clerical correction, since an
a!end!ent ill not alter its substance.
( dissent, hoever, insofar as the !a"ority orders the re!and of the !atter of bail to the loer court. (
ta#e it that hen e, in our Resolution of March @, ,--., $ranted the petitioner Cprovisional libertyC
upon the filin$ of a bond of P,..,......, e $ranted hi! bail. The fact that e $ave hi! Cprovisional
libertyC is in !y vie, of no !o!ent, because bail !eans provisional liberty. (t ill serve no useful
purpose to have the trial court hear the incident a$ain hen e ourselves have been satisfied that
the petitioner is entitled to te!porary freedo!.

PA!IA, J., dissentin$>
( concur in the !a"ority opinion insofar as it holds that the rulin$ in People vs. Hernandez, -- Phil.
?,? Cre!ains bindin$ doctrine operatin$ to prohibit the co!ple%in$ of rebellion ith any other offense
co!!itted on the occasion thereof, either as a !eans necessary to its co!!ission or as an
unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion.C
( dissent, hoever, fro! the !a"ority opinion insofar as it holds that the infor!ation in 'uestion, hile
char$in$ the co!ple% cri!e of rebellion ith !urder and !ultiple frustrated !urder, :is to be read as
charging simple rebellion.:
The present cases are to be distin$uished fro! the Hernandez case in at least one <,= !aterial
respect. (n theHernandez case, this Court as confronted ith an appealed case, i.e., 3ernande4
had been convicted by the trial court of the co!ple% cri!e of rebellion ith !urder, arson and
robbery, and his plea to be released on bail before the /upre!e Court, pendin$ appeal, $ave birth to
the no celebrated Hernandez doctrine that the cri!e of rebellion co!ple%ed ith !urder, arson
and robbery does not e%ist. (n the present cases, on the other hand, the Court is confronted ith
an original case, i.e., here an infor!ation has been recently filed in the trial court and the
petitioners have not even pleaded thereto.
)urther!ore, the /upre!e Court, in the Hernandez case, as C$round-brea#in$C on the issue of
hether rebellion can be co!ple%ed ith !urder, arson, robbery, etc. (n the present cases, on the
other hand, the prosecution and the loer court, not only had the Hernandez doctrine <as case law=,
but E%ecutive ;rder No. ,9+ of President Cora4on C. A'uino dated ? 1une ,-9+ <as statutory law= to
bind the! to the le$al proposition thatthe crime of rebellion complexed with murder, and multiple
frustrated murder does not exist.
And yet, notithstandin$ these unmista(able and controlling beacon li$hts-absent hen this Court
laid don theHernandez doctrine-the prosecution has insisted in filin$, and the loer court has
persisted in hearin$, an infor!ation char$in$ the petitioners ith rebellion co!ple%ed ith !urder an
!ultiple frustrated !urder. ;hat information is clearly a nullity and plainly void ab initio. (ts head
should not be alloed to surface. As a nullity in substantive la, it char$es nothin$& it has $iven rise
to nothin$. The arrants of arrest issued pursuant thereto are as null and void as the infor!ation on
hich they are anchored. And, since the entire 'uestion of the infor!ationBs validity is before the
Court in these habeas corpus cases, ( venture to say that the infor!ation isfatally defective, even
under procedural la, because it char$es !ore than one <,= offense </ec. ,6, Rule ,,., Rules of
Court=.
( sub!it then that it is not for this Court to ener$i4e a dead and, at best, fatally decrepit infor!ation
by labellin$ or Cbapti4in$C it differently fro! hat it announces itself to be. The prosecution !ust file
an entirely new and properinfor!ation, for this entire e%ercise to !erit the serious consideration of
the courts.
ACC;R2(N80J, ( vote to 8RANT the petitions, 5DA/3 the arrants of arrest, and ;R2ER the
infor!ation for rebellion co!ple%ed ith !urder and !ultiple frustrated !urder in Cri!inal Case
Nos. -.-,.-7,, RTC of 5ue4on City, 2(/M(//E2.
Conse'uently, the petitioners should be ordered per!anently released and their bails cancelled.
Paras, ., concurs.