Cuentapropismo

Maybe Tomorrow Ill Turn Capitalist:
Cuentapropismo in a Workers State

Emma F. Phillips
In 1993, the Cuban government significantly expanded the scope of legal self-
employment on the island. The change has not been uncontroversial, and
cuentapropistas have frequently been held up, both in Cuba and in the United
States, as the symbol of Cubas transition to a free-market economy. In fram-
ing cuentapropistas as the vanguards of capitalism, observers have adopted a
concept of transition which is both rigidly ideological and teleological. This
article argues that by employing a sociolegal approach toward cuentapropismo
Fexamining close-up not only the Cuban governments regulation of self-
employment, but also how the operation of law is mediated through
cuentapropistas own self-perceptionsFwe can develop a richer and more
complex understanding of transitional periods. Rather than conceptualizing
transition as a straight line from communism to capitalism, a sociolegal
analysis draws attention to the complex relationship between law, identity, and
work in the renegotiation of citizenship, and the constitutive role that evolving
conceptions of citizenship may have for the shape and character of a tran-
sitional period.
Maybe tomorrow Ill turn capitalist, Alejandro

1
jokingly
tells me. Today Im staying home! Alejandro is one of a small
number of licensed self-employed workers in Cuba, or trabajadores
por cuenta propia (workers for own account). Although legal in Cuba
for more than 10 years, trabajo por cuenta propia remains a contro-
versial sector in the Cuban economy. As the rst Cubans to shift
from the centralized state sector to self-employment in the private
sector, cuentapropistas challenge the state socialist monopoly on la-
bor and production. For a country whose constitution states that it
is a nation composed of workers, peasants, and other manual and
Law & Society Review, Volume 41, Number 2 (2007)
r 2007 by The Law and Society Association. All rights reserved.
305
I am grateful for the support of the David Rockefeller Centre for Latin American
Studies, the Department of Anthropology at Harvard University, and the Centre for
Criminology at the University of Toronto, which enabled me to conduct eldwork in Cuba.
I would like to thank William Fisher, Brian Palmer, and Ron Levi for their encouragement
and guidance in the development of this project, and Mariana Valverde, Mark Salber
Phillips, Herbert M. Kritzer, and the anonymous reviewers of the LSR for their very
helpful comments. Please direct correspondence to Emma Phillips, Sack Goldblatt
Mitchell, 20 Dundas Street West, Toronto, Ontario, M5G 2G8; e-mail: efphillips@gmail.
com.
1
All names have been changed to protect interview subjects anonymity.
intellectual laborers (Constituticion de la Republica de Cuba
1992), the legalization of independent workers motivated by pri-
vate gain is particularly contentious. Of course, trabajo por cuenta
propia is not a unique change in the Cuban labor market, and the
creation of joint venture and market-oriented state enterprises,
as well as an active black market, pose equally strong challenges to
the socialist labor regime. Yet cuentapropistas remain one of the
most potent symbols of Cubas changing economic, political, and
ideological characterFin part because of the significance outside
observers have attached to their existence. Indeed, the group has
frequently been portrayed as a kind of capitalist vanguard by
North American commentators, the shepherds of Cubas transition
from socialism to a free-market democracy.
In examining the tension surrounding cuentapropismo, this ar-
ticle argues that a sociolegal approach can help expose the overly
rigid assumptions that have frequently informed analyses of Cubas
limited opening of self-employment. Cuba-observers have tended
to view Cubas transition to a free-market economy as all but
inevitable, with cuentapropistas as its personal agents. Viewed from
the inside, however, the picture looks significantly different. As
Alejandros comment illustrates, cuentapropistas themselves are
ambivalent about claiming a larger group identity, on the one hand
taking pride in their unique position outside of the state-controlled
centralized economy, and on the other hand disclaiming any kind
of capitalist mentality or work culture. Rather than asking whether
cuentapropistas are capitalist or socialistFrubrics that are
closely bound up in Cold War ideology and hard-line rhetoric in
Cuba and the United StatesFa sociolegal approach provides a
richer, more complex understanding of the contemporary moment
in Cuban society by focusing our attention on how the law con-
structs identity by opening up spaces for particular kinds of eco-
nomic and social activity, which then become the basis for the
renegotiation of citizen-state relationships. Drawing on the work of
Sarat (1990), Espeland (1994, 1998, 2001), and Ewick and Silbey
(1998, 2003), I argue that cuentapropismo is not simply a profes-
sional classication, but a legally constructed social framework with
a range of consequences beyond the simple facilitation of economic
activity. More specifically, changes in the regulation of labor have
implications for cuentapropistas changing self-conceptions, which
in turn put pressure on traditional socialist models of state and
citizen. Rather than understanding the role of law in periods of
significant social change as purely instrumentalist, a sociolegal ap-
proach illustrates the ways in which the regulation of economic
activity may result in new self-perceptions, which may themselves
become constitutive of fundamental social change that is not easily
captured by the binary of communism/capitalism.
306 Cuentapropismo in a Workers State
In broad terms, this article seeks to make two contributions.
First, it argues that a more complex understanding of the significance
of cuentapropismo can be achieved if we bracket ideological consid-
erations and examine not only the regulation of self-employment,
but also the ways in which cuentapropistas negotiate those regu-
lations. This approach entails exploring how the operation of law is
mediated through cuentapropistas self-perceptions. Such an in-
vestigation highlights the complex interaction between law and
identity in the context of a socialist state, one which may differ in
marked ways from sociolegal accounts based in Europe and North
America. Equally, it illuminates how, in periods of significant
change, individuals reconstruct their identities by extrapolating
from existing structures, rather than entering into a kind of stark
ideological ip.
Second, the article asserts that studies of transition can benet
from a sociolegal analysis of the interrelationship between law,
identity, and work during periods of significant social change.
Adopting a sociolegal lens can help complicate ideological inter-
pretations of transition by focusing our attention instead on chang-
ing individual-state relations and conceptions of citizenship. Not
only does such an approach help expose the limitations of a mod-
ernization view of Cubas current transformations, but it also
illustrates how the factors that shape periods of change are
frequently unpredictable, contradictory, and bottom-up as well
as top-down.
One of the complexities of employing the term transition is
the difculty of distinguishing a period of transition from the
less sharply marked uctuations of social evolution. While Cubas
direction remains unknown, it is almost certainly a country un-
dergoing a period of profound transformation. The pace and
scale of economic change since 1990, including the dollarization
of the economy, the growth of foreign investment, and the explo-
sion of foreign tourism, have created a fundamental shift in
Cubas socialist framework that will be difcult to reverse, despite
the governments recent announcement that Cuba is in a phase
of deepening socialism.
2
Thus while this article specifically
rejects a teleological, evolutionist conception of transition (as
do Bridger & Pine 1998; Verdery 1997; Kubicek 2004), it does
suggest that the contemporary moment in Cuba is one of pro-
found and radical change. As a close examination of cuen-
tapropismo illustrates, the legalization of self-employment has
important consequences for the renegotiation of individual-state
relations and the construction of citizenship. This renegotiation
2
Announcement of National Assembly President Ricardo Alarcon, EFE News Service,
December 1, 2005.
Phillips 307
may itself help contribute to the creation, shape, and character of a
transitional period.
The article is divided into four sections. The rst section briefly
describes the research methodology and the context of cuen-
tapropismo. The second section, building on extensive eld re-
search, focuses on the legalization of self-employment and the
governments ambivalent reaction to the creation of an indepen-
dent work culture. The third section critiques conventional
conceptions of transition by drawing on discussions of govern-
mentality, work, and the legal constitution of identity. The fourth
section concludes by asking whether self-employed workers them-
selves identify with a larger cuentapropista identity and with the
capitalist label they have often been given.
Methods and the Context of Research
This article builds on eldwork conducted in Havana, Cuba,
intermittently over a period of seven years, from 1998 to 2005.
3
From August 1998 to January 1999, I conducted eldwork in
Havana, immersing myself as much as a foreigner can in the ev-
eryday life of my neighborhood. My interest in the expansion of
self-employment on the island took focus when I was introduced to
Alejandro, a cuentapropista craftsman who sells papier-ma che to
tourists, and who quickly became my primary informant on the
ways and means of cuentapropismo. Several days a week for a
period of three months, I accompanied Alejandro to the Malecon
Market, where he has a stall. The second largest of Havanas three
tourist markets, the Malecon Market turned out to be an ideal
eldwork site, with the close quarters of market stalls and the long
hours of a slow day providing ample opportunity for conversation
and gossip. The nature of the market as a tourist center was also
particularly important since it allowed a focused look at the rapid
growth of the tourist industry, stimulated by one of the most dra-
matic changes in recent government policy.
4
My daily observations came into sharper focus through 12
formal interviews with eight informants, which I conducted in
the Malecon Market with Alejandro and four of his neighboring
3
The germ of this article originated in an undergraduate thesis in anthropology
entitled Transforming Identities: An Ethnography of Change in a Cuban Market (2000;
on le with author) at Harvard University, in which the ethnographic material is more fully
presented. Further work was conducted in 20042005 for a research project in the Masters
of Criminology program at the Centre for Criminology, University of Toronto.
4
The Malecon Market was moved from its previous site to an indoor location in
Central Havana in early 2006, for reasons I have not yet been able to explore. Ofcials
indicated that the market would ultimately be moved to a building that once housed a
department store.
vendors, as well as with Alejandro and members of his family in his
home. Informal visits to Alejandros home also gave me added
insight into the domestic economy of families dependent on cuen-
tapropismoFthe balance between paid work and domestic work,
family time and work timeFas well as relationships within the
neighborhood. Informants were chosen in part as a function of
Alejandros friendships and thus cannot be said to be objectively
representative. Particularly in the early stages of research,
Alejandros introductions were essential in allaying suspicion about
my presence in the market.
5
Over time, however, my face became
known in the marketplace and I was able to approach vendors of
my own accord. Indeed, one afternoon in February 2005, after I
conducted several tape-recorded interviews, a vendor informed me
that some Cuban students had been at the market that morning
seeking to interview cuentapropistas about the contribution of self-
employment to the Cuban economy. Almost all the vendors, in-
cluding the ones I had just interviewed, refused because they were
concerned about how the material might be used. By contrast, my
status as a foreigner seemed to reassure themFperhaps because it
indicated that I might be more neutral, and because I would be
taking my research back to North America with me, where it would
be unlikely to appear in a Cuban publication.
