Dynamics of agricultural rehabilitation in conflict and post conflict situation in Sub

Saharan Africa: A case of input supplies in Northern Uganda

By Rachkara

Background
Emergencies caused by armed conflict and natural happening have always had deep affects
on the agricultural systems of rural people particularly in sub Saharan Africa (SSA). Sadly
these governments, economies and other systems are often incapacitated to withstand the
impacts of these pressures. For example in Northern Uganda, as a result exponential
increase in displacement; the local farmers lost their seeds stocks, planting materials and
tools as well as important livelihood assets. Consequently; the integrated socioeconomic,
environmental and cultural elements of the farming system are damaged, the ability of
farmers to maintain seed security have been compromised. CRS (2002) noted that the
diagnosis of seed unavailability following conflict is based on the recognition that
displacement results in a loss of assets, including seed. Although displacement does result
in a loss of seed, this determination focuses narrowly on affected families rather than on the
larger community seed systems. Seed security is the access by farmers to adequate good
quality seed of locally adapted varieties. It is of paramount importance in achieving long-
term food security in developing countries and in maintaining sustainable livelihoods
(Longley and Richards 1998; FAO 1998).

Northern Uganda faced a serious humanitarian crisis for more than two decades with severe
long-term consequences. The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) insurgency, coupled with other
factors created poverty and collapsing public and private services but without HIV/AIDS the
crisis would not be of the same dimensions. While for the last two decades the armed
conflict was seen as a threat that pushed more than 1.6million people into the camps, in a
near future the HIV/AIDS pandemic is going to be the heart of the crisis. To this day, it is
already threatening the lives of many people. The HIV/AIDS prevalence rate in Northern
Uganda is nearly twice as high as the national average and is continuing to increase.
Because northern Uganda has been raged with war and internal conflict, capacity within the
existing authorities particularly in the local government remains very weak at both technical
and managerial levels.

In response to these problems, international, national and local organizations intervened in

order to help affected communities, save lives, recover and restore their livelihoods and
agricultural systems. From 2002, seeds and tools projects were often seen as a cheap and
effective way of addressing food needs in protracted emergencies in northern Uganda.
Distributing seeds and tools is generally regarded as a way of supporting longer-term food
security, and is widely undertaken by agencies operating in disaster and ongoing emergency
situations (Humanitarian Exchange Magazine). Due to the lack of preparation and the
complexity related to emergency operations, many relief interventions have been
unsuccessful in restoring the full agricultural capacity of farming systems (Eberdt, 2000;
Bushamuka, 1999; Hines et al., 1998). Longley, who has been echoed by other writers,
argues that a more detailed understanding of agricultural rehabilitation and relief is required
(Longley 2001).

To ensure that programmes are focussed, food security actor strategies were based on
needs analysis and response plans aim to address identified needs taking into account an
agency response capacity. In light of the fluidity of the context and to maintain a response
focussed on actual needs as they evolve, the humanitarian response must retain a high
degree of flexibility. In so doing, saving lives by reducing immediate mortality and morbidity
through ensuring an effective and rapid emergency response – including a protection
response – in all crisis areas where human lives are at risk due to conflict-related causes,
epidemics and other natural disasters was the objective. This paper discusses some of the
intervention applied in the agriculture sector between emergency context and post conflict
situations. The paper restricts discussions to input supply systems. It analyses some of the
challenges that evolve from the various interventions employed in the northern Uganda
situations.

Seeds and tools interventions

The free distribution of seeds and tools has been the standard approach to agricultural and
food security interventions in emergencies. The prevalence of the input approach is to a
certain extent attributable to the following: (1) perceptions that during displacement,
farmers lost their seed stocks, (2) perception that farmer seed quality is poor, (3) Donor
regulations and acceptance of seed certification as a proxy for seed and varietal quality, (4)
promotion of researcher varieties, (5) misdiagnosis of unavailability, (5) difficulty accessing
farmer seed, and (6) support for the commercial seed sector.

The free distribution approach that most frequently used in post-disaster situations is the
distribution of seeds, inputs and agricultural tools; this approach is referred to as the
distribution of ‘seeds and tools’ (Longley 2002). Several reasons why this approach is
favoured by practitioners are explored here. Seed distribution can help re-establish a ‘self-
help’ mode within communities by helping families to produce their own food and support
their livelihoods. Seed distributions are also often perceived to be a more long-term and
effective activity than short-term food aid (Bryce 2001). Furthermore, when rural livelihood
systems have been damaged, it is possible to distribute seeds and tools immediately and
efficiently thus enabling the benefits of a catch-crop in the first available season (O’Keef and
Kirby 1997; ODI 1996; Long 2000).

