COVERAGE

POLITICAL AND
INTERNATIONAL
LAW
2014
BAR
EXAMINATIONS
*Political Law Definition People vs. Perfector, G.R. No. L-18463, October 4, 1922 branch of public law which deals
with the organization and operations of the governmental organs of the State and defines the relations of the State with
the inhabitants of its territory.
I. The Philippine Constitution
*date of effectivity De Leon vs. Esguerra, G.R. No. L-78059, August 31, 1987. The 1987 Constitution took effect on
February 2, 1987, the date of its ratification in the plebiscite held on that same date and not on the date its ratification was
proclaimed
A. Constitution: definition, nature and concepts
Interpretation of the Constitution:
a.) Verba legis
b.) Ratio legis et anima
c.) Ut magis valeat quam pereat Francisco vs. HR, G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003 the Constitution has to be
interpreted as a whole.
B. Parts
C. Amendments and revisions
D. Self-executing and non-self-executing provisions
a.) Self-executing provisions Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, February 1997 those which are
immediately effective without the need of legislation; those which the nature and extent of the right conferred and the
liability imposed are fixed by the Constitution itself.
b.) Non-self-executing provisions Pamatong vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004 those which lay down a
general principle; merely indicate the principles without laying down rules giving them the force of law. The disregard of
such provisions does not give rise to any cause of action before the courts.
E. General provisions
II. General Considerations
*Definition of State CIR vs. Campos Rueda, G.R. No. L-13250, October 29, 1971 - a politically organized sovereign
community independent of outside control bound by penalties of nationhood, legally supreme within its territory, acting
through a government functioning under a regime of law.
*Doctrine of Auto-limitation Reagan vs. CIR, G.R. No. L-26379, December 27, 1969 - It is to be admitted that any state
may, by its consent, express or implied, submit to a restriction of its sovereign rights. There may thus be a curtailment of
what otherwise is a power plenary in character. That is the concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation, which, in the succinct
language of Jellinek, "is the property of a state-force due to which it has the exclusive capacity of legal self-determination
and self-restriction." A state then, if it chooses to, may refrain from the exercise of what otherwise is illimitable
competence.
*Effect of Revolutionary Government Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 104768, July 21, 2003 A revolutionary
government is bound by no constitution. However, the revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the
Declaration [International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("Covenant") and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights ("Declaration")] in the same way it repudiated the Constitution. As the de jure government, the revolutionary
government could not escape responsibility for the States good faith compliance with its treaty obligations under
international law. During the interregnum when no constitution or Bill of Rights existed, directives and orders issued by
government officers were valid so long as these officers did not exceed the authority granted them by the revolutionary
government. The directives and orders should not have also violated the Covenant or the Declaration.
*The government under Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, established after the ouster of Estrada was a de jure government
Estrada vs. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001.
*Police Power MMDA vs. Viron Transportation Co., G.R. No. 170656
August 15, 2007 - Police power is the
plenary power vested in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and
ordinances, not repugnant to the Constitution, for the good and welfare of the people. This power to prescribe regulations
to promote the health, morals, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people flows from the
recognition that salus populi est suprema lex the welfare of the people is the supreme law.
*Fernando vs. St. Scholasticas College, et al., G.R. No. 161107, March 12, 2013 - As with the State, local governments
may be considered as having properly exercised their police power only if the following requisites are met: (1) the
interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require its exercise and (2) the means
employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
In short, there must be a concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful method.
*Gancayco vs. City Government of Quezon City, et al., G.R. No. 177807, October 11, 2011 - With regard to the power of
LGUs to issue zoning ordinances, jurisprudence has recognized that the government may enact legislation that may
interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations to promote the general welfare. However, the

interference must be reasonable and not arbitrary. Based on the foregoing, the power to establish zones for industrial,
commercial and residential uses is derived from the police power itself and is exercised for the protection and benefit of
the residents of a locality.
