Case title: ESALYN CHAVEZ VS HON. EDNA BONTO-PEREZ, HON. ROGELIO T. RAYALA, HON.

DOMINGO
H. ZAPANTA, HON. JOSE N. SARMIENTO, CENTRUM PROMOTIONS PLACEMENT CORPORATION, JOSE A.
AZUCENA, JR., and TIMES SURETY & INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. GR number: G.R. No. 109808 Date:
March 1, 1995 Petitioner: ESALYN CHAVEZ Respondent: HON. EDNA BONTO-PEREZ, HON. ROGELIO T.
RAYALA, HON. DOMINGO H. ZAPANTA, HON. JOSE N. SARMIENTO, CENTRUM PROMOTIONS
PLACEMENT CORPORATION, JOSE A. AZUCENA, JR., and TIMES SURETY & INSURANCE COMPANY, INC.
Ponente: PUNO, J.
Facts:
On December 1, 1988, petitioner, an entertainment dancer, entered into a standard employment
contract for overseas Filipino artists and entertainers with Planning Japan Co., Ltd., through its
Philippine representative, private respondent Centrum Placement & Promotions Corporation. The
contract had a duration of two (2) to six (6) months, and petitioner was to be paid a monthly
compensation of One Thousand Five Hundred Dollars (US$1,5000.00). On December 5, 1888, the POEA
approved the contract. Subsequently, petitioner executed the following side agreement with her
Japanese employer through her local manager, Jaz Talents Promotion. On December 16, 1988,
petitioner left for Osaka, Japan, where she worked for six (6) months, until June 10, 1989. She came
back to the Philippines on June 14, 1989. Petitioner instituted the case at bench for underpayment of
wages with the POEA on February 21, 1991. She prayed for the payment of Six Thousand U.S. Dollars
(US$6,000.00), representing the unpaid portion of her basic salary for six months. Charged in the case
were private respondent Centrum Promotions and Placement Corporation, the Philippine
representative of Planning Japan, Co., Inc., its insurer, Times Surety and Insurance Co., Inc., and Jaz
Talents Promotion.
Issue: Whether or not the there was an invalid side agreement present in the case at bar.
Held:
Yes, IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED Clearly, the basic salary of One Thousand Five
Hundred U.S. Dollars (US$1,500.00) guaranteed to petitioner under the parties' standard employment
contract is in accordance with the minimum employment standards with respect to wages set by the
POEA, Thus, the side agreement which reduced petitioner's basic wage to Seven Hundred Fifty U.S.
Dollars (US$750.00) is null and void for violating the POEA's minimum employment standards, and for
not having been approved by the POEA. Indeed, this side agreement is a scheme all too frequently
resorted to by unscrupulous employers against our helpless overseas workers who are compelled to
agree to satisfy their basic economic needs. Private respondents are held jointly and severally liable to
petitioner for the payment of SIX THOUSAND US DOLLARS (US$6,000.00) in unpaid wages.
It was expressly stated in the employment contract that any changes or alterations made
to any part of said contract without prior approval from the POEA shall be null and void
notwithstanding the fact the employee had agreed to said contract.

