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for January 14, 2014

Cases #1-4 assigned to Joylyn Tria
18, 20, 22 & 23 Rowena Gallego
90, 91, 92 & 93 Alpha Bonifacio

Not yet passed as of consolidation time (January 14, 2014,
8:38 am)

-John Doe Warrant-
Pagandaman vs. Casar
Facts: On July 27, 1985, a shooting incident occurred in
Pantao, Masiu, Lanao del Sur, which left atleast five
persons dead and two others wounded. What in fact
transpired is still unclear.
On the following day, Atty. Mangurun Batuampar,
claiming to represent the widow of one of the victims,
filed a letter-complaint with the Provincial Fiscal at
Marawi City, asking for a "full blast preliminary
investigation" of the incident. The letter adverted to the
possibility of innocent persons being implicated by the
parties involved on both sides none of whom was,
however, identified and promised that supporting
affidavits would shortly be filed. Immediately the
Provincial Fiscal addressed a "1st endorsement" to the
respondent Judge, transmitting Atty. Batuampar's letter
and requesting that "all cases that may be filed relative
(to the incident) that happened in the afternoon of
July 27, 1985," be forwarded to his office, which "has
first taken cognizance of said cases."
No case relative to the incident was, however, presented
to the respondent Judge until Saturday, August 10, 1985,
when a criminal complaint for multiple murder was filed
before him by P.C. Sgt. Jose L. Laruan, which was docketed
as Case No. 1748. On that same day, the respondent Judge
"examined personally all (three) witnesses (brought by the
sergeant) under oath thru (his) closed and direct
supervision," reducing to writing the questions to the
witnesses and the latter's answers. Thereafter the Judge
"approved the complaint and issued the corresponding
warrant of arrest against the fourteen (14) petitioners
(who were named by the witnesses) and fifty (50) John
An "ex-parte" motion for reconsideration was filed on
August 14, 1985 by Atty. Batuampar (joined by Atty. Pama
L. Muti), seeking recall of the warrant of arrest and
subsequent holding of a thorough investigation" on
the ground that the Judge's initial investigation had been
"hasty and manifestly haphazard" with "no searching
questions" having been propounded. The
respondent Judge denied the motion for lack of basis,
hence the present petition.
The petitioners further assert that: (a) the respondent
Judge in the case at bar failed to conduct the investigation
in accordance with the procedure prescribed in Section 3,
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court; (b) failure constituted a
denial to petitioners of due process which nullified the
proceedings leading to the issuance of the warrant for
the petitioners' arrest; (c) on August 10, 1985 was a
Saturday during which "Municipal Trial Courts are open
from8:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. only ..." and "... it would hardly
have been possible for respondent Judge to determine
the existence of probable cause against sixty- four (64)
persons whose participations were of varying nature and
degree in a matter of hours and issue the warrant of arrest
in the same day"; (d) there was undue haste and an
omission to ask searching questions by the Judge who
relied "mainly on the supporting affidavits which were
obviously prepared already when presented to him by
an enlisted PC personnel as investigator."; (e) conducted
the preliminary investigation of the charges"... in total
disregard of the Provincial Fiscal ..."who, as said
respondent well knew, had already taken cognizance of
the matter twelve (12) days earlier and was poised to
conduct his own investigation of the same; and (f)
issuance of a warrant of arrest against fifty (50) "John
Does" transgressed the Constitutional provision
requiring that such warrants should particularly describe
the persons or things to be seized.

Issue: WON the warrant issued against fifty (50) john
Does unconstitutional and void?

Ruling: Yes. Insofar, however, as said warrant is issued
against fifty (50) John Does not one of whom the
witnesses to the complaint could or would identify, it is of
the nature of a general warrant, one of a class of writs
long proscribed as unconstitutional and once
anathematized as totally subversive of the liberty of the
subject. Cleary violative of the constitutional injunction
that warrants of arrest should particularly describe the
person or persons to be seized, the warrant must, as
regards its unidentified subject be voided.
Disposition: WHEREFORE, the warrant complained of is
upheld and declared valid insofar as it orders the arrest of
the petitioners. Said warrant is voided to the extent that it
is issued against fifty (50) "John Does." The respondent
Judge is directed to forward to the Provincial Fiscal of
Lanao del Sur the record of the preliminary investigation
of the complaint in Criminal Case No. 1728 of his court for
further appropriate action.
Without pronouncement as to costs.
RD: Section 3 of Rule 112, 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure. And although not specifically so declared, the
procedure mandated by the Rule actually consists of two
phases or stages.
The first phase consists of an ex-parte inquiry into the
sufficiency of the complaint and the affidavits and other
documents offered in support thereof. And it ends with
the determination by the Judge either: (1) that there is no
ground to continue with the inquiry, in which case he
dismisses the complaint and transmits the order of
dismissal, together with the records of the case, to the
provincial fiscal; or (2) that the complaint and the
supporting documents show sufficient cause to continue
with the inquiry and this ushers in the second phase.
This second phase is designed to give the respondent
notice of the complaint, access to the complainant's
evidence and an opportunity to submit counter-affidavits
and supporting documents. At this stage also, the Judge
may conduct a hearing and propound to the parties and
their witnesses questions on matters that, in his view,
need to be clarified. The second phase concludes with the
Judge rendering his resolution, either for dismissal of the
complaint or holding the respondent for trial, which shall
be transmitted, together with the record, to the provincial
fiscal for appropriate action.
There is no requirement that the entire procedure
for preliminary investigation must be completed before a
warrant of arrest may be issued. The present Section 6 of
the same Rule 112 clearly authorizes the municipal trial
court to order the respondent's arrest:

Sec. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue.-

xxx xxx xxx

(b) By the Municipal Trial Court. If the municipal trial judge
conducting the preliminary investigation is satisfied after
an examination in writing and under oath of the
complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching
question and answers, that a probable cause exists and
that there is a necessity of placing the respondent under
immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of
justice, he shag issue a warrant of arrest.

The argument, therefore, must be rejected that the
respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the warrant of arrest against petitioners without
first completing the preliminary investigation in
accordance with the prescribed procedure. The rule is and
has always been that such issuance need only await
a finding of probable cause, not the completion of the
entire procedure of preliminary investigation.

Babst et. al., vs. National Intelligence Board
Facts: This petition was originally a petition for prohibition
with preliminary injunction which was superseded by the
amended and supplemental petition for prohibition with
preliminary injunction filed by petitioners on March 3,
1983, seeking to prohibit the respondents (a) from issuing
subpoenas or letters of invitation to petitioners and
interrogating them, and (b) from filing libel suits on
matters that have been the subject of inquiry by
respondent National Intelligence Board (NIB)

Petitioners are columnists, feature article writers and
reporters of various local publications. Since July 1980,
some of them have allegedly been summoned by military
authorities who have subjected them to sustained
interrogation on various aspects of their works, feelings,
sentiments, beliefs, associations and even their private
lives. The invitations were contained in letters sent by the
National Intelligence Bureau (NIB) and were of the
following tenor:


Pursuant to the authority vested in me by law, you are
hereby requested to appear before this Special Committee
at Philippine Army Officer's Clubhouse, Fort Bonifacio,
Metro Manila (sketch attached), 9:00 A.M., December 22,
1982, to shed light on confidential matters being looked
into by this Committee.

Your failure to appear on the specified date and place
shall be considered as a waiver on your part and this
Committee will be constrained to proceed in accordance
with law.

Very truly yours,

Brig. General, AFP (Ret.)

Petitioners argued that the respondents do not have the
authority to conduct the proceeding above-described
which are violative of the constitutional guarantee on
freedom of expression since they have the effect of
imposing restrictive guidelines and norms on mass media.
Petitioners further claim that such proceedings are a
punitive ordeal or subsequent punishment for lawful
publications and that they amount to a system of
censorship, curtailing the "free flow of information and
petition and opinion," indispensable to the right of the
people to know matters of public concern guaranteed the
Constitution. Finally they claim that such coercive
invitations constitute intrusions into spheres of individual

Respondents countered by claiming that no issue of
jurisdiction exists since they do not pretend to exercise
jurisdiction over the petitioners. They claimed that what
were sent to petitioners were neither subpoenas nor
summonses, but mere invitations to dialogues which were
completely voluntary, without any compulsion employed
on petitioners. The dialogues themselves were designed
simply to elicit information and exchange of ideas.
Respondents contended that the that the expression of
personal preferences and opinions by members of the
respondent Board is not equivalent to the imposition of
norms and guidelines to be followed by petitioners.
Finally, they argued that the petition filed is moot and
academic because the proceedings before NIB Special
Committee No. 2 (which conducted the interrogations)
have already been ordered terminated by General Fabian
C. Ver in his capacity as Director General and Chairman of
the NIB, and said proceedings have in fact been

Issue: WON the issuance of letters of invitations and the
subsequent interrogations that are conducted thereafter
are valid under the Constitution?

Ruling: No. Invitation with coercion is constitutionally
objectionable. Be that as it may, it is not idle to note that
ordinarily, an invitation to attend a hearing and answer
some questions, which the person invited may heed or
refuse at his pleasure, is not illegal or constitutionally
objectionable. Under certain circumstances, however,
such an invitation can easily assume a different
appearance. Thus, where the invitation comes from a
powerful group composed predominantly of ranking
military officers issued at a time when the country has just
emerged from martial rule and when the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has not entirely
been lifted and the designated interrogation site is a
military camp, the same can easily be taken, not as a
strictly voluntary invitation which it purports to be, but as
an authoritative command which one can only defy at his
peril, especially where, as in the instant case, the
invitation carries the ominous seaming that failure to
appear . . . shall be considered as a waiver . . . and this
Committee will be constrained to proceed in accordance
with law. Fortunately, the NIB director general and
chairman saw the wisdom of terminating the proceedings
and the unwelcome interrogation.
Dispositive: The Supreme Court dismissed the petition.

People vs. Sequino
Facts: Eugenio Godinez, overseer since 1952 of Hacienda
Jose Ancajas in Medellin, Cebu, and Pedro Broniola, the
haciendas bookkeeper, went to the Medellin Rural Bank,
located three kilometers from the hacienda, to withdraw
P50,557.17 to pay for the wages of the hacienda workers.
The banks cashier instructed Jimmy Serafin, janitor and
motorcycle driver of the bank, to drive Godinez and
Broniola back to the hacienda on one of the banks
motorcycles. Serafin drove the motorcycle with Godinez
behind him and Broniola behind Godinez. Godinez carried
the money in a money bag which he hung over his left

As the three were in sitio Lahug, Antipolo, Medellin, Cebu,
and nearing the hacienda, the accused, armed with guns,
tried to block their path and ordered them to stop.
Godinez recognized the armed men because Nenito
Melvida and Emerlindo Sequio used to work in the
hacienda while Vicente Tumangans parents were
Godinezs neighbors.

Serafin drove on, but as the motorcycle went past the
accused, he and Godinez heard a gunshot. Godinez
noticed that Broniola had fallen off the motorcycle.
Serafin leapt from the motorcycle and ran away. The
motorcycle toppled over Godinez, pinning him to the
ground. Accused Tumangan, with gun in hand,
approached Godinex, took the money from the money
bag, and fled on foot with his co-accused. With the
assailants gone, Godinez ran home, leaving Broniola
behind. Meanwhile, Serafin had proceeded to the house
of the Broniolas which was near the crime scene, and
informed Broniolas wife of the incident. SPO Elpidio Luna
received a report from another policeman about a
robbery at Sitio Antipolo. Luna went to the crime scene
and found a piece of paper utilized as toilet paper with a
stool on it. The paper was a bio-date sheet with the name
Melvida, Nenito and the entry for the fathers name
filled with Elpidio Melvida. One bystander volunteered to
take Luna to Elpidio Melvidas house and was not able to
find. Elpidio told Luna that Nonito is not in his house so he
took him to the house of Nenito and found him playing
cards, he asked Nenito to go with him at first he
hesitated but he was persuaded and went with SPO Luna.
In the course of Lunas investigation, Melvida admitted
that he kept his share the loot in his house. Melvida
then was brought to his house where he got P9,000.00, in
one hundred peso bills, placed inside a shoe which he
delivered to the policemen and he also admitted that
admitted that his (Melvidas) companions during the
robbery were Vicente Tumangan and Ermelindo Sequio,
who were staying in the house of Juanito Hones in
Daanlungsod, Medellin, Cebu. Immediately, Mondigo and
policeman Proniely Artiquela proceeded to the house of
Hones where they saw Tumangan and Sequio on the
porch. Noticing something bulging on the waist of
Tumangan, Mondigo and Artiquela approached Tumangan
and asked him what was that bulging at his waist.
Tumangan did not answer. So, Mondigo patted the bulge
which turned out to be a .38 caliber Squires Bingham
revolver with holster and four bullets. When asked if he
had a license for the firearm, Tumangan answered in the
negative. Mondigo and Artiquela then brought Tumangan
and Sequio to the police station. Tumangan was then
investigated in the presence of the Municipal mayor.
Tumangan admitted that he was one of the holdupppers.
Parafin tests were conducted and test yield negative for
Tumangan and Melvida but as to Sequino, the result was

The RTC rendered judgment declaring Tumangan, Melvida
and Sequino guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of robbery with homicide. Hence, this appeal.

Issue: WON voluntary going with the policeman upon such
officers invitation constituted an arrest?

Ruling: Yes. Regardless of Lunas claim to the contrary,
accused Nenito Melvida was arrested. An arrest is the
taking of a person into custody in order that he may be
bound to answer for the commission of an offense, and it
is made by an actual restraint of the person to be
arrested, or by his submission to the custody of the person
making an arrest. Meldivas voluntarily going with Luna
upon the latters invitation was a submission to Lunas
custody, and Luna believed that Melvida was a suspect in
the robbery charged herein, hence, Melvida was being
held to answer for the commission of the said offense.
Disposition: WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED
and the challenged decision of Branch 21 of the Regional
Trial Court of Cebu City of 24 February 1994 in Criminal
Case No. CBU-22486 is hereby AFFIRMED, subject to the
following modifications, viz., the award of P10,000.00
each to Eugenio Godinez and Jimmy Serafin are deleted,
while that for Presentacion vda de Broniola shall only be
considered as moral damages, and that the accused-
appellants are hereby ordered, jointly and severally, to
indemnify the Hacienda Jose Ancajas of Medellin, Cebu,
the sum of Fifty Thousand Five Hundred and Seventy-
Seven Pesos and Seventeen Centavos (P50,577.17), with
interest thereon at the legal rate reckoned from 24 April
1991 and until it shall have been fully paid.
Costs against the accused-appellants.

People vs. Del Rosario
Facts: On 13 May 1996 between 6:00 and 6:30 p.m., Paul
Vincent Alonzo stopped his tricycle by the side of Nita's
Drugstore, General Luna St., Cabanatuan City, when three
women flagged him. Parked at a distance of about 1
meters in front of him was a tricycle driven by Joselito del
Rosario y Pascual. At that point, Alonzo saw 2 men and a
woman (Virginia Bernas) grappling for possession of a bag.
After taking hold of the bag one of the two men (Ernesto
"Jun" Marquez) armed with a gun started chasing a man
who was trying to help the woman, while the other
snatcher ("Dodong" Bisaya) kicked the woman sending her
to the ground. Soon after, the armed man returned and
while the woman was still on the ground he shot her on
the head. The bag taken by the man was brought to the
tricycle of del Rosario where someone inside (Virgilio
"Boy" Santos) received the bag. The armed man then sat
behind the driver while his companion entered the
sidecar. When the tricycle sped away Alonzo gave chase
and was able to get the plate number of the tricycle. He
also recognized the driver, after which he went to the
nearest police headquarters and reported the incident.
Upon finding the name of the owner of the tricycle, SP04
Geronimo de Leon and his team proceeded to Bakod
Bayan in the house of the barangay captain where the
owner of the tricycle was summoned and who in turn
revealed the driver's name and was invited for interview.
Del Rosario volunteered to name his passengers on 13
May 1996.

On the way to the police station, del Rosario informed
them of the bag and lunch kit's location and the place
where the hold-uppers may be found and they reported
these findings to their officers, Capt. Biag and Capt. Cruz.
After lunch, they proceeded to Brgy. Dicarma composed of
15 armed men where a shoot-out transpired that lasted
from 1:00 to 4:00 p.m. After a brief encounter, they went
inside the house where they found Marquez dead holding
a magazine and a gun. While all of these were happening,
del Rosario was at the back of the school, handcuffed by
the police because allegedly they had already gathered
enough evidence against him and they were afraid that he
might attempt to escape. After the encounter, they went
back to the police station. The investigator took the
statement of del Rosario on 14 May 1996, and was only
subscribed on 22 May 1996. All the while, he was detained
in the police station as ordered by the Fiscal. His
statements were only signed on 16 May 1996. He also
executed a waiver of his detention. His Sinumpaang
Salaysay was done with the assistance of Ex-Judge
Talavera. Del Rosario, on the other hand, claimed that he
was hired for P120.00 by "Boy" Santos to drive him to a
cockpit at the Blas Edward Coliseum but was directed him
to proceed to the market place to fetch "Jun" Marquez
and "Dodong" Bisaya; where the robbery homicide
occurred. He claimed that the 3 men alighted and warned
del Rosario not to inform the police authorities about the
incident otherwise he and his family would be harmed.
Del Rosario then went home. Because of the threat,
however, he did not report the matter to the owner of the
tricycle nor to the barangay captain and the police. Del
Rosario, Marquez, Santos, and John Doe alias "Dodong"
were charged with the special complex crime of Robbery
with Homicide for having robbed Virginia Bernas, a 66-
year old businesswoman, of P200,000.00 in cash and
jewelry and on the occasion thereof shot and killed her.
While del Rosario pleaded not guilty, Santos and alias
"Dodong" remained at large. Thus, only del Rosario was
tried. The trial court found del Rosario guilty as co-
principal in the crime of Robbery with Homicide and
sentencing him to death, and to pay the heirs of victim
Virginia Bernas P550,000.00 as actual damages and
P100,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages. Hence, the
automatic review.

Issue: WON Del Rosario was deprived of his rights during
custodial investigation at the time he was invited for
questioning at the house of the barangay captain?

Ruling: Yes. From the foregoing, it is clear that del Rosario
was deprived of his rights during custodial
investigation. From the time he was "invited" for
questioning at the house of the barangay captain, he was
already undereffective custodial investigation, but he was
not apprised nor made aware thereof by the investigating
officers. The police already knew the name of the tricycle
driver and the latter was already a suspect in the robbing
and senseless slaying of Virginia Bernas. Since the
prosecution failed to establish that del Rosario had waived
his right to remain silent, his verbal admissions on his
participation in the crime even before his actual arrest
were inadmissible against him, as the same transgressed
the safeguards provided by law and the Bill of Rights.
Custodial investigation is the stage where the police
investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular
suspect taken into custody by the police who carry out a
process of interrogation that lends itself to elicit
incriminating statements. It is well-settled that it
encompasses any question initiated by law enforcers after
a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.
This concept of custodial investigation has been
broadened by RA 7438 to include "the Practice of issuing
an 'invitation' to a person who is investigated
in connection with an offense he is suspected to have
committed." Section 2 of the same Act further provides
that -
x x x x Any public officer or employee, or anyone acting
under his order or in his place, who arrests, detains or
investigates any person for the commission of an offense
shall inform the latter, in a language known and
understood by him of his right to remain silent and to
have competent and independent counsel, preferably of
his own choice, who shall at all times be allowed to confer
privately with the person arrested, detained or under
custodial investigation. If such person cannot afford the
services of his own counsel, he must be provided with a
competent and independent counsel by the investigating
Herein, Del Rosario was a hapless victim who was forcibly
used by other persons with nefarious designs to
perpetrate a dastardly act. Del Rosario's defense of
"irresistible force" has been substantiated by clear and
convincing evidence. Del Rosario was threatened with a
gun. He could not therefore be expected to flee nor risk
his life to help a stranger. A person under the same
circumstances would be more concerned with his personal
welfare and security rather than the safety of a person
whom he only saw for the first time that day. On the other
hand, conspiracy between him and his co-accused was not
proved beyond a whimper of a doubt by the prosecution,
thus clearing del Rosario of any complicity in the crime
Disposition: WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Cabanatuan City convicting accused
Homicide and sentencing him to death, is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE, and the accused is ACQUITTED of the crime
charged. His immediate RELEASE from confinement is
ordered unless held for some other lawful cause. In this
regard, the Director of Prisons is directed to report to the
Court his compliance herewith within five (5) days from
receipt hereof.

Facts--The case is an appeal from the decision of the
Regional Trial Court finding accused Alberto Pasudag y
Bokang guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal
cultivation of marijuana and sentencing him to reclusion
perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00, without
subsidiary penalty and accessories of the law.

SPO2 Pepito Calip went to Brgy. Artacho to conduct anti-
jueteng operations. He urinated at a bushy bamboo fence
behind the public school. About five (5) meters away, he
saw a garden of about 70 square meters. There were
marijuana plants in between corn plants and camote tops.
He inquired from a storekeeper nearby as to who owned
the house with the garden. The storeowner told him that
Alberto Pasudag owned it.

SPO2 Calip went to the Police Station and reported to
Chief of Police Romeo C. Astrero. The latter dispatched
team to conduct an investigation. At around 2:30 in that
same afternoon, the team arrived at Brgy; Artacho and
went straight to the house of accused Pasudag. SPO3
Fajarito looked for accused Pasudag and asked him to
bring the team to his backyard garden which was about
five (5) meters away.

Upon seeing the marijuana plants, the policemen called
for a photographer, who took pictures of accused Pasudag
standing besides one of the marijuana plants. They
uprooted seven (7) marijuana plants. The team brought
accused Pasudag and the marijuana plants to the police

At the police station, accused Pasudag admitted, in the
presence of Chief of Police Astrero, that he owned the
marijuana plants. SPO3 Fajarito prepared a confiscation
report which accused Pasudag signed. He kept the six
marijuana plants inside the cabinet in the office of the
Chief of Police and brought the tallest plant to the PNP
Crime Laboratory for examination. The examination was
positive for marijuana.

The trial court rendered a decision finding the accused
guilty as charged and, taking into consideration his
educational attainment (he reached only grade IV),
imposed the minimum of the imposable penalty.

Hence, this appeal.


I. Whether or not marijuana is admissible as evidence. NO!

II. Whether or not the confiscation report was not an
extrajudicial admission which required the intervention of
his counsel. YES!


We find the appeal meritorious.

I. As a general rule, the procurement of a search warrant is
required before a law enforcer may validly search or seize
the person, house, papers or effects of any individual. The
Constitution provides that "the right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, x x x." Any
evidence obtained in violation of this provision is

In tile case at bar, the police authorities had ample
opportunity to secure from the court a search warrant.
SPO2 Pepito Calip inquired as to who owned the house.
He was acquainted with marijuana plants and immediately
recognized that some plants in the backyard of the house
were marijuana plants. Time was not of the essence to
uproot and confiscate the plants. They were three months
old and there was no sufficient reason to believe that they
would be uprooted on that same day.

In People vs. Valdez the Court ruled that search and
seizure conducted without the requisite judicial warrant is
illegal and void ab initio. The prosecution's evidence
clearly established that the police conducted a search of
accused's backyard garden without a warrant; they had
sufficient time to obtain a search warrant; they failed to
secure one. There was no showing of urgency or necessity
for the warrantless search, or the immediate seizure of
the marijuana plants.

"Lawmen cannot be allowed to violate the very law they
are expected to enforce."

"The Court is not unmindful of the difficulties of law
enforcement agencies in suppressing the illegal traffic of
dangerous drugs. However, quick solutions of crimes and
apprehension of malefactors do not justify a callous
disregard of the Bill of Rights." We need not underscore
that the protection against illegal search and seizure is
constitutionally mandated and only under specific
instances are searches allowed without warrants." "The
mantle of protection extended by the Bill of Rights covers
both innocent and guilty alike against any form of high
handedness of law enforcers, regardless of the praise
worthiness of their intentions."

With the illegal seizure of the marijuana plants subject of
this case, the seized plants are inadmissible in evidence
against accused-appellant.

The arrest of accused-appellant was tainted with
constitutional infirmity. The accused-appellant was not
inform of his constitutional rights.

II. After the interrogation, SPO3 Fajarito prepared a
confiscation report,

which was part of the investigation.
Accused-Appellant signed the confiscation report. In both,
the interrogation and the signing of the confiscation
receipt, no counsel assisted accused-appellant. He was the
only civilian present in the Office of the Chief of Police.

We do not agree with the Solicitor General that accused-
appellant was not under custodial investigation when he
signed the confiscation receipt. It has been held
repeatedly that custodial investigation commences when
a person is taken into custody and is singled out as a
suspect in the commission of a crime under investigation
and the police officers begin to ask questions on the
suspect's participation therein and which tend to elicit an
admission. Obviously, accused-appellant was a suspect
from the moment the police team went to his house and
ordered the uprooting of the marijuana plants in his
backyard garden.

