AN ONTOLOGICALLY AGNOSTIC STANCE ABSTRACT. The Quine/Putnam indispensability approach to the conrmation of math- ematical theories in recent times has been the subject of signicant criticism. In this paper I explore an alternative to the Quine/Putnam indispensability approach. I begin with a van Fraassen-like distinction between accepting the adequacy of a mathematical theory and believing in the truth of a mathematical theory. Finally, I consider the problem of moving from the adequacy of a mathematical theory to its truth. I argue that the prospects for justifying this move are qualitatively worse in mathematics than they are in science. 1. INTRODUCTION Of late it has become customary for philosophers to speak of the con- rmation of pure mathematical theories. This notion derives from the Quine/Putnam indispensability account which maintains that the conrm- ation of mathematical theories involves nothing beyond ordinary scientic conrmation: pure mathematical theories, in virtue of being an indispens- able part of our accepted scientic theories, enjoy the same conrmation. Quine rarely applies the concept of conrmation to scientic theories, and even less often to mathematical theories. My discussion here, con- sequently, does not target strict Quineans (if any such exist); rather, my remarks are directed toward the contemporary discussion of mathematical Platonism that has grown out of the Quine/Putnam approach. In this arena, the contemporary import of the Quinean move to accept the truth of math- ematics because mathematics plays an indispensable role in our scientic theories can be fairly characterized as a move to understand mathematical theories as being conrmed because they participate (indispensably) in conrmed scientic theories. Finally, my project here is not to argue dir- ectly against contemporary indispensability approaches that can be found elsewhere. 1 In this paper, I seek to offer an alternative to indispensability considerations as way of thinking about the reasons we have to believe that mathematical theories are true in a sense that entails the existence of mathematical objects. 2 In spite of the problems with the indispensability account, it seems promising to approach the conrmation of mathematical theories in a way Synthese 118: 257277, 1999. 1999 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands. 258 ANTHONY PERESSINI parallel to the conrmation of scientic theories. Care must be taken, how- ever, not to force mathematics into the mold of science. Serious attention must be paid to the particular mathematical methodologies involved. A fundamental problem with certain versions of the indispensability approach is that they depict mathematical theory as being conrmationally dependent on science in an implausible way. Unlike discarded scientic theories, pure mathematical theories do not dry up and blow away if their usefulness in science ceases; rather, they retain whatever status they had qua pure mathematical theory. On the other hand, when a scientic theory is no longer useful in science, it does in an important sense, dry up and blow away. This is because its role in empirical science was its (sole) source of conrmation. Pure mathematical theories, on the other hand, appear to have their own internal sources of conrmation and this conrmation is independent of how/whether the theory is used in science. I propose to pay particular attention to this conrmational independence and not merely chalk it up to appearance. In what follows, respecting this conrmational independence of pure mathematical theories will be taken as an adequacy condition for an account of mathematical conrmation. In developing my account, I begin with a van Fraassen-like distinction between accepting the adequacy of a theory and believing the truth of a theory; I then work out an appropriate sense of adequacy for the math- ematical setting. This mathematical adequacy will be determined by the conrmational methodology of pure mathematics. In particular, the math- ematical adequacy of a theory is what is being directly conrmed by the methodology of pure mathematics just as empirical adequacy is what is being directly conrmed by the methodology in science. I argue that the conrmational independence of pure mathematics is due to the fact that the criterion for accepting a theory of pure mathematics, its mathematical adequacy, is independent of the evidential support at work in science. I next consider the problem of moving from the mathematical adequacy of a theory to its truth. The question becomes: at what point, if ever, does a theorys mathematical adequacy commit us to its truth? I argue that the prospects for justifying this move are qualitatively worse in mathematics than they are in science. 2. ACCEPTING AND BELIEVING The debate between scientic realists, and empiricists (led by van Fraassen) has suggested a subtle shift in how we think about conrmation. It is no longer to be taken for granted that in conrming a scientic theory, we simply conrm the truth of the theorys statements. The idea that we CONFIRMING MATHEMATICAL THEORIES 259 may accept a scientic theory as empirically adequate without believing all of it to be true is a possibility that has enough merit to have sustained considerable discussion. At the very least, this possibility has forced philo- sophers to recognize that the empirical adequacy of a scientic theory is what is most directly conrmed by the activity of scientists, and that to pass from empirical adequacy to the truth of the theory requires an additional step. 3 2.1. Some Terminology The propositional attitudes picked out by the terms believe and accept are really not as different as might be thought. In fact, the latter may be analyzed in terms of the former. To believe a theory is to believe that the statements that make it up are true. 4 To accept a theory is to believe that the theory is adequate in some relevant sense, but not necessarily that all of the statements that make it up are true. We may also speak of accepting individual statements: to accept a statement p (in the context of an accep- ted theory of which it is a part) is to believe it to be adequate in some sense, but not necessarily to believe that p is true. Thus the statements of a theory T have a natural partition into the statements that are believed (T b ) and the statements that are merely accepted (T a ). In describing a statement as merely accepted the implication is, of course, that it is not believed. Similarly, when a theory is described as merely accepted, the implication will be that it is not believed and thus that T a is non-empty. Analyzing the concept of acceptance in terms of belief avoids an important criticism that has been successfully leveled against certain presentations of it. It has been argued that dichotomous (either/or) accounts of propositional attitudes like acceptance are too coarsely grained. We do not accept or reject hypotheses rather, we assign degrees of belief to them. 5 Notice, however, that since acceptance of T is analyzed as believing T empirically adequate, if belief comes in degree, then so does acceptance. The essential feature of the idea of acceptance is not that it be an either/or affair, but rather that it be an attitude toward an hypothesis distinct from believing it true. In this discussion, belief, and consequently acceptance, will be understood as being a matter of degree. 