6
In August 1999, I conducted six follow-up interviews with
Malecon Market vendors, including three of the original infor-
mants, as well as an informal survey of 14 vendors in the market-
place. Interview questions focused on the individuals education
and work prior to becoming a cuentapropista, reasons for entering
into self-employment, perceived advantages and disadvantages of
the shift in work practices and income, attempts to balance family
and work time, plans for the future, and aspirations for the chil-
dren. In February 2005, I again interviewed three of my original
informants, as well as four new research subjects. Interview ques-
tions remained largely the same as in 1999; however, I also asked
informants to comment on some of their previous observations, as
well as whether they continued to view cuentapropismo as a pro-
visional measure, and how they perceived their recent incorpora-
tion into a local union. Two of the new informants were chosen
5
The fact that I am Canadian, a country Cubans generally consider to be friendly and
nonthreatening, and was also a student at a well-known American university and thus able
to satisfy my interviewees curiosity about a variety of aspects of American life, also helped
diminish any apprehension.
6
I also had the opposite experience. One cuentapropista agreed to be interviewed
but requested that I not audiotape the interview. She recounted that Spanish CNN had
televised an interview with some cuentapropistas who had formed a kind of informal
cooperative. Shortly after the interview was broadcast in Spain, the collective was closed
down by the government.
Phillips 309
because they work in areas of licensed self-employment other than
craftsmanship: running a hair salon for local Cubans, and renting a
room to tourists. These activities provided an interesting contrast
to the work of the vendors in the marketplace because they are run
out of the home and because they represent the commercialization
of womens work. Interviewing cuentapropistas outside of the
Malecon Market allowed me to explore whether other groups of
self-employed workers were also joining national unions.
The ability to return to Havana over a period of seven years
added an important dimension to the research. Such revisits al-
lowed me to compare points of variance or constancy over time, to
recognize that a phenomenon rst seen in a moment of apparent
stability was in fact in a state of ux, or that something that seemed
short-lived was able to endure. As such, my return visits did not so
much constitute ethnographic updates as opportunities for a re-
theorization of self-employment and the relationship between
work, identity, and the state (Burawoy 2003).
The focus on artisans gave me a specific perspective on trabajo
por cuenta propia. In some ways craftsmanship is one of the least
controversial activities authorized for self-employment. Where pri-
vate taxis, restaurants, or casas particulares (room rentals in private
homes) are perceived as competing with their state counterparts
for tourist revenue, the government is less likely to attempt to
nationalize craftsmanship since the very fact that an object is hand-
made by an individual artisan is what gives it value. Moreover,
tourists ock to craft markets precisely for the sensation of buying
authentic local goods. Craftspeople are also able to draw on the
image of the artist, whose work is an extension of him or herself,
rather than something produced purely for its commercial value.
This is particularly advantageous for craftspeople because the gov-
ernments attitude toward artistic activity has undergone significant
change in the past decade, involving, for example, the recognition
of copyright and artistic authorship (Herna ndez-Reguant 2004).
The focus on artisans, however, does not limit the relevancy of
the analysis to other types of cuentapropismo. While the less pre-
carious position of artisans may allow them to speak more freely
with a foreign researcher, the fundamental changes they have ex-
perienced in the regulation of their daily workFthe freedom to set
their own schedule and negotiate their own prices, the difculty of
dealing with government licenses and inspectors, the exclusion
from state welfare programsFis shared by all cuentapropistas.
Furthermore, like most residents of Havana, I had daily contact
with cuentapropistas at work in a variety of settings, and this article
is therefore equally grounded in my informal conversations with
taxi drivers, booksellers, and food vendors, as well with people in
private homes. Finally, I was able to put my observations and
interviews into context through discussions with several Cuban
scholars at the Centro Ps cologico y Sociologico who have conduct-
ed extensive sociological studies of the Cuban labor market.
Of course, this study cannot claim to represent all cuen-
tapropistas and remains limited by its geographical focus and
small empirical base. The challenges and advantages of cuen-
tapropismo may vary significantly in smaller communities or in
regions less affected by tourism. Moreover, I only conducted one
interview with a cuentapropista whose work focuses on providing
services to Cubans rather than to tourists; a more comprehensive
study would benet from a comparison of self-employment in the
tourist industry with self-employment in the domestic sector. Nor
can Alejandro be said to speak for a single cuentapropista work
culture. Indeed, a key nding of the study is that cuentapropistas
themselves reject adopting a cohesive group identity, and therefore
any attempt at generalization must be treated with caution. While
these limitations are significant, they do not, however, undermine
the broader conclusion of this studyFthat cuentapropistas are
neither capitalist nor socialist, but are helping to redene what it
means to be a productive worker, and therefore a citizen, in Cuba.
Sometimes, of course, vendors refused to be interviewed. The
position of cuentapropistas is clearly precarious, and it was under-
standable that some cuentapropistas were unwilling to enter into
conversation. Furthermore, while most vendors adopted a largely
avuncular attitude toward me, this was sometimes tempered by
their recognition of my greater purchasing power or exposure to
technology and world travel. It is also impossible to know to what
extent my own questions inuenced the direction of my infor-
mants answers. Despite my attempts to avoid using ideologically
charged terminology, it is entirely possible that when interviewees
used terms such as socialist and capitalist, they were merely using the
categories they thought would be most recognizable to me, or that
would be most intriguing to an outside observer of the dying
days of socialism. In daily contact with tourists, the market ven-
dors are by no means unaware of the fascination they hold for
foreigners arriving on their island with preset, and often highly
romanticized, notions of the Revolution.
Finally, an analysis of cuentapropismo cannot be understood in
isolation from Cuban-American politics. As Arnaldo Perez Garcia, a
Cuban psychologist who has written about recent changes in the
Cuban labor market, explained to me, You have to remember that
the disagreement between Cuba and the United States penetrates
every single decision made in Cuba. You cannot understand cuen-
tapropismo outside of this context (Personal communication,
Havana, February 2005). Drawing a circle on a piece of paper, he
explained that the circle represents the system, and that, from
Phillips 311
the Cuban governments point of view, anything that falls outside
of the system is vulnerable to manipulation by American interests
and is therefore a threat. A 1997 statement by Raul Valdes Vivo,
the Communist Partys Academy Director, supports Perez Garcias
comments. Writing in the state newspaper, Granma Internacional,
Valdes Vivo effectively announced the governments intention to
limit cuentapropismo, stating, The creation of the seeds of a local
bourgeoisie would bring in a social force which sooner or later
would serve the counterrevolution (Valde s Vivo 1997:4; trans-
lated by author). American media and academics have added to
this perception. For example, one analysis of self-employed work-
ers in Cuba, presented at the annual meeting of the Association for
the Study of the Cuban Economy in Miami in 1998, suggests that
the highly visible success achieved by cuentapropistas.
is what makes the self-employed phenomenon so interesting and
important for the near term future of the country; when a tran-
sition toward a true free market economy occurs in Cuba, the self-
employed will be an important minority of Cubans who have
small enterprise experience, who are familiar with risk taking,
investment and profits, taxes and regulation. They will be
uniquely equipped to thrive in a capitalist setting. They will con-
tinue to sell goods and services to the domestic population and
cater to tourists, but they will be able to expand their businesses,
hire other people, and generate real wealth (B. Smith 1998:58).
Secure in the assumption that Cuba will transform itself into a free
market economy, the author concludes, To the extent that the self-
employed can create employment and demonstrate the tangible
benets of hard work for average Cubans, they will do much to
smooth the transition to a market economy in Cuba (B. Smith
1998:59). Cuentapropistas, in this account, serve a symbolic func-
tion in promoting popular support for reform by demonstrating
that widely held fears about capitalism are unfounded, and that
hard work will result in material gain.
The specific position that cuentapropistas occupy within Cubas
economic and political infrastructure is therefore as significant as
the kind of economic, capitalist activity they engage in. While
representing only a very small percentage of the Cuban labor force
Fminuscule in comparison with the number of Cubans who par-
ticipate in the black marketFcuentapropistas pose a powerful
symbolic challenge to the socialist regime. In particular, cuen-
tapropistas embody an increasing tension between Cubas socialist
past and uncertain future. In this period of late socialism, many
Cubans express both a deep attachment to and pride in the suc-
cesses of the Revolution, and an increasing certainty that socialism
is no longer economically or politically viable. Yet many Cubans are
equally reluctant to embrace a capitalist future, which they worry
will breed avarice, income inequality, and a lack of compassion.
This ambivalence is further heightened by deep strains of nation-
alism, which lead some Cubans to rejoice at being one of the only
countries to withstand the political interference of the United
States, even as they decry the socialist Revolution that helped to
protect Cuban sovereignty. The gure of the cuentapropista, in its
ambiguous position between socialism and capitalism, captures this
tension in a particularly explicit way, making the cuentapropista
both a powerful and a vulnerable actor in the Cuban landscape.
The Legal Creation of an Anomaly
From its inception in 1993, cuentapropismo has been an un-
comfortable development for the Cuban government. In the midst
of the special periodFa series of austerity measures and radical
economic reforms adopted in the face of Cubas dramatic economic
decline
7
FNational Assembly members vigorously debated the
wisdom of expanding the private sector.
8
Those who argued in
favor of cuenta propia maintained that it would create jobs for the
unemployed, provide goods and services that the state could not
satisfy, increase control of illegal activities, boost tax revenues, and
satisfy a popular demand. Among the opposing arguments were
concerns that self-employment encouraged profiteering, that it
would compete with state enterprises for labor, or that it was too
small-scale to be efcientFpossibly creating deformities in the sys-
tem (Jatar-Hausmann 1999:934). Even those in favor of the ec-
onomic reforms were constrained to maintain that the economic
pragmatism motivating the limited opening of self-employment
was not indicative of changed ideological orientation.
While self-employment was ultimately authorized, political and
ideological ambivalence informs its very existence, and the attempt
to harmonize economic pragmatism with ideological purity has
been imperfect and contradictory. At the time of the legalization of
self-employment, for example, the following description of the
ideal self-employed individual was given in the Cuban media:
7
Between 1989 and 1993, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Cubas GDP fell
by approximately 40 percent, and its imports dropped by around 80 percent. Salaries
declined more than 45 percent, and the average monthly salary is now around 232 pesos,
or $10 USD. In response to the crisis, in 1990, the Cuban government declared the
implementation of a Special Period in Times of Peace, modeled after wartime contin-
gency plans. Most notably, the government introduced a series of dramatic economic
reforms, including the de-penalization of the U.S. dollar and the reintroduction of foreign
tourism, foreign investment, and market mechanisms on the island.