"The implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any,
could not have been more that mere passive conformity
given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is
thus considered no consent at all within the purview of
the constitutional guarantee." Even if the confession or
admission were "gospel truth", if it was made without
assistance of counsel and without a valid waiver of such
assistance, the confession is inadmissible in evidence.

In light of the foregoing, we uphold the constitutional
right of accused-appellant to a presumption of innocence.
The prosecution failed to establish his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant ALBERTO
PASUDAG y BOKANG is ACQUITED of the crime charged
for lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt. The Director of
Corrections is hereby directed to forthwith release
accused-appellant unless he is held for another case, and
to inform the Court of the action taken hereon within ten
(10) days from notice.

Facts--The case is an appeal of accused Maximo Velarde y
de los Reyes, Nelson Garcia y Temporas and Tito Zuela y
Morandarte from the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Camarines Sur, Libmanan, Branch 24, finding them guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide and
sentencing each of them to reclusion perpetua, and to pay
jointly and severally the amount of one hundred thousand
(P100,000.00) pesos to the heirs of Maria Abendao and
John Abendao, and fifty thousand (P50,000.00) pesos to
the heirs of Hegino Hernandez, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

Assistant Provincial Fiscal Julian C. Ocampo III filed with
the Regional Trial Court an information charging accused
Maximo Velarde y de los Reyes, Nelson Garcia y Temporas
and Tito Zuela y Morandarte with "robbery with triple

On June 1, 1985 Maximo Velarde was arrested at
Magallanes, Sorsogon, while accused Nelson Garcia and
Tito Zuela were arrested at Cabusao, Camarines Sur on
June 4, 1985 and June 9, 1985, respectively.

All three accused, were arraigned with the assistance of
their counsel, and pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial

The evidence established the following facts:

The three accused allegedly robbed Maria Abendano and
killed her, her son and her driver during a delivery of the
palay she buys and sells. Romualda, Marias sister whose
store was beside Marias, was the witness in this case.

Romualda stated that she saw the three accused board
the jeepney of Maria during a delivery. Gerardo, to whom
the palay was going to be delivered, saw Maximo inside
the jeepney during the delivery of the palay to his ricemill.

The following morning, the bodies of Maria, her son and
her driver were found in rigor mortis condition at New
Poblacion, Cabusao, Camarines Sur.

According to Romualda, the 3 accused conceived the
planto hold-up Maria while drinking in front of Romualdas
store because Maximo needed money to go to Manila.
Maximo was supposed to board the jeep while the two
others would wait somewhere else to board the jeepney
and hold-up Maria.

The crime happened.

Though there were no eyewitnesses, the prosecution
established how the crime was committed with the
testimony of Romualda Algarin, which was in turn based
on the extrajudicial admission given by Maximo Velarde to
Romualda when she visited the latter at the municipal jail.

On June 1, 1985, Lt. Ernesto J. Idian, Station Commander
assisted by two (2) other policemen, arrested Maximo.
Though no warrant of arrest had been issued, Maximo
was immediately brought to the Camaligan police station
where he was investigated and asked to give a written
statement in the presence of Atty. Jose Ocampo from the
Citizen's Legal Assistance Office (CLAO), Naga City.

On June 4, and 9, 1985, Tito and Nelson were taken into
police custody without a warrant. They underwent
custodial investigation without the assistance of counsel
because no lawyer could be found in Cabusao, Camarines

On the last page of each accused's confession appeared a
statement, in their own handwriting, to the effect that
they voluntarily gave their statements and that no one
coerced or promised them anything to admit
responsibility for the crime.

The three signed their individual statements in front
of Judge Valencia Bagalacsa. She followed the same
procedure and line of questioning, using the local dialect,
in ascertaining the voluntariness of the confessions. She
ordered Lt. Idian and his companions to leave her and the
accused inside the chamber.

Satisfied that they were properly apprised of their rights
and that they voluntarily executed their statements, she
had them sign their individual extrajudicial statements.
The three accused interposed common defenses: denial
and they were tortured and forced to make a confession.
Tito and Nelson also claimed that they were not assisted
by counsel when their confessions were taken.

Maximo claimed that he went with Lt. Idian because he
was told that his parents wanted to see him because his
brother died. He was shown a picture of the cadaver.
Along the way, he felt a hard object hit his head and he
passed out. When he regained consciousness, he was
already handcuffed. Pointing a gun, Lt. Idian told him that
he could choose either to die or to sign the statement
they prepared because his brother had wronged them. He
was warned not to tell anyone that he was mauled.

Two days later, in front of Lt. Idian, Atty. Ocampo and Pat.
Refe, Atty. Ocampo read a prepared statement. He
refused to sign. He overheard that he was going to be
made to sign in front of Atty. Ocampo.

According to Maximo, he was kicked in the stomach and a
gun was poked at him. He signed the statement out of
fear. He was also made to sign another statement in front
of Judge Valencia Bagalacsa. Fromthe time he was
arrested, he was never released.

Nelson Garcia denied knowledge of the crime and claimed
that he was mauled by Lt. Idian when his group went to
Garcias house to invite him to the station. He was mauled
again at the station and to prevent injury, he just signed
the prepared statement. He also claimed that he was
neither informed of the contents nor assisted by counsel.
He was asked to copy in his own handwriting the prepared
statement. He was never released from custody from the
time he was arrested.

Tito also claimed that he was arrested and was mauled in
order to make him sign the prepared statement. He also
claimed that he was neither informed of the contents nor
assisted by counsel.


Whether or not the extra-judicial confessions were
executed in accordance with the provisions of the 1973
Constitution, in light of the fact that the crime took place
in 1985.

The pertinent provision of the 1973 Constitution provides:

Art. IV, Section 20. No person shall be compelled to be a
witness against himself. Any person under investigation
for the commission of an offense shall have the right to
remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such
right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other
means, which vitiates the free will, shall be used against
him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section
shall be inadmissible in evidence.

The right to counsel attaches the moment an investigating
officer starts to ask questions to elicit information on the
crime from the suspected offender. It is at this point that
the law requires the assistance of counsel to avoid the
pernicious practice of extorting forced or coerced
admissions or confessions from the person undergoing
interrogation. In other words, "the moment there is a
move or even urge of said investigators to elicit
admissions or confessions or even plain information which
may appear innocent or innocuous at the time, from said
suspect, he should then and there be assisted by counsel,
unless he waives the right, but the waiver shall be made in
writing and in the presence of counsel."

There was no evidence that Maximo executed a waiver of
his right to counsel. In light of these facts, we are
constrained to the rule that Maximo Velarde's extra-
judicial statement is inadmissible in evidence. "An
uncounselled extra-judicial confession without a valid
waiver of the right to counsel that is, in writing and in
the presence of counsel is inadmissible in evidence."

The respective sworn statements of appellants Tito and
Nelson were likewise inadmissible in evidence because
they were executed without the assistance of counsel.
Despite the fact that the reason for the absence of lawyer
during the custodial investigation was the scarcity of
lawyers in the area, the Court could not be lenient in this
case. The absence or scarcity of lawyers in any given place
is not a valid reason for defying the constitutional
mandate on counseled confessions.

Contrary to the ruling of the trial court, the defect in the
confessions of Tito and Nelson was not cured by their
signing the extra-judicial statements before Judge

With regard to Maximo, he repeated the statements to
Romualda who related these in court. That is admissible.
Constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do
not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited
through questioning by the authorities, but given in an
ordinary manner whereby appellant orally admitted
having committed the crime.

Romualda's testimony on accused-appellant Maximo's
admission sealed not only the latter's fate but also that of
appellants Tito and Nelson. The rule that an extrajudicial
confession is binding only upon the confessant and is not
admissible against his co-accused because the latter has
no opportunity to cross-examine the confessant and
therefore, as against him, the confession is hearsay, is not
applicable here. What is involved here is an admission, not
a confession.
Wharton distinguished these terms as follows: A
confession is an acknowledgment in express terms, by a
party in a criminal case, of his guilt of the crime charged,
while an admission is a statement by the accused, direct
or implied, of facts pertinent to the issue and tending, in
connection with proof of other facts, to prove his guilt. In
other words, an admission is something less than a
confession, and is but an acknowledgment of some fact or
circumstance which in itself is insufficient to authorize a
conviction and which tends only to establish the ultimate
fact of guilt.

Appellants Tito and Nelson were afforded the opportunity
to cross-examine witness Romualda on accused-appellant
Maximo's declaration. They could have questioned its
veracity by presenting evidence in support of their
defenses of denial and alibi so they could put to test
Romualda's credibility. Having failed to do so, Romualda's
testimony, which the trial court correctly considered as
credible, stands unscathed.

Other note: Crime changed from "robbery with triple
homicide" to robbery with homicide.

decision of the trial court. The Court renders judgment
finding accused-appellants Tito Zuela y Morandarte,
Maximo Velarde y de los Reyes, Nelson Garcia y Temporas
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide,
defined and penalized under Article 294 (1) of the Revised
Penal Code, and sentences each of them to reclusion
perpetua with all its accessory penalties and to pay civil
indemnity of one hundred thousand (P100,000.00) pesos
to the heirs of Maria Abendao and John Abendao and
fifty thousand (P50,000.00) pesos to the heirs of Hegino
Hernandez, Jr.

In addition, the Court sentences each of the accused-
appellants solidarily to pay the additional amounts of forty
three thousand (P43,000.00) pesos as reimbursement of
damages to the heirs of Maria Abendao, and fifty
thousand (P50,000.00) pesos as exemplary damages to
the heirs of each of the three (3) victims.

Facts--For automatic review is the decision by the
Regional Trial Court which found appellant Abe Valdez y
Dela Cruz guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violating
Section 9 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (R.A. No.
6425), as amended by R.A. No. 7659. He was sentenced to
suffer the penalty of death by lethal injection.

Accused-appellant was caught in flagrante delicto and
without authority of law, plant, cultivate and culture seven
(7) fully grown marijuana plants known as Indian Hemp.

Appellant was arraigned and, with assistance of counsel,
pleaded not guilty to the charge.

SPO3 Marcelo Tipay, a member of the police force
testified that he received a tip from an unnamed informer
about the presence of a marijuana plantation, allegedly
owned by appellant. The prohibited plants were allegedly
planted close to appellant's hut. Police Inspector
Alejandro R. Parungao, Chief of Police, then formed a
reaction team from his operatives to verify the report.
Inspector Parungao gave them specific instructions to
"uproot said marijuana plants and arrest the cultivator of

Said police team, accompanied by their informer, left for
the site where the marijuana plants were allegedly being
grown. The police found appellant alone in his nipa hut.
They, then, proceeded to look around the area where
appellant had his kaingin and saw seven (7) five-foot high,
flowering marijuana plants in two rows, from appellant's
hut. PO2 Balut asked appellant who owned the prohibited
plants and, according to Balut, the latter admitted that
they were his. The police uprooted the seven marijuana
plants. The police took photos of appellant standing
beside the cannabis plants. Appellant was then arrested.
One of the plants was sent to the Philippine National
Police Crime Laboratory for analysis and it had a positive
indication for marijuana.

Accused-appellant testified that he was weeding his
vegetable farm when he was called by a person whose
identity he does not know. He was asked to go with the
latter to "see something." This unknown person then
brought appellant to the place where the marijuana plants
were found, approximately 100 meters away from his nipa
hut. Five armed policemen were present and they made
him stand in front of the hemp plants. He was then asked
if he knew anything about the marijuana growing there.
When he denied any knowledge thereof, SPO2 Libunao
poked a fist at him and told him to admit ownership of the
plants. Appellant was so nervous and afraid that he
admitted owning the marijuana. The police then took a
photo of him standing in front of one of the marijuana
plants. He was then made to uproot five of the cannabis
plants, and bring them to his hut, where another photo
was taken of him standing next to a bundle of uprooted
marijuana plants. The police team then brought him to the
police station. At the police headquarters, appellant
reiterated that he knew nothing about the marijuana
plants seized by the police.

The trial court held appellant liable as charged for
cultivation and ownership of marijuana plants.
"WHEREFORE, finding the accused GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of cultivating marijuana plants
punishable under section 9 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972, as amended, accused is hereby sentenced to death
by lethal injection. Costs against the accused.


Whether or not that the admission of the appellant-
accused that the plants were his was made under
custodial investigation. Yes! Therefore, admission is
inadmissible as evidence because it was made without a


In convicting appellant, the trial court likewise relied on
the testimony of the police officers to the effect that
appellant admitted ownership of the marijuana when he
was asked who planted them. It made the following

"It may be true that the admission to the police by the
accused that he planted the marijuana plants was made in
the absence of any independent and competent counsel.
But the accused was not, at the time of police verification;
under custodial investigation. His admission is, therefore,
admissible in evidence and not violative of the
constitutional fiat that admission given during custodial
investigation is not admissible if given without any

Appellant now argues that his admission of ownership of
the marijuana plants in question cannot be used against
him for being violative of his right to counsel during the
police investigation. Hence, it was error for the trial court
to have relied upon said admission of ownership. He
submits that the investigation conducted by the police
officers was not a general inquiry, but was meant to elicit
information on the ownership of the marijuana plants.
Appellant theorizes that since the investigation had
narrowed down to him, competent and independent
counsel should have assisted him, when the police sought
information from him regarding the ownership of the
prohibited plants. Appellant claims the presumption of
regularity of duty of officers cannot be made to apply to
his purported voluntarily confession of ownership of the
marijuana plants. Nor can it override his constitutional
right to counsel during investigation.

The Office of the Solicitor General believes otherwise. The
OSG avers that appellant was not yet under custodial
investigation when he admitted to the police that he
owned the marijuana plants. His right to competent and
independent counsel, accordingly, had not yet attached.
Moreover, appellants failure to impute any false motive
for the police officers to falsely accuse him indicates that
the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duties by police officers was not sufficiently

The Constitution plainly declares that any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have
the right: (1) to remain silent; (2) to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice; and (3)
to be informed of such rights. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
An investigation begins when it is no longer a general
inquiry but starts to focus on a particular person as a
suspect, i.e., when the police investigator starts
interrogating or exacting a confession from the suspect in
connection with an alleged offense. The moment the
police try to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain
information from a person suspected of having committed
an offense, he should at that juncture be assisted by
counsel, unless he waives the right in writing and in the
presence of counsel.

In the instant case we find that, from the start, a tipster
had furnished the police appellant's name as well as the
location of appellant's farm, where the marijuana plants
were allegedly being grown. While the police operation
was supposedly meant to merely "verify" said information,
the police chief had likewise issued instructions to arrest
appellant as a suspected marijuana cultivator. Thus, at the
time the police talked to appellant in his farm, the latter
was already under investigation as a suspect. The
questioning by the police was no longer a general inquiry.

Under cross-examination, PO2 Balut stated, he "did not
yet admit that he is the cultivator of that marijuana so we
just asked him and I think there is no need to inform (him
of) his constitutional rights because we are just asking
him..." In trying to elicit information from appellant, the
police was already investigating appellant as a suspect. At
this point, he was already under custodial investigation
and had a right to counsel even if he had not yet been
arrested. Custodial investigation is "questioning initiated
by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken
into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of
action in any significant way." As a suspect, two armed
policemen interrogated appellant. Behind his inquisitors
were a barangay peace officer and three other armed
policemen. All had been dispatched to arrest him. From
these circumstances, we may infer that appellant had
already been deprived of his freedom of action in a
significant way, even before the actual arrest. Note that
even before he was arrested, the police made him
incriminatingly pose for photos in front of the marijuana

Moreover, we find appellant's extrajudicial confession
flawed with respect to its admissibility. For a confession to
be admissible, it must satisfy the following requirements:
(1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the
assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) it
must be express; and (4) it must be in writing. The records
show that the admission by appellant was verbal. It was
also uncounselled. A verbal admission allegedly made by
an accused during the investigation, without the
assistance of counsel at the time of his arrest and even
before his formal investigation is not only inadmissible for
being violative of the right to counsel during criminal
investigations, it is also hearsay. Even if the confession or
admission were "gospel truth", if it was made without
assistance of counsel and without a valid waiver of such
assistance, the confession is inadmissible in evidence,
regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had
been voluntarily given.

341 SCRA 645 (2000)


On appeal is the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
convicting appellant and his co-accused of the crime of
murder, sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion

Early in the morning, at the Far East Bank and Trust
Company, a messenger discovered the lifeless body of
Matias, inside the bank premises. SPO3 Mendoza and two
other officers of the Western Police District arrived after
receiving a report on the incident. They interviewed the
bank janitor and the other security guard.

Jamoralin and four other WPD policemen conducted a
follow-up investigation and learned that there was an on-
going construction on the upper floors of the bank, and
that appellant and his co-accused had access to the bank
after office hours. On the third floor, they saw the co-
accused, Rodriguez, packing his personal belongings. SPO3
Jamoralin and the other police officers saw a pair of worn-
out maong pants on appellants bed, which had reddish
stains on the right leg. The police also saw reddish stains
on accuseds shirt. Rodriguez explained that he had a
wound on his neck but police found no wound. The police
then arrested Rodriguez and appellant and brought them
to the police station for interrogation. The police took the
maong and t-shirt and had them examined by the
Chemistry Section of National Bureau of Investigation

Rodriguez executed a sworn statement confessing that he
and appellant together with three other men, killed
Matias. Rodriguez was assisted by Atty. Procopio Lao III, of
the Public Attorneys Office.

Appellant and Rodriguez were charged with the crime of
Robbery with Homicide.

Appellant and Rodriguez plead not guilty.

Both Rodriguez and appellant admitted that they were
provincemates and co-workers in the construction site.
They slept inside the building on the night before the
incident but denied any participation in killing. They
claimed that they learned of the killing when they saw
many people milling around the area. Rodriguez claimed
that he was mauled by policemen to confess to the crime.
Appellant, on his part, testified that the policemen merely
placed him outside the room where Rodriguez was being
interrogated, and that the police did not take any
statement from him. Appellant also denied owning the
maong pants which the police said were taken from his

The trial court rendered a decision finding appellant and
Rodriguez guilty of murder, instead of robbery with

Only appellant pursued his appeal. Rodriguez withdrew his
appeal for financial reasons.


Whether or not the extrajudicial confession of accused
Rodriguez is admissible not only against him but also
against appellant. No!


We find that Rodriguezs confession is constitutionally
flawed so that it could not be used as evidence against
them at all.

The four fundamental requisites for the admissibility of a
confession are (1) the confession must be voluntary; (2)
the confession must be made with the assistance of
competent and independent counsel; (3) the confession
must be express; and (4) the confession must be in

We find the second requisite lacking. Prosecution witness
SPO3 Jamoralin testified that the accused and appellant
were arrested and brought to the police. The records
show that the extrajudicial confession of Rodriguez was
taken down by Pat. David D. Tuazon. Atty. Lao confirmed
on the stand that the police investigators called him and
that he conferred with the accused for about 10 minutes
prior to the execution of the extrajudicial confession.
Evidently, Rodriguez and appellant were detained for four
days, but Atty. Lao of the PAO was called only on the
fourth day of detention when accused was about to put
his confession in writing. Under the factual milieu, the
moment accused and appellant were arrested and
brought to the police station, they were already under
custodial investigation.

In the case of People v. Bolanos, we held that an accused
who is on board the police vehicle on the way to the police
station is already under custodial investigation, and should
therefore be accorded his rights under the Constitution.

The rights of persons under custodial investigation is
enshrined in Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution
which provides:

Sec. 12 (1) Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel,
he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any
other means which vitiates the free will shall be used
against him. Secret detention places, solitary,
incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are


Custodial investigation refers to the critical pre-trial stage
when the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into
an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular
person as a suspect. When Rodriguez and appellant were
arrested by the police, they were already the suspects in
the slaying of the security guard,

Ramon Matias, and
should have been afforded the rights guaranteed by
Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution, particularly
the right to counsel. The records do not show that
Rodriguez and appellant, at the time of their arrest, were
informed of the well-known Miranda rights. Worse, they
were not provided with competent and independent
counsel during the custodial investigation prior to the
execution of the extrajudicial confession.

In People v. De la Cruz, 279 SCRA 245 (1997), we declared
as inadmissible the extrajudicial confession of accused
where the interrogation started at 9:00 A.M. and his
lawyer arrived only at 11:00 A.M.. Jurisprudence is clear
that an accused under custodial investigation must
continuously have a counsel assisting him from the very
start thereof. In this case, Rodriguez and appellant were in
the hands of the police for about four days without the
assistance of counsel.

The operative act, it has been stressed, is when the police
investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular
suspect who has been taken into custody by the police to
carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to
eliciting incriminatory statements, and not the signing by
the suspect of his supposed extrajudicial confession.

The purpose of providing counsel to a person under
custodial investigation is to curb the uncivilized practice of
extracting confession even by the slightest coercion as
would lead the accused to admit something false. What is
sought to be avoided is the evil of extorting from the very
mouth of the person undergoing interrogation for the
commission of an offense, the very evidence with which to
prosecute and thereafter convict him. These
constitutional guarantees have been made available to
protect him from the inherently coercive psychological, if
not physical, atmosphere of such investigation.

As to appellant, the trial court convicted him on the basis
of two pieces of circumstantial evidence which show
conspiracy: (1) the extrajudicial confession of accused
implicating him as one of the perpetrators and (2) the fact
that the maong pants allegedly belonging to appellant was
found positive of type O blood. The former being
inadmissible and the latter being of no probative value
since the blood type of appellant and the victim were not
taken for purposes of comparison, there remains nothing
to support appellants conviction.

As pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, even
granting arguendo that the extrajudicial confession of
accused was admissible, Section 33 of Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court provides that such confession is only
admissible against the confessant. In order to be
admissible against his co-accused, Section 30 of Rule 130
of the Rules of Court require there must be independent
evidence aside from the extrajudicial confession to prove
conspiracy. In this case, however, no other piece of
evidence was presented to prove the alleged conspiracy.

Although it is only appellant who persisted with the
present appeal, the well-established rule is that an appeal
in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for
review of all its aspects, including those not raised by the
parties. The records show that Rodriguez had withdrawn
his appeal due to financial reasons. However, Section 11
(a) of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides that [a]n
appeal taken by one or more [of] several accused shall not
affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the
judgment of the appellant court is favorable and
applicable to the latter. As we have elucidated, the
evidence against and the conviction of both appellant and
Rodriguez are inextricably linked. Hence, appellants
acquittal, which is favorable and applicable to Rodriguez,
should benefit the latter.

#14. People vs. Muleta
(version of the prosecution)
On April 15, 1993, Charito Delgado, a native of
Oriental Mindoro went to manila to find work. Once in
Manila, she resided in Tondo where her uncle and sister
lived. Shortly thereafter, she landed a job as a saleslady at
the Ali Mall in Cubao.
On April 29, 2013, Charito left Tondo and moved
to Valenzuela. However, when she returned to Tondo to
pick up her remaining baggage, it was the last time she
was seen alive.
On April 30, 1993, Charitos lifeless body was
found naked in Bulacan, tied to a post with the use of a
pair of pants and both her hands tied with a bra. She bore
5 stab wounds.
NBI Agent Ely Tolentino took over the case. Based
on his investigation:
the appellant Domingo Muleta (uncle of the victim
and brother of victims mother Milagros
Delgado), left his workplace (Loadstar Shipping
Lines located at Pier 16 Tondo) around 9:30 pm
and reported 8 pm the next day;
that when appellant was requested to go to NBI
Manila, he readily obliged;
that during the custodial investigation, where he
was assisted with a counsel Atty. Deborah Daquis,
he admitted having raped and killed Charito;
that another eyewitness Danilo Delgado, testified
that during the wake of Charito, appellant
became hysterical, crying, shaking his head and
muttering: patawarin mo ako Charito, ikaw kasi
lumaban pa, nakakahiya, mabuti pang mamatay
na. Delgado saw appellant drink Chlorux after
which he fell to the ground and was rushed to
(version of the defense)
Accused, who presented himself as witness,
denied having committed the crime. He was
unscrupulously picked by NBI and forced to admit the
That on April 30, he left his house 5:30pm and
went to the house where Charito lived. He learned from
his sister that Charito transferred to another house and
was then missing. He reported the matter to authorities.
Accused was tortured and was forced to sign a
document which he was not able to read and he was not
accompanied by a lawyer.
Accused appeals the decision of RTC Bulacan
finding him guilty of complex crime of rape with homicide.

