Restituto Ynot vs Intermediate Appellate Court

Police Power Not Validly Exercised

There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos (EO 626). To strengthen the
law, Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only banned the movement of carabaos from interprovinces but
as well as the movement of carabeef. On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot was caught transporting 6 carabaos from
Masbate to Iloilo. He was then charged in violation of EO 626-A. Ynot averred EO 626-A as
unconstitutional for it violated his right to be heard or his right to due process. He said that the authority
provided by EO 626-A to outrightly confiscate carabaos even without being heard is unconstitutional. The
lower court ruled against Ynot ruling that the EO is a valid exercise of police power in order to promote
general welfare so as to curb down the indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos.
ISSUE: Whether or not the law is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due process. EO 626-A ctreated a
presumption based on the judgment of the executive. The movement of carabaos from one area to the
other does not mean a subsequent slaughter of the same would ensue. Ynot should be given to defend
himself and explain why the carabaos are being transferred before they can be confiscated. The
SC found that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method
employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is
unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the
right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the
administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear
encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is,
finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted
unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.

Lao Ichong vs Jaime Hernandez
Lao Ichong is a Chinese businessman who entered the country to take advantage of business
opportunities herein abound (then) particularly in the retail business. For some time he and his fellow
Chinese businessmen enjoyed a monopoly in the local market in Pasay. Until in June 1954 when
Congress passed the RA 1180 or the Retail Trade Nationalization Act the purpose of which is to reserve
to Filipinos the right to engage in the retail business. Ichong then petitioned for the nullification of the said
Act on the ground that it contravened several treaties concluded by the RP which, according to him,
violates the equal protection clause (pacta sund servanda). He said that as a Chinese businessman
engaged in the business here in the country who helps in the income generation of the country he should
be given equal opportunity.




Ang Tibay vs Court of Industrial Relations
Due Process Admin Bodies CIR
TeodoroToribio owns and operates Ang Tibay a leather company which supplies the Philippine Army. Due
to alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused the lay off of members of National Labor Union Inc. NLU
averred that Toribios act is not valid as it is not within the CBA. That there are two labor unions in Ang
Tibay; NLU and National Workers Brotherhood. That NWB is dominated by Toribio hence he favors it
over NLU. That NLU wishes for a new trial as they were able to come up with new evidence/documents
that they were not able to obtain before as they were inaccessible and they were not able to present it
before in the CIR.
ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a due process of law.
HELD: The SC ruled that there should be a new trial in favor of NLU. The SC ruled that all administrative
bodies cannot ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process. They are;
(1) The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own
case and submit evidence in support thereof.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending
to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity
which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A decision with
absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the evidence must be
substantial. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in
the record and disclosed to the parties affected.
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a
subordinate in arriving at a decision.
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a
manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the vario issues involved, and the reasons for the
decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.