2.2. Adequacy in Science To accept an hypothesis is to believe it adequate in some relevant sense. In the conrmational setting of science, adequate gets eshed out in terms of empirical adequacy. What it means for a scientic theory to be empirically adequate is that it gets things right with respect to what we can (even potentially) observe. The idea is that an empirically adequate 260 ANTHONY PERESSINI theory will correctly describe and predict any empirical result we may ever obtain. A rough but helpful way of thinking about what it means to be an empirically adequate theory is that such theories say true things and only true things about observables. 6 The important feature of this idea for the purposes of this discussion is that, as long as a theory gets things right about everything observable, then it will be empirically adequate regardless of how it happens to relate the observables to unobservables and whatever it says about unobservables. 7 Thus an empirically adequate theory need not get anything right other than what it says about what we can observe; in particular, what it says about unobservables need not be true. In what sense, then, is the empirical adequacy of a theory most directly conrmed? Consider what scientists actually do in the process of conrm- ing a theory they work to establish, by way of ingenious experiments and subtle observations, that the theory gets things right about the available em- pirical data. This empirical data is, of course, data regarding observables. In this sense, the immediate object of conrmation is the theorys empirical adequacy. It may well be that scientists are, with the same work, also con- rming the truth of statements about unobservables. This is done, however, by way of observables: whatever further conrmation a scientic theory accrues grows out of the conrmation of its empirical adequacy. Science is such that whatever it conrms, be it about observables or unobservables, it does so by way of observables, i.e., by way of establishing empirical ad- equacy. It requires an additional step to move from the empirical adequacy of a theory to the truth of its statements regarding unobservables, (i.e., the truth of the theory). 8 Empiricists such as van Fraassen insist that this additional step is never epistemologically justied. According to this view, there is an unbridgeable epistemological chasm separating claims about observables from claims about unobservables: the line separating claims we are justied in accepting from claims we are justied in believing falls precisely along the line separating claims about observables from claims about unobservables. Our empirical methods justify belief only in claims about observables; claims about unobservables are categorically relegated to the class of the accepted. The standard realist criticism of this line has been to deny the epistemological signicance of the distinction between observable and unobservable. As the debate has developed, it seems the realist is right about the epistemological signicance of the distinction between observable and un- observable. We clearly can be justied in believing statements about things we have not observed based on things we have observed. For example, when I see tiny footprints and gnawed baseboards, and when I hear tiny CONFIRMING MATHEMATICAL THEORIES 261 footsteps and little squeaking sounds, I am justied in believing in the existence of the mouse that I have not observed. In just the same way, I am justied in believing in the electron I have not directly observed, but whose tracks in cloud chambers I have seen, and whose impact on Geiger sensors I have heard. It is true that I cannot, even in principle, observe the electron, whereas I could observe the mouse if I were in the right place at the right time. It seems mistaken, however, to maintain that the unobservability of the electron makes a qualitative difference in whether we have reason to believe it exists, especially when the structure of the reasoning is other- wise so similar. Furthermore, we lack even the beginning of an effective argument that observability should make an epistemic difference in such cases of abductive reasoning. As Clark Glymour (1984, 187) put it, the argument for atoms is as good as the argument for orbits. On the other hand, it is not an easy task to justify a realist position; in fact, it is not clear that it has been done successfully. I am not going to try to sort out the realism debate in science. Instead I am going to describe, in rough terms, two features of scientic conrmation, at least one of which is employed in the standard arguments for scientic realism. In the next section I will consider the extent to which these two features carry over to the setting of pure mathematics. 2.3. Explanatory Value and Evidential Relevance The two features of conrmation that are typically used in justifying the move from empirical adequacy to truth are explanatory value and evidential relevance. One general line argues that the truth of a theorys claims regarding unobservables is well supported by the explanatory value such assumptions have. The other approach attempts to make out some kind of evidential relationship which shows how observations can be conrmationally relevant to the truth of claims regarding unobservables. Philosophers such as Clark Glymour (1980a, 1984), Ernan McMullin (1984), and Richard Boyd (1984, 1985) have argued that the explanatory value of a theory provides reason to believe it, independent of the reason provided by its passing tests of empirical adequacy. The rough idea behind these approaches is that, while it may be true that scientic tests of a theory only give us reason to accept a theory, the explanatory considerations give us further, independent reason to believe that the theory is true. Glymours approach follows that of Michael Friedmans (1974). The basic idea is that good theories reduce the number of independently accep- ted hypotheses. 