WON the accused extra judicial confession was
Appeal is meritorious. Confessions extracted
without the assistance of counsel are taboo and useless in
the court of law.
To be acceptable, extrajudicial confessions must
conform to constitutional requirements. A confession is
not valid and not admissible in evidence when it is
obtained in violation of any of the following rights of
persons under custodial investigation:
to remain silent;
to have independent and competent counsel
preferable of their own choice;
to be provided with counsel if they are unable to
secure one;
to be assisted by such counsel during the
to have such counsel present when they decide to
waive these rights; and
to be informed of all these rights and of the fact
that anything they say can be used against them in

Flagrantly violated in this case were the appellants right
to be informed of his rights under custodial investigation,
his right to counsel, as well as this right to have said
counsel present during the waiver of his rights under
custodial investigation.
One final note. In acquitting the appellant, the Court is not
saying that he did not commit the offense charged. The
prosecution failed to present credible and admissible
evidence of appellants guilt. The strongest evidence of
the prosecution is the extrajudicial confession of the
appellant. But the Constitution is clear a confession
obtained in violation of the rights of an accused cannot be
used as evidence. Without Muletas confession, the other
pieces of the circumstantial evidence lose their

#15. People vs. Tan
On December 15, 1988, about 7 pm, tricycle driver
Freddie Saavedra went to see his wife, Delfa, at our Lady
of Angels Academy to inform her that he will drive both
accused Lito Amido and accused-appellant Herson Tan to
Barangay Maligaya. It was the last time Freddie was seen
When he failed to return that evening, Delfa
inquired on his whereabouts. A certain Arnel Villarama
revealed that the lifeless body of her husband was
discovered on the diversion road at Atimonan. They found
him sprawled on the ground with 14 stab wounds in his
Lt. Carlos Santos proceeded to the crime scene
and found a blue sidecar. Subsequently, the appellant was
invited in connection with the instant case and with
respect to 2 robbery cases reported in Lucena City.
During their conversation, appellant allegedly
gave an explicit account of what really actually transpired
in the case at bar. He narrated that he and co-accused
Amido were responsible for the loss of the motorcycle and
the consequent death of Saavedra.
Lt. Carlos, on cross examination, testified that
when he invited appellant to their headquarters, he had
no warrant of arrest. In the course thereof, he informed
the latter that he was a suspect, not only in the instant
case, but also in the 2 robbery cases. In the belief that
they were only conversing inside the police station, he
admitted he did not inform appellant of his constitutional
rights to remain silent and to the assistance of counsel;
nor did her reduce the supposed confession in writing.
Appellant alleged that he had no participation in
the offense charged and contended that his only
involvement in the matter was the referral of accused
Amido. Amido present the defense of alibi.
Appellant was found guilty. Meanwhile, Amido
was acquitted due to insufficiency of evidence.
Appellant assails the finding of conviction despite
the failure of the prosecution to positively identify him as
the culprit of the crime and to present clear and
convincing circumstantial evidence that would overcome
his innocence.
WON the uncounselled confession or admission of the
accused violates his Constitutional right?
The appealed decision is set aside and appellant is
acquitted on the ground that his constitutional rights were
Art. III, Sec. 12 (1)-(3):
Sec. 12(1) Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his rights and to have competent and
independent counsel preferable of his own choice. If the
person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These righrs cannot be waived except
in writing and in the presence of counsel.
Sec. 12(3) any confession obtained in violation of this or
the preceding section shall be inadmissible against him.
Custodial investigation involves any questioning
initiated by law enforcement authorities after a person is
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom
of action in any significant manner. The rules on custodial
investigation begin to operate as soon as the investigation
ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and
begins to focus a particular suspect, the suspect is taken
into custody, and the police carries out a process of
interrogations that tends itself to eliciting incriminating
statements that the rule begins to operate.
RA7438 (protecting the rights of persons under custodial
investigation) as used in this Act, custodial investigation
shall include the practice of issuing an invitation to a
person who is investigated in connection with an offense
he is suspected to have committed, without prejudice to
the liability of the inviting officer for any violation of the
What remains of the evidence of the
prosecution is inadequate to warrant a conviction.
Considering the circumstances attendant in the conduct of
appellants investigation which fell short of compliance
with constitutional safeguards, we are constrained to
acquit the appellant.

#16. People vs. Obrero
(version of the prosecution)
In the morning August 11, 1989, the accused-
appellant Jimmy Obrero was asked to deliver dressed
chicken to Emma Cabrera, a regular customer at Sta. Cruz,
Manila. About 10:20am, Jimmy came back and turned
over to his employer the amount of P2,000.
Pat. Ines testified that after receiving a report of
killing, he and Pfc. Ricardo Sibal went to see Angie
Cabosas from which they learned that she received a call
from Emma informing her that her house had been
robbed and her 2 maids killed.
Pat. Ines identified 2 sworn statements, one of
which was executed by Helen Moral, a househelp of
Emma. In her statement, upon arriving in the house that
day, she and her employers nephew found the bodies of
the victims sprawled in the floor. She told Pat. Ines that
the accused-appellant used to deliver pork and dressed
chicken to their place. On the other hand, Anita De Los
Reyes, testified that she saw Jimmy and Ronnie Liwanag,
their hands covered with blood, coming out of the Gatlin
Building on C.M. Recto, Sta. Cruz, Manila.
Pat. Ines testified that they received an
information that accused-appellant was in Urdaneta,
Pangasinan. Accordingly, they went to the place and were
able to apprehend accused-appellant whom they brought
to Manila. Accused-appellant was positively identified by
Pat. Ines testified that accused-appellant gave a
confession in writing with the assistance of counsel, Atty.
Bienvenido De Los Reyes, in which he admitted the killing.
Pat. Ines himself executed an affidavit stating the
circumstances of the accused-appellants arrest. He said
accused-appellant refused to sign the booking and
information sheet.
(version of the defense)
Defense presented, Jimmy as its sole witness. He
denied participation in the commission of the crime.
According to him, on August 11, 1989, about 9:00am, he
delivered dressed chickens to Emmas residence. He came
back from his errand around 10:20am and remitted the
amount of P2,000.
He claimed that, after being informed of the
charges against him, he was beaten up and detained for a
week and made to execute an extrajudicial confession. He
denied having known Atty. De Los Reyes before and stated
that he did not understand the contents of the
extrajudicial confession which he signed because he does
not know how to read.
RTC found accused-appellant guilty of the crime of
Robbery with Homicide. Hence, this instant appeal.
WON the confession of the accused-appellant is
inadmissible as evidence?
The confession of the accused-appellant is
inadmissible because of the fact that he was not given the
Miranda warnings effectively. Under the Constitution, an
uncounselled statement is presumed to be psychologically
coerced. Swept into an unfamiliar environment and
surrounded by intimidating figures typical of the
atmosphere of police interrogation, the suspect really
needs the guiding hand of counsel.
It is required that the suspect in custodial
interrogation must be given the following warnings:
1. he must be informed of his rights to remain silent;
2. he must be warned that anything he says can and
will be used against him; and
3. he must be told that he has the right to counsel,
and that if he is indigent, a lawyer will be
appointed to represent him.
In the case at bar, the prosecution presented Pat. Ines and
Atty. De Los Reyes to establish the above-enumerated
requisites were fully satisfied when the accused-appellant
executed his extrajudicial confession. However, there was
only a perfunctory reading of the Miranda rights to
accussed-appellant without any effort to find him out
from whether he wanted to have a counsel and, if so,
whether he had his own counsel or he wanted the police
to appoint for him. The Court finds this simply ceremonial
and inadequate to transmit meaningful information to the
suspect. Especially in this case, care should have been
scrupulously observed by the police investigator that the
accused-appellant was specifically asked questions
considering that he only finished grade 4 of elementary
Moreoever, Art. III, Sec.12(1), requires that counsel
assisting suspects in custodial interrogations be
competent and independent. Atty. De Los Reyes, though
considered competent, cannot be considered independent
since he was the station commander of the WPD at the
time he assisted the accused-appellant.
we cannot thus affirmed the conviction of the accused-
appellant because of procedural irregularities committed
during custodial investigation and the trial of the case.
it may be that by this decision a guilty person is set free
because the prosecution stumbled, but we are committed
to the principle that it is better to acquit several guilty
persons than to convict one single innocent person.

#17. People vs. Duero
(version of the prosecution)
Late evening of March 2,1982, Patrolmen Silverio
Quevedo and Remeo Punzalan together with Barangay
Tanod Macario Sacdalan were conducting a surveillance
mission at Victory Liner Terminal (San Fernando,
Pampanga) based on information of persons who may be
engaging in trafficking dangerous drugs.
Around 9:30pm, they noticed a person (Medel
Tangliban), carrying a travelling bag and acting
suspiciously. They requested him to open his red travelling
bag but he refused. Later on, he acceded after the
policemen identified themselves. The policemen found
marijuana leaves wrapped in a plastic wrapper. When
asked, Tangliban revealed his name and was waiting a ride
to deliver said drugs to Olongapo city. He was taken to the
police headquarters for further investigation.
The gathered evidence was taken to PCCL at Camp
Olivas and was found to be marijuana when examined.
(version of the defense)
The accused (Tangliban) declared that he was
formerly employed in the poultry farm and he is engaged
in the business of selling poultry medicine and feeds. He
goes to Subic at times in connection with his business and
buy C-ration from one Nena Ballon.
On March 2, 1982, the accused never left his
On March 3, he went to Subic to collect a balance
of 100pesos from a customer and to buy C-rations from
Nena at 6:00pm. He stayed until 8:00pm at Nenas house
because he had a drinking spree with her son. He tried to
catch a ride at 8:00pm but he failed and was only able to
take one at 9:00pm. As he was tipsy, he didnt notice he
rode a Victory Liner Bus bound to Pampanga. As soon as
he arrived at Pampanga, he crossed the street hoping to
catch a bus going back to Manila.
Pat. Punzalan approached him and asked for a
residence certificate. But as he took out his wallet,
Punzalan took it and got the money inside amounting to
545pesos. He was taken to municipal building for
verification as he may be a NPA.
At the municipal building, he was told to take out
everything from his pocket as the prisoners in jail might
get them. He took out a 50pesos bill and was taken, telling
him it would be returned but it was never returned. Once
inside the jail, somebody told him he was being charged
with possession of marijuana and if he would be willing to
bailed out, somebody is willing to help him.
He was visited with his wife but he told her not to
complain anymore as it would be useless.
Accused was found guilty by RTC Pampanga, guilty
of violating Sec. 4, Art. II of RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs
Act). Appellant, through counsel Atty. Enrique Chan, raised
a lone assignment of error the court erred in convicting
the accused due to insufficient and doubtful evidence.
However, before the Court had the chance to act on the
appeal, counsel de oficio died. Thereafter, the court
appointed Atty. Katz Tiera who was required to file her
appellants brief.
1. WON the evidence seized was a product of
unlawful search w/o warrant?
2. WON the evidence is admissible when it was
never authenticated?
3. WON the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of
1. This contention is devoid of merit.
Sec. 12, Rule 126 of Rules of Court
Search incident to lawful arrest. A person
lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which
may be used as proof of the commission
of an offense without a search warrant.
Sec. 5(a), Rule 113 a peace officer or a
private person may, without warrant,
arrest a person: (a) when, in his presence,
the person to be arrested has committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense.
Accused was caught in flagrante. The warrantless
search is consequently valid.
Aminnudin Ruling there was no
urgency, the policemen had 2 days to
secure a warrant. They could have
persuaded the judge that there was
probable cause based from the
information they had. Yet they did
nothing. No effort was made to comply
with the law. The Bill of Rights was
ignored altogether because the head PC
lieutenant had determined on his own
authority that a search warrant was not
In contrast, the present case presented urgency. There was
an informer who pointed the accused. The police officers
had to act quickly. There was not enough time to secure a
warrant. We cannot therefore apply the Aminnudin ruling.
2. The evidence was sufficient. The marijuana
package examined by the forensic checklist was
satisfactorily identified as the one seized from the
3. Appellant avers that the informer should have
been presented before the lower court.

we discard this argument as a futile attempt to revive
an already settled issue. This Court had ruled in several
cases that non-presentation of the informer, where his
testimony would be merely corroborative or cumulative, is
not fatal to the prosecutions case.

As to doubtfulness of evidence, well-settled is the rule
that findings of the trial court on the issue of credibility of
witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to great
respect and accorded the highest consideration by the
appellate court. Since credibility is a matter that is
peculiarly within the province of the trial judge.

In People vs. Tolentino ruling the Court not only
abrogated the rule on presumption of regularity of the
officials acts relative to inadmissibility of statements taken
during in-custody interrogation but likewise dispelled any
doubt as to the full adoption of the Miranda doctrine in
this jurisdiction. It is now incumbent upon the prosecution
to prove during the trial prior to questioning, the
confessant was warned of his constitutionally protected

What was therefore proved beyond reasonable doubt is
not his intent to transport the marijuana but his actual

A. Source, Definition, Scope &
#18 People vs. Ordono, et al. (334
SCRA 673)
G.R. No. 132154, June 29, 2000

This is an automatic review of the decision of the
RTC. Both accused, Ordono and Medina were found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape
with homicide and imposing upon each of them 2
separate death penalties.

Records show that both accused were invited by the
police as suspects for the death of Shirley, and
brought them to the police station for questioning.
However, for lack of evidence then to directly link
them to the crime, they were allowed to go home.
Days passed, the two suspects returned to the police
station one after another and acknowledged that they
committed the crime. Acting on their admission, both
accused were apprised of their constitutional rights to
remain silent and to be assisted by a competent
counsel of their choice. Upon their assurance that
they had understood their rights and did not require
the services of counsel, the police immediately
conducted an investigation and put their confessions
in writing, however, the investigators could not find
the services of a lawyer to assist both accused,
because there were no practicing lawyers in that
remote town. Be that as it may, their statements were
taken in the presence of Medinas wife and mother,
the Parish Priest, Mun. Mayor, Chief of Police and
other police officers to witness the giving of their
voluntary statements for the commission of the crime.
At the end of their narration, they were asked to
affixed their signature, however, Ordono only affixed
his thumbmark as he did not know how to write.

Thereafter, both were detained at the police station.
They were visited and interviewed by a radio
announcer, Roland Almoite, which was duly tape-
recorded, and again, both accused admitted their
complicity in the crime.

A couple of days later, the police brought the two
accused to PAO for assistance and counseling. They
were also apprised of their constitutional rights and
the consequences of their confessions, through Atty.
Corpuz, leading them to defer the affixing of their
signatures. After a week or so, the two went back
again to Atty. Corpuz to informed him of their
willingness to affix their signatures, and once again,
Atty. Corpuz apprised them of their rights, explained
the contents of their respective statements, and finally
accompanied them to Judge Baustista, who also
apprised them of their rights, and to subscribe before
him in the presence of MTC staffs who witnessed the

During the arraignment, both accused pleaded not
guilty. On trial, both insisted their innocence and
testified their own alibis, and that they were forced by
the police officers to admit the commission of the
crime. The Trial Court adjudged both accused guilty
of the crime of rape with homicide attended with
conspiracy on the basis of their extrajudicial
confessions. Hence, the present petition filed by both
accused, assailing their conviction on the ground of
constitutional infirmities attended the execution of
their extrajudicial confessions.

Whether or not the extrajudicial confessions of both
accused under custodial investigation is admissible in

NO. The Supreme Court held that custodial
investigation began when both accused voluntarily
went to the police station to confess and the
investigating officer started asking questions to elicit
information and/or confession from them. At such
point, the right of the accused to counsel
automatically attached to them. Concededly, after
informing both accused of their rights, the police
sought to provide them with counsel, however, none
could be furnished due to the non-availability of
practicing lawyers and the remoteness of the town.
The presence of the parish Priest and the Municipal
Mayor as well as the relatives of the accused did not
cure in any way the absence of a lawyer during the
investigation. RA 7438 explicitly states that before
they can appear, 2 conditions must be met: (a)
counsel of the accused must be absent, and (b) a valid
waiver must be executed. Hence, in the absence of
such valid waiver, the presence of Parish Priest, Mun.
Mayor and their relatives could not stand, even with
the apparent consent of the accused, as waiver in
order to be valid must be made in writing.
Consequently, any admission obtained from the tow
accused emanating from such uncounselled
interrogation would be inadmissible in evidence in
any proceeding.

NOTE: The petition is affirmed with modification for
damages. Although the extrajudicial confessions of
both accused are held to be inadmissible in evidence,
the Supreme Court relied its affirmation on the
testimony of Almoite, who conducted an interview
with both accused and voluntarily admitted their
complicity in the crime.

B. Rights Involved and Consequences of

#20 People vs. Mojello
G.R. No. 145566, March 9, 2004

On automatic review is the decision of the RTC,
finding Mojello guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of rape with homicide and sentencing him to
suffer the supreme penalty of death.

Rogelio Rayco, the victims uncle, saw Mojello with
the victim, walking together some 30 mtrs. towards
the direction of Sitio Kota. The following day, the
victims body was found at the seashore of Sitio Kota.
Mojello was arrested while attempting to board a
motor launch bound for Cadiz City. He admitted that
he was the perpetrator of the dastardly deed, and was
assisted by Atty. Giduquio during his custodial
interrogation. His confessions was also witnessed by
Brgy. Captains Batobalanos and Landao, who testified
that after it was executed, the contents of the
document were read to Mojello who later on
voluntarily signed it. His extrajudicial confession was
sworn before Judge Jaca.

The RTC rendered judgment finding him guilty as
charged. Hence, the automatic review by the Supreme

Whether or not the extrajudicial confession executed
by appellant is admissible in evidence.

YES. The Supreme Court held that the extrajudicial
confession complies with the strict constitutional
requirements on the right to counsel. In other words,
it is valid and therefore, admissible in evidence. The
right to counsel at all times is intended to preclude
the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to
admit something false.

The records of the case clearly reflect that the
appellant freely, voluntarily and intelligently entered
into the extrajudicial confession in full compliance
with the Miranda doctrine under Art. III, Sec. 12, par.
1 of the Constitution, in relation to RA No. 7438, Sec.
2, where the investigator explained to the appellant
his constitutional rights in the Visayan dialect. The
trial court also observed that the appellant was
properly assisted by Atty. Giduquio, and that it was
subscribed and sworn to before Judge Jaca, who
declared that he explained to the appellant the
contents of the extrajudicial confession and asked if
he understood it.

Thus, the confession, having strictly complied with
the constitutional requirements under Art. III, Sec.
12, par. 1, is deemed admissible in evidence against
appellant. It follows that the admission of culpability
made therein is admissible. It is therefore NOT fruit
of poisonous tree since the tree itself is not

NOTE: The petition is affirmed with modification, he
was found guilty of the crime of STATUTORY RAPE
with award for damages, instead of rape with
homicide because the cause of death of the victim has
not been substantially proved.

#22 People vs. Figueroa (335 SCRA
G.R. No. 134056, July 6, 2000

Figueroa was arrested by the NBI operatives through
a buy-bust operation. It was established that an
informant called the NBI agents that Figueroa
(OBET) was allegedly engaged in large-scale drug
trafficking in Makati City. They instructed their
informant to establish contact with Obet for a buy-
bust operation, which the informant succeeded. They
proceeded to the rendezvous area after preparing the
buy-bust money. When the NBI saw the informant
hand-over the money to Obet, Obet while counting it,
fired his .45 caliber 2x towards the direction of
Palencia while hurrying towards the house. Obet then
hostage her mistress and her 2 children for the next 3
hours until Major Reyes arrives, to whom Obet had
surrendered. The NBI agents brought Obet to the NBI
headquarters for interrogation regarding the source of
his shabu. He eventually volunteered pointing Betty
as his source of shabu. A follow-up operation was
made at the Bettys house. Thereafter, they seized
items examined to be positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride without search warrant.

An information was filed before the RTC for violation
of RA No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972), as
amended by RA No. 7659. When arraigned, Obet and
Betty pleaded not guilty. On trial, the NBI agents
testified that they were not armed with a search
warrant when they conducted a search at Bettys
house, but maintained that it was a consented search.
They also testified that they did not see the actual
crystallization processes. The trial court rendered
judgment acquitting Betty for the prosecutions
failure to adduce evidence that she, in conspiracy with
Obet manufactured shabu without the requisite
authority. However, Obet was found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged, and ordered
his immediate transfer to the Bureau of Corrections in
Muntinlupa. Unsatisfied with the verdict, Obet
appealed the decision to the Supreme Court.

Whether or not he was deprived of his constitutional
rights during custodial investigation.

YES. The Supreme Court ruled that when Obet was
held in custody and investigated or interrogated about
the source of the shabu, none of which was found
during the buy-bust operation. In short, he was held n
custody as a consequence of a failed buy-bust
operation and as a follow-up to link him to the source
and established conspiracy in the illegal trade of
shabu. Allegedly, he admitted that the source was
Betty. On the basis of that admission, the NBI agents,
together with Obet, proceeded to the residence of
Betty. Needless to state, Obet, cannot be investigated
for anything in relation to shabu while under custody
without informing him of his rights to remain silent
and to have a competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. Any waiver of such
rights should be in writing and made in the presence
of a counsel pursuant to Section 12, (1), Article III of
the Constitution. It has been held that this rights
attach from the moment the investigation starts.
Hence, in the absence of proof that the arresting
officers complied with these constitutional
safeguards, extrajudicial statements, whether
inculpatory or exculpatory, made during custodial
investigation are inadmissible and cannot be
considered in the adjudication of the case. In other
words, confessions and admissions in violation of the
Constitution are inadmissible in evidence against the
declarant and more so against third persons, even if
such statements are gospel truth and voluntarily

NOTE: The Supreme Court held that the buy-bust
operation was a failure because no shabu or other
regulated or prohibited drug was found in Obets
person and residence. No evidence was adduced to
show that Obet handed shabu over to the informant.
Yet, he was placed in custody. For what offense he
was held in custody, does not, initially, appear very
clear on the record. ACQUITTED

#23 Gumabon, et al. vs. Director of
the Bureau of Prisons (37 SCRA 429)
G.R. No. L-30026, Jan. 30, 1971

The case before the Supreme Court is for Habeas
Corpus, the writ of great liberty which was relied
upon by the petitioners for their release from
imprisonment for the complex crime of rebellion with
murder and other crimes, invoking the case of People
vs. Hernandez, a doctrine negating the existence of
such an offense, a ruling that unfortunately for them,
was not handed down until their convictions had
become final.

Petitioners pleaded guilty for the complex crime of
rebellion with multiple murder, robbery, arson and
kidnapping, and was made to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. Since then, each of them was
imprisoned by virtue of the above convictions for
more than 13 years. In the case of People vs.
Hernandez, the SC ruled that the information
against the accused in that case for rebellion
complexed with murder, arson and robbery was not
warranted under Article 134 of the RPC, there being
no such complex offense. Such ruling was also
affirmed in the case of People vs. Lava, where the
petitioners in that case has already served more than
the maximum penalty that could have been imposed
upon him. He is entitled to freedom, his continued
detention being illegal.

These two cases prompted the petitioners to file the
Petition for Habeas Corpus, that they be afforded the
same treatment as the petitioners in the above-
entitled case. They precisely assert a deprivation of a
constitutional right, namely, the denial of equal
protection. In their petition, they stated that they
were convicted by the CFI for the very same rebellion
for which Hernandez, Geronimo and others were
convicted. The law under which they were convicted
is the very same law under which the latter were
convicted. It had not and has not been changed. For
the same crime, committed under the same law, how
can the Court, in conscience, allow the petitioners to
suffer life imprisonment, while others can suffer only
prision mayor? They also stress that, contrary to the
mandate of equal protection people similarly situated
were not similarly deal with. What is required under
the Constitutional guarantee is the uniform operation
of legal norms so that all persons under similar
circumstances would be accorder the same treatment
both in the privileges conferred an the liabilities

ISSUE: (No issue regarding custodial investigation)
Whether or not equal protection may be afforded to
the petitioners

YES. The Supreme Court, noting its recent decision,
reiterates:Favoritism and undue preference cannot
be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection
and security shall be given to every person under
circumstances, which if not identical are analogous. If
law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges,
those that fall within class should be treated in the
same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in
the group equally binding on the rest.

The argument of petitioners thus possesses a
persuasive ring. The continued incarceration after the
12-year period when such is the maximum length of
imprisonment in accordance with the controlling
doctrine, when others similarly convicted have been
freed, is fraught with implications at war with equal
protection. That is not to give it life. On the contrary,
it would render it nugatory.

The petition for habeas corpus is granted, and
ordered that petitioners be set at liberty.

Case: People vs. Caguioa
Facts: The Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan filed in the CFI of
Bulacan, an information for murder against Paquito Yupo y
Gonzales which was assigned to Branch VIII, presided by
respondent Judge. Upon arraignment, the accused
pleaded not guilty. Prosecution presented Corporal
Conrado Roca of the Meycauayan Police Department,
before whom a written statement of the accused Paquito
Yupo and his alleged waiver of his right to remain silent
and to be assisted by a counsel of his own choice was
taken. After this witness had Identified the statement of
the accused and the waiver, he was questioned on the
incriminating answers in such statement to the police, but
there was an objection on the part of the defense counsel
based on the ground of such statement being inadmissible
in evidence, as the statement was taken by the police
without any counsel assisting the accused in the
investigation. Respondent Judge sustained the objection
of the defense on the view that such judicial confession of
the accused is inadmissible in evidence for being
unconstitutional, it appearing that the accused was not
assisted by a counsel when it was given. He likewise stated
that such right could not be waived. Upon his refuse to
reconsider such ruling, this petition was filed.

