Garcia vs.

Recio
PANGANIBAN, J .:
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction,
provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner.
However, the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien
spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Our courts do not take
judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment; hence, like any other facts, both
the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and
proven according to our law on evidence.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
seeking to nullify the January 7, 1999 Decision
1
and the March 24, 1999
Order
2
of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 28, in Civil
Case No. 3026-AF. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage between Grace J.
Garcia and Rederick A. Recio solemnized on January 12, 1994 at
Cabanatuan City as dissolved and both parties can now remarry
under existing and applicable laws to any and/or both parties."
3

The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the above-quoted Decision.
The Facts
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian
citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987.
4
They lived together as
husband and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989,
5
a decree of divorce,
purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family court.
On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a
"Certificate of Australian Citizenship" issued by the Australian government.
6

Petitioner a Filipina and respondent were married on January 12, 1994 in
Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan City.
7
In their application
for a marriage license, respondent was declared as "single" and "Filipino."
8

Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without
prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. While the two were still in Australia,
their conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their
Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.
9

On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage
10
in the court a quo, on the ground of bigamy respondent
allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he married her on
January 12, 1994. She claimed that she learned of respondent's marriage to
Editha Samson only in November, 1997.
In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had revealed
to petitioner his prior marriage and its subsequent dissolution.
11
He
contended that his first marriage to an Australian citizen had been validly
dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australian in 1989;
12
thus, he was
legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994.1wphi1.nt
On July 7, 1998 or about five years after the couple's wedding and while
the suit for the declaration of nullity was pending respondent was able to
secure a divorce decree from a family court in Sydney, Australia because the
"marriage ha[d] irretrievably broken down."
13

Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complained be dismissed on the
ground that it stated no cause of action.
14
The Office of the Solicitor General
agreed with respondent.
15
The court marked and admitted the documentary
evidence of both parties.
16
After they submitted their respective memoranda,
the case was submitted for resolution.
17

Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision and Order.
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce
issued in Australia was valid and recognized in the Philippines. It deemed the
marriage ended, but not on the basis of any defect in an essential element of
the marriage; that is, respondent's alleged lack of legal capacity to remarry.
Rather, it based its Decision on the divorce decree obtained by respondent.
The Australian divorce had ended the marriage; thus, there was no more
martial union to nullify or annual.
Hence, this Petition.
18

Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:
"I
The trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce decree
obtained in Australia by the respondent ipso facto terminated his first
marriage to Editha Samson thereby capacitating him to contract a
second marriage with the petitioner.
"2
The failure of the respondent, who is now a naturalized Australian, to
present a certificate of legal capacity to marry constitutes absence of
a substantial requisite voiding the petitioner' marriage to the
respondent.
"3
The trial court seriously erred in the application of Art. 26 of the
Family Code in this case.
"4
The trial court patently and grievously erred in disregarding Arts. 11,
13, 21, 35, 40, 52 and 53 of the Family Code as the applicable
provisions in this case.
"5
The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce gravely
erred in pronouncing that the divorce decree obtained by the
respondent in Australia ipso facto capacitated the parties to remarry,
without first securing a recognition of the judgment granting the
divorce decree before our courts."
19

The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of this Decision, we shall
concentrate on two pivotal ones: (1) whether the divorce between respondent
and Editha Samson was proven, and (2) whether respondent was proven to
be legally capacitated to marry petitioner. Because of our ruling on these two,
there is no more necessity to take up the rest.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is partly meritorious.
First Issue:
Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and Editha Samson
Petitioner assails the trial court's recognition of the divorce between
respondent and Editha Samson. Citing Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,
20

petitioner argues that the divorce decree, like any other foreign judgment,
may be given recognition in this jurisdiction only upon proof of the existence
of (1) the foreign law allowing absolute divorce and (2) the alleged divorce
decree itself. She adds that respondent miserably failed to establish these
elements.
Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code, marriages solemnized abroad are governed by the law of the place
where they were celebrated (the lex loci celebrationist). In effect, the Code
requires the presentation of the foreign law to show the conformity of the
marriage in question to the legal requirements of the place where the
marriage was performed.
At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the take-off points
for our discussion. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce;
hence, our courts cannot grant it.
21
A marriage between two Filipinos cannot
be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 15
22

and 17
23
of the Civil Code.
24
In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a
foreigner, Article 26
25
of the Family Code allows the former to contract a
subsequent marriage in case the divorce is "validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry."
26
A divorce obtained abroad
by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided it is consistent with their respective national laws.
27

A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and proof
are concerned, can be made. Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. decrees that "aliens
may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national law."
28
Therefore, before a
foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it
must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the
foreign law allowing it.
29
Presentation solely of the divorce decree is
insufficient.
Divorce as a Question of Fact
Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be admitted in evidence, it
must first comply with the registration requirements under Articles 11, 13 and
52 of the Family Code. These articles read as follows:
"ART. 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of the
contracting parties shall file separately a sworn application for such
license with the proper local civil registrar which shall specify the
following:
x x x x x x x x x
"(5) If previously married, how, when and where the previous
marriage was dissolved or annulled;
x x x x x x x x x
"ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been
previously married, the applicant shall be required to furnish, instead
of the birth of baptismal certificate required in the last preceding
article, the death certificate of the deceased spouse or the judicial
decree of annulment or declaration of nullity of his or her previous
marriage. x x x.
"ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the
marriage, the partition and distribution of the properties of the
spouses, and the delivery of the children's presumptive legitimes
shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of
property; otherwise, the same shall not affect their persons."
Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian divorce decree is
a public document a written official act of an Australian family court.
Therefore, it requires no further proof of its authenticity and due execution.
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given
presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and
admitted in evidence.
30
A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce
decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself.
31

The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an officially
body or tribunal of a foreign country.
32

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or
document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by
either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested
33
by the officer
having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the
Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by
the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office.
34

The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be
an authentic one issued by an Australian family court.
35
However,
appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the aforemetioned rules on
evidence must be demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree of May 18,
1989 was submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its
admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not been registered in the Local
Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City.
36
The trial court ruled that it was
admissible, subject to petitioner's qualification.
37
Hence, it was admitted in
evidence and accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioner's failure to
object properly rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written act of the
Family Court of Sydney, Australia.
38

Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not
necessary; respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws
after he acquired Australian citizenship in 1992.
39
Naturalization is the legal
act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the political and civil rights
belonging to a citizen.
40
Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak
of their former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming
an Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the
vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal laws.
Burden of Proving Australian Law
Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls
upon petitioner, because she is the party challenging the validity of a foreign
judgment. He contends that petitioner was satisfied with the original of the
divorce decree and was cognizant of the marital laws of Australia, because
she had lived and worked in that country for quite a long time. Besides, the
Australian divorce law is allegedly known by Philippine courts: thus, judges
may take judicial notice of foreign laws in the exercise of sound discretion.
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with "the party who alleges
the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an
action."
41
In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material
allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the answer; and
defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their
answer when they introduce new matters.
42
Since the divorce was a defense
raised by respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent Australian law
validating it falls squarely upon him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of
foreign laws.
43
Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved.
Australian marital laws are not among those matters that judges are
supposed to know by reason of their judicial function.
44
The power of judicial
notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the
subject should be resolved in the negative.
Second Issue:
Respondent's Legal Capacity to Remarry
Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient proof of the divorce,
respondent was legally incapacitated to marry her in 1994.
Hence, she concludes that their marriage was void ab initio.
Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly
admitted in evidence, adequately established his legal capacity to marry
under Australian law.
Respondent's contention is untenable. In its strict legal sense, divorce means
the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But
divorces are of different types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce
or a vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first
kind terminates the marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves the
bond in full force.
45
There is no showing in the case at bar which type of
divorce was procured by respondent.
Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree a
conditional or provisional judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same as a
separation from bed and board, although an absolute divorce may follow
after the lapse of the prescribed period during which no reconciliation is
effected.
46

Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign
statutes and practices, still restrict remarriage. Under some other
jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited by statute; thus, the guilty party in a
divorce which was granted on the ground of adultery may be prohibited from
remarrying again. The court may allow a remarriage only after proof of good
behavior.
47

On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that
reads:
"1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree
becomes absolute (unless the other party has died) commits the
offence of bigamy."
48

This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by
respondent may have been restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal
capacity to remarry according to his national law. Hence, we find no basis for
the ruling of the trial court, which erroneously assumed that the Australian
divorce ipso facto restored respondent's capacity to remarry despite the
paucity of evidence on this matter.
We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce decree raises a
disputable presumption or presumptive evidence as to his civil status based
on Section 48, Rule 39
49
of the Rules of Court, for the simple reason that no
proof has been presented on the legal effects of the divorce decree obtained
under Australian laws.
Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity
Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity required by Article 21 of
the Family Code was not submitted together with the application for a
marriage license. According to her, its absence is proof that respondent did
not have legal capacity to remarry.
We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is determined
by the national law of the party concerned. The certificate mentioned in
Article 21 of the Family Code would have been sufficient to establish the
legal capacity of respondent, had he duly presented it in court. A duly
authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal
capacity to marry on the part of the alien applicant for a marriage license.
50

As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondent's
legal capacity to marry petitioner. A review of the records before this Court
shows that only the following exhibits were presented before the lower court:
(1) for petitioner: (a) Exhibit "A" Complaint;
51
(b) Exhibit "B" Certificate of
Marriage Between Rederick A. Recto (Filipino-Australian) and Grace J.
Garcia (Filipino) on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija;
52
(c)
Exhibit "C" Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino) and
Editha D. Samson (Australian) on March 1, 1987 in Malabon, Metro Manila;
53

(d) Exhibit "D" Office of the City Registrar of Cabanatuan City Certification
that no information of annulment between Rederick A. Recto and Editha D.
Samson was in its records;
54
and (e) Exhibit "E" Certificate of Australian
Citizenship of Rederick A. Recto;
55
(2) for respondent: (Exhibit "1"
Amended Answer;
56
(b) Exhibit "S" Family Law Act 1975 Decree Nisi of
Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia;
57
(c) Exhibit "3"
Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recto;
58
(d) Exhibit "4"
Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia
Certificate;
59
and Exhibit "5" Statutory Declaration of the Legal Separation
Between Rederick A. Recto and Grace J. Garcia Recio since October 22,
1995.
60

Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent, who was
then a naturalized Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry
petitioner on January 12, 1994. We agree with petitioner's contention that the
court a quo erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed
respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without requiring him to adduce
sufficient evidence to show the Australian personal law governing his status;
or at the very least, to prove his legal capacity to contract the second
marriage.
Neither can we grant petitioner's prayer to declare her marriage to
respondent null and void on the ground of bigamy. After all, it may turn out
that under Australian law, he was really capacitated to marry petitioner as a
direct result of the divorce decree. Hence, we believe that the most judicious
course is to remand this case to the trial court to receive evidence, if any,
which show petitioner's legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in that, then
the court a quo may declare a nullity of the parties' marriage on the ground of
bigamy, there being already in evidence two existing marriage certificates,
which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro Manila
dated March 1, 1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City dated January 12,
1994.
WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice,
we REMAND the case to the court a quo for the purpose of receiving
evidence which conclusively show respondent's legal capacity to marry
petitioner; and failing in that, of declaring the parties' marriage void on the
ground of bigamy, as above discussed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Cosca vs. Palaypayon
PER CURIAM, J .:
Complainants Juvy N. Cosca, Edmundo B. Peralta, Ramon C. Sambo, and
Apollo Villamora, are Stenographer I, Interpreter I, Clerk II, and Process
Server, respectively, of the Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac, Camarines
Sur. Respondents Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon, Jr. and Nelia B. Esmeralda-
Baroy are respectively the Presiding Judge and Clerk of Court II of the same
court.
In an administrative complaint filed with the Office of the Court Administrator
on October 5, 1992, herein respondents were charged with the following
offenses, to wit: (1) illegal solemnization of marriage; (2) falsification of the
monthly reports of cases; (3) bribery in consideration of an appointment in
the court; (4) non-issuance of receipt for cash bond received; (5) infidelity in
the custody of detained prisoners; and (6) requiring payment of filing fees
from exempted entities.
1

Pursuant to a resolution issued by this Court respondents filed their
respective Comments.
2
A Reply to Answers of Respondents was filed by
complainants.
3
The case was thereafter referred to Executive Judge David
C. Naval of the Regional Trial Court, Naga City, for investigation report and
recommendation. The case was however transferred to First Assistant
Executive Judge Antonio N. Gerona when Judge Naval inhibited himself for
the reason that his wife is a cousin of respondent Judge Palaypayon, Jr.
4