8
While self-employment was never completely banned after the triumph of the
Revolution in 1959, it all but disappeared and was mostly limited to peasant-farmers who
did not join agricultural cooperatives.
Phillips 313
The idea of the self-employed worker is based on incorporating
people with honorable social behavior into these activities. Crim-
inals, speculators and embezzlers will not have access to these
activities. In accordance with this principle, requesters must rst
present a certication with information from their work center, in
which their discipline is recorded. Before being approved by the
labor directive of the municipality, the registrations will be sub-
mitted for consideration by the [local] Peoples Council since it is
there where the person and the needs of the locality are known
(Perez-Lopez 1998:245).
On this somewhat paradoxical view, self-employment ought only to
be undertaken by those who prove themselves to be model socialist
citizensFthese being the very people who ought not to be swayed
by the economic incentives characteristic of self-employment.
The deep ambivalence surrounding self-employment must be
understood in relation to the powerful symbolic role of the worker in
the Cuban Revolution. The very rst article of the Cuban Constitu-
tion states that Cuba is a country composed of workers, peasants,
and other manual and intellectual laborers (Constitucion de la
Republica de Cuba 1992; translated by author). This symbolism is
equally apparent in Che Guevaras conceptualization of the New
Socialist Man (el hombre nuevo): a gure that denoted more than a
productive worker or an individual dedicated to revolutionary ideals,
but the forging of a new morality and consciousness (Perez 1998:340).
Man dominated by commodity relationships will cease to exist,
writes Che Guevara (1965) in his inuential Man and Socialism.
. . . Man will begin to see himself mirrored in his work and to
realize his full stature as a human being through the object cre-
ated, through the work accomplished. Work will no longer entail
surrendering a part of his being in the form of labor-power sold
. . . but will represent an emanation of himself reecting his con-
tribution to the common life, the fulllment of his social duty
(Che Guevara 1965: n.p. translated by author).
While el hombre nuevo was not a long-lasting economic or even
ideological success, the concept continued to function as a kind of
moral yardstick up until the early 1990s, and even today it carries a
certain nostalgic and emotive powerFhelped, no doubt, by the
continuing symbolic power of Che Guevara himself. It is hardly
surprising, then, that a gure as antithetical to the social ideal of
worker and personhood as the trabajador por cuenta propia has re-
ceived a mixed welcome from the Cuban government. As Nunez
Moreno, a Cuban sociologist, observes, Of all the changes intro-
duced by the current reforms, the extension of private activity is
perceived by many as the change that has the greatest capacity to
dissolve Cuban socialism (1998:41; translated by author).
An Occupational Constituency: Cuentapropistas and the Legal
Constitution of Identity
It is difcult to draw a comprehensive prole of the community
of people working in trabajo por cuenta propia. Government data
on self-employed workers are not available and indeed may not
exist. Two informal, small-scale surveys conducted in 1996 (Jatar-
Hausmann 1999) and 1997 (B. Smith 1998), however, provide a
picture.
9
In the mid-1990s, the average cuentapropista earned
$135 USD a month, as compared to an average state salary of $10 a
month (B. Smith 1998:51). Thirty-two percent of cuentapropistas
were women, corresponding with an estimated 33 percent of
women in the total Cuban labor force (Jatar-Hausmann 1999:99).
Around 45 percent of cuentapropistas graduated from technical
schools, while 29 percent had university degrees (Jatar-Hausmann
1999:100; B. Smith 1998:55), making them more educated than
the average Cuban worker. Forty percent of cuentapropistas fell
between the ages of 25 and 34 (Jatar-Hausmann 1999:100), and
the average age was 37.5 years (B. Smith 1998:56). Because the
sector has been closed off for a number of years, however, the
average age is likely rising.
The rules governing self-employment are tightly drawn.
Under Law Decree No. 141, 162 occupations
10
are eligible for
self-employment, including food vendor, taxi driver, carpenter,
bicycle and car repairperson, artisan, hairdresser, shoe repair-
person, and manicurist (Decree-Law #141 (DL-141), Sobre
el trabajo por cuenta propia, Granma, 9 Sept. 1993). Renting
out a room or apartmentFusually to touristsFis also an activity
governed by trabajo por cuenta propia. Initially, only individuals
at the margins of the workforce were permitted to enter into
self-employment, such as retirees or workers with a reduced
ability to work, redundant workers, or homemakers. These re-
strictions ensured that a very limited number of workers within
the labor force were eligible to enter the private sector and that
those who did become self-employed workers were not core
employees in the state sector or at the height of their productivity.
Eventually, university graduates were also permitted to register for
9
It is important to note, however, that the government stopped issuing new licenses
in 19981999, and a significant number of cuentapropistas have since dropped out of the
work sector. No data are available to indicate whether those who dropped out of the private
sector share any particular characteristic, such as age, gender, or education level, and
therefore whether the prole of cuentapropistas today differs significantly from the time of
the surveys.
10
This number has uctuated somewhat since the inception of self-employment. In
1993, 110 activities were authorized for self-employment. Five activities were struck off the
list in 1994, apparently in reaction to the growing popularity of cuentapropismo. In 1995,
19 new occupations were added to the list, and in 1996, the government authorized
another 40 activities.
Phillips 315
self-employment,
11
although they are not allowed to carry out
self-employed activity in their own profession (for example,
doctors cannot establish private clinics). Nor can state or foreign
enterprises contract the services of self-employed workers (Evenson
2003:265). Other regulations govern more specific details of dif-
ferent cuentapropista activities, such as hygiene, hours of opera-
tion, allowable materials, and so forth.
More signicantly, government regulations are carefully de-
signed to prevent the exploitation of labor and the development of
significant income inequalities within the population (Nunez Mo-
reno 1998:44). Self-employed workers cannot employ others, pric-
es may be standardized by the government if there is any evidence
of abuse, and the government can adopt measures to forestall the
excessive proliferation of vendors and to prohibit the emergence of
middlemen (Resolucion Conjunta no. 10/95 1995). Heavy licens-
ing fees
12
and an annual progressive income tax
13
make it difcult
for many cuentapropistas to continue their trade, or at least to
accumulate a net profit. Artisans, for example, pay around $150
USD a month, while those who rent rooms to tourists commonly
pay $200 or $250 USD per room, regardless of whether they are
occupied.
Cuentapropistas lives are therefore deeply shaped and in-
formed by law. As Sarat writes about the welfare poor in the United
States, law is all over for welfare recipients, in the sense that a
significant part of their lives is organized by a regime of legal rules
invoked by ofcials to claim jurisdiction over choices (1990:344).
As discussed in greater detail below, however, cuentapropistas
make an interesting counterexample to Sarats welfare poor. On
the one hand, they too encounter law in the most ordinary trans-
actions and events of their lives (Sarat 1990:344). But this is an
experience common to all Cubans, not just cuentapropistas. In-
stead, what makes cuentapropistas distinct is their position outside
of the normal legal regulation of labor. In choosing to leave
state employment, cuentapropistas give up their afliation to the
work centers that would otherwise be a requirement of their
employment. As such, they not only relinquish the social benets
11
Resolucion Conjunta no. 10/95, 1995.
12
Benjamin Smith observes that while the National Tax Administration Ofce (Of-
icina Nacional de Administracion Tributaria) establishes minimum monthly fees, municipal
authorities may adjust these rates higher, giving them considerable discretionary authority
to encourage or dissuade self-employment in their jurisdiction (B. Smith 1998:512).
13
Benjamin Smith estimates that in 1996, the average cuentapropista paid an annual
income tax of 57 percent. Cuentapropistas must report their annual income in the form of
a sworn statement and may deduct the value of the monthly fees from their pretax annual
income, as well as 10 percent of gross income to pay for business expenses. Anecdotal
evidence indicates that underreporting of income is rampant, perhaps indicating why tax
rates are so high (B. Smith 1998:52).
distributed by work centersFeverything from pensions to state
subsidized child care to the use of a beach house in the summer
14
Fbut they also remove themselves from a system of state incor-
poration and control. Under socialist ideology, according to Cuban
sociologists Jose Luis, Martin Romero and Armando Capote
Gonzalez, The individual existed more as a member of a groupF
of the neighborhood, of the work center . . . the we was privileged
over the I, the interests of the collective over the interests of indi-
viduals (1998:80; translated by author). Cuentapropismo, by con-
trast, depends on the decentralization of the organization of work,
allowing for increased autonomy not simply in the distribution of
labor and resources, but also in the realm of decisionmaking.
The partial abstraction of cuentapropistas from the centralized
state labor system thus represents a fundamental challenge to the
collectivist social pact underlying Cuban socialism. Arguably, it is this
relational shift that, more than economic status or capitalist mental-
ity, distinguishes trabajadores por cuenta propia from the rest of the
populace and provides some sense of group identity. This restruc-
turing of worker-state relations may also be at the heart of the Cuban
governments anxiety about trabajo por cuenta propia. As Maribel, a
37-year-old cuentapropista who was an audiovisual technician before
selling leather goods in the Malecon Market, comments,
Before, the state provided you with the necessities of life. Now,
the trabajador por cuenta propia can acquire things, and we
control ourselves. The state doesnt interest us, because it doesnt
do anything for us. We even have to pay to do our work. What it
does do is sell us things at a high price, and at the same time
imposes more taxes and sends more inspectors. [The govern-
ment] realizes that they are losing control of trabajo por cuenta
propia, although we dont have any kind of capitalist mentality.
Here they practically dont even let you think. And so it seems to
me that thats what the government fears, not that we have
a capitalist mentality, but that we dont depend on the state
for anything, nothing more than to pay our $163 each month
(Personal communication, Malecon Market, August 1999).
Similarly, economist Jatar-Hausmann writes in describing a cuen-
tapropista shoemaker she interviewed, Jorge likes to work at odd
hours, he likes to raise the prices of his shoes, to lower them, to give
them away . . . to speak out about and defend the need to develop
the minuscule private sector open to Cubans. He is part of a new
social breed who does not rely on the government to earn a decent
living; and he is enjoying it with a vengeance (1999:107).
14
Cuentapropistas continue to receive state benets distributed to the population at
large, such as free health care, subsidized public transportation, free public education, and
food ration cards.
