2008 Cases

Sandoval, Merta Gracilla C.

Espina, Mae Lisette
Malapitan, Leizel
Labitan, Jo Ann
Sagauinit, Rex
Domingo, Junryan
Rivera, Ma. Angela



















Republic of the Philippines v. Royales
G.R. No. 168742
September 3, 2008


FACTS:

On July 7, 1970, the Director of Lands filed a cadastral case in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of
Camarines Sur for several parcels of land to be declared as public land. Norma Royales was a claimant of
the said lots. Subsequently, a notice was published in the Official Gazette.

On September 17, 1975, the CFI ruled in favour of Royales and ordered the registration of the
lots in her name. However, before the certificate of the finality of the decision and the order of the
issuance of the decree of registration could be issued by the court, the Registry of Deeds of Camarines
Sur was razed by fire, burning all the titles and documents therein.

After about 27 years, herein respondent filed a petition for the reconstitution of the CFI decision
in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Camarines Sur. The RTC then set a date for the hearing without
directing the respondent to cause the publication of the said order in the Official Gazette. Subsequently,
the RTC granted the petition and ordered the reconstitution of the 1975 decision.

The Republic of the Philippines appealed to the CA, which upheld the decision of the RTC. A
motion for reconsideration was also denied, ruling that held that publication was no longer required
because the CFI, through the Land Registration Commission (predecessor of the LRA), had already
caused the publication of the order in the Official Gazette.

ISSUE:

Whether or not publication was necessary for the court to acquire jurisdiction over a petition for
reconstitution of a final and executory decision in a cadastral case.

HELD:

Yes, publication is an indispensible requirement in order for the court to acquire jurisdiction
over the subject matter.

The action is one of a cadastral proceeding as it was initiated by the Republic of the Philippines
and this remains to be the case despite the earlier ruling of the CFI in favor of respondent since the
decree of registration has not yet been issued. This means the case remains to be a pending cadastral
case. The pertinent provision, therefore, is Section 10 of Act 3110 which applies to the reconstitution of
a pending cadastral action, a distinct kind of land registration process. It provides:

SEC. 10. Pending cadastral case shall be reconstituted as follows:

The Court shall issue an order directing the person interested to file anew their
replies, for which purpose reasonable time may be allowed. The order shall be
published in the Official Gazette and by local notices during a period fixed in said order.

Consequently, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over respondents petition for reconstitution
for failing to comply with the publication requirement.

However, this does not mean that the cadastral case should be filed anew. What the respondent
has to do is to file the petition for reconstitution anew and observe the requirements under Section 10
of Act 3110. Considering that there is already a final decision in her favor, the case can continue and the
court, if proper, may order the issuance of a decree of registration.

The petition here is granted, reversing and setting aside the decision of the Court of Appeals.







































Pasio vs. Monterroyo
G.R. No. 159494
July 31, 2008

FACTS:

Petitioners filed an action for recovery of possession and damages, with prayer for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, against the respondents.
The petitioners alleged that the subject land was occupied, cultivated and cleared by Laureano Pasio in
1933 and that the land was part of the 24-hectare public land, which was later declared alienable and
disposable. Also, they alleged that Laureano filed a homestead application over the entire 24-hectare
land and the same was approved by the Director of Lands on in 1941. Laureano died in 1950. Thereafter,
the Director of Lands ordered the issuance of a homestead patent in his favor. However, the heirs of
Laureano did not receive the order. Consequently, the land was not registered under Laureanos name
or under that of his heirs.

Between 1949 and 1954, a cadastral survey was conducted and found that the subject land was
divided by a creek into two portions, identified as Lot No. 2138 and Lot No. 2139. Petitioners contended
that they continuously possessed and cultivated both lots. Jose Pasio, the son of Laureano, secured a
title in his name for Lot No. 2138 and later disposed of Lot No. 2139 in favor of his children (petitioners
in this case) who, in 1994, simultaneously filed applications for grant of Free Patent Titles over their
respective shares of Lot No. 2139 before the Land Management Bureau of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources. The latter granted the applications and issued an Original
Certificate of Title in favor of the petitioners, who alleged that their possession of Lot No. 2139 was
interrupted in 1993 when respondents forcibly took possession of the property.

