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[G.R. No. L-17714. May 31, 1922. ]

In the matter of the estate of Jesus de Leon. IGNACIA DIAZ, Petitioner-Appellant, v. ANA DE
LEON, Opponent-Appellee.

Montinola, Montinola & Hontiveros and Jose Lopez Vito for Appellant.

Francisco A. Delgado , Powell & Hill and Padilla & Trenas for Appellee.

SYLLABUS

WILLS; REVOCATION; "ANIMO REVOCANDI." According to the statute governing the subject in this jurisdiction
the destruction animo revocandi of a will constitutes, in itself, a sufficient revocation. (Sec. 623, Code of Civil
Procedure.) The original will herein presented for probate having destroyed animo revocandi, cannot be declared
the will and last testament of the testator.

[G.R. No. 26317. January 29, 1927.]

Estate of Miguel Mamuyac, deceased. FRANCISCO GAGO, Petitioner-Appellant, v. CORNELIO MAMUYAC,
AMBROSIO LARIOSA, FELICIANA BAUZON, and CATALINA MAMUYAC, opponents-appellees.

Nicanor Tavora for Appellant.

Jose Rivera for Appellees.

SYLLABUS

1. WILLS, CANCELLATION OF; PRESUMPTION. The law does not require any evidence of the revocation or
cancellation of the will to be preserved. It therefore becomes difficult at times to prove the cancellation or
revocation of wills. The fact that such cancellation or revocation has taken place must either remain unproved or be
inferred from evidence showing that after due search the original will cannot be found. Where a will which cannot
be found is shown to have been in the possession of the testator, when last seen, the presumption is in the
absence of other competent evidence, that the same was cancelled or destroyed. The same presumption arises
where it is shown that the testator had ready access to the will and it cannot be found after his death. It will not be
presumed that such will has been destroyed by any other person without the knowledge or authority of the testator.




[G.R. No. 76464. February 29, 1988.]

TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE ADRIANA MALOTO, ALDINA MALOTO CASIANO, CONSTANCIO
MALOTO, PURIFICACION MIRAFLOR, ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH OF MOLO, AND ASILO DE
MOLO, Petitioners, v. COURT OF APPEALS, PANFILO MALOTO AND FELINO MALOTO,Respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; SUCCESSION; WILLS; REVOCATION THEREOF; PHYSICAL ACT OF DESTRUCTION; ANIMUS
REVOCANDI, A NECESSARY ELEMENT. The physical act of destruction of a will, like burning in this case,
does not per se constitute an effective revocation, unless the destruction is coupled with animus revocandi on the
part of the testator. It is not imperative that the physical destruction be done by the testator himself. It may be
performed by another person but under the express direction and in the presence of the testator. Of course, it goes
without saying that the document destroyed must be the will itself. In this case, while animus revocandi, or the
intention to revoke, may be conceded, for that is a state of mind, yet that requisite alone would not suffice. "Animus
revocandi is only one of the necessary elements for the effective revocation of a last will and testament. The
intention to revoke must be accompanied by the overt physical act of burning, tearing, obliterating, or cancelling the
will carried out by the testator or by another person in his presence and under his express direction.

2. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL ACTIONS; RES JUDICATA; ELEMENTS. For a judgment to be a bar to a
subsequent case, the following requisites must concur: (1) the presence of a final former judgment; (2) the former
judgment was rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the former
judgment is a judgment on the merits; and (4) there is, between the first and the second action, identity of parties,
of subject matter, and of cause of action. We do not find here the presence of all the enumerated requisites.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; DOCTRINE NOT APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. There is yet, strictly speaking, no final
judgment rendered insofar as the probate of Adriana Malotos will is concerned. The decision of the trial court in
Special Proceeding No. 1736, although final, involved only the intestate settlement of the estate of Adriana. As
such, that judgment could not in any manner be construed to be final with respect to the probate of the
subsequently discovered will of the decedent. Neither is it a judgment on the merits of the action for probate. This is
understandably so because the trial court, in the intestate proceeding, was without jurisdiction to rule on the
probate of the contested will. After all, an action for probate, as it implies, is founded on the presence of a will and
with the objective of proving its due execution and validity, something which can not be properly done in an
intestate settlement of estate proceeding which is predicated on the assumption that the decedent left no will. Thus,
there is likewise no identity between the cause of action in intestate proceeding and that in an action for probate.
Be that as it may, it would be remembered that it was precisely because of our ruling in G.R. No. L-30479 that the
petitioners instituted this separate action for the probate of the late Adriana Malotos will. Hence, on these grounds
alone, the position of the private respondents on this score can not be sustained.