Phillips 317
Law No. 141 therefore allows cuentapropistas to step outside of
the state-controlled economy and to challenge existing social and
legal norms. It is for this reason that Nunez Moreno refers to the
creation of cuentapropistas as the change with the greatest ca-
pacity to dissolve Cuban socialism. (1998:41; translated by
author). Under the mantle of legal legitimacy, cuentapropistas
are not only breaking down traditional institutions and avenues
of power, but they are also helping to create new social norms
characterized by increased individualism and autonomy (Ewick &
Silbey 2003:13323). The result is the development of a culturally
demarcated group whose authorized experimentation with new
forms of property and market relations is leading to the formation
of a new work culture and a new kind of worker (Martin
Romero & Capote Gonza lez 1998:79). Law No. 141 has not, there-
fore, simply facilitated individual workers undertaking legal self-
employment, but has created a kind of occupational constituency
that has become the basis for cuentapropista identity. As Espeland
observes in another context, law can act as a mediating structure
that can potentially transform the identity and interests of the
group it brings together (2001:431). It is this relational shift that,
more than economic status or capitalist mentality, distinguishes
trabajadores por cuenta propia from the rest of the populace and
provides the basis for a new sense of group identity outside the
socialist mainstream.
As Jatar-Hausmann illustrates, this new breed of workers is
characterized by an unprecedented autonomy within the Cuban
labor market. The Malecon Market vendors frequently cite their
newfound independence as one of the greatest advantages of the
shift to self-employment from the state sector. The ability to set their
own schedule and to see the fruits of their labor is a frequently
recurring theme. Were our own masters, Maribel comments:
Despite the regulations we have, were our own masters because
you can get up at the hour that you want . . . I come if I want, take
vacation when I want . . . I dont have to wait for my colleagues to
take vacationFwhen I want to take them, I take them, I go where
I want. You understand? And we really obtain the fruits of our
own effort. If we push ourselves more, we gain more. If we push
ourselves less, we gain less. The difference is that the rest of the
workers [in the state sector] dont have this [incentive]. Push
yourself more or less, you almost always get the same. You have to
establish goals in life, depending on what you obtain (Personal
communication, Malecon Market, February 2005).
Like Jorge, Maribel nds great satisfaction in the increased self-
reliance and decisionmaking that trabajo por cuenta propia al-
lows her. As opposed to the government mentality she says is
ubiquitous in the state sector, self-employment allows her to de-
termine her own goals and the strategies she will use to achieve
them. Significantly, however, Maribels change in viewpoint goes
beyond the personal; participating in private work has also led her
to redene what makes a good worker more generally:
I think that state work should also depend on the effort that you
put inFnot having a rigid salary structure for all workers. De-
pending on the effort that you put in, the amount of work that
you want to do. I think this would raise peoples enthusiasm to
work in order to obtain better results and at the same time better
remunerationFpeople would be able to have the work that they
want. Just like we do here. We push ourselves and so can the rest
of the population . . .. It would also be good for the government
because they can gain with this (Personal communication,
Malecon Market, February 2005).
Although the government has, in fact, incorporated material in-
centives into a new business model for some state enterprisesF
known as el perfeccionamiento empresarialFthis shift toward inde-
pendence and personal accountability goes to the heart of the state
monopoly on employment and one of the most important sources
of state power.
It is important to note, however, that not all cuentapropistas
express the same sense of freedom as the Malecon craftsmen. Bar-
bara, for example, was an economist in the sugar industry before
obtaining a cuentapropista license to rst sell pizzas and then to rent
out an apartment in her home to tourists. Commenting that she feels
tied down because she must constantly take care of clients, watch out
for inspectors, and obtain foodFfrequently from black market ven-
dors selling door to doorFBarbara sometimes longs for her old
profession. If you could live from [state] work, she comments, it
would be better. Because you have your work for eight hours a day,
or your studies or whatever. But all this with the house is difcult.
You have to be paying attention 24 hours a day (Personal com-
munication, Barbaras home, Havana, February 2005). Rachel,
Alejandros wife, similarly expresses a sense of being trapped
inside her home as a result of trabajo por cuenta propia. Rachel
is not a licensed cuentapropista, but she helps Alejandro produce,
in contravention of the regulations, the papier-ma che objects that
Alejandro sells. In recent years Rachel has begun to long for her
old job as a teacher. As she puts it, Its not easy. Here youre like
a slave. If you work for the state you have a xed schedule. You
have your weekends free, or you spend them doing something else
like reading. But Im always here working, working, working.
I know that I have to do it, but really, Im exhausted with
this (Personal communication, Rachels home, Havana, February
Phillips 319
2005). Rachel misses being in the middle of things as a teacherF
running to meetings, dealing with students, meeting with parents
Fand appears to feel isolated by her work in the home. At the
same time, it is likely that if Rachel were working in the state sector
in the current economy, she would spend all her available free time
engaging in some kind of illegal or informal work in order to gain
extra income and would have even less leisure time than she cur-
rently has.
Rachels and Barbaras comments indicate not only that the
degree of independence enjoyed by self-employed workers may
vary by activity, but also that there is an important gender dimen-
sion to the benets of cuentapropismo. While certain self-em-
ployed activities may enjoy greater autonomy and mobility, such as
vending to tourists or driving a taxi, these activities tend to be
dominated by men. By contrast, anecdotal evidence suggests that
cuentapropista businesses that occur within the home, such as
renting a room to tourists, selling snacks from a cafeteria on the
front doorstep, or running a hairdressing salon, are overwhelm-
ingly run by women. Female cuentapropistas may therefore be
much less likely to enjoy the freedom and exibility that their male
counterparts do.
15
Similarly, some female vendors complain that they suffer a
disadvantage as cuentapropistas because they do not receive the
same state benets as do other working women. Specifically, female
cuentapropistas may not enroll their children in the free day care
services, or crculo infantl, provided to working women in Cuba.
Rachel speculates that this is because the state does not consider
cuentapropismo to be real work, but rather an activity under-
taken by retired persons, the unemployed, housewives, and others
on the margins of the labor market. As such, people working in the
self-employed sector should not need to avail themselves of services
that are designed for workers, such as subsidized day care. At the
same time, it is illegal for Cubans to pay privately for child care by
employing a babysitter or nanny. Thus while some cuentapropistas
may rely on a family member for child care, many are caught in a
dilemma. This catch-22 has been brought to the attention of the
union representing the Malecon vendors, and union representa-
tives have negotiated on behalf of individual vendors in the market
to secure public child care. No sectorwide policy has thus far been
developed, however. Women entering cuentapropismo are thus
caught in the contradiction that the work they have undertaken to
provide for their families disentitles them to the key welfare
15
One exception to this might be family-run private restaurants, or paladares, which
usually involve the whole family working from the home.
services of a socialist state.
16
It is a contradiction that arises, at least
in the mind of some, from the fact that the state does not dene
self-employment as real work, even though it functions this way.
The gendered dimensions of cuentapropsimo, however, does
not obviate the fact that cuentapropistas, both women and men,
enjoy an independence of decisionmaking that is rarely seen in the
state sector. If power is the ability to mobilize individuals concerted
activities (D. Smith 1990:80), the development of cuentapropismo
represents a marked challenge to the Cuban states control over
labor, economic activity, and, to a certain extent, popular ideas
about what makes a productive citizen. Once removed from the
centralized state system, furthermore, cuentapropistas are rapidly
developing their own networks of social and economic relations
outside of state-controlled venues. Alejandro and his family, for
example, sometimes rent a beach house in the summer since they
no longer have access to state-subsidized holidays. The woman they
rent the house from is also a licensed cuentapropista, and the
transportation they use is licensed taxi drivers.
17
What has there-
fore become increasingly evident, as Martin Romero and Capote
Gonza lez argue, is that cuentapropistas are developing a whole
range of exible options permitting each individual to structure his
or her own [life-]strategies and, as a result, to continually readjust
what the [social contract] has to offer (Martin Romero & Capote
Gonza lez 1998:80; translation by author). As a result, cuen-
tapropistas are consciously experimenting with new models not
only of private economic activity, but of private social activity as well.
Of course, cuentapropistas are not the only Cubans to engage
in private work, and a far greater number of Cubans are involved
in informal or black market activities.
18
Yet ironically, the states
authorization of self-employment may create a situation of even
greater ambivalence for cuentapropistas than for those who engage
in illegal work. While black marketeers can claim that their illegal
wheeling and dealing is more a matter of survival than of ideology,
16
The question of gender and cuentapropismo thus far has received very little
attention and is an important topic for further study.
17
Of course, cuentapropistas also develop these networks through informal or illegal
economic exchange, such as by employing other Cubans for private services (e.g., child
care, private tutoring, tailoring, etc.) or by relying on others for the exchange of illegally
obtained goods such as gasoline. For a detailed discussion of the underground economy,
see Ritter 2006.
18
It is important to understand cuentapropistas in relation to other actors involved in
the dollar and underground economy, as well as in relation to the exchange of informal
services prior to 1993. See, e.g., Ritter 2006 for a description of the range of legal, in-
formal, and illegal economic activities characterizing day-to-day life in Cuba and their effect
on the functioning of the Cuban economy. In an essay being prepared for publication,
I examine the reorganization of the Cuban labor market, including the development of
self-employed workers, workers for international or joint venture companies, informal
workers, and black marketeers.
Phillips 321
cuentapropistas have greater difculty reconciling their ofcial,
legitimate activity with membership in a socialist state. Recog-
nizing the liminality of cuentapropistas structural positionFone
that is ideologically threatening in part because it is legally autho-
rizedFhelps illuminate why they are regarded with suspicion by
the Cuban government. As legally authorized private, for-profit
workers, cuentapropistas throw into confusion the ideologically
clear-cut categories of socialism and capitalism. Adopting the
language of Mary Douglas, cuentapropistas transgress the inter-
nal lines of the socialist system, thereby becoming a social pol-
lutant (Douglas 1966:122).
The legalization of self-employment thus creates the paradox-
ical question of whether cuentapropistas can claim to be socialist
citizens. Alejandro suggests that the answer lies in cuen-
tapropistas contributions to the everyday functioning of their
country:
Were bringing in a lot of money to the country, to the govern-
ment. Plus services that the government cant provide. If the
private farmers market [agropecuario] closes, where will people
nd things to eat? And if they stop the taxi drivers, how will
people move around Havana? Or if they stop the shoe repair-
men, who will repair the shoes? The trabajador por cuenta propia
resolves many problems for the population that the government
just cant provide for the moment (Personal communication, Ale-
jandros home, Havana, August 1999).