Respondents contended that they had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of the subject lot by themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest for over 30 years
or since July 10, 1949. Furthermore, the respondents alleged that Jose was not the owner of Lot No.
2139 and as such, he could not sell the land to his children. They claimed that petitioners OCTs were
null and void for having been procured in violation of the Public Land Act and that the Land
Management Bureau had no authority to issue the free patent titles because Lot No. 2139 was a private
land.

The trial court ruled in favor of the respondents stating that as of January 1994, Lot No. 2139
had already acquired the character of a private land by operation of law thus the Land Management
Bureau had no power or authority to dispose of it by issuing free patent titles. According to the trial
court, the order for the issuance of a patent in favor of Laureano lapsed and became functus officio
when it was not registered. Also, trial court found that the respondents were in physical, open, public,
adverse and continuous possession of the disputed lot in the concept of owner for at least 30 years prior
to petitioners application for free patent titles over the land. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the trial courts ruling.


ISSUE:

Whether or not the subject land had already become a private land prior to petitioners
application for free patent titles filed in 1994

HELD:

The Court ruled in favor of the respondents. In Director of Lands vs. IAC (146 SCRA 509 , 1986),
the Court held that alienable public land held by a possessor, continuously or through his predecessors-
in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for the prescribed statutory period of 30 years is
converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of the period, ipso jure.
The Court stated that once a homestead patent is registered in accordance with law, the
certificate of title issued by virtue of the patent has the force and effect of a Torrens title issued under
the land registration law. In this case, the issuance of a homestead patent in 1952 in favor of Laureano
was not registered hence rendered it functus officio under Sec. 103 of Presidential Decree No. 1529.
Furthermore, considering that petitioners application for free patent titles was filed only in 1994, when
Lot No. 2139 had already become private land ipso jure, the Land Management Bureau had no
jurisdiction to entertain petitioners application.
Finally, according to the Court, the factual findings of the trial court and the CA support that the
respondents were able to establish that they have a better right to the subject land since they had long
been in possession of the property in the concept of owners, by themselves and through their
predecessors-in-interest. Therefore, despite the irrevocability of the Torrens titles issued in their names
and even if they are already the registered owners under the Torrens system, petitioners may still be
compelled under the law to reconvey the property to respondents.


















DEHEZA-INAMARGA v. ALANO
G.R. No. 171321
December 18, 2008

FACTS:
Tomas Alano, husband of respondent Celenia Alano, owned two parcels of land covered by
Original Certificates of Title (OCT). He mortgaged the properties in favor of Renato Gepty on September
20, 1972. In 1976, Gepty demanded that Tomas pay the loan. Tomas, however, did not have money at
that time to redeem his properties so he sought help from his niece, petitioner Mary Ann Deheza-
Inamarga. Petitioner agreed to pay the loan while the spouses, in turn, mortgaged said properties to
her. Petitioner kept in her possession Original Certificates of Title (OCT) and asked the spouses to sign
blank pieces of paper which petitioner said will be converted into receipts evidencing their indebtedness
to her.
In November 1990, after Tomas had passed away, respondents Celenia and her children went to
petitioner to redeem the property. Petitioner, however, told them that she had mortgaged the property
to the Rural Bank of Libacao. Respondents verified the matter with the bank and discovered that OCT
have been cancelled and in lieu thereof, Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. T-9080 and T-9081 were
issued in petitioners name. Respondents learned that the TCTs in petitioners favor were issued by
virtue of a Deed of Sale purportedly executed by the Spouses Alano in her favor.
On January 24, 1991, respondents filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of document,
reconveyance and damages against petitioner and the Rural Bank of Libacao. Respondents contended
that the deed of sale is null and void because the signatures of the Spouses Alano were forged and even
if they were the signatures of the spouses, they were affixed on blank sheets of paper which were not
intended to be a deed of sale.
Petitioner, on the other hand, denied the allegation of forgery and maintained that the deed of
sale was valid. She claimed that the spouses offered to sell her the property so they can use the
purchase price of P7,000 to redeem the property from Gepty. Petitioner added that the action is barred
by prescription, laches and estoppel.
On November 26, 1998, the RTC rendered its decision in favour of the respondents. Petitioner
elevated the case to the Court of Appeals but her appeal was denied. The Court of appeals affirmed in
toto the RTCs decision. Thus, a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the Court of
Appeals is filed
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the Deed of Sale is a forgery;
(2) Whether or not the transaction between petitioner and the Spouses Alano is one of sale or equitable
mortgage; and
(3) Whether or not respondents action is already barred by prescription, laches or estoppel.