JMM Promotions and Management Inc. vs. NLRC and Delos Santos [G.R. No. 109835Ponente:
CRUZ, J.
FACTS:
Petitioners appeal was dismissed by the respondent National Labor Relations Commission
citing the second paragraph of Article 223 of the Labor Code as amended and Rule VI, Section
6 of the new Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, as amended. The petitioner contends that the
NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in applying these rules to decisions rendered by
the POEA. It insists that the appeal bond is not necessary in the case of licensed recruiters for
overseas employment because they are already required under Section 4, Rule II, Book II of
the POEA Rules not only to pay a license fee of P30,000 but also to post a cash bond of
P100,000 and a surety bond of P50,000. In addition, the petitioner claims it has placed in
escrow the sum of P200,000 with the Philippine National Bank in compliance with Section 17,
Rule II, Book II of the same Rule, to primarily answer for valid and legal claims of recruited
workers as a result of recruitment violations or money claims. The Solicitor General sustained
the appeal bond and commented that appeals from decisions of the POEA were governed by
Section 5 and 6, Rule V, Book VII of the POEA Rules.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is still required to post an appeal bond to perfect its appeal from a
decision of the POEA to the NLRC?
HELD:
YES. Petitioners contention has no merit.
RATIO:
Statutes should be read as a whole. Ut res magis valeat quam pereat that the thing may
rather have effect than be destroyed.
It is a principle of legal hermeneutics that in interpreting a statute (or a set of rules as in this
case), care should be taken that every part thereof be given effect, on the theory that it was
enacted as an integrated measure and not as a hodge-podge of conflicting provisions. Under
the petitioners interpretation, the appeal bond required by Section 6 of the POEA Rule should
be disregarded because of the earlier bonds and escrow money it has posted. The petitioner
would in effect nullify Section 6 as a superfluity but there is no such redundancy. On the
contrary, Section 6 complements Section 4 and Section 17. The rule is that a construction that
would render a provision inoperative should be avoided. Instead, apparently inconsistent
provisions should be reconciled whenever possible as parts of a coordinated and harmonious
whole.
Manuela S. Catan/M.S. Catan Placement Agency v. The NLRC and Francisco Reyes
G.R. No. 77279 April 15, 1988

Ponente: Cortes. J.

FACTS:
Petitioner Catan, a duly licensed recruitment agency, as agent of Ali and Fahd
Shabokshi Group, a Saudi Arabian firm recruited private respondent Francisco D. Reyes to
work in Saudi Arabia. The term of contract is for one (1) year, however, the contract provided
for automatic renewal.
Said contract was automatically renewed when private respondent was not
repatriated by hi Saudi employer but instead was assigned to work as a crusher plant operator.
On March 30, 1983 while he was working as a crusher plant operator, his ankle was
crushed under the machine he was operating.
On May 15, 1983 after expiration of renewed term, private respondent returned to the
Philippines. His ankle was operated on at the Sta. Mesa Heights Medical Center for which he
incurred expenses.
On September 9, 1983, he returned to Saudi and resume to his work and on May 15,
1984, he was repatriated. And upon his return, he had ankle treated for which he incurred
further expenses.
Private respondent filed a claim against Catan placement agency on the basis of the
provision in the employment contract that the employer shall compensate the employee if he is
injured or permanently disabled in the course of employment.
POEA rendered judgment in favor of the complainant. Ordering the respondent placement
agency to pay SEVEN THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED EIGHTY FIVE and 60/100 (P7, 985.60),
TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND NINTY SIX 20/100 (P29, 096.20) and 10% for attorneys fees.
On appeal, respondent NLRC affirmed the decision of the POEA.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Placement Agency is liable for disability benefits to private
respondent, since the time he was injured his original contract had already expired?

HELD:
Yes, Catan Placement Agency is liable for disability benefits to private respondent.
Private respondents contract of employment can not be said to have expired on May 14, 1982
as it was automatically renewed since no notice of its termination was given by either or both
parties at a month before its termination. As stipulated in their contract.
M. S. Catan Agency was at the time of complainant's accident resulting in his permanent
partial disability was (sic) no longer the accredited agent of its foreign principal, foreign
respondent herein, yet its responsibility over the proper implementation of complainant's
employment/service contract and the welfare of complainant himself in the foreign job site, still
existed, the contract of employment in question not having expired yet. This must be so,
because the obligations covenanted in the recruitment agreement entered into by and between
the local agent and its foreign principal are not coterminus with the term of such agreement so
that if either or both of the parties decide to end the agreement, the responsibilities of such
parties towards the contracted employees under the agreement do not at all end, but the same
extends up to and until the expiration of the employment contracts of the employees recruited
and employed pursuant to the said recruitment agreement. Otherwise, this will render nugatory
the very purpose for which the law governing the employment of workers for foreign jobs
abroad was enacted.