Issue: WON there was a valid waiver of right to counsel

Held: It was not shown that the alleged waiver was given
freely and voluntarily. The questioning was rather
perfunctory. An even more telling circumstance against
such alleged waiver being given credence was that private
respondent, a native of Samar, then nineteen years old,
was interrogated extensively in Tagalog, no showing
having been made that his acquaintance with the
language was such that he could fully understand the
import of what was asked him. On the specific question of
whether or not the right to counsel during custodial
interrogation interrogation may be waived, the Court rules
that there is no bar to such a waiver if made intelligently
and voluntarily, with full understanding of its
The landmark opinion of Miranda v. Arizona,
decided in
1966, as noted above, the source of this constitutional
provision, emphasized that statements made during the
period of custodial interrogation to be admissible require
a clear intelligent waiver of constitutional rights, the
suspect being warned prior to questioning that he has a
right to remain silent, that any utterance may be used
against him and that he has the right to the presence of a
counsel, either retained or appointed.
The defendant may waive effectuation of those rights,
provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and
intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any manner and
at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with
an attorney before speaking, there can be no questioning.
Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any
manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the
police may not question him. The mere fact that he may
have answered some questions or volunteered some
statements on his own does not deprive him of the right
to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he
has consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to
be questioned.

Case: People vs. Galit
Facts: Mrs. Natividad Fernando, a widow, was found dead
in the bedroom of her house located at Barrio Geronimo,
Montalban, Rizal, as a result of seven (7) wounds inflicted
upon different parts of her body by a blunt
instrument. More than two weeks thereafter, police
authorities of Montalban picked up the herein accused,
Francisco Galit, on suspicion of the murder. On the
following day, however, September 8, 1977, the case was
referred to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for
further investigation in view of the alleged limited facilities
of the Montalban police station. Accordingly, the herein
accused was brought to the NBI where he was
investigated by a team headed by NBI Agent Carlos
Flores. NBI Agent Flores conducted a preliminary
interview of the suspect who allegedly gave evasive
answers to his questions. But the following day, Francisco
Galit voluntarily executed a Salaysay admitting
participation in the commission of the crime. He
implicated Juling Dulay and Pabling Dulay as his
companions in the crime. As a result, he was charged with
the crime of Robbery with Homicide, in an information
filed before the Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal.

Issue: WON there was a valid waiver of the rights of the

Held: We find that the evidence presented by the
prosecution does not support a conviction. In fact, the
findings of the trial court relative to the acts attributed to
the accused are not supported by competent evidence.
There were no eyewitnesses, no property recovered from
the accused, no state witnesses, and not even fingerprints
of the accused at the scene of the crime. The only
evidence against the accused is his alleged confession. It
behooves Us therefore to give it a close scrutiny.
Such a long question followed by a monosyllabic answer
does not satisfy the requirements of the law that the
accused be informed of his rights under the Constitution
and our laws. Instead there should be several short and
clear questions and every right explained in simple words
in a dialect or language known to the person under
investigation. Accused is from Samar and there is no
showing that he understands Tagalog. Moreover, at the
time of his arrest, accused was not permitted to
communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or a friend. In
fact, his sisters and other relatives did not know that he
had been brought to the NBI for investigation and it was
only about two weeks after he had executed
the salaysay that his relatives were allowed to visit him.
His statement does not even contain any waiver of right
to counsel and yet during the investigation he was not
assisted by one. At the supposed reenactment, again
accused was not assisted by counsel of his choice. These
constitute gross violations of his rights. The alleged
confession and the pictures of the supposed re-
enactment are inadmissible as evidence because they
were obtained in a manner contrary to law.

Case: People vs. Continente
Facts: Appellant Donato Continente and several other
John Does were initially charged with the crimes of
murder and frustrated murder in two (2) separate
Informations in connection with the shooting incident
which caused the death of U.S. Col. James N. Rowe while
seriously wounding his driver, Joaquin Vinuya. After the
arrest of another suspect, Juanito Itaas, the prosecution,
with prior leave of court, filed two (2) separate amended
Informations for murder and frustrated murder to include
Juanito T. Itaas.
With counsels present, the appellants executed
extrajudicial confessions admitting to the crime. Then the
trial court found both appellants guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the cries of murder and frustrated murder. They
question the validity and admissibility of their confessions
alleging that CIS officers threatened them to admit the
contents of the sworn statements. Appellants also
contend that they were not properly informed of their
custodial rights under the constitution as to enable them
to make a valid waiver.

Issue: WON there was a valid waiver of their rights

Held: Yes. It must be noted that far from being a mere
enumeration of the custodial rights of an accused, the
aforequoted portions ("Paliwanag") of the written
statements contain an explanation as to the nature of the
investigation that is, regarding the respective
participations of the appellants in the ambush on April 21,
1989 that resulted in the killing of U.S. Col. James Rowe
while seriously wounding his driver, Joaquin Vinuya. They
also include an advice that the appellants may choose not
to give any statement to the investigator and a warning
that any statement obtained from the appellants may be
used in favor or against them in court. In addition, they
contain an advice that the appellants may engage the
services of a lawyer of their own choice. If they cannot
afford the services of a lawyer, they will be provided with
one by the government for free. Thereafter, both
appellants manifested to CIS Investigator Virgilio Pablico
their intentions to give their statements even in the
absence of counsel.
Despite the manifestations of the appellants, Investigator
Pablico requested for the legal services of Atty. Bonifacio
Manansala to act as counsel for appellant Continente and
Atty. Felimon Corpuz for appellant Itaas. Significantly,
Investigator Pablico disclosed that appellant Continente
conferred with Atty. Manansala in his presence for about
half an hour before the investigation started.
Nevertheless, the appellant (Continente) maintained his
decision to give a statement even in the absence of
counsel. As proof thereof, the appellant signed
"Pagpapatunay" that contains an express waiver of his
constitutional rights in the presence of Atty. Manansala
who also signed the same as counsel of the appellant.
There is also no basis to support the claim of appellant
Itaas that he was tortured into giving a confession and was
threatened by the CIS agents to admit the truth of the
same before the administering officer.

Case: People vs. Bacor
Facts: Julian Albores was resting at the living room of his
house with his son Dionisio and the latter's common-law
wife Delia. Suddenly, Julian heard a gunfire followed by
Delia's exclamation that Dionisio had fallen down on the
floor. Immediately, thereafter, Julian brought his wounded
son to the hospital for treatment but just a few minutes
after arrival there, his son died. Appellant went to the
Sinacaban Police Station and told that he was the one
responsible for the killing of Dionisio Albores. Appellant
said what prompted him to surrender was due to his guilty
Consequently, appellant was brought to the Public
Attorney's Office (PAO). In the presence of Atty Anggot,
appellant was asked by the policemen if he had a lawyer
and appellant replied that he had none and said that he
would avail the service of PAO. Then, Atty. Anggot
requested the policemen to leave her and appellant alone
inside the office. She then inquired if appellant was not
intimidated, coerced or forced and whether appellant was
promised any reward. She also informed appellant of
constitutional rights. After being informed of such facts,
appellant still declared that he was going to confess
because he had committed a crime.
During the taking of appellant's confession, in the
presence and with the assistance of PAO Atty. Anggot,
SPO3 Ydulzura likewise reminded appellant in the Visayan
dialect of constitutional rights. Despite such reminder,
appellant still agreed and accepted the appointment of
PAO Atty. Meriam Anggot as his lawyer to assist him
during the taking of his affidavit of confession. Before
signing the affidavit, Atty. Lumasag read to appellant the
contents thereof and informed him of his constitutional
rights to remain silent, against self-incrimination and to
counsel of his own choice. She also informed appellant
about the consequences of his affidavit and that it may be
used as evidence against him. She also asked him whether
he understood the contents of the affidavit. Subsequently,
appellant was asked if the statements in the affidavit are
true and correct and he declared that the statements
therein are true and correct and that he was willing to sign
the affidavit on his own free will.
Appellant now questions the admissibility of the

Issue: WON there was a valid waiver of right

Held: Accused-appellant's confession leaves no doubt as
to its voluntariness and spontaneity. Accused-appellant
does not deny that he surrendered to the police on June 6,
1991, almost three months after the fatal shooting of
Dionesio Albores, and confessed to the crime because he
"could no longer bear a guilty conscience." In his
testimony before the trial court, he admitted that the
signature on pages 1, 2, and 3 of his sworn confession
(Exh. B) was his without any claim that he was forced,
coerced or threatened to make the confession.
the details contained in his confession could have been
known to accused-appellant alone.
The records shows that he was advised of his rights,
particularly the right to remain silent, not only once but
thrice: first, by his counsel, Atty. Meriam Anggot of Public
Attorney's Office (PAO): second, SPO3 Maharlika Ydulzura,
the investigator who took accused-appellant's confession;
and lastly, by the branch clerk of the court of the Regional
Trial Court of Oroquieta City, Atty. Nora Montejo-
Lumasag, before whom accused-appellant swore to the
veracity of his confession. Each time, he was asked
whether he was willing to give statement and he said he
was. This is sufficient. Contrary to the accused-appellant's
contention, there is no need for a separate and express
written waiver of his constitutional rights. Accused-
appellant was not arrested. He presented himself to the
authorities to confess to the crime because, he said, he
was being bothered by his conscience. By voluntarily
executing his extrajudicial confession, which he did in the
presence of and with the assistance of counsel and after
having been informed of his constitutional rights, accused-
appellant effectively waived his right to remain silent.
Not only was the confession signed by accused-appellant
with the assistance of counsel, it was also sworn to by him
before the branch clerk of court who, before
administering the oath to accused-appellant, read the
affidavit of confession to him and informed him of his
rights and the consequences of his confession. Accused-
appellant stood pat on his decision to tell it all.


Bernardo Quidato, Sr. (SR) was the father of Bernardo
Quidato, Jr. (JR). Being a widower, Bernardo lived alone in
his house. He owned sixteen hectares of coconut land in
the area. SR, accompanied by JR and two hired hands,
Reynaldo Malita and Eddie Malita, went to Davao City to
sell 41 sacks of copra.

JR asked Reynaldo to come to the formers house to
discuss an important matter. His brother Eddie was
already there. They started drinking beer. JR proposed
that they rob and kill his father SR. They went to SRs
house. JR knocked on the door, asking SR to let them in.
When SR opened the door, Eddie rushed in and knocked
SR down. Reynaldo then hacked Bernardo, and JR and
Eddie ransacked Bernardos aparador looking for money
but they found none; so, the three of them left.

JR, Reynaldo and Eddie were arrested by the police.

The Malita brothers were interrogated by Patrolman
Lucrecio Mara. Mara apprised them of their constitutional
rights, including their right to counsel, but they signified
their intent to confess even in the absence of counsel.
Mara took down the testimony of the two but refrained
from requiring them to sign their affidavits. Instead, he
escorted the Malita brothers to Davao City and presented
them, along with their unsigned affidavits, to Atty. Jocom.
Atty. Jocom conferred with Reynaldo and Eddie, again
advising the two of their constitutional rights. He
explained the contents of the affidavits, in Visayan, to the
Malita brothers, who affirmed the veracity and voluntary
execution of the same. Only then did Reynaldo and Eddie
affix their signatures on the affidavits.

RTC found Bernardo Quidato, Jr., guilty of the crime of
parricide. Hence, this petition.

WON an extrajudicial confession made without a counsel,
signed in the presence of a counsel in a later day, is
admissible as evidence.

SC ruled that Bernardo Quiadato Jr. must be acquitted.

The prosecution relied heavily on the affidavits executed
by Reynaldo and Eddie. The two brothers were, however,
not presented on the witness stand to testify on their
extra-judicial confessions. The failure to present the two
gives these affidavits the character of hearsay. It is
hornbook doctrine that unless the affiants themselves
take the witness stand to affirm the averments in their
affidavits, the affidavits must be excluded from the judicial
proceeding, being inadmissible hearsay. The voluntary
admissions of an accused made extrajudicially are not
admissible in evidence against his co-accused when the
latter had not been given an opportunity to hear him
testify and cross-examine him.

The manner by which the affidavits were obtained by
Mara render the same inadmissible in evidence even if
they were voluntarily given.

The settled rule is that an uncounseled extrajudicial
confession without a valid waiver of the right to counsel
that is, in writing and in the presence of counsel is
inadmissible in evidence. It is undisputed that the Malita
brothers gave their statements to Mara in the absence of
counsel, although they signed the same in the presence of
counsel the next day.

ANDRES, accused. RAMIL
SAMOLDE, accused-appellant.

While Ramil Samolde was walking towards the market,
Feliciano Nepomuceno pointed a gun at him and called
him a thief. Samolde parried the gun and stabbed
Nepomuceno. When the gun fell to the ground, Samolde
picked it up and shot Nepomuceno. He then went to his
brothers house, and was later on arrested. He claimed
that he was beaten up by the police in jail, and that the
police wanted to know who helped him kill Nepomuceno.
He gave a statement implicating Armando Andres.
Samolde claimed that although he was provided a lawyer,
the latter was not really present during his investigation.
During his detention, he was not allowed to be seen, lest
visitors notice his swollen face.

In his extrajudicial confession, Samolde was informed of
his constitutional rights. It was stated that his lawyer, Atty.
Emiliano Benito was present when he affixed his signature
on the said extrajudicial confession. As regards his
counsel, Somalde stated that, contrary to what was stated
in his extrajudicial confession, his lawyer did not really
assist him. He was not informed of his constitutional rights
when he executed his extrajudicial confession, and he did
so only after he had been subjected to some brutality by
the police.

Andres claimed that he was in Ilocos Sur when the event
happened. He learned that he was implicated in the killing
of Nepomuceno only when the police came to arrest him.
Andres also claimed he was beaten up by a policeman;
that the sworn statement he gave had been prepared by
the police; that he was not given any opportunity to read
it before he signed it; and that he did so because he was
subjected to torture and intimidation by the police.

During cross-examination, Sgt. De Leon claimed that he
and his group arrested Samolde. He denied having used
violence against Samolde and Andres. It was admitted
that no counsel assisted Andres when he was

RTC found both accused guilty of the crime of murder.
Only Samolde appealed.

WON the extrajudicial confession of Samolde is admissible
in evidence.

The extrajudicial confession of Samolde is not admissible
in evidence. He was not informed of his constitutional
rights before his statement was taken. Samolde was not
properly apprised of his constitutional rights.

Art. III, Sec. 12(1) of the Constitution provides the rights of
a suspect in a custodial investigation: (1) He must be
informed of his right to remain silent; (2) he must be
warned that anything he says can and will be used against
him; and (3) he must be told that he has a right to counsel,
and that if he is indigent, a lawyer will be appointed to
represent him.

Samolde was given no more than an obligatory recitation
of his rights, signifying nothing more than an insincere
compliance with the constitutional requirements. Such
manner was "merely ceremonial and inadequate to
transmit meaningful information to the suspect."
However, apart from the testimony of Ricardo
Nepomuceno and the extrajudicial confession of accused-
appellant, there is sufficient evidence in the records
showing Samoldes guilt. Samolde confessed in open court
that he had killed Nepomuceno. It is this admission of
Samolde which should be considered.
SC, affirmed.


Before the RTC, accused-appellants were found guilty of
murder for the killing of Edmundo Orizal. Gallardo and
Micate were identified as suspects. Gallardo and Columna
were investigated by SPO4 Isidro Marcos, and they gave
statements admitting that they, together with Micate,
killed Orizal.

During the investigation, the dialect used was Ilocano, the
native tongue of the accused, and during the taking of the
statements, Atty. Rolando Velasco assisted them. Judge
Vilma Pauig was present. She administered the oath on
the jurat of the statements. Accused-appellants signed
their statements admitting the killing of Orizal. According
to accused-appellants, they planned and executed the
killing of Orizal. A certain Pat. Molina, Gallardo and
Columna, together with Micate and Hidalgo, met at the
house of Columna. Pat. Molina conveyed to the group the
desire of Cong. Tuzon that Orizal be killed because the
latter was planning to ambush him and grab his land.
Orizal was a strong campaigner and a bodyguard of
retired Gen. Olivas, who was running for mayor against
the congressmans re-electionist wife. Pat. Molina told the
group that if they accepted the job and succeeded in their
mission, Cong. Tuzon would work for their acquittal in all
their criminal cases, and would give cash rewards.
Accused-appellants accepted the job.

Accused-appellants filed with the RTC a demurrer to
evidence, arguing that the prosecution failed to establish
that the signed statements of the accused were procured
in violation of Article III Section 12 (1) of the Constitution.
RTC denied the demurrer and stated that the court would
want to know controverting evidence that the defense
may give to intelligently decide the issues of the case.
Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: WON the court erred in admitting their extra-
judicial confessions in evidence against them.

No. The extra-judicial confessions of the accused were
given after they were completely and clearly apprised of
their Constitutional rights. A lawyer assisted them and a
judge administered their oath.

Although Atty. Velasco was provided by the State and not
by the accused themselves, the accused were given an
opportunity whether to accept or not to accept him as
their lawyer. They were asked and they immediately
agreed to have Atty. Velasco as their counsel during the
investigation. There is no requirement in the Constitution
that the lawyer of an accused during custodial
investigation be previously known to them. The
Constitution provides that the counsel be a competent
and independent counsel, who will represent the accused
and protect their Constitutionally guaranteed rights.

SC held that, "to be an effective counsel, a lawyer need
not challenge all the questions being propounded to his
client. The presence of a lawyer is not intended to stop an
accused from saying anything which might incriminate him
but, rather, it was adopted in our Constitution to preclude
the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit
something false. The counsel, however, should never
prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the

Under rules laid by the Constitution, a confession to be
admissible must satisfy the following requirements: (1)
The confession must be voluntary; (2) The confession
must be made with the assistance of competent and
independent counsel; (3) The confession must be express;
and (4) the confession must be in writing. All these
requirements were complied with.

SC, affirmed.

People vs. Canoy
328 scra 385

Facts: This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional
Trial Court finding accused Heracleo Manriquez (hereafter
HERACLEO) and Gregorio Canoy (hereafter GREGORIO)
guilty of two counts of murder for stabbing to death
Ernesto Gabuyan (hereafter GABUYAN) and Ferdinand
Duay (hereafter DUAY) on 12 January 1990.

GREGORIO maintains that the oral admission and extra-
judicial confession he gave before the police authorities
cannot be used as evidence against him because his
waiver of his rights to remain silent and to counsel during
custodial interrogation cannot be characterized as one
made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently since: (1)
the sworn statement was written in English and there was
no proof that the preliminary questions and answers
therein were translated, much less a translation after
every question and answer in his alleged waiver, into the
Visayan-Cebuano dialect, a language spoken and
understood by him; (2) there was no proof that he, then
only 18 years old and a 4th grader, clearly understood the
import and consequences of the waiver which was
"couched in broad and general terms"; (3) the sworn
statement related only to his alleged disinterest to be
represented by a counsel but it did not signify an
agreement to make a confession of the crime with which
he was charged; (4) he executed the sworn statement not
knowing that an extra-judicial confession was attached
thereto and; (5) the presence of his mother during the
signing of the waiver did not guarantee that the same was
done voluntarily and intelligently.

Issue: The validity of the so-called waiver and extra-
judicial confession executed by GREGORIO.

Held: No meaningful information as to his rights under
custodial interrogation was conveyed to GREGORIO. He
was not asked if he wanted to avail of his rights and was
not told that if he has no lawyer of his own choice he
could avail of one to be appointed for him. Furthermore,
the waiver states that he does not want the assistance of
counsel and it is not shown that he agreed to be assisted
by Atty. Tanjili. The testimony of Atty. Tanjili also
eloquently reveals his cavalier attitude and the
insufficiency of the assistance given. His explanation to
GREGORIO on his constitutional rights during custodial
interrogation and of the effects of the waiver thereof is

Although the waiver of GREGORIO was intrinsically flawed
and, therefore, null and void, and although the
extrajudicial confession is inadmissible in evidence, it did
not absolve GREGORIO from any criminal responsibility.
The evidence on record satisfies us with moral certainty
that he and his co-accused conspired together to kill DUAY
and GABUYAN and that GREGORIO was not a mere
witness to the acts of the others; he himself materially
contributed to the pursuit of the conspiracy. Miso

The accused-appellant is GREGORIO CANOY is guilty in
each case beyond reasonable doubt, as principal, of the
crime of murder.

328 scra 417

Irregularities in arrest

Conviction based on proof beyond reasonable doubt


Accused-appellant was arrested based on a warrant issued
against him after he failed to attend his arraignment. He
contends that certain irregularities attended his arrest,
and that the prosecution failed to show his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.


Admittedly, accused is deemed to have waived his right to
question the irregularities attending his arrest for his
failure to raise the same at the opportune time, i.e.,
before he entered his plea. Nonetheless, the peculiar
factual circumstances surrounding the case, e.g., the
police authorities failure to comply with the clear
directive of the warrant of arrest issued by Judge Barrios,
the undue delay in preparing the documents relating to
the arrest of accused and his wife and in delivering them
to the proper authorities for inquest, and the failure of the
law enforcers to provide accused with a counsel during
the custodial investigation, effectively destroy the
presumption of regularity in the performance by Gomez
and his colleagues of their duties. Such being the case, the
presumption of regularity cannot be made the sole basis
of the conviction of accused.

It is well-settled that where the circumstances shown to
exist yield two or more inferences, one of which is
consistent with the presumption of innocence while the
other or others may be compatible with the finding of
guilt, the court must acquit the accused: for the evidence
does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is
insufficient to support a judgment of conviction.

People vs. Jara
144 scra 517

Facts: The three appellants - Bernades, Vergara amd Jara
were all sentenced to death in Criminal Case No. 2564 for
Robbery with Homicide. In the companion case of
parricide, one was sentenced to another death penalty
while the two other appellants received sentences ranging
from 12 to 20 years of imprisonment. This court's task is
made difficult by the fact that the crimes were specially
ruthless and barbarous in their commission. No less than
the counsel for the appellants states that the people of
Puerto Princesa are no strangers to crime and that the
frequency of criminal acts in their city has somehow
benumbed the sensibilities of its citizens. Yet, the
discovery on June 9, 1978 of the brutally and badly bashed
corpses of two well-known and loved women of their
community was still shocking to their senses. The police
officers who investigated the crime and secured the
confessions seemed so certain that indeed the three
appellants are the malefactors. The confessions are
convincing in their details. The trial court noted that "both
victims were assaulted and killed with the might and fury
of one really who had harbored so long a grudge and
hate" and only Felicisimo Jara had that kind of ill-will
against his estranged wife and her female companion.
Moreover, Jara, a recidivist for the crime of homicide, was
characterized as an experienced killer. There must be
many residents of Puerto Princesa who are thus,
convinced about the correct solution of the crime. And
perhaps, the appellants could have been the killers

All the accused pleaded not guilty during the arraignment.
On motion by the prosecution and the defense, the court
a quo ordered a joint trial of the two cases which arose
from one incident and where the witnesses are the same

There is no dispute that the confessions in these cases
were obtained in the absence of counsel. According to the
records, there was a waiver by the accused-appellants of
their right to counsel.

Issue: whether or not the waiver was valid:

Held: No. Before the extrajudicial confession of appellant
Bernadas was reduced to writing, Pfc. Henry E. Pulga, in
the presence of four other police officers, made a
"Pasubali" followed by the answer, "Opo".

The stereotyped "advice" appearing in practically all
extrajudicial confessions which are later repudiated has
assumed the nature of a "legal form" or model. Police
investigators either automatically type it together with the
cour "Opo" as the answer or ask the accused to sign it or
even copy it in their handwriting. Its tired, punctilious,
fixed, and artificially stated style does not create an
impression of voluntariness or even understanding on the
part of the accused. The showing of a spontaneous, free,
and unconstrained giving up of a right is missing.
Whenever a protection given by the Constitution is waived
by the person entitled to that protection, the presumption
is always against the waiver. Consequently, the
prosecution must prove with strongly convincing evidence
to the satisfaction of this Court that indeed the accused
willingly and voluntarily submitted his confession and
knowingly and deliberately manifested that he was not
interested in having a lawyer assist him during the taking
of that confession. That proof is missing in this case.

Apart from their extra-judicial confessions, no other
evidence to implicate Bernadas and Vergara as
perpetrators of the killing was introduced by the
prosecution. Since these confessions are inadmissible in
evidence, the two appellants have to be acquitted.

However, as to the accused Jara, the requirements for
circumstantial evidence to sustain a conviction are present
in this case. The circumstances constitute an unbroken
chain leading to one fair and reasonable conclusion which
points to the guilt of the accused Jara beyond reasonable
doubt. Mere denials of the accused as to his participation
jarajarain the crime are only self-serving negative
evidence which cannot outweigh circumstantial evidence
clearly establishing his active participation in the crime

Wherefore, In Crim. Case No. 2564, the accused Bernadas
and Vergara are acquitted of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide on the ground of reasonable doubt. Accused
Jara is convicted of the crime of Murder and is sentenced
to suffer the penalty of death.