HELD:
1. After a careful perusal of the records and a thorough consideration, the Court finds sufficient basis for
the finding of the Court of Appeals that the said signatures were indeed forged, signatures on the deed
of sale appeared to be different in characteristics, spacing and strokes from the signatures of the
Spouses Alano. The question of forgery is one of fact. It is well-settled that when supported by
substantial evidence or borne out by the records, the findings of fact of the trial court and Court of
Appeals are conclusive and binding on the parties and are not reviewable by this Court.
2. The Court sustained the decision of the trial court holding that the transaction between the parties is
an equitable mortgage. An equitable mortgage is one which, although lacking in some formality, or
form, or words, or other requisites demanded by a statute, nevertheless reveals the intention of the
parties to charge real property as security for a debt and contains nothing impossible or contrary to law.
In the instant case it is correctly found that more than one of the circumstances enumerated in Article
1602 are present, to wit: the inadequacy of the selling price of the properties in relation to its true
value; the vendors (Spouses Alano) remained in possession as lessee or otherwise; respondents paid the
real property taxes; and the spouses secured the payment of the principal debt owed to petitioner with
said properties. On this score, the Court ruled that the parties intended an equitable mortgage and not
a contract of sale.
3. Where there is no consent given by one party in a purported contract, such contract was not
perfected; therefore, there is no contract to speak of. The deed of sale relied upon by petitioner is
deemed a void contract. This being so, the action based on said deed of sale shall not prescribe in
accordance with Article 1410 of the Civil Code.






















Lucasan v. Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation
G.R. No. 176929
July 4, 2008


FACTS:

Spouses Lucasan were owners of 2 lots situated in Bacolod City. In 1979, Pacific Banking
Corporation (PBC) extended a P5, 000.00 loan to Lucasan, with Benares as co-maker, which they failed
to pay when it became due and demandable. As a consequence, PBC filed a collection case with the RTC
of Bacolod. The RTC rendered a decision ordering Lucasan and Bernales to pay PBC. Lucasan failed to
pay the monetary award, thus, to satisfy the judgment, the RTC issued a writ of execution directing the
sheriff to effect the levy on the properties owned by Lucasan and sell the same at public auction. A
Notice of Embargo was issued by the sheriff in 1981, which was annotated on the Transfer Certificate of
Title covering the two properties of Lucasan. Annotations as prior encumbrances on the same titles
were the mortgages in favor of two more banks, executed to secure Lucasans loans with said banks.

On May 13, 1981, the lots were sold at public auction and were awarded to PBC as
highest bidder. A certificate of sale was executed in its favor, registered and annotated on the titles on
June 5, 1981. Mortgagee banks did not assail the auction sale nor did Lucasan and the mortgagee banks
redeemed the properties within the redemption period. PBC, on the other hand, did not file a petition
for consolidation of ownership.