Alejandro thus emphasizes not only the nancial benet that cuen-
tapropistas bringFwhich may, after all, continue to be viewed as
suspect in a socialist stateFbut also their key role in facilitating the
day-to-day functioning of the country. This is an imperfect answer,
however, since it is through private, profit-making activity anti-
thetical to the socialist paradigm that cuentapropistas are able to
make this contribution. Yet it illustrates both the strength and the
vulnerability of cuentapropistas as they straddle the socialist past
and an uncertain future.
The Legal Regulation of Cuentapropismo
While cuentapropistas are broadening the scope of per-
sonal autonomy, they are not by any means lawless; by strictly reg-
ulating income, materials, hours of operation, and other work
conditions, the government seeks to reassert some control over
cuentapropistas. In March 2001, for example, the government
released orientaciones (legally binding guidelines or regulations),
which, among other requirements, oblige cuentapropistas to
conduct business out of their own homes or designated markets
(they cannot, in other words, rent a space that may have better
commercial prospects), register their earnings and expenses with
the Oficina de Trabajo por Cuenta Propia, buy their primary
materials from assigned government stores, and so on. While some
of the regulations aim at ensuring clean and hygienic workplaces,
others prohibit cuentapropistas from forming cooperatives, con-
tracting out work, or creating any kind of collective organization of
production.
19
Such strict regulations have taken their toll, and
there are now just over 100,000 registered cuentapropistas on the
islandFabout half as many as there were in 1997 (The Economist, 16
October 2004, p. 33). The Ministry of Labor, which is in charge of
allocating licenses, appears to have stopped issuing new licenses
in 1998 or 1999, and thus cuentapropistas who drop out of the
market are not replaced.
Where cuentapropistas express greatest frustration, however, is
where legal regulation appears to be deliberately irrational, often
pushing them into violating the law. Because cuentapropistas are
viewed as a mal necesario (necessary evil), Perez Garc a explains,
the state has taken an increasing number of steps to restrict their
activities, to the point where the relationship between the state
and the cuentapropistas hasnt been one of facilitating cuen-
tapropismo, but rather of impeding it. As a result, for [cuen-
tapropistas] to carry out their activities, at certain moments in their
workFsometimes at many momentsFthey have to act illegally
(Personal communication, February 2005). For example, strict
rules limit where self-employed workers can acquire the materials
used in their servicesFwhether it be paint, clay, textiles, gasoline,
or shampoo. Cuentapropistas are required to prove that all ma-
terials were acquired legally, usually from state-run stores, and in-
spectors frequently request receipts. However, materials in state
stores are usually very expensive and of poor quality, if they exist at
all. Cuentapropistas are thus faced with buying materials on the
black market, thereby breaking the law, or going out of business. As
Maribel explains,
Acquiring materials is getting more and more difcult. Because
not only do they restrict where we can acquire materials, but they
also dont help us [to buy them legally]. We have to buy materials
through them, but if they dont have them, you can imagine, we
are obliged to break the rules (Personal communication, Malecon
Market, Havana, February 2005).
The more irrational the regulations appear to cuentapropistas, the
more justied they feel in breaking themFalthough they must still
be careful of being caughtFand the less they respect the state that
19
Some argue that these regulations are an attempt to prevent the development of
nongovernmental organizations and a nascent civil society; see for example Fornaris 2001.
Phillips 323
seems to want to impede, rather than facilitate, legal behavior. As
Ewick and Silbey suggest, the seeming arbitrariness of law under-
mines legal authority by reversing the direction of legitimation
between power and law. Rather than viewing laws authority as
derived from some higher source of morality, for cuentapropistas
law sometimes simply becomes the power of the powerful, an
arbitrary and unpredictable exercise of the coercive force of the
state (Ewick & Silbey 2003:1347).
Yet despite such experiences, cuentapropistas are not anti-
law, and many of the orientaciones that structure legal self-em-
ployment appear to them to be reasonable and valuable. Majela,
who taught technical drawing in a faculty of engineering before
obtaining a license to sell leather goods in the Malecon Market
in 1996, suggests that some regulations are for the good of the
vendors themselves:
Sometimes its really to do with us. Theyve told us now that we
have to be here before 9:30 in the morning to put up our stalls.
But we were the ones at fault. Not me, because Im always here
early, but there were people arriving at 11 a.m. or 12 p.m. Then
theyd have all their things in the passage, all their bags in the
middle of the passage in the way of other sales. So this rule was
for our own benet . . .. They passed the law because everyone
was arriving late, there were vendors who were ghting because
of the blocked passageways. . . . When they tell us we have to be
here before 9:30 a.m. and people complain, its because they
dont realize that we ourselves are a part of this (Personal com-
munication, Malecon Market, Havana, February 2005).
Majelas description of law as a benign means of conict resolution
supports Ewick and Silbeys observation that in narratives about
the law, legal authority is often valued for its objectivity as well as
for its ability to prevent or resolve the inevitability of conict (Ewick
& Silbey 2003:1347). But cuentapropistas may also view the basis
for laws authority in another source: the benevolence of the so-
cialist state. As Barbara comments, the government creates new
regulations as they gain experience. They change something
every year, she observes, as a result of the problems that have
occurredFwhat occurred last year with the tourists, and so forth
(Personal communication, Barbaras home, Havana, February
2005). Barbara seems to express an almost fraternal relationship
to the state, forgiving government policy makers for their mistakes
and recognizing that it is, in a sense, only human to learn
from past experience. This reication and personalization of the
state may be a result of the strong identication of the Cuban
government with its powerful, charismatic, and seemingly
omnipresent leader.
Rules protecting the health and welfare of the Cuban public
may garner even more support among cuentapropistas. For ex-
ample, Barbara notes with approval a recent regulation prohibiting
the owners of casas particulares from renting a room for less than
24 hours, an obvious attempt to prevent the growth of prostitution
and sex tourism. Similarly, a recent law against drug trafcking
provides that the owner of a casa particular can be criminally pros-
ecutedFand have the house conscatedFif it is found that he or
she knowingly rented a room to someone possessing or trafcking
in drugs (Law Decree No. 232, issued January 2003). Barbara
seems comfortable with this provision, even though there is a risk
that an innocent homeowner may be wrongfully arrested:
They have to investigate, because here, you know, the movement
against drugs is very strong and organized. So from this point of
view I dont see it as a bad thing [that they investigate]; we have to
because young people are starting to take drugs and I dont want
anyone to end up in this, you understand? (Personal communi-
cation, Barbaras home, Havana, February 2005).
Laws designed to protect the public goodFparticularly against
moral corruption by touristsFmay therefore meet with wide-
spread support, even where it means a potential loss in profit. The
fact that cuentapropistas are experimenting with private, individ-
ualized forms of economic activity does not, therefore, mean that
they no longer view themselves as members of a wider social or
national collective for which they maintain some responsibility.
Barbara and Majelas comments indicate an ambivalent rela-
tionship to the state. While on the one hand they decry the use of
legal regulation to restrict and impede their activities, cuen-
tapropistas continue to respect and, more important, presume
the states right to regulate in certain circumstances. Such a pre-
sumption contributes to the hegemonic power of the state and the
relationship between state power and law. Yet at the same time,
what constitutes the public good and who gets to determine its
parameters may be a matter of decreasing consensus. While many
cuentapropistas may support a rule preventing a tourist from dat-
ing a Cuban under age 15, for example, there may be much less
agreement about the social benet of rules designed to prevent
increases in income inequality within the population. Similarly,
rules established by the government to prevent Cubans from buy-
ing electronic equipment such as microwaves and VCRs in order to
control energy consumption may be viewed as the prerogative of
government by some, and oppressive by othersFparticularly those
who have the nancial means, but not the opportunity, to purchase
such goods. The states authority to foster particular visions of the
social good through legal regulation may therefore be increasingly
Phillips 325
ineffectual. This is particularly true as alternative lifestyles and
models of governance are transmitted through European and
North American media, conversations with tourists, and the in-
creasing number of Cuban emigrants.
Cuentapropistas have also, in some cases, been able to
negotiate with state ofcials to modify legal obligations. For exam-
ple, cuentapropista artisans are not allowed to employ assistants
(ayudantes). The vendors in the Malecon Market nd this partic-
ularly difcult because they are tied to their market stalls all day
long, unable to take a break to go for lunch, to the washroom, or to
step out of the hot sun. Many artisans in the Malecon Market have
therefore unofcially hired assistantsFsometimes a family mem-
ber or another artisan who would have liked to be a cuentapropista
but was unable to obtain a license. With the help of the union, the
cuentapropistas have come to an implicit understanding with the
market administratorFa state employee charged with looking af-
ter the day-to-day operations of the marketFallowing them to hire
assistants. When state inspectors catch assistants in the marketplace,
the administrator or one of his or her assistants will often step in to
smooth things over and prevent the inspector from imposing a ne.
While it is unclear whether other cuentapropistas have been able to
come to similar compromisesFand it is unlikely that the govern-
ment will legalize the practiceFthis arrangement demonstrates the
ways in which cuentapropistas have been able to actively shape the
law, rather than simply live within its connes.
20
Through such
negotiations, the relationship of power between the cuentapropistas
and the state remains in ux. As Ewick and Silbey point out,
Power . . . is exercised by drawing upon the symbols, practices,
statuses, and privileges that have become habitual in social struc-
tures. Although structures . . . often confront us as external and
coercive, they are more accurately understood as emergent fea-
tures of social transactions, (re)produced with each repetitive act
20
This arrangement has not met with uniform approval among cuentapropistas.
Raquel, a 45-year-old cuentapropista who sells a variety of ceramic and wooden souvenirs
for tourists, explains that unless she can delegate work to an assistant, the arrangement
seems pointless: I dont have an assistant . . .. If I could leave him here, taking care of my
business, and go do what I need to at home [it would make sense]. But to be here with him
or her, under the same hot sun, why do I need an assistant? . . . He cant sell, I cant leave
him to sell . . . If I leave the market I have to close up my business. Why would I want this
kind of assistant? (Personal Communication, Malecon Market, Havana, February 2005)
This is, of course, exactly the situation the state seeks to prevent by making it illegal for
cuentapropistas to employ others. At the same time, the ofcial prohibition on ayudantes
has left many assistants vulnerable to exploitation by their employers. As Juan, an ayudante
for a cuentapropista craftsman selling wooden sculptures, says, There are more people
who would like to do this than there are people who need ayudantes, so I cant afford to take
it too lightly. (Personal Communication, Malecon Market, Havana, February 2005) Juan
earns a percentage of his employers earnings and only takes time off when his employer
does. Because his employer sells in the market six days a week, Juan has only one day off.
and transformed with each innovation or unfaithful repetition
(Ewick & Silbey 2003:1334).
