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Rez of Ferrari (G.R.F. ) (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to Plato’s
Republic. Pp. xxvi + 533. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2007. Paper, £16.99, US$29.99 (Cased, £48, US$80).
ISBN: 978-0-521-54842-7 (978-0-521-83963-1 hbk).
Rez of Ferrari (G.R.F. ) (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to Plato’s
Republic. Pp. xxvi + 533. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2007. Paper, £16.99, US$29.99 (Cased, £48, US$80).
ISBN: 978-0-521-54842-7 (978-0-521-83963-1 hbk).
Rez of Ferrari (G.R.F. ) (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to Plato’s
Republic. Pp. xxvi + 533. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2007. Paper, £16.99, US$29.99 (Cased, £48, US$80).
ISBN: 978-0-521-54842-7 (978-0-521-83963-1 hbk).
Fr:i ( G. R. F. ) (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to Platos
Republic. Pp. xxvi + 533. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007. Paper, 16.99, US$29.99 (Cased, 48, US$80). ISBN: 978-0-521-54842-7 (978-0-521-83963-1 hbk). doi:10.1017/S0009840X08001856 This volume maintains the high standard which readers have come to expect of the Cambridge Companions. In addition to an introduction by the Editor it has sixteen chapters, all specially commissioned, covering all the major aspects of the dialogue. Ten of the contributors are from the USA, ve from the UK and one from Germany; as the interests of the authors cover a spectrum from the more literary and historical at one extreme to the more narrowly philosophical at the other (several contributions manifesting both aspects) the work as a whole displays a greater breadth of approach than in some comparable volumes, as is particularly appropriate to the notoriously diverse subject-matter and complex construction of the Republic. Each chapter contains a bibliography, and in addition there is a comprehensive survey of work on the dialogue, listing edited collections, editions, commentaries, translations, books and articles (thematically arranged), totalling more than 600 items. Students of the dialogue will place this bibliographical provision high among the many merits of this volume. The work is completed by an index locorum and a general index. After the Editors introduction, setting out the aim of the volume and summarising the individual chapters, the work proper begins with three chapters discussing dierent general features of the dialogue. Harvey Yunis presents it as a work of protreptic rhetoric, whose strategy is to exploit the available literary resources in such a way that an unknown reader would most likely be moved as close to Socrates position on justice and the soul as was possible (p. 7); this strategy requires Socrates to defend justice by deploying arguments which are maximally persuasive to a readership untrained in technical philosophy, at the same time as employing literary artice to challenge the status of poetry as the foundation of the popular values which the dialogue seeks to subvert. The theme of Platos use of poetic techniques and imagery to challenge the cultural supremacy of poetry is explored in more detail by David OConnor in Chapter 3, which points among other themes to the reshaping of Homers account of Odysseus descent to the underworld in Socrates descent to the Piraeus at the beginning of the dialogue and in the escaped prisoners return to the cave, episodes in which (as in Protagoras 315bc and Meno 100a) the gure of Socrates is ambiguous between Odysseus and the blind seer Tiresias. In Chapter 2 Christopher Rowe places the Republic in the context of Platos other political writings, arguing persuasively for a closer continuity among them than is generally assumed, and suggesting provocatively (but not unpersuasively) that since the necessity for a warrior class arises from the corruption of the original city of pigs, the political system of Callipolis, as opposed to a simpler social structure based on fundamental human needs, may be not the ideal form of social organisation but a concession to fallen human nature. (A very similar suggestion appears at the end of Donald Morrisons extremely sensible discussion of Platos utopianism [Chapter 9]. It is one of the most stimulating aspects of the collection that, as ts the character of the dialogue [see above], certain themes recur, treated from dierent viewpoints, and sometimes with divergent results, in dierent chapters. I discuss another instance below.) The Classical Review vol. 59 no. 1 The Classical Association 2009; all rights reserved 1nr ci:ssi c:i rvi rv 63 The remaining chapters deal with the principal arguments of the dialogue, together with certain specic themes, starting with the defence of justice in Books 1 and 2, continuing through psychology, ethics and politics and the metaphysics and epistemology of Books 57 to conclude with the degenerate political states of Books 89 and the leading themes of 10, the critique of imitative poetry and the myth. Since a brief review does not allow extended discussion of such copious and diverse material, I restrict myself to a single central issue. Among the themes which recur in several contributions is that of the philosophers return to the cave in Book 7. Are the guardians obliged to sacrice their own well-being in taking their share of administration instead of devoting their whole energies to metaphysics? If they are, are they a counter-example to the central thesis of the dialogue, that justice benets the just person both intrinsically and in terms of its consequences? Further, if they have to sacrice their well-being, what motivates them to do so? This issue is discussed by Roslyn Weiss in the context of the defence of justice in Books 12, by Malcolm Schoeld on the Noble Lie, by Donald Morrison on Platos utopianism, and by David Sedley on the role and education of the philosopher-rulers. Sedley alone maintains that the philosophers do not sacrice their well-being, since the alternative to their accepting their share in government is, as specied in Book 1 (347cd), subjection to the rule of non-philosophers, with