In 1997, Lucasan wrote to PDIC, PBCs receiver and liquidator, seeking the cancellation
of the certificate of sale and offered to pay PBCs claim against him. PDIC denied the request stating that
it was already beyond the redemption period. Lucasan then filed a petition denomicated as declaratory
relief seeking confirmation of his rights provided in the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the
1964 Rules of Court in relation to Section 75 of PD 1529. PDIC moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of
cause of action. RTC granted PDICs motion. Lucasan filed a motion for reconsideration, but was denied
by the RTC. On appeal, the CA affirmed in toto the RTC ruling, declaring that Lucasan already lost his
right of redemption when he failed to exercise it within prescribed period. The effect of such failure was
to vest in PBC absolute ownership over said properties.

ISSUE:

Is the annotations regarding the notice of embargo and certificate of sale beclouded the validity
and efficacy of Lucasans title which would warrant an action for quieting of title under Rule 63 of the
1964 Rules of Court.







HELD:

No.

Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud of doubt or
uncertainty with respect to real property. The Civil Code authorizes the said remedy in the following
language:

ART. 476. Whenever there is cloud on title to real property or any interest therein,
by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently
valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable or unenforceable, and
may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the
title.

An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real
property or any interest therein.

ART. 477. The plaintiff must have legal and equitable title to, or interest in the real
property which is the subject-matter of the action. He need not be in possession of said
property.

To avail of the remedy of quieting of title, two (2) indispensable requisites must concur,
name: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property
subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be casting a cloud
on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of
validity or legal efficacy. Stated differently, the plaintiff must show that he has a legal or at least an
equitable title over the real property in dispute, and that some deed or proceeding beclouds its validity.

Unfortunately, the foregoing requisites are wanting in this case.

Admittedly, the subject parcels of land were levied upon by virtue if a writ of execution
issued in Civil Case No. 12188. On May 13, 1981, a public auction of the subject parcels of land was held
and the lots were awarded to PBC as the highest bidder. A certificate of sale in favor of PBC was issued
on the same day, and was registered and annotated on TCT Nos. T-68115 and T-13816 as Entry No.
112552 on June 5, 1981.

Under the 1964 Rules of Court, which were in effect at that time, the judgment debtor
or redemptioner had the right to redeem the property from PBC within twelve (12) months from the
registration of certificate of sale. With the expiration of the twelve-month period of redemption and no
redemption having been made, as in this case, the judgment debtor or redemptioner lost whatever right
he had over the land in question.

Lucasan admitted that he failed to redeem the properties within the redemption period,
on account of his then limited financial situation. It was only in January 1997 or fifteen (15) years later
that he manifested his desire to reacquire the properties. Clearly thus, he had lost whatever right he had
over Lot Nos. 1500-A and 229-E.








































Spouses Santos v. Heirs of Lustre
G.R. No. 151016
August 6, 2008

FACTS:

Lustre owned a lot which she mortgaged and later on sold to Natividad Santos, who
subsequently sold it to her son Froilan for which a TCT was issued in his name.

Lustres heirs Macaspac and Maniquiz filed with RTC of Gapan, Nueva Ecija a Complaint for
Declaration of the Inexistence of Contract, Annulment of Title, Reconveyance and Damages against
Froilan Santos.

Lustres other heirs filed a Complaint for Annulment of Transfer Certificate of Title and Deed of
Absolute Sale against spouses Santos, Froilan Santos, R Transport Corp, Cecilia Macaspac with the same
RTC. Macaspac was impleaded as defendant in the 2
nd
case because she refused to join the other heirs
as plaintiffs.