The contending versions of the parties regarding the factual antecedents of
this administrative matter, as culled from the records thereof, are set out
under each particular charge against respondents.
1. Illegal solemnization of marriage
Complainants allege that respondent judge solemnized marriages even
without the requisite marriage license. Thus, the following couples were able
to get married by the simple expedient of paying the marriage fees to
respondent Baroy, despite the absence of a marriage license, viz.: Alano P.
Abellano and Nelly Edralin, Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido, Eddie
Terrobias and Maria Gacer, Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga, Arsenio
Sabater and Margarita Nacario, and Sammy Bocaya and Gina Bismonte. As
a consequence, their marriage contracts (Exhibits B, C, D, F, G, and A,
respectively) did not reflect any marriage license number. In addition,
respondent judge did not sign their marriage contracts and did not indicate
the date of solemnization, the reason being that he allegedly had to wait for
the marriage license to be submitted by the parties which was usually several
days after the ceremony. Indubitably, the marriage contracts were not filed
with the local civil registrar. Complainant Ramon Sambo, who prepares the
marriage contracts, called the attention of respondents to the lack of
marriage licenses and its effect on the marriages involved, but the latter
opted to proceed with the celebration of said marriages.
Respondent Nelia Baroy claims that when she was appointed Clerk of Court
II, the employees of the court were already hostile to her, especially
complainant Ramon Sambo who told her that he was filing a protest against
her appointment. She avers that it was only lately when she discovered that
the court had a marriage Register which is in the custody of Sambo; that it
was Sambo who failed to furnish the parties copies of the marriage contract
and to register these with the local civil registrar; and that apparently Sambo
kept these marriage contracts in preparation for this administrative case.
Complainant Sambo, however, claims that all file copies of the marriage
contracts were kept by respondent Baroy, but the latter insists that she had
instructed Sambo to follow up the submission by the contracting parties of
their marriage licenses as part of his duties but he failed to do so.
Respondent Judge Palaypayon, Jr. contends that the marriage between
Alano P. Abellano and Nelly Edralin falls under Article 34 of the Civil Code,
hence it is exempt from the marriage license requirement; that he gave strict
instructions to complainant Sambo to furnish the couple a copy of the
marriage contract and to file the same with the civil registrar, but the latter
failed to do so; that in order to solve the problem, the spouses subsequently
formalized their marriage by securing a marriage license and executing their
marriage contract, a copy of which was filed with the civil registrar; that the
other five marriages alluded to in the administrative complaint were not
illegally solemnized because the marriage contracts were not signed by him
and they did not contain the date and place of marriage; that copies of these
marriage contracts are in the custody of complainant Sambo; that the alleged
marriage of Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido, Eddie Terrobias and Maria
Emma Gaor, Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga, and of Arsenio Sabater and
Margarita Nacario were not celebrated by him since he refused to solemnize
them in the absence of a marriage license; that the marriage of Samy
Bocaya and Gina Bismonte was celebrated even without the requisite license
due to the insistence of the parties in order to avoid embarrassment to their
guests but that, at any rate, he did not sign their marriage contract which
remains unsigned up to the present.
2. Falsification of monthly report for July, 1991 regarding the
number of marriages solemnized and the number of
documents notarized.
It is alleged that respondent judge made it appear that he solemnized seven
(7) marriages in the month of July, 1992, when in truth he did not do so or at
most those marriages were null and void; that respondents likewise made it
appear that they have notarized only six (6) documents for July, 1992, but
the Notarial Register will show that there were one hundred thirteen (113)
documents which were notarized during that month; and that respondents
reported a notarial fee of only P18.50 for each document, although in fact
they collected P20.00 therefor and failed to account for the difference.
Respondent Baroy contends, however, that the marriage registry where all
marriages celebrated by respondent judge are entered is under the exclusive
control and custody of complainant Ramon Sambo, hence he is the only one
who should be held responsible for the entries made therein; that the
reported marriages are merely based on the payments made as
solemnization fees which are in the custody of respondent Baroy. She further
avers that it is Sambo who is likewise the custodian of the Notarial Register;
that she cannot be held accountable for whatever alleged difference there is
in the notarial fees because she is liable only for those payments tendered to
her by Sambo himself; that the notarial fees she collects are duly covered by
receipts; that of the P20.00 charged, P18.50 is remitted directly to the
Supreme Court as part of the Judiciary Development Fund and P150 goes to
the general fund of the Supreme Court which is paid to the Municipal
Treasurer of Tinambac, Camarines Sur. Respondent theorizes that the
discrepancies in the monthly report were manipulated by complainant Sambo
considering that he is the one in charge of the preparation of the monthly
report.
Respondent Judge Palaypayon avers that the erroneous number of
marriages celebrated was intentionally placed by complainant Sambo; that
the number of marriages solemnized should not be based on solemnization
fees paid for that month since not all the marriages paid for are solemnized in
the same month. He claims that there were actually only six (6) documents
notarized in the month of July, 1992 which tallied with the official receipts
issued by the clerk of court; that it is Sambo who should be held accountable
for any unreceipted payment for notarial fees because he is the one in
charge of the Notarial Register; and that this case filed by complainant
Sambo is merely in retaliation for his failure to be appointed as the clerk of
court. Furthermore, respondent judge contends that he is not the one
supervising or preparing the monthly report, and that he merely has the
ministerial duty to sign the same.
3. Bribery in consideration of an appointment in the court
Complainants allege that because of the retirement of the clerk of court,
respondent judge forwarded to the Supreme Court the applications of Rodel
Abogado, Ramon Sambo, and Jessell Abiog. However, they were surprised
when respondent Baroy reported for duty as clerk of court on October 21,
1991. They later found out that respondent Baroy was the one appointed
because she gave a brand-new air-conditioning unit to respondent judge.
Respondent Baroy claims that when she was still in Naga City she
purchased an air-conditioning unit but when she was appointed clerk of court
she had to transfer to Tinambac and, since she no longer needed the air
conditioner, she decided to sell the same to respondent judge. The
installation and use thereof by the latter in his office was with the consent of
the Mayor of Tinambac.
Respondent judge contends that he endorsed all the applications for the
position of clerk of court to the Supreme Court which has the sole authority
over such appointments and that he had no hand in the appointment of
respondent Baroy. He contends that the air-conditioning unit was bought
from his
co-respondent on installment basis on May 29, 1992, eight (8) months after
Baroy had been appointed clerk of court. He claims that he would not be that
naive to exhibit to the public as item which could not be defended as a matter
of honor and prestige.
4. Cash bond issued without a receipt
It is alleged that in Criminal Case No. 5438, entitled "People vs. Mendeza, et
al., "bondswoman Januaria Dacara was allowed by respondent judge to
change her property bond to cash bond; that she paid the amount of
P1,000.00 but was never issued a receipt therefor nor was it made to appear
in the records that the bond has been paid; that despite the lapse of two
years, the money was never returned to the bondswoman; and that it has not
been shown that the money was turned over to the Municipal Treasurer of
Tinambac.
Respondent Baroy counters that the cash bond was deposited with the
former clerk of court, then turned over to the acting clerk of court and, later,
given to her under a corresponding receipt; that the cash bond is deposited
with the bank; and that should the bondswoman desire to withdraw the same,
she should follow the proper procedure therefor.
Respondent judge contends that Criminal Case No. 5438 was archieved for
failure of the bondsman to deliver the body of the accused in court despite
notice; and that he has nothing to do with the payment of the cash bond as
this is the duty of the clerk of court.
5. Infidelity in the custody of prisoners
Complainants contend that respondent judge usually got detention prisoners
to work in his house, one of whom was Alex Alano, who is accused in
Criminal Case No. 5647 for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act; that while
Alano was in the custody of respondent judge, the former escaped and was
never recaptured; that in order to conceal this fact, the case was archived
pursuant to an order issued by respondent judge dated April 6, 1992.
Respondent judge denied the accusation and claims that he never employed
detention prisoners and that he has adequate household help; and that he
had to order the case archived because it had been pending for more than
six (6) months and the accused therein remained at large.
6. Unlawful collection of docket fees
Finally, respondents are charged with collecting docket fees from the Rural
Bank of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, Inc. although such entity is exempt by
law from the payment of said fees, and that while the corresponding receipt
was issued, respondent Baroy failed to remit the amount to the Supreme
Court and, instead, she deposited the same in her personal account.
Respondents Baroy contends that it was Judge-Designate Felimon
Montenegro (because respondent judge was on sick leave) who instructed
her to demand payment of docket fees from said rural bank; that the bank
issued a check for P800.00; that she was not allowed by the Philippine
National Bank to encash the check and, instead, was instructed to deposit
the same in any bank account for clearing; that respondent deposited the
same in her account; and that after the check was cleared, she remitted
P400.00 to the Supreme Court and the other P400.00 was paid to the
Municipal Treasurer of Tinambac.
On the basis of the foregoing contentions, First Vice-Executive Judge
Antonio N. Gerona prepared and submitted to us his Report and
Recommendations dated May 20, 1994, together with the administrative
matter. We have perspicaciously reviewed the same and we are favorably
impressed by the thorough and exhaustive presentation and analysis of the
facts and evidence in said report. We commend the investigating judge for
his industry and perspicacity reflected by his findings in said report which,
being amply substantiated by the evidence and supported by logical illations,
we hereby approve and hereunder reproduce at length the material portions
thereof.
xxx xxx xxx
The first charge against the respondents is illegal
solemnization of marriage. Judge Palaypayon is charged
with having solemnized without a marriage license the
marriage of Sammy Bocaya and Gina Besmonte (Exh. A).
Alano Abellano and Nelly Edralin (Exh. B), Francisco Selpo
and Julieta Carrido (Exh. C), Eddie Terrobias and Maria
Emma Gaor (Exh. D), Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga
(Exh. F) and Arsenio Sabater and Margarita Nacario (Exh.
G).
In all these aforementioned marriages, the blank space in
the marriage contracts to show the number of the marriage
was solemnized as required by Article 22 of the Family Code
were not filled up. While the contracting parties and their
witnesses signed their marriage contracts, Judge
Palaypayon did not affix his signature in the marriage
contracts, except that of Abellano and Edralin when Judge
Palaypayon signed their marriage certificate as he claims
that he solemnized this marriage under Article 34 of the
Family Code of the Philippines. In said marriages the
contracting parties were not furnished a copy of their
marriage contract and the Local Civil Registrar was not sent
either a copy of the marriage certificate as required by Article
23 of the Family Code.
The marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte is shown to have
been solemnized by Judge Palaypayon without a marriage
license. The testimonies of Bocay himself and Pompeo
Ariola, one of the witnesses of the marriage of Bocaya and
Besmonte, and the photographs taken when Judge
Palaypayon solemnized their marriage (Exhs. K-3 to K-9)
sufficiently show that Judge Palaypayon really solemnized
their marriage. Bocaya declared that they were advised by
Judge Palaypayon to return after ten (10) days after their
marriage was solemnized and bring with them their marriage
license. In the meantime, they already started living together
as husband and wife believing that the formal requisites of
marriage were complied with.
Judge Palaypayon denied that he solemnized the marriage
of Bocaya and Besmonte because the parties allegedly did
not have a marriage license. He declared that in fact he did
not sign the marriage certificate, there was no date stated on
it and both the parties and the Local Civil Registrar did not
have a copy of the marriage certificate.
With respect to the photographs which show that he
solemnized the marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte, Judge
Palaypayon explains that they merely show as if he was
solemnizing the marriage. It was actually a simulated
solemnization of marriage and not a real one. This happened
because of the pleading of the mother of one of the
contracting parties that he consent to be photographed to
show that as if he was solemnizing the marriage as he was
told that the food for the wedding reception was already
prepared, visitors were already invited and the place of the
parties where the reception would be held was more than
twenty (20) kilometers away from the poblacion of Tinambac.
The denial made by Judge Palaypayon is difficult to believe.
The fact alone that he did not sign the marriage certificate or
contract, the same did not bear a date and the parties and
the Local Civil Registrar were not furnished a copy of the
marriage certificate, do not by themselves show that he did
not solemnize the marriage. His uncorroborated testimony
cannot prevail over the testimony of Bocaya and Ariola who
also declared, among others, that Bocaya and his bride were
advised by Judge Palaypayon to return after ten (10) days
with their marriage license and whose credibility had not
been impeached.
The pictures taken also from the start of the wedding
ceremony up to the signing of the marriage certificate in front
of Judge Palaypayon and on his table (Exhs. K-3, K-3-a, K-
3-b, K-3-c, K-4, K-4-a, K-4-b, K-4-c,
K-4-d, K-5, K-5-a, K-5-b, K-6, K-7, K-8, K-8-a and K-9),
cannot possibly be just to show a simulated solemnization of
marriage. One or two pictures may convince a person of the
explanation of Judge Palaypayon, but not all those pictures.
Besides, as a judge it is very difficult to believe that Judge
Palaypayon would allows himself to be photographed as if
he was solemnizing a marriage on a mere pleading of a
person whom he did not even know for the alleged reasons
given. It would be highly improper and unbecoming of him to
allow himself to be used as an instrument of deceit by
making it appear that Bocaya and Besmonte were married
by him when in truth and in fact he did not solemnize their
marriage.
With respect to the marriage of Abellano and Edralin (Exh.
B), Judge Palaypayon admitted that he solemnized their
marriage, but he claims that it was under Article 34 of the
Family Code, so a marriage license was not required. The
contracting parties here executed a joint affidavit that they
have been living together as husband and wife for almost six
(6) years already (Exh. 12; Exh. AA).
In their marriage contract which did not bear any date either
when it was solemnized, it was stated that Abellano was only
eighteen (18) years, two (2) months and seven (7) days old.
If he and Edralin had been living together as husband and
wife for almost six (6) years already before they got married
as they stated in their joint affidavit, Abellano must ha(ve)
been less than thirteen (13) years old when he started living
with Edralin as his wife and this is hard to believe. Judge
Palaypayon should ha(ve) been aware of this when he
solemnized their marriage as it was his duty to ascertain the
qualification of the contracting parties who might ha(ve)
executed a false joint affidavit in order to have an instant
marriage by avoiding the marriage license requirement.
On May 23, 1992, however, after this case was already filed,
Judge Palaypayon married again Abellano and Edralin, this
time with a marriage license (Exh. BB). The explanation
given by Judge Palaypayon why he solemnized the marriage
of the same couple for the second time is that he did not
consider the first marriage he solemnized under Article 34 of
the Family Code as (a) marriage at all because complainant
Ramon Sambo did not follow his instruction that the date
should be placed in the marriage certificate to show when he
solemnized the marriage and that the contracting parties
were not furnished a copy of their marriage certificate.
This act of Judge Palaypayon of solemnizing the marriage of
Abellano and Edralin for the second time with a marriage
license already only gave rise to the suspicion that the first
time he solemnized the marriage it was only made to appear
that it was solemnized under exceptional character as there
was not marriage license and Judge Palaypayon had
already signed the marriage certificate. If it was true that he
solemnized the first marriage under exceptional character
where a marriage license was not required, why did he
already require the parties to have a marriage license when
he solemnized their marriage for the second time?
The explanation of Judge Palaypayon that the first marriage
of Abellano and Edralin was not a marriage at all as the
marriage certificate did not state the date when the marriage
was solemnized and that the contracting parties were not
furnished a copy of their marriage certificate, is not well
taken as they are not any of those grounds under Article(s)
35, 36, 37 and 38 of the Family Code which declare a
marriage void from the beginning. Even if no one, however,
received a copy of the marriage certificate, the marriage is
still valid (Jones vs. H(o)rtiguela, 64 Phil. 179). Judge
Palaypayon cannot just absolve himself from responsibility
by blaming his personnel. They are not the guardian(s) of his
official function and under Article 23 of the Family Code it is
his duty to furnish the contracting parties (a) copy of their
marriage contract.
With respect to the marriage of Francisco Selpo and Julieta
Carrido (Exh. C), and Arsenio Sabater and Margarita
Nacario (Exh. G), Selpo and Carrido and Sabater and
Nacarcio executed joint affidavits that Judge Palaypayon did
not solemnize their marriage (Exh. 13-A and Exh. 1). Both
Carrido and Nacario testified for the respondents that
actually Judge Palaypayon did not solemnize their marriage
as they did not have a marriage license. On cross-
examination, however, both admitted that they did not know
who prepared their affidavits. They were just told, Carrido by
a certain Charito Palaypayon, and Nacario by a certain
Kagawad Encinas, to just go to the Municipal building and
sign their joint affidavits there which were already prepared
before the Municipal Mayor of Tinambac, Camarines Sur.
With respect to the marriage of Renato Gamay and Maricris
Belga (Exh. f), their marriage contract was signed by them
and by their two (2) witnesses, Atty. Elmer Brioso and
respondent Baroy (Exhs. F-1 and F-2). Like the other
aforementioned marriages, the solemnization fee was also
paid as shown by a receipt dated June 7, 1992 and signed
by respondent Baroy (Exh. F-4).
Judge Palaypayon also denied having solemnized the
marriage of Gamay and Belga allegedly because there was
no marriage license. On her part, respondent Baroy at first
denied that the marriage was solemnized. When she was
asked, however, why did she sign the marriage contract as a
witness she answered that she thought the marriage was
already solemnized (TSN, p. 14; 10-28-93).
Respondent Baroy was, and is, the clerk of court of Judge
Palaypayon. She signed the marriage contract of Gamay
and Belga as one of the two principal sponsors. Yet, she
wanted to give the impression that she did not even know
that the marriage was solemnized by Judge Palaypayon.
This is found very difficult to believe.
Judge Palaypayon made the same denial of having
solemnized also the marriage of Terrobias and Gaor (Exh.
D). The contracting parties and their witnesses also signed
the marriage contract and paid the solemnization fee, but
Judge Palaypayon allegedly did not solemnize their marriage
due to lack of marriage license. Judge Palaypayon submitted
the affidavit of William Medina, Vice-Mayor of Tinambac, to
corroborate his testimony (Exh. 14). Medina, however, did
not testify in this case and so his affidavit has no probative
value.
Judge Palaypayon testified that his procedure and practice
have been that before the contracting parties and their
witnesses enter his chamber in order to get married, he
already required complainant Ramon Sambo to whom he
assigned the task of preparing the marriage contract, to
already let the parties and their witnesses sign their marriage
contracts, as what happened to Gamay and Belga, and
Terrobias and Gaor, among others. His purpose was to save
his precious time as he has been solemnizing marriages at
the rate of three (3) to four (4) times everyday (TSN, p. 12;
2-1-94).
This alleged practice and procedure, if true, is highly
improper and irregular, if not illegal, because the contracting
parties are supposed to be first asked by the solemnizing
officer and declare that they take each other as husband and
wife before the solemnizing officer in the presence of at least
two (2) witnesses before they are supposed to sign their
marriage contracts (Art. 6, Family Code).
The uncorroborated testimony, however, of Judge
Palaypayon as to his alleged practice and procedure before
solemnizing a marriage, is not true as shown by the picture
taken during the wedding of Bocaya and Besmonte (Exhs.
K-3 to K-9) and by the testimony of respondent Baroy herself
who declared that the practice of Judge Palaypayon ha(s)
been to let the contracting parties and their witnesses sign
the marriage contract only after Judge Palaypayon has
solemnized their marriage (TSN, p. 53;
10-28-93).
Judge Palaypayon did not present any evidence to show
also that he was really solemnizing three (3) to four (4)
marriages everyday. On the contrary his monthly report of
cases for July, 1992 shows that his court had only twenty-
seven (27) pending cases and he solemnized only seven (7)
marriages for the whole month (Exh. E). His monthly report
of cases for September, 1992 shows also that he
solemnized only four (4) marriages during the whole month
(Exh. 7).
In this first charge of having illegally solemnized marriages,
respondent Judge Palaypayon has presented and marked in
evidence several marriage contracts of other persons,
affidavits of persons and certification issued by the Local
Civil Registrar (Exhs. 12-B to 12-H). These persons who
executed affidavits, however, did not testify in this case.
Besides, the marriage contracts and certification mentioned
are immaterial as Judge Palaypayon is not charged of
having solemnized these marriages illegally also. He is not
charged that the marriages he solemnized were all illegal.
The second charge against herein respondents, that of
having falsified the monthly report of cases submitted to the
Supreme Court and not stating in the monthly report the
actual number of documents notarized and issuing the
corresponding receipts of the notarial fees, have been
sufficiently proven by the complainants insofar as the
monthly report of cases for July and September, 1992 are
concerned.
The monthly report of cases of the MTC of Tinambac,
Camarines Sur for July, 1992 both signed by the
respondents, show that for said month there were six (6)
documents notarized by Judge Palaypayon in his capacity
as Ex-Officio Notary Public (Exhs. H to H-1-b). The notarial
register of the MTC of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, however,
shows that there were actually one hundred thirteen (113)
documents notarized by Judge Palaypayon for the said
month (Exhs. Q to Q-45).
Judge Palaypayon claims that there was no falsification of
the monthly report of cases for July, 1992 because there
were only six (6) notarized documents that were paid (for) as
shown by official receipts. He did not, however, present
evidence of the alleged official receipts showing that the
notarial fee for the six (6) documetns were paid. Besides, the
monthly report of cases with respect to the number of
documents notarized should not be based on how many
notarized documents were paid of the notarial fees, but the
number of documents placed or recorded in the notarial
register.
Judge Palaypayon admitted that he was not personally
verifying and checking anymore the correctness of the
monthly reports because he relies on his co-respondent who
is the Clerk of Court and whom he has assumed to have
checked and verified the records. He merely signs the
monthly report when it is already signed by respondent
Baroy.
The explanation of Judge Palaypayon is not well taken
because he is required to have close supervision in the
preparation of the monthly report of cases of which he
certifies as to their correctness. As a judge he is personally
responsible for the proper discharge of his functions (The
Phil. Trial Lawyer's Asso. Inc. vs. Agana, Sr., 102 SCRA
517). In Nidera vs. Lazaro, 174 SCRA 581, it was held that
"A judge cannot take refuge behind the inefficiency or
mismanagement of his court personnel."
On the part of respondent Baroy, she puts the blame of the
falsification of the monthly report of cases on complainant
Sambo whom she allegedly assigned to prepare not only the
monthly report of cases, but the preparation and custody of
marriage contracts, notarized documents and the notarial
register. By her own admission she has assigned to
complainant Sambo duties she was supposed to perform,
yet according to her she never bother(ed) to check the
notarial register of the court to find out the number of
documents notarized in a month (TSN, p. 30; 11-23-93).
Assuming that respondent Baroy assigned the preparation of
the monthly report of cases to Sambo, which was denied by
the latter as he claims that he only typed the monthly report
based on the data given to him by her, still it is her duty to
verify and check whether the report is correct.
The explanation of respondent Baroy that Sambo was the
one in custody of marriage contracts, notarized documents
and notarial register, among other things, is not acceptable
not only because as clerk of court she was supposed to be
in custody, control and supervision of all court records
including documents and other properties of the court (p. 32,
Manual for Clerks of Court), but she herself admitted that
from January, 1992 she was already in full control of all the
records of the court including receipts (TSN, p. 11; 11-23-
93).
The evidence adduced in this cases in connection with the
charge of falsification, however, also shows that respondent
Baroy did not account for what happened to the notarial fees
received for those documents notarized during the month of
July and September, 1992. The evidence adduced in this
case also sufficiently show that she received cash bond
deposits and she did not deposit them to a bank or to the
Municipal Treasurer; and that she only issued temporary
receipts for said cash bond deposits.
For July, 1992 there were only six (6) documents reported to
have been notarized by Judge Palaypayon although the
documents notarized for said month were actually one
hundred thirteen (113) as recorded in the notarial register.
For September, 1992, there were only five (5) documents
reported as notarized for that month, though the notarial
register show(s) that there were fifty-six (56) documents
actually notarized. The fee for each document notarized as
appearing in the notarial register was P18.50. Respondent
Baroy and Sambo declared that what was actually being
charged was P20.00. Respondent Baroy declared that
P18.50 went to the Supreme Court and P1.50 was being
turned over to the Municipal Treasurer.
Baroy, however, did not present any evidence to show that
she really sent to the Supreme Court the notarial fees of
P18.50 for each document notarized and to the Municipal
Treasurer the additional notarial fee of P1.50. This should be
fully accounted for considering that Baroy herself declared
that some notarial fees were allowed by her at her own
discretion to be paid later. Similarly, the solemnization fees
have not been accounted for by Baroy considering that she
admitted that even (i)n those instances where the marriages
were not solemnized due to lack of marriage license the
solemnization fees were not returned anymore, unless the
contracting parties made a demand for their return. Judge
Palaypayon declared that he did not know of any instance
when solemnization fee was returned when the marriage
was not solemnized due to lack of marriage license.
Respondent Baroy also claims that Ramon Sambo did not
turn over to her some of the notarial fees. This is difficult to
believe. It was not only because Sambo vehemently denied
it, but the minutes of the conference of the personnel of the
MTC of Tinambac dated January 20, 1992 shows that on
that date Baroy informed the personnel of the court that she
was taking over the functions she assigned to Sambo,
particularly the collection of legal fees (Exh. 7). The notarial
fees she claims that Sambo did not turn over to her were for
those documents notarized (i)n July and September, 1992
already. Besides there never was any demand she made for
Sambo to turn over some notarial fees supposedly in his
possession. Neither was there any memorandum she issued
on this matter, in spite of the fact that she has been holding
meetings and issuing memoranda to the personnel of the
court (Exhs. V, W, FF, FF-1, FF-2, FF-3; Exhs. 4-A
(supplement(s), 5-8, 6-S, 7-S and 8-S).
It is admitted by respondent Baroy that on October 29, 1991
a cash bond deposit of a certain Dacara in the amount of
One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos was turned over to her
after she assumed office and for this cash bond she issued
only a temporary receipt (Exh. Y). She did not deposit this
cash bond in any bank or to the Municipal Treasurer. She
just kept it in her own cash box on the alleged ground that
the parties in that case where the cash bond was deposited
informed her that they would settle the case amicably.
Respondent Baroy declared that she finally deposited the
aforementioned cash bond of One Thousand (P1,000.00)
Pesos with the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) in
February, 1993, after this administrative case was already
filed (TSN, pp. 27-28; 12-22-93). The Pass Book, however,
shows that actually Baroy opened an account with the LBP,
Naga Branch, only on March 26, 1993 when she deposited
an amount of Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos (Exhs. 8 to
8-1-a). She claims that One Thousand (P1,000.000) Pesos
of the initial deposit was the cash bond of Dacara. If it were
true, it was only after keeping to herself the cash bond of
One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos for around one year and
five months when she finally deposited it because of the
filing of this case.
On April 29, 1993, or only one month and two days after she
finally deposited the One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos cash
bond of Dacara, she withdrew it from the bank without any
authority or order from the court. It was only on July 23,
1993, or after almost three (3) months after she withdrew it,
when she redeposited said cash bond (TSN, p. 6; 1-4-94).
The evidence presented in this case also show that on
February 28, 1993 respondent Baroy received also a cash
bond of Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos from a certain
Alfredo Seprones in Crim. Case No. 5180. For this cash
bond deposit, respondent Baroy issued only an annumbered
temporary receipt (Exh. X and X-1). Again Baroy just kept
this Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos cash bond to
herself. She did not deposit it either (in) a bank or (with) the
Municipal Treasurer. Her explanation was that the parties in
Crim. Case No. 5180 informed her that they would settle the
case amicably. It was on April 26, 1993, or almost two
months later when Judge Palaypayon issued an order for the
release of said cash bond (Exh. 7).
Respondent Baroy also admitted that since she assumed
office on October 21, 1991 she used to issue temporary
receipt only for cash bond deposits and other payments and
collections she received. She further admitted that some of
these temporary receipts she issued she failed to place the
number of the receipts such as that receipt marked Exhibit X
(TSN, p. 35; 11-23-93). Baroy claims that she did not know
that she had to use the official receipts of the Supreme
Court. It was only from February, 1993, after this case was
already filed, when she only started issuing official receipts.
The next charge against the respondents is that in order to
be appointed Clerk of Court, Baroy gave Judge Palaypayon
an air conditioner as a gift. The evidence adduced with
respect to this charge, show that on August 24, 1991 Baroy
bought an air conditioner for the sum of Seventeen
Thousand Six Hundred (P17,600.00) Pesos (Exhs. I and I-
1). The same was paid partly in cash and in check (Exhs. I-2
and I-3). When the air conditioner was brought to court in
order to be installed in the chamber of Judge Palaypayon, it
was still placed in the same box when it was bought and was
not used yet.
The respondents claim that Baroy sold it to Judge
Palaypayon for Twenty Thousand (P20,00.00) Pesos on
installment basis with a down payment of Five Thousand
(P5,000.00) Pesos and as proof thereof the respondents
presented a typewritten receipt dated May 29, 1993 (Exh.
22). The receipt was signed by both respondents and by the
Municipal Mayor of Tinambac, Camarines Sur and another
person as witness.
The alleged sale between respondents is not beyond
suspicion. It was bought by Baroy at a time when she was
applying for the vacant position of Clerk of Court (to) which
she was eventually appointed in October, 1991. From the
time she bought the air conditioner on August 24, 1991 until
it was installed in the office of Judge Palaypayon it was not
used yet. The sale to Judge Palaypayon was only evidenced
by a mere typewritten receipt dated May 29, 1992 when this
case was already filed. The receipt could have been easily
prepared. The Municipal Mayor of Tinambac who signed in
the receipt as a witness did not testify in this case. The sale
is between the Clerk of Court and the Judge of the same
court. All these circumstances give rise to suspicion of at
least impropriety. Judges should avoid such action as would
subject (them) to suspicion and (their) conduct should be
free from the appearance of impropriety (Jaagueta vs.
Boncasos, 60 SCRA 27).
With respect to the charge that Judge Palaypayon received
a cash bond deposit of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos
from Januaria Dacara without issuing a receipt, Dacara
executed an affidavit regarding this charge that Judge
Palaypayon did not give her a receipt for the P1,000.00 cash
bond she deposited (Exh. N). Her affidavit, however, has no
probative value as she did not show that this cash bond of
P1,000.00 found its way into the hands of respondent Baroy
who issued only a temporary receipt for it and this has been
discussed earlier.
Another charge against Judge Palaypayon is the getting of
detention prisoners to work in his house and one of them
escaped while in his custody and was never found again. To
hide this fact, the case against said accused was ordered
archived by Judge Palaypayon. The evidence adduced with
respect to this particular charge, show that in Crim. Case No.
5647 entitled People vs. Stephen Kalaw, Alex Alano and
Allan Adupe, accused Alex Alano and Allan Adupe were
arrested on April 12, 1991 and placed in the municipal jail of
Tinambac, Camarines Sur (Exhs. 0, 0-1, 0-2 and 0-3; Exh.
25). The evidence presented that Alex Alano was taken by
Judge Palaypayon from the municipal jail where said
accused was confined and that he escaped while in custody
of Judge Palaypayon is solely testimonial, particularly that of
David Ortiz, a former utility worker of the MTC of Tinambac.
Herein investigator finds said evidence not sufficient. The
complainants should have presented records from the police
of Tinambac to show that Judge Palaypayon took out from
the municipal jail Alex Alano where he was under detention
and said accused escaped while in the custody of Judge
Palaypayon.
The order, however, of Judge Palaypayon dated April 6,
1992 in Crim. Case No. 5047 archiving said case appears to
be without basis. The order states: "this case was filed on
April 12, 1991 and the records show that the warrant of
arrest (was) issued against the accused, but up to this
moment there is no return of service for the warrant of arrest
issued against said accused" (Exh. 0-4). The records of said
case, however, show that in fact there was a return of the
service of the warrant of arrest dated April 12, 1991 showing
that Alano and Adupe were arrested (Exh. 0-3).
Judge Palaypayon explained that his order dated April 6,
1992 archiving Crim. Case No. 5047 referred only to one of
the accused who remained at large. The explanation cannot
be accepted because the two other accused, Alano and
Adupe, were arrested. Judge Palaypayon should have
issued an order for the arrest of Adupe who allegedly
jumped bail, but Alano was supposed to be confined in the
municipal jail if his claim is true that he did not take custody
of Alano.
The explanation also of Judge Palaypayon why he ordered
the case archived was because he heard from the police that
Alano escaped. This explanation is not acceptable either. He
should ha(ve) set the case and if the police failed to bring to
court Alano, the former should have been required to explain
in writing why Alano was not brought to court. If the
explanation was that Alano escaped from jail, he should
have issued an order for his arrest. It is only later on when
he could not be arrested when the case should have been
ordered archived. The order archiving this case for the
reason that he only heard that Alano escaped is another
circumstance which gave rise to a suspicion that Alano might
have really escaped while in his custody only that the
complainants could not present records or other
documentary evidence to prove the same.
The last charge against the respondents is that they
collected filing fees on collection cases filed by the Rural
Bank of Tinambac, Camarines Sur which was supposed to
be exempted in paying filing fees under existing laws and
that the filing fees received was deposited by respondent
Baroy in her personal account in the bank. The evidence
presented show that on February 4, 1992 the Rural Bank of
Tinambac filed ten (10) civil cases for collection against
farmers and it paid the total amount of Four Hundred
(P400.00) Pesos representing filing fees. The complainants
cited Section 14 of Republic Act 720, as amended, which
exempts Rural Banks (from) the payment of filing fees on
collection of sums of money cases filed against farmers on
loans they obtained.
Judge Palaypayon, however, had nothing to do with the
payment of the filing fees of the Rural Bank of Tinambac as
it was respondent Baroy who received them and besides, on
February 4, 1992, he was on sick leave. On her part Baroy
claims that the bank paid voluntarily the filing fees. The
records, however, shows that respondent Baroy sent a letter
to the manager of the bank dated January 28, 1992 to the
effect that if the bank would not pay she would submit all
Rural Bank cases for dismissal (Annex 6, comment by
respondent Baroy).
Respondent Baroy should have checked whether the Rural
Bank of Tinambac was really exempt from the payment of
filing fees pursuant to Republic Act 720, as amended,
instead of threatening the bank to have its cases be
submitted to the court in order to have them dismissed. Here
the payment of the filing fees was made on February 4,
1992, but the Four Hundred (P400.00) Pesos was only
turned over to the Municipal Treasurer on March 12, 1992.
Here, there is an undue delay again in complying with her
obligation as accountable officer.
In view of the foregoing findings that the evidence presented
by the complainants sufficiently show that respondent Judge
Lucio P. Palaypayon, Jr. had solemnized marriages,
particularly that of Sammy Bocaya and Gina Besmonte,
without a marriage license, and that it having been shown
that he did not comply with his duty in closely supervising his
clerk of court in the preparation of the monthly report of
cases being submitted to the Supreme Court, particularly for
the months of July and September, 1992 where it has been
proven that the reports for said two (2) months were falsified
with respect to the number of documents notarized, it is
respectfully recommended that he be imposed a fine of TEN
THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS with a warning that the
same or similar offenses will be more severely dealt with.
The fact that Judge Palaypayon did not sign the marriage
contracts or certificates of those marriages he solemnized
without a marriage license, there were no dates placed in the
marriage contracts to show when they were solemnized, the
contracting parties were not furnished their marriage
contracts and the Local Civil Registrar was not being sent
any copy of the marriage contract, will not absolve him from
liability. By solemnizing alone a marriage without a marriage
license he as the solemnizing officer is the one responsible
for the irregularity in not complying (with) the formal
requ(i)sites of marriage and under Article 4(3) of the Family
Code of the Philippines, he shall be civilly, criminally and
administratively liable.
Judge Palaypayon is likewise liable for his negligence or
failure to comply with his duty of closely supervising his clerk
of court in the performance of the latter's duties and
functions, particularly the preparation of the monthly report of
cases (Bendesula vs. Laya, 58 SCRA 16). His explanation
that he only signed the monthly report of cases only when
his clerk of court already signed the same, cannot be
accepted. It is his duty to closely supervise her, to check and
verify the records if the monthly reports prepared by his clerk
of court do not contain false statements. It was held that "A
judge cannot take refuge behind the inefficiency or
incompetence of court personnel (Nidua vs. Lazaro, 174
SCRA 158).
In view also of the foregoing finding that respondent Nelia
Esmeralda-Baroy, the clerk of court of the Municipal Trial
Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, has been found to have
falsified the monthly report of cases for the months of July
and September, 1992 with respect to the number of
documents notarized, for having failed to account (for) the
notarial fees she received for said two (2) months period; for
having failed to account (for) the solemnization fees of those
marriages allegedly not solemnized, but the solemnization
fees were not returned; for unauthorized issuance of
temporary receipts, some of which were issued
unnumbered; for receiving the cash bond of Dacara on
October 29, 1991 in the amount of One Thousand
(P1,000.00) Pesos for which she issued only a temporary
receipt (Exh. Y) and for depositing it with the Land Bank of
the Philippines only on March 26, 1993, or after one year
and five months in her possession and after this case was
already filed; for withdrawing said cash bond of One
Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos on April 29, 1993 without any
court order or authority and redepositing it only on July 23,
1993; for receiving a cash bond of Three Thousand
(P3,000.00) Pesos from Alfredo Seprones in Crim. Case No.
5180, MTC, Tinambac, Camarines Sur, for which she issued
only an unnumbered temporary receipt (Exhs. X and X-1)
and for not depositing it with a bank or with the Municipal
Treasurer until it was ordered released; and for requiring the
Rural Bank of Tinambac, Camarines Sur to pay filing fees on
February 4, 1992 for collection cases filed against farmers in
the amount of Four Hundred (P400.00) Pesos, but turning
over said amount to the Municipal Treasurer only on March
12, 1992, it is respectfully recommended that said
respondent clerk of court Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy be
dismissed from the service.
It is provided that "Withdrawal of court deposits shall be by
the clerk of court who shall issue official receipt to the
provincial, city or municipal treasurer for the amount
withdrawn. Court deposits cannot be withdrawn except by
order of the court, . . . ." (Revised Manual of Instructions for
Treasurers, Sec. 183, 184 and 626; p. 127, Manual for
Clerks of Court). A circular also provides that the Clerks of
Court shall immediately issue an official receipt upon receipt
of deposits from party litigants and thereafter deposit intact
the collection with the municipal, city or provincial treasurer
and their deposits, can only be withdrawn upon proper
receipt and order of the Court (DOJ Circular No. 52, 26 April
1968; p. 136, Manual for Clerks of Court). Supreme Court
Memorandum Circular No. 5, 25 November 1982, also
provides that "all collections of funds of fiduciary character
including rental deposits, shall be deposited immediately by
the clerk of court concerned upon receipt thereof with City,
Municipal or Provincial Treasurer where his court is located"
and that "no withdrawal of any of such deposits shall be
made except upon lawful order of the court exercising
jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Respondent Baroy had either failed to comply with the
foregoing circulars, or deliberately disregarded, or even
intentionally violated them. By her conduct, she
demonstrated her callous unconcern for the obligations and
responsibility of her duties and functions as a clerk of court
and accountable officer. The gross neglect of her duties
shown by her constitute(s) a serious misconduct which
warrant(s) her removal from office. In the case of Belen P.
Ferriola vs. Norma Hiam, Clerk of Court, MTCC, Branch I,
Batangas City; A.M. No. P-90-414; August 9, 1993, it was
held that "The clerk of court is not authorized to keep funds
in his/her custody; monies received by him/her shall be
deposited immediately upon receipt thereof with the City,
Municipal or Provincial Treasurer. Supreme Court Circular
Nos. 5 dated November 25, 1982 and 5-A dated December
3, 1982. Respondent Hiam's failure to remit the cash bail
bonds and fine she collected constitutes serious misconduct
and her misappropriation of said funds constitutes
dishonesty. "Respondent Norma Hiam was found guilty of
dishonesty and serious misconduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service and (the Court) ordered her immediate
dismissal (from) the service.
xxx xxx xxx
We here emphasize once again our adjuration that the conduct and behavior
of everyone connected with an office charged with the dispensation of
justice, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, should be circumscribed
with the heavy burden of responsibility. His conduct, at all times, must not
only be characterized by propriety and decorum but, above all else, must be
beyond suspicion. Every employee should be an example of integrity,
uprightness and honesty.
5
Integrity in a judicial office is more than a virtue, it
is a necessity.
6
It applies, without qualification as to rank or position, from
the judge to the least of its personnel, they being standard-bearers of the
exacting norms of ethics and morality imposed upon a Court of justice.
On the charge regarding illegal marriages the Family Code pertinently
provides that the formal requisites of marriage are, inter alia, a valid marriage
license except in the cases provided for therein.
7
Complementarily, it
declares that the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall
generally render the marriage void ab initio and that, while an irregularity in
the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage, the party or
parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and
administratively liable.
8

