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12
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DEFENCE
Indian visitor to the Persian Gulf: an Indian
Air Force Tu-124, V-644 seen recently taking
off from RAF Sharjah. It is one of three
operated by the IAF communications sqn.
NATO' s nuclear retal i ati on
USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS in bot h
strategic and tactical situations was
defined by the Minister of Defence, Mr
Denis Healey, as a core of current British
defence policy when the Commons
debated the Government' s Statement on
Defence 1970 on March 4 and 5.
He said that the best advice he ever
received as Secretary of State for
Defenceand which came from Lord
Mountbatten, then Chief of Defence Staff
was that the only final answer to a
major deliberate attack was strategic
nuclear retaliation and that this was both
effective and credible as a deterrent. "The
role of the Nato powers in Europe1
was toldwas not to wage a general
war," he said, "still less to fight a
broken-backed war after the nuclear
exchange; it was to contribute to the
overall deterrent by being able to stop
small-scale attacks and force the enemy
to mount a major invasion if he wanted
to move Westwards at all."
Secondly, Mr Healey said, he was told
that to deter a minor incursion "Nato
powers needed sufficient tactical nuclear
weapons to make the risk of escalation
a real one. I was told that provided they
were properly armed with tactical nuclear
as well as with conventional weapons,
the existing level of Nato forces was
sufficient, and was likely to remain
sufficient in the future. And 1 was told
very strongly that tactical nuclear
weapons could not be used to fight and
win a war or to defend an areain the
classical senselike a sort of superior
artillery: their role was. rather, to
strengthen the c r e d i b i l i t y of the
deterrent."
Mr Healey said that the Government
had helped to promote a significant
change in Nat o strategy. "Instead of the
immediate and automatic use of nuclear
weapons in case of a major attack, Nato
has shifted to a more flexible strategy
which maximises the conventional capa-
bility to give Governments as much time
as possible to decide whether the use of
nuclear weapons is justified and, if so,
how to use them.
"To illustrate the reality and import-
ance of this shift in strategy," he added.
"I will give an example of what it means
in practice. Since the tripwire strategy
assumed the immediate use of nuclear
weapons in case of an all-out attack.
Nato strike aircraft at that time were
intended for nuclear attack and had
little or no conventional capability.
Moreover, little or no attempt was made
to protect them at their airfields, since it
was assumed that they would have left
the ground on their one and only nuclear
mission by the time that the first Soviet
attacking planes or missiles arrived.
"Under the new strategy, Nat o strike
aircraft will, as far as possible, have
a dual capability and will be ready for
conventional as well as nuclear opera-
tions, so that the bulk of them can be
used initially in the conventional r&Ie
to support ground forces in maximising
the period of conventional response.
This is why, as the White Paper explains,
in Chapter 1 (27), we are sending Blood-
hound and light anti-aircraft squadrons
to our airfields in Germany this year
and why we are beginning a programme
for the construction of aircraft shelters,
since we envisage a period of conven-
tional war in which aircraft must be
protected while on the ground.
"But it remains as true today as it
was in 1965. when Lord Mountbatten
spoke, that the only final answer to a
deliberate major attack would be nuclear
retaliation by the strategic forces. How-
ever, under the new strategy it would be
possible to delay this ultimate response
so that, at successive stages, the enemy
could be given time and opportunity to
cease his aggression, rather than to
provoke escalation to the use of more
destructive weapons on a larger scale."
Austria's Saab 105s
FIRST PRODUCTION AIRCRAFT of t he 40
Saab 1050s being built for the Austrian
Air Force at Linkoping made its first
flight in February. This lasted lhr 20min
and was described by Saab test pilots
Karl Erik Fernberg and Lars Ahrberg
as "very successful". A photograph of
the aircraft after its roll-out was pub-
lished in Flight for February 12, page
247. The AAF ( 5 stand for osterreich)
intends to use the aircraft for strike,
reconnaissance and training duties. They
are of considerably higher performance
than the 105s in service with the Royal
Swedish Air Force. The latter (Sk60Cs)
are powered by 1,6401b s.t. Turbomeca
Aubisque turbofan engines and have a
maximum speed of 478 m.p.h.; the 1056s
have General Electric J85-17BS of
2,8501b s.t., giving a 603 m.p.h. maxi-
mum speed.