The modality for blanket and free distribution was almost universal for the agencies
operating in the area. If an agency (A) was operating in an area, it would register household
heads as beneficiaries. This registration was covering all households in a camp. Owing that
the Local Councils (LCs) were dysfunctional at that point of massive displacement, all the
activities in the camps were coordinated by the leadership of camp commandant 1. Certainly
because movement within the camps was unplanned and was very dynamic, the household
figures for households for camps were not stable. Agencies had to move a step further to
verify whether or not all the registered households were in that particular camp. It is true

1
A camp commandant is a leader elected to leader all communities in the camp system
that some households with more large numbers would split up into two so as to realize a
significant amount of the materials distributed.

Distribution of seeds and tools were base on the agreed and/or presumed safe-radius 2.
Although safe-radius was not homogeneous for all the camps, generally it varied between 1
– 5km. The amount of seeds and tools were also determined by land access, types of crops
that the IDP communities were permitted to grow, amount of resources available for and
organization, and minimum standards set by actors of food security.

By 2005, many stakeholders including donours were not convinced with the sustainability of
seeds and tools distribution. Although around this time, nobody had an idea of when and
how the situation that has for years been described as one of the worst in the world would
normalize. The need to engage farmers to be involved in more meaningful agricultural
activities was undisputed. Approaches that worked well in other places or are working well
in other emergency situations had to be imported. Food security actors who were not
convinced over the free distribution of seeds and tools had started improving their
interventions into a more sustaining one.

As the number of critiques of seeds and tools distribution grew from within, it was still not
possible to rule out the significant of the seeds and tools distribution. Better still; the
improved security situation in the sub region late 2006 resulted into increased return
process and land access. Soon the Office of the Prime Minister realized that the need to
empower returning farming community with seeds and planting materials to kick-start their
agricultural livelihood activities was quite important.

Some stakeholders called the support inputs that were distributed to the locals and
returning farming communities as comprehensive return packages. The three perceptions of
that farmer seed quality is poor, donour regulations and acceptance of seed certification as
a proxy for seed and varietal quality, and promotion of researcher varieties were the
bottom-line. While demands were too high food the seed industry in Uganda to meet,
apparently quality would be the last thing to consider by the suppliers. The questions on
quality of the inputs did not stop on seeds but also on the tools. As a result, the germination
rate for the seeds were very low and consequently the yields. This was justifiable for
development partners to switch gears to other innovations, that were used and/or being
used in other areas.

Up to this point, there was nothing to concretely show that the impacts collectively of all
interventions of seeds and tools distribution can be quantified. In other words, the impacts
of this intervention cannot be easily seen. It has been evident that some IDP farmers as
part of the copying mechanism sold off the tools to buy other basic necessities. Does it
mean that development partners distributed seed and tools without considering the
community priority/needs? Absolutely not. Arguably, it can be that the farmers’ other needs
were more pressing that the needs for seeds and tools.

2
Safe-radius is an area around the camp that HH were allowed to move freely within and agreed period of time
(9:00am – 4:00pm)
Delivery mechanisms and proper targeting of recipients are important in seeds and tools
initiatives. With respect to targeting, identifying those most in need is critical to providing
effective assistance (Betrand et al., 1989). Following Hurricane Mitch it was revealed that
the hardest hit were the most marginalized members of society such as small producers,
and female-headed households. In Honduras, female headship increased from a pre-
disaster level of 20.4% to 50%. Targeting initiatives should take into account such changing
demographics. In this case, distributing seeds solely to male-headed households would have
further handicapped a large portion of the population (Delaney and Shrader 2000). Within
the literature reviewed, community participation was portrayed as the most effective way to
ensure proper and inclusive targeting of seed distribution (Richards 2001; Pratten 1997).