The civil aspect is addressed to the contracting parties and those affected by
the illegal marriages, and what we are providing for herein pertains to the
administrative liability of respondents, all without prejudice to their criminal
responsibility. The Revised Penal Code provides that "(p)riests or ministers
of any religious denomination or sect, or civil authorities who shall perform or
authorize any illegal marriage ceremony shall be punished in accordance
with the provisions of the Marriage Law."
9
This is of course, within the
province of the prosecutorial agencies of the Government.
The recommendation with respect to the administrative sanction to be
imposed on respondent judge should, therefore, be modified. For one, with
respect to the charge of illegal solemnization of marriages, it does appear
that he had not taken to heart, but actually trifled with, the law's concern for
the institution of marriage and the legal effects flowing from civil status. This,
and his undeniable participation in the other offenses charged as
hereinbefore narrated in detail, approximate such serious degree of
misconduct and of gross negligence in the performance of judicial duties as
to ineludibly require a higher penalty.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby imposes a FINE of P20,000.00 on
respondent Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon. Jr., with a stern warning that any
repetition of the same or similar offenses in the future will definitely be
severely dealt with. Respondent Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy is hereby
DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and
with prejudice to employment in any branch, agency or instrumentality of the
Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
Let copies of this decision be spread on their records and furnished to the
Office of the Ombudsman for appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.

Loria vs. Felix
BENGZON, J .:
Review of a decision of the Court of Appeals, involving the central issue of
the validity of the marriage in articulo mortis between Matea de la Cruz and
Felipe Apelan Felix.
It appears that long before, and during the War of the Pacific, these two
persons lived together as wife and husband at Cabrera Street, Pasay City.
They acquired properties but had no children. In the early part of the
liberation of Manila and surrounding territory, Matea be came seriously ill.
Knowing her critical condition, two young ladies of legal age dedicated to the
service of God, named Carmen Ordiales and Judith Vizcarra
1
visited and
persuaded her to go to confession. They fetched Father Gerardo Bautista,
Catholic parish priest of Pasay. The latter, upon learning that the penitent
had been living with Felipe Apelan Felix without benefit of marriage, asked
both parties to ratify their union according to the rites of his Church. Both
agreed. Whereupon the priest heard the confession of the bed-ridden old
woman, gave her Holy Communion, administered the Sacrament of Extreme
Unction and then solemnized her marriage with Felipe Apelan Felix in
articulo mortis,
2
Carmen Ordiales and Judith Vizcarra acting as sponsors or
witnesses. It was then January 29 or 30, 1945.
After a few months, Matea recovered from her sickness; but death was not to
be denied, and in January 1946, she was interred in Pasay, the same Fr.
Bautista performing the burial ceremonies.
On May 12, 1952, Arsenio de Loria and Ricarda de Loria filed this complaint
to compel defendant to an accounting and to deliver the properties left by the
deceased. They are grandchildren of Adriana de la Cruz, sister of Matea, and
claim to be the only surviving forced heirs of the latter. Felipe Apelan Felix
resisted the action, setting up his rights as widower. They obtained favorable
judgment in the court of first instance, but on appeal the Court of Appeals
reversed and dismissed the complaint.
Their request for review here was given due course principally to consider
the legal question-which they amply discussed in their petition and printed
brief whether the events which took place in January 1945 constituted, in
the eyes of the law, a valid and binding marriage.
According to the Court of Appeals:
There is no doubt at all in the mind of this Court, that Fr. Gerardo
Bautista, solemnized the marriage in articulo mortis of Defendant
Apelan Felix and Matea de la Cruz, on January 29 and 30, 1945,
under the circumstances set forth in the reverend's testimony in
court. Fr. Bautista, a respectable old priest of Pasay City then, had
no reason to side one or the other. . . . Notwithstanding this positive
evidence on the celebration or performance of the marriage in
question, Plaintiffs-Appellees contend that the same was not in
articulo mortis, because Matea de la Cruz was not then on the point
of death. Fr. Bautista clearly testified, however, that her condition at
the time was bad; she was bed-ridden; and according to his
observation, she might die at any moment (Exhibit 1), so
apprehensive was he about her condition that he decided in
administering to her the sacrament of extreme unction, after hearing
her confession. . . . .The greatest objection of the Appellees and the
trial court against the validity of the marriage under consideration, is
the admitted fact that it was not registered.
The applicable legal provisions are contained in the Marriage Law of 1929
(Act No. 3613) as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 114 (Nov. 1936)
specially sections 1, 3, 20 and 21.
There is no question about the officiating priest's authority to solemnize
marriage. There is also no question that the parties had legal capacity to
contract marriage, and that both declared before Fr. Bautista and Carmen
Ordiales and Judith Vizcarra that "they took each other as husband and
wife."
The appellants' contention of invalidity rests on these propositions:
(a) There was no "marriage contract" signed by the wedded couple the
witnesses and the priest, as required by section 3 of the Marriage Law; and
(b) The priest filed no affidavit, nor recorded the marriage with the local civil
registry.
The factual basis of the first proposition no signing may seriously be
doubted. The Court of Appeals made no finding thereon. Indeed if anything,
its decision impliedly held such marriage contract to have been executed,
since it said "the marriage in articulo mortis was a fact", and the only
question at issue was whether "the failure of Fr. Bautista to send copies of
the certificate of marriage in question to the Local Civil Registrar and to
register the said marriage in the Record of Marriages of the Pasay Catholic
Church . . . renders the said marriage invalid." And such was the only issue
tendered in the court of first instance. (See p. 14, 34, Record on Appeal.)
However, we may as well face this second issue: Does the failure to sign the
"marriage certificate or contract" constitute a cause for nullity?
Marriage contract is the "instrument in triplicate" mentioned in sec. 3 of the
Marriage Law which provides:
Sec. 3. Mutual Consent. No particular form for the ceremony of
marriage is required, but the parties with legal capacity to contract
marriage must declare, in the presence of the person solemnizing
the marriage and of two witnesses of legal age, that they take each
other as husband and wife. This declaration shall be set forth in an
instrument in triplicate, signed by signature or mark by the
contracting parties and said two witnesses and attested by the
person solemnizing the marriage. . . . (Emphasis ours).
In the first place, the Marriage Law itself, in sections 28, 29 and 30
enumerates the causes for annulment of marriage. Failure to sign the
marriage contract is not one of them.
In the second place, bearing in mind that the "essential requisites for
marriage are the legal capacity of the contracting parties and their consent"
(section 1), the latter being manifested by the declaration of "the parties" "in
the presence of the person solemnizing the marriage and of two witnesses of
legal age that they take each other as husband and wife" which in this
case actually occurred.
3
We think the signing of the marriage contract or
certificate was required by the statute simply for the purpose of evidencing
the act.
4
No statutory provision or court ruling has been cited making it an
essential requisite not the formal requirement of evidentiary value, which
we believe it is. The fact of marriage is one thing; the proof by which it may
be established is quite another.
Certificate and Record. Statutes relating to the solemnization of
marriage usually provide for the issuance of a certificate of marriage
and for the registration or recording of marriage . . . Generally
speaking, the registration or recording of a marriage is not essential
to its validity, the statute being addressed to the officials issuing the
license, certifying the marriage, and making the proper return and
registration or recording. (Sec. 27 American Jurisprudence
"Marriage" p. 197-198.)
Formal Requisites. . . . The general rule, however, is that statutes
which direct that a license must be issued and procured, that only
certain persons shall perform the ceremony, that a certain number of
witnesses shall be present, that a certificate of the marriage shall be
signed, returned, and recorded, and that persons violating the
conditions shall be guilty of a criminal offense, are addressed to
persons in authority to secure publicity and to require a record to be
made of the marriage contract. Such statutes do not void common-
law marriages unless they do so expressly, even where such
marriage are entered into without obtaining a license and are not
recorded. It is the purpose of these statutes to discourage deception
and seduction, prevent illicit intercourse under the guise of
matrimony, and relieve from doubt the status of parties who live
together as man and wife, by providing competent evidence of the
marriage. . . . (Section 15 American Jurisprudence "Marriage" pp.
188-189.) Emphasis Ours. (See also Corpus Juris Secundum
"Marriage" Sec. 33.)
And our law says, "no marriage shall be declared invalid because of the
absence of one or several formal requirements of this Act . . . ." (Section 27.)
In the third place, the law, imposing on the priest the duty to furnish to the
parties copies of such marriage certificate (section 16) and punishing him for
its omission (section 41) implies his obligation to see that such "certificate" is
executed accordingly. Hence, it would not be fair to visit upon the wedded
couple in the form of annulment, Father Bautista's omission, if any, which
apparently had been caused by the prevailing disorder during the liberation
of Manila and its environs.
Identical remarks apply to the priest's failure to make and file the affidavit
required by sections 20 and 21. It was the priest's obligation; non-compliance
with it, should bring no serious consequences to the married pair, specially
where as in this case, it was caused by the emergency.
The mere fact that the parish priest who married the plaintiff's natural
father and mother, while the latter was in articulo mortis, failed to
send a copy of the marriage certificate to the municipal secretary,
does not invalidate said marriage, since it does not appear that in the
celebration thereof all requisites for its validity were not present, the
forwarding of a copy of the marriage certificate not being one of the
requisites. (Jones vs. Hortiguela, 64 Phil. 179.) See also Madridejo
vs. De Leon, 55 Phil. 1.
The law permits in articulo mortis marriages, without marriage license; but it
requires the priest to make the affidavit and file it. Such affidavit contains the
data usually required for the issuance of a marriage license. The first
practically substitutes the latter. Now then, if a marriage celebrated without
the license is not voidable (under Act 3613),
5
this marriage should not also
be voidable for lack of such affidavit.
In line with the policy to encourage the legalization of the union of men and
women who have lived publicly in a state of concubinage
6
, (section 22), we
must hold this marriage to be valid.
The widower, needless to add, has better rights to the estate of the deceased
than the plaintiffs who are the grandchildren of her sister Adriana. "In the
absence of brothers or sisters and of nephews, children of the former, . . . the
surviving spouse . . . shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. (Art
952, Civil Code.)
Wherefore, the Court of Appeals' decision is affirmed, with costs. So ordered.
Eugenio vs. Velez
PADILLA, J .:
On 5 October 1988, petitioner came to this Court with a petition for certiorari
and prohibition with application for restraining order and/or injunction
(docketed as G.R. No. 85140) seeking to enjoin respondent Judge from
proceeding with the Habeas Corpus case (Sp. Proc. No. 88- 55, RTC,
Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City), * the respondent Sheriff from enforcing
and implementing the writ and orders of the respondent Judge dated 28, 29,
and 30 September 1988, and to declare said writ and orders as null and void.
In a resolution issued on 11 October 1988, this Court required comment from
the respondents on the petition but denied the application for a temporary
restraining order.
The records disclose the following:
Unaware of the death on 28 August 1988 of (Vitaliana Vargas Vitaliana for
brevity), her full blood brothers and sisters, herein private respondents
(Vargases', for brevity) filed on 27 September 1988, a petition for habeas
corpus before the RTC of Misamis Oriental (Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro
City) alleging that Vitaliana was forcibly taken from her residence sometime
in 1987 and confined by herein petitioner in his palacial residence in Jasaan,
Misamis Oriental. Despite her desire to escape, Vitaliana was allegedly
deprived of her liberty without any legal authority. At the time the petition was
filed, it was alleged that Vitaliana was 25 years of age, single, and living with
petitioner Tomas Eugenio.
The respondent court in an order dated 28 September 1988 issued the writ of
habeas corpus, but the writ was returned unsatisfied. Petitioner refused to
surrender the body of Vitaliana (who had died on 28 August 1988) to the
respondent sheriff, reasoning that a corpse cannot be the subject of habeas
corpus proceedings; besides, according to petitioner, he had already
obtained a burial permit from the Undersecretary of the Department of
Health, authorizing the burial at the palace quadrangle of the Philippine
Benevolent Christian Missionary, Inc. (PBCM), a registered religious sect, of
which he (petitioner) is the Supreme President and Founder.
Petitioner also alleged that Vitaliana died of heart failure due to toxemia of
pregnancy in his residence on 28 August 1988. As her common law
husband, petitioner claimed legal custody of her body. These reasons were
incorporated in an explanation filed before the respondent court. Two (2)
orders dated 29 and 30 September 1988 were then issued by respondent
court, directing delivery of the deceased's body to a funeral parlor in
Cagayan de Oro City and its autopsy.
Petitioner (as respondent in the habeas corpus proceedings) filed an urgent
motion to dismiss the petition therein, claiming lack of jurisdiction of the court
over the nature of the action under sec. 1(b) of Rule 16 in relation to sec. 2,
Rule 72 of the Rules of Court.
1
A special proceeding for habeas corpus,
petitioner argued, is not applicable to a dead person but extends only to all
cases of illegal confinement or detention of a live person.
Before resolving the motion to dismiss, private respondents (as petitioners
below) were granted leave to amend their petition.
2
Claiming to have
knowledge of the death of Vitaliana only on 28 September 1988 (or after the
filing of the habeas corpus petition), private respondents (Vargases') alleged
that petitioner Tomas Eugenia who is not in any way related to Vitaliana was
wrongfully interfering with their (Vargases') duty to bury her. Invoking Arts.
305 and 308 of the Civil Code,
3
the Vargases contended that, as the next of
kin in the Philippines, they are the legal custodians of the dead body of their
sister Vitaliana. An exchange of pleadings followed. The motion to dismiss
was finally submitted for resolution on 21 October 1988.
In the absence of a restraining order from this Court, proceedings continued
before the respondent court; the body was placed in a coffin, transferred to
the Greenhills Memorial Homes in Cagayan de Oro City, viewed by the
presiding Judge of respondent court, and examined by a duly authorized
government pathologist.
4

Denying the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner, the court a quo held in an
order,
5
dated 17 November 1988, that:
It should be noted from the original petition, to the first
amended petition, up to the second amended petition that
the ultimate facts show that if the person of Vitaliana Vargas
turns out to be dead then this Court is being prayed to
declare the petitioners as the persons entitled to the custody,
interment and/or burial of the body of said deceased. The
Court, considering the circumstance that Vitaliana Vargas
was already dead on August 28, 1988 but only revealed to
the Court on September 29, 1988 by respondent's counsel,
did not lose jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of
this case because it may entertain this case thru the
allegations in the body of the petition on the determination as
to who is entitled to the custody of the dead body of the late
Vitaliana Vargas as well as the burial or interment thereof,
for the reason that under the provisions of Sec. 19 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, which reads as follows:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts
shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of
the litigation is incapable of pecuniary
estimation;
xxx xxx xxx
(5) In all actions involving the contract of
marriage and marital relations;
(6) In all cases not within the exclusive
jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or
body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions:
xxx xxx xxx
it so provides that the Regional Trial Court has exclusive
original jurisdiction to try this case. The authority to try the
issue of custody and burial of a dead person is within the
lawful jurisdiction of this Court because of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129 and because of the allegations of the pleadings in
this case, which are enumerated in Sec. 19, pars. 1, 5 and 6
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
Thereafter, the court a quo proceeded as in or civil cases and, in due course,
rendered a decision on 17 January 1989,
6
resolving the main issue of
whether or not said court acquired jurisdiction over the case by treating it as
an action for custody of a dead body, without the petitioners having to file a
separate civil action for such relief, and without the Court first dismissing the
original petition for habeas corpus.
Citing Sections 19 and 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1981),
7
Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 135 of the Rules of
Court
8
Articles 305 and 308 in relation to Article 294 of the Civil Code and
Section 1104 of the Revised Administrative Code,
9
the decision stated:
. . . . By a mere reading of the petition the court observed
that the allegations in the original petition as well as in the
two amended petitions show that Vitaliana Vargas has been
restrained of her liberty and if she were dead then relief was
prayed for the custody and burial of said dead person. The
amendments to the petition were but elaborations but the
ultimate facts remained the same, hence, this court strongly
finds that this court has ample jurisdiction to entertain and sit
on this case as an action for custody and burial of the dead
body because the body of the petition controls and is binding
and since this case was raffled to this court to the exclusion
of all other courts, it is the primary duty of this court to decide
and dispose of this case. . . . .
10

Satisfied with its jurisdiction, the respondent court then proceeded to the
matter of rightful custody over the dead body, (for purposes of burial thereof).
The order of preference to give support under Art. 294 was used as the basis
of the award. Since there was no surviving spouse, ascendants or
descendants, the brothers and sisters were preferred over petitioner who
was merely a common law spouse, the latter being himself legally married to
another woman.
11

On 23 January 1989, a new petition for review with application for a
temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction was filed with this
Court (G.R. No. 86470). Raised therein were pure questions of law, basically
Identical to those raised in the earlier petition (G.R. No. 85140); hence, the
consolidation of both cases.
12
On 7 February 1989, petitioner filed an urgent
motion for the issuance of an injunction to maintain status quo pending
appeal, which this Court denied in a resolution dated 23 February 1989
stating that "Tomas Eugenio has so far failed to sufficiently establish a clear
legal right to the custody of the dead body of Vitaliana Vargas, which now
needs a decent burial." The petitions were then submitted for decision
without further pleadings.
Between the two (2) consolidated petitions, the following issues are raised:
1. propriety of a habeas corpus proceeding under Rule 102
of the Rules of Court to recover custody of the dead body of
a 25 year old female, single, whose nearest surviving
claimants are full blood brothers and sisters and a common
law husband.
2. jurisdiction of the RTC over such proceedings and/or its
authority to treat the action as one for
custody/possession/authority to bury the deceased/recovery
of the dead.
3. interpretation of par. 1, Art. 294 of the
Civil Code (Art. 199 of the new Family Code)
which states:
Art. 294. The claim for support, when proper
and two or more persons are obliged to give
it, shall be made in the following order:
(1) From
the spouse;
xxx xxx xxx
Section 19, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 provides for the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts over civil cases. Under Sec. 2, Rule
102 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus may be granted by a
Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court). It is an elementary rule of
procedure that what controls is not the caption of the complaint or petition;
but the allegations therein determine the nature of the action, and even
without the prayer for a specific remedy, proper relief may nevertheless be
granted by the court if the facts alleged in the complaint and the evidence
introduced so warrant.
13

When the petition for habeas corpus was filed before the court a quo, it was
not certain whether Vitaliana was dead or alive. While habeas corpus is a
writ of right, it will not issue as a matter of course or as a mere perfimetory
operation on the filing of the petition. Judicial discretion is exercised in its
issuance, and such facts must be made to appear to the judge to whom the
petition is presented as, in his judgment, prima facie entitle the petitioner to
the writ.
14
While the court may refuse to grant the writ if the petition is
insufficient in form and substance, the writ should issue if the petition
complies with the legal requirements and its averments make a prima facie
case for relief. However, a judge who is asked to issue a writ of habeas
corpus need not be very critical in looking into the petition for very clear
grounds for the exercise of this jurisdiction. The latter's power to make full
inquiry into the cause of commitment or detention will enable him to correct
any errors or defects in the petition.
15

In Macazo and Nunez vs. Nunez, 16 the Court frowned upon the dismissal of
a habeas corpus petition filed by a brother to obtain custody of a minor sister,
stating:
All these circumstances notwithstanding, we believe that the
case should not have been dismissed. The court below
should not have overlooked that by dismissing the petition, it
was virtually sanctioning the continuance of an adulterous
and scandalous relation between the minor and her married
employer, respondent Benildo Nunez against all principles of
law and morality. It is no excuse that the minor has
expressed preference for remaining with said respondent,
because the minor may not chose to continue an illicit
relation that morals and law repudiate.
xxx xxx xxx
The minor's welfare being the paramount consideration, the
court below should not allow the technicality, that Teofilo
Macazo was not originally made a party, to stand in the way
of its giving the child full protection. Even in a habeas corpus
proceeding the court had power to award temporary custody
to the petitioner herein, or some other suitable person, after
summoning and hearing all parties concerned. What matters
is that the immoral situation disclosed by the records be not
allowed to continue.
17