In Crim. Case No. 2565, the accused Bernadas and Vergara
are likewise acquitted of the crime of Homicide on the
ground of reasonable doubt. Accused Jara is convicted of
the crime of Parricide and is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of death.

Considering, however, that the accused Jara is now over
70 years of age, the penalty of death is lowered to
reclusion perpetua.

People vs. Nicandro
141 SCRA 289


After the complaints and reports were verified to be true,
an entrapment with the confidential informant acting as
the buyer of marijuana was organized. The police team
formed to carry out the entrapment plan was alerted of
the presence of the drug pusher, the appellant Nelia
Nicandro y Velarma, alias Nel. The informant asked to
buy some marijuana cigarette and gave appellant the two
(2) marked P 5.00 bills Thereupon, the appellant delivered
to informant four (4) sticks of marijuana cigarette.
Immediately the police team closed in and nabbed the
appellant, was frisked and got from the right front pocket
of her pants the two (2), marked P5.00 bills, and from the
left pocket of her pants the marijuana flowering tops
wrapped in a piece of newspaper. Upon being investigated
and after having been duly apprised of her constitutional
rights, appellant orally admitted having sold the four (4)
sticks of marijuana cigarettes and the ownership of the
marijuana flowering tops taken from her pocket, but
refused to reduce her confession to writing.

Issue: Whether or not there was a violation of the accused
constitutional rights to be informed of his rights and to


When the Constitution requires a person under
investigation to be informed of his right to remain silent
and to counsel, it must be presumed to contemplate the
transmission of meaningful information rather than just
the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract
constitutional principle. As a rule, therefor, it would not be
sufficient for a police officer just to repeat to the person
under investigation the provisions of Section 20, Article IV
of the Constitution. He is not only duty-bound to tell the
person the rights to which the latter is entitled; he must
also explain their effects in practical terms, e.g., what the
person under interrogation may or may not do, and in a
language the subject fairly understands. In other words,
the right of a person under interrogation to be informed
implies a correlative obligation on the part of the police
investigator to explain, and contemplates an effective
communication that results in understanding what is
conveyed. Short of this, there is a denial of the right, as it
cannot truly be said that the person has been informed
of his rights. Now, since the right to be informed implies
comprehension, the degree of explanation required will
necessary vary, depending upon the education,
intelligence and other relevant personal circumstances of
the person under investigation. Suffice it to say that a
simpler and more lucid explanation is needed where the
subject is unlettered.

Like other constitutional rights, the right against self-
incrimination, including the right of a person under
investigation to remain silent and to counsel, and to be
informed of such right, may be waived. To be valid,
however, a waiver of the right must not only be voluntary;
it must be made knowingly and intelligently, which
presupposes an awareness or understanding of what is
being waived. It stands to reason that where the right has
not been adequately explained and there are serious
doubts as to whether the person interrogated knew and
understood his relevant constitutional rights when he
answered the questions, it is idle to talk of waiver of

The fiscal has the duty to adduce evidence that there was
compliance with the duties of an interrogating officer.- As
it is the obligation of the investigating officer to inform a
person under investigation of his right to remain silent and
to counsel, so it is the duty of the prosecution to
affirmatively establish compliance by the investigating
officer with his said obligation. Absent such affirmative
showing, the admission or confession made by a person
under investigation cannot be admitted in evidence.

Gamboa v Cruz
Petitioner alleged that he was arrested for vagrancy,
without a warrant of arrest, by Patrolman Arturo Palencia.
Thereafter, petitioner was brought to Precinct 2, Manila,
where he was booked for vagrancy and then detained
therein together with several others.
The following day, 20 July 1979, during the lineup of five
(5) detainees, including petitioner, complainant Erlinda B.
Bernal pointed to petitioner and said, "that one is a
companion." After the Identification, the other detainees
were brought back to their cell but petitioner was ordered
to stay on. While the complainant was being interrogated
by the police investigator, petitioner was told to sit down
in front of her.

Issue: WON a police line-up is covered by the Right to
Counsel of accused?

Ruling: The police line-up was not part of the custodial
inquest, hence, petitioner was not yet entitled, at such
stage, to counsel. He had not been held yet to answer for
a criminal offense. The moment there is a move or even
an urge of said investigators to elicit admissions or
confessions or even plain information which may appear
innocent or innocuous at the time, from said suspect, he
should then and there be assisted by counsel, unless he
waives the right, but the waiver shall be made in writing
and in the presence of counsel.

People vs Pavillare
On March 10, 1996 the accused-appellant was
apprehended in connection with the kidnapping of
another Indian national. While under police custody the
appellant was required to stand in a police line-up where
he was supposedly identified by the private complainant
as one of his abductors. Five separate charges arising from
five separate incidents of kidnapping, all of whom were
Indian nationals, were filed against him. He claims that he
was identified by the private complainant as one of his
abductors because the Indians needed a "scapegoat" for
the other four cases of kidnapping of Indian nationals then

Issue: WON the police line-up is inadmissible because the
appellant stood at the line-up without the assistance of

Ruling: The stage of an investigation wherein a person is
asked to stand in a police line-up has been held to be
outside the mantle of protection of the right to counsel
because it involves a general inquiry into an unsolved
crime and is purely investigatory in nature. It has also
been held that an uncounseled identification at the police
line-up does not preclude the admissibility of an in-court
identification. The identification made by the private
complainant in the police line-up pointing to Pavillare as
one of his abductors is admissible in evidence although
the accused-appellant was not assisted by counsel.

People vs Jara
Accued Jara was convicted with the crime of Robbery with
Homicide. Two suspects in the killing, appellants
Reymundo Vergara and Roberto Bernadas, were
apprehended. After investigation, they confessed their
guilt to the Provincial Commander of the Philippine
Constabulary in Palawan and other police investigators.
They also positively identified appellant Felicisimo Jara as
the mastermind who had plotted the killing and who
promised them a fee of P1,000.00 each for their
Issue: WON the extrajudicial confession made by the two
witnesses are admissible?
Ruling: An extra-judicial confession is generally presumed
to have been voluntarily executed. The confessant carries
the burden of convincing the trial judge that his
admissions are involuntary or untrue. The trial court, in
this case, was not convinced that the extrajudicial
confessions of appellants were made involuntarily.
Constitution, in expressly adopting the so-called Miranda
rule, has reversed the presumption. The prosecution must
now prove that an extrajudicial confession was voluntarily
given, instead of relying on a presumption and requiring
the accused to offset it. There would have been no need
to amend the centuries-old provisions of the Bill of Rights
and to expressly add the interdiction that "no force,
violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which
vitiates the free will shall be used against him. It is natural
and to be expected that the police officers who secured
the confessions in these cases should testify that the
statements were voluntarily given. However, the records
show that the interrogations were conducted
incommunicado in a police-dominated atmosphere.


The body of six-year old Jennifer Domantay was found
sprawled amidst a bamboo grove in Guilig, Malasiqui,
Pangasinan. The child's body bore several stab wounds.
The investigation by the Malasiqui police pointed to
accused-appellant Bernardino Domantay, a cousin of the
victim's grandfather, as the lone suspect in the gruesome
crime. Police officers of the Malasiqui Philippine National
Police (PNP) picked up accused-appellant at the Malasiqui
public market and took him to the police station where
accused-appellant, upon questioning by SPO1 Antonio
Espinoza, confessed to killing Jennifer Domantay.
A Medico-legal expert of the NBI, performed an autopsy
on the embalmed body of Jennifer. The result of his
examination of the victim's genitalia indicated that the
child's hymen had been completely lacerated on the right
side. Based on this finding, SPO4 Carpizo filed a criminal
complaint against accused-appellant of rape with
At the trial, SPO1 Espinoza testified that he investigated
accused-appellant after the latter had been brought to the
Malasiqui police station. Before he commenced his
questioning, he apprised accused-appellant of his
constitutional right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel, in English, which
was later translated into Pangasinense. According to SPO1
Espinoza, accused-appellant agreed to answer the
questions of the investigator even in the absence of
counsel and admitted killing the victim. Accused-appellant
also disclosed the location of the bayonet he used in killing
the victim. On cross-examination, Espinoza admitted that
at no time during the course of his questioning was
accused-appellant assisted by counsel. Neither was
accused-appellant's confession reduced in writing.
Espinoza's testimony was admitted by the trial court over
the objection of the defense.
The trial court found accused-appellant guilty as charged.
In this appeal, accused-appellant alleges that:
In the case at bar, when accused-appellant was brought to
the Malasiqui police station, he was already a suspect, in
fact the only one, in the brutal slaying of Jennifer
Domantay. He was, therefore, already under custodial
investigation and the rights guaranteed in Art. III, 12(1)
of the Constitution applied to him. SPO1 Espinoza
narrated what transpired during accused-appellant's
But though he waived the assistance of counsel, the
waiver was neither put in writing nor made in the
presence of counsel. For this reason, the waiver is invalid
and his confession is inadmissible. SPO1 Espinoza's
testimony on the alleged confession of accused-appellant
should have been excluded by the trial court. So is the
bayonet inadmissible in evidence, being, as it were, the
"fruit of the poisonous tree.


A Criminal case in the Municipal Court of Tambulig against
one Felipe Cedilla for preliminary investigation. On the
same date, Judge Gualberto Bacarro, Sr. of the Tambulig
Municipal Court issued a warrant of arrest against Cedilla.
Finding a prima facie case against Cedilla, the Judge issued
an order forwarding the case to the then Court of First
Instance of Zamboanga del Sur for trial.
Cedilla was duly arraigned, after which the government
presented its evidence.
Meanwhile, Chief of Police of Tambulig, on the strength of
a statement given by Adelita Decierdo, pointing to Pedro
Decierdo, Adelita's husband, and Regino Duhay lungsod as
Montillano's killers, filed a complaint against Decierdo and
Duhay lungsod. Judge Bacarro, who conducted the
preliminary examination, issued a warrant for the arrest of
both Decierdo and Duhay Lungsod.
Decierdo was apprehended in his residence at Matingon,
about 30 kilometers from Tambulig, On May 23 or 24,
1973, Patrolman Alfredo Bopadora of the Tambulig police
was brought to the Tambulig municipal building where he
supposedly executed a written confession admitting
responsibility for the shooting of Montillano. He likewise
allegedly fingered Duhay lungsod as the mastermind. It
was a confession Decierdo was supposed to have
reiterated before Baldomero Fernandez, Assistant
Provincial Fiscal of Zamboanga del Sur, who investigated
the Criminal case
The Zamboanga del Sur Provincial Fiscal filed an
Information against Decierdo and Duhay Lungsod for
Fiscal Fernandez, in view of the alleged confession in
question, moved to dismiss the Criminal case. Acting on
such motion to dismiss, the Honorable Asaali Isnani,
presiding Judge of the Zamboanga del Sur Court of First
Instance, issued, on the same date, an order dismissing
death shortly thereafter, the murder case against Felipe
Both Decierdo and Duhay lungsod entered pleas of not
guilty. Thereafter, the case was set for trial.
Judge Isnani issued an order acquitting Duhay lungsod for
lack of evidence and convicted Decierdo.
The case is now before the SC for automatic review.
There is no doubt that the accused's alleged extrajudicial
confession is in the nature of an uncounselled confession
and hence, inadmissible in evidence. Section 20 of Article
IV of the 1973 Constitution applies.
In the case at bar, Pedro Decierdo was not assisted by a
lawyer when he signed Exhibits "A"-"A-25", his supposed
confession. Judge Bacarro himself so admitted.
That fact alone (absence of counsel) nullifies the
confession. Hence, the evidence cannot therefore be

III. Rights and Remedies

Case # 49 Remedies
Case * 75 Definition of Bail
G.R. No. 158763 March 31, 2006

Respondents SPO1 Wilfredo Leao, SPO1
Ferdinand Marzan, SPO1 Ruben B. Agustin, SPO2
Alexander Micu, SPO2 Rodel Maderal, and SPO4 Emilio
Ramirez were charged for murder before the RTC of
Santiago City for the deaths of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer
Tuliao who were found burnt in Ramon, Isabela.
Trial for the murder case was transferred to RTC
of Manila where all of the accused were eventually
convicted as charged. But such decision of the lower court
was reversed on automatic review by the Supreme Court
and acquitted the accused.
However, one of the accused who was then at
large during the course of the trial was apprehended.
SPO2 Rodel Maderal executed a sworn statement and
identified petitioners Jose C. Miranda, PO3 Romeo B.
Ocon, and SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio, a certain Boyet dela
Cruz and Amado Doe, as the persons responsible for the
deaths of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao.
Herein respondent Virgilio Tuliao thereafter filed a case of
muder against Boyet dele Cruz and Amado Doe while
Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan issued
warrants of arrest against petitioners and SPO2 Maderal.
Petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary
investigation, to reinvestigate, and to recall and/or quash
the warrants of arrest. But such was denied by Judge
Timaluan on the ground that, the court did not acquire
jurisdiction over their persons.
The new Presiding Judge took over the case and issued
three subsequent orders and joint orders such as
cancellation of the warrant of arrest issued against
petitioner Miranda, Ocon and Dalmacio; and the denial of
the Motion for Reconsideration with a prayer for the
inhibition of Judge Anghad filed by the State Prosecutor
and respondent Tuliao.
As a result of those orders and joint orders, Tuliao filed
petions for madamus certiorari, mandamus and
prohibition with a prayer for a TRO sought to enjoin Judge
Anghad from further proceeding with the case, and
seeking to nullify said orders Orders and Joint Orders.
However, despite the granting of said motions, the
respondent judge proceeded by issuing a joint order
dismissing the two Informations for murder against
The SC took note of respondents cash bond evidenced by
O.R. No. 15924532 dated 15 November 2001, and issued
the temporary restraining order while referring the
petition to the Court of Appeals for adjudication on the
Thereafter, the Court of Appeals rendered the
assailed decision granting the petition and ordering the
reinstatement of the criminal cases in the RTC of Santiago
City, as well as the issuance of warrants of arrest against
petitioners and SPO2 Maderal. Petitioners moved for a
reconsideration of this Decision, but the same was denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not, an accused cannot seek any
judicial relief if he does not submit his person to the
jurisdiction of the court.

Except in applications for bail, it is not necessary
for the court to first acquire jurisdiction over the person of
the accused to dismiss the case or grant other relief.

Custody of the law is required before the court
can act upon the application for bail, but is not required
for the adjudication of other reliefs sought by the
defendant where the mere application therefor
constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction
over the person of the accused.
Custody of the law is
accomplished either by arrest or voluntary
while jurisdiction over the person of the
accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary
One can be under the custody of the law
but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his
person, such as when a person arrested by virtue of a
warrant files a motion before arraignment to quash the
warrant. On the other hand, one can be subject to the
jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet not be in
the custody of the law, such as when an accused escapes
custody after his trial has commenced.
Being in the
custody of the law signifies restraint on the person, who is
thereby deprived of his own will and liberty, binding him
to become obedient to the will of the law.
Custody of
the law is literally custody over the body of the accused. It
includes, but is not limited to, detention.

A person applying for admission to bail must be in
the custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his liberty.
A person who has not submitted himself to the jurisdiction
of the court has no right to invoke the processes of that

[t]he purpose of bail is to secure ones release and
it would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is free.
Thus, bail is the security required and given for the
release of a person who is in the custody of law."

Case # 50

A.M. No. RTJ-04-1852. June 3, 2004

Peitioner Wilfredo Talag along with two other
were accused for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and
Estafa. However, only the respondent was subsequently
charged for the crime.
Complainant filed a motion for reconsideration before the
Office of the City Prosecutor, praying for the dismissal of
the complaint against him for utter lack of merit. On even
date, he filed an Omnibus Motion before the trial court:
(1) to defer issuance of warrant of arrest and/or to recall
the same if already issued; and (2) to remand case to the
Office of the City Prosecutor pending review of the motion
for reconsideration.
On May 31, 2002, complainant filed with the trial court a
Very Urgent Motion to Set for Hearing Accuseds Omnibus
Motion to defer issuance of warrant of arrest and/or to
remand case to the Office of the City Prosecutor pending
review of the motion for reconsideration. Respondent
Judge ordered the issuance of a warrant of arrest without
first resolving the said motions.
Complainant immediately filed a petition for certiorari
before the Court of Appeals challenging the issuance of
the warrant of arrest. The Court of Appeals issued a
temporary restraining order enjoining the trial court from
enforcing the said warrant.
Two days after the complainant filed for motion for
respondent Judges inhibition, the judge issued the
assailed warrant of arrest against the complainant.
Meanwhile, the complainant filed a Notice of Change of
Address. As a result, two notice of arraignment were not
received by the complainant as it was sent to his former
address. Thus, the judge issued a bench warrant of arrest
against the accused for failing to attend his arraignment.
Subsequently, complainant filed a Motion to Recall
Warrant of Arrest and a Very Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration. The judge granted the motion to recall
warrant of arrest and lifted the bench warrant but denied
the motion for reconsideration.
The complainant consequently filed for verified complaint
against the respondent allegedly for partiality, grave
abuse of authority and oppression.
Among the allegations was the issuance of the bench
warrant by the judge because of the failure of the
complainant to attend his arraignment due to lack of
notice. Which the judge refuted and comments that since
the trial court has not acquired jurisdiction of the person
of the complainant, after the Court of Appeals denied
complainants petition and lifted the 60-day TRO, has to
order the issuance of a warrant of arrest against
The Court Administrator recommends for the dismissal of
the complaint for lack of merit.

ISSUE: Whether or not the he issuance of warrant of
arrest procedurally correct.

The issuance of the warrant was not only procedurally
sound but it was even required considering that
respondent had yet to acquire jurisdiction over the person
of complainant.
The issuance of the alias warrant was issued after the
expiration of the 60-day TRO issued by the Court of
Appeals. With the lifting of the restraining order, no legal
obstacle was left for the issuance of the arrest warrant
and thus set in motion the stalled prosecutorial process by
acquiring jurisdiction over the person of the accused.
As to the issue of the failure of the complainant to attend
his arraignment attributed to the failure to receive two
Produce Order issued by the judge, the notice of change
of address pertains to the address of the counsel,
therefore the court assumed that court processes could
be sent to complainants old and unchanged
residence. Accordingly, the two notices were sent to
complainants bondsman.
In accordance with Sec. 21, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules
of Court, his bondsman must produce him before the
court on the given date and failing to do so; the bond was
forfeited as it was.

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
Court resolves to adopt the recommendation of the Court
Administrator, and accordingly, DISMISS the instant
complaint for lack of merit.

Case # 51

G.R. No. 162416 January 31, 2006

A complaint of syndicated Estafa was filed against
Mina Tan Hao @ Ma. Gracia Tan Hao and Victor Ngo y Tan
by Manuel Dy Awiten for allegedly inducing the latter to
invest more than a hundred million pesos in State
Resources Development Management Corporation, but
when the latters investments fell due, the checks issued
by Hao in favor of Dy as payment for his investments were
dishonored for being drawn against insufficient funds or
that the account was closed.
The complainant includes the incorporators and
members of the board of directors of State Resources
Development Management Corporation as participants in
the conspiracy to commit the crime of syndicated estafa.
Among those included was petitioner Chester De Joya
being one of the incorporators of said corporation
The respondent judge issued the questioned
warrant of arrest on the basis of the report sent by the
state prosecutor findings of probable cause and after
examination of the document.
Evidences showed that private complainant was enticed
to invest a large sum of money in State Resources
Development Management Corporation; that he issued
several checks amounting to P114,286,086.14 in favor of
the corporation; that the corporation, in turn, issued
several checks to private complainant, purportedly
representing the return of his investments; that said
checks were later dishonored for insufficient funds and
closed account; that petitioner and his co-accused, being
incorporators and directors of the corporation, had
knowledge of its activities and transactions.
Hence the petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner could obtain relief
from the courts without submitting to its jurisdiction.

there is no exceptional reason in this case to allow
petitioner to obtain relief from the courts without
submitting to its jurisdiction. On the contrary, his
continued refusal to submit to the courts jurisdiction
should give this Court more reason to uphold the action of
the respondent judge. The purpose of a warrant of arrest
is to place the accused under the custody of the law to
hold him for trial of the charges against him. His evasive
stance shows intent to circumvent and frustrate the object
of this legal process. It should be remembered that he
who invokes the courts jurisdiction must first submit to its

Luna vs Plaza (In the matter of the application for a
writ of habeas corpus, Simon Luna vs Plaza)
Facts: Respondent Judge Plaza ordered a warrant of arrest
without bail for the provisional release of accused, herein
petitioner, Luna for the crime of murder. Supporting the
complaint were sworn statements of the witnesses for the
prosecution, in the form of questions and answers taken
by taken by Investigator Patosa and subscribed and sworn
to before the respondent Judge at the time of the filing of
the complaint. The respondent Judge examined the
prosecution witnesses by reading to them "all over again
the questions and answers" in their statements in writing,
and the witnesses-affiants declared before Judge Plaza
that the questions were propounded by Investigator
Patosa, and that the answers were made by them. The
affiants further declared before respondent Judge that
their answers were true, and were freely and voluntarily
made, that they fully understood the questions and
answers, and that they were willing to sign their
respective affidavits. The affiants signed their respective
affidavits in the presence of the respondent Judge, who
also signed after the usual procedure of administering the
Petitioner filed a waiver for his right to preliminary
investigation and he was charged thereafter with murder.
Petitioner then filed for the writ of habeas corpus claiming
that he was being deprived of liberty without due process
of law, on the ground that the imprisonment and
detention was illegal and the warrant of arrest was
illegally issued because the questions propounded by
respondent judge were not searching questions.

Issue: WON the warrant of arrest was validly issued
WON petitioners right to procedural due process has
been violated for a defective preliminary investigation
WON the writ of habeas corpus is the proper

Held: Yes, the warrant of arrest was validly issued. The
Constitution, in Section 1(3), Article III, provides that no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce. The Judiciary Act of 1848, as amended by RA
3828, requires that before a municipal judge issues a
warrant of arrest he should first satisfy himself that there
is a probable cause by examining the witnesses personally,
and that the examination must be under oath and
reduced to writing in the form of searching questions and
answers. The purpose of this is to prevent the issuance of
a warrant of arrest against a person based simply upon
affidavits of witnesses who made, and swore to, their
statements before a person or persons other than the
judge before whom the criminal complaint is filed. In the
case at bar, while it is true that the respondent Municipal
Judge did not himself personally cause to be reduced to
writing in the form of questions and answers the
examination of witnesses presented before him by the
person who filed the criminal complaint, respondent
Judge had personally examined the witnesses under oath
and that the questions asked by the Judge and the
answers of the witnesses were reflected in writings which
were actually subscribed and sworned to before him.
No, there was no violation of accuseds right to procedural
due process. Preliminary examination is not an essential
part of due process of law. Preliminary examination may
be conducted by the municipal judge, prior to the issuance
of the warrant of arrest, either in the presence, or in the
absence, of the accused. The record shows that herein
petitioner waived the preliminary investigation and
applied for bail before respondent Municipal Judge. This
conduct of petitioner constitutes as an implied admission
on his part that there was a probable cause for the
issuance of the warrant of arrest against him and that he
had waived his objection to whatever defect, if any, in the
preliminary examination conducted by respondent Judge
prior to the issuance of the warrant of arrest.
No, the writ of habeas corpus is not the proper remedy of
petitioner, but a petition to quash the warrant of arrest or
a petition for a reinvestigation of the case by the
respondent Municipal Judge or by the Provincial Fiscal.
Section 4 of Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides
"SECTION. 4 When writ not allowed or discharge
authorized. If it appears that the person alleged to be
restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer
under process issued by a court or judge .. and that the
court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process .. or
make the order, the writ shall not be allowed . . ."cralaw
virtua1aw library

All the conditions set forth to deny the writ, are present in
the instant case. It is shown that petitioner is detained and
is in the custody of the respondent Provincial Warden by
virtue of the order of arrest, and the order of respondent
Judge, to confine petitioner in the provincial jail. It is not
disputed by petitioner that respondent Judge had
jurisdiction to issue the warrant of arrest and the order of
commitment, although petitioner did question the validity
of the warrant of arrest for allegedly having been issued in
violation of Republic Act No. 3828 which claim We have
found to be untenable. Consequently, the trial Judge did
not commit an error in denying the writ of habeas
corpus prayed for. At any rate, the remedy available to the
petitioner herein, under the circumstances stated in this
opinion, is not a petition for a writ of habeas corpus but a
petition to quash the warrant of arrest or a petition for a
reinvestigation of the case by the respondent Municipal
Judge or by the Provincial Fiscal.