9 Specically, we should believe the theory that makes the most extensive use of established regularities in explaining the phenomena (Glymour 1984, 184). Consider for example, the atomic theory, that is, the 262 ANTHONY PERESSINI theory that asserts the existence of atoms. An early form of this theory was developed by Dalton (1808) to help explain the established regular- ities embodied in the law of denite proportions. A contending theory, the theory of equivalences, maintained that the regularity of the law of denite proportions is a brute tendency in no need of explanation. The atomic theory is better on explanatory grounds because it uses the further regularity of the additivity of masses. This explanatory value is supposed to warrant belief in the theory. McMullins and Boyds approach differs from Glymours in that the explanatory value is not internal to the particular theories involved, but has to do with explaining the success of science in general. The idea is that we should accept realism because realism provides the best explanation of the instrumental reliability of scientic methodology (Boyd 1984; 66). Science has come up with, and continues to come up with, amazingly effective theories as far as empirical adequacy goes. Quite often it does so by positing unobserved or unobservable entities like planets, genes, di- nosaurs, and electrons. What explains this remarkable success? According to the argument, the best explanation of this success is that the posited entities actually exist and behave (approximately) as the theory describes. Scientic realism is the best explanation of scientic success. The second strategy for moving from the empirical adequacy of a the- ory to its truth involves establishing the evidential relevance of claims about observables for claims about unobservables. This general move can be found in most accounts that work with formal scientic epistemologies (e.g., Bayesian, boot-strapping, likelihood). The strategy is to establish rst the legitimacy of the account of conrmation, and then show that the account allows for evidence regarding observables to conrm claims about unobservables. Consider the likelihood framework for characterizing how evidence bears on hypotheses. 10 The central idea is the likelihood principle: observation O favors H 1 over H 2 if and only if p(O|H 1 ) > p(O|H 2 ). (LP) The underlying intuition is that if H 1 says that the observation is to be expected, while H 2 says that it is miraculous, then the observation strongly favors H 1 over H 2 . This account allows for observations to be evidentially relevant for hypotheses about unobservables, since to deny this would mean that for some reason we cannot make sense of the conditional prob- ability p(O|H), where H is an hypothesis about unobservables. This, however, is clearly not the case: our ability to make sense of this probabil- ity does not depend on whether H is about an observable like a continent CONFIRMING MATHEMATICAL THEORIES 263 or an unobservable like an electron. If we can make sense of one of these, and we can, then we can make sense of the other. At bottom, what gets an account like this off the ground is the clear intuition that we can have observable evidence for things we do not (or cannot) observe; the empirical adequacy of a theory is evidentially relevant to the truth of the theory. This allows us to move rationally from belief in statements about ob- servables (empirical adequacy of the theory) to belief in statements about unobservables (truth of the theory). 3. MATHEMATICAL ADEQUACY In the setting of science, the adequacy involved in the distinction between accepting and believing is empirical adequacy. This same distinction between acceptance and belief is appropriate in the setting of pure mathem- atics as well. In this setting, we exchange empirical adequacy for mathem- atical adequacy. In considering what mathematical adequacy amounts to, I will naturally look to the methodology of mathematics itself. I will here provide only a sketch of what a fully developed account of mathematical adequacy would consist of, since this is a project (or more) in itself. 11 What do mathematicians do, conrmationally speaking? As an over- simplied sketch of what mathematicians do, consider the following. Given an area of interest generally specied by some intuitive, pre- theoretic principles and denitions mathematicians seek to characterize formally and explore the logical relationships that obtain among the con- stituents of the formal characterization. Just as in science, the factors that determine which areas of pure mathematics are of interest seem to be of an essentially pragmatic nature. In fact, the pragmatic factors often come indirectly to mathematics through science. For example, the interest in be- ing able to navigate effectively fueled the interest in celestial mechanics, which in turn led to the discovery and development of the calculus. But again, as in science, once pragmatics xes an area, it makes sense to speak of non-pragmatic epistemological principles. More specically, once an area is xed, mathematicians seek to develop, in the loosely specied area, formal theories that have consistent and manageable foundations, sound proof schemes, unambiguous denitions, and internal consistency. I will take this as a rough specication of what it means to have a mathematic- ally adequate theory, namely, that such theories will have consistent and manageable foundations, a sound proof scheme, well-dened denitions, and that they will be internally consistent. I will say a bit about each of these below. 