After the fact of Vitaliana's death was made known to the petitioners in the
habeas corpus proceedings, amendment of the petition for habeas corpus,
not dismissal, was proper to avoid multiplicity of suits. Amendments to
pleadings are generally favored and should be liberally allowed in
furtherance of justice in order that every case may so far as possible be
determined on its real facts and in order to expedite the trial of cases or
prevent circuity of action and unnecessary expense, unless there are
circumstances such as inexcusable delay or the taking of the adverse party
by surprise or the like, which justify a refusal of permission to amend.
18
As
correctly alleged by respondents, the writ of habeas corpus as a remedy
became moot and academic due to the death of the person allegedly
restrained of liberty, but the issue of custody remained, which the court a quo
had to resolve.
Petitioner claims he is the spouse contemplated under Art. 294 of the Civil
Code, the term spouse used therein not being preceded by any qualification;
hence, in the absence of such qualification, he is the rightful custodian of
Vitaliana's body. Vitaliana's brothers and sisters contend otherwise. Indeed,
Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and
woman not legally married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife,
who represent themselves to the public as husband and wife, and who are
reputed to be husband and wife in the community where they live may be
considered legally mauled in common law jurisdictions but not in the
Philippines.
19

While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the fact that such
relationships are present in our society, and that they produce a community
of properties and interests which is governed by law,
20
authority exists in
case law to the effect that such form of co-ownership requires that the man
and woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract
marriage.
21
In any case, herein petitioner has a subsisting marriage with
another woman, a legal impediment which disqualified him from even legally
marrying Vitaliana. In Santero vs. CFI of Cavite,
22
,the Court, thru Mr. Justice
Paras, interpreting Art. 188 of the Civil Code (Support of Surviving Spouse
and Children During Liquidation of Inventoried Property) stated: "Be it noted
however that with respect to 'spouse', the same must be the legitimate
'spouse' (not common-law spouses)."
There is a view that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the term
"spouse" embraces common law relation for purposes of exemption from
criminal liability in cases of theft, swindling and malicious mischief committed
or caused mutually by spouses. The Penal Code article, it is said, makes no
distinction between a couple whose cohabitation is sanctioned by a
sacrament or legal tie and another who are husband and wife de facto.
23
But
this view cannot even apply to the facts of the case at bar. We hold that the
provisions of the Civil Code, unless expressly providing to the contrary as in
Article 144, when referring to a "spouse" contemplate a lawfully wedded
spouse. Petitioner vis-a-vis Vitaliana was not a lawfully-wedded spouse to
her; in fact, he was not legally capacitated to marry her in her lifetime.
Custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to her surviving
brothers and sisters (the Vargases). Section 1103 of the Revised
Administrative Code provides:
Sec. 1103. Persons charged with duty of burial. The
immediate duty of burying the body of a deceased person,
regardless of the ultimate liability for the expense thereof,
shall devolve upon the persons hereinbelow specified:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) If the deceased was an unmarried man
or woman, or a child, and left any kin, the
duty of burial shall devolve upon the nearest
of kin of the deceased, if they be adults and
within the Philippines and in possession of
sufficient means to defray the necessary
expenses.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Both petitions are
hereby DISMISSED. No Costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic vs. Dagdag
QUISUMBING, J .:
For review on certiorari is the decision
1
of the Court of Appeals dated April
22, 1993, in CA-G.R. CY No. 34378, which affirmed the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City in Civil Case No. 380-0-90 declaring
the marriage of Erlinda Matias Dagdag and Avelino Dagdag void under
Article 36 of the Family Code.
On September 7, 1975, Erlinda Matias, 16 years old, married Avelino
Parangan Dagdag, 20 years old, at the Iglesia Filipina Independent Church in
Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija.
2
The marriage certificate was issued by the Office of
the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, on
October 20, 1988.
Erlinda and Avelino begot two children, namely: Avelyn M. Dagdag, born on
January 16, 1978; and Eden M. Dagdag, born on April 21, 1982.
3
Their birth
certificates were issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the
Municipality of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, also on October 20, 1988.
Erlinda and Avelino lived in a house in District 8, Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija,
located at the back of the house of their in-laws.
4
A week after the wedding,
Avelino started leaving his family without explanation. He would disappear for
months, suddenly reappear for a few months, then disappear again. During
the times when he was with his family, he indulged in drinking sprees with
friends and would return home drunk. He would force his wife to submit to
sexual intercourse and if she refused, he would inflict physical injuries on
her.
5

On October 1993, he left his family again and that was the last they heard
from him. Erlinda was constrained to look for a job in Olongapo City as a
manicurist to support herself and her children. Finally, Erlinda learned that
Avelino was imprisoned for some crime,
6
and that he escaped from jail on
October 22, 1985.
7
A certification therefor dated February 14, 1990, was
issued by Jail Warden Orlando S. Limon. Avelino remains at-large to date.
On July 3, 1990, Erlinda filed with the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City
a petition for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
8
Since Avelino
could not be located, summons was served by publication in the Olongapo
News, a newspaper of general circulation, on September 3, 10, and 17,
1990.
9
Subsequently, a hearing was conducted to establish jurisdictional
facts. Thereafter, on December 17, 1990, the date set for presentation of
evidence, only Erlinda and her counsel appeared. Erlinda testified and
presented her sister-in-law, Virginia Dagdag, as her only witness.
Virginia testified that she is married to the brother of Avelino. She and her
husband live in Olongapo City but they spend their vacations at the house of
Avelino's parents in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija. She testified that Erlinda and
Avelino always quarrelled, and that Avelino never stayed for long at the
couple's house. She knew that Avelino had been gone for a long time now,
and that she pitied Erlinda and the children.
10

Thereafter, Erlinda rested her case. The trial court issued an Order giving the
investigating prosecutor until January 2, 1991, to manifest in writing whether
or not he would present controverting evidence, and stating that should he
fail to file said manifestation, the case would be deemed submitted for
decision.
In compliance with the Order, the investigating prosecutor conducted an
investigation and found that there was no collusion between the parties.
However, he intended to intervene in the case to avoid fabrication of
evidence.
11

On December 27, 1990, without waiting for the investigating prosecutor's
manifestation dated December 5, 1990, the trial court rendered a decision
12

declaring the marriage of Erlinda and Avelino void under Article 36 of the
Family Code, disposing thus:
"WHEREFORE, and viewed from the foregoing considerations, the
Court hereby declares the marriage celebrated at Cuyapo, Nueva
Ecija between Erlinda Matias and Avelino Dagdag on 7 September
1975 to be null and void.
The Local Civil Registrar of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija is hereby ordered
to enter into his Book of Marriage this declaration after this decision
shall have become final and executory .
SO ORDERED."
On January 29, 1991, the investigating prosecutor filed a Motion to Set Aside
Judgment on the ground that the decision was prematurely rendered since
he was given until January 2, 1991 to manifest whether he was presenting
controverting evidence.
The Office of the Solicitor General likewise filed a Motion for Reconsideration
of the decision on the ground that the same is not in accordance with the
evidence and the law. After requiring Erlinda to comment, the trial court
denied the Motion for Reconsideration in an Order dated August 21, 1991 as
follows:
13

"This resolves the Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of this
Honorable Court dated December 27, 1990 filed by the Solicitor-
General. The observation of the movant is to the effect that 'Mere
alcoholism and abusiveness are not enough to show psychological
incapacity. Nor is abandonment. These are common in marriage.
There must be showing that these traits, stemmed from
psychological incapacity existing at the time of celebration of the
marriage.
In the case at bar, the abandonment is prolonged as the husband left
his wife and children since 1983. The defendant, while in jail
escaped and whose present whereabouts are unknown. He failed to
support his family for the same period of time, actuations clearly
indicative of the failure of the husband to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage defined and enumerated under Article
68 of the Family Code. These findings of facts are uncontroverted.
1wphi1.nt
Defendant's character traits, by their nature, existed at the time of
marriage and became manifest only after the marriage. In rerum
natura, these traits are manifestations of lack of marital responsibility
and appear now to be incurable. Nothing can be graver since the
family members are now left to fend for themselves. Contrary to the
opinion of the Solicitor-General, these are not common in marriage.
Let it be said that the provisions of Article 36 of the New Family
Code, to assuage the sensibilities of the more numerous church, is a
substitute for divorce (See: Sempio Diy, New Family Code, p. 36) in
order to dissolve marriages that exist only in name.
WHEREFORE, and the foregoing considered, the motion for
Reconsideration aforecited is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED"
The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals, raising the sole
assignment of error that:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING APPELLEE'S
MARRIAGE TO A VELINO DAGDAG NULL AND VOID ON THE
GROUND OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF THE LATTER,
PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE, THE
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF THE NATURE
CONTEMPLATED BY THE LAW NOT HAVING BEEN PROVEN TO
EXIST.
14

On April 22, 1993, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision
15
affirming the
decision of the trial court, disposing thus:
"Avelino Dagdag is psychologically incapacitated not only because
he failed to perform the duties and obligations of a married person
but because he is emotionally immature and irresponsible, an
alcoholic, and a criminal. Necessarily, the plaintiff is now endowed
with the right to seek the judicial declaration of nullity of their
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. Defendant's constant
non-fulfillment of any of such obligations is continously (sic)
destroying the integrity or wholeness of his marriage with the plaintiff.
(Pineda, The Family Code of the Philippines Annotated, 1992 Ed., p.
46)."
16

Hence, the present petition for review ,
17
filed by the Solicitor General.
The Solicitor General contends that the alleged psychological incapacity of
Avelino Dagdag is not of the nature contemplated by Article 36 of the Family
Code. According to him, the Court of Appeals made an erroneous and
incorrect interpretation of the phrase "psychological incapacity" and an
incorrect application thereof to the facts of the case. Respondent, in her
Comment, insists that the facts constituting psychological incapacity were
proven by preponderance of evidence during trial.
At issue is whether or not the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly
declared the marriage as null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code,
on the ground that the husband suffers from psychological incapacity as he is
emotionally immature and irresponsible, a habitual alcoholic, and a fugitive
from justice.
Article 36 of the Family Code provides -
"A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even
if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization."
Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for
annulment of a marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of the law,
on the facts of the case. Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a
priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own
facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of
marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The
trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate
court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that
of the trial court.
18

In Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,
19
the Court laid down the
following GUIDELINES in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of
the Family Code:
"(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs
to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence
and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and
nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our
laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. x x x
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity
must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the
court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill
to such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given
valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity
need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision
under the principle of ejusdem generis (Salita vs. Magtolis, 233
SCRA 100, June 13, 1994), nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists
and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness
was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but
the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even
relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity
must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not
necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be
effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine
to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to
procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential
obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of
the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be
shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less in will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the
person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code
20
as regards the husband
and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code
21
in
regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence
and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. x
x x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and
the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision
shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating
therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may
be, to the petition. The Solicitor-General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15)
days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of
the court. The Solicitor-General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095."
22

Taking into consideration these guidelines, it is evident that Erlinda failed to
comply with the above-mentioned evidentiary requirements. Erlinda failed to
comply with guideline No. 2 which requires that the root cause of
psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified and
sufficiently proven by experts, since no psychiatrist or medical doctor testified
as to the alleged psychological incapacity of her husband. Further, the
allegation that the husband is a fugitive from justice was not sufficiently
proven. In fact, the crime for which he was arrested was not even alleged.
The investigating prosecutor was likewise not given an opportunity to present
controverting evidence since the trial court's decision was prematurely
rendered.
In the case of Hernandez v. Court of Appeals,
23
we affirmed the dismissal of
the trial court and Court of Appeals of the petition for annulment on the
ground of dearth of the evidence presented. We further explained therein that
-
"Moreover, expert testimony should have been presented to
establish the precise cause of private respondent's psychological
incapacity, if any, in order to show that it existed at the inception of
the marriage. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
rests upon petitioner. The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987
Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic
autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the
family. (Art. II, Sec. 12, Art. XV, Secs. 1-2) Thus, any doubt should
be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. (citing Republic of
the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, supra. )"
24

WHEREFORE, the present petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of
the Court of Appeals dated April 22, 1993, in CA-G.R. CY No. 34378 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Pesca vs. Pesca
VITUG, J .:
Submitted for review is the decision of the Court of Appeals,
promulgated on 27 May 1998, in C.A. G.R. CV. No. 52374, reversing the
decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 130,
which has declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent to be
null and void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of
respondent.
Petitioner Lorna G. Pesca and respondent Zosimo A. Pesca first met
sometime in 1975 while on board an inter-island vessel bound for Bacolod
City. After a whirlwind courtship, they got married on 03 March 1975.
Initially, the young couple did not live together as petitioner was still a student
in college and respondent, a seaman, had to leave the country on board an
ocean-going vessel barely a month after the marriage. Six months later, the
young couple established their residence in Quezon City until they were able
to build their own house in Caloocan City where they finally resided. It was
blissful marriage for the couple during the two months of the year that they
could stay together when respondent was on vacation. The union begot
four children, 19-year old Ruhem, 17-year old Rez, 11-year old Ryan, and 9-
year old Richie.
It started in 1988, petitioner said, when she noticed that respondent
surprisingly showed signs of psychological incapacity to perform his marital
covenant. His "true color" of being an emotionally immature and
irresponsible husband became apparent. He was cruel and violent. He was
a habitual drinker, staying with friends daily from 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon
until 1:00 o'clock in the morning. When cautioned to stop or, to at least,
minimize his drinking, respondent would beat, slap and kick her. At one time,
he chased petitioner with a loaded shotgun and threatened to kill her in the
presence of the children. The children themselves were not spared from
physical violence.
Finally, on 19 November 1992, petitioner and her children left the
conjugal abode to live in the house of her sister in Quezon City as they could
no longer bear his violent ways. Two months later, petitioner decided to
forgive respondent, and she returned home to give him a chance to change.
But, to her dismay, things did not so turn out as expected. Indeed, matters
became worse.
On the morning of 22 March 1994, about eight oclock, respondent
assaulted petitioner for about half an hour in the presence of the children.
She was battered black and blue. She submitted herself to medical
examination at the Quezon City General Hospital, which diagnosed her
injuries as contusions and abrasions. Petitioner filed a complaint with the
barangay authorities, and a case was filed against respondent for slight
physical injuries. He was convicted by the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Caloocan City and sentenced to eleven days of imprisonment.
This time, petitioner and her children left the conjugal home for good
and stayed with her sister. Eventually, they decided to rent an apartment.
Petitioner sued respondent before the Regional Trial Court for the declaration
of nullity of their marriage invoking psychological incapacity. Petitioner
likewise sought the custody of her minor children and prayed for support
pendente lite.
Summons, together with a copy of the complaint, was served on
respondent on 25 April 1994 by personal service by the sheriff. As
respondent failed to file an answer or to enter his appearance within the
reglementary period, the trial court ordered the city prosecutor to look into a
possible collusion between the parties. Prosecutor Rosa C. Reyes, on 03
August 1994, submitted her report to the effect that she found no evidence to
establish that there was collusion between the parties.
On 11 January 1995, respondent belatedly filed, without leave of court,
an answer, and the same, although filed late, was admitted by the court. In
his answer, respondent admitted the fact of his marriage with petitioner and
the birth of their children. He also confirmed the veracity of Annex "A" of the
complaint which listed the conjugal property. Respondent vehemently
denied, however, the allegation that he was psychologically incapacitated.
On 15 November 1995, following hearings conducted by it, the trial court
rendered its decision declaring the marriage between petitioner and
respondent to be null and void ab initio on the basis of psychological
incapacity on the part of respondent and ordered the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership.
Respondent appealed the above decision to the Court of Appeals,
contending that the trial court erred, particularly, in holding that there was
legal basis to declare the marriage null and void and in denying his motion to
reopen the case.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and
declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent valid and
subsisting. The appellate court said:
"Definitely the appellee has not established the following: That the
appellant showed signs of mental incapacity as would cause him to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenant, as so provided for in Article 68 of
the Family Code; that the incapacity is grave, has preceded the marriage and
is incurable; that his incapacity to meet his marital responsibility is because
of a psychological, not physical illness; that the root cause of the incapacity
has been identified medically or clinically, and has been proven by an expert;
and that the incapacity is permanent and incurable in nature.
The burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage lies in the plaintiff
and any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation
of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity."
i[1]

Petitioner, in her plea to this Court, would have the decision of the Court
of Appeals reversed on the thesis that the doctrine enunciated in Santos vs.
Court of Appeals,
ii[2]
promulgated on 14 January 1995, as well as the
guidelines set out in Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina,
iii[3]