Although community participation is vital in targeting, challenges can potentially arise with
this approach. Illustrating this, Richards describes targeting methodologies in Sierra Leone
in the mid-1990s where relief agencies organized village committees to identify potential
beneficiaries for seeds and tools. However, amongst these identified beneficiaries, not all
farms were included. In some cases, the excluded individuals were angry enough to
threaten joining the rebels (2001). In a similar example of participatory targeting in
Ethiopia, the community based organization in charge of targeting excluded women in their
seed distributions (Pratten 1997). These case studies illustrate the importance of integrating
the unique social and economic make-up of the population into participatory targeting in
order to help those who are most in need.

Seedfairs intervention
With respect to distribution techniques, there are a variety of benefits and drawbacks to
delivering seeds by donation, credit or sale. Firstly, when relief is given by donation, it
supports farmers who have insufficient funds to purchase materials themselves and is
logistically easier for NGOs. However, donating seed has been critiqued because it may
reduce farmer incentive to rescue their own production systems and can potentially create
dependency upon the donors (De Barbentane, 2001). Northern Uganda started enjoying
relative security since the signing of the cessation of hostilities agreement between the
Government of Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in August 2006 and the start
of the Juba Peace Process which resulted in the signing of all but the final part of a multi-
component peace agreement. Despite recent setbacks in peace negotiations and the lack of
a final agreement signature, the current security environment provides an opportunity to
move toward a process of recovery and to address the development gap between northern
Uganda and the rest of the country. The security situation encouraged the IDPs to begin
the second leg back home late 2006. Farm activities started at a more active pace than the
previous year since land access itself has increased. This compelled the Office of the Prime
Minister (OPM) to massively distribute seeds and tools in the region in order to support
farmers with planting materials to kick-start their livelihoods. Because the demands for
certified seeds were high, quality of these seeds were highly questionable. This resulted into
very low germination rates.

Failure of the seeds to germinate in 2007 sparked the thinking to reshape the future of
interventions possibly to replace seeds distribution. Although a number of agencies in the
region had been facilitating seed access since early 2000, the value attached to seedfairs
methodology was not paramount. Soon after poor seeds of 2007, stakeholders appreciated
the saline nature of seedfairs and voucher system. These include the following: farmers’
access seed of their preferred crops and varieties; boosting the local economy; seed quality
is left to the judgment of farmers; and the approach can be modified to suit the level of
seed insecurity (e.g. slightly scarce, very scarce).

Because seedfairs is much more demanding in terms of organisation compared to

distribution of seeds and tools, implementation was a big challenge to many development
partners. While seeds from seed companies are usually more costly compared to farmer
grains, the development partners were putting prices of grains that are sold at the seedfair
market as the same as those from seed companies. It is true that in many seedfair markets,
the seed stockiest or seed company agents have been present for sales of commodities at
the certified seed company price. If the grains/seeds are to be sold at a cheaper price
compared to the prices of certified seed companies, there were high chances that the seeds
from the agents would not be bought. The option was to follow the prices of the certified
seeds.

Owing the vouchers that are the medium for exchange were distributed for free, the
voucher recipients did not feel cheated for buying seeds/grains twice at the actual amount
at the seed fairs markets. On the other hand, a number of agencies that learnt the approach
from CRS when it was introduced into the region; were using the approach to promote the
production of ground nut that was a major cash and food crop at a time. Perhaps the
adopters were moving faster than the initiators. As a result, the farming community
understood the approach as buying and selling of groundnuts. Large number of farmers
continued to grow groundnuts so as to sell at the seedfair markets.

It was evident that production of groundnuts went up at the expense of other food-cash
crops. According to land use crop yield assessment for second season 2008, production of
groundnuts was 33,932MT compared to 12,870MT of maize, 7,394MT of beans and 3,940MT
of rice. Priority was given to groundnut at the expense of other crops. Groundnuts were
grown for seedfair markets at the expense of important food crops.

Although the above yielded positive indicators such as increased food self sufficiency,
reduced number of households who are food insecurity, and reduced levels of global acute
malnutrition; the hope that the population would one day after years depending on food
assistance came to pass early 2009. Though the above is true, the farmers had banked their
harvest for seedfair markets. After a short dryspell in the first rain, it was impossible for the
farmers to make it through without the food assistance for just a season.