ROYAL CROWN INTERNATIONALE, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSI0N and VIRGILIO P.
NACIONALES, respondents
Facts:
In 1983, petitioner, a duly licensed private employment agency, recruited and deployed private
respondent for employment with ZAMEL as an architectural draftsman in Saudi Arabia.
On February 13, 1984, ZAMEL terminated the employment of private respondent on the
ground that his performance was below par. For three (3) successive days thereafter, he was
detained at his quarters and was not allowed to report to work until his exit papers were ready.
On February 16, 1984, he was made to board a plane bound for the Philippines.

Private respondent then filed on April 23, 1984 a complaint for illegal termination against
petitioner and ZAMEL.

Based on a finding that petitioner and ZAMEL failed to establish that private respondent was
terminated for just and valid cause, the Workers' Assistance and Adjudication Office of the
POEA issued a decision ordering the former to pay, jointly and severally, the complainant.
Petitioner Royal Crown Internationale seeks the nullification of a resolution of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) which affirmed a decision of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA) holding it liable to pay, jointly and severally with Zamel-
Turbag Engineering and Architectural Consultant (ZAMEL), private respondent Virgilio P.
Nacionales' salary and vacation pay corresponding to the unexpired portion of his employment
contract with ZAMEL.

Issue:
I. Whether or not petitioner as a private employment agency may be held
jointly and severally liable with the foreign-based employer for any claim which may
arise in connection with the implementation of the employment contracts of the
employees recruited and deployed abroad;
II. Whether or not sufficient evidence was presented by petitioner to establish
the termination of private respondent's employment for just and valid cause.

Ruling:
I. In applying for its license to operate a private employment agency for
overseas recruitment and placement, petitioner was required to submit, among
others, a document or verified undertaking whereby it assumed all responsibilities for
the proper use of its license and the implementation of the contracts of employment
with the workers it recruited and deployed for overseas employment [Section 2(e),
Rule V, Book 1, Rules to Implement the Labor Code (1976)]. It was also required to
file with the Bureau a formal appointment or agency contract executed by the foreign-
based employer in its favor to recruit and hire personnel for the former, which
contained a provision empowering it to sue and be sued jointly and solidarily with the
foreign principal for any of the violations of the recruitment agreement and the
contracts of employment [Section 10 (a) (2), Rule V, Book I of the Rules to Implement
the Labor Code (1976)].

II. The NLRC upheld the POEA finding that petitioner's evidence was
insufficient to prove termination from employment for just and valid cause. And a
careful study of the evidence thus far presented by petitioner reveals to this Court that
there is legal basis for public respondent's conclusion.

The Court holds, therefore, that the NLRC committed no grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in upholding the POEA's finding of insufficiency of evidence to
prove termination for just and valid cause.
WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the instant petition.
Facilities Management Corporation, J.S Dreyer and J.V. Catuira vs. Leonardo Dela Osa
March 26, 1979 GR L-38649

Makasiar, J:

Leonardo dela Osa sought his reinstatement. with full backwages, as well as the recovery of
his overtime compensation, swing shift and graveyard shift differentials. Petitioner alleged that
he was employed by respondents as, painter, houseboy and cashier. He further averred that
from December, 1965 to August, 1966, inclusive, he rendered overtime services daily and that
this entire period was divided into swing and graveyard shifts to which he was assigned, but he
was not paid both overtime and night shift premiums despite his repeated demands from
respondents. The petitioner, a foreign corporation domiciled outside the Philippines was
ordered by CIR then to pay the unpaid overtime and premium pay. However, on certiorari, the
petitioner contended that because it was domiciled outside and not doing business in
Philippines, it could not be sued in the country.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner has been doing business in the Philippines so that the
service of summons upon its agent in the Philippines vested the Court of First Instance of
Manila with jurisdiction.
Held:
Yes, the object of Sections 68 and 69 of the Corporation Law was not to prevent the foreign
corporation from performing single acts, but to prevent it from acquiring a domicile for the
purpose of business without taking the steps necessary to render it amenable to suit in the
local courts. It was never the purpose of the Legislature to exclude a foreign corporation which
happens to obtain an isolated order for business from the Philippines, from securing redress in
the Philippine courts. Indeed, if a foreign corporation, not engaged in business in the
Philippines, is not banned from seeking redress from courts in the Philippines, a fortiori, that
same corporation cannot claim exemption from being sued in Philippine courts for acts done
against a person or persons in the Philippines.