promulgated on 13 February 1997, should have no retroactive application
and, on the assumption that the Molina ruling could be applied retroactively,
the guidelines therein outlined should be taken to be merely advisory and not
mandatory in nature. In any case, petitioner argues, the application of the
Santos and Molina dicta should warrant only a remand of the case to the
trial court for further proceedings and not its dismissal.
Be that as it may, respondent submits, the appellate court did not err in
its assailed decision for there is absolutely no evidence that has been shown
to prove psychological incapacity on his part as the term has been so defined
in Santos.
Indeed, there is no merit in the petition.
The term psychological incapacity, as a ground for the declaration of
nullity of a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, has been explained
by the Court in Santos and reiterated in Molina. The Court, in Santos,
concluded:
"It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including,
and most importantly, the deliberations of the Family Code Revision
Committee itself, that the use of the phrase `psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible
cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical
authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances
(cited in Fr. Artemio Balumad's `Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family
Code and their Parallels in Canon Law, quoting form the Diagnostic
Statistical Manuel of Mental Disorder by the American Psychiatric
Association; Edward Hudson's `Handbook II for Marriage Nullity Cases).
Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently
of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on
marriage. Thus correlated, `psychological incapacity should refer to no less
than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so
expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations
to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been
to confine the meaning of `psychological incapacity to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity
or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This
psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated."
The "doctrine of stare decisis," ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code,
expresses that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form
part of the legal system of the Philippines. The rule follows the settled legal
maxim legis interpretado legis vim obtinet that the interpretation placed
upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law.
iv[4]
The
interpretation or construction placed by the courts establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent of the law. The latter as so interpreted
and construed would thus constitute a part of that law as of the date the
statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court finds itself later
overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to
be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old
doctrine and have acted in good faith in accordance therewith
v[5]
under the
familiar rule of lex prospicit, non respicit.
The phrase psychological incapacity, borrowed from Canon law, is an
entirely novel provision in our statute books, and, until the relatively recent
enactment of the Family Code, the concept has escaped jurisprudential
attention. It is in Santos when, for the first time, the Court has given life to
the term. Molina, that followed, has additionally provided procedural
guidelines to assist the courts and the parties in trying cases for annulment of
marriages grounded on psychological incapacity. Molina has strengthened,
not overturned, Santos.
At all events, petitioner has utterly failed, both in her allegations in the
complaint and in her evidence, to make out a case of psychological
incapacity on the part of respondent, let alone at the time of solemnization of
the contract, so as to warrant a declaration of nullity of the marriage.
Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, invoked by her, cannot be equated
with psychological incapacity.
The Court reiterates its reminder that marriage is an inviolable social
institution and the foundation of the family
vi[6]
that the State cherishes and
protects. While the Court commisserates with petitioner in her unhappy
marital relationship with respondent, totally terminating that relationship,
however, may not necessarily be the fitting denouement to it. In these
cases, the law has not quite given up, neither should we.
WHEREFORE, the herein petition is DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Choa vs. Choa
DAVIDE, JR., J .:
The uncomplicated issues in this administrative complaint have been
properly joined with the filing of the respondents comment as required in the
1st Indorsement of 18 August 1995 of Hon. Bernardo P. Abesamis, Deputy
Court Administrator. No further pleadings need be required from the parties.
In the complaint signed by Atty. Raymundo A. Quiroz as counsel for the
complainant and verified by the latter, the respondent is charged with grave
misconduct, gross bias and partiality, and having knowingly rendered an
unjust judgment in Criminal Case No. 50322 entitled, People of the
Philippines vs. Alfonso C. Choa.
Criminal Case No. 50322 was for Perjury and initiated by the
complainants wife, Leni L. Ong-Choa, through the filing of a letter-complaint
with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Bacolod City. This complaint arose
from the alleged untruthful statements or falsehoods in the complainants
Petition for Naturalization dated 30 March 1989 which was docketed as Case
No. 5395, of Branch 41 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City.
In due course, an Information was filed, in the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MCTC) of Bacolod City by the Office of the Prosecutor, charging the
complainant herein with perjury allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 30th day of March, 1989, in the City of Bacolod,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein
accused, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly
made untruthful statements of [sic] falsehoods upon material matters
required by the Revised Naturalization Law (C.A. No. 473) in his verified
Petition for Naturalization dated April 13, 1989, subscribed and sworn to
before Notary Public Felomino B. Tan, Jr., who is authorized to administer
oath[s], which petition bears Doc. No. 140; Page No. 29; Book No. XXIII; and
Series of 1989, in the Notarial Register of said Notary Public, by stating
therein the following, to wit:
5. 1 am married to a Filipino. My wifes name is Leni Ong
Choa and now resides at 46 Malaspina Street, Bacolod City. I have
two (2) children, whose names, dates and places of birth, and
residences are as follows:
NAME DATE OF
PLACE RESIDENCE
BIRTH
OF BIRTH
ALBRYAN July 19,
Bacolod 46 Malaspina St.,
ONG CUQA 1981 City
Bacolod City
CHERYL LYNNE May 5, Bacolod
46 Malaspina St.,
ONG CHOA 1983
City Bacolod City
xxx xxx xxx
10. I am of good moral character, I believe in the principles
underlying the Philippine Constitution. I have conducted myself in a
proper and irreprQachable manner during the entire period of my
residence in the Philippines in my relations with the constituted
government as well as with
the community in which 1 am living.
xxx xxx xxx
When in truth and in fact said accused knew that his wife Leni Ong
Choa and their two (2) children were not then residing at the said
address at No. 46 Malaspina Street, Villamonte, Bacolod City,
having left the aforesaid residence in 1984, or about five (5) years
earlier and were then residing at Hervias Subdivision, Bacolod City,
that contrary to his aforesaid allegations in his verified Petition for
Naturalization, accused while residing at 211, 106 Street,
Greenplains Subdivision, Bacolod City, has been carrying on an
immoral and illicit relationship with one Stella Flores Saludar, a
woman not his wife since 1984, and begotting [sic] two (2) children
with her as a consequence, as he and his wife, the private offended
party herein, have long been separated from bed and boards [sic]
since 1984; which falsehoods and/ or immoral and improper
conduct are grounds for disqualifications [sic] of [sic] becoming a
citizen of the Philippines.
Act contrary to law.
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 50322 and was assigned
to Branch III thereof where the respondent is the presiding Judge.
After trial, the respondent Judge rendered judgment on 21 February
1995 and found the complainant herein guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of perjury. The respondent Judge accordingly sentenced him to
suffer the penalty of six months and one day of prision correccional and to
pay the costs.
The complainant moved for a reconsideration of the judgment alleging
that: (1) there is no basis for the conviction since his petition for naturalization
had been withdrawn and therefore had become functus officio; (2) the
petition for naturalization is a pleading, hence its allegations are privileged;
and (3) his prosecution violates the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. The last ground is founded on an admission made by a
representative of the Office of the Solicitor General of her lack of knowledge
of any perjury case filed based on a withdrawn or dismissed petition for
naturalization.
The respondent Judge denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of
merit in an order dated 31 March 1995.
The complainant filed the instant complaint on 14 July. 1995 and prayed
for the removal of the respondent fudge from office. As grounds therefor, he
alleges that:
(1) The respondent Judge is guilty of Grave Misconduct, Gross
Bias and Partiality, and Knowingly Rendering An Unjust
Judgment when he intentionally failed to divulge the next-door-
neighbor relationship between him and the family of Leni Ong
Choa and to disqualify himself from sitting in the criminal case
on such ground as part of the grand design and preconceived
intention to unjustly convict the complainant of the crime
charged without due process.
(2) The allegations in the Information do not constitute the offense
of perjury.
(3) The petition having been withdrawn with finality, it has become
functus oficio and it is as if the Petition was not filed at all so
that whatever false statemeuts were contained therein were no
longer requiredby law and had ceased to be on a material
matter.
(4) The respondent Judge admitted for prosecution Exhibit P
(handwritten list of properties) even if this was self-serving as it
was undated and unsigned; and Exhibit Q (letter of Leni Ong
Choas counsel to the complainant) even if it was also self-
serving as there was no showing that he received the letter.
(5) The respondent Judge has sentenced the complainant to suffer
a penalty higher than that provided by law, without applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law.
The respondent Judge refutes the charge in his Comment dated 12
September 1995, thus:
He denies being the next-door-neighbor of Leni Ong Choa
there being a house, belonging to the Sia family, separating his
house and that of Leni Choa; he and the rest of the members of his
family are not acquainted with Leni Choa or any member of her
family and had not exchanged greetings nor is he even a nodding
acquaintance of Leni Choa or any member of her family.
He asserts that if the allegations in the Information do not
constitute an offense, the complainant should have filed a Motion to
Quash but he did not. Just the same, when the complainant stated
in the Petition that he together with his wife and children lived at 46
Malaspina St., Bacolod City, he committed a falsehood under oath
because the truth is two (2) years before the filing of the Petition,
his wife and two (2) children were not living with him anymore,
making him liable for perjury.
Respondent also avers that the complainant is not of good
moral character contrary to what he stated in the Petition for
Naturalization since he is conducting an extra-marital relationship
with Stella Flores Saludar, his former employee, with whom he has
begotten two (2) children. As a matter of fact, a case for
concubinage against complainant was filed and is now pending in
Court.
According to the respondent, a reading of the Order granting
the Motion to Withdraw the Petition will show that the Prosecutor
representing the Office of the Solicitor General opposed the Motion
to Withdraw the Petition for the reason that the complainant had
abandoned his wife and two (2) children, is not giving them support
and is now living with his paramour.
On the claim of the complainant that his petition for
naturalization has became functus officio in view of its withdrawal,
hence no longer existent, the respondent Judge maintains that the
withdrawal reduced the petition to functus officio only for the
purpose of the Special Proceedings. but not when it is used as
evidence in other cases.
On the issue of the admissibility of the Exhibits P. Q and R,
the respondent Judge contends that Exhibits P. Q and R were duly
identified by Leni Ong Choa and her testimonies on these were
found to be credible by the Court.
Finally, respondent Judge asserts that the Indeterminate
Sentence Law is not applicable in the perjury case as the penalty
imposed by the court did not exceed one (1) year.
The respondent Judge then prays for the dismissal of the complaint for
being patently without merit and for the censure and reprimand of the
complainants counsel with a warning to refrain from filing similar harassment
suits.
In the Evaluation contained in a Memorandum dated 17 November 1995
and duly approved by the Court Mministrator, Hon. Zenaida N. Elepao,
Deputy Court Administrator, makes the following findings and conclusions:
EVALUATION: A careful study of the records shows that the
allegations of the complainant are devoid of any merit.
The charge that respondent Judge and Leni Choa are
neighbors [sic] appears to be petty under the circumstances.
Granting that they are indeed next-door neighbors does not
necessarily mean that respondent Judge has violated Rule 137 of
the Rules of Court for Disqualification of Judges. Nowhere in said
Rule is it ordained that being the neighbor of a party-litigant is
reason enough for the Judge to disqualify himself from hearing the
formers case.
With respect to the complainants claim that the allegations in
the information do not constitute the offense of perjury, an
administrative proceeding is not the forum to decide whether the
judge has erred or not, especially as complainant has appealed his
conviction.
Even if the matter can be examined, we do not find any error
in the Courts decision.
The elements of perjury as enumerated in the case of People of the
Philippines vs. Bautista (C.A., 40 O.G. 2491) are as follows:
(a) Statement in the affidavit upon material matter made under
oath;
(b) The affiant swears to the truthfulness of the statements in his
affidavit before a competent officer authorized to administer
oath;
(c) There is a willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood; and
(d) Sworn statement containing the falsity is required by law.
It cannot be denied that the petition for naturalization filed by
Alfonso C. Choa was made under oath and before a competent
officer authorized to administer oath as shown by the records (p. 4,
APPENDIX A). This petition for naturalization is required by law
as a condition precedent for the grant of Philippine citizenship
(Section 7 Corn. Act No. 473).
The question now boils down to whether there is a willful and
deliberate assertion of falsehood.
As shown by the records (p. 1, APPENDIX A), Alfonso C.
Choa declared in his petition dated 30 March 1989 that his wife
Leni Ong Choa resides at 46 Ma!aspina St. Bacolod City while in
the administrative complaint he filed against respondent Judge, he
stated that his wife Leni Ong Choa left their family residence (46
Malaspina St., Bacolod City) in the latter part of 1984 (p. 6, par. 2
of Adrn. Complaint). This simply means that when he filed his
petition for naturalization, Leni Ong Choa was not residing at the
abovementioned address anymore.
It was also proven that Alfonso C. Choa had a child with a
woman not his wife and he himself signed the birth certificate as
the father of that child (p. 4, APPENDIX E). This is contrary to
what he declared in his petition that he is of good moral character
which is required under the Naturalization Law (par. 3, Sec. 2 Corn.
Act No. 473).
There wa therefore a deliberate assertion of falsehood by
Alfonso C.. Choa to warrant conviction for perjury as found by
Judge Chiongson.
As to the complainants claim that the withdrawal of the
petitiorr makes it functus officio, we sustain the respondent Judges
view that the Petition can be used as evidence in another case. In
the case of People of the Philippines vs. Cainglet (16 SCRA 748)
the Court held that every interest of public policy demands that
perjury be not shielded by artificial refinements and narrow
technicalities. For perjury strikes at the very administration of the
laws (Jay vs. State, [1916] 15 Ala. App. 255, 43 So. 137). It is the
policy of the law that judicial proceedings and judgment shall be fair
and free from fraud, Sand that litigants and parties be encouraged
to tell the truth and that they be punished if they do not (People vs.
Niles, 300 III., 458, 133 N.E. 252,37 A.R.L. 1284, 1289).
On whether the judge erred in not applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law to the case, we cite Section 2 of R.A. No. 4103
(Indeterminate Sentence Law) which provides in part that This Act
shall not apply to x x x those whose maximum term of
imprisonment does not exceed one year, x x x Since the penalty
for perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code is arresto
mayor in its maximum period which is one (1) month and one (1)
day to six (6) months toprision correccional in its minimum period
which is six (6) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four
(4) months, the respondent Judge was correct in not applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law.
As earlier stated, the foregoing discussion is in no way the
final appreciation of the Courts decision which is on appeal, but is
made only to illustrate the utter lack of merit of this charge. Counsel
for the complainant must be reprimanded for assisting in the filing
of this complaint.
Deputy Court Administrator Elepaflo then recommends:
Premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that this
complaint against Judge Roberto S. Chiongson be DISMISSED for
lack of merit. It is further recommended that Atty. Raymundo A.
Quiroz be REPRIMANDED for assisting in the filing of a patently
unmeritorious complaint.
We fully agree with Deputy Court Administrator Elepaflo that the allegations
in the complaint are utterly devoid of merit. Good faith and good motive did
not seem to have inspired the filing of the complaint.
Indeed, as correctly pointed out by the respondent, if the complainant
and his counsel honestly believed that the allegations in the Information in
the perjury case did not constitute an offense, they should have filed a
motion to quash. Under Section 3(a), Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, the
accused may move to quash the complaint or information on this ground.
The complainant never did; he was arraigned and entered intp trial.
Although his failure to do so did not operate as a waiver of the said ground
pursuant to Section 8 of the same Rule, it showed, nevertheless, his
admission of the weakness of the ground. If he had perceived it to be strong,
he would not have wasted an opportunity to put an early end to the ordeal of
a prolonged litigation. Besides, this ground had not at all been invoked by
him, as shown in the order of 31 March 1995 denying the complainants
motion for the reconsideration.
The withdrawal of the Petition for Naturalization did not and cannot
amount to a recall of the questioned untruthful statements. Neither could it
extinguish any offense which may have been committed by reason of such
untruthful statements.
As to the respondent Judges being a next-door neighbor of the
complainants wife - the complainant in the perjury case - it must be stressed
that that alone is not a ground for either a mandatory disqualification under
the first paragraph or for a voluntary disqualification under the second
paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court. In any event, the
complainant has failed to disclose in his complaint that he had raised this
matter at any time before the rendition of the judgment. In fact, the summary
of the grounds of his motion for reconsideration in the respondents order
denying the said motion does not include this matter. If indeed the
complainant honestly believed in the justness of this grievance, he would
have raised it in an appropriate pleading before the trial court.
Finally, the nature and character of the complainants grievances
relative to the respondents judgment finding the former guilty of perjury. May
only be properly ventilated in an appropriate judicial proceeding, such as an
appeal from the judgment.
This kind of recourse, whether made in addition to a regular appeal from
the judgment, or in lieu thereof, if none had been made, is clearly without any
basis and cannot be tolerated for it robs Judges of precious time which they
could otherwise devote to the cases in their courts or to the unclogging of
their dockets.
Atty. Raymundo A. Quiroz, counsel for the complainant, must have been
aware of the utter lack of merit of the charges against the respondent. As a
Member of the Philippine Bar he is bound: (1) by his oath, not to, wittingly or
willingly, promote or sue any groundless, false, or unlawful suit nor give aid
nor consent to the same; (2) by Section 20(c), Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court, to counsel or maintain such action or proceedings only as appear to
him to be just; and (3) to uphold the Code of Professional Responsibility. It
was incumbent upon him to give a candid and honest opinion on the merits
and probable results of the complainants case (Rule 15.05, Canon 15, Code
of Professional Responsibility) with the end in view of promoting respect for
the law and legal processes (Canon 1, Id.). He should, therefore, be required
to show cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against him for his
apparent failure to observe the foregoing duties and responsibilities.
WHEREFORE, for want of merit, the instant complaint is DISMISSED.
For the reasons above stated, Atty. Raymundo A. Quiroz is hereby
directed to SHOW CAUSE, within fifteen (15) days from notice hereof, why
he should not be disciplinarily dealt with for his apparent failure to comply
with his duties and responsibilities above stated.
SO ORDERED.
Antonio vs. Reyes
TINGA, J .:
Statistics never lie, but lovers often do, quipped a sage. This sad truth has
unsettled many a love transformed into matrimony. Any sort of deception
between spouses, no matter the gravity, is always disquieting. Deceit to the
depth and breadth unveiled in the following pages, dark and irrational as in
the modern noir tale, dims any trace of certitude on the guilty spouses
capability to fulfill the marital obligations even more.
The Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision
1
and Resolution
2
of
the Court of Appeals dated 29 November 2001 and 24 October 2002. The
Court of Appeals had reversed the judgment
3
of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Makati declaring the marriage of Leonilo N. Antonio (petitioner) and
Marie Ivonne F. Reyes (respondent), null and void. After careful
consideration, we reverse and affirm instead the trial court.
Antecedent Facts
Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when petitioner was 26 years
old and respondent was 36 years of age. Barely a year after their first
meeting, they got married before a minister of the Gospel
4
at the Manila City
Hall, and through a subsequent church wedding
5
at the Sta. Rosa de Lima
Parish, Bagong Ilog, Pasig, Metro Manila on 6 December 1990.
6
Out of their
union, a child was born on 19 April 1991, who sadly died five (5) months
later.
On 8 March 1993,
7
petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage to
respondent declared null and void. He anchored his petition for nullity on
Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. He
asserted that respondents incapacity existed at the time their marriage was
celebrated and still subsists up to the present.
8

As manifestations of respondents alleged psychological incapacity, petitioner
claimed that respondent persistently lied about herself, the people around
her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and other events or
things,
9
to wit:
(1) She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an illegitimate
son,
10
and instead introduced the boy to petitioner as the adopted child of her
family. She only confessed the truth about the boys parentage when
petitioner learned about it from other sources after their marriage.
11

(2) She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin David, attempted to
rape and kill her when in fact, no such incident occurred.
12

(3) She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to her obstetrician, Dr.
Consuelo Gardiner, and told some of her friends that she graduated with a
degree in psychology, when she was neither.
13

(4) She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice talent affiliated with
Blackgold Recording Company (Blackgold); yet, not a single member of her
family ever witnessed her alleged singing activities with the group. In the
same vein, she postulated that a luncheon show was held at the Philippine
Village Hotel in her honor and even presented an invitation to that effect
14
but
petitioner discovered per certification by the Director of Sales of said hotel
that no such occasion had taken place.
15

(5) She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez, and under
those names, sent lengthy letters to petitioner claiming to be from Blackgold
and touting her as the "number one moneymaker" in the commercial industry
worth P2 million.
16
Petitioner later found out that respondent herself was the
one who wrote and sent the letters to him when she admitted the truth in one
of their quarrels.
17
He likewise realized that Babes Santos and Via Marquez
were only figments of her imagination when he discovered they were not
known in or connected with Blackgold.
18

(6) She represented herself as a person of greater means, thus, she altered
her payslip to make it appear that she earned a higher income. She bought a
sala set from a public market but told petitioner that she acquired it from a
famous furniture dealer.
19
She spent lavishly on unnecessary items and
ended up borrowing money from other people on false pretexts.
20

(7) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the extent of calling
up his officemates to monitor his whereabouts. When he could no longer take
her unusual behavior, he separated from her in August 1991. He tried to
attempt a reconciliation but since her behavior did not change, he finally left
her for good in November 1991.
21

In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Dante Herrera Abcede (Dr.
Abcede), a psychiatrist, and Dr. Arnulfo V.
Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical psychologist, who stated, based on the tests
they conducted, that petitioner was essentially a normal, introspective, shy
and conservative type of person. On the other hand, they observed that
respondents persistent and constant lying
to petitioner was abnormal or pathological. It undermined the basic
relationship that should be based on love, trust and respect.
22
They further
asserted that respondents extreme jealousy was also pathological. It
reached the point of paranoia since there was no actual basis for her to
suspect that petitioner was having an affair with another woman. They
concluded based on the foregoing that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations.
23

In opposing the petition, respondent claimed that she performed her marital
obligations by attending to all the needs of her husband. She asserted that
there was no truth to the allegation that she fabricated stories, told lies and
invented personalities.
24
She presented her version, thus:
(1) She concealed her child by another man from petitioner because she was
afraid of losing her husband.
25

(2) She told petitioner about Davids attempt to rape and kill her because she
surmised such intent from Davids act of touching her back and ogling her
from head to foot.
26

(3) She was actually a BS Banking and Finance graduate and had been
teaching psychology at the Pasig Catholic School for two (2) years.
27

(4) She was a free-lance voice talent of Aris de las Alas, an executive
producer of Channel 9 and she had done three (3) commercials with McCann
Erickson for the advertisement of Coca-cola, Johnson & Johnson, and
Traders Royal Bank. She told petitioner she was a Blackgold recording artist
although she was not under contract with the company, yet she reported to
the Blackgold office after office hours. She claimed that a luncheon show
was indeed held in her honor at the Philippine Village Hotel on 8 December
1979.
28

(5) She vowed that the letters sent to petitioner were not written by her and
the writers thereof were not fictitious. Bea Marquez Recto of the Recto
political clan was a resident of the United States while Babes Santos was
employed with Saniwares.
29

(6) She admitted that she called up an officemate of her husband but averred
that she merely asked the latter in a diplomatic matter if she was the one
asking for chocolates from petitioner, and not to monitor her husbands
whereabouts.
30

(7) She belied the allegation that she spent lavishly as she supported almost
ten people from her monthly budget of P7,000.00.
31

In fine, respondent argued that apart from her non-disclosure of a child prior
to their marriage, the other lies attributed to her by petitioner were mostly
hearsay and unconvincing. Her stance was that the totality of the evidence
presented is not sufficient for a finding of psychological incapacity on her
part.
32

In addition, respondent presented Dr. Antonio Efren Reyes (Dr. Reyes), a
psychiatrist, to refute the allegations anent her psychological condition. Dr.
Reyes testified that the series of tests conducted by his assistant,
33
together
with the screening procedures and the Comprehensive Psycho-Pathological
Rating Scale (CPRS) he himself conducted, led him to conclude that
respondent was not psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential
marital obligations. He postulated that regressive behavior, gross
neuroticism, psychotic tendencies, and poor control of impulses, which are
signs that might point to the presence of disabling trends, were not elicited
from respondent.
34

In rebuttal, Dr. Lopez asseverated that there were flaws in the evaluation
conducted by Dr. Reyes as (i) he was not the one who administered and
interpreted respondents psychological evaluation, and (ii) he made use of
only one instrument called CPRS which was not reliable because a good liar
can fake the results of such test.
35

After trial, the lower court gave credence to petitioners evidence and held
that respondents propensity to lying about almost anythingher occupation,
state of health, singing abilities and her income, among othershad been
duly established. According to the trial court, respondents fantastic ability to
invent and fabricate stories and personalities enabled her to live in a world of
make-believe. This made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her
incapable of giving meaning and significance to her marriage.
36
The trial
court thus declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and
void.
Shortly before the trial court rendered its decision, the Metropolitan Tribunal
of the Archdiocese of Manila annulled the Catholic marriage of the parties, on
the ground of lack of due discretion on the part of the parties.
37
During the
pendency of the appeal before the Court of Appeals, the Metropolitan
Tribunals ruling was affirmed with modification by both the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal, which held instead that only respondent was
impaired by a lack of due discretion.
38
Subsequently, the decision of the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal was upheld by the Roman Rota of
the Vatican.
39

Petitioner duly alerted the Court of Appeals of these rulings by the Catholic
tribunals. Still, the appellate court reversed the RTCs judgment. While
conceding that respondent may not have been completely honest with
petitioner, the Court of Appeals nevertheless held that the totality of the
evidence presented was insufficient to establish respondents psychological
incapacity. It declared that the requirements in the case of Republic v. Court
of Appeals
40
governing the application and interpretation of psychological
incapacity had not been satisfied.
Taking exception to the appellate courts pronouncement, petitioner elevated
the case to this Court. He contends herein that the evidence conclusively
establish respondents psychological incapacity.
In considering the merit of this petition, the Court is heavily influenced by the
credence accorded by the RTC to the factual allegations of petitioner.
41
It is a
settled principle of civil procedure that the conclusions of the trial court
regarding the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect from the
appellate courts because the trial court had an opportunity to observe the
demeanor of witnesses while giving testimony which may indicate their
candor or lack thereof.
42
The Court is likewise guided by the fact that the
Court of Appeals did not dispute the veracity of the evidence presented by
petitioner. Instead, the appellate court concluded that such evidence was not
sufficient to establish the psychological incapacity of respondent.
43

Thus, the Court is impelled to accept the factual version of petitioner as the
operative facts. Still, the crucial question remains as to whether the state of
facts as presented by petitioner sufficiently meets the standards set for the
declaration of nullity of a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
These standards were definitively laid down in the Courts 1997 ruling in
Republic v. Court of Appeals
44
(also known as the Molina case
45
), and indeed
the Court of Appeals cited the Molina guidelines in reversing the RTC in the
case at bar.
46
Since Molina was decided in 1997, the Supreme Court has yet
to squarely affirm the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code.
47
In fact, even before Molina was handed down, there was only
one case, Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,
48
wherein the Court definitively
concluded that a spouse was psychologically incapacitated under Article 36.
This state of jurisprudential affairs may have led to the misperception that the
remedy afforded by Article 36 of the Family Code is hollow, insofar as the
Supreme Court is concerned.
49
Yet what Molina and the succeeding cases
did ordain was a set of guidelines which, while undoubtedly onerous on the
petitioner seeking the declaration of nullity, still leave room for a decree of
nullity under the proper circumstances. Molina did not foreclose the grant of a
decree of nullity under Article 36, even as it raised the bar for its allowance.
Legal Guides to Understanding Article 36
Article 36 of the Family Code states that "[a] marriage contracted by any
party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be
void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization."
50

The concept of psychological incapacity as a ground for nullity of marriage is
novel in our body of laws, although mental incapacity has long been
recognized as a ground for the dissolution of a marriage.
The Spanish Civil Code of 1889 prohibited from contracting marriage
persons "who are not in the full enjoyment of their reason at the time of
contracting marriage."
51
Marriages with such persons were ordained as
void,
52
in the same class as marriages with underage parties and persons
already married, among others. A partys mental capacity was not a ground
for divorce under the Divorce Law of 1917,
53
but a marriage where "either
party was of unsound mind" at the time of its celebration was cited as an
"annullable marriage" under the Marriage Law of 1929.
54
Divorce on the
ground of a spouses incurable insanity was permitted under the divorce law
enacted during the Japanese occupation.
55
Upon the enactment of the Civil
Code in 1950, a marriage contracted by a party of "unsound mind" was
classified under Article 85 of the Civil Code as a voidable marriage.
56
The
mental capacity, or lack thereof, of the marrying spouse was not among the
grounds for declaring a marriage void ab initio.
57
Similarly, among the
marriages classified as voidable under Article 45 (2) of the Family Code is
one contracted by a party of unsound mind.
58

Such cause for the annulment of marriage is recognized as a vice of consent,
just like insanity impinges on consent freely given which is one of the
essential requisites of a contract.
59
The initial common consensus on
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code was that it did
not constitute a specie of vice of consent. Justices Sempio-Diy and Caguioa,
both members of the Family Code revision committee that drafted the Code,
have opined that psychological incapacity is not a vice of consent, and
conceded that the spouse may have given free and voluntary consent to a
marriage but was nonetheless incapable of fulfilling such rights and
obligations.
60
Dr. Tolentino likewise stated in the 1990 edition of his
commentaries on the Family Code that this "psychological incapacity to
comply with the essential marital obligations does not affect the consent to
the marriage."
61

There were initial criticisms of this original understanding of Article 36 as
phrased by the Family Code committee. Tolentino opined that
"psychologically incapacity to comply would not be
juridically different from physical incapacity of consummating the marriage,
which makes the marriage only voidable under Article 45 (5) of the Civil Code
x x x [and thus] should have been a cause for annulment of the marriage
only."
62
At the same time, Tolentino noted "[it] would be different if it were
psychological incapacity to understand the essential marital obligations,
because then this would amount to lack of consent to the marriage."
63
These
concerns though were answered, beginning with Santos v. Court of
Appeals,
64
wherein the Court, through Justice Vitug, acknowledged that
"psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage."
65

The notion that psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to
understand the obligations of marriage, as opposed to a mere inability to
comply with them, was further affirmed in the Molina
66
case. Therein, the
Court, through then Justice (now Chief Justice) Panganiban observed that
"[t]he evidence [to establish psychological incapacity] must convince the
court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such
extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereto."
67
Jurisprudence since then has recognized that psychological
incapacity "is a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is
about to assume."
68

It might seem that this present understanding of psychological incapacity
deviates from the literal wording of Article 36, with its central phase reading
"psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage."
69
At the same time, it has
been consistently recognized by this Court that the intent of the Family Code
committee was to design the law as to allow some resiliency in its
application, by avoiding specific examples that would limit the applicability of
the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the preference
of the revision committee was for "the judge to interpret the provision on a
case-to-case basis, guided by experience, in the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church
tribunals which, although not binding on
the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was
taken from Canon Law."
70

We likewise observed in Republic v. Dagdag:
71

Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for
annulment of a marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of the law,
on the facts of the case. Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a
priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own
facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of
marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The
trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate
court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that
of the trial court.
72