Over the years, IDP farmers, humanitarian community and government blamed to war for
farmers’ situations. Three years of relative peace, some local authorities pin pointed
development partners for creating dependency syndrome. Humanitarian bodies on the other
hand blamed the local governments for not taking charge of the situation and the IDP and
returning communities for refusal to work hence counting on the aid. This kind of pressure
built up until some aid agencies had to discourage free inputs – whether in terms of
distribution or by way of input fairs.
Working for vouchers for inputs

An approach of vouchers for work soon replaced the approach of free voucher distribution.
Communities are expected to work to acquire voucher that would later be used to purchase
inputs of their choice. Buying this idea was very easy for stakeholders such as donours,
development partners and local authorities. This has been envisaged as a means of
promoting private sector, input dealers, rehabilitation of agricultural infrastructures etc.
Owing that many stakeholders bought the idea of the vouchers for work, the approach of
distribution of free vouchers of fairs had to be discouraged at a wider scale.

In some districts like Pader for example, the voucher for work was used to rehabilitate or
open community access roads, protecting springs, rehabilitating physical markets,
establishing woodlots etc. It was started by a few and as it was registering success, the
initiators had to use this as a means marking the free voucher methodology unpopular.
While developing a voucher for work, cash for work and food for work methodology
coordination and harmonization guidelines, stakeholders at a workshop noted that free hand
out of agricultural inputs etc. should be avoided as it will damage the business for
agricultural input dealers etc. Only if there is no market and a market cannot be established
should free hand outs be considered. Please note that seedfairs also provide free handouts
as the beneficiaries normally have received the vouchers for free.

Following the adopted parish approach of the inter-agency standing committee, the
implementation of the two methodologies became a challenge. These approaches became
conflicting once because communities would prefer free vouchers. Conflicts started within
parishes, then sub counties and later on within and between agencies. Although an
experience sharing workshop as scheduled to have a set of guiding principles for
coordination of the interventions with regard to geographical areas, target groups and type
of works done and for harmonization of the implementation modalities, so that different
interventions don’t compete and negatively impact each other; the conflicts between and
within interventions persisted. Soon afterwards, politics had to play a big role. This would
range among many factors to how the district perceives your relevance. In whatever the
case, the stakeholders were working together to enhance food and nutritional security to
save lives and alleviate suffering and kick-start livelihoods.

According to Collinson et al. 2002, if humanitarian responses are to provide effective

assistance to food-insecure groups, for example, it has been argued that humanitarian
agencies must understand how and why the economic and political processes associated
with war have led these groups to become vulnerable As such, a political economy
perspective in understanding the dynamic patterns of power and vulnerability that exist
within any given conflict situation can help agencies to intervene more effectively and apply
an ethical framework to their work (Collinson et al., 2002). If it is accepted that
humanitarian action is an inherently political activity (Leader, 2000), then political economy
analysis can help humanitarian actors to reach principled and accountable decisions about
how to engage with local political and commercial actors.
Within the humanitarian sector, a somewhat confusing array of slightly differing sets of
principles of humanitarian action, with differing interpretations, has been put forward by
different agencies and different commentators. This continual renegotiation of the principles
of humanitarian action is closely related to the changing nature of contemporary conflict
described above. It is interesting to consider three core humanitarian principles: impartiality
(the provision of aid according to and in proportion to need); neutrality (dealing equally with
both sides to a conflict and not discriminating on the basis of gender, ethnicity, class or
other traits); and independence (the independence of humanitarian objectives from any
political, military or economic considerations). Furthermore, also considering key principles
from livelihoods and rights-based approaches is important.

The objective of the enhancing food and nutritional security to save lives and alleviate
suffering and kick-start livelihoods is a humanitarian objective. Majority of the development
partners in the region have deep experiences in humanitarian work. However relating or
linking relief to development has been a big challenge. This has been evident in the number
of conflicts that emerged in achieving the above objective.