Unionization and the Value of Legal Legitimacy
Given the value that cuentapropistas attach to their indepen-
dence, it is perhaps surprising that the Malecon Market vendors
voted to join a national union in 2004.
21
State workers in Cuba are
organized into sectorwide national unions. Although Cuban unions
have, historically, played a role in protecting individual workers at
disciplinary hearings or in conicts with management, critics have
argued that they are, fundamentally, adjuncts of the state and
function to subjugate workers rights to the interests of the state
(Leiva 2000:481). Yet it is, arguably, precisely the unions close
relationship to the state that makes them attractive to cuen-
tapropistas. While self-employed workers are proud of their po-
sition outside of the state, they are also keenly aware of the threat
this independence poses to the government, and thus of the vul-
nerability of their work sector. As Maribel explains,
Its completely uncertain . . . We imagine . . . that were a stable
sector, because we dont cost anything [to the state] and we bring a
lotFin dollars and in national pesos. But at the same time, were
a privileged sector because weve obtained independence with
our work . . . and that brings advantages and disadvantages. Be-
cause when weve become too privileged relative to the rest of the
population, we could disappear any minute. Because really, it
seems to me that the government doesnt really look at what we
contribute. If we compare ourselves to the rest of the population
Fthe contribution, the revenue, what we provide to touristsF
its a lot (Personal communication, Malecon Market, Havana,
February 2005).
Maribel recognizes the threat posed by an independent workforce
to the state. At the same time, however, her observations highlight
the consternation that many cuentapropistas express that they do
not receive more recognition for the economic benets they bring.
Perez Garc a similarly argues that despite the controversy sur-
rounding cuentapropismo, in many cases the work sector has only
reafrmed a strong work ethic. While some state workers simply
go to work in a factory to rob, Perez Garc a points out, there are
many cuentapropistas who are educating their children about
21
Specifically, they joined the Sindicato de Industr a Ligera, or Union of Light In-
dustry. The unionization of cuentapropistas has received no academic attention as yet.
Indeed, Cuban labor researchers with whom I spoke were unaware that unionization was
even being considered. My future research will include the investigation of the extent of
unionization of cuentapropistas, the representation of cuentapropistas within unions, and
the relationship of cuentapropistas to the Partido Comunista Cubana.
Phillips 327
sacrice and the value of hard work . . .. [Cuentapropistas] are
earning money with the sweat of their brow (Personal communi-
cation, Havana, February 2005). The vilication of cuentapropistas,
Perez Garc a concludes, may thus create a deformation in popular
understandings of a good work ethic.
Like Maribel, Majela also expresses concern about the uncer-
tainty of trabajo por cuenta prop a. Despite the contribution made
by self-employed workers to the national economy, Majela remains
keenly aware that in the eyes of the government, self-employment
is a necessary evil. Moreover, because cuentapropismo originated
in the economic crisis, she worries that the government may decide
to close the work sector as soon as the economy recuperates:
This is like anything elseFtoday were here and tomorrow self-
employment is over, and we have to nd a place for ourselves [in
the state sector.] This work isnt secure, were not secure. [Self-
employment] arose because of the special period, the lack of
employment . . .. Weve brought benetsFwe contribute a lot to
the state. But just as quickly as this appeared, it could disappear.
It appeared at a specific moment and because of a specific set of
conditions in the country. If this situation ends, well, I assume we
could also disappear (Personal communication, Malecon Market,
Havana, February 2005).
Alejandro similarly ties the fate of self-employment to the vagaries
of the economy. The country will recuperate, he observes, or
rather, it is recuperating . . .. So it could be that tomorrow they tell
us that we cant do this anymore. Majela and Alejandros com-
ments illustrate not only the deep uncertainty that underlies self-
employment, but also their profound awareness that they are living
through a particular historical phase that has demanded radicalF
and quite possibly temporaryFmeasures.
While cuentapropistas may value the independence they enjoy
in determining their work conditions, therefore, they are also
aware that this independence is self-defeating if it means that the
government will continue to view them with hostility. Unionization
can mitigate the threat of cuentapropismo by reincorporating self-
employed workers back into the state through labor regulation. As
Maribel explains,
At a minimum [unionization] incorporates us into the rest of so-
ciety. Now were no longer an isolated society . . .. Were incor-
porated, regardless of whether we work in the private sector and
we have private earnings . . .. We want to be independent work-
ers, but not independent in spirit (Personal communication,
Malecon Market, Havana, February 2005).
Unionization may therefore provide cuentapropistas with an im-
portant mantle of legitimacy, and thus with an added degree of
security. It also provides cuentapropistas with valuable symbolic
capital. As members of the union, cuentapropistas are no longer
outliers in the system but can instead claim full membership
in the Cuban stateFwithout giving up their autonomy and
material benets. In this sense, the distinction that Maribel
makes between being independent workers and being indepen-
dent in spirit is a significant one, because it indicates a desire
to be viewed as part of the same spirit, or social fabric, as the rest
of Cuban society, even if their work habits differ from those of
state workers.
As members of a union, cuentapropistas have been able to
further demonstrate their social citizenship through the frequent
collections that the union takes up for charitable and Revolutionary
causes. Rachel, Alejandros wife, points to these contributions
proudly, if with some bitterness about the states failure to recog-
nize the contributions made by cuentapropistas:
They dont give trabajo por cuenta propia the value it really de-
serves . . .. The artisanFor the cuentapropistaFis really contrib-
uting to the state! Alejandro, for examples, pays the MTT [local
militia].
22
He helps to buy them uniforms, arms, whatever else
they need. Alejandro gives money to cancer hospitals where there
are sick children. He helps to collect money for the union. And he
has to pay 45 pesos every time he wants to sell [to rent his spot in
the market] and $159 a month. There are people in society who
do nothing at allFso why dont they give them a hard time?
(Personal communication, Alejandro and Rachels home, Havana,
February 2005).
Barbara similarly argues that in comparison to the many Cubans
who participate in illegal or black market activities, cuen-
tapropismo is at least a legal form of earning money. While she
would prefer to return to the quieter lifestyle of state employment,
she explains, You do this because you have to; because life is so
expensive and you have to get the money from somewhere. I
started in cuentapropismo because its at least an honorable way of
making money, no? (Personal communication, Barbaras home,
Havana, February 2005). While the Cuban government may view
cuentapropistas as potential agents of American interests, most
cuentapropistas would likely be shocked by such a suggestion.
Through union participation, cuentapropistas can counter the
image of the parasitic, exploitative capitalist by making nancial
contributions to state-approved, socially valuable causes.
The Cuban government appears to have come to a similar
conclusion that through unionization the government can retain
22
Movimiento de Tropas Teritoriales, a local peoples militia that played an important
role in the 1959 Revolution.
Phillips 329
the economic benets of self-employment
23
while reasserting some
control over self-employed workers. At its national conference in
2005, the Congreso de Trabajadores Cubano (National Congress of
Workers, or CTC), which coordinates the national unions and
represents workers interests to the national government, recog-
nized that cuentapropistas are now a substantial entity
24
and
announced a campaign to invite self-employed workers to join the
national unions. Magalys, an older cuentapropista in the Malecon
Market and the main representative of the Malecon vendors to the
Union de Industr a L gera,
25
suggests that the government may be
waiting until the private sector is organizedFi.e., unionizedFbe-
fore it permits new licenses:
What happened was that to allow us to organize ourselves they
stopped allowing new licenses. Right now they arent giving out
new licenses in order to say to people: Stop. Lets get orga-
nized. And after everythings organized, it will open up again
. . .. So that when new people enter [the sector], they enter into
something organized (Personal communication, Malecon Market,
Havana, February 2005).
While it is unclear whether cuentapropismo will be allowed to grow
again after unionization is complete, Magalyss comments afrm
the idea that the government is seeking to integrate cuen-
tapropistas into the state sector. Cuentapropistas are being invit-
ed to join either the union most related to their work activity or
physically closest to their home. Noticeably, no suggestion has been
made of creating a cuentapropista union, which would allow self-
employed workers to pool economic power and to developFor
solidifyFa sense of common identity and purpose. Indeed, cuen-
tapropistas are strictly prohibited from forming cooperatives or
associations. It is unclear how many cuentapropistas have decided
to take up the invitation to join a union, although Barbara reports
that the idea was discussed and rejected at a recent meeting of
cuentapropistas who are licensed to rent rooms.
Besides these important symbolic gains, unionization has also
brought small but concrete improvements to the marketplace,
particularly to the physical work conditions. For example, vendors
23
Benjamin Smith (1998:58) estimates that in 1997, cuentapropistas brought in an
estimated $130 million USD in tax revenue. The government does not release data on tax
revenues from self-employed workers.
24
Interview with the secretara general (general secretary) of the Malecon Market to the
Union of Light Industry (Personal communication, Malecon Market, Havana, 24 February
2005). This is an interesting comment, given the steep decrease in the number of self-
employed workers over the last ve years.
25
There are 12 cuentapropistas in the market who serve as union representatives,
and Magalys is the secretar a general. She is also a member of the National Committee of
the Union of Light Industry to the Cuban Labor Congress.
used to rent space in local private homes to store their merchandise
overnight. When the government recently banned this practice,
26
the vendors were left without any choice but to haul their mer-
chandise home with them, often over a considerable distance. At
the cuentapropistas instigation, the union negotiated with the
market administration to allocate a small warehouse next to the
marketplace to the vendors so that they may store their products
close by. As Magalys explains,
At times, the laws of the administration [of the market] are a little
rigid. So the union is the organization that can persuade the ad-
ministration in some areas . . .. Through the mediation of the
union we were able to increase the space of the marketplace and
now within the market itself we have our own warehouse (Per-
sonal communication, Malecon Market, Havana, February 2005).
Similarly, as previously discussed, the union was able to negotiate a
tacit agreement with market administrators to allow the vendors to
hire assistants. Both of these changes made a significant difference
to the market vendors daily work and indicate that at least some
ofcials within the state are sympathetic to the difculties that
constrain cuentapropistas. Rather than functioning purely to en-
force state regulation and to restrict cuentapropistas activities,
union ofcials have in fact attempted to modify some of the par-
adoxes of government regulationFcreating, where possible, un-
ofcial compromises or alternate avenues to facilitate day-to-day
operations. The fact that such assistance is limitedFthat union
ofcials will not, for example, challenge the government on some
of the more significant restrictions on cuentapropista activity or
advocate for large-scale reformFillustrates that union ofcials ex-
perience their own ambivalence about the place of private activity
in the economy and the role of market mechanisms in Cubas
future.