264 ANTHONY PERESSINI In the case of empirical adequacy, as van Fraassen (1980, 12, 69) points out, the phenomena that must be saved is vast. I must emphasize that this refers to all the phenomena; these are not exhausted by those actually observed, nor even by those observed at some time, whether past, present or future. . . . empirical adequacy goes far beyond what we can know at any given time. (All the results of measurement are not in; they will never all be in; and in any case, we wont measure everything that can be measured.) Similarly, establishing that a mathematical theory has consistent founda- tions, that all the statements of the theory are internally consistent, that the proof scheme is sound, etc., is not usually something that it is humanly possible to do. We develop relative consistency proofs. We continue to prove theorems and explore the logical relations as a way of helping to establish internal consistency. We analyze and explore our proof schemes. By these means, we obtain good evidence that a theory is adequate, but as in science, it is not something that we can know with certainty. The ad- equacy of a theory, mathematical or empirical, is what is directly conrmed by the activity of mathematicians or scientists, but it is neither easily nor absolutely conrmed. I note also that these conditions characterize a minimally acceptable pure mathematical theory. 12 A theory that satises these conditions will be an adequate pure mathematical theory. This does not mean, however, that the theory will have any further virtues such as applicability, usefulness, richness, depth, fecundity, simplicity, elegance, connections with other mathematical theories, or explanatory power. Pure theories lacking some or all of these further virtues may not be deemed worthy of investiga- tion, but this does not mean that they are not legitimate pure mathematical theories. Only inconsistency, ambiguity, or unsoundness seem sufcient to condemn a pure mathematical theory. 3.1. Consistent Foundations An essential feature of a pure mathematical theory is that it have a manage- able set of fundamental denitions and rules; it must be axiomatizable in some acceptable way, the axiomatization must be manageable in some way. An innite (or large nite) number of axioms with no clear recursive pattern or scheme would not be manageable, for example, whereas a small nite number or recursively enumerable set of axioms would be. Of course, in the early stages of a theorys development, it is often not well enough understood to be axiomatized. A classic example is the calculus. It took over a hundred years for the calculus, present in the late 17th century work of Newton and Leibniz, to be put on secure foundations. It was not until CONFIRMING MATHEMATICAL THEORIES 265 the latter half of the 19th century that Weierstrass, Cauchy, and others were able to work out consistent foundations for analysis. Even in later stages, certain features of the mathematical theories may not make mathematical sense. It may take renements in the the- ory, or even an entirely new theory, to make mathematical sense of things. The Dirac delta function was used in Fourier analysis for dec- ades before a mathematically consistent description was worked out. To this day the renormalization procedure in quantum electrodynamics is what its inventor, Richard Feynman, called a dippy process! . . . I suspect that renormalization is not mathematically legitimate (Feynman 1985, 128). Working out these foundations is part of the ongoing process of establishing the mathematical adequacy of the mathematical theory. 3.2. Sound Proof Scheme The proof scheme that a pure mathematical theory employs is an essential feature of it. By proof scheme nothing more is meant than the rules for inferring the truth of certain statements from the truth of others. It must be sound in that the method of inference must not give rise to inconsistency. Mathematical proof is generally taken to be deductive. While deductive proof may not be the only means of justication in pure mathematics, it is the predominant type. A theory that did not incorporate (at least) a sound deductive proof scheme could hardly be an adequate pure mathematical theory. As we have come to see, proof schemes are closely linked to the choice of logic used to formalize the mathematical theory. The particu- lar types of proof utilized by a mathematical theory, (e.g., direct proofs, proofs by contradiction, proofs by mathematical induction, etc.), are de- termined by how it is formalized. There are pure theories that allow only certain types of proof, e.g., constructivist theories. Constructivist theories are distinct from their classical counterparts, which allow a wider range of proof. At bottom this difference stems from the different logics employed by each: constructivist theories employ an intuitionist logic and classical theories employ classical logic. A branch of mathematics itself, mathematical logic, provides a formal setting for investigating the various properties (e.g., soundness, complete- ness, etc.) of formal systems in general. In the last one hundred years or so, mathematical logic has provided us with a clearer understanding of the virtues and limitations of particular formalizations of mathematics. While the informal logic actually used in mathematics has become rather universal and uncontroversial, its formal rendering is still a topic of debate. The debate over whether the formal logic behind mathematics should be 266 ANTHONY PERESSINI rst-order or higher is still being waged, for example, and there continue to be responsible calls for alternative logics. 3.3. Well-Dened Denitions Another necessary condition for a theorys mathematical adequacy is that the concepts it employs must be well-dened. Denitions can fail to be good denitions (well-dened) by being ambiguous or by failing to refer. Often it is not obvious whether a denition is unambiguous, and es- tablishing it requires non-trivial proof. As a simple example of the failure to refer problem, consider the following denition: Let M be the maximum value of the continuous function f (x) on the open interval (a, b). M is not well-dened because continuous functions on nite open intervals need not have maximum values. (It would be well-dened if the functions were continuous on the closed interval.) The denition of M fails to refer in the sense that the procedure for assigning a value to M fails to pick out a value for some functions over which the denition implicitly quanties. As an example of an ambiguous denition, consider the following. Let G be a group and N a subgroup of G. The left coset of N in G containing a G is dened to be Na := {xa|x N}. The factor group G/N is dened to be {Na|a G}, with the factor group operation dened as (Na)(Nb) := N(ab). The questionable denition here is the factor group operation. The problem arises because there are different ways of representing a given coset Na; in particular, if a = b and b Na, then Nb = Na. So care must be taken in dening the factor group operation as (Na)(Nb) := N(ab) since, if it depends on the particular representative (a or b), the denition will be ambiguous. It needs to be established that if a and a