The Court thus acknowledges that the definition of psychological incapacity,
as intended by the revision committee, was not cast in intractable specifics.
Judicial understanding of psychological incapacity may be informed by
evolving standards, taking into account the particulars of each case, current
trends in psychological and even canonical thought, and experience. It is
under the auspices of the deliberate ambiguity of the framers that the Court
has developed the Molina rules, which have been consistently applied since
1997. Molina has proven indubitably useful in providing a unitary framework
that guides courts in adjudicating petitions for declaration of nullity under
Article 36. At the same time, the Molina guidelines are not set in stone, the
clear legislative intent mandating a case-to-case perception of each situation,
and Molina itself arising from this evolutionary understanding of Article 36.
There is no cause to disavow Molina at present, and indeed the disposition of
this case shall rely primarily on that precedent. There is need though to
emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of
petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36.
Of particular notice has been the citation of the Court, first in Santos then in
Molina, of the considered opinion of canon law experts in the interpretation of
psychological incapacity. This is but unavoidable, considering that the Family
Code committee had bluntly acknowledged that the concept of psychological
incapacity was derived from canon law,
73
and as one member admitted,
enacted as a solution to the problem of marriages already annulled by the
Catholic Church but still existent under civil law.
74
It would be disingenuous to
disregard the influence of Catholic Church doctrine in the formulation and
subsequent understanding of Article 36, and the Court has expressly
acknowledged that interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the local Church, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts.
75
Still, it must be emphasized
that the Catholic Church is hardly the sole source of influence in the
interpretation of Article 36. Even though the concept may have been derived
from canon law, its incorporation into the Family Code and subsequent
judicial interpretation occurred in wholly secular progression. Indeed, while
Church thought on psychological incapacity is merely persuasive on the trial
courts, judicial decisions of this Court interpreting psychological incapacity
are binding on lower courts.
76

Now is also opportune time to comment on another common legal guide
utilized in the adjudication of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article
36. All too frequently, this Court and lower courts, in denying petitions of the
kind, have favorably cited Sections 1 and 2, Article XV of the Constitution,
which respectively state that "[t]he State recognizes the Filipino family as the
foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and
actively promote its total developmen[t]," and that "[m]arriage, as an
inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State." These provisions highlight the importance of the
family and the constitutional protection accorded to the institution of
marriage.
But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of state
protection to marriage as a social institution and the foundation of the family.
It remains the province of the legislature to define all legal aspects of
marriage and prescribe the strategy and the modalities to protect it, based on
whatever socio-political influences it deems proper, and subject of course to
the qualification that such legislative enactment itself adheres to the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This being the case, it also falls on the
legislature to put into operation the constitutional provisions that protect
marriage and the family. This has been accomplished at present through the
enactment of the Family Code, which defines marriage and the family, spells
out the corresponding legal effects, imposes the limitations that affect
married and family life, as well as prescribes the grounds for declaration of
nullity and those for legal separation. While it may appear that the judicial
denial of a petition for declaration of nullity is reflective of the constitutional
mandate to protect marriage, such action in fact merely enforces a statutory
definition of marriage, not a constitutionally ordained decree of what marriage
is. Indeed, if circumstances warrant, Sections 1 and 2 of Article XV need not
be the only constitutional considerations to be taken into account in resolving
a petition for declaration of nullity.
Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages contracted by
a psychologically incapacitated person as a nullity, should be deemed as an
implement of this constitutional protection of marriage. Given the avowed
State interest in promoting marriage as the foundation of the family, which in
turn serves as the foundation of the nation, there is a corresponding interest
for the State to defend against marriages ill-equipped to promote family life.
Void ab initio marriages under Article 36 do not further the initiatives of the
State concerning marriage and family, as they promote wedlock among
persons who, for reasons independent of their will, are not capacitated to
understand or comply with the essential obligations of marriage.
These are the legal premises that inform us as we decide the present
petition.
Molina Guidelines As Applied in This Case
As stated earlier, Molina established the guidelines presently recognized in
the judicial disposition of petitions for nullity under Article 36. The Court has
consistently applied Molina since its promulgation in 1997, and the guidelines
therein operate as the general rules. They warrant citation in full:
1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact
that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of
marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution
devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the
foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally
"inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim
of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
"protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on
marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence,
inviolability and solidarity.
2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be:
(a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychologicalnot
physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may
be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the
parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to
such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not
have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example
of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as
a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time
of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show
that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged
their "I dos." The manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse,
not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those
not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective
in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine
to cure them but not be psychologically capacitated to
procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an
essential obligation of marriage.
5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be
accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced
by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such
non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.
7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given
great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was
taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon
1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became
effective in 1983 and which provides:
"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable
to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of
psychological nature."
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to
harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to
reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should
be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideallysubject to our law
on evidencewhat is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed
civilly void.
77

Molina had provided for an additional requirement that the Solicitor General
issue a certification stating his reasons for his agreement or opposition to the
petition.
78
This requirement however was dispensed with following the
implementation of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, or the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages.
79

Still, Article 48 of the Family Code mandates that the appearance of the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned be on behalf of the State to take steps
to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not
fabricated or suppressed. Obviously, collusion is not an issue in this case,
considering the consistent vigorous opposition of respondent to the petition
for declaration of nullity. In any event, the fiscals participation in the hearings
before the trial court is extant from the records of this case.
As earlier noted, the factual findings of the RTC are now deemed binding on
this Court, owing to the great weight accorded to the opinion of the primary
trier of facts, and the refusal of the Court of Appeals to dispute the veracity of
these facts. As such, it must be considered that respondent had consistently
lied about many material aspects as to her character and personality. The
question remains whether her pattern of fabrication sufficiently establishes
her psychological incapacity, consistent with Article 36 and generally, the
Molina guidelines.
We find that the present case sufficiently satisfies the guidelines in Molina.
First. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the
psychological incapacity of his spouse. Apart from his own testimony, he
presented witnesses who corroborated his allegations on his wifes behavior,
and certifications from Blackgold Records and the Philippine Village Hotel
Pavillon which disputed respondents claims pertinent to her alleged singing
career. He also presented two (2) expert witnesses from the field of
psychology who testified that the aberrant behavior of respondent was
tantamount to psychological incapacity. In any event, both courts below
considered petitioners evidence as credible enough. Even the appellate
court acknowledged that respondent was not totally honest with petitioner.
80

As in all civil matters, the petitioner in an action for declaration of nullity under
Article 36 must be able to establish the cause of action with a preponderance
of evidence. However, since the action cannot be considered as a non-public
matter between private parties, but is impressed with State interest, the
Family Code likewise requires the participation of the State, through the
prosecuting attorney, fiscal, or Solicitor General, to take steps to prevent
collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated
or suppressed. Thus, even if the petitioner is able establish the psychological
incapacity of respondent with preponderant evidence, any finding of collusion
among the parties would necessarily negate such proofs.
Second. The root cause of respondents psychological incapacity has been
medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven
by experts, and clearly explained in the trial courts decision. The initiatory
complaint alleged that respondent, from the start, had exhibited unusual and
abnormal behavior "of peren[n]ially telling lies, fabricating ridiculous stories,
and inventing personalities and situations," of writing letters to petitioner
using fictitious names, and of lying about her actual occupation, income,
educational attainment, and family background, among others.
81

These allegations, initially characterized in generalities, were further linked to
medical or clinical causes by expert witnesses from the field of psychology.
Petitioner presented two (2) such witnesses in particular. Dr. Abcede, a
psychiatrist who had headed the department of psychiatry of at least two (2)
major hospitals,
82
testified as follows:
WITNESS:
Given that as a fact, which is only based on the affidavit provided to me, I
can say that there are a couple of things that [are] terribly wrong with the
standards. There are a couple of things that seems (sic) to be repeated over
and over again in the affidavit. One of which is the persistent, constant and
repeated lying of the "respondent"; which, I think, based on assessment of
normal behavior of an individual, is abnormal or pathological. x x x
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)
Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that because of these actuations of the
respondent she is then incapable of performing the basic obligations of her
marriage?
A- Well, persistent lying violates the respect that one owes towards another.
The lack of concern, the lack of love towards the person, and it is also
something that endangers human relationship. You see, relationship is based
on communication between individuals and what we generally communicate
are our thoughts and feelings. But then when one talks and expresse[s] their
feelings, [you] are expected to tell the truth. And therefore, if you constantly
lie, what do you think is going to happen as far as this relationship is
concerned. Therefore, it undermines that basic relationship that should be
based on love, trust and respect.
Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that due to the behavior of the
respondent in constantly lying and fabricating stories, she is then incapable
of performing the basic obligations of the marriage?
x x x
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)
Q- Mr. witness, based on the testimony of Mr. Levy Mendoza, who is the
third witness for the petitioner, testified that the respondent has been calling
up the petitioners officemates and ask him (sic) on the activities of the
petitioner and ask him on the behavior of the petitioner. And this is
specifically stated on page six (6) of the transcript of stenographic notes,
what can you say about this, Mr. witness?
A- If an individual is jealous enough to the point that he is paranoid, which
means that there is no actual basis on her suspect (sic) that her husband is
having an affair with a woman, if carried on to the extreme, then that is
pathological. That is not abnormal. We all feel jealous, in the same way as
we also lie every now and then; but everything that is carried out in extreme
is abnormal or pathological. If there is no basis in reality to the fact that the
husband is having an affair with another woman and if she persistently
believes that the husband is having an affair with different women, then that
is pathological and we call that paranoid jealousy.
Q- Now, if a person is in paranoid jealousy, would she be considered
psychologically incapacitated to perform the basic obligations of the
marriage?
A- Yes, Maam.
83

The other witness, Dr. Lopez, was presented to establish not only the
psychological incapacity of respondent, but also the psychological capacity of
petitioner. He concluded that respondent "is [a] pathological liar, that [she
continues] to lie [and] she loves to fabricate about herself."
84

These two witnesses based their conclusions of psychological incapacity on
the case record, particularly the trial transcripts of respondents testimony, as
well as the supporting affidavits of petitioner. While these witnesses did not
personally examine respondent, the Court had already held in Marcos v.
Marcos
85
that personal examination of the subject by the physician is not
required for the spouse to be declared psychologically incapacitated.
86
We
deem the methodology utilized by petitioners witnesses as sufficient basis
for their medical conclusions. Admittedly, Drs. Abcede and Lopezs common
conclusion of respondents psychological incapacity hinged heavily on their
own acceptance of petitioners version as the true set of facts. However,
since the trial court itself accepted the veracity of petitioners factual
premises, there is no cause to dispute the conclusion of psychological
incapacity drawn therefrom by petitioners expert witnesses.
Also, with the totality of the evidence presented as basis, the trial court
explicated its finding of psychological incapacity in its decision in this wise:
To the mind of the Court, all of the above are indications that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential obligations of
marriage. It has been shown clearly from her actuations that respondent has
that propensity for telling lies about almost anything, be it her occupation, her
state of health, her singing abilities, her income, etc. She has this fantastic
ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities. She practically lived in
a world of make believe making her therefore not in a position to give
meaning and significance to her marriage to petitioner. In persistently and
constantly lying to petitioner, respondent undermined the basic tenets of
relationship between spouses that is based on love, trust and respect. As
concluded by the psychiatrist presented by petitioner, such repeated lying is
abnormal and pathological and amounts to psychological incapacity.
87

Third. Respondents psychological incapacity was established to have clearly
existed at the time of and even before the celebration of marriage. She
fabricated friends and made up letters from fictitious characters well before
she married petitioner. Likewise, she kept petitioner in the dark about her
natural childs real parentage as she only confessed when the latter had
found out the truth after their marriage.
Fourth. The gravity of respondents psychological incapacity is sufficient to
prove her disability to assume the essential obligations of marriage. It is
immediately discernible that the parties had shared only a little over a year of
cohabitation before the exasperated petitioner left his wife. Whatever such
circumstance speaks of the degree of tolerance of petitioner, it likewise
supports the belief that respondents psychological incapacity, as borne by
the record, was so grave in extent that any prolonged marital life was
dubitable.
It should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent were not adopted as
false pretenses in order to induce petitioner into marriage. More disturbingly,
they indicate a failure on the part of respondent to distinguish truth from
fiction, or at least abide by the truth. Petitioners witnesses and the trial court
were emphatic on respondents inveterate proclivity to telling lies and the
pathologic nature of her mistruths, which according to them, were revelatory
of respondents inability to understand and perform the essential obligations
of marriage. Indeed, a person unable to distinguish between fantasy and
reality would similarly be unable to comprehend the legal nature of the
marital bond, much less its psychic meaning, and the corresponding
obligations attached to marriage, including parenting. One unable to adhere
to reality cannot be expected to adhere as well to any legal or emotional
commitments.
The Court of Appeals somehow concluded that since respondent allegedly
tried her best to effect a reconciliation, she had amply exhibited her ability to
perform her marital obligations. We are not convinced. Given the nature of
her psychological condition, her willingness to remain in the marriage hardly
banishes nay extenuates her lack of capacity to fulfill the essential marital
obligations. Respondents ability to even comprehend what the essential
marital obligations are is impaired at best. Considering that the evidence
convincingly disputes respondents ability to adhere to the truth, her avowals
as to her commitment to the marriage cannot be accorded much credence.
At this point, it is worth considering Article 45(3) of the Family Code which
states that a marriage may be annulled if the consent of either party was
obtained by fraud, and Article 46 which enumerates the circumstances
constituting fraud under the previous article, clarifies that "no other
misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity
shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of
marriage." It would be improper to draw linkages between
misrepresentations made by respondent and the misrepresentations under
Articles 45 (3) and 46. The fraud under Article 45(3) vitiates the consent of
the spouse who is lied to, and does not allude to vitiated consent of the lying
spouse. In this case, the misrepresentations of respondent point to her own
inadequacy to cope with her marital obligations, kindred to psychological
incapacity under Article 36.
Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital
obligations as embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code. Article 68,
in particular, enjoins the spouses to live together, observe mutual love,
respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. As noted by the trial
court, it is difficult to see how an inveterate pathological liar would be able to
commit to the basic tenets of relationship between spouses based on love,
trust and respect.
Sixth. The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take into
consideration the fact that the marriage of the parties was annulled by the
Catholic Church. The appellate court apparently deemed this detail totally
inconsequential as no reference was made to it anywhere in the assailed
decision despite petitioners efforts to bring the matter to its attention.
88
Such
deliberate ignorance is in contravention of Molina, which held that
interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should
be given great respect by our courts.
As noted earlier, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila
decreed the invalidity of the marriage in question in a Conclusion
89
dated 30
March 1995, citing the "lack of due discretion" on the part of respondent.
90

Such decree of nullity was affirmed by both the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal,
91
and the Roman Rota of the Vatican.
92
In fact,
respondents psychological incapacity was considered so grave that a
restrictive clause
93
was appended to the sentence of nullity prohibiting
respondent from contracting another marriage without the Tribunals consent.
In its Decision dated 4 June 1995, the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal pronounced:
The JURISRPRUDENCE in the Case maintains that matrimonial consent is
considered ontologically defective and wherefore judicially ineffective when
elicited by a Part Contractant in possession and employ of a discretionary
judgment faculty with a perceptive vigor markedly inadequate for the practical
understanding of the conjugal Covenant or serious impaired from the correct
appreciation of the integral significance and implications of the marriage
vows.
The FACTS in the Case sufficiently prove with the certitude required by law
that based on the depositions of the Partes in Causa and premised on the
testimonies of the Common and Expert Witnesse[s], the Respondent made
the marriage option in tenure of adverse personality constracts that
were markedly antithetical to the substantive content and implications
of the Marriage Covenant, and that seriously undermined the integrality
of her matrimonial consent in terms of its deliberative component. In
other words, afflicted with a discretionary faculty impaired in its
practico-concrete judgment formation on account of an adverse action
and reaction pattern, the Respondent was impaired from eliciting a
judicially binding matrimonial consent. There is no sufficient evidence in
the Case however to prove as well the fact of grave lack of due discretion on
the part of the Petitioner.
94

Evidently, the conclusion of psychological incapacity was arrived at not only
by the trial court, but also by canonical bodies. Yet, we must clarify the
proper import of the Church rulings annulling the marriage in this case. They
hold sway since they are drawn from a similar recognition, as the trial court,
of the veracity of petitioners allegations. Had the trial court instead
appreciated respondents version as correct, and the appellate court affirmed
such conclusion, the rulings of the Catholic Church on this matter would have
diminished persuasive value. After all, it is the factual findings of the judicial
trier of facts, and not that of the canonical courts, that are accorded
significant recognition by this Court.
Seventh. The final point of contention is the requirement in Molina that such
psychological incapacity be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. It was on this score that the Court of Appeals reversed the
judgment of the trial court, the appellate court noting that it did not appear
certain that respondents condition was incurable and that Dr. Abcede did not
testify to such effect.
95

Petitioner points out that one month after he and his wife initially separated,
he returned to her, desiring to make their marriage work. However,
respondents aberrant behavior remained unchanged, as she continued to
lie, fabricate stories, and maintained her excessive jealousy. From this fact,
he draws the conclusion that respondents condition is incurable.
From the totality of the evidence, can it be definitively concluded that
respondents condition is incurable? It would seem, at least, that
respondents psychosis is quite grave, and a cure thereof a remarkable feat.
Certainly, it would have been easier had petitioners expert witnesses
characterized respondents condition as incurable. Instead, they remained
silent on whether the psychological incapacity was curable or incurable.
But on careful examination, there was good reason for the experts taciturnity
on this point.
The petitioners expert witnesses testified in 1994 and 1995, and the trial
court rendered its decision on 10 August 1995. These events transpired well
before Molina was promulgated in 1997 and made explicit the requirement
that the psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such requirement was not expressly stated in Article
36 or any other provision of the Family Code.
On the other hand, the Court in Santos, which was decided in January 1995,
began its discussion by first citing the deliberations of the Family Code
committee,
96
then the opinion of canonical scholars,
97
before arriving at its
formulation of the doctrinal definition of psychological incapacity.
98
Santos did
refer to Justice Caguioas opinion expressed during the deliberations that
"psychological incapacity is incurable,"
99
and the view of a former presiding
judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila that
psychological incapacity must be characterized "by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability."
100
However, in formulating the doctrinal
rule on psychological incapacity, the Court in Santos omitted any reference
to incurability as a characteristic of psychological incapacity.
101

This disquisition is material as Santos was decided months before the trial
court came out with its own ruling that remained silent on whether
respondents psychological incapacity was incurable. Certainly, Santos did
not clearly mandate that the incurability of the psychological incapacity be
established in an action for declaration of nullity. At least, there was no
jurisprudential clarity at the time of the trial of this case and the subsequent
promulgation of the trial courts decision that required a medical finding of
incurability. Such requisite arose only with Molina in 1997, at a time when
this case was on appellate review, or after the reception of evidence.
We are aware that in Pesca v. Pesca,
102
the Court countered an argument
that Molina and Santos should not apply retroactively
with the observation that the interpretation or construction placed by the
courts of a law constitutes a part of that law as of the date the statute in
enacted.
103
Yet we approach this present case from utterly practical
considerations. The requirement that psychological incapacity must be
shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable is one that
necessarily cannot be divined without expert opinion. Clearly in this case,
there was no categorical averment from the expert witnesses that
respondents psychological incapacity was curable or incurable simply
because there was no legal necessity yet to elicit such a declaration and the
appropriate question was not accordingly propounded to him. If we apply
Pesca without deep reflection, there would be undue prejudice to those
cases tried before Molina or Santos, especially those presently on appellate
review, where presumably the respective petitioners and their expert
witnesses would not have seen the need to adduce a diagnosis of
incurability. It may hold in those cases, as in this case, that the psychological
incapacity of a spouse is actually incurable, even if not pronounced as such
at the trial court level.
We stated earlier that Molina is not set in stone, and that the interpretation of
Article 36 relies heavily on a case-to-case perception. It would be insensate
to reason to mandate in this case an expert medical or clinical diagnosis of
incurability, since the parties would have had no impelling cause to present
evidence to that effect at the time this case was tried by the RTC more than
ten (10) years ago. From the totality of the evidence, we are sufficiently
convinced that the incurability of respondents psychological incapacity has
been established by the petitioner. Any lingering doubts are further dispelled
by the fact that the Catholic Church tribunals, which indubitably consider
incurability as an integral requisite of psychological incapacity, were
sufficiently convinced that respondent was so incapacitated to contract
marriage to the degree that annulment was warranted.
All told, we conclude that petitioner has established his cause of action for
declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The RTC correctly
ruled, and the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court.
There is little relish in deciding this present petition, pronouncing as it does
the marital bond as having been inexistent in the first place. It is possible that
respondent, despite her psychological state, remains in love with petitioner,
as exhibited by her persistent challenge to the petition for nullity. In fact, the
appellate court placed undue emphasis on respondents avowed
commitment to remain in the marriage. Yet the Court decides these cases on
legal reasons and not vapid sentimentality. Marriage, in legal contemplation,
is more than the legitimatization of a desire of people in love to live together.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the RTC dated 10
August 1995, declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent
NULL and VOID under Article 36 of the Family Code, is REINSTATED. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairman
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Asscociate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairman, Third Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Attestation by
the Divisions Chairman, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Barcelona vs. Ca and Bens=gzon
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO, J .:
The Case
The Petition for Review before us assails the 30 May 1997 Decision
1[1]

as well as the 7 August 1997 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 43393. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Order
2[2]
dated 21 January
1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 106, in Civil Case
No. Q-95-24471. The Regional Trial Court refused to dismiss private
respondents Petition for Annulment of Marriage for failure to state a cause of
action and for violation of Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94.
The assailed Resolution denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The Facts
On 29 March 1995, private respondent Tadeo R. Bengzon (respondent
Tadeo) filed a Petition for Annulment of Marriage against petitioner Diana M.
Barcelona (petitioner Diana). The case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-
95-23445 (first petition) before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 87.
3[3]
On 9 May 1995, respondent Tadeo filed a Motion to Withdraw
Petition which the trial court granted in its Order dated 7 June 1995.
On 21 July 1995, respondent Tadeo filed anew a Petition for Annulment
of Marriage against petitioner Diana. This time, the case was docketed as
Civil Case No. Q-95-24471 (second petition) before the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 106 (trial court).
Petitioner Diana filed a Motion to Dismiss the second petition on two
grounds. First, the second petition fails to state a cause of action. Second, it
violates Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94 (Circular No. 04-
94) on forum shopping. Respondent Tadeo opposed the Motion to which
petitioner Diana filed Additional Arguments in Support of the Motion.
The trial court, through Judge Julieto P. Tabiolo, issued on 18







September 1996 an Order (first order) deferring resolution of the Motion
until the parties ventilate their arguments in a hearing. Petitioner Diana filed
a motion for reconsideration. However, the trial court, through Pairing Judge
Rosalina L. Luna Pison, issued on 21 January 1997 an Order (second
order) denying the motion. In denying the motion for reconsideration, Judge
Pison explained that when the ground for dismissal is the complaints failure
to state a cause of action, the trial court determines such fact solely from the
petition itself. Judge Pison held that contrary to petitioner Dianas claim, a
perusal of the allegations in the petition shows that petitioner Diana has
violated respondent Tadeos right, thus giving rise to a cause of action.
Judge Pison also rejected petitioner Dianas claim that respondent Tadeo is
guilty of forum shopping in filing the second petition. Judge Pison explained
that when respondent Tadeo filed the second petition, the first petition (Civil
Case No. Q-95-23445) was no longer pending as it had been earlier
dismissed without prejudice.
Petitioner Diana filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
before the Court of Appeals assailing the trial courts first order deferring
action on the Motion and the second order denying the motion for
reconsideration on 14 February 1997. The Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition and denied the motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals agreed with petitioner Diana that the trial court in
its first order erred in deferring action on the Motion until after a hearing on
whether the complaint states a cause of action. Nevertheless, the Court of
Appeals pointed out that the trial courts second order corrected the situation
since in denying the motion for reconsideration, the trial court in effect denied
the Motion. The appellate court agreed with the trial court that the
allegations in the second petition state a cause of action sufficient to sustain
a valid judgment if proven to be true.
The Court of Appeals also held that there was no violation of Circular
No. 04-94. To determine the existence of forum shopping, the elements of
litis pendentia must exist or a final judgment in one case must amount to res
judicata in the other. In this case, there is no litis pendentia because
respondent Tadeo had caused the dismissal without prejudice of the first
petition before filing the second petition. Neither is there res judicata
because there is no final decision on the merits.
Issues
In her Memorandum, petitioner Diana raises the following issues:
I. WHETHER THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE SECOND
PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE
SUFFICIENTLY STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION;
II. WHETHER RESPONDENT TADEO VIOLATED SUPREME
COURT ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 04-94 IN
FAILING TO STATE THE FILING OF A PREVIOUS
PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE, ITS
TERMINATION AND STATUS.
4[4]