ANIAG VS. COMELEC [237 SCRA 194; G.R. NO. 104961; 7 OCT 1994]
Sunday, February 01, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: In preparation for the synchronized national and localelections, the COMELEC issued Resolution
No. 2323, Gun Ban, promulgating rules and regulations on bearing, carrying and transporting of firearm
or other deadly weapons on security personnelor bodyguards, on bearing arms by members of security
agencies or police organizations, and organization or maintenance of reaction forces during the election
period. COMELEC also issued Resolution No. 2327 providing for the summary disqualification of
candidates engaged in gunrunning, using and transporting of firearms, organizing special strike forces,
and establishing spot checkpoints. Pursuant to the Gun Ban, Mr. Serrapio Taccad, Sergeant at Arms of
the House of Representatives, wrote petitioner for the return of the two firearms issued to him by
the House of Representatives. Petitioner then instructed his driver, Arellano, to pick up the firearms from
petitioners house and return them to Congress. The PNP set up a checkpoint. When the car driven by
Arellano approached the checkpoint, the PNP searched the car and found the firearms. Arellano was
apprehended and detained. He then explained the order of petitioner. Petitioner also explained that
Arellano was only complying with the firearms ban, and that he was not a security officer or a bodyguard.
Later, COMELEC issued Resolution No.92-0829 directing the filing of information against petitioner and
Arellano for violation of the Omnibus Election Code, and for petitioner to show cause why he should not
be disqualified from running for an elective position. Petitioner then questions the constitutionality of
Resolution No. 2327. He argues that gunrunning, using or transporting firearms or similar weapons and
other acts mentioned in the resolution are not within the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code. Thus,
according to petitioner, Resolution No. 2327 is unconstitutional. The issue on the disqualification of
petitioner from running in the elections was rendered moot when he lost his bid for a seat in Congress in
the elections.
Issue: Whether or Not petitioner can be validly prosecuted for instructing his driver to return the firearms
issued to him on the basis of the evidence gathered from the warrant less search of his car
Held: A valid search must be authorized by a search warrant issued by an appropriate authority. However,
a warrantless search is not violative of the Constitution for as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor
its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is merely limited to a visual
search. In the case at bar, the guns were not tucked in Arellanos waist nor placed within his reach, as
they were neatly packed in gun cases and placed inside a bag at the back of the car. Given these
circumstances, the PNP could not have thoroughly searched the car lawfully as well as
thepackage without violating the constitutional injunction. Absent any justifying circumstance specifically
pointing to the culpability of petitioner and Arellano, the search could not have been valid. Consequently,
the firearms obtained from the warrantless search cannot be admitted for any purpose in any proceeding.
It was also shown in the facts that the PNP had not informed the public of the purpose of setting up the
checkpoint. Petitioner was also not among those charged by the PNP with violation of the Omnibus
Election Code. He was not informed by the City Prosecutor that he was a respondent in the preliminary
investigation. Such constituted a violation of his right to due process. Hence, it cannot be contended that
petitioner was fully given the opportunity to meet the accusation against him as he was not informed that
he was himself a respondent in the case. Thus, the warrantless search conducted by the PNP is declared
illegal and the firearms seized during the search cannot be used as evidence in any proceeding against
the petitioner. Resolution No. 92-0829 is unconstitutional, and therefore, set aside.

ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY VS. HON. JUDGE IGNACIO CAPULONG [222 SCRA 644; G.R.
99327; 27 MAY 1993]
Facts: Leonardo H. Villa, a first year law student of Petitioner University, died of serious physical injuries
at Chinese General Hospital after the initiation rites of Aquila Legis. Bienvenido Marquez was also
hospitalized at the Capitol Medical Center for acute renal failure occasioned by the serious physical
injuries inflicted upon him on the same occasion. Petitioner Dean Cynthia del Castillo created a Joint
Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating Committee which was tasked to investigate and submit a
report within 72 hours on the circumstances surrounding the death of Lennie Villa. Said notice also
required respondent students to submit their written statements within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt.
Although respondent students received a copy of the written notice, they failed to file a reply. In the
meantime, they were placed on preventive suspension. The Joint Administration-Faculty-Student
Investigating Committee, after receiving the written statements and hearing the testimonies of several
witness, found a prima facie case against respondent students for violation of Rule 3 of the Law
School Catalogue entitled "Discipline." Respondent students were then required to file their written
answers to the formal charge. Petitioner Dean created a Disciplinary Board to hear the charges against
respondent students. The Board found respondent students guilty of violating Rule No. 3 of the
Ateneo Law School Rules on Discipline which prohibits participation in hazing activities. However, in view
of the lack of unanimity among the members of the Board on the penalty of dismissal, the Board left the
imposition of the penalty to the University Administration. Accordingly, Fr. Bernas imposed the penalty of
dismissal on all respondent students. Respondent students filed with RTC Makati a TRO since they are
currently enrolled. This was granted. A TRO was also issued enjoining petitioners from dismissing the
respondents. A day after the expiration of the temporary restraining order, Dean del Castillo created a
Special Board to investigate the charges of hazing against respondent students Abas and Mendoza. This
was requested to be stricken out by the respondents and argued that the creation of the Special Board
was totally unrelated to the original petition which alleged lack of due process. This was granted and
reinstatement of the students was ordered.


Issue: Was there denial of due process against the respondent students.


Held: There was no denial of due process, more particularly procedural due process. Dean of the
Ateneo Law School, notified and required respondent students to submit their written statement on the
incident. Instead of filing a reply, respondent students requested through their counsel, copies of the
charges. The nature and cause of the accusation were adequately spelled out in petitioners' notices.
Present is the twin elements of notice and hearing.