are in Na, and b and b
are in Nb (i.e., Na = Na
and Nb = Nb
), then it must be the case that (Na)(Nb) = (Na
)(Nb
). This is not easy to
prove, and it turns out that the factor group operation is well-dened if and only if the subgroup N is normal. (See Herstein 1986, 9092 for details.) 3.4. Internal Consistency Naturally, the statements of a pure mathematical theory must be mutually consistent. One might think (mistakenly) that mathematical theories are obviously internally consistent, since mathematicians start with consistent axioms and from these deduce the remaining part of the theory. This, how- ever, is not how mathematics usually gets done. Theories typically develop in isolated bits and pieces, often initially with no explicit foundations; thus, CONFIRMING MATHEMATICAL THEORIES 267 internal consistency is a genuine concern. Also, pure mathematical theories are often taken to include statements that have not yet been proven, but for which a proof is believed to be forthcoming (e.g., the Riemann Hypothesis, and prior to a few years ago, Fermats Last Theorem). The implications of such conjectures are often explored well before they themselves are proven, if in fact they ever are. In the end, the conjecture may turn out to be independent of the main body of the theory, inconsistent with it, or provable from it. The size, complexity, and vitality of pure mathematical theories make the issue of internal consistency one that requires ongoing attention. The continuing process of expanding the theory by proving new results can be seen as helping to conrm a theorys internal consistency. If internal inconsistencies are present, then the process of proving new results might eventually expose a contradiction. The more a mathematical theory is explored and expanded without contradiction, the more reason we have to believe it is internally consistent, and hence mathematically adequate. 3.5. Summary As developed above, the work of mathematicians directly conrms a pure theorys mathematical adequacy (consistent foundations, sound proof scheme, unambiguous denitions, and internal consistency). As with sci- entic theories, however, the truth of the theory is not directly conrmed. Thus on this conception, whether a pure theory is mathematically adequate is a question internal to mathematics; in particular, it is independent of whatever application the pure theory might have in scientic theories. 13 In the next section, I examine the prospects of moving from the adequacy of pure mathematical theories to their truth. 4. FROM ADEQUACY TO BELIEF Given that mathematicians are directly conrming the mathematical ad- equacy of pure mathematical theories, we may ask whether we are (at least sometimes) justied in believing the truth of the pure theory. Following van Fraassen and in accordance with what I have said above, what I have in mind with respect to the truth of the pure theory is the literal truth of the theory taken at face-value. This is a full-blown sense of true with ontological commitments and all. At this point, I am not concerned with the various interpretations of mathematics (e.g., if-then, modal, open- sentence, Field-style nominalistic), which (rightly) are said to muddy the water as far as ontology is concerned. 268 ANTHONY PERESSINI In pure mathematics, the question becomes whether we ever have reason to believe in the existence of the theoretical ontology based on the fact that the theory is mathematically adequate. For example, does the fact that we have good reason to believe that the theory of real analysis is internally consistent, consistently founded, well-dened, etc., give us further reason to believe that there exist numbers (0, 1,
2, e, , . . . ), functions (x n , |x|, sin(x), e x , . . . ), operators (d/dx, dx), and sets (of num- bers, of functions, of sets, of physical objects, . . . )? I begin by examining the prospects for justifying the move from acceptance to belief in a way analogous to how it is (putatively) justied in science. Finally, I briey discuss a few other possibilities. 4.1. Explanation and Evidence Empirical adequacy has a natural link to the truth of scientic theories a causal link. We are able to make sense of evidential relationships between statements about observables and statements about unobservables. This is because the truth of both kinds of statements is grounded in the physical world, and we have clear intuitions (at least some of the time) about such evidential relationships. In general, these intuitions are grounded in causal relationships between observable and unobservable. The observable tracks in a cloud chamber, for example, or audible clicks of a Geiger counter, have a chance of constituting evidence for the existence of electrons because the tracks and clicks are causally re- lated to the existence and behavior of electrons. This causal relationship is generally what allows us to make sense of conditional probabilities like Pr(H|e) and Pr(e|H) (Bayesian, likelihood, etc.) that quantify the evidential relationship. Consider for example, the likelihood, Pr(vestigial organs | natural selection took place). We understand intuitively that this probability is rather high; this is because of causal background assump- tions relating the process of natural selection and its effects (vestigial organs, etc.). Even Bayesian accounts seem to make use of causal ideas. While they do not depend on particular causal relationships between hypothesis and evidence, causal ideas seem inevitably to be present in the basic intuitions on which Bayesianism is grounded. For example, Bayesians reject the idea that positive instances in general conrm hypotheses. A positive instance of a generalization may or may not be conrming depending on back- ground assumptions having to do with the sampling process. 