Alleging that the plaintiffs right of action for annulment of the Deed of Sale and TCT had long
prescribed and was barred by laches, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss, also on the ground of litis
pendentia.
The RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss. They then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals (CA) which dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not prescription or laches apply.
HELD:
The action for reconveyance on the ground that the certificate of title was obtained by means of
a fictitious deed of sale is virtually an action for the declaration of its nullity, which does not prescribe.
Moreover, a person acquiring property through fraud becomes, by operation of law, a trustee of an
implied trust for the benefit of the real owner of the property. An action for reconveyance based on an
implied trust prescribes in ten years. And in such case, the prescriptive period applies only if there is an
actual need to reconvey the property as when the plaintiff is not in possession of the property.
Otherwise, if plaintiff is in possession of the property, prescription does not commence to run against
him. Thus, when an action for reconveyance is nonetheless filed, it would be in the nature of a suit for
quieting of title, an action that is imprescriptible.
It follows then that the respondents present action should not be barred by laches. Laches is a
doctrine in equity, which may be used only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law.
Obviously, it cannot be set up to resist the enforcement of an imprescriptible legal right.








































Eagle Realty Corporation v. Republic of the Philippines
G.R. No. 151424
July 4, 2008


FACTS:


On May 21, 1963, the spouses Casiano de Leon and Maria Socorro de Leon filed with the then
Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal an application for registration of Lots 1 and 2, Plan Psu-173022-B,
located at Barrio San Dionisio, Paraaque, Rizal. The case was raffled to Branch II presided over by Judge
Pedro C. Navarro and docketed as LRC Case No. N-4140. On December 11, 1979, the CFI rendered a
decision in favor of Casiano de Leon and his children, namely, Esmeralda, Rosario Rodriguez, Bernardita,
and Cesario.

Another decision, similar to the De Leon Decision but adjudicating the property to a certain
Martina G. Medina, was surreptitiously inserted in the records of the LRC. Medina Decision, was
similarly dated December 11, 1979 and purportedly signed by Judge Pedro C. Navarro. Likewise inserted
in the records of the LRC was the Order for the Issuance of the Decree dated February 14, 1980, also
bearing what purports to be the signature of Judge Pedro C. Navarro, with a Certification dated February
17, 1980 by Clerk of Court Nicanor G. Salaysay, attesting that the decision has not been supplemented,
amended or otherwise modified. Pursuant to these documents, Hon. Oscar R. Victoriano, then Acting
Land Registration Commissioner, issued Decree of Registration No. N-188044. In accordance with this
Decree, the Register of Deeds of Pasay City issued OCT No. 129 on July 7, 1983 in the name of a
Martina G. Medina.

Medina later exchanged the property for a 3,000-hectare parcel of land in Norzagaray, Bulacan
owned by Pilarita Reyes through a Deed of Exchange dated September 12, 1983. On November 2, 1983,
OCT No. 129 was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 74216 issued in the name of Reyes.
Thereafter, through a Deed of Sale dated February 22, 1984, Reyes sold the property to petitioner for
P1,200,000.00. On March 1, 1984, TCT No. 74216 was cancelled, and TCT No. 78982 was issued in
petitioners name.

Cesario de Leon discovered that OCT No. 129 was issued to Martina G. Medina. The De Leons
sent a letter-complaint to the LRC asking for an investigation on the matter. This was referred to Atty.
Manuel Panis, Chief of the Inspection and Investigation Division of the LRC. In a report dated July 20,
1984, Atty. Panis concluded that the Medina Decision and the Order for the Issuance of Decree dated
February 14, 1980 were fake. He then recommended that the appropriate action be filed for the
nullification of OCT No. 129 and its derivative titles TCT No. 74216 in the name of Pilarita Reyes, and
TCT No. 78982 in the name of petitioner Eagle Realty Corporation.

The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Acting Land Registration Commissioner, filed
a complaint for Annulment of Judgment and Cancellation of Decree and Titles against Martina G.
Medina, Pilarita Reyes and petitioner Eagle Realty Corporation.

The complaint alleged that the LRC received a copy of the De Leon Decision but this was
surreptitiously substituted with the Medina Decision, together with the Order for the Issuance of the
Decree dated February 14, 1980, in the LRC records. It further alleged that the LRC, unaware of any
irregularity, issued OCT No. 129 to Martina Medina on the basis of these fake documents.