*Administrative power is different from police power MMDA vs. Trackworks, G.R. No. 179554, December 16, 2009
MMDAs powers were limited to the formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management,
monitoring, setting of policies, installing a system, and administration. Nothing in Republic Act No. 7924 granted MMDA
police power, let alone legislative power.
*Power of Eminent Domain
*Public Use Requisite Expansive Concept Vda. De Ouano vs. Republic, G.R. No. 168770, February 9, 2011 Public
use, as an eminent domain concept, has now acquired an expansive meaning to include any use that is of usefulness,
utility, or advantage, or what is productive of general benefit of the public. If the genuine public necessity the very
reason or condition as it were allowing, at the first instance, the expropriation of a private land ceases or disappears,
then there is no more cogent point for the governments retention of the expropriated land. The same legal situation
should hold if the government devotes the property to another public use very much different from the original or deviates
from the declared purpose to benefit another private person.
*Two Stages of Eminent Domain Cases Republic vs. Lim, G.R. No. 161656, June 29, 2005:
a.) Determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise
in the context of facts involved in the suit.
b.) Determination by the court of the just compensation for the property sought to be taken.
*Just compensation means not only the correct amount to be paid to the owner of the land but also payment within a
reasonable time from its taking Eslaban vs. De Onorio, G.R. No. 146062, June 28, 2001.
*While the prevailing doctrine is that the non-payment of just compensation does not entitle the private landowner to
recover possession of the expropriated lots, however, in cases where the government failed to pay just compensation
within five (5) years from the finality of the judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the owners concerned shall have
the right to recover possession of their property. - Republic vs. Lim, G.R. No. 161656, June 29, 2005.
*Effect of abandonment of intended use and right of repurchase:
*More particularly, with respect to the element of public use, the expropriator should commit to use the property pursuant
to the purpose stated in the petition for expropriation filed, failing which, it should file another petition for the new purpose.
If not, it is then incumbent upon the expropriator to return the said property to its private owner, if the latter desires to
reacquire the same. Otherwise, the judgment of expropriation suffers an intrinsic flaw, as it would lack one indispensable
element for the proper exercise of the power of eminent domain, namely, the particular public purpose for which the
property will be devoted. Accordingly, the private property owner would be denied due process of law, and the judgment
would violate the property owners right to justice, fairness, and equity. MCIAA vs. Lozada, Sr., G.R. No. 176625,
February 25, 2010.
*Once the purpose is terminated or peremptorily abandoned, then the former owner, if he so desires, may seek its
reversion, subject of course to the return, at the very least, of the just compensation received. - Vda. De Ouano vs.
Republic, G.R. No. 168770, February 9, 2011.
*When right to use property is complete:
*The right to enter on and use the property is complete, as soon as the property is actually expropriated under the
authority of law for a public use, but that the title does not pass from the owner without his consent, until just
compensation has been made to him. - Republic vs. Lim, G.R. No. 161656, June 29, 2005.
A. National territory
1. Archipelagic doctrine
* The SC, in upholding the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9522 (adjusting the countrys archipelagic baselines and classifying
the baseline regime of nearby territories) stated that:
UNCLOS III and its ancillary baselines laws play no role in the acquisition, enlargement or, as petitioners claim,
diminution of territory. Under traditional international law typology, States acquire (or conversely, lose) territory through
occupation, accretion, cession and prescription, not by executing multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights
or enacting statutes to comply with the treatys terms to delimit maritime zones and continental shelves. Territorial claims
to land features are outside UNCLOS III, and are instead governed by the rules on general international law. Magallona,
et al. vs. Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 187167, August 16, 2011.
B. State immunity
* Department of Health, et al. vs. Phil. Pharmawealth, Inc., G.R. No. 169304, March 13, 2007. Facts: DOH Secretary Romualdez issued an A.O. mandating that only
products accredited by the pre-qualifications,
bids and awards
committee of the DOH shall be allowed to be procured by the DOH
and all other entities
under its jurisdiction. Phil. Pharmawealth, Inc. applied for accreditation of their penicillin drug as early as May 9,
2000. On September 2000, DOH issued an invitation for bids for the
procurement of a substantial amount of
penicillin. Despite the lack of
response from DOH regarding the application for accreditation, Phil.