Much of the recent literature on humanitarian principles notes the difficulties in applying the
principles in practice (e.g. Charny, 2004; Keen, 1998; Weiss, 1999), and events in Iraq and
Afghanistan are widely considered by humanitarian actors to have seriously compromised
the principles on which the very integrity of humanitarian action is founded (FIFC, 2004).
Three broad – and, at times, overlapping – positions have been identified at a conceptual
level among humanitarians in relation to humanitarian principles (in particular the role of
neutrality) and political agendas (FIFC, 2004; Leader, 2000; Weiss, 1999):
(a) ‘Principle-centred’ (FIFC, 2004) or ‘neutrality elevated’ (Leader, 2000). Also referred to
as ‘classicists’ (Weiss, 1999), these agencies and individuals share a continuing commitment
to the core humanitarian principles, particularly that of neutrality. Proponents of this
position argue that the more highly politicized the terrain, the more urgent is unswerving
and unabashed fidelity to the core principles (Harroff-Tavel, 2003). In such contexts, the
manipulation of humanitarian action by political actors should be minimised through
operational rules. They believe that humanitarian action should be restricted to saving lives
and protecting civilians, and many also feel that humanitarian actors should avoid becoming
politically engaged in activities such as reconstruction or advocacy for human rights.
(b) ‘Pragmatists’ (Weiss, 1999; FIFC, 2004) or ‘third-way humanitarianism’ (Leader, 2000).
This position accepts that politics and humanitarianism are intimately intertwined in the
reality of contemporary conflict. Principles are seen not as absolutes but as reference
guidelines: something to be strived for, but not always attainable in all contexts. Although
they resist taking sides, pragmatists believe that the principle of neutrality is not an
absolute necessity for aid to be effective and impartial. Pragmatists have also been referred
to as ‘political humanitarians’, within which a distinction can be made between those who
pursue minimalist (‘do no harm’) or maximalist (peace-building) political agendas (Weiss,
1999).
(c) ‘Solidarists’ (Weiss, 1999; FIFC, 2004) or ‘neutrality abandoned’ (Leader, 2000). These
agencies and individuals hold the view that neither humanitarian principles nor saving lives
are enough in aid responses to conflict. They believe that there is also an obligation to
become politically engaged (which may mean taking sides) in addressing the root causes of
conflict through actions to uphold justice and human rights. Neutrality and impartiality are
seen as an impediment to effective action. Rather than viewing themselves first and
foremost as humanitarian agencies, solidarists see themselves as rights-based agencies
whose agenda includes poverty alleviation and social transformation, as well as the more
traditional humanitarian activities in contexts where other activities are not possible.

The politics between the vouchers for work and free voucher methodologies almost came
official in a workshop organized early 2009 in Acholi Inn – Gulu district. This workshop
attracted donours, UN agencies, international and national NGOs, and local governments.
The objective was to have a set of guiding principles for coordination of the voucher related
interventions with regard to geographical areas, target groups and type of works done and
for harmonisation of the implementation modalities, so that different interventions don’t
compete and negatively impact each other. It was agreed that free hand out of agricultural
inputs etc. should be avoided as it will damage the business for agricultural input dealers
etc. Only if there is no market and a market cannot be established should free hand outs be
considered. Please note that Seed Fairs also provide free handouts as the beneficiaries
normally have received the vouchers for free.

Hereafter, beneficiaries started working for vouchers. The first challenge came where
beneficiaries preferred cash to vouchers. Where cash and voucher works were in the same
sun county, beneficiaries would leave where they are paid with vouchers and go for cash
related activities. Secondly, the communities felt that their choices should not be limited to
inputs predetermined by an agency or to those found with a particular input dealer. Failure
to meet their expectations during the input fairs would result to discontinuation with the
work. Thirdly the time for working for vouchers is the same planting season that farmers
should be in their own gardens. This later affects the amount of land tilled by a household.
Fourth only able people work for vouchers. This does not guarantee that the needy
households are the one getting the vouchers. By the end of it all, if the households with
seeds work for vouchers, they still find a way of converting their vouchers to cash. On
phasing such challenges, most of the districts abandoned the voucher for work
methodology.

According to UNPRAP (2009), 30.8% of households in the North are female-headed

households, compared to the national average of 26.9%. The continuous conflict in the
region is a likely explanation. In the voucher for work methodology, it was agreed that the
task rate of every for the northern Uganda region is UgX 3,000. However, within the
process of work, activities vary and the harder the task, the higher the task rate. The UgX
3,000 task rate is for activities such as bush clearing, ditching, leveling etc. while activities
such as removal of tree stumps, trees and aunt-hills etc. do not have fixed prices but the
prices depend on the sizes. It is true that such activities are usually handled by men. For
example, a man removes three trees and will earn 90,000UgX (30,000UgX/tree).
Meanwhile, a woman will earn require 30 days at one task per day to earn the same
amount. In rural areas, women comprise the majority of the labour force in agriculture,
while men form a substantially higher majority of the labour force in the industry and
service sectors (UNPRAP, 2009). In northern Uganda during and after the insurgencies,
household food security is a woman’s burden. For all types of livestock, female-headed
households were less endowed compared to male counterparts, and female livestock
ownership is typically limited to goats and chicken.