14 It is in the assumptions about the sampling process that causal concepts enter, since actual sampling processes will be causal processes. In mathematics, there appears to be no such link between the mathematical adequacy of a theory CONFIRMING MATHEMATICAL THEORIES 269 and its truth surely not a causal link. What is the evidential relationship between the internal consistency (etc.) of number theory and the existence of numbers? How can the consistency (etc.) of the theory be evidence that the theory is true, i.e., that numbers exist? That a theory is mathematically adequate is grounded in the nature of logic. Whatever grounds the truth of mathematical existence claims (if they are true) presumably the nature of the mathematical world does not have any obvious connection with the laws of logic. We have learned from Frege, Russell and other logicists that mathematics bears an intimate relation to logic. The second part of their lesson, however is that math- ematics is not merely logic. Unless one subscribes to some over-zealous Meinongian principle like any mathematically adequate theory describes an actually ex- isting mathematical ontology, (MP) the move from believing the mathematical adequacy of a theory to believ- ing the truth of the theory (in an ontologically signicant way) remains philosophically unjustied. What is more, unlike the situation in science, we seem to lack an intuitive sense that it should be justied. Perhaps, then, the inference can be justied by the explanatory value of posited entities. In science there is a clear sense in which the existence of electrons, atoms, and genes help explain certain physical, chemical, and hereditary phenomena. According to some philosophers, this explanatory value is itself conrming; the posits explanatory value justies belief in their existence. But the same move cannot be made for mathematical the- ories. In fact, even granting that explanatory value is conrming, there is a problem with this move for pure mathematical theories. First of all we need to understand how to think about explanatory value whether in the internal sense of Glymour, or the reliability sense of Boyd and McMullin. In other words, what exactly is the explanandum? Is it the fact that theorem T follows from assumptions A? Is it the fact that theory R is mathematically adequate? Or is it rather the remarkable success of mathematical methodology in coming up with mathematically adequate theories that is to be explained by the existence of mathematical objects? Unfortunately, the existence of mathematical entities has no explanatory value for these explanandums. The rst is explained by the logical re- lationships that obtain among the mathematical concepts and denitions involved. As a concrete example, it is a theorem of real analysis due to Lindelf that any collection of open sets of real numbers has a countable subcollection that has the same union. (LT) 270 ANTHONY PERESSINI The two key ideas in the proof of (LT) are that between any two real num- bers exists a rational number, and that the rational numbers are countable. The rst idea follows from the completeness axiom for real numbers and the second idea is a consequence of the fact that the rationals can be put in a 1-1 correspondence with the natural numbers. The logical connections between the steps of the proof of (LT) explain why it is that (LT) follows from the axioms for real numbers. Nothing is gained, explanatorily, by the assumption that real numbers exist. In a similar way, the existence of real numbers does not help explain the mathematical adequacy of the theory of real analysis. This adequacy is explained by general facts about what is required to be a mathematically adequate theory, along with the specics of how the standard theory of real analysis satises these requirements. Even if further explanation were required, it is not at all clear how the fact (if it is a fact) that the theory is about (ontologically) real mathematical entities helps explain anything. In general, the fact that a theory is about real things does not explain why it is consistent. What then explains the success of mathematical methodology in com- ing up with mathematically adequate theories? Could not the existence of the posited mathematical entities (i.e., the truth of the theory) be the best explanation of the ability of the methods of pure mathematics to come up with mathematically adequate theories? 15 No. There is a crucial disanalogy lurking here. The prima facie plausibility of the scientic version of this argument stems from the intuitive idea that, if I continue to deduce many and varied statements that I directly verify as true from a provisionally assumed statement whose truth I do not (or cannot) directly verify, then this gives me reason to believe that my provisional assumption is true. Science does seem to have a knack of (somehow and eventually) coming up with provisional assumptions that entail (in the context of the theory) many and varied veriably true statements. It does seem initially plausible that what explains this is that the provisional assumptions that science is coming up with are true. For pure mathematics, however, this picture does not work. Mathem- aticians do not come up with provisional assumptions (e.g., that numbers exist and obey Peanos axioms) whose consequences can be veried to be true. The proper analogy here is at the level of adequacy. There is a way of looking at things in which mathematicians and scientists both have a knack for (somehow and eventually) coming up with provisional assumptions that ground a theory whose adequacy (empirical or mathem- atical) can be veried. Due to the different senses of adequacy, the analogy breaks down. In science, since empirical adequacy amounts to the truth CONFIRMING MATHEMATICAL THEORIES 271 of the theorys statements about observables, verifying adequacy amounts to establishing the truth of a certain class of statements. In mathematics, however, verifying adequacy does not amount to verifying the truth of the theorys non-axiomatic statements (theorems). In the mathematical setting, verifying adequacy amounts to verifying that the theorems do in fact fol- low from the provisional assumptions (axioms), not that the theorems are themselves true. Thus, in science we have provisional assumptions that lead to statements that are veried to be true, whereas in mathematics we have provisional assumptions that lead to statements that are veried to be consistent with or consequences of each other and the provisional assumptions. It is prima facie plausible that the truth of the provisional assumptions is required to explain why the resulting statements are true; it is not plausible, however, that the truth of the provisional assumptions is required to explain why the resulting statements are consistent with or consequences of the provisional assumptions. In science, the connection between what is directly conrmed (em- pirical adequacy) and the truth of the existence claims are causal and constitutive. 