Law and Identity in Transitional Societies
As the comments of Alejandro, Maribel, Barbara, and others
make clear, cuentapropistas cannot easily be cast in an ideological
mold. While cuentapropistas themselves argue that their existence
provides crucial support to the continuation of the socialist state,
it is clear that their activities also amount to an expansion of
spheres of individual autonomy and alternate social and economic
26
It is unclear why this decision was made. It may have been part of a broader move
to prohibit renting space, other than rooms or apartments for tourists. In other words,
renting living space seems to be allowed, while renting space to conduct a commercial
venture is strictly prohibited.
Phillips 331
networks that circumvent ofcial state avenues. In so doing, cuen-
tapropistas are developing new conceptions of what it means to be
a productive worker in Cuban society and what kind of relationship
workers will have with the state. For a country that places labor at
the very center of its national and ideological identity, the impact of
such changes on fundamental questions of citizenship and com-
munity are profound. By citizenship, I refer not so much to the
narrower definition of citizenship as legal status, but to the broader
concept of citizenship as an expression of ones membership in a
political community. (Kymlicka & Norman 1994:369) As subjec-
tivities change and citizenship is reconceptualized, increased pres-
sure is brought to bear on the structures of governmental power,
leading to the further evolution of new governance regimes. In
other words, changes in popular understandings of citizenship
bring about further changes in models of governance and exert
an important inuence on the evolving shape and nature of new
governmental authorities.
The renegotiation of work thus has implications far beyond the
day-to-day lives of cuentapropistas themselves, and it poses a sig-
nificant challenge to socialist orthodoxy. In the renegotiation of
social, political, and economic power during periods of dramatic
change, underlying ideas about who is a productive member of
society become a key battleground. This insight into the relation-
ship between law, work, and identity during transitional periods
helps complicate the conventional transition paradigm, in which
law is represented as an autonomous force acting upon society,
rather than as a product of contestation and negotiation among
individuals, ofcials, and state institutions. As a close examination
of trabajo por cuenta propia makes clear, such a unidimensional,
externalized account fails to account for the powerful ways in which
law opens up spaces for new kinds of economic, political, and social
activity, as well as the consequences that this may have for the
renegotiation of political and social relations. This process of
renegotiation has important bearing on the character and scope of
a transition.
A number of law and society theorists have addressed this
constitutive role of law in the process of identity formation, high-
lighting the way in which law exists in society as a negotiation
between citizen and state (Ellickson 1991; Engel 2003; Espeland
1994, 1998, 2001; Ewick & Silbey 1998). Through its functions of
categorization and legitimization, law delineates how individuals
and communities are valued and what kinds of activities and beliefs
are rewarded. Law channels interactions with, or challenges to, the
state, and delimits at what point, or under what conditions, those
interactions will no longer be supported. Yet law is also regularly
appropriated, manipulated, and resisted by individuals and
communities (Espeland 1994, 1998, 2001) who mobilize to formally
change legal codes or develop alternative practices that bypass
formal law altogether (Ellickson 1991). In struggles to dene the
boundaries of community or individual identity, law becomes not
only a powerful tool of legitimization, but also an integral part of
the frame around which identity is constructed.
The role of law in the construction of avenues for social par-
ticipation and conceptions of citizenship is particularly important in
the context of the socialist state, given that a central goal of the
socialist project is not only to remake the economic and political
character of the state, but also to reconstruct the socialist citizen at
the core of the new regime. Yet the insights of law and society
theorists do not map onto socialist states with perfect precision.
One of the most important moves by legal sociologists has been the
realization that the production of legality is not limited to formal
legal institutions, or to the ofcial legal actors who populate them.
In recognizing the pervasiveness of law, legal sociologists remind us
that law is manifested in the most mundane interactions of every-
day life, affecting in often invisible or unconscious ways how we
structure our lives and dene our relationships. Sarat (1990:344),
for example, illustrates how the welfare poor in the United States
experience law almost viscerally because of the way in which their
lives are organized around a heavily regimented legal bureaucracy.
By comparison with other groups in society who would never ex-
pect ofcials to claim jurisdiction over private areas of their lives,
welfare recipients are caught in a web of law. For citizens of
socialist societies, however, the power of law to shape the minutiae
of daily existence, or the ability of state ofcials to exercise this
power, may come as little surprise. The pervasiveness of the law
may simply be viewed as an extension of the revolutionary char-
acter of the state, which requires a unied, total commitment. (For
those who view the socialist project as inherently repressive, the
authoritarian operation of law is perhaps even more apparent).
In line with Sarat, Ewick and Silbey observe that in modern
American society, people generally confront legal authority within
impersonal, rule-governed, functionally organized hierarchies
(Ewick & Silbey 2003:1347). In narratives of resistance, Ewick
and Silbey comment, Americans emplot law as a powerful force,
describe themselves as a protagonist up against this force, and
present some action that avoided or overcame, if only temporarily,
this situation of relative powerlessness (Ewick & Silbey
2003:1345). By contrast, cuentapropistas do not paint themselves
in such heroic colors; rather, their comments reect a conception of
the law as fully embedded in the fabric of everyday life. Law is not
something that is encountered, conquered, and vanquished, but
maneuvred and negotiated through ordinary acts. In this narrative
Phillips 333
structure, cuentapropistas are neither heroes nor victims (nor
socialists, nor capitalists), but individuals seeking to wend their
way through the law in order to obtain the basic necessities of life.
Despite this need to tailor the insights of law and society to
the socialist context, a sociolegal approach can enrich our under-
standing of the constitutive role of law in transitional periods sig-
nificantlyFhelping the eld to move beyond, for example, asking
simply what role legal institutions can play in establishing demo-
cratic governance. Transition theory, as some critics have pointed
out (Bridger & Pine 1998; Verdery 1997; Kubicek 2004:136), has
been tainted with a kind of Cold War triumphalism that posits
transition as a progressive set of stages along a unidirectional path
from communism to capitalism. Such teleological and ahistorical
thinking ignores the impact that changing conceptions of citizen-
ship and state may have on the evolution of the transition itself, and
on the development of new models of governance.
27
The transition
literature has largely, of course, come out of the particular social,
political, and geographic context of the end of communism in
Eastern Europe. Cuba is clearly not postcommunist, and the
transition literature can thus only be applied in a general way to the
Cuban case. Yet the tendency to frame transition analyses in highly
politicized terms is particularly strong in Cuban studies; in the
ongoing political battle between the United States and Cuba, U.S.
foreign policy interests, as well as the interests of many in the
Cuban American community, have been particularly inuential
in polarizing the terms of debate.
Analyses of societies in transition may therefore be greatly
enriched by the recognition that in the negotiation between citizen
and state, law has a profound inuence on individual and group
identity. Law, as Espeland observes, not only represents the in-
terests of some group, or even constructs their interests but also,
simultaneously and often implicitly, constructs the subject who is
holding those interests (Espeland 1994:1171). In understanding
the relationship between law and identity in the socialist context,
the insight of governmentality theorists that modes of conduct,
knowledge, and agency are not suppressed by government but are
cultivated in ways that are aligned to specific governmental aims
(Valverde et al. 1999:4) is particularly useful. Different ideological
systems will produce different subjectivities and, by extension, dif-
ferent conceptions of citizenship, as individuals are conditioned by
particular structures of power. Where most transition studies take a
27
Moreover, in service of such politicized thinking, as Guilhot points out, transition
theorists have ignored the origins of the concept of transition in Marxs own highly
evolved discussion of transitions to socialism. For a discussion of the historical and the-
oretical development of the concept of transition, see Guilhot 2002.
top-down approach, focusing on the role of law in the macro-
structure of governance, the concept of governmentality draws at-
tention to the ways in which the very conception of citizenship is
reconstructed during periods of profound economic and political
transformation. Indeed, the success of a transitionFthe extent
to which it establishes a new, stable model of governanceFdepends
not only on its authorization of new modes of conduct, knowledge,
and morality (as well as its stigmatization of old modes), but also on
its ability to remake subjectivities.
28
As the focus on cuentapropismo illustrates, workplaces are a
particularly significant site of governance and identity formation.
The bond between individual and workplace, Martin Romero and
Capote Gonzalez, observe,
generates a set of relations which are incorporated, as part of the
individuals experiences, into the existence of the person and, as
such, into his or her subjective internal world . . .. Through this
bond, people construct a form of existence which converts em-
ployment into a social condition necessary for self-realization
(1998:81; translated by author).
By structuring workers time, activities, aspirations, economic re-
muneration, and social interactions, laws governing work sites play
a formative role in conditioning the interests and desires of work-
ers to align with those of the employer and the state (Rose
1999:157). In socialist societies, the link between work, govern-
mental power, and the construction of citizenship is particularly
clear because of the states monopoly over employment and its
ideological position as the voice of the workers. The legitimacy of
the state depends, at least rhetorically, on its identication with
workers interests, and in a workers state workers are presumed
to share in state policies encouraging productivity and efciency.
The state, moreover, has direct control over work sites to ensure
the implementation of these policies. The authoritarianism of so-
cialist states, as well as their ideological formation, thus reinforce
the importance of work sites as a governable space (Rose
1999:31) for the dissemination of state power and the construction
of citizenship. As Martin Romero and Capote Gonzalez argue, In
the Cuban case, more then any other, inclusion in the program of
employment . . . is a form of incorporating [individuals] into the
sociopolitical project and of fostering proactive participation in the
28
There is, of course, something of a chicken-and-egg question here, highlighting
the limitations of the governmentality literature. Is it the creation of new economic and
political activities that produces new subjectivities, or do changing beliefs and forms of
knowledge spur political and economic change? What is the role of law in creating and
impeding these processes? While analyses of governmental power tell us something im-
portant about how power is produced and reproduced, it provides less of a lens onto why
regimes of power change and in what directions.
Phillips 335
creation of the base and the socio-political system (1998:82;
translated by author).
The central role of work in the construction of citizenship
makes work a particularly important factor in periods of transition.