VI. CODICILS AND INCORPORATIONS BY REFERENCE

VII. REVOCATION OF WILLS AND TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION

MOLO VS. MOLO
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Molo vs. Molo
G.R. No. L-2538 September 21, 1951
Bautista Angelo, J. (Ponente)
Doctrine of Dependent Relative Revocation
Facts:
1. Marcos Molo executed 2 wills, one in August 1918 and another in June 1939. The latter will contained a
revocation clause which expressly revoked the will in 1918. He died without any forced heirs but he was survived by
his wife, herein petitioner Juana. The oppositors to the probate were his nephews and nieces.
2. Only a carbon copy of the second will was found. The widow filed a petition for the probate of the 1939 will. It was
admitted to probate but subsequently set aside on ground that the petitioner failed to prove its due execution.
3. As a result, the petitioner filed another petition for the probate of the 1918 will this time. Again the oppositors
alleged that said will had already been revoked under the 1939 will. They contended that despite the disallowance of
the 1939 will, the revocation clause is valid and thus effectively nullified the 1918 will.

Issue: Whether or not the 1918 will can still be valid despite the revocation in the subsequent disallowed
1939 will

RULING: Yes.The court applied the doctrine laid down in Samson v. Naval that a subsequent will,containing a
clause revoking a previous will, having been disallowed for the reason that it was not executed in accordance with
law cannot produce the effect of annulling the previous will, inasmuch as the said revocatory clause is void.
There was no valid revocation in this case. No evidence was shown that the testator deliberately destroyed the
original 1918 will because of his knowledge of the revocatory clause contained in the will executed in 1939.The
earlier will can still be probated under the principle of dependent relative revocation.The doctrine applies
when a testator cancels or destroys a will or executes an instrument intended to revoke a will with the
intention to make a new testamentary disposition as substitute for the old, and the new disposition fails of
effect for some reason.

A. REVOCATION BY PHYSICAL DESTRUCTION
DIAZ VS. DE LEON
Diaz vs De Leon

FACTS:
Jesus De Leon executed a will, it was allegedly revoked by him.
Petitioner Diaz denied the same.
The opposition alleged that the testator revoked the same by destroying it and by executing a new will.
Among the evidence submitted by the oppositors is that the testator asked that the first will be returned to him.
Upon its return, he ordered his servant to tear the same.
o This was done in his presence and before a nurse who testified to this effect.
After some time, the testator was asked by Dr. Mapa about the will and he exclaimed that he destroyed the
same.

ISSUE: Whether the will was revoked by testator?

RULING: YES!!!
According to the statute governing the subject in this jurisdiction, the destruction of a will with animo revocandi
constitutes in itself a sufficient revocation.
The intention of revoking the will is manifest from the established fact that the testator was anxious to withdraw or
change the provisions he had made in his first will. This fact was disclosed by the testators own statement to the
witnesses Canto and the Mother Superior of the Hospital where he was confined.
So the original will cannot now be probated.

GAGO VS. MAMUYAC
[G.R. No. 26317. January 29, 1927.]
Estate of Miguel Mamuyac, deceased. FRANCISCO GAGO, Petitioner-Appellant, v. CORNELIO MAMUYAC,
AMBROSIO LARIOSA, FELICIANA BAUZON, and CATALINA MAMUYAC, opponents-appellees.
Nicanor Tavora for Appellant.
Jose Rivera for Appellees.
Facts:
This action was to obtain the probation of a last will and testament of Miguel Mamuyac, who died on Jan 2,
1922, in the municipality of Agoo of the Province of La Union.
On July 27, 1918, the said Miguel Mamuyac executed a last will and testament.
In the month of January, 1922, the said Francisco Gago presented a petition in the Court of First Instance of
the Province of La Union for the probation of that will.
The probation of the same was opposed by Cornelio Mamuyac, Ambrosio Lariosa, Feliciana Bauzon, and
Catalina Mamuyac (civil cause No. 1144, Province of La Union).
On November 22, 1923 After hearing all of the parties the petition for the probation of said will was denied by
the Honorable C. M. Villareal upon the ground that the deceased had on the April 16, 1919, executed a new will and
testament.
On February 21, 1925, the present action was commenced.
Its purpose was to secure the probation of the said will of the April 16, 1919.
To said petition Cornelio Mamuyac, Ambrosio Lariosa, Feliciana Bauzon, and Catalina Mamuyac presented
their oppositions, alleging:
(a) that the said will is a copy of the second will and testament executed by the said Miguel Mamuyac;
(b) that the same had been cancelled and revoked during the lifetime of Miguel Mamuyac and
(c) that the said will was not the last will and testament of the deceased Miguel Mamuyac.
Honorable Anastasio R. Teodoro, judge, after hearing the respective parties, denied the probation of
said will of April 16, 1919, upon the ground that the same had been cancelled and revoked in the year 1920.

Issue: Whether or not the will had been revoked and cancelled?