16 This sort of connection does support explanation. For example, the empirical adequacy of the atomic theory has causal and constitutive connections with the existence claims regarding atoms and molecules. The observable macroscopic properties of chemical reactions are explained (causally) by the various atomic-level transactions (borrow- ing/lending/sharing of electrons, etc.). The fact that this liquid is not water is explained (constitutively) by the fact that water is H 2 O and this liquid is H 2 O 2 . Without an analogous explanatory connection between what it is that is directly conrmed by mathematicians (mathematical adequacy) and the truth of the existence claims, the existence claims will have no explanatory relevance. 17 4.2. Other Possibilities The standard considerations which in the scientic setting, help justify the inference from the acceptance of a theory to its belief, are unavailable in the mathematical setting. The evidential and explanatory relationships that intuitively ground such arguments in the setting of science do not carry over to mathematics. It seems, then, that two possibilities for such justication remain: 1. distinct internal (to mathematics) means, or 2. external means, (e.g., Quines indispensability approach, metaphysical or conceptual considerations). 272 ANTHONY PERESSINI As mentioned above, the standard argument for external justication from science, the Quine/Putnam indispensability argument, is beginning to appear to be problematic. Furthermore, the desiderata of capturing the conrmational independence of pure mathematics, while perhaps not in- consistent with an external justication, renders the prospects dim. Even so, it is possible that there is an external metaphysical justication, one that does not suffer the problems of the indispensability approach. More effort should be expended investigating this possibility. As for other internal means of justifying the move, again the prospects are not good. The obvious strategy would be to justify belief in the axioms, which would in turn justify belief in the theory assuming the soundness of the system. How does one justify belief in an axiom? If one makes use of criteria like explanatory power, fecundity, ability to unify, etc., then one will again be faced with showing that satisfying these criteria counts as evidence for the truth of an axiom. This is why we are trying to justify belief in the axioms in the rst place, so no obvious gain will have been made. Another possibility is that an axiom is somehow self-evident, that once you understand it, you see that it is true. 18 But not even univer- sally accepted axioms like the axiom of choice enjoy this status, much less the more controversial ones. 19 Fueled in part by these poor prospects for justifying the move from acceptance to belief, I next explore an ontological agnosticism for math- ematical theories. Before doing that, however, I explain briey how this project differs from Hartry Fields (1989) ctionalist account, which makes use of the thesis that mathematics need not be true to be good. Field is wedded to a particular notion of good for a mathematical theory, conservativeness, and as I discussed briey above, his notion could certainly be subsumed under my general notion of mathematical adequacy. This afnity between Fields notion of good and my notion of ad- equacy might suggest that our conclusions are more similar than they in fact are. Fields position seems to be that if mathematical entities play an indispensable role in science (i.e., if no substitute for the literal truth of the theory could be had), then mathematical entities would have to be taken as conrmed (Field 1989, 20, esp. note 15). His notion of conservat- iveness is thus an effort to show how the truth of the mathematical theory is not indispensable for science, but rather only its conservativeness. As I have argued elsewhere, it is not at all clear that such an indispensability argument is valid, and thus I do not accept the above if/then as the main staging ground for issues of mathematical ontology. I attempt here to begin to develop an alternative way of thinking about mathematical ontology. In particular, I make use of a general notion of mathematical adequacy CONFIRMING MATHEMATICAL THEORIES 273 in order to capture what mathematicians are doing (conrming) in doing their work; I then argue that the move from mathematical adequacy to the truth of the theory (in an ontologically signicant sense) is unwarranted. In doing this, I consider whether the truth of the mathematical theory is (in- dispensably) required to explain its mathematical adequacy. This is quite distinct from Fields question of whether the truth of the mathematical theory is (indispensably) required for the scientic theory (in which it is applied) to do its explanatory work. 5. ONTOLOGICAL AGNOSTICISM As we have seen, van Fraassens categorical agnosticism with respect to the truth of scientic theories is extravagant; however, an analog- ous agnosticism with respect to mathematical theories is more tenable. Van Fraassens agnosticism requires that the line of demarcation between acceptance and belief coincide with the line between observable and unobservable; but as has been (I believe) convincingly argued, the observ- able/unobservable distinction is not up to this epistemological task. 20 The general consensus seems to be that in certain situations, with respect to certain scientic theories, we may have reason to believe the truth of state- ments about unobservables; in other situations and with respect to other theories, we may not. The acceptance/belief line is unclassiably situation- dependent; how it is drawn seems to depend in an ungeneralizable way on the specic conrmation situation. In a similar way, in mathematics the line demarcating acceptance and belief is situation-dependent. Precisely what statements we should believe will depend on the epistemic situation and particular features of the theory. For example, whether we should believe the statement, Fermats Last Theorem follows from the basic principles of number theory, (S) depends on what we take the principles of number theory to be and how much we know about the theory. Five or six years ago we would have been much less justied in believing (S) than we are now! 21 But in mathematics, this situation-dependence is not quite as inscrutable. There is at least one important generalization that may be made regarding acceptance and be- lief: categorical existence claims are always on the acceptance side of the line. Statements like numbers exist or sets exist are not to be believed on the basis of the mathematical adequacy of mathematical theories. The statements that the mathematical adequacy of a theory licenses one to believe are statements like: p follows from q, p is inconsistent with 274 ANTHONY PERESSINI q, p is independent of q, x is well-dened, if A then T , etc. These are statements that we are justied in believing based on a theorys mathem- atical adequacy categorical existence claims, however, are not similarly licensed. 