The challenge of balancing between working for vouchers and on-farm as well as off-farm
activities is prominent. Whereas communities find it very important to work hard to acquire
significant inputs (enough seeds and tools), community work has to happen within the
agricultural season. To ditch the road sides for example during dry season is close to
impossible for women. Labor has then to be balance in the planting season between
community work and farm work.

Owing that acquisition of inputs have to be timely and in adequate quantity, often many
families have to engage more family members into the community work. Particularly of
Saturdays and Sundays, school going children often join their parents – particularly in
female headed households to work along side with them to earn better voucher rates. In
Pader for example, an agency that planned to do input fairs in the beginning of second
season could not go ahead because the various agreed task were not yet completed.
Because they communities were working on road rehabilitation for vouchers, some
communities finished their before others. Convening fairs for a fraction of the beneficiaries
while leaving the rest is not very cost effective logistically.

The question of whether the farmers who work for vouchers get the inputs they desire
cannot be ignored. Because vouchers are medium for exchange, specific input dealers in
some cases are the ones who are allowed to deal their inputs in exchange for the vouchers.
Where farmers have specific input dealers to buy inputs from, the constraints of failing to
buy inputs in time or failing to buy inputs they want.

Some farmers have devised their own solutions to such constraints. They have gotten a
means of changing the vouchers in to cash without acquiring inputs. Where farmers work
for vouchers and the inputs dealers are not restricted, they bring their own items and buy
their own items. For example in a livestock fair that took place in Kitgum, a significant
number of voucher recipients had their own livestock already. On the day of the livestock
fairs, they brought their family members and friends brought their animals and the voucher
recipients bought their own animals. By the end of the exercise, the vouchers were
redeemed and changed to cash within the same household. In a seedfair with voucher for
work component in Kitgum, the able people who had seeds did the work, received the
vouchers, brought their own seeds into the market and registered the seeds on their friend
and household members, bought their own seeds and converted their vouchers to cash.

In voucher for work, restricting who should bring his/her input for sales at the fairs is very
difficult. Sometime this happens due to the fact that the inputs from those who did not
participate in the voucher for work is not enough. When the farmers are allowed to work
and sell their inputs also at the fairs, they end up buying their own inputs. While organizing
fairs after voucher for work in Pader, an agency realized that the registered venders could
not meet the input demand for the amount worked for. When the voucher recipients were
also allowed to bring their various inputs, the market supply was twice the demand with
inputs ranging from small seeded crops to the largest livestock. The probability that non-
voucher recipients would sell their inputs in such a market is very minimum.

Conclusion

Severe disruption of food production and marketing systems is common during

emergencies. Crop destruction and livestock deaths may result from natural events
(drought and floods as well as outbreaks of plant and animal pests and diseases), the
devastation of war or a combination of events. Access to adequate food becomes difficult,
and this hardship contributes to high rates of malnutrition. The provision of food, water,
shelter, protection and medical care is essential for survival of refugees and internally
displaced persons until the crisis is over and they can return to their homes or establish new
ones. Actions are also needed to assist people who remain in their home communities
during the crisis. Temporary food distribution and supplementary feeding for vulnerable
groups and provision of agricultural inputs are common humanitarian interventions to help
people cope when an emergency occurs.

Agriculture rehabilitation is a complex, unstable and dynamic process. It depends on a

number of factors such as donour influence, politics within and between interventions and
organizations, experiences, trail and errors and innovations. Rehabilitation of rural
agriculture has no formula. What worked in one area may not be applicable in the other
area. It is particularly important to understand the socio-cultural aspects of the communities
in agricultural rehabilitation. The communities have mechanisms of making their ends meets
within any intervention. They are very fast in learning how to survive within any
intervention.

In view of all the above, the discourse on agricultural rehabilitation is very slow. Being the
major if not the only industry, the possibility to meaningfully make livelihoods sustainable
irrespective of the duration of these interventions is far from reaching. Compared to the
amount of resources used, there are no solid successes made of the above interventions.
Even farmers who used to outstanding have become increasingly difficult to trace. There are
always excuses to events and happenings that result into failure to revitalize agriculture.

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