Alimpoos vs CA
Facts: Accused Reynaldo Mosquito was detained by virtue
of a warrant of arrest for the prosecution of robber with
less serious physical injuries. The place allegedly robbed
belonged to petitioner spouses Alimpoos. The accused
and his wife instituted the habeas corpus case before the
trial court contending that the warrant was illegally issued.
The petitioner spouses and the witnesses were named as
defendants in the habeas corpus case. In an amended
complaint, the two arresting policemen, the Chief of
Police, and the Municipal Judge were added as co-
defendants. Spouses Alimpoos and the petitioner
witnesses contended that they had nothing to do with the
Accuseds detention and arrest. The Municipal Judge, the
Chief of Police, and Patrolmen Libres and Galimba alleged
that the Warrant of Arrest was validly issued. Herein
respondent trial judge issued an order declaring the
detention of the Accused illegal, granting the Writ of
Habeas Corpus and enjoining the prosecution of the
Accused in the Criminal Case.
Issue: WON the habeas corpus case is defective
WON the order to enjoing the prosecution of the accused
in another criminal case is valid

HELD: Yes, the habeas corpus proceeding is defective. A
Habeas Corpus proceeding is not a suit between parties.
While the issuance of the writ is to all intents and
purposes the commencement of a civil action, a suit, yet
technically the proceedings by Habeas Corpus is in no
sense a suit between private parties. It is an inquisition by
the government, at the suggestion and instance of an
individual, most probably, but still in the name and
capacity of the sovereign. It may be analogized to a
proceeding in rem and instituted for the sole purpose of
fixing the status of a person. The person restrained is the
central figure in the transaction. The proceeding is
instituted solely for his benefit. As it is not designed to
obtain redress against anybody, and as no judgment can
be entered against anybody, and as there is no real
plaintiff and defendant, there can be no suit in the
technical sense. The Accused, therefore, should have
limited his complaint against the Chief of Police of
Bayugan, the person having him in alleged illegal custody.
Moreover, habeas corpus was not a proper remedy for the
accused. The remedy available to the petitioner herein,
under the circumstances stated in this opinion, is not a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus but a petition to quash
the warrant of arrest or a petition for reinvestigation of
the case. It is the general rule that Habeas Corpus should
not be resorted to when there is another remedy
No, the order containing a provision enjoining the
prosecution of the Accused in the Criminal Case is
erroneous. If the Accused was illegally detained because
he was arrested without a preliminary examination, what
should have been done was to set aside the warrant of
arrest and order the discharge of the Accused, but without
enjoining the Municipal Judge from conducting a
preliminary examination and afterwards properly issuing a
warrant of arrest. Habeas Corpus proceedings are not
meant to determine criminal responsibility. When a
preliminary investigation is not held, or is improperly held,
the procedure is not to dismiss the case, or enjoin its
prosecution, but to have the preliminary investigation

Parada vs Veneracion
Facts: Parada is the accused in a case for 4 counts of
estafa, duly bonded with EASCO. He notified the court and
the manager of the bonding company of his change of
address. However, the notice of hearing was sent to
petitioners former address. For failure to appear,
respondent judge ordered the arrest of herein accused-
complainant, ordering the confiscation of the bond and
a trial in absentia was conducted. Respondent Judge
likewise assigned a counsel de officio, Atty. Jesse Tiburan
of the Public Attorneys Office (PAO) as counsel for the
accused. Furthermore, a warrant of arrest with no bail was
issued. Thereafter, a decision was rendered convicting
herein accused-appellant of the crime and the decision
was promulgated despite his absence. Accused-
complainant was arrested and brought to the Makati City
Jail. Accused-complainant filed a Petition for Habeas
Corpus, Certiorari and Annulment of Judgment with
prayer for immediate relief with the Court of Appeals.

Issue: WON the warrant of arrest issued with no bail is

Held: No. Section 14 (2), Article 3 of the Constitution
provides, inter alia, that trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that
he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustifiable. The requisites then of a valid trial in
absentia are: (1) the accused has already been arraigned;
(2) he has been duly notified of the trial; and (3) his failure
to appear is unjustifiable. In the case at bar, requisite
numbers two (2) and three (3) of a valid trial in
absentia are clearly wanting. Parada had not been duly
notified of the trial because the notice of hearing was sent
to the former address of Paradas counsel despite the fact
that the latter formally notified the court of his change of
address. the warrant of arrest with no recommendation
for bail that was issued by respondent Judge is a
downright violation of Paradas constitutional right to
bail. The rule is clear that unless charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua and the evidence of guilt
is strong, all persons detained, arrested or otherwise
under the custody of the law are entitled to bail as a
matter of right. It should be noted that the crime with
which Parada was charged is estafa which is undoubtedly
a bailable offense.

Secretary of national Defense vs Manalo
Facts: Respondent Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo
recounted being forcibly taken from their home in Bulacan
by armed men wearing white shirts, fatigue pants and
army boots. They were handcuffed, forced to face the
ground, kicked and brought into a white L300 van. In their
18 months of captivity, they learned some of the names of
their abductors. They were blindfolded and tortured in the
place where they were brought. They were forced to eat
spoiled or left over food by their interrogators and are
questioned if they were members of the NPA. One night,
Raymond tried to escape and after walking through a
forested area, he talked to some women he saw who told
him he was at Fort Magsaysay. Upon reaching the
highway, he was spotted by some soldiers who chased
and caught up with him. He was again tortured until his
back bled. For some weeks, they would be tortured, and
their wounds would be healed. When the wounds healed
the torture would resume particularly when respondents
guards were drunk. They were detained in Fort Magsaysay
for three and a half weeks. One day, they met with Gen.
Palparan who told them that they would be given another
chance if they told their parents to stop joining rallies, the
court hearing and CHR. The respondents agreed as they
felt that they could not do otherwise.As they were also
afraid, their parents acceded. Thereafter, they were
brought to Camp Tecson, where they learned that they
were in the detachment of the Rangers. There, they
cleaned in the morning and put to chains at night. They
also met Sherlyn Cadapan there who confided to them
that they she has been subjected to severe torture and
raped. At times, they were tortured and threatened that if
they escaped, their families would be killed. Respondents
were then again transferred to the 24
infantry battalion
in Limay, Bataan. They were made to clean, cook and help
in raising livestock and occasionally tortured. From Limay,
they were transferred to Zambales were they witnessed
several people being killed, including an aeta. The bodies
are burned then buried. They were brought to Pangasinan
to help raise poultry for Donald Caigas and were paid
200php or 400php. They were no longer put in chains but
were instructed to use the names Rommel and Rod.
There, they started to plan their escape. They earned
some money until they had saved 1400php between
them. One night, Caigas and his cohorts had a drinking
sessions. When none of their guards were awake and took
notice, they proceeded towards the highway and boarded
a bus bound for Manila.
Dr Molino corroborated the accounts of respondents
saying that the two had scars consistent with physical
injuries inflicted upon them. He conducted the medical
examination on the respondents two days after their
escape. They filed originally filed for a Petition for
Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order
to stop herein petitioners and/or their officers and agents
from depriving them of their right to liberty and other
basic rights. Therein petitioners also sought ancillary
remedies, Protective Custody Orders, Appointment of
Commissioner, Inspection and Access Orders, and all other
legal and equitable reliefs. While the petition was
pending, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo took effect. The
Manalo siblings filed a Manifestation and Omnibus Motion
to Treat Existing Petition as Amparo Petition, to Admit
Supporting Affidavits, and to Grant Interim and
Final Amparo Reliefs.
Issue: WON the writ of amparo can be issued
Held: Yes. Respondents were abducted from their house
in Bulacan until they escaped. The abduction, detention,
torture, and escape of the respondents were narrated by
respondent Raymond Manalo in a clear and convincing
manner. His account is dotted with countless candid
details of respondents' harrowing experience and
tenacious will to escape, captured through his different
senses and etched in his memory. Raymond's affidavit and
testimony were corroborated by the affidavit of
respondent Reynaldo Manalo. The testimony and medical
reports prepared by forensic specialist Dr. Molino, and the
pictures of the scars left by the physical injuries inflicted
on respondents, also corroborate respondents' accounts
of the torture they endured while in detention.
The possibility of respondents being executed stared them
in the eye while they were in detention. With their escape,
this continuing threat to their life is apparent, moreso now
that they have surfaced and implicated specific officers in
the military not only in their own abduction and torture,
but also in those of other persons known to have
disappeared. Nonetheless, the circumstances of
respondents' abduction, detention, torture and escape
reasonably support a conclusion that there is an apparent
threat that they will again be abducted, tortured, and this
time, even executed. These constitute threats to their
liberty, security, and life, actionable through a petition for
a writ of Amparo. Respondents' right to security as
"freedom from threat" is violated by the apparent threat
to their life, liberty and security of person. Their right to
security as a guarantee of protection by the government is
likewise violated by the ineffective investigation and
protection on the part of the military.

Velasco v CA
Larkins was arrested for violation of B.P. 22 on September
1993 by virtue of a warrant. On November 1994 Alinea
executed an affidavit before the NBI accusing Larkins for
the crime of rape. Then authorities of NBI arrested Larkins
on the basis of the said complaint. 2 days later Larkins
filed for bail however, he was not released by NBI on the
ground that a complaint of rape was filed against him.
Subsequently Alinea executed a formal complaint of rape
against Larkins. Accused common law wife filed for habeas
corpus which was approved by the CA, hence, this petition
for review.

WON illegal arrest of Larkins was cured by the subsequent
filing of an information against him.

Even if the arrest of the person is illegal it can be
subsequently cured based on supervening circumstances
such as the issuance of judicial process preventing the
discharge of the detained person. Another is the filing of
the complaint or information for the offense for which the
accused is detained. By then, the restraint of liberty is
already by virtue of the complaint or information and,
therefore, the writ of habeas corpus is no longer available.
Ilagan v Enrile

Ilagan was arrested based on the mission order issued by
then Defense Minister Enrile. Ilagans lawyer was also
arrested, hence, habeas corpus was filed. Enrile contented
that they cant avail habeas corpus for that time it was
suspended. A hearing was conducted and the court issued
the release of Ilagan which was opposed by Enrile on the
ground that warrant of arrest for the crime of rebellion
was already filed against Ilagan. Petitioner also claimed
that respondent cant avail habeas corpus for its
unconstitutional being violative of search and seizure.

WON habeas corpus Is the proper remedy for petitioners

The court held that Ilagan should have filed motion to
quash the warrant of arrest, or filed for preliminary
investigation and not habeas corpus. It is also the duty of
the trial court to determine if Sec 5 of Rule 113 was
properly applied. Moreover, since warrant of arrest was
availed of and rebellion was filed in court, render the case
moot and academic.

Moncupa v Enrile

Efren moncupa and 8 other persons were arrested on the
basis that he was a National Democratic Front member
and a Presidential commitment order was issued against
him. An investigation was conducted and he was excluded
in the subversive case and only illegal possession of
firearms was filed against him. Moncupa then was
temporarily released by the Minister of National Defense
with the approval of the president under some conditions
or restraint. Moncupa filed for habeas corpus and the
respondent opposed it on the ground that its already
moot and academic for Moncupa was already released.

WON the filing of habeas corpus is moot and academic for
Moncupa was already released.

A release that renders a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus moot and academic must be one which is free from
involuntary restraints. Where a person continues to be
unlawfully denied one or more of his constitutional
freedoms, where there is present a denial of due process,
where the restraints are not merely involuntary but
appear to be unnecessary, and where a deprivation of
freedom originally valid has, in the light of subsequent
developments, become arbitrary, the person concerned or
those applying in his behalf may still avail themselves of
the privilege of the writ.

Navla v Pardico

Bong Lapore and Benhur Pardico was envited by Asian
Land for questioning for someone saw them stole the
lamps and electric wires in Grand Royale Subdivision.
Thereafter, Lolita, Bong mother and Bens wife went to
the office of Asian Land and ask for the release of Bong
and Ben. Bong was released but Ben was left behind for
further questioning. On the next day, Asian Land claimed
that they already released Ben but Lolita could not find
her husband. Hence, Petition for writ of amparo was filed
which was granted by the trial court and opposed by the
petitioner claiming that writ of amparo is available only in
cases where the factual and legal bases of the violation or
threatened violation of the aggrieved partys right to life,
liberty and security are clear.

WON Bens dissappearance is within the ambit of writ of

A writ of amparo may lie against a private individual or
entity. But even if the person sought to be held
accountable or responsible in an amparo petition is a
private individual or entity, still, government involvement
in the disappearance remains an indispensable
element. Here, petitioners are mere security guards at
Grand Royale Subdivision in Brgy. Lugam, Malolos City and
their principal, the Asian Land, is a private entity. They do
not work for the government and nothing has been
presented that would link or connect them to some covert
police, military or governmental operation.

Rubrico vs Arroyo
Facts: On April 3, 2007, Lourdes Rubrico while attending
Lenten pabasa was abducted by armed men belonging to
301st Air intelligence and Security Squadron based in
Fernando Airbase Lipa City. Lourdes was brought and
detained at the Airbase without charges. She was
interrogated conducted my hooded individuals which
amounts to verbal abuses and mental harassment.
Lourdes was eventually released but only after she signed
a statement that she would be military assets. After being
release, the harassment continued in form of being tailed
on at least two occasions at different place by
motorcycling men wearing bonnet. Lourdes filed a
complaint with the office of the ombudsman, a complaint
for kidnapping and arbitrary detention and grave
misconduct against Cuaresma, Alfaro, Santana and
Jonathan but nothing was happened. She also reported
the harassment incident but nothing happened. Human
Rights group of Karapatan conducted an investigation
which indicated that men belonging to the Armed Forces
of the Philippines (AFP) led the abduction of Lourdes.
Based on such information, Rubrico filed a petition for the
writ of amparo with the Supreme Court on 25 October
2007, praying that respondents be ordered to desist from
performing any threatening act against the security of
petitioners and for the Ombudsman to immediately file
information for kidnapping qualified with the aggravating
circumstance of gender of the offended party. Rubrico
also prayed for damages and for respondents to produce
documents submitted to any of them on the case of
Lourdes. The Supreme Court issued the desired writ and
then referred the petition to the Court of Appeals (CA) for
summary hearing and appropriate action. At the hearing
conducted on 20 November 2007, the CA granted
petitioners motion that the petition and writ be served on
Darwin Sy/Reyes, Santana, Alfaro, Cuaresma, and
Jonathan. By a separate resolution, the CA dropped the
President as respondent in the case. On 31 July 2008, after
due proceedings, the CA rendered its partial judgment,
dismissing the petition with respect to Esperon, Razon,
Roquero, Gomez, and Ombudsman.

Issue: WON the CA commited reversible error in
dismissing their petition and dropping President GMA as
party respondent. WON the doctrine of command
responsibility is applicable in an amparo petition.

Held: NO. The presidential immunity from suit remains
preserved under our system of government, albeit not
expressly reserved in the present constitution. Addressing
a concern of his co-members in the 1986 Constitutional
Commission on the absence of an express provision on the
matter, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J. observed that it was
already understood in jurisprudence that the President
may not be sued during his or her tenure.
Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his
tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in
any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide
for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity
of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he
can be dragged into court litigations while serving as such.
The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine
finds its context in the development of laws of war and
armed combats. According to Fr. Bernas, command
responsibility, in its simplest terms, means the
responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by
subordinate members of the armed forces or other
persons subject to their control in international wars or
domestic conflict. In this sense, command responsibility is
properly a form of criminal complicity. The Hague
Conventions of 1907 adopted the doctrine of command
responsibility, foreshadowing the present-day precept of
holding a superior accountable for the atrocities
committed by his subordinates should he be remiss in his
duty of control over them. As then formulated, command
responsibility is an omission mode of individual criminal
liability, whereby the superior is made responsible for
crimes committed by his subordinates for failing to
prevent or punish the perpetrators. There is no Philippine
law that provides for criminal liability under the Doctrine
of Command Responsibility While there are several
pending bills on command responsibility, there is still no
Philippine law that provides for criminal liability under
that doctrine. It may plausibly be contended that
command responsibility, as legal basis to hold
military/police commanders liable for extra-legal killings,
enforced disappearances, or threats, may be made
applicable to this jurisdiction on the theory that the
command responsibility doctrine now constitutes a
principle of international law or customary international
law in accordance with the incorporation clause of the
Constitution. Still, it would be inappropriate to apply to
these proceedings the doctrine of command
responsibility, as the CA seemed to have done, as a form
of criminal complicity through omission, for individual
respondents criminal liability, if there be any, is beyond
the reach of amparo. In other words, the Court does not
rule in such proceedings on any issue of criminal
culpability, even if incidentally a crime or an infraction of
an administrative rule may have been committed.

Facts: Cleofas and Marciana (respondents) alleged that on
September 17, 2006 at around 8:00 p.m., their respective
sons Nicolas Sanchez and Heherson Medina were catching
frogs outside their home in Sitio Dalin, Barangay Bueno,
Capas, Tarlac; that at around 1:00 a.m. of the next day,
September 18, 2006, Nicolas wives Lourdez and Rosalie
Sanchez, who were then at home, heard gunshots and
saw armed men in soldiers uniforms passing by; that at
around 4:00 a.m. of the same day, Lourdez and Rosalie
went out to check on Nicolas and Heherson but only saw
their caps, slippers, pana and airgun for catching frogs, as
well as bloodstains; and that they immediately reported
the matter to the barangay officials. Respondents
narrated that they, together with other family members,
proceeded on September 19, 2006 to the Capas Station of
the Philippine National Police (PNP). Accompanied by
officials of the National Commission on Indigenous
Peoples (NCIP), they also tried to search for Nicolas and
Heherson at the Camp Detachment of the 71stInfantry
Batallion of the Philippine Army (Army) in Barangay
Burgos, San Jose, Tarlac, and at the Camp of the Bravo
Company of the Armys 71st Infantry Batallion inside
Hacienda Luisita, Tarlac City, but to no avail. respondents
alleged that Josephine Galang Victoria, also known as
Antonina Galang (Josephine), niece of a neighbor, later
informed them that she had seen two men inside Camp
Servillano Aquino of the Northern Luzon Command
(Nolcom) in San Miguel, Tarlac City on September 21,
2006, whom Josephine later identified as Nicolas and
Heherson (the victims) after respondents had shown her
their photographs; and that Josephine informed them that
she saw the victims again on September 24, 2006 and
November 1, 2006, this time at the Camp of the Bravo
Company of the Armys 71st Infantry Batallion inside
Hacienda Luisita, where she had occasion to talk to Lt.
Sumangil and Sgt. Villalobos. Respondents filed a case on
December 21, 2006 before the Commission on Human
Rights (CHR), which endorsed the same to the
Ombudsman for appropriate action. In the amended
petition dated January 14, 2008, the respondents prayed
for the issuance of a writ of Amparo, the production of the
victims bodies during the hearing on the Writ, the
inspection of certain military camps, the issuance of
temporary and permanent protection orders, and the
rendition of judgment under Section 18 of the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo. In their Return, the military officers
mainly denied having custody of the victims and posited
that the respondents herein failed to substantiate their
claim. In a Decision dated 17 September 2008, the CA
absolved the impleaded military officers on the ground
that the petitioners have not adequately and convincingly
established any direct or indirect link between the
individual military officers and the disappearances of
Nicolas and Heherson. Aggrieved, the petitioners filed a
petition for review with the Supreme Court.

Issue: WON the grant of the provisional remedies
provided in Section 14 of the Amparo Rule is proper in
cases where the public respondents were absolved of the
disappearance of the alleged victims.

Held: No. The interim or provisional remedies provided in
Section 14 of the Amparo Rule are intended to assist the
court before it arrives at a judicious determination of the
amparo petition Section 14 of the Amparo Rule provides
for interim or provisional reliefs that the courts may grant
in order to, inter alia, protect the witnesses and the rights
of the parties, and preserve all relevant evidence. These
provisional reliefs are intended to assist the court before it
arrives at a judicious determination of the amparo
petition. For the appellate court to, in the present case,
still order the inspection of the military camps and order
the army units to conduct an investigation into the
disappearance of Nicolas and Heherson after it absolved
petitioners is thus not in order. The reliefs granted by the
appellate court to respondents are not in sync with a
finding that petitioners could not be held accountable for
the disappearance of the victims.

Razon vs Tagistis
Facts: Engineer Morced N. Tagitis (Tagitis), a consultant for
the World Bank and the Senior Honorary Counselor for the
Islamic Development Bank (IDB) Scholarship Programme,
together with Arsimin Kunnong (Kunnong), an IDB scholar,
arrived in Jolo by boat in the early morning of October 31,
2007 from a seminar in Zamboanga City. They
immediately checked-in at ASY Pension House. Tagitis
asked Kunnong to buy him a boat ticket for his return trip
the following day to Zamboanga. When Kunnong returned
from this errand, Tagitis was no longer around. Kunnong
looked for Tagitis and even sent a text message to the
latters Manila-based secretary, who advised Kunnong to
simply wait for Tagitis return. On November 4, 2007,
Kunnong and Muhammad Abdulnazeir N. Matli, a UP
professor of Muslim studies and Tagitis fellow student
counselor at the IDB, reported Tagitis disappearance to
the Jolo Police Station. More than a month later, or on
December 28, 2007, the respondent, May Jean Tagitis,
through her attorney-in-fact, filed a Petition for the Writ
of Amparo against several generals. On the same day CA
issued the writ of amparo and set the case for hearing on
January 7, 2008. n March 7, 2008, the CA issued its
decision confirming that the disappearance of Tagitis was
an enforced disappearance under the United Nations
(UN) Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from
Enforced Disappearances. The CA ruled that when military
intelligence pinpointed the investigative arm of the PNP
(CIDG) to be involved in the abduction, the missing-person
case qualified as an enforced disappearance. Hence, the
CA extended the privilege of the writ to Tagitis and his
family, and directed the petitioners to exert extraordinary
diligence and efforts to protect the life, liberty and
security of Tagitis, with the obligation to provide monthly
reports of their actions to the CA. At the same time, the
CA dismissed the petition against the then respondents
from the military, Lt. Gen Alexander Yano and Gen. Ruben
Rafael, based on the finding that it was PNP-CIDG, not the
military, that was involved. On March 31, 2008, the
petitioners moved to reconsider the CA decision, but the
CA denied the motion in its Resolution dated April 9, 2008.
Aggrieved, the petitioners filed a petition for review with
the Supreme Court.

Issue: WON the writ of amparo determines guilt nor
pinpoint criminal culpability for the alleged enforced
disappearance of the subject of the petition for the writ.

HELD: No. The writ of amparo does not determine guilt
nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the disappearance,
rather, it determines responsibility, or at least
accountability, for the enforced disappearance for
purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to address
the disappearance. The writ of amparo is a protective
remedy against violations or threats of violation against
the rights to life, liberty and security. It embodies, as a
remedy, the courts directive to police agencies to
undertake specified courses of action to address the
disappearance of an individual, in this case, Engr. Morced
N. Tagitis. It does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal
culpability for the disappearance; rather, it determines
responsibility, or at least accountability, for the enforced
disappearance for purposes of imposing the appropriate
remedies to address the disappearance. Responsibility
refers to the extent the actors have been established by
substantial evidence to have participated in whatever
way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance,
as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among
them, the directive to file the appropriate criminal and
civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper
courts. Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the
measure of remedies that should be addressed to those
who exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance
without bringing the level of their complicity to the level
of responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with
knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and
who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry,
but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary
diligence in the investigation of the enforced
disappearance. In all these cases, the issuance of the Writ
of Amparo is justified by our primary goal of addressing
the disappearance, so that the life of the victim is
preserved and his liberty and security are restored.

Facts: On October 11, 1994, Julette Pearanda and Gerra
Rustia went to Amsic Elementary School where they were
Grade III pupils. During the recess at around 10:00 a.m.,
both girls went to the house of Julette to get a dress which
Julette intended to show to her teacher. On their way
back to school, appellant talked to them, showed them a
picture of a woman and asked them if they knew the
woman in the picture. Julette told appellant that she did
not know the woman. Appellant told them to help him
look for the woman. The two girls accompanied appellant
who was then riding a green bicycle. The three of them
rode towards Amsic. In view of an obstruction on the
road, appellant told the girls to go down and walk as they
made a turn towards Plaridel. Thereafter, the two girls
rode the bicycle again. This time it was Julette who stayed
at the back while Gerra was placed at the front of the
bicycle. Both girls was brought to a grassy place and was
raped. Alojado was convicted of statutory rape.

Issue: Whether or not irregularity of arrest is deemed
Yes. The Supreme Court said Appellant (Alojado) also
maintains that he was illegally arrested. This argument,
however, comes too late in the day, because appellant
failed to allege it PRIOR TO HIS ARRAIGNEMENT. In People
vs. Salvatierra, the Court emphasized that an objection to
the legality of an arrest MUST BE SUBMITTED TO THE
Appellant is stopped from questioning the legality of his
arrest considering that he never raised this before
entering his plea. Any objection involving a warrant of
arrest or the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of
an accused must be made before he enters his plea ,
otherwise the objection is deemed waive.
Consequently, any defect concerning the arrest of the
appellant was CURED by his COLUNTARY, submission to
the jurisdiction of the trial court, as shown when entered
his plea during his arraignment, and when he actively
participated in the trial thereafter.