Pharmawealth,
Inc. submitted its bid for the Penicillin contract. But
when the bids were opened on October 11, 2000, only two
companies
other than Pharmawealth were allowed to participate. Thus,
Pharmawealth filed a complaint for
injunction, mandamus, and
damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injuction
and/or

temporary restraining order against DOH and its officials. DOH contends that the complaint should be dismissed under
the doctrine of state immunity.
Held: The defense of immunity from suit will not avail despite its being an
unincorporated
agency
of
the
government, for the only causes of
action directed against it are preliminary injunction and mandamus.
Under
Section 1, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, preliminary injunction may be directed against a party or a court, agency or a
person. Moreover, the defense of state immunity from suit does not apply in
causes of action which do not seek to
impose a charge or financial
liability against the State.
As regards the liability of the DOH Officials:
While the doctrine of state immunity appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it
is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the
discharge of their duties. The suit is regarded as one against the state where satisfaction of the judgment against
the officials will require the state itself to perform a positive act, such as the appropriation of the amount
necessary to pay the damages awarded against them.
The rule, however, is not so all-encompassing as to be applicable under all circumstances.
The rule does not apply where the public official is charged in his official capacity for acts that are
unauthorized or unlawful and injurious to the rights of others. Neither does it apply where the public official is
clearly being sued not in his official capacity but in his personal capacity, although the acts complained of may
have been committed while he occupied a public position. For an officer who exceeds the power conferred on him
by law cannot hide behind the plea of sovereign immunity and must bear the liability personally.
C. General principles and state policies
*Razon vs. Tagitis, G.R. No. 182498, December 3, 2009. - The right to security of a person is a corollary of the policy that
the State guarantees full respect for human rights under Article II Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. As the government
is the chief guarantor of order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of person
is rendered ineffective if the government does not afford protection to these rights especially when they are under threat.
*Province of North Cotabato vs. GRP Peace Panel, G.R. No. 183591, October 14, 2008. - The Constitution does not
contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine state, much less does it provide for a transitory status
that aims to prepare any part of the Philippine territory for independence.
*Equal Access to Opportunity for Public Service:
*Pamatong vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004. - This provision does not contain a judicially enforceable
constitutional right and merely specifies a guideline for legislative action. It is not intended to compel the state to enact
positive measures that would accommodate as many as possible into public office. The privilege may be subjected to
limitations such as the provision of the Omnibus Election Code on nuisance candidates.
*Full Public Disclosure of All Transactions Involving Public Interest:
* Province of North Cotabato vs. GRP Peace Panel, G.R. No. 183591, October 14, 2008. - This provision recognizes the
duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. This provision is essential to hold public officials
accountable to the people. The absence of an implementing legislation is not an excuse in not effecting such policy.
Article III Bill of Rights
*Agabon vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 158693, November 17, 2004 (Justice Tinga's separate opinion) The Bill of Rights affords
protection against possible State oppression against its citizens, but not against an unjust or repressive conduct by a
private party towards another.
*Due Process of Law:
*Relativity of Due Process:
*Secretary of Justice vs. Lantion, G.R. No. 139465, October 17, 2000. - The concept of due process is flexible for not all
situations calling for procedural safeguards call for the same kind of procedure.
*Availability of due process in extradition proceedings:
*Secretary of Justice vs. Lantion, G.R. No. 139465, October 17, 2000. - An application of the basic twin due process rights
of notice and hearing will not go against the treaty or the implementing law. Neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Law
precludes these rights from a prospective extraditee.
*Constitutional and Statutory Due Process
*Agabon vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 158693, November 17, 2004 Constitutional due process protects the individual from the
government and assures him of his rights in criminal, civil, or administrative proceedings; while statutory due process
found in the Labor Code and Implementing Rules protects employees from being unjustly terminated without just cause
after notice and hearing.