685 SCRA 245 Labor Law Labor Standards - Constitutionality of Sections 6, 7, 9, 10,
29, and 30 of the Migrant Workers Act or R.A. No. 8042
This case is a consolidation of the following cases: G.R. No. 152642, G.R. No.
152710, G.R. No. 167590, G.R. Nos. 182978-79, and G.R. Nos. 184298-99.
G.R. No. 152642 and G.R. No. 152710
In G.R. No. 152642, in 2002, Rey Salac et al, who are recruiters deploying workers abroad,
sought to enjoin the Secretary of Labor, Patricia Sto. Tomas, the POEA, and TESDA, from
regulating the activities of private recruiters. Salac et al invoked Sections 29 and 30 of the
Republic Act 8042 or the Migrant Workers Act which provides that recruitment agency in the
Philippines shall be deregulated one year from the passage of the said law; that 5 years
thereafter, recruitment should be fully deregulated. RA 8042 was passed in 1995, hence, Salac
et al insisted that as early as 2000, the aforementioned government agencies should have
stopped issuing memorandums and circulars regulating the recruitment of workers abroad.
Sto. Tomas then questioned the validity of Sections 29 and 30.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sections 29 and 30 are valid.
HELD: The issue became moot and academic. It appears that during the pendency of this
case in 2007, RA 9422 (An Act to Strengthen the Regulatory Functions of the POEA) was
passed which repealed Sections 29 and 30 of RA 8042.
G.R. 167590
In this case, the Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI) questioned the
validity of the following provisions of RA 8042:
a. Section 6, which defines the term illegal recruitment. PASEI claims that the definition by
the law is vague as it fails to distinguish between licensed and non-licensed recruiters;
b. Section 7, which penalizes violations against RA 8042. PASEI argues that the penalties for
simple violations against RA 8042, i.e., mere failure to render report or obstructing inspection
are already punishable for at least 6 years and 1 day imprisonment an a fine of at least P200k.
PASEI argues that such is unreasonable;
c. Section 9, which allows the victims of illegal recruitment to have the option to either file the
criminal case where he or she resides or at the place where the crime was committed. PASEI
argues that this provision is void for being contrary to the Rules of Court which provides that
criminal cases must be prosecuted in the placed where the crime or any of its essential
elements were committed;
d. Section 10, which provides that corporate officers and directors of a company found to be in
violation of RA 8042 shall be themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation or
partnership for the aforesaid claims and damages. PASEI claims that this automatic liability
imposed upon corporate officers and directors is void for being violative of due process.
RTC Judge Jose Paneda of Quezon City agreed with PASEI and he declraed the said
provisions of RA 8042 as void. Secretary Sto. Tomas petitioned for the annulment of the RTC
judgment.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sections 6, 7, and 9 of RA 8042 are void.
HELD: No, they are valid provisions.
a. Section 6: The law clearly and unambiguously distinguished between licensed and non-
licensed recruiters. By its terms, persons who engage in canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers without the appropriate government license
or authority are guilty of illegal recruitment whether or not they commit the wrongful acts
enumerated in that section. On the other hand, recruiters who engage in the canvassing,
enlisting, etc. of OFWs, although with the appropriate government license or authority, are
guilty of illegal recruitment only if they commit any of the wrongful acts enumerated in Section
6.
b. Section 7: The penalties are valid. Congress is well within its right to prescribed the said
penalties. Besides, it is not the duty of the courts to inquire into the wisdom behind the law.
c. Section 9: The Rules on Criminal Procedure, particularly Section 15(a) of Rule 110, itself,
provides that the rule on venue when it comes to criminal cases is subject to existing laws.
Therefore, there is nothing arbitrary when Congress provided an alternative venue for
violations of a special penal law like RA 8042.
d. Section 10: The liability of corporate officers and directors is not automatic. To make them
jointly and solidarily liable with their company, there must be a finding that they were remiss in
directing the affairs of that company, such as sponsoring or tolerating the conduct of illegal
activities.
G.R. 182978-79, and G.R. 184298-99
In this case, Jasmin Cuaresma, a nurse working in Saudi Arabia was found dead. Her parents
received insurance benefits from the OWWA (Overseas Workers Welfare Administration). But
when they found out based on an autopsy conducted in the Philippines that Jasmin was raped
and thereafter killed, her parents (Simplicio and Mila Cuaresma) filed for death and insurance
benefits with damages from the recruitment and placement agency which handled Jasmin
(Becmen Service Exporter and Promotion, Inc.).
The case reached the Supreme Court where the Supreme Court ruled that since Becmen was
negligent in investigating the true cause of death of Jasmin ( aviolation of RA 8042), it shall be
liable for damages. The Supreme Court also ruled that pursuant to Section 10 of RA 8042, the
directors and officers of Becmen are themselves jointly and solidarily liable with Becmen.
Eufrocina Gumabay and the other officers of Becmen filed a motion for leave to intervene.
They aver that Section 10 is invalid.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section is invalid.
HELD: No. As earlier discussed, Section is valid. The liability of Gumabay et al is not
automatic. However, the SC reconsidered its earlier ruling that Gumabay et al are solidarily
and jointly liable with Becmen there being no evidence on record which shows that they ere
personally involved in their companys particular actions or omissions in Jasmins case.