People vs. Rondero
On the evening of March 25, 1994, Mardy Doria came
home late from a barrio fiesta. When he noticed that his
nine year old sister, Mylene, was not around, he woke up
his parents to inquire about his sisters
whereabouts. Realizing that Mylene was missing, their
father, Maximo Doria, sought the help of a neighbor,
Barangay Kagawad Andong Rondero to search for
Mylene. Maximo and Andong went to the house of a
Barangay Captain to ask for assistance and also requested
their other neighbors in to look for Mylene.
The group began searching for Mylene at around 1:00
oclock in the morning but to no avail. Tired and
distraught, Maximo started on his way home. When he
was about 5 m. away from his house, Maximo, who was
then carrying a flashlight, saw herein accused-appellant
Delfin Rondero pumping the artesian well about 1 m.
away. Accused-appellant had an ice pick clenched in his
mouth and was washing his bloodied hands.
Maximo told Kagawad Andong what he saw without,
however, revealing that the person he saw was the latters
own son. Maximo and Andong continued their search for
Mylene but after failing to find her, the two men decided
to go home. After some time, a restless Maximo began to
search anew for her daughter. He again sought the help
of Andong and the barangay secretary. The group
returned to Pugaro Elementary School where they found
Mylenes lifeless body lying on a cemented pavement near
the canteen. Her right hand was raised above her head,
which was severely bashed, and her fractured left hand
was behind her back. She was naked from the waist down
and had several contusions and abrasions on different
parts of her body. Tightly gripped in her right hand were
some hair strands. A blue rubber slipper with a tiny leaf
painted in red was found beside her body while the other
slipper was found behind her back.
Half an hour later, five (5) policemen arrived at the scene
and conducted a spot investigation. They found a pair of
under Mylenes buttocks, which Maximo
identified as hers. Thereafter, Maximo led the policemen
to the artesian well where he had seen accused-appellant
earlier washing his hands. The policemen found that the
artesian well was spattered with blood.
After the
investigation, the policemen, together with Maximo, went
back to their headquarters in Dagupan City. There,
Maximo disclosed that before they found Mylenes body,
he saw accused-appellant washing his bloodstained hands
at the artesian well.
Acting on this lead, the policemen
returned to Pugaro and arrested accused-appellant.
Meanwhile, on March 30, 1994, accused-appellant was
formally charged with the special complex crime of rape
with homicide. Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty at his

Anent accused-appellants third assignment of error, it
might be true that accused-appellants warrantless arrest
was not lawful. The police officers who arrested him had
no personal knowledge of facts indicating that he was the
perpetrator of the crime just committed. His warrantless
arrest was not based on a personal knowledge of the
police officers indicating facts that he has committed the
gruesome crime but solely on Maximos suspicion that he
was involved in the slaying of Mylene since he was seen
washing his bloodied hands in the early morning of March
26, 1994. Nevertheless, it is hornbook knowledge that any
irregularity attending the arrest of an accused is deemed
waived when, instead of quashing the information for lack
of jurisdiction over his person, the accused voluntarily
submits himself to the court by entering a plea of guilty or
not guilty during the arraignment and participating in the

Cited case in Esquillo vs. People, J. Bersamin Dissenting
The petitioners failure to assail the invalidity of her arrest
prior to her arraignment, and her objecting to the
inadmissibility of the evidence for the first time only on
appeal on the ground that the search was illegal for being
done despite her not committing any unlawful act to give
a justification for the search did not amount to a waiver of
her objection to the admissibility of the evidence against

The failure to object to the irregularity of an arrest prior to
the arraignment does not involve a waiver of the
inadmissibility of the evidence. It only amounts to a
submission to the jurisdiction of the trial court. The Court
said so in several decisions, including People v.

A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not also
mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized
during an illegal warrantless arrest. The following
searches and seizures are deemed permissible by
jurisprudence: (1) search of moving vehicles (2) seizure in
plain view (3) customs searches (4) waiver or consent
searches (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry Search) and (6)
search incidental to a lawful arrest. The last includes a
valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an
equally valid warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an
arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid
warrant of arrest, the Rules of Court recognize permissible
warrantless arrests, to wit: (1) arrests in flagrante delicto,
(2) arrests effected in hot pursuit, and, (3) arrests of
escaped prisoners.

People vs. Rancho
On May 19, 2003, a confidential agent of the police
transacted through cellular phone with appellant for the
purchase of shabu. The agent later reported the
transaction to the police authorities who immediately
formed a team composed of member of the PDEA, the
Intelligence group of the Philippine Army and the local
police force to apprehend the appellant. The agent gave
the police appellants name, together with his physical
description. He also assured them that appellant would
arrive in Baler, Aurora the following day.
On May 20, 2003, at 11:00 a.m., appellant called up the
agent and informed him that he was on board a Genesis
bus and would arrive in Baler, Aurora, anytime of the day
wearing a red and white striped T-shirt. The team
members then posted themselves along the national
highway in Baler, Aurora. At around 3:00 p.m. of the same
day, a Genesis bus arrived in Baler. When appellant
alighted from the bus, the confidential agent pointed to
him as the person he transacted with earlier. Having
alighted from the bus, appellant stood near the highway
and waited for a tricycle that would bring him to his final
destination. As appellant was about to board a tricycle,
the team approached him and invited him to the police
station on suspicion of carrying shabu. Appellant
immediately denied the accusation, but as he pulled out
his hands from his pants pocket, a white envelope slipped
therefrom which, when opened, yielded a small sachet
containing the suspected drug.
The team then brought appellant to the police station for
investigation. The confiscated specimen was turned over
to Police Inspector Rogelio Sarenas De Vera who marked it
with his initials and with appellants name. The field test
and laboratory examinations on the contents of the
confiscated sachet yielded positive results for
methamphetamine hydrochloride.
Appellant was charged in two separate Informations, one
for violation of Section 5 of R.A. 9165, for transporting or
delivering; and the second, of Section 11 of the same law
for possessing, dangerous drugs.
During the arraignment, appellant pleaded "Not Guilty" to
both charges.

The records show that appellant never objected to the
irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment. In fact,
this is the first time that he raises the issue. Considering
this lapse, coupled with his active participation in the trial
of the case, we must abide with jurisprudence which
dictates that appellant, having voluntarily submitted to
the jurisdiction of the trial court, is deemed to have
waived his right to question the validity of his arrest, thus
curing whatever defect may have attended his arrest. The
legality of the arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the
court over his person. Appellants warrantless arrest
therefore cannot, in itself, be the basis of his acquittal.

In RE: Umil vs. Ramos

Facts: [GR 81567] On 1 February 1988, the Regional
Intelligence Operations Unit of the Capital Command
(RIOU-CAPCOM) received confidential information about a
member of the NPA Sparrow Unit (liquidation squad)
being treated for a gunshot wound at the St. Agnes
Hospital in Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City. Upon
verification, it was found that the wounded person, who
was listed in the hospital records as Ronnie Javelon, is
actually Rolando Dural, a member of the NPA liquidation
squad, responsible for the killing of 2 CAPCOM soldiers the
day before, or on 31 January 1988, in Macanining Street,
Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. In view
of this verification, Dural was transferred to the Regional
Medical Services of the CAPCOM, for security reasons.
While confined thereat, or on 4 February 1988, Dural was
positively identified by eyewitnesses as the gunman who
went on top of the hood of the CAPCOM mobile patrol
car, and fired at the 2 CAPCOM soldiers seated inside the
car identified as T/Sgt. Carlos Pabon and CIC Renato
Manligot. As a consequence of this positive identification,
Dural was referred to the Caloocan City Fiscal who
conducted an inquest and thereafter filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City an information
charging Rolando Dural alias Ronnie Javelon with the
crime of "Double Murder with Assault Upon Agents of
Persons in Authority." (Criminal Case C-30112; no bail
recommended). On 15 February 1988, the information
was amended to include, as defendant, Bernardo Itucal, Jr.
who, at the filing of the original information, was still
unidentified. Meanwhile, on 6 February 1988, a petition
for habeas corpus was filed with the Supreme Court on
behalf of Roberto Umil, Rolando Dural, and Renato

The Court issued the writ of habeas corpus on 9 February
1988 and Fidel V. Ramos, Maj. Gen. Renato de Villa, Brig.
Gen. Ramon Montano, and Brig. Gen. Alexander Aguirre
filed a Return of the Writ on 12 February 1988. Thereafter,
the parties were heard on 15 February 1988. On 26
February 1988, however, Umil and Villanueva posted bail
before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City where
charges for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act had been
filed against them, and they were accordingly released.

Issue: Whether Dural can be validly arrested without any
warrant of arrest for the crime of rebellion.

Dural, it clearly appears that he was not arrested while in
the act of shooting the 2 CAPCOM soldiers nor was he
arrested just after the commission of the said offense for
his arrest came a day after the said shooting incident.
Seemingly, his arrest without warrant is unjustified.
However, Dural was arrested for being a member of the
New Peoples Army (NPA), an outlawed subversive
organization. Subversion being a continuing offense, the
arrest of Rolando Dural without warrant is justified as it
can be said that he was committing an offense when
arrested. The crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy
or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses
committed in furtherance thereof or in connection
therewith constitute direct assaults against the State and
are in the nature of continuing crimes. The arrest of
persons involved in the rebellion whether as its fighting
armed elements, or for committing non-violent acts but in
furtherance of the rebellion, is more an act of capturing
them in the course of an armed conflict, to quell the
rebellion, than for the purpose of immediately
prosecuting them in court for a statutory offense. The
arrest, therefore, need not follow the usual procedure in
the prosecution of offenses which requires the
determination by a judge of the existence of probable
cause before the issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest
and the granting of bail if the offense is bailable.
Obviously, the absence of a judicial warrant is no legal
impediment to arresting or capturing persons committing
overt acts of violence against government forces, or any
other milder acts but equally in pursuance of the
rebellious movement. The arrest or capture is thus
impelled by the exigencies of the situation that involves
the very survival of society and its government and duly
constituted authorities.

Bagcal vs Villaraza
The case was about the petition asking for the issuance of
Habeas Corpus alleging that he was illegally detained.
Bagcal was arrested on Feb. 28, 1982, by the Philippine
Constabulary. The arrest was without warrant. He has
been detained at camp Aguilar.
On August 6, 1982, the City Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro filed
an information for murder against petitioner with the
Municipal Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro presided by
respondent Judge Rolando R. Villaraza. The information
was accompanied by the affidavits of several
persons. They were not subscribed before Judge Villaraza
who did not ask the affiants to ratify their oaths nor did he
ask them searching questions. The information has no
certification by the City Fiscal that he had conducted a
preliminary investigation. Indeed, if the City Fiscal had
conducted a preliminary investigation, the information
should have been filed in the Court of First Instance which
had jurisdiction to try the case on its merits. It is obvious
that the information was filed with Judge Villaraza so that
he would conduct a preliminary examination and
thereafter issue a warrant of arrest.

Issue: whether or not the issuance of warrant of arrest
cured the illegality of his previous warrantless arrest
meriting his immediate release from detention.

The circumstances attending the issuance of the warrant
of arrest have been invoked in the petition for habeas
corpus. And it is the warrant of arrest that has been
invoked in the return of the writ to justify petitioner's
detention and it is also the basis for the decision of Judge
Rosete on denying the petition.
Petitioner claims, and Judge Rosete agrees, that
respondent Judge Villaraza should not have issued a
warrant of arrest without a preliminary examination of the
witnesses for the prosecution. However, Judge Rosete
held, and We agree, that although the warrant of arrest
was irregularly issued, any infirmity attached to it was
cured when petitioner submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court by applying for bail, submitting a
memorandum in support thereof, and filing a motion for
reconsideration when his application was denied.

Brown vs Illinois
Petitioner, who had been arrested without probable cause
and without a warrant, and under circumstances
indicating that the arrest was investigatory, made two in-
custody inculpatory statements after he had been given
the warnings prescribed by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S.
436. Thereafter indicted for murder, petitioner filed a
pretrial motion to suppress the statements. The motion
was overruled and the statements were used in the trial,
which resulted in petitioner's conviction. The State
Supreme Court, though recognizing the unlawfulness of
petitioner's arrest, held that the statements were
admissible on the ground that the giving of the Miranda
warnings served to break the causal connection between
the illegal arrest and the giving of the statements, and
petitioner's act in making the statements was "sufficiently
an act of free will to purge the primary taint of the
unlawful invasion." Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S.
471, 486.

WON the Illinois Supreme Court err in finding that the
statements made by Brown, although after an illegal
arrest, were properly admitted by the trial court.

The Illinois courts erred in adopting a per se rule that
Miranda warnings in and of themselves broke the causal
chain so that any subsequent statement, even one
induced by the continuing effects of unconstitutional
custody, was admissible so long as, in the traditional
sense, it was voluntary and not coerced in violation of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. When the
exclusionary rule is used to effectuate the Fourth
Amendment, it serves interests and policies that are
distinct from those it serves under the Fifth, being
directed at all unlawful searches and seizures, and not
merely those that happen to produce incriminating
material or testimony as fruits. Thus, even if the
statements in this case were found to be voluntary under
the Fifth Amendment, the Fourth Amendment issue
remains. Wong Sun requires not merely that a statement
meet the Fifth Amendment voluntariness standard, but
that it be "sufficiently an act of free will to purge the
primary taint" in light of the distinct policies and interests
of the Fourth Amendment.

Sayo vs Chief of Police
Upon complaint of Bernardino Malinao, charging the
petitioners with having committed the crime of robbery,
Benjamin Dumlao, a policeman of the City of Manila,
arrested the petitioners on April 2, 1948, and presented a
complaint against them with the fiscal's office of Manila.
Until April 7, 1948, when the petition for habeas corpus
filed with this Court was heard, the petitioners were still
detained or under arrest, and the city fiscal had not yet
released or filed against them information with the proper
courts justice.
Whether or not the petitioners are being illegally
restrained of their liberty,
Under the law, a complaint charging a person with the
commission of an offense cognizable by the courts of
Manila is not filed with municipal court or the Court of
First Instance of Manila, because as above stated, the
latter do not make or conduct a preliminary investigation
proper. The complaint must be made or filed with the city
fiscal of Manila who, personally or through one of his
assistants, makes the investigation, not for the purpose of
ordering the arrest of the accused, but of filing with the
proper court the necessary information against the
accused if the result of the investigation so warrants, and
obtaining from the court a warrant of arrest or
commitment of the accused.

When a person is arrested without warrant in cases
permitted bylaw, the officer or person making the arrest
should, as abovestated, without unnecessary delay take or
surrender the person arrested, within the period of time
prescribed in the Revised Penal Code, to the court or
judge having jurisdiction to try or make a preliminary
investigation of the offense (section 17, Rule 109); and the
court or judge shall try and decide the case if the court has
original jurisdiction over the offense charged, or make the
preliminary investigation if it is a justice of the peace court
having no original jurisdiction, and then transfer the case
to the proper Court of First Instance in accordance with
the provisions of section 13, Rule 108.

In the City of Manila, where complaints are not filed
directly with the municipal court or the Court of First
Instance, the officer or person making the arrest without
warrant shall surrender or take the person arrested to the
city fiscal, and the latter shall make the investigation
above mentioned and file, if proper, the corresponding
information within the time prescribed by section 125 of
the Revised Penal Code, so that the court may issue a
warrant of commitment for the temporary detention of
the accused. And the city fiscal or his assistants shall make
the investigation forthwith, unless it is materially
impossible for them to do so, because the testimony of
the person or officer making the arrest without warrant is
in such cases ready and available, and shall, immediately
after the investigation, either release the person arrested
or file the corresponding information. If the city fiscal has
any doubt as to the probability of the defendant having
committed the offense charged, or is not ready to file the
information on the strength of the testimony or evidence
presented, he should release and not detain the person
arrested for a longer period than that prescribed in the
Penal Code, without prejudice to making or continuing the
investigation and filing afterwards the proper information
against him with the court, in order to obtain or secure a
warrant of his arrest. Of course, for the purpose of
determining the criminal liability of an officer detaining a
person for more than six hours prescribed by the Revised
Penal Code, the means of communication as well as the
hour of arrested and other circumstances, such as the
time of surrender and the material possibility for the fiscal
to make the investigation and file in time the necessary
information, must be taken into consideration.
A peace officer has no power or authority to arrest a
person without a warrant upon complaint of the offended
party or any other person, except in those cases expressly
authorized by law. What he or the complainant may do in
such case is to file a complaint with the city fiscal of
Manila, or directly with the justice of the peace courts in
municipalities and other political subdivisions. If the City
Fiscal has no authority, and he has not, to order the arrest
even if he finds, after due investigation, that there is a
probability that a crime has been committed and the
accused is guilty thereof, a fortiori a police officer has no
authority to arrest and detain a person charged with an
offense upon complaint of the offended party or other
persons even though, after investigation, he becomes
convinced that the accused is guilty of the offense
In view of all the foregoing, without making any
pronouncement as to the responsibility of the officers
who intervened in the detention of the petitioners, for the
policeman Dumlao may have acted in good faith, in the
absence of a clear cut ruling on the matter in believing
that he had complied with the mandate of article 125 by
delivering the petitioners within six hours to the office of
the city fiscal, and the latter might have ignored the fact
that the petitioners were being actually detained when
the said policeman filed a complaint against them with the
city fiscal, we hold that the petitioners are being illegally
restrained of their liberty, and their release is hereby
ordered unless they are now detained by virtue of a
process issued by a competent court of justice. So


Under the Constitution, "all persons shall before
conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties, except those
charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is
strong." The words "all persons" used in said
constitutional provision have been interpreted to mean
"all persons, without distinction, whether formally
charged or not yet so charged with any criminal offense,".
However, the rule is subject to the limitation that the
person applying for admission to bail should be in the
custody of the law, or otherwise deprived of his liberty.
Bail is defined under the Rules of Court as security
"required and given for the release of a person who is in
custody of the law."
The petitioner, without surrendering himself, filed the
motion in which he asks that the court fix the amount of
the bail bond for his release pending trial. It is, therefore,
clear that the petitioner is a free man and is under the
jurisprudence not entitled to admission to bail.

Bail was DENIED.

Case: VILLASEOR vs ABAO (1967)

The judge, in increasing the bail of the petitioner charged
with Direct Assault Upon and Agent of a Person in
Authority with Murder (a capital offense), included a
condition that the property bond must be posted ONLY by
residents of the province of Marinduque actually staying

The petitioner argued that the condition collides with
Section 9 Rule 114 of the Rules of Court which provides
that each surety must be a resident householder or
freeholder within the Philippines. The respondent judge
reasoned that it is hard to send notices to people outside
the province: there is no way of knowing whether the
notices have been duly received; that he cannot order the
confiscation of the bond; and that sending telegrams to
people outside the province is too costly. The posture
taken by the judge does not offend the good sense of
justice. The respondent judge only wanted to make sure
that when the proper time comes for the court to order
the sureties to produce the person of defendant, no
undue delay will be incurred.

The Court also enumerated certain guidelines in bail fixing:
1. Ability of the accused to give bail;
2. Nature of the offense;
3. Penalty for the offense charged;
4. Character and reputation of the accused;
5. Health of the accused;
6. Character and strength of the evidence;
7. Probability of the accused appearing in trial;
8. Forfeiture of other bonds;
9. Whether the accused was a fugitive from justice
when arrested; and
10. If the accused is under bond for appearance at
trial in other cases.

However, the Court said that the principal factor to be
considered is the probability of the appearance of the
accused, or of his flight to avoid punishment.

Discretion, indeed, is with the court called upon to rule on
the question of bail. We must stress, however, that where
conditions imposed upon a defendant seeking bail would
amount to a refusal thereof and render nugatory the
constitutional right to bail, we will not hesitate to exercise
our supervisory powers to provide the required remedy.


Petitioner initially postulates that respondent court never
acquired jurisdiction over her person considering that she
has neither been arrested nor has she voluntarily
surrendered, aside from the fact that she has not validly
posted bail since she never personally appeared before
said court.

The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the
court acquires jurisdiction over his person, is
accomplished either by his pleading to the merits (such as
by filing a motion to quash or other pleadings requiring
the exercise of the court's jurisdiction thereover,
appearing for arraignment, entering trial) or by filing bail.
On the matter of bail, since the same is intended to obtain
the provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule the same
cannot be posted before custody of the accused has been
acquired by the judicial authorities either by his arrest or
voluntary surrender. We find and so hold that petitioner is
deemed to have voluntarily submitted herself to the
jurisdiction of respondent court upon the filing of her
aforequoted "Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of
Cash Bail Bond for and in behalf of Dr. Miriam Defensor-
Santiago" wherein she expressly sought leave "that she be
considered as having placed herself under the jurisdiction
of (the Sandiganbayan) for purposes of the required trial
and other proceedings," and categorically prayed "that the
bail bond she is posting in the amount of P15,000.00 be
duly accepted" and that by said motion "she be
considered as having placed herself under the custody" of
said court. Petitioner cannot now be heard to claim
otherwise for, by her own representations, she is
effectively estopped from asserting the contrary after she
had earlier recognized the jurisdiction of the court and
caused it to exercise that jurisdiction over the aforestated
pleadings she filed therein.


In the case, the respondent judge is being accused of gross
ignorance of the law in granting bail to certain cases
wherein bail is allegedly not to be granted.

Bail is the security required by the court and given by the
accused to ensure that the accused appears before the
proper court at the scheduled time and place to answer
the charges brought against him or her. It is awarded to
the accused to honor the presumption of innocence until
his guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt, and to enable
him to prepare his defense without being subject to
punishment prior to conviction. Bail should be fixed
according to the circumstances of each case. The amount
fixed should be sufficient to ensure the case presence of
the accused at the trial yet reasonable enough to comply
with the constitutional provision that bail should not be

When a person is charged with an offense punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, bail is a
matter of discretion. Rule 114, Section 7 of the Rules of
Court states: "No person charged with a capital offense, or
an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment when the evidence of guilt is strong, shall
be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal
action." Consequently, when the accused is charged with
an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, the judge is mandated to conduct a
hearing to determine the existence of strong evidence of
guilt or lack of it, against the accused.

Respondent judge, in two instances, granted bail to an
accused charged with murder, without having conducted
any hearing as to whether the evidence of guilt against the
accused is strong.

A hearing is likewise required if the prosecution refuses to
adduce evidence in opposition to the application to grant
and fix bail. If the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence
or fails to interpose an objection to the motion for bail, it
is still mandatory for the court to conduct a hearing or ask
searching questions from which it may infer the strength
of the evidence of guilt, or the lack of it against the
accused. Inasmuch as the determination of whether or not
the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong is a
matter of judicial discretion, it may rightly be exercised
only after the evidence is submitted to the court at the
hearing. Since the discretion is directed to the weight of
evidence and since evidence cannot properly be weighed
if not duly exhibited or produced before the court it is
obvious that a proper exercise of judicial discretion
requires that the evidence of guilt be submitted to the
court, the petitioner having the right of cross examination
and to introduce evidence in his own rebuttal.

(Sorry medyo mahaba. Multiple cases kasi yung
accusations against the judge and each case is different. I
just summed up yung discussion sa bail.)

Pp. vs. manallo
( definition)

That on the 30th day of March 1992, at more or less 11:00
oclock A.M. at Barangay Salugan, Camilig, Albay, the
accused with lewd design, armed with a knife, by means of
violence and intimidation, poked the victim Rosaldiza
Nabor Y Nebres with said knife and when the victim
resisted, slapped her rendering her unconscious, and
while in that stae (sic) accused have carnal knowledge
with Rosaldiza N. Nabor, to the latters damage and

No bail was recommended for the provisional liberty of
Alex. He filed, on May 8, 1992, a motion for bail with no
specific date and time for the hearing thereof.[12] Upon
the filing of said motion, the Executive Judge issued an
order granting the motion and fixing his bail bond at
P50,000.00.[13] On the same day, Alex posted a property
bond which was immediately approved by the court.[14]
Alex was forthwith released from detention.

RTC: convicted the accused for the crime of rape: by
reason of his ;flight from the scene of the crime, his having
jumped bail, and for eluding arrest for six long years as
evidence of his guilt.

Ruling :
A bail application does not only involve the right of the
accused to temporary liberty, but likewise the right of the
State to protect the people and the peace of the
community from dangerous elements. These two rights
must be balanced by a magistrate in the scale of justice,
hence, the necessity for hearing to guide his exercise of

The presiding judge of the trial court thus exposed his
gross ignorance of the law. As a consequence, the
appellant jumped bail and managed to elude arrest for six
years, to the prejudice of the administration of justice.

Refer to sec. 5

Pp. vs. nitcha
Jose Belmonte, Agustin Sibayan, and Joselito Sibayan
collectively pointed an accusing finger at accused-
appellant whom they witnessed firing his .38 caliber
firearm towards the direction of May Villa Rica Sibayan
who was then negotiating an earthen dike about three to
four meters from the position of accused-appellant. In
parrying the inculpatory thrusts of the prosecution,
accused-appellant ventured to develop the theory that it
was not he but one of the companions of Jojo Belmonte
who pulled and fired the gun. According to accused-
appellant, the bullet missed the head of his brother who
was then astride Jojo Belmonte while the latter and
accused-appellant's brother was engaged in a scuffle, and
that unfortunately, the bullet hit the head of May Villa
Rica Sibayan.