*Void-for-vagueness Rule:
*Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001. - When a statute forbids or requires the doing of an
act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess as to its meaning and differ as to its
application, that law is deemed void. Such kind of statute violates the first essential of due process of law because it
denies the accused the right to be informed of the charge against him.
*Relative Constitutionality:

*Central Bank Employees Association vs. BSP, G.R. No. 148208, December 15, 2004. - Under the concept of relative
constitutionality, the constitutionality of a statute cannot, in every instance, be determined by a mere comparison of its
provisions with applicable provisions of the Constitution since the statute may be constitutionally valid as applied to one
set of facts and invalid in its application to another. A statute valid at one time may become void at another time because
of altered circumstances. Thus, if a statute in its practical operation becomes arbitrary or confiscatory, its validity, even
though affirmed by a former adjudication, is open to inquiry and investigation in the light of changed conditions.
*Tests in determining compliance with the equal protection clause (two-tier approach):
1. Rational Basis Test The guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by legislation based on
reasonable classification. This standard of review is typically quite deferential; legislative classifications are
presumed to be valid largely for the reason that the drawing of lines that create distinctions is peculiarly a
legislative task and unavoidable one.
2. Strict scrutiny test It is applied when the challenged statute either:
a. Classifies on the basis of an inherently suspect characteristic or
b. Infringes fundamental constitutional rights;
- In these situations, the usual presumption of constitutionality is reversed, and it falls upon the government to
demonstrate that its classification has been narrowly tailored to further compelling governmental interests; otherwise, the
law shall be declared unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause. - Biraogo vs. Philippine Truth Commission,
G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010.
*Searches and Seizures:
*Pollo vs. Constantino-David, et al., G.R. No. 181881, Ocotber 18, 2011. - Availability of the right Once privacy right is
established, the next inquiry is whether the search alleged to have violated such right was reasonable. This proceeds from
the principle that the constitutional guarantee under Section 2, Article III, is not a prohibition of all searches and seizures
but only of unreasonable searches and seizures.
*Exclusionary Rule:
*Seizure is limited to those items particularly described in a valid search warrant. Searching officers are without discretion
regarding what articles they shall seize. Evidence seized on the occasion of such an unreasonable search and seizure is
tainted and excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In the language of the fundamental law, it shall be
inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding - Del Rosario vs. People, G.R. No. 142295, May 31, 2001.
*Recovery of seized articles
*Should there be no ensuing criminal prosecution in which the personal property seized is used as evidence, its return to
the person from whom it was taken, or to the person who is entitled to its possession is but a matter of course, except if it
is contraband or illegal per se. A proper court may order the return of property held solely as evidence should the
Government be unreasonably delayed in bringing a criminal prosecution. The order for the disposition of such property
can be made only when the case is finally terminated. - PDEA vs. Brodett and Joseph, G.R. No. 196390, September 18,
2011.
*Warrantless Arrest:
*Reliable information does not satisfy personal knowledge requirement:
- The long standing rule in this jurisdiction, applied with a great degree of consistency, is that reliable information alone is
not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest under Section 5(a), Rule 113. The rule requires, in addition, that the accused
perform some overt act that would indicate that he has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense. The officer arresting a person who has just committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense must have
personal knowledge of that fact. The offense must also be committed in his presence or within his view. - People vs. Noel
Tudtud and Dindo Bolong, G.R. No. 144037, September 26, 2003.
*Drug, Alcohol and Blood Tests:
*The constitutional viability of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing for students emanates primarily from
their waiver of their right to privacy when they seek entry to the school, and from their voluntary submitting their persons to
the parental authority of school authorities. - Laserna vs. DDB, G.R. No. 158633, November 3, 2008.
*However, there is no valid justification for mandatory drug testing for persons accused of crimes punishable with at least
6 years and one day imprisonment as they are singled out and impleaded against their will. The operative concepts in the
mandatory drug testing are that it must be random and suspicionless. In the case of persons charged with a crime
before the prosecutor's office, a mandatory drug testing can never be random or suspicionless. Thus, to impose
mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution. Laserna vs. DDB, G.R. No. 158633, November 3, 2008.