In postsocialist transitions in particular, new forms of property and
modes of economic activity frequently come into existence that are
completely antithetical to the outgoing regime. With the diversi-
cation of employment and forms of property typical of postso-
cialist economies, the individual no longer exists purely as a
member of the collectivity and must begin to explore new spheres
of individual decisionmaking and self-reliance. As Martin Romero
and Capote Gonzalez explain in the context of Cuba,
Society has been changing and we can only expect the individual
to do the same. Indeed a new [social] pact is being formed in
which none of the involved parties can maintain their previous
positions. In the case of the individual, we must consider the
implications of the changes that have occurred in his objective
social position for his subjective reection. Such changes may, in
turn, lead to a new evaluation of his or her individuality in the
new situation and to enhanced self-recognition under these new
conditions (1998:80; translated by author).
The rise of market relations, in particular, requires workers in the
new labor paradigm to assess a variety of state, informal, illegal,
and private work options to develop strategies for economic sur-
vivalFperhaps involving more than one work optionFdeal with
new forms of property, and make independent decisions unnec-
essary under the socialist system. Such new levels of individual
autonomy, risk-taking, and decisionmaking have implications far
beyond the workplace, extending to other realms of social and
family life, such as opening up opportunities for education, recre-
ation, and material comfort that other Cubans may not enjoy.
In transitional societies, workFin both ofcial discourse and
day-to-day practiceFthus becomes a battleground for the devel-
opment of new governmental powers. Significantly, the contest to
dene what will constitute work and who will be a legitimate
worker within the new socioeconomic model is itself constitutive
of the transitional period. As Perez Garc a observes, Work, as the
backbone of society, is not only impacted [by external factors], it
also produces them, converting itself, together with the crisis and
the reforms, into a cause of the transformations occurring in the
social structure (2004:148; translated by author). As worker sub-
jectivities are reconstructed to encompass a growing range of in-
dividual choices and opportunities, new ideas evolve about who is a
productive member of society and how citizen-state relationships
should be mediated. This, in turn, has an impact on how new
models of governance are envisioned and within what parameters.
Changing conceptions of work and worker are thus themselves
inextricably tied to shifting notions of citizenship and to the evo-
lution of new models of governance.
Conclusion: The View From the InsideFIs There Such a
Thing as a Cuentapropista Identity?
Sarat relates how a welfare client reminded him that the wel-
fare poor are not a natural social group. They neither share a
distinctive background nor common ties of sentiment; they vary
greatly in their life situations, their ability to survive without public
assistance, and their disposition to do so (1990:348). In much the
same way, cuentapropistas were not a preexisting community of
people that the Cuban government acted upon through legal
regulation, and the strong social cohesion that has formed around
the legalization of self-employment does not necessarily reect a
coherent or consistent internal identication among self-employed
workers. By focusing too closely on how government rationalities
shape cuentapropistas conduct, we may therefore miss some of the
more complex intersubjective dimensions of the construction of a
cuentapropista identity. For example, how do cuentapropistas re-
late to terms such as socialist and capitalist, and how conscious are
they of the ways in which their presence is viewed by the Cuban
government and the outside world? More broadly, how are images
of the good citizen constructed, and how do they get performed
on the ground? How do zones such as work become sites for
the construction of the citizen, and how are certain kinds of
economic behavior rewarded and legitimated? What is the inu-
ence of internal and external politics on the propagation of certain
conceptions of citizenship? How do conceptualizations of state and
citizen change in periods of profound economic and political
transformation, and what inuence do such changes have on the
possibility for, and character of, transition itself?
These questions bring us back, in effect, to the statement with
which we began. When Alejandro jokes that maybe tomorrow hell
turn capitalist but today hes staying home, how is he positioning
himself in relation to capitalist and socialist work paradigms, and
what mix of resistance and acceptance does he signal toward
a larger cuentapropista group identity? At rst glance, Alejandro
appears to reject the capitalist label, expressing, through a com-
bination of humor and irony, his awareness of the potency of
the categorization and its importance in the ongoing dispute
between Cuba and the United States. Indeed, implicit in
Alejandros comment is his understanding that regardless of his
Phillips 337
own self-conception, he will inevitably be viewed in relation to the
gure of the capitalist and is better off explicitly positioning himself
against it. By contrast to the common image in Cuba of capitalists as
competitive, self-absorbed workaholics with little time for family or
friends, Alejandro feels that his own relaxed attitude toward work
and turning a profit is clear proof of his noncapitalist tendencies.
Rather than being concerned about drawing ahead of his neigh-
bors, Alejandro in fact uses his increased income to buy more
leisure time for socializing with friends and family. Indeed, for
Alejandro capitalism is incompatible with such Cuban cultural
idiosyncrasies as sociability and spontaneity. Whether he views
these characteristics as distinctly socialist, or not, Alejandro
appeals to a broader set of values that are more public-minded
than those he associates with the hyperindividualism of a market
economy.
Yet despite Alejandros attempts to distance himself rhetorically
from the more negative capitalist stereotypes, the realities
of his daily practice tell a different story, suggesting a second
interpretation of his comment. While Alejandro may have chosen
to stay at home today, he knows he has the potential to turn
capitalist in the future, should such an adaptation be necessary
materially, politically, or both. The ability to respond quickly and
with ingenuity to changing economic circumstances is, Cubans
boast, something of a national characteristic. Resolver is the oper-
ative verb, describing the combination of ingenuity, creativity, and
energy required to resolve or obtain daily necessities. What Ale-
jandro and the other cuentapropistas have further been able to
accomplish, however, is to make a substantial living by resolving
other peoples needs, whether it be by supplying shoes or tourist
knick-knacks.
29
Despite the obvious skill and business acumen that go into
being a successful cuentapropista, however, Alejandro rejects any
attempt to construct a general prole of self-employed workers,
arguing, Theres no dened type. There are university graduates,
professionals, workers, housewives, those who have never worked.
Theres no one definition of cuentapropista. There are all kinds,
all kinds (Personal communication, Alejandro and Rachels
home, Havana, August 1999). Businessman seems not to be a legit-
imate category, despite the fact that Alejandro has himself
changed product types several times since quitting his job and
is constantly planning new schemes (such as opening up a
private health club), whose common feature is not craftsmanship
29
Indeed, Perez Garc a comments that the Cuban government has on several occa-
sions adopted ideas developed by cuentapropistas and then sought to create a government
monopoly for the service (Personal communication, 25 February 2005).
so much as self-employment in the private sector. There is, then, an
unresolved tension for Alejandro between a desire to distance
himself from the image of the malevolent capitalist exploiting the
labor of others, and pride in the contributions that cuentapropistas
make and the modest material success that cuentapropismo has
brought his family. In expressing both sentiments, Alejandro is not
contradicting himself. Rather, he is asserting his ability to reject
both the economic tyranny of capitalism and the bureaucratic
tyranny of socialism to determine for himself the distribution of his
labor and leisure time. Alejandro is clearly not unaffected by the
underlying logic of either socialism or capitalism, but he is actively
negotiating the host of economic and ideological contradictions
that currently inform the cuentapropista work sector with his own
particular blend of economic pragmatism, entrepreneurial spirit,
and sense of humor.
Another way of understanding Alejandros suggestion that he
might turn capitalist is to examine what kinds of aspirations
cuentapropistas articulate for their children. On the one hand,
cuentapropistas express an almost universal desire to see their
children obtain a university education. This may be a result of a
continued sense that professional work is more prestigious or
valuable than commerce, or a concern that cuentapropismo is
only a provisional response to a historically specific problem. As
Maribel comments, Tomorrow the system will change. Being a
professional will be valued again . . .. Cuentapropismo is necessary
because of the economic crisis, I dont know how long into the
future it will continueFit depends on history, on the changes
that history brings (Personal communication, Malecon Market,
Havana, August 1999). Cuentapropistas do not, therefore, express
any kind of explicit desire to see the growth of a capitalist class
in Cuba, to which their children would be the natural inheritors.
30
At the same time, however, many recognize that the Cuban
economy has gone through irrevocable changes from which their
children are well-positioned to benet. Thus while Alejandro
himself may not turn capitalist tomorrow, his childrenFin part
30
Interestingly, while most cuentapropistas expressed a similar hope that their chil-
dren will pursue higher education, some cuentapropistas views about the value of a uni-
versity degree have changed as they have become more established in the private sector. In
an interview in 1999, for example, Maribel emphasized her desire that her son, Jorge,
obtain a university education. However, in 2004, Jorge began working for his mother as an
assistant in the Malecon Market, and Maribel hopes that he will be able to secure a cuen-
tapropista license if the government starts to distribute them again. Jorges decision not to
attend university may be the result of a number of factors, both personal and economic.
However, it is interesting to note how the valuation of professional education may change
as self-employed workers become increasingly accustomed to private sector work. Such
changes may also indicate that the longer cuentapropismo continues in existence, the more
assured self-employed workers will feel that the private work sector has a long-term future
in Cuba.
Phillips 339
as a result of his effortsFwill have a much greater ability to
take advantage of new opportunities to work in profit-making
enterprises.
While cuentapropistas frequently resist dening themselves in
terms of a larger occupational identityFparticularly one dened in
relation to capitalismFthey are equally clear that they are devel-
oping new skills and abilities that give them a particular indepen-
denceFboth economic and ideologicalFfrom traditional
institutions of state power. In experimenting with new forms of
property and profit-making, cuentapropistas are expanding
spheres of individual autonomy and creating alternate social
and economic networks that circumvent ofcial state avenues.
This renegotiation of work has implications far beyond the day-to-
day lives of cuentapropistas themselves and poses a significant
challenge to socialist orthodoxy and the Cuban government. No
longer following in the footsteps of el hombre nuevo, the new
Cuban worker is entrepreneurial, independent, guided by material
as well as moral incentives, and self-motivated. Yet cuentapropistas
are equally adamant that they are full members of Cuban
society and in fact are making important contributions to the
prosperity of the socialist state. Nor do they accept that they
must be guided by stereotypical capitalist values, but hold up al-
ternate culturally informed ideas about family and community. It is
this dualityFthe challenge that cuentapropistas pose to the social-
ist paradigm, and their insistence that this challenge is in fact a
contributionFthat resonates with many ordinary Cubans and
makes cuentapropistas a powerful actor in the Cuban landscape. In
redening what kind of work is considered productive and legit-
imate on the island, and therefore who is a valued worker, cuen-
tapropistas are informing the scope and direction of a transition
in Cuba and the evolution of new models of governance on the
island.
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Maybe Tomorrow Ill Turn Capitalist:

Cuentapropismo in a Workers State

Maybe tomorrow Ill turn capitalist, Alejandro

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