22 It seems, then, that there is a qualitative difference between the scientic and mathematical setting with respect to moving from adequacy to truth. Consequently, an agnostic stance with respect to the existence of mathematical entities is defensible. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I am grateful to Mike Byrd, Malcolm Forster, Penelope Maddy, Michael Resnik, Elliott Sober, Mark Steiner, and anonymous referees for this journal for various comments and discussion. NOTES 1 See Maddy (1992), Sober (1993b), Vineberg (1996), and Peressini (1997) for some of the problems being raised; see Resnik (1995) and Colyvan (1998) for defenses. 2 Throughout this paper, when I write of a mathematical theory being true, I intend this to be understood in the natural way that implies the existence of mathematical objects. As is well-known, there have been numerous attempts to reinterpret mathematical theory or the notion of (mathematical) truth in such a way as to avoid such ontological implications, my remarks here are obviously not directed at such accounts. 3 Volumes have been devoted to justifying this step; see, for example, Leplin (1984), Churchland and Hooker (1985). 4 I will not enter here into the debate about how precisely to explicate the notion of believing a statement to be true. One may safely understand this notion in terms of any of the standard accounts of belief and truth since our concern here, the difference between believing and accepting, does not depend on any particular account of belief or of truth. 5 This has been thought to be one lesson of Kyburgs (1970) lottery paradox; see Sober (1993a, 4449) for discussion. 6 In general, this characterization will not be strictly correct, since most scientic theor- ies will contain statements relating observables to unobservable posits. These statements, while about observables, need not be true for the theory to be empirically adequate. 7 As van Fraassen (1980, 12) puts it,. . . a theory is empirically adequate exactly if what it says about the observable things and events in this world is true exactly if it saves the phenomena. A little more precisely: such a theory has at least one model that all the actual phenomena t inside. I must emphasize that this refers to all the phenomena: these are not exhausted by those actually observed, nor even by those observed at some time, whether past, present, or future. 8 See Sober (1993a, 5256) for a likelihood analysis of the idea that the knowledge science provides us of observables is more direct than the knowledge it provides us of unobservables. CONFIRMING MATHEMATICAL THEORIES 275 9 Friedman (1974 and esp. 1983) associates reducing the number of independently ac- cepted hypotheses with theory unication. While I will not get further into this here, recent work has suggested that unication tends to have the opposite effect on the number of independent hypotheses; see Forester and Sober (1994) for discussion. 10 The basic idea behind this analysis is Edwards Likelihood Principle (1972). The current applications of the likelihood idea to the scientic realism debate come from Sober (1990, 1993). 11 See Maddy (1998) for extended attempt to understand mathematics on its own method- ological terms. Also Hartry Field (1989, 57 ff), in developing his thesis that mathematics need not be true to be good, argues that what makes a mathematical theory good is it being conservative (i.e., consistent with any internally consistent theory about the physical world). These insights (and many others no doubt) can be used to supplement, rene, and replace parts of my sketch of mathematical adequacy; this will only serve to strengthen what I say about the general notion of mathematical adequacy in subsequent sections. 12 See Peressini (1999) for a discussion of the pure/applied distinction and its relevance to the debate. 13 Strange enough results in science might lead scientists (and mathematicians) to question, say, the consistency of a pure theory employed in science. But ultimately the fate of the pure theory qua pure theory would turn on whether there was enough pure mathematical evidence to show the theory mathematically inadequate. I note also that while one might be tempted to think of this scenario as empirical evidence for the inconsistency of the pure theory, there is nothing essential about the empirical observations here. That the predictions of an applied mathematical theory fail to match observations is no grounds for believing the pure theory to be mathematically inadequate; rather, the predictions would have to be such that they could not match observations (i.e., inconsistent, incoherent, fail to behave as required by measurement theory, etc.). 14 See Horwich (1982, 5463) for the details of a Bayesian rejection of the positive instance account of conrmation. 15 In the next few paragraphs I will lapse into an untenable positivistic dialect regarding science and an equally untenable deductivist dialect regarding mathematics. This is only to simplify the discussion; it should be clear that the points I make survive translation to a more tenable dialect. 16 For a discussion of the different roles played by causal and constitutive relations in scientic explanation, see En (1986, esp. 404408). 17 There is a distinct but important sense of explanatory value at work in mathematics: namely, the idea that some proofs are more explanatory than others. It is not at all clear that this sort of explanatory value makes the proven statement more secure. At any rate, this explanatory value will favor one proof over another, rather than one belief over another. 18 See Chisholm (1977, 40) as quoted in Maddy (1990, 144). 19 See Maddy (1990, 143 ff.) for discussion. 20 See, for example, Sober (1993a). 21 At the time this was initially written, Wiles proof was still incomplete. 22 Relative existence claims may be believed on the basis of a theorys adequacy. 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