Rule:The subsistence of a bail bond is also no legal
obstacle to accused-appellant's immediate incarceration
after promulgation of a decision involving a felony
punishable by reclusion perpetua following the principle
enunciated in People vs. Fortes (223 SCRA 619 [1993])

It is clear from Section 13, Article III of the 1987
Constitution and Section 3, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules
of a s amended, that:

. . . before conviction bail is either a matter of right or of
discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense charged
is punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion
perpetua. To that extent the right is absolute.

xxx xxx xxx

Upon the other hand, if the offense charged is punishable
by reclusion perpetua bail becomes a matter of discretion.
It shall be denied if the evidence of guilt is strong. The
court's discretion id limited to determining whether or not
evidence of guilt is strong. But once it is determined that
the evidence of guilt is not strong, bail also becomes a
matter of right. . . .

The clear implication therefore, is that if an accused who
is charged with a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua
is convicted by the trial court and sentenced to suffer such
a penalty, bail is neither a matter of right on the part of
the accused nor of discretion on the part of the court. In
such a situation, the court would not have only
determined that the evidence of guilt is strong which
would have been sufficient to deny bail even before
conviction it would have likewise ruled that the
accused's guilt has been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Bail must not then be granted to the accused during the
pendency of his appeal from the judgment of conviction.
Construing Section 3, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure, as amended, this Court, in the en
banc Resolution of 15 October 1991 in People vs. Ricardo
Cortez, ruled that:

Pursuant to the aforecited provision, an accused who is
charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua, shall no longer be entitled to bail as a
matter of right even if he appeals the case to this Court
since his conviction clearly imports that the evidence of
his guilt of the offense charged is strong.

Pp. vs. donato
( nature)

private respondent filed on 9 May 1987 a petition for bail,
9 which herein petitioner opposed in an Opposition filed
on 27 May 1987 10 on the ground that since rebellion
became a capital offense under the provisions of P.D. Nos.
1996, 942 and 1834, which amended Article 135 of the
Revised Penal Code, by imposing the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death on those who promote, maintain, or
head a rebellion the accused is no longer entitled to bail
as evidence of his guilt is strong.

Rule : We agree with the respondent court that bail
cannot be denied to the private respondent for he is
charged with the crime of rebellion as defined in Article
134 of the Revised Penal Code to which is attached the
penalty of prision mayor and a fine not exceeding
P20,000.00. 30 It is, therefore, a bailable offense under
Section 13 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution which
provides thus:

Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is
strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient
sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be
prescribed by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired
even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.

Section 3, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended, also

Bail, a matter of right: exception. All persons in custody
shall, before final conviction, be entitled to bail as a
matter of right, except those charged with a capital
offense or an offense which, under the law at the time of
its commission and at the time of the application for bail,
is punishable by reclusion perpetua, when evidence of
guilt is strong.

Therefore, before conviction bail is either a matter of right
or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense
charged is punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion
perpetua. 31 To that extent the right is absolute.

the prosecution does not have the right to present
evidence for the denial of bail in the instances where bail
is a matter of right. However, in the cases where the grant
of bail is discretionary, due process requires that the
prosecution must be given an opportunity to present,
within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may
desire to introduce before the court should resolve the
motion for bail.

Note: under the new law rebellion and coup d' eta are
punishable by reclusion perpetua

Lavides vs. ca
( nature)

Petitioner Manolet Lavides was arrested on April 3, 1997
for child abuse under R.A. No. 7610 (an act providing for
stronger deterrence and special protection against child
abuse, exploitation and discrimination, providing penalties
for its violation, and other purposes). His arrest was made
without a warrant as a result of an entrapment conducted
by the police. It appears that on April 3, 1997, the parents
of complainant Lorelie San Miguel reported to the police
that their daughter, then 16 years old, had been contacted
by petitioner for an assignation that night at petitioners
room at the Metropolitan Hotel in Diliman, Quezon City.
Apparently, this was not the first time the police received
reports of petitioners activities. An entrapment operation
was therefore set in motion. At around 8:20 in the evening
of April 3, 1997, the police knocked at the door of Room
308 of the Metropolitan Hotel where petitioner was
staying. When petitioner opened the door, the police saw
him with Lorelie, who was wearing only a t-shirt and an
underwear, whereupon they arrested him. Based on the
sworn statement of complainant and the affidavits of the
arresting officers, which were submitted at the inquest, an
information for violation of Art. III, 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610
was filed on April 7, 1997

On April 10, 1997, petitioner filed an "Omnibus Motion (1)
For Judicial Determination of Probable Cause; (2) For the
Immediate Release of the Accused Unlawfully Detained on
an Unlawful Warrantless Arrest; and (3) In the Event of
Adverse Resolution of the
Above Incident, Herein Accused be Allowed to Bail as a
Matter of Right under the Law on Which He is Charged.

Rule: In the first place, as the trial court itself
acknowledged, in cases where it is authorized, bail should
be granted before arraignment, otherwise the accused
may be precluded from filing a motion to quash. For if the
information is quashed and the case is dismissed, there
would then be no need for the arraignment of the
accused. In the second place, the trial court could ensure
the presence of petitioner at the arraignment precisely by
granting bail and ordering his presence at any stage of the
proceedings, such as arraignment. Under Rule 114, 2(b)
of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, one of the conditions
of bail is that "the accused shall appear before the proper
court whenever so required by the court or these Rules,"
while under Rule 116, 1(b) the presence of the accused
at the arraignment is required.

On the other hand, to condition the grant of bail to an
accused on his arraignment would be to place him in a
position where he has to choose between (1) filing a
motion to quash and thus delay his release on bail
because until his motion to quash can be resolved, his
arraignment cannot be held, and (2) foregoing the filing of
a motion to quash so that he can be arraigned at once and
thereafter be released on bail. These scenarios certainly
undermine the accuseds constitutional right not to be put
on trial except upon valid complaint or information
sufficient to charge him with a crime and his right to

It is the condition in the May 16, 1997 order of the trial
court that "approval of the bail bonds shall be made only
after arraignment," which the Court of Appeals should
instead have declared void. The condition imposed in the
trial courts order of May 16, 1997 that the accused
cannot waive his appearance at the trial but that he must
be present at the hearings of the case is valid and is in
accordance with Rule 114. For another condition of bail
under Rule 114, 2(c) is that "The failure of the accused to
appear at the trial without justification despite due notice
to him or his bondsman shall be deemed an express
waiver of his right to be present on the date specified in
the notice. In such case, trial shall proceed in absentia."

Serapio v. Sandiganbayan
Petitioner is one of the accused (For the crime of plunder)
together with former President Joseph E. Estrada, Jose
Jinggoy P. Estrada and several others. The
Sandiganbayan deferred the hearing of his petition for bail
to July 10, 2001, arraigned him on said date and entered a
plea of not guilty for him when he refused to be
arraigned. He insists that the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, as amended, does not require that he be
arraigned first prior to the conduct of bail hearings since
the latter can stand alone and must, of necessity, be heard
immediately. The People insist that arraignment is
necessary before bail hearings may be commenced,
because it is only upon arraignment that the issues are

WON petitioner should first be arraigned before hearings
of his petition for bail may be conducted

The arraignment of an accused is not a prerequisite to the
conduct of hearings on his petition for bail. A person is
allowed to petition for bail as soon as he is deprived of his
liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary surrender. An
accused need not wait for his arraignment before filing a
petition for bail. However, the foregoing pronouncement
should not be taken to mean that the hearing on a
petition for bail should at all times precede arraignment,
because the rule is that a person deprived of his liberty by
virtue of his arrest or voluntary surrender may apply for
bail as soon as he is deprived of his liberty, even before a
complaint or information is filed against him. The Courts
pronouncement in Lavides should be understood in light
of the fact that the accused in said case filed a petition for
bail as well as a motion to quash the informations filed
against him. Hence, we explained therein that to
condition the grant of bail to an accused on his
arraignment would be to place him in a position where he
has to choose between (1) filing a motion to quash and
thus delay his release on bail because until his motion to
quash can be resolved, his arraignment cannot be held,
and (2) foregoing the filing of a motion to quash so that he
can be arraigned at once and thereafter be released on
bail. This would undermine his constitutional right not to
be put on trial except upon a valid complaint or
Information sufficient to charge him with a crime and his
right to bail. It is therefore not necessary that an accused
be first arraigned before the conduct of hearings on his
application for bail. For when bail is a matter of right, an
accused may apply for and be granted bail even prior to
arraignment. The ruling in Lavides also implies that an
application for bail in a case involving an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death may also be
heard even before an accused is arraigned. Further, if the
court finds in such case that the accused is entitled to bail
because the evidence against him is not strong, he may be
granted provisional liberty even prior to arraignment; for
in such a situation, bail would be authorized under the

Teehankee v. Director of Prisons
Teehankee was apprehended by Counter Intelligence
Corps Detachment of the US army. She was specifically
charged with (a) "active collaboration with the Japanese,"
and (b) "previous association with the enemy. She was
then delivered to the Commonwealth Government for
custody. No information was filed against her in the
Peoples Court for about a year and she applied for bail
which was denied. She appealed to the SC assailing the
Peoples Courts order on the ground that she was not
given a hearing. SC granted her appeal and a hearing was
set. The Solicitor General recommended a bail of PhP50,
000php but the Peoples Court did not rule on the
application for bail and merely concluded that the amount
of bail really shows that the charge against her is serious.
Teehankee appealed to the SC again and prayed for it to
direct the Peoples Court to render a judgment on her
application for bail. SC granted but the Peoples Court
instead of complying, set a third hearing where the Judge
asked the same questions tending to compel the
prosecutor to produce evidence and when the Special
Prosecutor refused to adduce evidence stating that it
would imperil the success of the prosecution and
jeopardize public interest, the Judge had the prosecutor
arrested for contempt of court. The prosecutor was
released through habeas corpus. Teehankee again asked
the SC to decide on her application for bail and the SC
again directed the Peoples Court to render a decision but
in the resolution the SC declared that if the Peoples Court
does not feel justified in the Special Prosecutors attitude
of not opposing the petition for bail by the petitioner and
the Sol Gen files a statement that doing so would imperil
the success of the prosecution and jeopardize public
interest, the Peoples Court may not inquire further into
the prosecutions evidence and the prosecutor may not be
held guilty in contempt of court for refusing to answer the
PCs question and that the hearing should be made in the
presence of the petitioner or with due notice to her. The
Peoples Court however, instituted a fourth hearing, this
time, when the prosecutor refused to adduce evidence,
the Judge called the prosecutor into a private conference
where he allegedly acquired strong evidence of
Teehankees guilt. The Peoples Court thereafter rendered
a decision based on the evidence acquired in the private
conference denying the petition for bail. Teehankee again
filed a petition in the SC alleging that the Peoples Courts
order was issued with grave abuse of discretion and
prayed for her provisional release under bail as may be
fixed by the SC.

WON the Peoples Court may compel the prosecution to
adduce evidence in the petitioners application for bail.

The SC clarified that the Constitutional provision gives all
persons the right to bail except those charged with a
capital offense or when evidence of guilt is strong. This is
because of the presumption of innocence. If the
presumption of innocence is available to a person already
charged or accused more so for a person who was merely
arrested or detained. The Constitution does not qualify
because to limit it to those charged would be a
curtailment of individual freedom. The right to bail is
therefore available to Teehankee especially because she
has not been charged of any offense yet.
The SC then proceeded to rule that the Peoples Court has
the discretion after due notice and hearing to allow
political prisoners to be released on bail even before
presentation of the information unless it sees strong
evidence for the commission of a capital offense. But this
judicial discretion to grant bail must be within
reasonable bounds guided by the Constitution, statutes,
rules of court, and principles of equity and justice. The
Sol Gen is empowered to oppose the application for bail
and to adduce evidence based on the States interest. If it
refuses to do so, then the Peoples Court must rule on
what it was presented and in the absence of strong
evidence of guilt, the Peoples Court must grant the bail.
Hence, the Peoples Court cannot coerce the prosecution
if it does not oppose the application for bail of the
petitioner and refuses to adduce evidence because it
might imperil the success of the prosecution and
jeopardize public interest. The Peoples Court must
therefore grant the petition for bail.

People v. San diego
The information charged the defendants, Mario Henson
et. al, as principals of the murder of Jesus Lapid. The
prosecution and the defense agreed that the motions for
bail of the defendants would be considered in the course
of the regular trial instead of in a summary proceeding. In
the course of the regular trial, after the prosecution had
presented eight witnesses, the trial court resolved the
motions for bail granting the same despite the objection
of the prosecution on the ground that it still had material
witnesses to present. The orders granting bail in the
amount of P50,000 for each defendant on the ground that
the evidence of guilt was not strong must have made
Fiscal Oscar Inocentes very angry because in his motion
for reconsideration of the orders granting bail he used
contumacious language for which he was forthwith cited
for contempt.

WON the prosecution was deprived of procedural due

We are of the considered opinion that whether the
motion for bail of a defendant who is in custody for a
capital offense be resolved in a summary proceeding or in
the course of a regular trial, the prosecution must be given
an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all
the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the
court should resolve the motion for bail. If, as in the
criminal case involved in the instant special civil action,
the prosecution should be denied such an opportunity,
there would be a violation of procedural due process, and
the order of the court granting bail should be considered
void on that ground. The orders complained herein,
having been issued in violation of procedural due process,
must be considered null and void.
The court's discretion to grant bail in capital offenses must
be exercised in the light of a summary of the evidence
presented by the prosecution; otherwise, it would be
uncontrolled and might be capricious or whimsical. Hence,
the court's order granting or refusing bail must contain a
summary of the evidence for the prosecution followed by
its conclusion whether or not the evidence of guilt is
strong. The orders granting bail to the five defendants
are defective in form and substance because they do not
contain a summary of the evidence presented by the
prosecution. They only contain the court's conclusion that
the evidence of guilt is not strong.

Ocampo v. Bernabe
The petitioner was arrested by the Counter
Intelligence Corps of the Armed Forces of the United
States and confined in Muntinlupa Prison and was turned
over to the Commonwealth of the Phils. and later on filed
with the Peoples Court his application for bail. The special
prosecutor stated that petitioner with having pointed out
Placido Trinidad as a guerilla to the Japanese and for that
reason Placido Trinidad was shot to death. No evidence,
however, was presented by the special prosecutor and
all that he did at the hearing was to recite the contents
of an affidavit which has no referrence to count No. 4,
and to state further that he had 27 more affidavits.
Petitioner made an objection stating that a mere recital is
not an evidence and that evidence cannot be considered
strong which has not been subjected to the test of cross-
examination. He testified in his own behalf in denying all
the charges preferred against him and stated that said
charges are mere intrigues of his political enemy Marcelo
Trinidad. He presented two affidavits, one of Leoncia
Nario and the other of Eugenio Trinidad, mother and
uncle, respectively, of Placido Trinidad, wherein it is stated
that Placido Trinidad was killed by the Japanese because
of his having attempted to wrest a revolver from a
foreman in charge of a detail at work under orders of the
Japanese and that petitioner had nothing to do with such
killing. The People's Court composed of Judges Jose
Bernabe and others issued an order denying the
application for bail.

WON no proof was presented by the Special Prosecutor to
show that the evidence of guilt is strong.

No proof was presented to show that evidence of guilt is
We have held in Herras Teehankee vs. Director of
Prisons (76 Phil., 756), that all persons shall before
conviction be bailable except when charge is a
capital offense and the evidence of guilt is strong. the
general rule, therefore, is that all persons, whether
charged or not yet charges, are, before their conviction,
entitled to provisional release on bail, the only exception
being where the charge is a capital offense and the
evidence of guilt is found to be strong. At the hearing of
the application for bail, the burden of showing that
the case falls within the exception is on the prosecution,
according to Rule 110, section 7. The determination of
whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong is, as stated
in Herras Teehankee case, a matter of judicial discretion.
This discretion, by the very nature of things, may rightly be
exercise only after the evidence is submitted to the court
at the hearing. Since the discretion is directed to the
weight of evidence cannot properly be weighed if not duly
exhibited or produced before the court (Ramos vs. Ramos,
45 Phil., 362), it is obvious that a proper exercise of
judicial discretion requires that the evidence of guilt be
submitted to the court, the petitioner having the right of
cross-examination and to introduce his own evidence in
rebuttal. Mere affidavits or recital of their contents are
not sufficient since they are mere hearsay evidence,
unless the petitioner fails to object thereto.
The Peoples Court committed a grave abuse of discretion
in denying the bail applied for.

G.R. Nos. L-34156 to L-34158. October 29,

The accused and before the commencement of the trial,
the applications for bail, dated February 8 and July 2,
1971, were heard. After hearing both parties and with the
announcement made by the Fiscal that he has between 40
and 50 witnesses to present, the Court ruled and ordered
a joint hearing of the cases on the merits and of the
applications for bail. On this game occasion the Court also
considered the motion filed by the prosecution to
discharge the defendant Angelico Najar. Without any
objection on the part of the defense, said motion to
discharge was granted and accused Najar was discharged
to become state witness.

As the trial progressed, the defense on August 2, 1971
filed an urgent motion for the reconsideration of the order
given in open Court ordering a joint hearing of the cases
on the merits and of the applications for bail, to which the
prosecution also filed its opposition. After hearing the
arguments of both parties and realizing that it should give
paramount importance to the constitutional provision
regarding the right to bail, specially before conviction, and
considering the announcement of the prosecution that it
has about 50 witnesses to present, and considering
further that this Court has also to travel to other provinces
to try other cases, the Court reconsidered its previous
order and ordered that the applications for bail be first
heard to which the prosecution gave its assent.

Whether or not a proceeding in an application for bail is
still summary in nature as it was under the old rule.

As a general proposition, all persons shall before
conviction be bailable except when the charge is a capital
offense and the evidence of guilt is strong.

At the hearing of the application for bail the burden of
showing that the case falls within the exception is on the
prosecution, according to Section 7, Rule 114 of the Rules
of Court.

The determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt
is strong is a matter of judicial discretion, which in the very
nature of things may rightly be exercised only after the
evidence is submitted to the court at the hearing.

Neither under the old nor under the new Rules is there
any specific provision defining what kind of hearing it
should be, but in the two cases decided by this Court it
was stated that the hearing should be summary or
otherwise in the discretion of the court. "By summary
hearing, this Court added, "we mean such brief and
speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence
of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of
the hearing which is merely to determine the weight of the
evidence for purposes of bail. The course of the inquiry
may be left to the discretion of the court which may
confine itself to receiving such evidence as has reference to
substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in
the examination and cross-examination of witnesses and
reducing to a reasonable minimum at the amount of
corroboration particularly on details that are not essential
to the purposes of the hearing."

We fail to find any grave abuse of discretion committed by
the respondent Judge. The prosecution had three months
since the hearing started until the questioned order was
issued and had called 27 witnesses just to lay a sufficient
corroborative basis for the testimony of its principal
witness, Angelico Najar. The plea that this witness will
reveal the names of persons who have some knowledge of
circumstances which tend to connect the two accused
with the crimes and who presumably will also be called to
testify, and whose willingness to do so may thereby be
adversely influenced by such revelation, does not appear
to be convincing, since the record of the cases below
already contains the testimony which Najar gave at the
preliminary investigation, aside from his three sworn
statements consisting of 16 pages typed single-space in
question and answer form.

The right of the prosecution to control the quantum of
evidence and the order of presentation of the witnesses,
while not to be disregarded, must nevertheless be
equated with the purpose of the hearing, which is to
determine whether the accused falls within the exception
to the general rule that he is constitutionally entitled to
bail before conviction. To allow the prosecution to
conduct the hearing as if it were a full-dress trial on the
merits would defeat the purpose of the proceeding.

A.M. No. MTJ-96-1072. January 31, 1996


A criminal complaint for murder was filed against Antonio
Balagot and Ariel Acha before the MCTC of Bansalan-
Magsaysay, Davao del Sur, for the murder of Daniel
Mamolo,Jr., son of complainant. After Judge Rogelio R.
Narisma conducted the requisite preliminary examination
he issued the corresponding warrants of arrest against the
accused. Respondent Judge recommended no bail since
murder is a capital offense and the evidence of guilt was
strong. Acha was later arrested while Balagot surrendered
to the PC Provincial Command in Cotabato.

Balagot through counsel filed a Petition For Admission to
Bail and set the same for hearing on 25 May 1994. At the
scheduled hearing defense counsel informed the court
that Balagot was ill and asked the court to dispense with
the submission of his petition and, instead, to allow
Balagot to be treated at the hospital.


Whether or not the procedures on the application of bail
are complied with.


The procedure of conducting a hearing on the application
for admission to bail should provide the basis for judges to
determine whether the prosecutions evidence is weak or

In the case at bench, while respondent conducted a
hearing on Balagots petition for bail such proceeding did
not elicit evidence from the prosecution to guide
respondent in the proper determination of the petition. A
review of the hearing reveals that only the amount of bail
was discussed after an impasse on the plea regarding the
confinement of the accused. Nowhere in the transcript of
the hearing do we find questions propounded by
respondent Judge verifying the strength of the
prosecutions evidence.

In justifying his grant of bail respondent claims that he
afforded the prosecution the chance to present evidence
but the latter submitted the resolution of the petition to
the sound discretion of the court without presenting
additional evidence.
The deferential attitude of the prosecution cannot excuse
respondents disregard of his peremptory duty. It is
worthy to note that in the resumption of the hearing in
the afternoon of 25 May 1994 the prosecution prefaced
its submission with a statement of its serious vehement
objection to the petition for bail. Such manifestation
ought to have alerted respondent of the next appropriate
steps in resolving the petition.
The failure of respondent Judge to adhere to a basic,
fundamental procedure cannot be lightly overlooked. As
correctly perceived by OCA, this omission by respondent
constitutes gross ignorance of the law since it resulted in
depriving the prosecution the time-tested and enduring
procedural due process. It is an oft-repeated dictum that a
judge should exhibit more than just a cursory
acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules. For
the role of judges in the administration of justice requires a
continuous study of the law and jurisprudence.
Indubitably, the industry of a judge in keeping abreast with
the law and court rulings will enhance the faith of our
people in the administration of justice since litigants will
be confidently and invariably assured that the occupants
of the bench cannot justly be accused of a deficiency in
their grasp of legal principles.

G.R. Nos. 137982-85. January 13, 2003


On the evening of December 22, 1989, the spouses
Bonifacio and Florfina Solito and their four-year-old child,
Efren, attended the wedding of Florfinas younger sister,
Loida Atuan. At about 11:30 P.M., the Solitos
accompanied by Bartolo Atuan, Jr., Florfinas 26-year-old
brother, left the wedding reception. They had barely
traveled some 300 meters away and were in front of the
house of Felix Sacang, when they were waylaid by
appellant and his four companions, now the co-accused,
namely: Danilo, Pedro, Ben and Marcelo, all surnamed
Tuppal. After Ben Tuppal announced a heist, Danilo
Tuppal immediately ran off with Florfinas handbag
containing P2,500.00 in cash. Appellant then shot Florfina
with a short firearm, hitting her in the abdomen. Bartolo
Atuan, Jr., tried to shield Florfina from further harm but
Marcelo Tuppal then shot Bartolo, killing him on the spot.

Florfina took advantage of the situation and scurried
towards a nearby banana plantation. The malefactors
gave pursuit and continued to fire at her hitting her
further at the buttocks and in the arm. She pretended to
be dead and fell to the ground. The ploy worked because
she heard accused Pedro Tuppal say, Let us go, she is
already dead.

In the meantime, upon hearing the gunshots, Bonifacio
Solito and his son Efren scampered towards the house of
Felix Sacang. Co-accused Ben Tuppal ran after both father
and son. He aimed the gun at them, but the gun jammed
and did not fire.

After the malefactors fled, Florfina was brought to the
Isabela Provincial Hospital where Dr. Leonides Melendres
administered emergency treatment. At the trial, Dr.
Melendres testified that Florfina sustained three gunshot
wounds, two of which could have been fatal had there
been no medical treatment.

Dr. Antonio Salvador, who autopsied the cadaver of
Bartolo Atuan, Jr., recovered a metallic slug from the
victims heart.

Whether or not the trial court erred in ruling during the
bail hearing that the prosecution evidence was weak, it is
estopped from rendering a contrary ruling after the trial.

The findings of the trial court during the bail hearing were
but a preliminary appraisal of the strength of the
prosecutions evidence for the limited purpose of
determining whether appellant is entitled to be released
on bail during the pendency of the trial. The said findings
should not be construed as an immutable evaluation of
the prosecutions evidence. It is settled that the
assessment of the prosecution evidence presented
during bail hearings in capital offenses is preliminary and
intended only for the purpose of granting or denying
applications for the provisional release of the accused.