disastrous consequences for the political system, and hence for their well-being. He acknowledges (p. 281) that this provides a self-interested reason for the philosophers as a class to accept that they should rule, but not for any individual philosopher to take his or her turn, as opposed to becoming a free rider, selshly devoting him or herself to full-time metaphysics. To avoid that possibility Sedley posits appeal to a principle of fair sharing of burdens. That is indeed closer to the text of 520, which stresses, not the avoidance of the perils of rule by inferiors but the obligation of the philosophers to replay the benets of their education by the polis, but then self-interest is being subordinated to the independent claims of fairness, contrary to Sedleys thesis. Weiss accepts (p. 112) that for the philosophers themselves, only the justice argument compels It is justice in the form of repaying a debt that motivates the philosophers to rule. To the objection that in that case justice does not pay the philosophers, contrary to the central thesis, she replies (ibid.) that it is being just, not acting justly, which benets the just person. The state of being just, i.e. of having ones soul in optimal condition, is desirable both in itself, as a source of joy and pleasure to the person in that condition (p. 113), and for its consequences, but the consequences, viz. just actions, benet primarily not the agent himself but others (ibid.). I doubt whether this ingenious suggestion ts the text; the class of things desirable for their consequences, whether intrinsically desirable like health or intrinsically undesirable like medical treatment, seems to be conceived of as desirable to or for the person who has or experiences those things. Given that conception, being just (as described by Weiss) would be desirable in itself but (frequently) undesirable for its consequences, which is contrary to Socrates view. Schoeld and Morrison propose a third view; the philosopher is motivated to rule neither by considerations of self-interest nor by the claims of abstract justice, but by patriotism. In Morrisons version (pp. 2434) patriotism does not require that the philosophers motivation is permeated by philosophically-based universal altruism. In Schoelds the distinction is less clear, since in his view the mechanism by which the spirit of patriotism is inculcated is an ideology including both the Noble Lie, which includes the myth of the universal brotherhood of the indigenous population (p. 138), and the claims of obligation on the philosophers to repay the benets of their education (see above). 64 1nr ci:ssi c:i rvi rv Comparison with the similar arguments put forward by the laws in the Crito shows how closely considerations of patriotism intertwine with those of abstract justice; the citizen must regard his city as his parents, and in virtue of that relationship he must acknowledge an abstract obligation to obey it. This diversity of opinion amply conrms Morrisons shrewd observation that the great messy hairball of the issue that is the philosophers return to the cave has no clear resolution without importing a great deal that is not explicit in the text, so any answer that is put forward by its advocates is speculative (pp. 2423). In addition to the value of its bibliography, a volume of this kind provides a snapshot of the scholarly work being done on its subject (primarily in the Anglophone world) at the time of its publication. Its longer-term utility depends on the value of its individual contributions, some of which are likely to enter the canon of the literature on the dialogue, while others sink without trace. I am prepared to hazard the prediction that among the contributions to this volume which will still be regularly read in twenty years time are those by Sedley, Nicholas Denyer on the Sun and Line (a model of lucidity, which makes illuminating use of the mathematical background) and Jessica Moss on the critique of imitative poetry; the clarity and freshness of this piece make it, in my view, one of the best discussions of this hoary topic, and it should be on everyones reading list. Corpus Christi College, Oxford C. C. W. TAYLOR christopher.taylor@philosophy.ox.ac.uk THE SOPHIST Axniri ( D. ) Image and Paradigm in Platos Sophist. Pp. xviii + 279. Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing, 2007. Cased, US$32. ISBN: 978-1-930972-04-9. doi:10.1017/S0009840X08001868 A.s book treats Platos Sophist in three parts. It rst presents an analysis of the whole dialogue, although the nal denition (264b268a) is visited briey. Then a new translation is provided, followed by an appendix which examines some scholarly discussions (the main target is G.E.L.Owen, Plato on Not-being [1971]). The translation is generally good, and its readable English will lessen the stress for readers who nd the dialogue full of unusual expressions and complex arguments. While it is based on the new OCT (D. Robinson, 1995), it has the good sense, for example, to adopt the manuscripts reading against the emendation at 251a (p. 224, n. 211). The whole strategy for reading the Sophist is presented at the outset (pp. xivxv). A. aims to establish three main points in the book: (1) the dialogue as a whole is aporetic, creating a reductio ad absurdum, for its apparent conclusion derives from assumptions that are shown in the middle section to be untenable; (2) the dialogue is meant to cricitise Parmenides, whose incomplete thought leads to sophistry; (3) the dialogue indirectly argues for the necessity of the ontological distinction between paradigm and image, the basis for the theory of participation as an account of reality and meaning. The meaning of these claims gradually emerges as the author proceeds to analyse each argument. However, a reader may feel ambivalent about a combination of the step-by-step analysis of Platos argument and the proposed line of reading, repeated throughout the book. On the one hand, the analysis seems to pay due attention to the details of The Classical Review vol. 59 no. 1 The Classical Association 2009; all rights reserved 1nr ci:ssi c:i rvi rv 65