Ruling:

With reference to the said cancellation, it may be stated that there is positive proof, not denied, which was accepted
by the lower court, that the will in question had been cancelled in 1920. The law does not require any evidence of
the revocation or cancellation of a will to. be preserved. It therefore becomes difficult at times to prove the revocation
or cancellation of wills. The fact that such cancellation or revocation has taken place must either remain unproved or
be inferred from evidence showing that after due search the original will cannot be found. Where a will which cannot
be found is shown to have been in the possession of the testator, when last seen, the presumption is, in the absence
of other competent evidence, that the same was cancelled or destroyed. The same presumption arises where it is
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shown that the testator had ready access to the will and it cannot be found after his death. It will not be presumed
that such will has been destroyed by any other person without the knowledge or authority of the testator. The force
of the presumption of cancellation or revocation by the testator, while varying greatly, being weak or strong
according to the circumstances, is never conclusive, but may be overcome by proof that the will was not destroyed
by the testator with intent to revoke it.

In view of the fact that the original will of 1919 could not be found after the death of the testator Miguel Mamuyac
and in view of the positive proof that the same had been cancelled, we are forced to the conclusion that the
conclusions of the lower court are in accordance with the weight of the evidence. In a proceeding to probate a will
the burden of proof is upon the proponent clearly to establish not only its execution but its existence. Having proved
its execution by the proponents, the burden is on the contestant to show that it has been revoked. In a great majority
of instances in which wills are destroyed for the purpose of revoking them there is no witness to the act of
cancellation or destruction and all evidence of its cancellation perishes with the testator. Copies of wills should be
admitted by the courts with great caution. When it is proven, however, by proper testimony that a will was executed
in duplicate and each copy was executed with all the formalities and requirements of the law, the duplicate may be
admitted in evidence when it is made to appear that the original has been lost and was not cancelled or destroyed
by the testator. (Borromeo v. Casquijo, G.R. No. 26063.) 1

After a careful examination of the entire record, we are fully persuaded that the will presented for probate had been
cancelled by the testator in 1920. Therefore the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed. And without any finding
as to costs, it is so ordered.

Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand, Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.

MALOTO VS. CA
Maloto vs CA

- In 1963, Adriana Maloto died leaving as heirs her niece and nephews (petitioners and respondents)
- Believing that the deceased did not leave behind a will, the heirs executed an extrajudicial settlement of the
estate, wherein they divided the estate equally
- 1n 1967, a former associate of Adrianas counsel discovered a discovered a document dated January 3,
1940 and purporting to be the last will and testament of the decedent (copy of the will, not the original).
- The will has the effect of giving much bigger and more valuable shares to two of the heirs. The will likewise
gives devises and legacies to other parties.
- Eventually, the heirs who were supposedly entitled to bigger share in the estate together with the named
devisees and legatees filed for petition for probate of the will
- During trial, it was alleged that the will was burned by the househelp under the instruction of the deceased.

Issue: Whether there was valid revocation of the will (see Art. 830)

Held: No.

Animus revokandi, or the intention to revoke, may be conceded, for that is a state of mind, yet that requisite alone
would not suffice.
Animus revocandi is only one of the necessary elements for the effective revocation of the will. The intention to
revoke must be accompanied by the overt act of burning, tearing, obliterating, or cancelling the will by the testator or
by another person in his presence and under his express direction.
The testimony of the two witnesses in favor of the revocation of the will appear inconclusive
- The document or papers burned by Adrianas maid was not established to be the will of Adriana;
- The burning was not proven to have been done under the express direction of Adriana;
- And that the burning was done in the Adrianas presence.

B. REVOCATION BY SUBSEQUENT WILLS

1. DEPENDENT RELATIVE REVOCATION

DIAZ VS. DE LEON
In the mater of the estate of Jesus de Leon.
IGNACIA DIAZ, petitioner-appellant, vs. ANA DE LEON, opponent-appellee.

FACTS :
The only question raised in this case is whether or to the will executed by Jesus de Leon, now, was revoked by him.
The petitioner denies such revocation, while the contestant affirms the same by alleging that the testator revoked his
will by destroying it, and by executing another will expressly revoking the former.

HELD:

The Court found that the second will (Exhibit 1) executed by the deceased is not cloth with all the necessary
requisites to constitute a sufficient revocation.
But according to the statute governing the subject in this jurisdiction, the destruction of a will animo revocandi
constitutes, in itself, a sufficient revocation. (Sec. 623, Code of Civil Procedure.
From the evidence submitted in this case, it appears that the testator, shortly after the execution of the first will in
question, asked that the same be returned to him. The instrument was returned to the testator who ordered his
servant to tear the document. This was done in his presence and before a nurse who testified to this effect. After
some time, the testator, being asked by Dr. Cornelio Mapa about the will, said that it had been destroyed.
The intention of revoking the will is manifest from the established fact that the testator was anxious to withdraw or
change the provisions he had made in his first will. This fact is disclosed by the testator's own statements to the
witnesses Canto and the Mother Superior of the Hospital where he was confined.
The original will herein presented for probate having been destroyed with animo revocandi, cannot now be probated
as the will and last testament of Jesus de Leon. Judgement is affirmed with costs against the petitioner.

2. FALSE CAUSE
C. REPUBLICATION AND REVIVAL OF WILLS