*Knock and Announce Principle:
*People vs. Huang Zhen Hua and Jogy Lee, G.R. No. 139301, September 29, 2004. - Police officers are obliged to give
notice, show their authority, and demand that they be allowed entry. They may only break open any outer or inner door or
window of a house to execute the search warrant if, after such notice and demand, such officers are refused entry to the
place of directed search.
Exceptions:
1. A party whose premises or is entitled to the possession thereof refuses, upon demand to open it;
2. When such person in the premises already knew of the identity of the officers and of their authority and persons;
3. When the officers are justified in the honest belief that there is an imminent peril to life or limb; and
4. When those in the premises, aware of the presence of someone outside (because, for example, there has been a
knock at the door), are then engaged in activity which justifies the officers to believe that an escape or the
destruction of evidence is being attempted.
*Privacy of Communication and Correspondence:
*Requisites of Existence of Privacy Right - Pollo vs. Constantino-David, et al., G.R. No. 181881, Ocotber 18, 2011:

1. A person has exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy; and

2. The expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable (objective).
*Right to Privacy of Detainees:
*Trillanes III vs. Cabuay, G.R. No. 160792, August 25, 2005. - The right to privacy of those detained is subject to Section 4
of R.A. No. 7438, stating in part that any security officer with custodial responsibility over a detainee may undertake such
reasonable measures to secure his safety and prevent the detainee's escape. By the very fact of their detention, pre-trial
detainees and convicted prisoners have a diminished expectation of privacy rights.
D. Separation of powers
E. Checks and balances
F. Delegation of powers
G. Forms of government
III. Legislative Department
A. Who may exercise legislative power
1. Congress
2. Regional/Local legislative power
3. Peoples initiative on statutes
a) Initiative and referendum
4. The President under a martial law rule or in a
revolutionary government
B. Houses of Congress
1. Senate
2. House of Representatives
a) District representatives and questions of apportionment
b) Party-list system
C. Legislative privileges, inhibitions and disqualifications
D. Quorum and voting majorities
E. Discipline of members
F. Electoral tribunals and the Commission on Appointments
1. Nature
2. Powers
G. Powers of Congress
1. Legislative
a) Legislative inquiries and the oversight functions
b) Bicameral conference committee
c) Limitations on legislative power
(i) Limitations on revenue, appropriations and tariff measures
(ii) Presidential veto and Congressional override
2. Non-legislative
a) Informing function
b) Power of impeachment
c) Other non-legislative powers
IV. Executive Department
A. Privileges, inhibitions and disqualifications
1. Presidential immunity
2. Presidential privilege
B. Powers
1. Executive and administrative powers in general
2. Power of appointment
a) In general
b) Commission on Appointments confirmation
c) Midnight appointments
d) Power of removal
3. Power of control and supervision
a) Doctrine of qualified political agency
b) Executive departments and offices
c) Local government units
4. Military powers
5. Pardoning power
a) Nature and limitations
b) Forms of executive clemency
6. Diplomatic power
7. Powers relative to appropriation measures
Conflicts of jurisdiction
J. Treatment of aliens
1. Extradition
a) Fundamental principles
b) Procedure
c) Distinguished from deportation
K. International Human Rights Law
1. Universal Declaration of Human Rights
2. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
3. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

L. International Humanitarian Law and neutrality

1. Categories of armed conflicts
a) International armed conflicts
b) Internal or non-international armed conflict
c) War of national liberation
2. Core international obligations of states in International Humanitarian Law
3. Principles of International Humanitarian Law
a) Treatment of civilians
b) Prisoners of war
4. Law on neutrality
M. Law of the sea
1. Baselines
2. Archipelagic states
a) Straight archipelagic baselines
b) Archipelagic waters
c) Archipelagic sea lanes passage
3. Internal waters
4. Territorial sea
5. Exclusive economic zone
6. Continental shelf
a) Extended continental shelf
7. International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
N. Madrid Protocol and the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property
O. International environmentallaw
1. Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration
P. International economic law