Medina averred that she purchased the property from Justino de Leon on March 5, 1973.
Justino, in turn, acquired this property from Casiano and Maria de Leon on October 29, 1971 through a
Deed of Absolute Sale. Eagle Realty Corporation alleged, inter alia, as affirmative defenses, that (a) the
Republic of the Philippines is not the real party-in-interest since the subject property is private, (b) the
one-year prescriptive period within which to seek a review of a decree of registration has already
lapsed, and (c) it is a buyer in good faith and for value. Petitioner also filed a cross-claim against Pilarita
Reyes to seek reimbursement for the purchase price and the Register of Deeds to hold the Assurance
Fund liable in case Reyes fails to pay. Later, petitioner filed a third-party complaint against the National
Treasurer of the Philippines, the public officer entrusted with the payment of claims against the
Assurance Fund.

Pilarita Reyes interposed the same defenses as the petitioner. She further claimed that she had
no knowledge of any infirmity in Medinas title and that she entered into the Deed of Exchange in good
faith and for value. As for the petitioners cross-claim, she averred that she acted in good faith in selling
the property to petitioner.

Heirs of Casiano and Maria de Leon filed a Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene which the trial
court granted. On July 19, 1985, they filed a Complaint-in-Intervention praying that judgment be
rendered in accordance with the prayer alleged in the complaint and, in addition, order defendants
jointly and severally to pay intervenors actual, moral and nominal damages, attorneys fees plus legal
interest. RTC ruled in favor of the private respondents Heirs of De Leon. On appeal, the CA, affirmed
the RTC
decision with modifications.

The CA held that the complaint is actually an action for the annulment of a certificate of title, not
for annulment of judgment as alleged by petitioner; hence, the RTC properly acquired jurisdiction. It also
upheld the LRCs personality to institute the complaint based on Section 100 of Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 1529 in order to protect the Assurance Fund from being held accountable by the private
respondents for the erroneous issuance of a certificate of title to Medina. It dismissed the issue on
prescription, ratiocinating that an action to declare the nullity of a void title does not prescribe and,
moreover, prescription does not run against the State.

According to the CA, the trial court was correct in finding that the Medina Decision and the
Order for the Issuance of Decree were both spurious and that petitioner was not an innocent purchaser
for value because it failed to make a prior inspection of the subject property which would have revealed
that it was being occupied by the private respondents. This omission amounted to a failure to exercise
diligence which prevented it from becoming an innocent purchaser for value. Hence, the Assurance
Fund cannot be made liable.

ISSUE:

Wether of not the Court of Appeals erred that petitioner is not an innocent purchaser for value entitled
for the Assurance fund.


HELD:

No. Case law has it that he who alleges that he is a purchaser in good faith and for value of
registered land bears the onus of proving such statement. This burden is not discharged by involving the
ordinary presumption of good faith. Petitioner failed to discharge this burden. In its Answer, petitioner
merely alleged that it is an innocent purchaser for value since it acquired the land from Pilarita Reyes for
P1,200,000.00, without notice of any defect in her title and after verifying the genuineness of the title in
the Register of Deeds of Pasay City and the LRC. Petitioner did not present any proof that would
substantiate this allegation nor did it present any evidence to show that it took other steps to verify the
authenticity of its predecessors title.

The general rule is that a purchaser may rely on what appears on the face of a certificate of title.
He may be considered a purchaser in good faith even if he simply examines the latest certificate of title.
An exception to this rule is when there exist important facts that would create suspicion in an otherwise
reasonable man to go beyond the present title and to investigate those that preceded it. The presence
of anything which excites or arouses suspicion should then prompt the vendee to look beyond the
certificate and investigate the title of the vendor as appearing on the face of said certificate. One who
falls within the exception can neither be denominated an innocent purchaser for value nor a purchaser
in good faith,
hence, does not merit the protection of the law.

