Conclusion

Raymond Hinnebusch
Egypt's experimentation with different developmental strategies makes it
a sort oflaboratory for gauging the efficacy of policy options. Just as the
developmentalstate was the dominant model in the 1960s and 1970s, so t
he neo-
liberal state isnow in fashion.
1
But none of the strategies Egypt has pursu
ed has yet been shownto be so clearly superior to others in advancing it a
long the road to equitabledevelopment that debate over appropriate polic
ies has been quieted or differencesresolved. Given this, prescriptions for
reform must depart from someinterpretation of the record that has so far
accumulated.

Interpreting Egypt's development record
Despite zigzags in policy, several constants and themes have defined a pa
rticularEgyptian development experience. Egypt, historically a 'hydraulic
society,'
2
hasenjoyed one fairly constant economic success, namely agric
ulture, the developmentof which in an arid land depended on state interv
ention. Putting aside the role ofthe Pharaonic state, modernization has m
eant hydraulic projects and commercialagriculture for export, beginning
with Mohammad Ali (1805-
48), continuingunder Cromer (First Aswan Dam of 1902), and climaxing
in the massiveinvestments in irrigation and reclamation under Nasser; t
he resulting expansion inirrigated land, later combined with intensificati
on via the application of subsidizedinputs through state cooperatives, ma
de Egyptian agriculture quite efficient byLDC standards.
However, rapid population growth in an extremely densely populated co
untry isanother Egyptian constant. Agricultural development has, except
for short periods,not kept pace with this growth. This, together with falli
ng world prices for primaryproducts, drove down per capita income almo
st 50 per cent in the first half of thetwentieth century, providing the unde
rlying conditions for the 1952 revolution(Berque 1972:620). As the possi
bilities of further agricultural expansionencountered falling marginal ret
urns in an arid land, the revolutionary regime sawno alternative to the di
versification of Egypt's monoculture primary product exporteconomy, wi
dely thought at the time to keep LDCs under-developed. Nasser's state-
led import-
substitute industrialization (ISI)
3
endowed the country with asignificant
industrial
NGOs and the development challeng
es ofthe twenty-first century*

Aziza Hussein

Introduction
Internationally, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) are increasingly viewedas the third s
ector
1
without which governments cannot alone address developmentch
allenges to meet the needs of the fast-
growing population. In Egypt, anassessment of the present socio-
economic situation concludes,
the State can no longer afford to maintain its heavy involvement inprodu
ction. Nor can it afford to pursue the role of major provider of jobsin the
economy, and meet the challenges of providing free access to allstages of
health care and education.
2

That is why the civil society - the non-governmental, voluntary and non-
profitsector - is expected in the twenty-
first century to assume greater responsibilities,and to play a more dynam
ic role in different aspects of national development.Furthermore, followi
ng the government's adoption, in 1991, of economic policyreforms for a p
redominant market economy and recent privatization of most ofpublic e
nterprises, NGOs should be enabled to play the role of partnership withg
overnment agencies. This partnership role requires a complete transform
ation ofexisting relations between government and NGOs in order to achi
eve the noble aimof alleviating poverty and unemployment, and to tackle
other social ills.
This chapter consists of five major sections. The first presents a brief hist
ory of theEgyptian NGOs, the context of their formation, legalization and
diversity ofactivities. The second section assesses the nature of the relati
onships betweenNGOs and the government at supervision and partnersh
ip levels, including anassessment of the June 2002 Law. This is followed
by an examination of the NGOs'relationships with the United Nations sys
tem. The fourth section presents theresults of two case studies on the exp
erience of two NGOs in development. Basedon the findings of the assess
ment made, the last section suggests, in broad terms,the challenges facin
g the Egyptian NGOs with a particular focus both onpartnership with gov
ernment in the development process and on volunteerism,which I consid
er the most important challenges into the twenty-first century.
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An evaluation of the political system
atthe end of the millennium

Robert Springborg

Introduction
At the turn of the century, Egypt faces the twin challenges of economic a
ndpolitical structural adjustments. Criteria to evaluate the success of the
former arereasonably standard and easily measured. On the other hand,
criteria to evaluatepolitical structural adjustment are more ambiguous a
nd there is less consensusabout them. In recent years, however, various
multilateral and bilateral donoragencies -
anxious to include progress towards democracy as one of their criteriain
evaluating-aid worthiness of potential recipients, including Egypt -
have beendeveloping such measures. In this chapter, the five criteria dev
eloped by the UnitedStates Agency for International Development USAI
D (1998) are used.
1
Thesecriteria are: consensus, rule of law, competitio
n, inclusion in political participationand good governance. In this chapte
r Egypt's position at the beginning of the newmillennium along these five
dimensions will be assessed, followed by someconclusions about politica
l challenges that confront the country at the outset of thetwenty-
first century.

Consensus
The most fundamental level at which consensus is required is on the exis
tence ofand boundaries for society and the state. Egypt, one of the world'
s oldestcivilizations and states, commands the virtual unanimous agreem
ent of itspopulation on its borders, on the identity question of 'who is an
Egyptian', and onthe existence of a state that has a legitimate right to exe
rcise power over society.Although since the mid-
1970s some extreme Islamist groups have contended thatthe very concep
t of state is 'illegal' because it is not Islamic, that view has beenrestricted,
even among radical Islamists themselves, the most extreme of whomwho
have in the past few years declined into political insignificance. Very few
Egyptians doubt the legitimacy of the fundamental structure of their gov
ernment,which in more or less its present form dates to the second half o
f the nineteenthcentury, although many more question the appropriaten
ess of the processes bywhich those structures operate and the incumbenc
y of those who occupy roleswithin them. The fact that Egyptians are ofte
n noted for their tolerance bespeaksthe widespread acceptance of the bas
ic forms of state and society and thegeographic space they occupy.
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