The Courts Ruling
The petition has no merit.
Sufficiency of Cause of Action
Petitioner Dianas contention that the second petition fails to state a
cause of action is untenable. A cause of action is an act or omission of the
defendant in violation of the legal right of the plaintiff.
5[5]
A complaint states a
cause of action when it contains three essential elements: (1) a right in favor
of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises; (2) an
obligation of the defendant to respect such right; and (3) the act or omission
of the defendant violates the right of the plaintiff.
6[6]

We find the second petition sufficiently alleges a cause of action. The
petition sought the declaration of nullity of the marriage based on Article 36







of the Family Code.
7[7]
The petition alleged that respondent Tadeo and
petitioner Diana were legally married at the Holy Cross Parish after a
whirlwind courtship as shown by the marriage contract attached to the
petition. The couple established their residence in Quezon City. The union
begot five children, Ana Maria, born on 8 November 1964; Isabel, born on 28
October 1968; Ernesto Tadeo, born on 31 March 1970; Regina Rachelle
born on 7 March 1974; and Cristina Maria born in February 1978. The
petition further alleged that petitioner Diana was psychologically
incapacitated at the time of the celebration of their marriage to comply with
the essential obligations of marriage and such incapacity subsists up to the
present time. The petition alleged the non-complied marital obligations in
this manner:
xxx
5. During their marriage, they had frequent quarrels due to their varied
upbringing. Respondent, coming from a rich family, was a disorganized
housekeeper and was frequently out of the house. She would go to her
sisters house or would play tennis the whole day.
6. When the family had crisis due to several miscarriages suffered by
respondent and the sickness of a child, respondent withdrew to herself and
eventually refused to speak to her husband.
7. On November 1977, the respondent, who was five months pregnant
with Cristina Maria and on the pretext of re-evaluating her feelings with
petitioner, requested the latter to temporarily leave their conjugal dwelling.
She further insisted that she wanted to feel a little freedom from petitioners
marital authority and influences. The petitioner argued that he could occupy
another room in their conjugal dwelling to accommodate respondents desire,
but no amount of plea and explanation could dissuade her from demanding
that the petitioner leave their conjugal dwelling.
8. In his desire to keep peace in the family and to safeguard the
respondents pregnancy, the petitioner was compelled to leave their conjugal
dwelling and reside in a condominium located in Greenhills.
9. This separation resulted in complete estrangement between the
petitioner and the respondent. The petitioner waived his right to the conjugal
dwelling in respondents favor through an extrajudicial dissolution of their
conjugal partnership of gains. The separation in fact between the petitioner
and the respondent still subsists to the present time.
10. The parties likewise agreed on the custody and support of the
children. The extrajudicial dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains is
hereto attached as Annex C and taken as an integral part hereof.
11. The respondent at the time of the celebration of their marriage was



psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligation of
marriage and such incapacity subsisted up to and until the present time.
Such incapacity was conclusively found in the psychological examination
conducted on the relationship between the petitioner and the respondent.
12. Under Article 36 of the Family Code, the marriage between the
petitioner and the respondent is void ab initio and needs to be annulled. This
petition is in accordance with Article 39 thereof.
xxx.
8[8]

The second petition states the ultimate facts on which respondent bases
his claim in accordance with Section 1, Rule 8 of the old Rules of Court.
9[9]

Ultimate facts refer to the principal, determinative, constitutive facts upon the
existence of which the cause of action rests. The term does not refer to
details of probative matter or particulars of evidence which establish the
material elements.
10[10]

Petitioner Diana relies mainly
11[11]
on the rulings in Santos v. Court of
Appeals
12[12]
as well as in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina.
13[13]

Santos gave life to the phrase psychological incapacity, a novel provision
in the Family Code, by defining the term in this wise:













xxx psychological incapacity should refer to no less than mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by
the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family
Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect
and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological
incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the
time the marriage is celebrated. xxx.
Molina additionally provided procedural guidelines to assist the courts and
the parties in cases for annulment of marriages grounded on psychological
incapacity.
14[14]

Petitioner Diana argues that the second petition falls short of the
guidelines set forth in Santos and Molina. Specifically, she contends that
the second petition is defective because it fails to allege the root cause of the
alleged psychological incapacity. The second petition also fails to state that
the alleged psychological incapacity existed from the celebration of the
marriage and that it is permanent or incurable. Further, the second petition is
devoid of any reference of the grave nature of the illness to bring about the
disability of the petitioner to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
Lastly, the second petition did not even state the marital obligations which
petitioner Diana allegedly failed to comply due to psychological incapacity.
Subsequent to Santos and Molina, the Court adopted the new Rules on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (new Rules).
15[15]
Specifically, Section 2, paragraph (d) of the
new Rules provides:
SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages
x x x.
(d) What to allege. A petition under Article 36 of the Family
Code shall specifically allege the complete facts showing
that either or both parties were psychologically
incapacitated from complying with the essential marital
obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of





marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only
after its celebration.
The complete facts should allege the physical
manifestations, if any, as are indicative of
psychological incapacity at the time of the
celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need
not be alleged. (Emphasis supplied)
Procedural rules apply to actions pending and unresolved at the time of
their passage.
16[16]
The obvious effect of the new Rules providing that expert
opinion need not be alleged in the petition is that there is also no need to
allege the root cause of the psychological incapacity. Only experts in the
fields of neurological and behavioral sciences are competent to determine
the root cause of psychological incapacity. Since the new Rules do not
require the petition to allege expert opinion on the psychological incapacity, it
follows that there is also no need to allege in the petition the root cause of
the psychological incapacity.
Science continues to explore, examine and explain how our brains work,
respond to and control the human body. Scientists still do not understand
everything there is to know about the root causes of psychological disorders.
The root causes of many psychological disorders are still unknown to science
even as their outward, physical manifestations are evident. Hence, what the
new Rules require the petition to allege are the physical manifestations
indicative of psychological incapacity. Respondent Tadeos second petition
complies with this requirement.
The second petition states a cause of action since it states the legal
right of respondent Tadeo, the correlative obligation of petitioner Diana, and
the act or omission of petitioner Diana in violation of the legal right. In Dulay
v. Court of Appeals,
17[17]
the Court held:
In determining whether the allegations of a complaint are sufficient to
support a cause of action, it must be borne in mind that the complaint does
not have to establish or allege the facts proving the existence of a cause of
action at the outset; this will have to be done at the trial on the merits of the
case (Del Bros Hotel Corporation v. CA, supra). If the allegations in a
complaint can furnish a sufficient basis by which the complaint can be
maintained, the same should not be dismissed regardless of the defenses





that may be assessed by the defendants (Rava Devt Corp. v. CA, 211 SCRA
152 [1992] citing Consolidated Bank & Trust Corporation v. Court of Appeals,
197 SCRA 663 [1991]). To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause
of action, the complaint must show that the claim for relief does not
exist rather than that a claim has been defectively stated or is
ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain (Azur v. Provincial Board, 27 SCRA 50
[1969]). xxx. (Emphasis supplied)
A defendant moving to dismiss a complaint on the ground of lack of
cause of action hypothetically admits all the factual averments in the
complaint.
18[18]
Given the hypothetically admitted facts in the second petition,
the trial court could render judgment over the case.
Forum Shopping
Similarly untenable is petitioner Dianas contention that the second
petitions certificate of non-forum shopping which does not mention the filing
of the first petition and its dismissal without prejudice violates Circular No.
04-94.
19[19]
Petitioner Diana refers to this portion of Circular No. 04-94-
1. The plaintiff, petitioner, applicant or principal party seeking relief in
the complaint, petition, application or other initiatory pleading shall certify
under oath in such original pleading, or in a sworn certification annexed
thereto and simultaneously filed therewith, to the truth of the following facts
and undertakings: (a) he has not theretofore commenced any other
action or proceeding involving the same issues in the Supreme court,
the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency; (b) to the best of
his knowledge, no action or proceeding is pending in the Supreme Court, the
Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency; (c) if there is any such
action or proceeding which is either pending or may have been
terminated, he must state the status thereof; and (d) if he should
thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is
pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other
tribunal or agency, he undertakes to report that fact within five (5) days
therefrom to the court or agency wherein the original pleading and sworn





certification contemplated herein have been filed.
20[20]

Petitioner Diana points out that respondent Tadeo did not disclose in his
certificate of non-forum shopping that he had previously commenced a
similar action based on the same grounds with the same prayer for relief.
The certificate of non-forum shopping should have stated the fact of
termination of the first petition or its status.
The Court has consistently held that a certificate of non-forum shopping
not attached to the petition or one belatedly filed or one signed by counsel
and not the party himself constitutes a violation of the requirement. Such
violation can result in the dismissal of the complaint or petition. However, the
Court has also previously held that the rule of substantial compliance
applies to the contents of the certification.
21[21]

In Roxas v. Court of Appeals,
22[22]
the Court squarely addressed the
issue of whether the omission of a statement on the prior filing and dismissal
of a case involving the same parties and issues merits dismissal of the
petition. In Roxas, the Court ruled:
xxx an omission in the certificate of non-forum shopping about any
event that would not constitute res judicata and litis pendentia as in the case
at bar, is not fatal as to merit the dismissal and nullification of the entire
proceedings considering that the evils sought to be prevented by the said
certificate are not present. It is in this light that we ruled in Maricalum Mining
Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission that a liberal interpretation of
Supreme Court Circular No. 04-94 on non-forum shopping would be more in
keeping with the objectives of procedural rules which is to secure a just,
speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.
The dismissal of the first petition precluded the eventuality of litis
pendentia. The first petitions dismissal did not also amount to res judicata.
Thus, there is no need to state in the certificate of non-forum shopping in the
second petition (Civil Case No. Q-95-24471) about the prior filing and
dismissal of the first petition (Civil Case No. Q-95-23445).







The first petition was dismissed without prejudice at the instance of
respondent Tadeo to keep the peace between him and his grown up
children. The dismissal happened before service of answer or any
responsive pleading. Clearly, there is no litis pendentia since respondent
Tadeo had already withdrawn and caused the dismissal of the first petition
when he subsequently filed the second petition. Neither is there res judicata
because the dismissal order was not a decision on the merits but a dismissal
without prejudice.
Circular No. 04-94,
23[23]
now Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, must be interpreted and applied to achieve its purpose. The
Supreme Court promulgated the Circular to promote and facilitate the orderly
administration of justice. The Circular should not be interpreted with such
absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective or
the goal of all rules of procedure which is to achieve substantial justice as
expeditiously as possible.
24[24]

A final word. We are ever mindful of the principle that marriage is an
inviolable social institution and the foundation of the family that the state
cherishes and protects.
25[25]
In rendering this Decision, this Court is not
prejudging the main issue of whether the marriage is void based on Article 36
of the Family Code. The trial court must resolve this issue after trial on the
merits where each party can present evidence to prove their respective
allegations and defenses. We are merely holding that, based on the
allegations in the second petition, the petition sufficiently alleges a cause of
action and does not violate the rule on forum shopping. Thus, the second
petition is not subject to attack by a motion to dismiss on these grounds.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The assailed Decision dated 30
May 1997 as well as the Resolution dated 7 August 1997 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43393 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Tuason vs. CA







PUNO, J .:p
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul and set aside the decision
dated July 29, 1994 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 37925
denying petitioner's appeal from an order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
149, Makati in Civil Case No. 3769.
This case arose from the following facts:
In 1989, private respondent Maria Victoria Lopez Tuason filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 149, Makati a petition for annulment or
declaration of nullity of her marriage to petitioner Emilio R. Tuason. In her
complaint, private respondent alleged that she and petitioner were married
on June 3, 1972 and from this union, begot two children; that at the time of
the marriage, petitioner was already psychologically incapacitated to comply
with his essential marital obligations which became manifest afterward and
resulted in violent fights between husband and wife; that in one of their fights,
petitioner inflicted physical injuries on private respondent which impelled her
to file a criminal case for physical injuries against him; that petitioner used
prohibited drugs, was apprehended by the authorities and sentenced to a
one-year suspended penalty and has not been rehabilitated; that petitioner
was a womanizer, and in 1984, he left the conjugal home and cohabited with
three women in succession, one of whom he presented to the public as his
wife; that after he left the conjugal dwelling, petitioner gave minimal support
to the family and even refused to pay for the tuition fees of their children
compelling private respondent to accept donations and dole-outs from her
family and friends; that petitioner likewise became a spendthrift and abused
his administration of the conjugal partnership by alienating some of their
assets and incurring large obligations with banks, credit card companies and
other financial institutions, without private respondent's consent; that
attempts at reconciliation were made but they all failed because of
petitioner's refusal to reform. In addition to her prayer for annulment of
marriage, private respondent prayed for powers of administration to save the
conjugal properties from further dissipation.
1

Petitioner answered denying the imputations against him. As affirmative
defense, he claimed that he and private respondent were a normal married
couple during the first ten years of their marriage and actually begot two
children during this period; that it was only in 1982 that they began to have
serious personal differences when his wife did not accord the respect and
dignity due him as a husband but treated him like a persona non grata; that
due to the "extreme animosities " between them, he temporarily left the
conjugal home for a "cooling-off period" in 1984; that it is private respondent
who had been taking prohibited drugs and had a serious affair with another
man; that petitioner's work as owner and operator of a radio and television
station exposed him to malicious gossip linking him to various women in
media and the entertainment world; and that since 1984, he experienced
financial reverses in his business and was compelled, with the knowledge of
his wife, to dispose of some of the conjugal shares in exclusive golf and
country clubs. Petitioner petitioned the court to allow him to return to the
conjugal home and continue his administration of the conjugal partnership.
After the issues were joined, trial commenced on March 30, 1990. Private
respondent presented four witnesses, namely, herself; Dr. Samuel Wiley, a
Canon Law expert and marriage counselor of both private respondent and
petitioner; Ms. Adelita Prieto, a close friend of the spouses, and Atty. Jose F.
Racela IV, private respondent's counsel. Private respondent likewise
submitted documentary evidence consisting of newspaper articles of her
husband's relationship with other women, his apprehension by the authorities
for illegal possession of drugs; and copies of a prior a church annulment
decree.
2
The parties' marriage was clerically annulled by the Tribunal
Metropolitanum Matrimonial which was affirmed by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal in 1986.
3

During presentation of private respondent's evidence, petitioner, on April 18,
1990, filed his Opposition to private respondent's petition for appointment as
administratrix of the conjugal partnership of gains.
After private respondent rested her case, the trial court scheduled the
reception of petitioner's evidence on May 11, 1990.
On May 8, 1990, two days before the scheduled hearing , a counsel for
petitioner moved for a postponement on the ground that the principal counsel
was out of the country and due to return on the first week of June.
4
The court
granted the motion and reset the hearing to June 8, 1990.
5

On June 8, 1990, petitioner failed to appear. On oral motion of private
respondent, the court declared petitioner to have waived his right to present
evidence and deemed the case submitted for decision on the basis of the
evidence presented.
On June 29, 1990, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the nullity of
private respondent's marriage to petitioner and awarding custody of the
children to private respondent. The court ruled:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the marriage
contracted by Ma. Victoria L. Tuason and Emilio R. Tuason
on June 3, 1972 is declared null and void ab initio on the
ground of psychological incapacity on the part of the
defendant under Sec. 36 of the Family Code. Let herein
judgment of annulment be recorded in the registry of
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila where the marriage was
contracted and in the registry of Makati, Metro Manila where
the marriage is annulled.
The custody of the two (2) legitimate children of the plaintiff
and the defendant is hereby awarded to the plaintiff.
The foregoing judgment is without prejudice to the
application of the other effects of annulment as provided for
under Arts . 50 and 51 of the Family Code of the Philippines.

6

Counsel for petitioner received a copy of this decision on August 24, 1990.
No appeal was taken from the decision.
On September 24, 1990, private respondent filed a "Motion for Dissolution of
Conjugal Partnership of Gains and Adjudication to Plaintiff of the Conjugal
Properties."
7
Petitioner opposed the motion on October 17, 1990.
8

Also on the same day, October 17, 1990, petitioner, through new counsel,
filed with the trial court a petition for relief from judgment of the June 29,
1990 decision.
The trial court denied the petition on August 8, 1991.
9

Petitioner appealed before the Court of Appeals the order of the trial court
denying his petition for relief from judgment. On July 29, 1994, the Court of
Appeals dismissed the appeal and affirmed the order of the trial court.
10

Hence this petition.
The threshold issue is whether a petition for relief from judgment is warranted
under the circumstances of the case.
We rule in the negative.
A petition for relief from judgment is governed by Rule 38, Section 2 of the
Revised Rules of Court which provides:
Sec. 2. Petition to Court of First Instance for relief from
judgment or other proceeding thereof. When a judgment
or order is entered, or any other proceeding is taken, against
a party in a Court of First Instance through fraud, accident,
mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a petition in
such court and in the same cause praying that the judgment,
order or proceeding be set aside.
Under the rules, a final and executory judgment or order of the Regional Trial
Court may be set aside on the ground of fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence. In addition, the petitioner must assert facts showing
that he has a good, substantial and meritorious defense or cause of action.
11

If the petition is granted, the court shall proceed to hear and determine the
case as if a timely motion for new trial had been granted therein.
12

In the case at bar, the decision annulling petitioner's marriage to private
respondent had already become final and executory when petitioner failed to
appeal during the reglementary period. Petitioner however claims that the
decision of the trial court was null and void for violation of his right to due
process. He contends he was denied due process when, after failing to
appear on two scheduled hearings, the trial court deemed him to have
waived his right to present evidence and rendered judgment on the basis of
the evidence for private respondent. Petitioner justifies his absence at the
hearings on the ground that he was then "confined for medical and/or
rehabilitation reason."
13
In his affidavit of merit before the trial court, he
attached a certification by Lt. Col. Plaridel F. Vidal, Director of the Narcotics
Command, Drug Rehabilitation Center which states that on March 27, 1990
petitioner was admitted for treatment of drug dependency at the Drug
Rehabilitation Center at Camp Bagong Diwa, Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila
of the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police.
14
The records,
however, show that the former counsel of petitioner did not inform the trial
court of this confinement. And when the court rendered its decision, the
same counsel was out of the country for which reason the decision became
final and executory as no appeal was taken therefrom.
15

The failure of petitioner's counsel to notify him on time of the adverse
judgment to enable him to appeal therefrom is negligence which is not
excusable. Notice sent to counsel of record is binding upon the client and the
neglect or failure of counsel to inform him of an adverse judgment resulting in
the loss of his right to appeal is not a ground for setting aside a judgment
valid and regular on its face.
16

Similarly inexcusable was the failure of his former counsel to inform the trial
court of petitioner's confinement and medical treatment as the reason for his
non-appearance at the scheduled hearings. Petitioner has not given any
reason why his former counsel, intentionally or unintentionally, did not inform
the court of this fact. This led the trial court to order the case deemed
submitted for decision on the basis of the evidence presented by the private
respondent alone. To compound the negligence of petitioner's counsel, the
order of the trial court was never assailed via a motion for reconsideration.
Clearly, petitioner cannot now claim that he was deprived of due process. He
may have lost his right to present evidence but he was not denied his day in
court. As the record show, petitioner, through counsel, actively participated in
the proceedings below. He filed his answer to the petition, cross-examined
private respondent's witnesses and even submitted his opposition to private
respondent's motion for dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains.
1
7
A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy; it is allowed only in
exception cases where there is no other available or adequate remedy.
When a party has another remedy available or adequate remedy. When a
party has another remedy available to him, which may be either a motion for
new trial or appeal from an adverse decision of the trial or appeal from an
adverse decision of the trial court, and he was not prevented by fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable negligence from filing such motion or taking
such appeal, he cannot avail himself of this petition.
18
Indeed, relief will not
be granted to a party who seeks avoidance from the effects of the judgment
when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence; otherwise
the petition for relief can be used to revive the right to appeal which had been
lost thru inexcusable negligence.
19

Petitioner also insists that he has a valid and meritorious defense. He cites
the Family Code which provides that in actions for annulment of marriage or
legal separation, the prosecuting officer should intervene for the state
because the law "looks with disfavor upon the haphazard declaration of
annulment of marriages by default." He contends that when he failed to
appear at the scheduled hearings, the trial court should have ordered the
prosecuting officer to intervene for the state and inquire as to the reason for
his non-appearance.
20

Articles 48 and 60 of the Family Code read as follows:
Art. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecution
attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the
State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties
and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed.
In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no
judgment shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or
confession of judgment.
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 60. No decree of legal separation shall be based upon a
stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment.
In any case, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal assigned to it to take steps to prevent collusion
between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not
fabricated or suppressed.
21

A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default is fraught with
the danger of collusion.
22
Hence, in all cases for annulment, declaration of
nullity of marriage and legal separation, the prosecuting attorney or fiscal is
ordered to appear on behalf of the state for the purpose of preventing any
collusion between the parties and to take care that their evidence is not
fabricated or suppressed. If the defendant spouse fails to answer the
complaint, the court cannot declare him or her in default but instead, should
order the prosecuting attorney to determine if collusion exists between the
parties.
23
The prosecuting attorney or fiscal may oppose the application for
legal separation or annulment through the presentation of his own evidence,
if in his opinion, the proof adduced is dubious and fabricated.
24
Our
Constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a basic
social institution.
25
Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not
a mere contract, but a social institution in which the state is vitally interested.
The state can find no stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy
families. The break up of families weakens our social and moral fabric and,
hence, their preservation is not the concern alone of the family members.
The facts in the case at bar do not call for the strict application of Articles 48
and 60 of the Family Code. For one, petitioner was not declared in default by
the trial court for failure to answer. Petitioner filed his answer to the complaint
and contested the cause of action alleged by private respondent. He actively
participated in the proceedings below by filing several pleadings and cross-
examining the witnesses of private respondent. It is crystal clear that every
stage of the litigation was characterized by a no-holds barred contest and not
by collusion.
The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal in annulment of marriage and
legal separation proceedings is to determine whether collusion exists
between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not suppressed or
fabricated. Petitioner's vehement opposition to the annulment proceedings
negates the conclusion that collusion existed between the parties. There is
no allegation by the petitioner that evidence was suppressed or fabricated by
any of the parties. Under these circumstances, we are convinced that the
non-intervention of a prosecuting attorney to assure lack of collusion
between the contending parties is not fatal to the validity of the proceedings
in the trial court.
Petitioner also refutes the testimonies of private respondent's witnesses,
particularly Dr. Samuel Wiley and Ms. Adelita Prieto, as biased, incredible
and hearsay. Petitioner alleges that if he were able to present his evidence,
he could have testified that he was not psychologically incapacitated at the
time of the marriage as indicated by the fact that during their first ten years,
he and private respondent lived together with their children as one normal
and happy family, that he continued supporting his family even after he left
the conjugal dwelling and that his work as owner and operator of a radio and
television corporation places him in the public eye and makes him a good
subject for malicious gossip linking him with various women. These facts,
according to petitioner, should disprove the ground for annulment of his
marriage to petitioner.
Suffice it to state that the finding of the trial court as to the existence or non-
existence of petitioner's psychological incapacity at the time of the marriage
is final and binding on us.
26
Petitioner has not sufficiently shown that the trial
court's factual findings and evaluation of the testimonies of private
respondent's witnesses vis-a-vis petitioner's defenses are clearly and
manifestly erroneous.
2
7
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is denied and the decision dated July 29,
1994 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 37925 is affirmed.
Hernandez vs. CA
MENDOZA, J .:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision
1
of the Court of
Appeals, dated January 30, 1996, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City, dated April 10, 1993, which dismissed the
petition for annulment of marriage filed by petitioner.
Petitioner Lucita Estrella Hernandez and private respondent Mario C.
Hernandez were married at the Silang Catholic Parish Church in Silang,
Cavite on January 1, 1981 (Exh. A).
2
Three children were born to them,
namely, Maie, who was born on May 3, 1982 (Exh. B),
3
Lyra, born on May
22, 1985
(Exh. C),
4
and Marian, born on June 15, 1989 (Exh. D).
5

On July 10, 1992, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18,
Tagaytay City, a petition seeking the annulment of her marriage to private
respondent on the ground of psychological incapacity of the latter. She
alleged that from the time of their marriage up to the time of the filing of the
suit, private respondent failed to perform his obligation to support the family
and contribute to the management of the household, devoting most of his
time engaging in drinking sprees with his friends. She further claimed that
private respondent, after they were married, cohabited with another woman
with whom he had an illegitimate child, while having affairs with different
women, and that, because of his promiscuity, private respondent endangered
her health by infecting her with a sexually transmissible disease (STD). She
averred that private respondent was irresponsible, immature and unprepared
for the duties of a married life. Petitioner prayed that for having abandoned
the family, private respondent be ordered to give support to their three
children in the total amount of P9,000.00 every month; that she be awarded
the custody of their children; and that she be adjudged as the sole owner of a
parcel of land located at Don Gregorio Subdivision I in Bo. Bucal,
Dasmarias, Cavite, purchased during the marriage, as well as the jeep
which private respondent took with him when he left the conjugal home on
June 12, 1992.
6