Case title: HORTENCIA SALAZAR VS HON. TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, in his capacity as Administrator of
the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, and FERDIE MARQUEZ GR number: G.R. No.
81510 Date: March 14, 1990 Petitioner: HORTENCIA SALAZAR Respondent: HON. TOMAS D.
ACHACOSO, in his capacity as Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration,
and FERDIE MARQUEZ Ponente: Sarmiento, J.
Facts:
On October 21, 1987, Rosalie Tesoro of 177 Tupaz Street, Leveriza, Pasay City, in a sworn statement
filed with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration charged petitioner Hortencia Salazar
with illegal recruitment.
On January 26, 1988 POEA Director on Licensing and Regulation Atty. Estelita B. Espiritu issued an
office order designating respondents Atty. Marquez, Atty. Jovencio Abara and Atty. Ernesto Vistro as
members of a team tasked to implement Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205. Doing so, the group
assisted by Mandaluyong policemen and mediamen Lito Castillo of the People's Journal and Ernie
Baluyot of News Today proceeded to the residence of the petitioner at 615 R.O. Santos St.,
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. There it was found that petitioner was operating Hannalie Dance Studio.
Before entering the place, the team served said Closure and Seizure order on a certain Mrs. Flora
Salazar who voluntarily allowed them entry into the premises. Mrs. Flora Salazar informed the team
that Hannalie Dance Studio was accredited with Moreman Development (Phil.). However, when
required to show credentials, she was unable to produce any. Inside the studio, the team chanced
upon twelve talent performers practicing a dance number and saw about twenty more waiting
outside, The team confiscated assorted costumes which were duly receipted for by Mrs. Asuncion
Maguelan and witnessed by Mrs. Flora Salazar.
Issue: Whether or not the POEA had jurisdiction to validly issue warrants of search and seizure (or
arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor Code.
Held:
No. We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest
warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial process. WHEREFORE, the petition is
GRANTED. Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and null and
void. The respondents are ORDERED to return all materials seized as a result of the implementation of
Search and Seizure Order No. 1205.