As correctly observed by the public respondent, the property covered by the void titles was
transferred from Medina to petitioner with unusual haste. Only 8 months lapsed since OCT No. 129 was
issued on July 7, 1983 until it was transferred to petitioner on February 22, 1984. The property was
transferred to petitioner from Reyes only more than five months after she herself acquired the property.
These circumstances, plus the fact that the subject property is a vast tract of land in a prime location,
should have, at the very least, triggered petitioners curiosity.

Moreover, petitioner is a corporation engaged in the real estate business. A corporation
engaged in the buying and selling of real estate is expected to exercise a higher standard of care and
diligence in ascertaining the status and condition of the property subject of its business transaction.
Similar to investment and financing corporations, it cannot simply rely on an examination of a Torrens
certificate to determine what the subject property, looks like as its condition is not apparent in the
document.

Petitioners claim against the Assurance Fund must necessarily fail. Its situation does not come
within the ambit of the cases protected by the Assurance Fund. It was not deprived of land in
consequence of bringing it under the operation of the Torrens system through fraud or in consequence
of any error, omission, mistake or misdescription in the certificate of title. It was simply a victim of
unscrupulous individuals. More importantly, it is a condition sine qua non that the person who brings
the action for damages against the Assurance Fund be the registered owner and, as the holders of
transfer certificates of title, that they be innocent purchasers in good faith and for value and the
petitioner does not qualify as such.





Lourdes vs. Pascual
G.R. No. 162097
February 13, 2008

FACTS:
Pascua petitioned for the reconstitution of the original title of a parcel of land (Lot 3209) located
in Pagsanjan, Laguna. She said that the lot was sold to her parents in 1930 by a certain Limuaco who
earlier acquired the land via a cadastral proceeding. However, in the Deed of Absolute Sale between
Limuaco and Pascuas parents, it was indicated that the land was unregistered. Also, because of the war,
the original copy as well as the duplicates were destroyed.
Pascua presented as evidence the said Deed of Sale as well as a tracing cloth plan and technical
description and a tax declaration. She claimed that the land issued to Limuaco was pursuant to a
cadastral decree. And that she has been paying taxes however the land reflecting on the tax declaration
is Lot No. 19-pt. Pascua averred that Lot No. 19-pt is one and the same as Lot 3209; that Lot 19-pt was
the Assessors designation to the same land when the cadastral survey was made but when the decree
was issued, it was turned to Lot 3209.
The lower court denied her petition due to lack of evidence. She was not able to prove that Lot 19-pt is
the same as Lot 3209.
ISSUE:
Whether or not to grant Pascuas petition.
HELD:
No. The evidence presented by Pascua to grant reconstitution are not those included in Section
2 of RA 26 which provides:
SEC. 2. Original certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of the sources hereunder
enumerated as may be available in the following order:
(a) The owners duplicate of the certificate of title;
(b) The co-owners, mortgagees, or lessees duplicate of the certificate of title;
(c) A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the register of deeds or by a legal
custodian thereof;
(d) An authenticated copy of the decree of registration or patent, as the case may be pursuant to which
the original certificate of title was issued;
(e) A document, on file in the Registry of Deeds by which the property, the description of which is given
in said document, is mortgaged, leased or encumbered, or an authenticated copy of said document
showing that its original has been registered; and
(f) Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper basis for
reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate of title.
Further, she presented two tax declarations: one pertaining to her parents and the other to
hers. Her parents tax declaration failed to reflect any Lot No. while hers reflected Lot No. 19-pt. It
cannot be legally concluded that the land is one and the same. She was not able to adduce any
additional document to prove her claim.
Even if Lot No 3209 and Lot 19-pt are one and the same, no title can still be reconstituted to
Pascua because there is no convincing evidence that a certificate of title was ever issued for either land.
Note that even the Deed of Sale between Limuaco and Pascuas parents indicated that the land is
unregistered.