On October 8, 1992, because of private respondent's failure to file his
answer, the trial court issued an order directing the assistant provincial
prosecutor to conduct an investigation to determine if there was collusion
between the
parties.
7
Only petitioner appeared at the investigation on November 5, 1992.
Nevertheless, the prosecutor found no evidence of collusion and
recommended that the case be set for trial.
8

Based on the evidence presented by the petitioner, the facts are as follows:
9

Petitioner and private respondent met in 1977 at the Philippine Christian
University in Dasmarias, Cavite. Petitioner, who is five years older than
private respondent, was then in her first year of teaching zoology and botany.
Private respondent, a college freshman, was her student for two consecutive
semesters. They became sweethearts in February 1979 when she was no
longer private respondent's teacher. On January 1, 1981, they were married.
Private respondent continued his studies for two more years. His parents
paid for his tuition fees, while petitioner provided his allowances and other
financial needs. The family income came from petitioner's salary as a faculty
member of the Philippine Christian University. Petitioner augmented her
earnings by selling "Tupperware" products, as well as engaging in the buy-
and-sell of coffee, rice and polvoron.
From 1983 up to 1986, as private respondent could not find a stable job, it
was agreed that he would help petitioner in her businesses by delivering
orders to customers. However, because her husband was a spendthrift and
had other women, petitioner's business suffered. Private respondent often
had smoking and drinking sprees with his friends and betted on fighting
cocks. In 1982, after the birth of their first child, petitioner discovered two love
letters written by a certain Realita Villena to private respondent. She knew
Villena as a married student whose husband was working in Saudi Arabia.
When petitioner confronted private respondent, he admitted having an extra-
marital affair with Villena. Petitioner then pleaded with Villena to end her
relationship with private respondent. For his part, private respondent said he
would end the affairs, but he did not keep his promise. Instead, he left the
conjugal home and abandoned petitioner and their child. When private
respondent came back, however, petitioner accepted him, despite private
respondent's infidelity in the hope of saving their marriage.
Upon the recommendation of a family friend, private respondent was able to
get a job at Reynolds Philippines, Inc. in San Agustin, Dasmarias, Cavite in
1986. However, private respondent was employed only until March 31, 1991,
because he availed himself of the early retirement plan offered by the
company. He received P53,000.00 in retirement pay, but instead of spending
the amount for the needs of the family, private respondent spent the money
on himself and consumed the entire amount within four months of his
retirement.
While private respondent worked at Reynolds Philippines, Inc., his smoking,
drinking, gambling and womanizing became worse. Petitioner discovered
that private respondent carried on relationships with different women. He had
relations with a certain Edna who worked at Yazaki; Angie, who was an
operator of a billiard hall; Tess, a "Japayuki"; Myrna Macatangay, a secretary
at the Road Master Driver's School in Bayan, Dasmarias, Cavite, with
whom he cohabited for quite a while; and, Ruth Oliva, by whom he had a
daughter named Margie P. Oliva, born on September 15, 1989 (Exh. E).
10

When petitioner confronted private respondent about his relationship with
Tess, he beat her up, as a result of which she was confined at the De la Salle
University Medical Center in Dasmarias, Cavite on July 4-5, 1990 because
of cerebral concussion (Exh. F).
11

According to petitioner, private respondent engaged in extreme promiscuous
conduct during the latter part of 1986. As a result, private respondent
contracted gonorrhea and infected petitioner. They both received treatment
at the Zapote Medical Specialists Center in Zapote, Bacoor, Cavite from
October 22, 1986 until March 13, 1987 (Exhs. G & H).
12

Petitioner averred that on one occasion of a heated argument, private
respondent hit their eldest child who was then barely a year old. Private
respondent is not close to any of their children as he was never affectionate
and hardly spent time with them.
On July 17, 1979, petitioner entered into a contract to sell (Exh. J)
13
with F &
C Realty Corporation whereby she agreed to buy from the latter a parcel of
land at the Don Gregorio Heights Subdivision I in Bo. Bucal, Dasmarias,
Cavite and placed a partial payment of P31,330.00. On May 26, 1987, after
full payment of the amount of P51,067.10, inclusive of interests from monthly
installments, a deed of absolute sale(Exh. K)
14
was executed in her favor
and TCT No. T-221529 (Exh. M)
15
was duly issued.
According to petitioner, on August 1, 1992, she sent a handwritten
letter
16
to private respondent expressing her frustration over the fact that her
efforts to save their marriage proved futile. In her letter, petitioner also stated
that she was allowing him to sell their owner-type jeepney
17
and to divide the
proceeds of the sale between the two of them. Petitioner also told private
respondent of her intention to fill a petition for the annulment of their
marriage.
It does not appear that private respondent ever replied to petitioner's letter.
By this time, he had already abandoned petitioner and their children. In
October 1992, petitioner learned that private respondent left for the Middle
East. Since then, private respondent's whereabouts had been unknown.
Ester Alfaro, petitioner's childhood friend and co-teacher at the Philippine
Christian University, testified during the hearing on the petition for annulment.
She said that sometime in June 1979, petitioner introduced private
respondent to her (Alfaro) as the former's sweetheart. Alfaro said she was
not impressed with private respondent who was her student in accounting.
She observed private respondent to be fun-loving, spending most of his time
with campus friends. In November 1980, when petitioner asked Alfaro to be
one of the secondary sponsors at her forthcoming wedding, Alfaro wanted to
dissuade petitioner from going through with the wedding because she
thought private respondent was not ready for married life as he was then
unemployed. True enough, although the couple appeared happy during the
early part of their marriage, it was not long thereafter that private respondent
started drinking with his friends and going home late at night. Alfaro
corroborated petitioner's claim that private respondent was a habitual
drunkard who carried on relationships with different women and continued
hanging out with his friends. She also confirmed that petitioner was once
hospitalized because she was beaten up by private respondent. After the first
year of petitioner's marriage, Alfaro tried to talk to private respondent, but the
latter accused her of meddling with their marital life. Alfaro said that private
respondent was not close to his children and that he had abandoned
petitioner.
18

On April 10, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision
19
dismissing the
petition for annulment of marriage filed by petitioner. The pertinent portion of
the decision reads:
20

The Court can underscore the fact that the circumstances
mentioned by the petitioner in support of her claim that
respondent was "psychologically incapacitated" to marry her
are among the grounds cited by the law as valid reasons for
the grant of legal separation (Article 55 of the Family Code)
not as grounds for a declaration of nullity of marriages or
annulment thereof. Thus, Article 55 of the same code reads
as follows:
Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may
be filed on any of the following grounds:
(1) Repeated physical violence or grossly
abusive conduct directed against the
petitioner, a common child, or a child of the
petitioner;
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of
the respondent;
xxx xxx xxx
(8) Sexual infidelity or perversion;
xxx xxx xxx
(10) Abandonment of petitioner by
respondent without justifiable cause for
more than one year.
xxx xxx xxx
If indeed Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines,
which mentions psychological incapacity as a ground for the
declaration of the nullity of a marriage, has intended to
include the above-stated circumstances as constitutive of
such incapacity, then the same would not have been
enumerated as grounds for legal separation.
In the same manner, this Court is not disposed to grant relief
in favor of the petitioner under Article 46, paragraph (3) of
the Family Code of the Philippines, as there is no dispute
that the "gonorrhea" transmitted to the petitioner by
respondent occurred sometime in 1986, or five (5) years
after petitioner's marriage with respondent was celebrated in
1981. The provisions of Article 46, paragraph (3) of the same
law should be taken in conjunction with Article 45, paragraph
(3) of the same code, and a careful reading of the two (2)
provisions of the law would require the existence of this
ground (fraud) at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
Hence, the annulment of petitioner's marriage with the
respondent on this ground, as alleged and proved in the
instant case, cannot be legally accepted by the Court.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which, on January 30, 1996,
rendered its decision affirming the decision of the trial court. Citing the ruling
in Santos v. Court of Appeals,
21
the Court of Appeals held:
22

It is clear in the above law and jurisprudence that the
psychological incapacity of a spouse, as a ground for
declaration of nullify of marriage, must exist at the time of the
celebration of marriage. More so, chronic sexual infidelity,
abandonment, gambling and use of prohibited drugs are not
grounds per se, of psychological incapacity of a spouse.
We agree with the Solicitor General that petitioner-appellant
failed to prove that her respondent-husband was
psychologically incapacitated at the time of the celebration of
the marriage. Certainly, petitioner-appellant's declaration that
at the time of their marriage her respondent-husband's
character was on the "borderline between a responsible
person and the happy-go-lucky," could not constitute the
psychological incapacity in contemplation of Article 36 of the
Family Code. In fact, petitioner-appellant herself ascribed
said attitude to her respondent-husband's youth and very
good looks, who was admittedly several years younger than
petitioner-appellant who, herself, happened to be the college
professor of her respondent-husband. Petitioner-appellant
even described her respondent-husband not as a problem
student but a normal one (p. 24, tsn, Dec. 8, 1992).
The acts and attitudes complained of by petitioner-appellant
happened after the marriage and there is no proof that the
same have already existed at the time of the celebration of
the marriage to constitute the psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Family Code.
Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that the respondent Court of
Appeals erred
I. IN FINDING THAT THE
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF THE
PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO COMPLY
WITH HIS ESSENTIAL MARITAL
OBLIGATIONS DID NOT EXIST FROM
THE TIME OF THE CELEBRATION OF
THE MARRIAGE.
II. IN RULING THAT PRIVATE
RESPONDENT WAS NOT
PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO
COMPLY WITH HIS ESSENTIAL MARITAL
OBLIGATIONS.
III. IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE
TRIAL COURT DENYING THE AWARD OF
PERMANENT CUSTODY OF THE
CHILDREN TO PETITIONER.
IV. IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE
TRIAL COURT DENYING THE PRAYER
FOR ISSUANCE OF AN ORDER
REQUIRING PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO
GIVE SUPPORT TO THE THREE
CHILDREN IN THE AMOUNT OF P3,000,00
PER CHILD.
V. IN NOT DECLARING THE REAL
PROPERTY ACQUIRED BY PETITIONER
AS HER EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY.
The issue in this case is whether or not the marriage of petitioner and private
respondent should be annulled on the ground of private respondent's
psychological incapacity.
Petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that petitioner
failed to show that private respondent's psychological incapacity existed at
the time of the celebration of the marriage. She argues that the fact that the
acts of incapacity of private respondent became manifest only after the
celebration of their marriage should not be a bar to the annulment of their
marriage.
Art. 36 of the Family Code states:
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest
only after its solemnization.
23

In Santos v. Court of Appeals,
24
we held:
"Psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be
truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68
of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help
and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment
of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological
incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality,
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
This psychological condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision,
upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have
sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit
under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children
conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void
marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of
marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound mind or
concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage
contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality
should occur only during the marriage, they become mere
grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family
Code. These provisions of the Code, however, do not
necessarily preclude the possibility of these various
circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree
and severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological
incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are
established, every circumstance that may have some
bearing on the degree, extent, and other conditions of that
incapacity must, in every case, be carefully examined and
evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is
peremptorily decreed. The well-considered opinions of
psychiatrists, psychologists, and persons with expertise in
psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desirable.
In the instant case, other than her self-serving declarations, petitioner failed
to establish the fact that at the time they were married, private respondent
was suffering from a psychological defect which in fact deprived him of the
ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and its concomitant
responsibilities. As the Court of Appeals pointed out, no evidence was
presented to show that private respondent was not cognizant of the basic
marital obligations. It was not sufficiently proved that private respondent was
really incapable of fulfilling his duties due to some incapacity of a
psychological nature, and not merely physical. Petitioner says that at the
outset of their marriage, private respondent showed lack of drive to work for
his family. Private respondent's parents and petitioner supported him through
college. After his schooling, although he eventually found a job, he availed
himself of the early retirement plan offered by his employer and spent the
entire amount he received on himself. For a greater part of their marital life,
private respondent was out of job and did not have the initiative to look for
another. He indulged in vices and engaged in philandering, and later
abandoned his family. Petitioner concludes that private respondent's
condition is incurable, causing the disintegration of their union and defeating
the very objectives of marriage.
However, private respondent's alleged habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity
or perversion, and abandonment do not by themselves constitute grounds for
finding that he is suffering from psychological incapacity within the
contemplation of the Family Code. It must be shown that these acts are
manifestations of a disordered personality which make private respondent
completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state,
and not merely due to private respondent's youth and self-conscious feeling
of being handsome, as the appellate court held. As pointed out in Republic of
the Philippines v. Court of Appeals:
25

The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint,
(c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in
the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological not physical, although
its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of
them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not
have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example
of such incapacity need given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis (citing Salaita v. Magtolis, supra) nevertheless such
root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and
its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence
may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
Moreover, expert testimony should have been presented to establish the
precise cause of private respondent's psychological incapacity, if any, in
order to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage. The burden of
proof to show the nullity of the marriage rests upon rests petitioner. The
Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and
strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage
as the foundation of the
family.
26
Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the
marriage.
27

We, therefore, find no reason to reverse the ruling of respondent Court of
Appeals whose conclusions, affirming the trial court's finding with regard to
the non-existence of private respondent's psychological incapacity at the
time of the marriage, are entitled to great weight and even finality.
28
Only
where it is shown that such findings are whimsical, capricious, and arbitrary
can these be overturned.
The conclusion we have reached makes it unnecessary for us to pass upon
petitioner's contentions on the issue of permanent custody of children, the
amount for their respective support, and the declaration of exclusive
ownership of petitioner over the real property. These matters may more
appropriately be litigated in a separate proceeding for legal separation,
dissolution of property regime, and/or custody of children which petitioner
may bring.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeal is AFFIRMED.
Ruiz vs. Atienza
CARPIO MORALES, J .:
Petitioners Integrated Bar of the Philippines
1
(IBP) and lawyers H. Harry L.
Roque and Joel R. Butuyan appeal the June 28, 2006 Decision
2
and the
October 26, 2006 Resolution
3
of the Court of Appeals that found no grave
abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Jose "Lito" Atienza, the then
mayor of Manila, in granting a permit to rally in a venue other than the one
applied for by the IBP.
On June 15, 2006, the IBP, through its then National President Jose
Anselmo Cadiz (Cadiz), filed with the Office of the City Mayor of Manila a
letter application
4
for a permit to rally at the foot of Mendiola Bridge on June
22, 2006 from 2:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m. to be participated in by IBP officers and
members, law students and multi-sectoral organizations.
Respondent issued a permit
5
dated June 16, 2006 allowing the IBP to stage
a rally on given date but indicated therein Plaza Miranda as the venue,
instead of Mendiola Bridge, which permit the IBP received on June 19, 2006.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed on June 21, 2006 before the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 94949.
6
The petition
having been unresolved within 24 hours from its filing, petitioners filed before
this Court on June 22, 2006 a petition for certiorari docketed as G.R. No.
172951 which assailed the appellate courts inaction or refusal to resolve the
petition within the period provided under the Public Assembly Act of 1985.
7

The Court, by Resolutions of July 26, 2006, August 30, 2006 and November
20, 2006, respectively, denied the petition for being moot and academic,
denied the relief that the petition be heard on the merits in view of the
pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 94949, and denied the motion for
reconsideration.
The rally pushed through on June 22, 2006 at Mendiola Bridge, after Cadiz
discussed with P/Supt. Arturo Paglinawan whose contingent from the Manila
Police District (MPD) earlier barred petitioners from proceeding thereto.
Petitioners allege that the participants voluntarily dispersed after the peaceful
conduct of the program.
The MPD thereupon instituted on June 26, 2006 a criminal action,
8
docketed
as I.S. No. 06I-12501, against Cadiz for violating the Public Assembly Act in
staging a rally at a venue not indicated in the permit, to which charge Cadiz
filed a Counter-Affidavit of August 3, 2006.
In the meantime, the appellate court ruled, in CA-G.R. SP No. 94949, by the
first assailed issuance, that the petition became moot and lacked merit. The
appellate court also denied petitioners motion for reconsideration by the
second assailed issuance.
Hence, the filing of the present petition for review on certiorari, to which
respondent filed his Comment of November 18, 2008 which merited
petitioners Reply of October 2, 2009.
The main issue is whether the appellate court erred in holding that the
modification of the venue in IBPs rally permit does not constitute grave
abuse of discretion.
Petitioners assert that the partial grant of the application runs contrary to the
Pubic Assembly Act and violates their constitutional right to freedom of
expression and public assembly.
The Court shall first resolve the preliminary issue of mootness.
Undoubtedly, the petition filed with the appellate court on June 21, 2006
became moot upon the passing of the date of the rally on June 22, 2006.
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable
controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon
would be of no practical use or value. Generally, courts decline jurisdiction
over such case or dismiss it on ground of mootness. However, even in cases
where supervening events had made the cases moot, this Court did not
hesitate to resolve the legal or constitutional issues raised to formulate
controlling principles to guide the bench, bar and public. Moreover, as an
exception to the rule on mootness, courts will decide a question otherwise
moot if it is capable of repetition, yet evading review.
9

In the present case, the question of the legality of a modification of a permit
to rally will arise each time the terms of an intended rally are altered by the
concerned official, yet it evades review, owing to the limited time in
processing the application where the shortest allowable period is five days
prior to the assembly. The susceptibility of recurrence compels the Court to
definitively resolve the issue at hand.
Respecting petitioners argument that the issues presented in CA-G.R. SP
No. 94949 pose a prejudicial question to the criminal case against Cadiz, the
Court finds it improper to resolve the same in the present case.
Under the Rules,
10
the existence of a prejudicial question is a ground in a
petition to suspend proceedings in a criminal action. Since suspension of the
proceedings in the criminal action may be made only upon petition and not at
the instance of the judge or the investigating prosecutor,
11
the latter cannot
take cognizance of a claim of prejudicial question without a petition to
suspend being filed. Since a petition to suspend can be filed only in the
criminal action,
12
the determination of the pendency of a prejudicial question
should be made at the first instance in the criminal action, and not before this
Court in an appeal from the civil action.
In proceeding to resolve the petition on the merits, the appellate court found
no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent because the Public
Assembly Act does not categorically require respondent to specify in writing
the imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil which warrants the
denial or modification of the permit and merely mandates that the action
taken shall be in writing and shall be served on respondent within 24 hours.
The appellate court went on to hold that respondent is authorized to regulate
the exercise of the freedom of expression and of public assembly which are
not absolute, and that the challenged permit is consistent with Plaza
Mirandas designation as a freedom park where protest rallies are allowed
without permit.
The Court finds for petitioners.
Section 6 of the Public Assembly Act reads:
Section 6. Action to be taken on the application -
(a) It shall be the duty of the mayor or any official acting in his behalf
to issue or grant a permit unless there is clear and convincing
evidence that the public assembly will create a clear and present
danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public
morals or public health.
(b) The mayor or any official acting in his behalf shall act on the
application within two (2) working days from the date the application
was filed, failing which, the permit shall be deemed granted. Should
for any reason the mayor or any official acting in his behalf refuse to
accept the application for a permit, said application shall be posted
by the applicant on the premises of the office of the mayor and shall
be deemed to have been filed.
(c) If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent and grave
danger of a substantive evil warranting the denial or modification of
the permit, he shall immediately inform the applicant who must be
heard on the matter.
(d) The action on the permit shall be in writing and served on the
application [sic] within twenty-four hours.
(e) If the mayor or any official acting in his behalf denies the
application or modifies the terms thereof in his permit, the applicant
may contest the decision in an appropriate court of law.
(f) In case suit is brought before the Metropolitan Trial Court, the
Municipal Trial Court, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the Regional
Trial Court, or the Intermediate Appellate Court, its decisions may be
appealed to the appropriate court within forty-eight (48) hours after
receipt of the same. No appeal bond and record on appeal shall be
required. A decision granting such permit or modifying it in terms
satisfactory to the applicant shall, be immediately executory.
(g) All cases filed in court under this Section shall be decided within
twenty-four (24) hours from date of filing. Cases filed hereunder shall
be immediately endorsed to the executive judge for disposition or, in
his absence, to the next in rank.
(h) In all cases, any decision may be appealed to the Supreme
Court.
(i) Telegraphic appeals to be followed by formal appeals are hereby
allowed. (underscoring supplied)
In Bayan, Karapatan, Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP) v. Ermita,
13

the Court reiterated:
x x x Freedom of assembly connotes the right of the people to meet
peaceably for consultation and discussion of matters of public concern. It is
entitled to be accorded the utmost deference and respect. It is not to be
limited, much less denied, except on a showing, as is the case with
freedom of expression, of a clear and present danger of a substantive
evil that the state has a right to prevent. Even prior to the 1935
Constitution, Justice Malcolm had occasion to stress that it is a necessary
consequence of our republican institutions and complements the right of free
speech. To paraphrase the opinion of Justice Rutledge, speaking for the
majority of the American Supreme Court in Thomas v. Collins, it was not by
accident or coincidence that the rights to freedom of speech and of the press
were coupled in a single guarantee with the rights of the people peaceably to
assemble and to petition the government for redress of grievances. All these
rights, while not identical, are inseparable. In every case, therefore, where
there is a limitation placed on the exercise of this right, the judiciary is called
upon to examine the effects of the challenged governmental actuation. The
sole justification for a limitation on the exercise of this right, so
fundamental to the maintenance of democratic institutions, is the
danger, of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to
public safety, public morals, public health, or any other legitimate
public interest.
14
(emphasis supplied)
The Court in Bayan stated that the provisions of the Public Assembly Act of
1985 practically codified the 1983 ruling in Reyes v. Bagatsing.
15
In
juxtaposing Sections 4 to 6 of the Public Assembly Act with the pertinent
portion of the Reyes case, the Court elucidated as follows:
x x x [The public official concerned shall] appraise whether there may be
valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public
place. It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the
clear and present danger test be the standard for the decision reached. If he
is of the view that there is such an imminent and grave danger of a
substantive evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter. Thereafter, his
decision, whether favorable or adverse, must be transmitted to them at the
earliest opportunity. Thus if so minded, they can have recourse to the proper
judicial authority.
16
(italics and underscoring supplied)
In modifying the permit outright, respondent gravely abused his discretion
when he did not immediately inform the IBP who should have been heard
first on the matter of his perceived imminent and grave danger of a
substantive evil that may warrant the changing of the venue. The opportunity
to be heard precedes the action on the permit, since the applicant may
directly go to court after an unfavorable action on the permit.1avvphi1
Respondent failed to indicate how he had arrived at modifying the terms of
the permit against the standard of a clear and present danger test which, it
bears repeating, is an indispensable condition to such modification. Nothing
in the issued permit adverts to an imminent and grave danger of a
substantive evil, which "blank" denial or modification would, when granted
imprimatur as the appellate court would have it, render illusory any judicial
scrutiny thereof.
It is true that the licensing official, here respondent Mayor, is not devoid of
discretion in determining whether or not a permit would be granted. It is not,
however, unfettered discretion. While prudence requires that there be a
realistic appraisal not of what may possibly occur but of what may probably
occur, given all the relevant circumstances, still the assumption especially
so where the assembly is scheduled for a specific public place is that the
permit must be for the assembly being held there. The exercise of such a
right, in the language of Justice Roberts, speaking for the American
Supreme Court, is not to be "abridged on the plea that it may be
exercised in some other place."
17
(emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Notably, respondent failed to indicate in his Comment any basis or
explanation for his action. It smacks of whim and caprice for respondent to
just impose a change of venue for an assembly that was slated for a specific
public place. It is thus reversible error for the appellate court not to have
found such grave abuse of discretion and, under specific statutory
provision, not to have modified the permit "in terms satisfactory to the
applicant."
18

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 94949 are REVERSED. The Court DECLARES that
respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in modifying the rally permit
issued on June 16, 2006 insofar as it altered the venue from Mendiola Bridge
to Plaza Miranda.
SO ORDERED.