Respondent students argue that petitioners are not in a position to file the instant petition under Rule 65
considering that they failed to file a motion for reconsideration first before the trial court, thereby by
passing the latter and the Court of Appeals. It is accepted legal doctrine that an exception to the doctrine
of exhaustion of remedies is when the case involves a question of law, as in this case, where the issue is
whether or not respondent students have been afforded procedural due process prior to their dismissal
from PetitionerUniversity.

Minimum standards to be satisfied in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic institutions, such
as petitioner university herein, thus:

(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them;
(2) that they shall have the right to answer the charges against them with the assistance of counsel, if
desired:
(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them
(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and
(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the
school authorities to hear and decide the case.

Ermita-Malate Hotel & Motel Operators Assoc., Inc vs Mayor of Manila
on November 17, 2010
Police Power Due Process Clause
On 13 June 1963, the Manila Municipal Board enacted Ord 4760 and the same was approved by then
acting mayor Astorga. Ord 4760 sought to regulate hotels and motels. It classified them into 1
st
class
(taxed at 6k/yr) and 2
nd
class (taxed at 4.5k/yr). It also compelled hotels/motels to get the demographics of
anyone who checks in to their rooms. It compelled hotels/motels to have wide open spaces so as not to
conceal the identity of their patrons. Ermita-Malate impugned the validity of the law averring that such is
oppressive, arbitrary and against due process. The lower court as well as the appellate court ruled in favor
of Ermita-Malate.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ord 4760 is against the due process clause.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Astorga. There is a presumption that the laws enacted by Congress (in
this case Mun Board) is valid. W/o a showing or a strong foundation of invalidity, the presumption stays.
As in this case, there was only a stipulation of facts and such cannot prevail over the presumption.
Further, the ordinance is a valid exercise of Police Power. There is no question but that the challenged
ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals. This is to minimize
prostitution. The increase in taxes not only discourages hotels/motels in doing any business other than
legal but also increases the revenue of the lgu concerned. And taxation is a valid exercise of police power
as well. The due process contention is likewise untenable, due process has no exact definition but has
reason as a standard. In this case, the precise reason why the ordinance was enacted was to curb down
prostitution in the city which is reason enough and cannot be defeated by mere singling out of the
provisions of the said ordinance alleged to be vague.





Ichong vs. Hernandez, GR No. L-7995
Post under case digests, labor law at Tuesday, February 21, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind
Facts: Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business." In effect it
nationalizes the retail trade business.

Petitioner attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending that: (1) it denies to alien residents the equal
protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property without due process of law ; (2) the subject
of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof; (3) the Act violates international and
treaty obligations of theRepublic of the Philippines; (4) the provisions of the Act against the transmission
by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary succession, and those requiring 100% Filipino
capitalization for a corporation or entity to entitle it to engage in the retail business, violate the spirit
of Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII and Section 8 of Article XIV of the Constitution.

In answer, the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila contend that: (1) the Act was passed
in the valid exercise of the police power of the State, which exercise is authorized in the Constitution in the
interest of national economic survival; (2) the Acthas only one subject embraced in the title; (3) no treaty
or international obligations are infringed; (4) as regards hereditary succession, only the form is affected
but the value of the property is not impaired, and the institution of inheritance is only of statutory origin.

Issue: Whether the conditions which the disputed law purports to remedy really or actually exist.

Held: Yes. We hold that the disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to
national economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail business and free citizens and
country from dominance and control. Such enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of
the State, thru which and by which it protects its own personality and insures its security and future.
Furthermore, the law does not violate the equal protectionclause of the Constitution because sufficient
grounds exist for the distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor
the due process of law clause, because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of
aliens already engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege. The wisdom and efficacy
of the law to carry out its objectives appear to us to be plainly evident as a matter of fact it seems not
only appropriate but actually necessary and that in any case such matter falls within the prerogative of
the Legislature, with whose power and discretion the Judicial department of the Government may not
interfere. Moreover, the provisions of the law are clearly embraced in the title, and this suffers from no
duplicity and has not misled the legislators or the segment of the population affected; and that it cannot be
said to be void for supposed conflict with treaty obligations because no treaty has actually been entered
into on the subject and the police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other
conventional agreement.